The American Political Science Association APSA Volume 14, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2016 In This Issue CD The Promise and Perils of Democracy Assistance in “Democracy Aid Authoritarian Regimes in Challenging Sarah Bush, Temple University Contexts” n 2006, Thomas Carothers wrote a Foreign Affairs article titled “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” which documented how authoritarian leaders
1 Editorial Board Note were pushing back against democracy assistance through a variety of legal and Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. extralegal tactics in the wake of the Colored Revolutions.1 The trend Carothers identified Lindberg I has only intensified in the decade since he wrote that article, as shown by a recent and 1 The Promise and Perils of Democracy Assistance in comprehensive analysis of restrictions to foreign funding for domestic civil society Authoritarian Regimes Sarah Bush organizations. In this analysis, Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash found that 2 1 Contextualizing Democracy 39 low- and middle-income countries had adopted laws restricting foreign funding. The Promotion Julia Leiniger 2 The Paradox of Democracy Aid 1. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,”Foreign Affairs 85 (March/April 2006): 55-68. to Closed Autocraces Anna Lührmann 2. Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid 2 Democracy Aid in the Middle to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries,” World Development: forthcoming. On East Erin A. Snider how authoritarian governments resist democracy assistance or use repression to stymie democracy assistance, see also: 3 Election Observers and Electoral Darin Christensen and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs,” Journal of Democracy Fraud Sarah Brierley and George 24 (April 2013): 77-91; Jesse Dillon Savage, “Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” Journal of Ofosu Conflict Resolution: forthcoming; Alberto Simpser and Daniela Donno, “Can International Election Monitoring Harm 3 Democracy Promotion and Governance?,” Journal of Politics 74 (March 2012): 501-513; Inken von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance: Political Polarization Johannes Who Seeks and Receives Technical Election Assistance?,” Review of International Organizations 11 ( June 2016): 247-282. Bubeck and Nikolay Marinov 24 Section News (click to continue on page 5) 30 New Research 36 Editorial Committee Contextualizing Democracy Promotion Julia Leininger, German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik From the Editorial Board t is uncontested that democracy promotion’s prospects for success depend on its political context. Most studies agree that domestic factors are the main drivers Amidst the current global authoritarian advance, political of democratization despite of international actors’ relevant influence on these conditions for democracy aid are processes.I However, two major flaws remain, which make it difficult to generalize the becoming increasingly challenging. influence of contextual factors on the process and effectiveness of democracy promotion. In many countries, democracy First, generalizable patterns of context conditions are not yet identified in quantitative and promoters face the resistance of ever qualitative research. Second, most researchers focus on genuinely political factors such as more self-confident authoritarian type of regime, state fragility or political event, but turn a blind eye on social, cultural and incumbents and their international global factors. In the following, I argue that democracy promotion can better be understood allies. State fragility and civil war and explained if research sheds light on blind spots ranging from societal individual (micro) further impede international to cultural, political and spatial (macro) contexts of democracy promotion. An additional efforts to support democracy. Thus, “blind spot” concerns the ethical responsibilities of research on democracy promotion. I doubts about the effectiveness of conclude with implications for conceptualizing context factors in the study of democracy democracy aid are spreading. promotion.
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The Paradox of Democracy Aid to Closed Autocracies Anna Lührmann, University of Gothenburg
hrough democracy aid, governments and international organizations seek to promote democratic norms and institutions across the world. According to OECD figures, between 2002 and 2012, donors spent 106 billion USD on aid for democracy, rule of law and governance.1 At the same time, Thomas Carothers – a leading expert onT the subject of democracy aid– cautions that all international actors can do is speed up “a moving train.”2 Based on this logic, we would expect democracy aid mainly to target countries where transition processes are already set in motion. Indeed, countries in transition - such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Afghanistan - and those in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy - such as Nigeria – are key recipients of democracy aid.
However, many democracy aid projects target closed autocracies such as China, Jordan, Eritrea and North Korea. This is surprising. Unlike more competitive autocracies or hybrid regimes, rulers of closed autocracies demonstrate their firm determination to non-democratic rule by not subjecting themselves to multi-party elections and substantially restricting the space for civil society. In closed autocracies, the train has not yet left the station, and date and time for departure are not set yet. Hence, it seems paradoxical that such regimes allow democracy aid activities within their territory and that democracy aid providers chose to target such regimes. The declared aim of democracy aid is to contribute to democratization - understood here as the gradual improvement of civil and political rights. If such aid would be effective, it could threaten the regime’s very existence.
