Successes and Failures of the Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Program in Tamil Nadu, India

Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1199

Elizabeth Jordan1 and Amy Javernick-Will2

1 WASH Benefits Project Implementation Manager, Innovations for Poverty Action Kenya, +254 0704-268-504, [email protected] 2 Assistant Professor, Dept. of Civil, Environmental, and Architectural Engineering, University of Colorado at Boulder, 720-220-7220, [email protected]

ABSTRACT In recent years, recovery efforts following major disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami have highlighted the need to better understand what factors lead to the long-term recovery of communities. Previous studies have found wide variation in outcomes of reconstruction programs, and, while there have been increasing numbers of individual and small-n case studies of disaster recovery in recent years, there have been few broad comparative studies that explain long-term recovery outcomes. In this paper, we focus specifically on how strategic interventions following the tsunami, including community participation, construction oversight, recovery agency presence and embeddedness in the community, and recovery funds affected the success of housing recovery programs. To answer the question, “What post-disaster actions can aid community recovery following a disaster?”, we employed fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), to determine what recovery strategies led to successful post-tsunami housing recovery in communities Tamil Nadu, India. Data were collected through observations, interviews and documentation on recovery outcomes and suspected conditions that affected recovery in 15 villages. Based upon the analysis, the recovery agency’s embeddedness in communities, community participation during the recovery process, and agency oversight during reconstruction are necessary for successful housing reconstruction.

INTRODUCTION The Indian Ocean Tsunami was the result of an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, which occurred off the northern coast of Sumatra, Indonesia on December 26, 2004. The tsunami waves hit the southern and eastern coastal areas of India and penetrated inland up to 3 km, causing extensive damage on the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and in the coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and the union territory of Pondicherry. Over 150,000 houses were destroyed in India. Rebuilding these houses is an essential part of any recovery program and has been found to be the top priority of affected populations (Alam and Collins 2010). Housing reconstruction is also one of the most commonly used indicators of recovery (Jordan and Javernick-Will 2013), and it is linked to both the social and economic recovery of communities (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). Unfortunately, while recovery should improve a community’s resilience (Berke et al. 1993), it is clear that past post-disaster reconstruction projects have had differing levels of success (e.g. Finch et al. 2010). However, why communities recover differently from the same disaster is less well known and is compounded by a Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1200

dearth of long-term recovery studies (Rubin 2009). As a result, this study examines the long-term outcomes of the housing reconstruction projects in the Nagapattinam and Villipuram districts of Tamil Nadu and the post-disaster interventions that were associated with successful outcomes.

POINTS OF DEPARTURE There were wide variations in the recovery efforts throughout the tsunami- affected region of India. Journal articles and reports by recovery practitioners often emphasize how features of the recovery process influence outcomes; however, there has been little systematic analysis of what post-disaster strategies are effective, meaning that past mistakes are repeated (World Bank 2004). Therefore, in this study, we systematically consider five post-disaster conditions that are hypothesized to influence housing recovery: community participation, construction oversight, NGO presence, recovery agency embeddedness, and funds. We emphasize post-disaster actions because these can be altered during the post-disaster planning phase, unlike pre-disaster conditions. These were selected both based on their importance in the disaster literature and emergent themes during the interviews.

Community Participation There has been increasing attention to community participation in disaster recovery programs, with many now acknowledging that it is critical for sustainability of the reconstruction projects (Berke et al. 1993; Olshansky 2005). Practitioner agencies have also begun advocating for a community engagement approach (GFDRR 2010). However, many NGOs still have limited knowledge about how to incorporate community participation into post-disaster programs, and centrally planned, contractor-built housing is still widely applied (Davidson et al. 2007). In addition, there are wide gradations of community participation. Therefore, it is important to understand the extent to which the community participated and whether the community actually had control of the project or whether they were merely informed about existing plans (Arnstein 1969).

