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Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice '63 Pcttigrcw. T. F. (1979). lhc ultirnale altrihulion enor: hending Allport's cognitive analysis of '$rcjudicc. I'r~sonali~nnd Srwial Psycholngv Bulkrin. 5. 461-476. Implicit Stereotyping and kelifisch. J hl. ( 1958). A wale for personality rigidit:,. Journal oJCnnsulrin~Ps.vc-holnxv. 22. 10- 15. Prejudice Rchson. B IIPX). January). Prick and prejudice. MplslSc Paul. pp. 42-51. 130-136. Sanbonmatsu. D. M.. Shemian. S. I.. & Hamilton. D. L. (1987). Illusory corrclali~inin the pcrcep- In M.P. Zanna & J.M. Olson (Eds.), (1994: lion of proups and individuals. Sncial Cognirion. 5. 461-476. Schmidt. I). F., & Boland. S. M. (1986). S~mclureof pcrceplions of older adulls: Evidence for The Psychology of Prejudice:----- The multiple slcrcotypes. l'sych~~lo~yand A,qin~.1. 255-260. Ontario Symposium-. (Vol. 7, pp. 55-76). Shavitt. S. (1989). Functional imperative theory. In A. R. Pralkanis, S. I. Brccklcr. & A. G. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Grrcnwald (rds.). Arrirudr, wucrurr und /rtrr(.rion (pp. 31 1-337). Ilillsdale. NJ: lawrence Erllla~lniAsscriarcs. Shcrif, M . & Sherif. C. W. (1953). Gmup in hurmrmv untl rrnsion: An inrrgrarion ojsrudirs on Mahzarin R. Banaji inrrr,qn~uprr1arion.c. New York: Harper. Yale University Sidanius. J (in press) The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dontin;rnce perspective. In W. McGuire & S lycnpar (Eds.). Current oppn~uchrs10 pc11itic.al Anthony G. Greenwald p.rvrhdn~vIMlsdalc. NJ: lawrence Erlhaum Asstriatcs. University of Washington Smith. M. I$.. Druncr. J. S.. & White. R. W. (1956). Opinions andprrsonality. New York: Wilcy. Snydcr. ht ( 1987). Public. upprrir(rnrrslpri~~rereulirirs: Thr ps~chnk~pcf sel/-monirnrin. New York: 1:rccrnan. Snyder. M (1988. August). Nerds and goals. plans and moriws: The new "new Irwk" in person- alirvand ~orialpcyrholo,qy.Address prcsenled at the annual meeting of the Anicrican I'sycholopi- cal Asscriation. Atlanta. GA. The world Gordon Allport wrote about in The Nulure of Prejudice provided Snydcr. M. (1992). Molivational kwndations of behavioral confirmalion. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.). impressive illustrations of prejudice and discrimination-of lynchings and the Advrrnc-rr in Erprrimrnrol 5c11ial f~vCho/o,q~(Vol. 25, pp. 67- 114). Orlandti. FI.: Acadcn~ic KKK, of religious persecution and Nazism, of political repression and Mc- Pres. Carthyism. In contemporary American society. such overt expressions are vaslly Snydcr. M.. B DcBono. K. <;. IIYHY). Undcrs~andingthe functions of attiludcs: Lessons from diminished. although even superficial analyses reveal thai disturbing expressions personality and scwial hchavior. In A. R. Pratkanis. S. J. Rrecklcr, & A. G. Grcenwald (Eds.). Afrirrrrlr .srrwrure crnd fitnilion (pp. 339-359). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlba~tmAssnciales. of prejudice and resulting inequities are pervasive. All sciences of society recog- Snydcr. hl . & Ickes. W (1985). Personalily and social behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson nize that inequities in access to human rights and justice significantly track (Eds. 1. Thr hunrlhool r,f soc rtil p.cu.hoby' (3rd cd.. Vol. 2. pp. 8x3-947). New York: Random demarcations of social categories (e.g.. racelethnicity. gender, socioccononiic I~~Iu~c. class, religion). and conspicuous challenges to barriers that prescrve systems of Snydcr. hl . & Mienc. P. K. (in prep ). Srrrrr~rvpin~rfrlic elderl~:Afunc~ric~nal u11pn)uc.h. Univcr- discrimination have recently been proposed (see. Galbraith. 1983; MacKinnon, sily 111 Minncsola. Minneapolis. h~c.('.. A I.asscur. D. (I'rtwluccrs & 1)irectcm). I IOcH)). Rrwrrd tlcrfe with Uill hlciycrs ID~KII- 1989; Sen. 1985; Thompson. 1992). nir~~tarylNcw York: hlystic Fire Video. In approaching the 21st century. it is tinicly for social psychology ~o'dcliae 'lylor. 11. A,. & Moriarty. El. I: (1987). Inlerproup hias as a function of competition and race. and. as necessary. refine the theoretical. empirical, and applied considerations of Jo~~ndojConflicr Resoli~f~on.31, 192- 199. research on the nature of prejudice. One such refinement. we believe. is lhe Tlw tlr~illof poverty. (19%). August). Ilurprr's Mqp:inc. p. 22. exploration of the unconscious1 operation of stereotyped belicfs. prejudicial IJhaw White union. (1992, March 6). hfinnrsc~faL)uilv. p. 1. U lifts While union han. (1992. March 9). Minne.roro Dcrilv, p. I. attitudes. and discriminatory behavior. With greater ease than the social psychol- Wilkcrson. 1. (1991. Novc~ilber10) Duhuquc confrwts prejudice amid cross-buniings lear. Min- ogist of Allport's time, contemporary social psychologists can identify and ap- nrupc11i.c Star Trihune. p. 6A. Wills. T. A (1981). Downward strial coniparison principles in social psycholcipy P.rvt~holo,qic.ul ITerminology. The lcrm unconxious is used to rcfcr to prcrcsscs or evcnls ti1 which the actor is B~dlrrrn.W). 