1. Own calculation based on aid data at the project level from the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/; accessed on June 16, 2016). All data and project examples used in this text are based on this source. The figures are disbursements in constant 2013 USD.
2. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999): 304. See also Judith Kelley, “International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States,”Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 203-220.
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Democracy Aid in the Middle East Erin A. Snider, Texas A&M University
n the last year, scholars and practitioners of democracy aid have devoted renewed attention to a global decline in democracy. Advocates for such aid, especially in the wake of the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world, have also called for the expansion of democracy aid funding in response to retractions in political and civil rights worldwide. This renewedI focus is an opportunity for scholars engaged in research on democracy aid to step back and reflect on how we study democracy aid and to revisit and critique assumptions on how we think it works in practice. The reflections that follow in this brief essay draw from my own research on US democracy aid in the Middle East over the last decade. Questions of power and security form an inherent tension and often contradiction with the expressed goals of democracy promotion and few regions underscore this more than the Middle East. While scholars have acknowledged the conceptual challenges and normative dimensions embedded within democracy promotion, they remain underexplored. In this essay, I argue that neglecting them in our work impedes our ability to build deeper knowledge about the micro politics of such aid and to understand the parameters and possibilities in restrictive states. I begin by highlighting some methodological and conceptual challenges to studying democracy aid. I then discuss how I address these challenges in my book manuscript on the political economy of democracy aid in the Middle East. I conclude with thoughts on the way forward for scholars studying democracy aid in challenging contexts drawn from my research in the region.
Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Democracy Aid Over the last fifteen years, the question of whether international actors can promote democracy is one that has drawn significant scholarly interest. This interest reflects the elevated attention and position that democracy aid programs have assumed within the foreign policies of western governments and the growth of actors such as for and not for profit organizations, aid
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Election Observers and Electoral Fraud Sarah Brierley, University of California, Los Angeles George Ofosu, University of California, Los Angeles lection observation - the deployment of trained personnel to monitor the compliance of political parties with electoral laws - has become a prominent feature of polls in countries across the world. Observers are usually deployed by multi-national organizations (international observers) or by local civil society groups (domestic observers). International election observers were present in 86 percent of the national elections organized in 95 E 1 newly democratic, or competitive authoritarian regimes, between 1989 and 2002. Today, domestic election observation groups are active in at least 60 countries.2
The main purpose of election observers is to detect and deter electoral fraud and violence. Do observers achieve this goal? At the national level, establishing the causal effect of observers on fraud is difficult because governments usually self-select into the treatment (i.e. allow themselves to be monitored). In this case, an association between observers and low levels of fraud does not prove observers reduce fraud, because the countries that choose to have observers may have cleaner elections to begin with compared to countries that are not open to observers. Similarly, within countries, if civil society groups deploy observers to historically troublesome regions, a comparison of outcomes at monitored and unmonitored polling stations may underestimate observers’ impacts.
1. Eric Bjornlund, Beyond free and fair: Monitoring elections and building democracy (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004).
2. See http://www.gndem.org/members for a complete list of members. (click to continue on page 19)
Democracy Promotion and Political Polarization: Evidence from a Novel Data Collection Effort Johannes Bubeck, University of Mannheim Nikolay Marinov, University of Mannheim hen do outside powers decide to promote democracy abroad? When do they interfere in the electoral process by targeting resources towards certain candidates? Were the commitment to the international norm of encouraging free and fair voting serious and unyielding, it would amount to a force for democratization to be reckoned with. Unfortunately, even admirers of the West’s commitment to W 1 2 liberal values would agree that reality is far from this ideal. In a new working paper, we offer an argument, based on a game-theoretic model, to explain why outsiders adopt the strategies they do in the elections of others.
Our model of democracy promotion starts from a formal model of elections with bias. We argue that scholars need to distinguish between processes, the “how” of elections, and parties competing in them, the “who”. Given a certain degree of domestic support, parties compete for office. But whether they win or not, is also a function of the electoral process and the amount of resources spent on influencing their domestic electorate. The model produces predictions on three quantities of interest: amount and mix of resources invested by the outside power, incumbent vote share, and compliance with democratic rules. A further contribution of our approach is the ability to offer results on how “election wars” – conflictual investments by outsiders with competing agendas – change elections.
1. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 1999); Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
2. Johannes Bubeck and Nikolay Marinov, ”Process or Candidate: The International Community and the Demand for Electoral Integrity” Available at SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2774467, 2016.
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deserve more scholarly attention. As a multi- and The contributions together provide a relatively field work in political science, ethical challenges and bilateral phenomena implemented in domestic comprehensive account of what we know about best practices. contexts, democracy assistance often falls between democracy aid, and also demonstrate that scholarly the rags of International Relations and Comparative engagement with the practice of democracy Again, let’s be thankful for the work these lead Politics. We believe that scholars of comparative promotion can be fruitful in terms of providing editors and the many colleagues making important democratization can provide vital insights to better some guidance to real world issues. It will contributions to our community. understand – and potentially adjust – democracy hopefully inspire more students of comparative support efforts. In particular, systematic studies democratization to pay increasing attention to this If the membership and the executive board will based on in-depth understanding of the causes and important topic. renew our mandate beyond next year’s meeting, we consequences of democratization are needed, in are ready at our end to continue the work with the order to capture the varying effects of international Anna Lührmann, Issue Editor Newsletter in 2018/2019. interventions. We hope to spur further engagements with such topics of direct societal relevance, beyond It seems to me that the past year’s issues of our As advertised in the last issue and through my the narrow focus of commissioned studies. Newsletter have naturally come to reflect recent message at the Business Meeting at APSA, I have developments in the world, where democracy is also decided to continue the practice of rotating This issue of the APSA-CD Newsletter explores being challenged in many parts of the world. For members in and out of the editorial committee for the challenging political contexts of providing aid a number of years now, we have as a community the NL. I have found that to work well: At least to support democracy. In the opening article, Sarah started to worry more about what seems like in my mind, new blood, new ideas, new networks Bush outlines the key conceptual debates and authoritarianism spreading again. The debate of scholars continue to enrich the Newsletter as a challenges related to democracy aid in authoritarian about whether backsliding is real or just apparent consequence. contexts. This is followed by Julia Leininger who continues (e.g. Journal of Democracy’s first issue of argues that several blind spots, such as lacking 2016) but the concern seems legitimate when big, Thus, I would like to again recognize outgoing attention to political attitudes and local norms, globally important countries such a Russia, Turkey, members Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Kelly mare both the practice and the study of democracy and Bangladesh record negative developments. In McMann, and Brigitte Seim, for their selfless promotion. Europe, we register the worrying explicit calls for service on the editorial board and for their great illiberal “democracy” heard in Hungary with similar contributions. The subsequent articles depict differentexpositions in Poland and the Chzech Republic. methodological approaches to investigate the I would also like to welcome the new members: conditions shaping the outcomes of democracy We are very grateful to the 26 colleagues authoring Rachel Sigman, Constanza Petrarca, and Steven aid in such challenging contexts empirically. contributions to expand our understanding of Wilson - all three new postdocs in the V-Dem Based on recent OECD data, Anna Lührmann authoritarianism and the threats to democracy Institute, Department of Political Science at scrutinizes the paradox of democracy aid to closed during the past year – too many to recite here, University of Gothenburg. autocracies. The main argument is that direct aid but the 15 excellent pieces in those 3 issues were to public administrations is unlikely to enhance graciously gifted to our membership. Thank you! These three were joined already in May by democratization whereas civil society support Ellen Lust, who as Professor at University of may lay the ground for future transition processes. The coming year’s issues will hopefully signify Gothenburg has founded a Governance and Local Erin Snider provides a critical analysis of U.S. coming, more positive changes in the world. The Development research program here, and her two democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East current Fall 2016 issue focuses on democracy aid in postdocs, Adam Harris and Kristen Kao. drawing on extensive field research and interviews. challenging contexts, when it works and how, with Her findings suggest that such programs shy away Anna Luhrmann as lead editor. It has some good I am really excited about the, partly new, constellation from challenging ruling elites in the region. Sarah news – it can work. and feel confident that we will be able to serve the Brierley and George Ofosu present results from a community with a high-quality newsletter also field experiment in Ghana, indicating that domestic The Winter 2017 issue will provide some positive going forward. As always, we naturally welcome election observers are successful in reducing perspectives on state building and democratization any suggestions for symposia and other things. electoral fraud and voter intimidation. Finally, with Rachel Sigman as the lead editor. Spring 2017 Nikolay Marinov and Johannes Bubeck reason takes us to the new exciting ways of measuring Last but not least, and thankfully, Melissa is still here that influences of non-democratic international democracy and its very detailed component parts - she is the one that really makes the Newsletter! actors may impede the effectiveness of democracy with new methodologies, in an issue where the lead promotion efforts. editor is Kyle Marquardt. We even have the Fall Staffan I. Lindberg, Executive Editor 2017 issue scheduled where Allen Hicken will be guest editor with pieces on what we know about
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increasing barriers placed on democracy Figure 1: Total U.S. Democracy Assistance 1990- 2003 by Polity2 Level assistance by non-democratic governments in countries such as Ethiopia, Jordan, Russia, and Venezuela during the 21st century raise important questions: How do democracy aid providers operate in authoritarian regimes? How should they operate?