Construction Oversight There is a lack of research on the effect of oversight of post-disaster reconstruction; however, agencies such as the World Bank have found that the construction industry is particularly prone to mis-use of recovery funds (Wolfgang et al. 2005). And scholars have noted that when recovery efforts are performed by the private sector, there are opportunities for corruption at the expense of the affected population (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). Therefore, in this study we include a metric for oversight by the reconstruction agency.

NGO Presence Post-disaster NGO presence is a controversial factor. On one hand, disaster scholars argue that the presence of an NGO provides important recovery resources and can help build capacity in socially vulnerable communities (Wachtendorf et al. 2006). On the other hand, some disaster scholars argue that NGOs create a culture of dependency that may actually impede recovery (Rubin 1991). This side also argues Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1201

that the NGO focus on spending money quickly and visibly to satisfy donor requirements may not make the best use of resources (Boano 2009). Because it is not known whether the presence of an NGO facilitates or hinders recovery, we include this factor in our analysis.

Embeddedness Previous research on in the field of construction management has shown that projects conducted outside an organization’s home country face challenges due to differences in regulations, culture and social norms (Javernick-Will and Scott 2010). In a post-disaster setting, this ‘liability of foreignness’ is likely to be larger because there is pressure to complete projects quickly. Past research has found that a recovery agency’s local knowledge influences recovery strategies. For example, in a study of the 1993 earthquake in Maharashtra, Barenstein and Iyengar (2010) found that Indian NGOs were likely to take a participatory approach, while large international NGOs did not.

Recovery Funds Following the tsunami, both Indian and national donors provided large amounts of funds for both relief and recovery. While some scholars have shown that aid has a positive influence on recovery (Bolin 1993), others note that dependence on external aid can lead to negative long-term consequences (Olshansky 2005). In addition, large amounts of aid may have unintended effects. Overall, findings on the influence of funds on economic recovery have been mixed.

RESEARCH METHOD To determine which post-disaster interventions, combined or in isolation, lead to successful housing recovery we employed qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). We selected QCA because we wanted to gain in-depth knowledge about recovery processes in a limited number of communities in this study. It can be very difficult to measure recovery through purely quantitative data, yet generalization of results from such studies is difficult. As a result, we used fuzzy-set QCA, which provides a middle ground between case studies and statistical analysis through set theory and fuzzy logic. QCA first involves identifying a specific outcome of interest, in this case, housing recovery, along with conditions that are posited to affect that outcome, in this case the post-disaster interventions discussed above. Then, researchers purposefully select cases that vary across these dimensions and collect data. These data are then calibrated and summarized in a truth table. Patterns in this resulting data array are identified to highlight combinations of conditions that lead to a given outcome (Jordan et al. 2011).

Data Collection We collected data through observations, interviews and documentation in 15 rural, coastal villages affected by the 2004 tsunami in Tamil Nadu, India, shown in Table 2 below. Over a period of five months, we conducted 106 semi-structured interviews with village leaders and community members about the recovery process and their current housing. We ensured that multiple respondents representing Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1202

different genders, age ranges and community roles were interviewed in each site. An independent translator was used to conduct all interviews in the local language, Tamil. Interviews were recorded and transcribed unless the respondent had an objection, in which case we took extensive notes. We also observed and recorded the current housing conditions, first assessing what portion of the community was living in an improved, or “pucca” house, and then assessing the quality, including checks for concrete cracking and erosion.

Calibration Once the raw data for each outcome and condition were collected, we calibrated this data to fuzzy-set scores ranging from 0 to 1. A score of 0 represents a case that is fully outside the set and 1 represents a case that is fully in the set. Using operationalized measures for each condition and outcome, we coded the transcriptions and field notes into categories for each condition and outcome using NVivo® Version 10. We developed a coding guide, and two researchers coded the interviews independently to ensure reliability. We used NVivo to summarize the codes for each variable for each case. Based on the coding summary and our definition of the set, we assigned scores to each variable for each case. Any contradictions between statements from different respondents were resolved by considering biases and triangulating with other sources of data (Basurto and Speer 2012). An example of the codes and calibration measures for the outcome and one condition is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Calibration for Recovery Outcome