245 271. unaware. Wo senses of the lcrm unconscious have been idcnrified to refer lo (a) processes that occur outside of allenlion (prealtentivc) and (b) processes thr~arr unrcplrrahle or nvt accurately rcportahlc (see Bargh, 1989; Grccnwald, 1992). In this chapter. it is largely thc second wnse or the lcrlrr unconscious that is invoked in our discussions of implicir slcrcolyping and dixritninalion. We borrow the term implicil from recent research on memory in which that term dexrihcs cllcc~sattribuled to unreportable residues of prior experiences (see Richardson Klavchn & njork. I9RX: Rwtligcr. lYW Schacter. 1987). 56 ~ANAJIAND GREENWALD prcciate the powerful influence of indirect, subtle, and seemingly innocuous TABLE 3.1 expressions of stereotypes and prejudice (c.g., Bcm & Ucm, 1970; Brewer. Deflnl!lons of Stereotyper and Slereotyplng 1988; Croshy. Bromley. & Saxe. 1980; Devine, 1989; Dovidio. Evans. & Tyler. 1986; Fiske, 1989a; Geis. in press; Perdue & Gurtman. 1988; Pratto & Bargh. A Emph.uis on lnacwracy of hdgrnent 199 1 ; Snyder. 198 1; Word, Zanna. & Cooper. 1974). Yet, current theories and 'A stereotype is a tixed ImpreJslon. whlch conform, wry Iltlle to the fad it pretends to represent. measurement techniques largely ignore the potential unconscious operation of and results tom wr definlng first and obdngsecond' (Kah 6 Brdy. 1935. p. 181). this fundamental evaluation system (see the analysis of this point by Greenwald, '... a stereotype Is an exaggeraled belU assoclaled with a category' (Allport. 1954. p. 191). 1990). 'An ahnlc stereotype b a generallutlon nude about an ethnk grwp, concerning a bal In this chapter, our concern lies chiefly with the unconscious operation of altrlbutlon, dchh considered to be un)urtl(bd by an observer (Brigham. 1971. p. 13). beliefs about social groups in judgments of individual members of the group. 'A genernllzatlon about a grwp of people that dlslingulshes lhosr paopb from others. namely. unconscious stereotyping. We cannot deny the important advances in the Stereotypes can ba wergensrailzed. Ituccurate, and resistant to new Information' (Myers 1990. understanding of stereotyping and attitudes that has resulted from the almost exclusive consideration of their conscious operation. Explicit theoretical atten- tion to unconscious processes. however, is necessary if discoveries of their 8. Emphasls on Categorization In Judgment increasingly prominent role in cognition is to be integrated into theories of social '... a categorkai response. 1.8.. membership is sufficient to evoke the judgment that the slimulus judgment. The central goals of this chapter are to: (a) argue that examinations of person possesses ail the attributes belonging to that categorf (Secord. 1959. p. 309). stereotyping and prejudice can be profitably pursued by focusing on their uncon- 'A stof beliefs about the personal altrlkrbs of r group of people' (Ashmore 6 Del Boca. 1981. scious operation, (b) identify recent empirical effects of unconscious stereotyp- p. 16). ing by locating their causal role in biases in perception and memory, and (c) 'In stereotyping. the Individual: [I) catogwlzes othar Individuals, usually on the basis of highly propow that the pervasive nature of such unconscious influences calls for more vkible chnracleriblu such u sex or race 12) atlributm a set of chuactalslla 0 dl msmben of radical corrective procedures than are generally acknowledged. If stereotyp- that category; and (3)altrlbutes that set of charaderislics to any individualmember of that' category' [Snyder. 1981. p. 183). ing and discrimination operate outside of conscious awareness. changing con- sciously held beliefs may be ineffective as a corrective strategy. 'Stereotypes. the cognilive component of grwp antagonism. are belief$ about he personal atMbutes shard by people in a parllcular group or soda1 categorf (Sears, Peplau. Freedman, 6 To accomplish these goals. we examine the involvement of unconscious cog- Taylor. 1988. p. 415). nition in stereotyping, discuss the role of implicit memory in revealing stereo- '. .. a collectionof associatiomthat link a target grwp to a set of descriptive characteristics' types, provide evidence from our recent research on implicit gender stereotypes (Gaerlner & Dovldio. 1986, p. 811. and others' research on implicit race stereotypes. and speculate about the impli- '... a cognitive structure that contains the percelver'r knowledge. beliefs, and expectancies about cations of implicit stereotyping for producing social change and the role of some human group' (Hamillon 6 Troiier. 1986. p. 133). intention and responsibility in social action. 70stereotype Is to assign Idanllfd chuacbrislics to any person h a grwp, regardless of
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