In this essay, I begin to answer those questions by outlining key points in the debate about whether and how it makes sense for international donors to pursue democracy assistance in authoritarian contexts. For the purposes of this discussion, I define authoritarian regimes as those regimes in which political leaders – specifically, the executive, the legislature, or both – are not chosen via free and fair elections with at least a minimal level of suffrage.3 On the one hand, authoritarian countries are arguably the places where democracy than $10 billion per year is now spent thought to have played an important assistance is needed most. Moreover, on democracy assistance activities, supporting role, such as Poland in some studies suggest that democracy which involve “thousands of projects” 1989 and Serbia in 2000 – suggest that assistance can play an important role in in “every country that has moved away donor governments ought to support fostering democratic transition in these from authoritarian rule, as well as most democracy assistance activities non- contexts by coordinating opposition countries living under dictatorship.”4 democratic states if they want to support movements and encouraging better This phenomenon has attracted democratization. elections, among other reforms. On the considerable recent scholarly interest, other hand, authoritarian environments with several comprehensive studies But to what extent is democracy present many challenges for the concluding that democracy assistance assistance focused on democratic successful design and implementation is correlated with improvements in transition in authoritarian states, as of democracy assistance. Democracy countries’ levels of democracy according opposed to democratic consolidation promoters ought to worry in these to general indices such as Polity in already democratic states? To answer contexts about whether they are and Freedom House.5 These studies’ that question, in Figure 1, I explore legitimizing authoritarian rule by findings – especially when combined patterns in the data from the Finkel, pursuing activities that do not challenge with noteworthy examples of successful Pérez-Liñan, and Seligson study of – or even cooperate with – authoritarian transitions away from authoritarian rule American democracy assistance cited rulers. After discussing these concerns, where the international community is above, which found a positive effect of I conclude the essay by suggesting 4. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25: Time democracy assistance on democracy. I several directions for future research to Choose,” Journal of Democracy 26 ( January 2015): plot the total amount of U.S. democracy 59-73. on democracy assistance in light of this assistance between 1990 and 2003 (in debate. 5. Although the United States is by no means the constant 2000 U.S. dollars) against the only important democracy assistance donor, it is the largest one, which is one reason why it has been the recipient country’s level of democracy Democracy Assistance in Authoritarian main focus of this literature. See Steven E. Finkel, according to the Polity IV data set. As Regimes: Opportunities Anìbal Pérez-Liñan, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The the figure illustrates, U.S. democracy Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy According to Thomas Carothers, more Building, 1990-2003,” World Politics 59 (April assistance – at least historically – has 2007): 404-438; James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, focused mainly on supporting the 3. See Carles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastian “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Rosato, “A Complete Data Set of Political Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988- consolidation of countries that have Regimes, 1800-2007,” Comparative Political Studies 2001,” International Studies Quarterly 55 (March already transitioned to democracy, 46(December 2013): 1523-1554. 2011): 47-69.