Variable Calibration Average of scores for housing type and housing quality Housing Type Housing Quality 0 less than 25% living in pucca 0 All are poor quality and defects (improved) houses interfere with the safety of the house 0.33 25%-49% living in pucca 0.33 Most houses have major defects, but (improved) houses houses are generally safe 0.67 50%-74% living in pucca 0.67 Most houses are in good quality, with (improved) houses minor defects observed Housing Recovery Recovery Housing 1 greater than 75% living in 1 All good quality, no major defects and pucca (improved) houses very few minor defects

Analysis Following the collection and calibration of the data for each case, we assembled a truth table, which is a table containing the scores for each condition and outcome for each case, as shown in Table 2. fs/QCA® software was used to analyze the truth table. Minimization of the truth table results in logical equations describing the pathways to an outcome, in this case, housing recovery. The usefulness of these pathways is generally measured with two metrics: consistency and coverage. Consistency measures the degree to which cases with a given set of causal conditions exhibit the outcome, generally required to be at least 0.8. Coverage measures the degree to which a given pathway explains the cases analyzed, indicating the relevance of each causal “recipe” (Ragin 2008). We also determined whether individual Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1203

conditions were either necessary or sufficient for the outcome. Necessity is a measure of the degree to which the outcome is a subset of the causal condition, meaning nearly all instances of the outcome show the condition. In contrast, sufficiency provides a measure of the degree to which the causal condition is a subset of the outcome, meaning that the condition nearly always results in a positive outcome, even though it may not be necessary.

Table 2: Truth Table

Community Name Participation Oversight Embedded- NGO Funds Housing ness Recovery Ambedkar Nagar (Nagai) 0.21 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.78 0 Ambedkar Nagar (Vil) 0.93 0.33 0.33 0 0.61 0.33 Anumandhai Kuppam 0.51 0.67 1 0.33 0.06 0.67 Boomaiyarpalayam 1 0.89 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.33 Chinnamudaliya 0.2 0.45 0.33 0 0.56 0.67 Kuppam Kallar 0 0.45 0 1 0.98 0.33 Keelamoovarakari 0.36 0.22 0.67 0.67 0.04 0.33 Keezhpettai 0.7 0.33 1 0.33 0 0.33 Koomimedu Kuppam 0.34 0.57 0.19 0.33 0.49 0.33 Pappakoil 0.2 0.45 0.67 0.67 0.95 0 Tharangambadi 1 1 1 1 0.89 1 Thethi 0 0 0 0.67 0.95 0 Vasavan Kuppam 1 0.81 0.87 0.33 0.5 1 Viluthamavadi North 0.41 0.56 0.67 1 0.78 0.33 Viluthamavadi South 0.44 0.55 0.67 1 0.96 0.67

RESULTS & DISCUSSION This analysis described above, together with out in-depth knowledge of the communities, allowed us to determine what post-disaster actions aided housing recovery within the communities studied. As shown in Table 1, housing recovery is measured on the basis of the types of housing in each of the 15 communities and the quality of that housing at the time of the visit. Of the fifteen communities, five achieved successful recovery, while ten did not. We began by examining the necessity and sufficiency of each condition individually, as shown in Table 2. This revealed that oversight, embeddedness and participation are usually necessary for successful housing recovery, while NGO presence and recovery funds are of less importance. The low sufficiency scores indicate that none of these conditions alone are sufficient for housing recovery, indicating that multiple post-disaster interventions must be in place. As a result, we analyzed how these conditions combine to achieve housing recovery. We found a single combination of post-disaster factors that led to this outcome, as shown: embeddedness and community participation and oversight. The consistency of this pathway is 0.90 and the coverage is 0.74. This pathway explains three of the five recovered communities, while a fourth has a membership score of 0.44, indicating that it is very close to inclusion in this pathway. The fifth, Chinnamudaliya, did not have strong participation or embeddedness, but it had high quality housing prior to the tsunami, which likely explains its successful recovery. Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1204

