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Teaching Strategy Michael W. Flamm From Testimony to Tragedy: My Lai in Personal Perspective Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/maghis/article/22/4/54/962344 by guest on 29 September 2021 n March 16, 1968, U.S. Private Dennis command immediately after they occurred, Conti personally witnessed the events and, if not, why not? Did senior officers Othat took place in the South Vietnamese conspire to cover up the killings? Should village of My Lai. As he later testified, he and the killings at My Lai be prosecuted as war rifleman Paul Meadlo were guarding a group of crimes? Was the eventual court-martial of prisoners—mostly women and children—when Calley justified, or did the U.S. Army turn Second Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., ap- him into a scapegoat after the incident be- proached them. According to Conti, Calley asked came known? Should the testimony against when he and Meadlo planned “to take care of Calley and Medina—not to mention their them.” Conti explained what happened next: own accounts of what happened—be con- “I said: ‘We’re taking care of them.’ And he sidered credible? Who, if anyone, was ul- [Calley] said: ‘I mean kill them.’ Meadlo fired timately responsible for what happened at awhile. I don’t know how much he fired, a clip, My Lai? Even after lengthy military court I think. It might have been more. He started to proceedings, the answers to these ques- cry, and he gave me his weapon. I took it, and he tions remain ambiguous at best. [Calley] told me to kill them. And I said I wasn’t While a number of officers faced charg- going to kill them. At the time, when we were es in this case, the court-martial of Calley, talking, the only thing left was children. I told in particular, caused a firestorm of protest. Meadlo, I said: ‘I’m not going to kill them. He After much testimony and considerable [Calley] looks like he’s enjoying it. I’m going debate, he was convicted in March 1971 of to let him do it.’ So like I said, the only thing the premeditated murder of twenty-two ci- left was children. He [Calley] started killing the vilians. Calley then received a sentence of children. I swore at him. It didn’t do any good. life in prison at hard labor, although it was And that was it. They were all dead. He [Calley] later reduced to ten years. Calley would be turned around, and said: ‘Okay, let’s go.’ We the only soldier convicted of killing South turned around, and walked away (1).” Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. On the written page, the words have a blunt Lt. William Calley outside the courthouse during his From the start, public response to the impact. When voiced by a young person, they court-martial trial, 1970. (Image courtesy of University verdict was mixed. Liberals maintained have an even more powerful—almost haunt- of San Diego.) during and long after the court-martial ing—effect that endures across decades. Why? that the mass killing at My Lai was not an In part, the horrific scene almost defies compre- isolated incident. More importantly, they hension. In part, the average age of a combat soldier in the Vietnam argued, the murders constituted a war crime in which all Americans War was only nineteen. And in part, with the United States once again were implicated. “We sense—all of us—that our best instincts are de- at war, many of the moral and military issues confronted in My Lai serting us,” wrote Jonathan Schell, a New Yorker columnist, “and we continue to resonate today. are oppressed by a dim feeling that beneath our words and phrases, Almost forty years later, what happened at My Lai remains contro- almost beneath our consciousness, we are quietly choking on the blood versial (2). American soldiers from a platoon commanded by Calley of innocents” (3). On the other hand, conservatives considered My Lai in Captain Ernest L. Medina’s Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th to be the tragic but predictable outcome of an ambiguous war in which Infantry Regiment of the 11th Infantry Brigade in the Americal Divi- communist guerrillas deliberately chose to operate among innocent sion massacred hundreds of South Vietnamese civilians, most of them civilians. They also condemned what the National Review described as women and children. Some soldiers raped some of the women before the “uncontrollable impulse not to blame the particular criminal, but killing them. When Ronald L. Ridenhour, a discharged veteran who rather to vilify America generally” (4). Considering the My Lai case to did not participate in the event, reported the episode over a year later, be an isolated incident, conservatives objected to the way in which the many questions arose: Were the soldiers following orders? If so, were media had rushed to judgment, exaggerated the event, and failed to those orders lawful? Were the killings reported through the chain of report countless Vietcong atrocities. Most applauded when Calley was 54 OAH Magazine of History • October 2008 Copyright © Organization of American Historians ▪ All Rights Reserved ▪ http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/ Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/maghis/article/22/4/54/962344 by guest on 29 September 2021 Photograph taken by U.S. Army Photographer Ronald L. Haeberle in the aftermath of the My Lai massacre. Killed by American soldiers, the victims of My Lai were mostly women and children. March 16, 1968 (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) paroled in November 1974. 3. Analyze the differences among historical, legal, and moral guilt. What follows is a teaching strategy designed to engage many of 4. Examine the issue of collective v. individual responsibility. the difficult moral, legal, political, military, and historical issues repre- sented in the My Lai incident. On Day One of the lesson, students will Procedures be introduced to the basics of military law. They will examine the brief- This simulation requires the use of James S. Olson and Randy Rob- ing conducted by Captain Medina prior to the operation and the orders erts, My Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, he gave to Lieutenant Calley during it. On Day Two, students will focus 1998). The instructor should either purchase a class set, have students on the actions and testimony of some eyewitnesses. On Day Three, buy the book, or place several copies on reserve in the library. Distrib- they will address whether or not American military leaders conspired ute the handout (located on page 57 below) a week or two in advance. to cover up the event, and who or what was ultimately responsible for Assign appropriate roles to individual students and explain to them what happened. that they must be prepared to put the testimony of their assigned wit- nesses into their own words. National Standards Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s) Day One Standard 2C: The student understands the foreign and domestic 1. Begin by discussing why Vietnam was such a difficult war for consequences of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. American soldiers. For background reading, see Ellen Frey-Wout- Standards in Historical Thinking: Historical Analysis and Interpre- ers and Robert S. Laufer, Legacy of a War: The American Soldier in tation Vietnam (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Library, 1989). Standard 3D: Consider multiple perspectives of various peoples in the past by demonstrating their differing motives, beliefs, in- 2. Discuss military law with specific reference to the Geneva Con- terests, hopes, and fears. ference and the Nuremberg Trials after World War II. For back- Standard 3F: Challenge arguments of historical inevitability by ground reading, see Norbert Ehrenfreund, The Nuremberg Legacy: formulating examples of historical contingency, of how different How the Nazi War Crimes Trials Changed the Course of History (New choices could have led to different consequences. York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007). Time 3. Review the concept of and specific ranks in the U.S. Army chain Three fifty-minute class periods. of command and emphasize that students should take this infor- mation into account as they take brief notes about the identity and Objectives testimony of each witness. They are also free to ask questions for 1. Evaluate the credibility of testimony. clarification. 2. Define the meaning of “war crime.” Copyright © Organization of American Historians ▪ All Rights Reserved ▪ http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/ OAH Magazine of History • October 2008 55 4. Using My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, explore the brief- Endnotes ing that Medina conducted the evening before the operation. Have 1. James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History with Documents the student representing Medina testify fi rst, followed by witnesses (New York: Bedford Books, 1998), 77-78. 2-5. What orders were given? How were they understood? 2. The My Lai controversy has generated many books. For relatively contemporary accounts, see Seymour M. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath (New York: Random House, 1970) and Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret 5. If time permits, discuss the issue of bias. Were some witnesses Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai (New York: Random House, 1971); more credible than others? Why? Martin Gershin, Destroy or Die: The Story of Mylai (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1971). For the fi ndings of the Peers Commission, the offi cial Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/maghis/article/22/4/54/962344 by guest on 29 September 2021 Day Two investigation, see The My Lai Inquiry (New York: Norton, 1979). For more 1. Review briefl y the previous day’s testimony.