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which is indicated by relatively high or “tame” because they tend not to time, international aid programs may Polity2 scores (typically 5 or greater). challenge – or can even reinforce – also offer less tangible resources. For At the same time, it also shows that authoritarian rule.7 Programs supporting example, the presence of uncritical democracy assistance has been present improved local and national governance international election observers – who in authoritarian countries (i.e., those in non-democratic countries typically are often supported via multilateral and countries that have relatively Polity2 fall into this category since they often bilateral democracy assistance – could scores).6 Interestingly, the amount of involve close coordination between add legitimacy to flawed elections.9 U.S. democracy assistance given at each international donors and incumbent level of the Polity2 score between 1990 regimes. Not only do such programs Second, international and domestic and 2003 generally tracks the total generally avoid confrontation with non-governmental organizations number of states in the world at each incumbents, but they may also at times (NGOs) might be unable – and perhaps level of the Polity2 score over the same reinforce the status quo; for example, even unwilling – to pursue certain types time period. In other words, the relatively activities that reduce corruption or of challenging activities in authoritarian low amounts of democracy assistance improve accountability may decrease environments because of their survival given to states scoring between -5 and 5 the likelihood of popular protest instincts. NGOs often deem challenging on the Polity2 scale is related to the fact and therefore support the survival activities too risky for authoritarian that there are relatively few countries of incumbents. Similarly, incumbent regimes given the crackdowns against during the time period that actually regimes may be quite willing to welcome foreign-funded democracy assistance received those scores. democracy assistance programs that programs in Egypt and elsewhere. This are designed to support their limited dynamic is important to understand Democracy Assistance in Authoritarian procedural reform efforts, such as since NGOs play a key role in the design Regimes: Challenges holding elections or adopting quotas and implementation of many democracy As noted above, several important designed to incorporate women into assistance activities in authoritarian studies have found that democracy politics. These procedural reforms do settings. Often, they are the best placed assistance is positively correlated not necessarily undermine incumbents’ actors to pursue democracy assistance with democratization in recipient hold on power and may even dovetail activities that are not designed and states – even when authoritarian with their strategies for survival via implemented in cooperation with countries are included in the analysis. clientelistic elections, which means that incumbent authoritarian regimes. Yet democracy assistance also has its democracy assistance can reinforce the However, NGOs – especially given critics. In particular, some observers status quo instead of challenging it.8 the increased number of laws that have advocated for a more focused The cited studies suggest that, restrict their activities cited above – approach to democracy assistance in in authoritarian environments, often find it difficult to operate in which donors concentrate on sending international aid programs may authoritarian environments if they are aid to countries that are already in the offer incumbents valuable financial not cooperating with the government. process of transitioning to democracy. and technical resources that help Out of concern for their own survival, There are at least two types of concerns them avoid popular challenges. For these organizations may therefore about the effectiveness of democracy in example, parliamentary strengthening hesitate to pursue activities – such as authoritarian environments that should programs may enhance the technical support to civil society organizations, be considered. capabilities and public image of a dissidents, and political parties – that First, scholars have argued that parliament that is fundamentally an would undermine the incumbent authoritarian rulers are quite skilled authoritarian institution. At the same regime. Instead, they are more likely at manipulating democracy assistance to opt for tamer activities that will not in their favor. In my research, I have 7. Sarah Sunn Bush, The Taming of Democracy disrupt – or may even reinforce – the Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not described certain types of democracy Confront Dictators (Cambridge: Cambridge political status quo. assistance as “regime compatible” University Press, 2015). 9. Judith G. Kelley, “D-Minus Elections: The Politics 6. Democracy assistance data are from the Finkel, 8. On the prevalence of democracy promotion tactics and Norms of International Election Observation,” Pérez-Liñan, and Seligson study. Polity2 data are that involve close collaboration with incumbent International Organization 63(October 2009): 765- from Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity governments, see Simone Dietrich and Joseph 787; Christopher Walker and Alexander Cooley, IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and “Vote of the Living Dead,” ForeignPolicy.com, October Transitions, 1800-2015, Center for Systemic Peace, Democratic Change in Africa,” Journal of Politics 77 31, 2013, accessed on June 13, 2016, available at accessed on June 13, 2016, and available at http:// ( January 2015): 216-234. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/31/vote-of- www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. the-living- dead.