Table 3: Necessity and Sufficiency Scores for Post-Disaster Actions

Post-Disaster Action Necessity Sufficiency Oversight 0.90 0.72 Embeddedness 0.85 0.64 Participation 0.81 0.70 NGO Presence 0.68 0.52 Recovery Funds 0.65 0.48

Recovery Agency Embeddedness There were a variety of types of agencies involved in the recovery process in Tamil Nadu, including international NGOs, national and state governments, and local NGOs. For example, in Tharangambadi and Vasavan Kuppam, the reconstruction was undertaken by a local NGO that had already been active in the area prior to the tsunami. While neither of these NGOs had previous disaster recovery experience, they were sensitive to the local needs. In particular, they ensured that housing was only relocated a short distance so that social ties and access to livelihoods were unaffected. However, in other communities, an international NGO performed the reconstruction without knowledge of the local culture and traditions. In villages such as Kallar, this led to negative outcomes such as relocation to an inappropriate site, which led many community members to reject the new housing and rebuild traditional thatch structures in their old location. Highly embedded agencies were also more likely to use a participatory approach during reconstruction and maintain oversight of the construction process.

Community Participation While the post-tsunami reconstruction generally followed a contractor-driven approach, the NGOs and government agencies responsible for reconstructing houses took varying approaches to engaging the community. We asked each respondent to describe how the community was involved in the housing reconstruction program, and allowed specific attributes of participation to emerge. The most common forms of participation mentioned were: attending meetings with the reconstruction agency, giving feedback on the house design, performing small construction tasks, and monitoring the construction quality.

Housing Allocation A key aspect of participation was whether the reconstructing agencies allotted housing plots prior to the start of construction so that community members could participate throughout the construction process. In many communities, members were only allotted a specific house after construction was completed. Without knowledge of which house would be theirs, the community’s ability to be involved in reconstruction was limited.

Involvement in Housing Design In some communities, beneficiaries were allowed input into the housing design. Community input was particularly important when reconstruction was being undertaken by foreign agencies that were unfamiliar with traditional housing culture. For example, minor changes such as a prayer room, outdoor access to the toilets and community open spaces were important to communities in Tamil Nadu (Arlikatti and Andrew 2012). In Tamil Nadu, many families were not using the newly constructed toilets because they were unhappy with its proximity to the kitchen and eating areas. In most cases, design input was limited to a public meeting in which the community was shown proposed housing plans and suggestions were taken for alterations. However, in many communities, the beneficiaries did not want to suggest any changes because they worried that changes might slow the reconstruction process. As one community member stated: People in the village were very desperate because they were living in temporary shelters, so all they needed was a house to stay. They were not very particular about the type of design or the architectural or interior work… All they were interested was they wanted to receive a house. So they did not speak much about the design of the house. (Viluth. South) However, in Tharangambadi four complete model houses were constructed and each family was able to select which of four models they preferred. This enabled the community to completely understand what the final house would look like. In this village, the majority of people are using their toilets. It should be noted, however, that this process added to the construction time, with houses handed over in 2009. Community Construction Monitoring In addition to the design, some community members were deployed to oversee the quality of the construction work. Monitoring by the local population could be very effective in ensuring that the construction was done according to building standards. However, effective monitoring relied on knowledge of construction methods. For example, in one community, respondents stated that they had formed a committee to oversee the construction, but did not understand what to look for. The committee did not have adequate knowledge on construction process. They did not know about cement sand mixture or the quality…they couldn’t understand what was going on… and the construction has been finished improperly. (Ambedkar Nagar, Naga) Therefore, it was also important that the community members received some amount of training prior to the start of construction. To ensure that beneficiaries had some construction knowledge, beneficiaries in Ambedkar Nagar, Villipuram received a booklet describing the house and appropriate construction practices, as shown in Figure 1. These booklets contained simple pictorial representations of key guidelines, which was important considering the high illiteracy rates in the affected communities. This information enabled the community members to compare progress of their own houses again the design standards. In the interviews, it was clear that participation played a role in how satisfied people were with their housing. Respondents in some communities blamed the poor quality of the housing on their inability to be involved, while those who were Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1206

involved reported feeling a greater sense of ownership and satisfaction with their new house.

Construction Oversight Because the post-tsunami shelter reconstruction program introduced a new technology on a wide scale, it was particularly important to ensure that the construction met quality standards. In some communities in this study, the NGO was present throughout the construction program while in others the NGO outsourced the entire project to a local contractor and rarely visited. Throughout the interviews, there were repeated reports of corruption by the local contractors responsible for construction, and oversight by the contracting agency was critical for ensuring high- quality construction and appropriate outcomes. As we discussed previously, oversight by the community members was often used. In some communities, the NGO explicitly told the community members that they should oversee the construction. However, in other communities, the beneficiaries took the initiative and attempted to act as a replacement for supervision by the reconstruction agency. For example, one respondent who had some prior knowledge of construction practices stated: In the absence of the PDA site supervisor, the local community who are aware of the construction process, they will visit the site. (Viluthamavadi North) Despite the active role played by many community members, it was necessary to have a representative of the reconstruction agency available to combat corruption problems. Multiple respondents reported being afraid to complain directly to contractors because they feared retribution and would rather receive a poor quality house than no house at all. When the implementing agency was available in the community regularly, community members could report problems to them, and they would make contractors rectify their mistakes. If the contractor did not put the good quality… five bags of cement, they only put the three bags, like that or some other problem, they go and tell to the government supervisor…He will go to the contractor, “why you doing like this, the house owners telling like this”…After they complain, they do the work correctly. (Ambedkar Nagar, Villipuram) Reinforced concrete houses were a new technology for most people affected by the tsunami in Nagapattinam and Villipuram. This means that many beneficiaries were unaware of how to rectify any problems. Therefore, it was also important that the reconstruction agency made post-handover follow-up visits to ensure that any problems were being addressed appropriately. In some villages, the follow-up visits rectified defects in the construction. Soon after the completion of the houses during the rains many houses had leaking ceilings…So the DPG organization, what they did is they came to the houses where leakage was there and they rectified it.” (Viluth.South)

Combined Conditions Each of these three conditions was individually necessary, but none alone was sufficient for recovery, indicating the importance of multiple post-disaster strategies. Construction Research Congress 2014 ©ASCE 2014 1207

For example, in Boomaiyarpalayam, the beneficiaries of new houses participated and the implementing agency performed regular oversight. However, because the recovery agency was not local, the housing allocation process did not take into account the needs of the entire population. Because of this, many people were left without a new house and instead rebuilt basic thatch structures. In contrast, in Tharangambadi and Vasavan Kuppam, the locally based NGO worked with the community members, with both beneficiaries and employees of the recovery agency performing oversight. In both of these communities, nearly everyone was living in a high quality concrete house built. This study considered only a single recovery outcome: the type and quality of rebuilt housing. Full recovery should also encompass social, economic and risk reduction outcomes. In addition, here we only consider what post-disaster actions influence recovery. Prior work has shown that pre-existing social, economic and infrastructural conditions in a community can influence its recovery. Therefore, future work should focus determining how combinations of pre-disaster conditions and post- disaster strategies affect recovery outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS This research demonstrates the importance of post-disaster strategies for successful long-term recovery outcomes. We determined that recovery agency embeddedness, oversight and community participation are all important for successful housing reconstruction. In general, recovery funds and the presence of an NGO were less important. Therefore, it is important that recovery agencies look beyond funding to improve post-disaster recovery and engage communities on the reconstruction process. And, while local agencies may not have the capacity to undertake all recovery activities, it is important that foreign NGOs develop local partnerships, engage the community and maintain oversight throughout reconstruction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This material is based in part on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1200422. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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