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Former democracy practitioner Melinda political processes, and the rule of attempt to understand the extent to Haring argues that international NGOs law. However, as the discussion above which the literature’s general American with field-based offices are particularly suggests, democracy assistance programs bias shapes our understanding of likely to tame their activities because vary considerably in terms of how easy democracy assistance’s tendency to be they have to cooperate with incumbent it is for incumbents to co-opt them. It relatively compatible with authoritarian regime.10 Citing examples from a will be important for future research to rulers. number of states in the post-Soviet account for variations in terms of how region, such as Azerbaijan, “where the tame democracy assistance programs Finally, research on democracy assistance U.S. government found serious fault are. Are tamer forms of aid less likely ought to grapple with a puzzle that the with the 2010 parliamentary elections to support democratic transition in recent phenomenon of authoritarian and then trained the winners,” she authoritarian states? restrictions on democracy assistance suggests that donors’ limited democracy raises: Why didn’t authoritarian assistance dollars would go farther in Second, more researchers should look at incumbents become suspicious of countries that are democratizing already. democracy assistance donors outside of democracy assistance earlier? My She refers to this as a “triage” approach the United States. Although the United research suggests that democracy to democracy assistance. Indeed, if States is the largest democracy assistance assistance is generally becoming tamer NGOs are deliberately seeking out donor and therefore merits special – or less confrontational – over time, non-confrontational approaches to scrutiny, relatively few cross-national which suggests that authoritarian rulers democracy promotion in authoritarian studies of aid effectiveness have focused should have been at least as suspicious of environments, then it will be difficult on other democracy donors. Given democracy assistance in its early days as for international donors to effectively the increasing availability of project- they are today. In retrospect, it appears support transition in these settings. level aid data, it will be important for somewhat strange that for much of the researchers to look beyond the United 1980s and 1990s, and even after some Directions for Future Research States – not only to the other traditional well-known early successes such as Future research on democracy assistance democracy donor states in Western Poland, international donors and NGOs in authoritarian settings might pursue Europe, but also to the newer democracy were allowed relative freedom to pursue several key areas, which promise to donors, such as in Central and Eastern democracy assistance activities in other help improve both our theories about Europe. One point that is consistently countries. Although it makes sense international pressure as well as made in the literature on democracy that sincerely democratizing countries policy decisions related to democracy promotion is that donor states’ strategic would have welcomed external support assistance. First, researchers should interests influence where and how they to help them with transitional processes, disaggregate democracy assistance and seek to aid democracy.11 We know that it remains unclear why more firmly examine which types of aid are more or foreign aid donors vary in the extent to authoritarian governments did not less effective in authoritarian regimes. which their national security interests pursue formal and informal measures The first generation of research on shape their decisions about economic that they have more recently adopted, democracy assistance – including many aid, with the United States being a which make it difficult for outside of the influential studies cited above – donor that is relatively likely to link aid actors to agitate for change within their understandably focused on the effects of to geopolitics. Future research should borders. Understanding this dynamic democracy assistance writ large, at best may shed valuable new light on how 11. For examples of studies that incorporate donor disaggregating democracy assistance states’ strategic interests, see: Bush (2015, 2016); authoritarian regimes engage with the into a limited number of categories Dietrich and Wright (2015); Daniela Donno, international community on issues Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors such as aid to civil society, governance, and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct (Oxford: related to democracy. 10. Melinda Haring, “Reforming the Democracy Oxford University Press, 2013); Finkel, Pérez-Liñan, Bureaucracy,” E-Note, June 2013, Foreign Policy and Seligson (2007); Susan D. Hyde, The Pseudo- Sarah Bush is an assistant professor of Research Institute, accessed on June 13, 2016, Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation available at http://www.fpri.org/article/2013/06/ Became and International Norm (Ithaca, NY: Cornell political science at Temple University. reforming-the-democracy-bureaucracy/. On other University Press, 2011); and Kelley (2009). On pertinent variations among international NGOs non-European democracy and democracy promotion, active in democracy assistance, see Sarah Sunn see: Tsveta Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Bush, “When and Why is Civil Society Support Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States ‘Made-in-America’? Delegation to Non-State Actors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); in American Democracy Promotion,” Review of Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy International Organizations 11 (September 2016): (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for forthcoming. International Peace, 2015).
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The programmatic approach proposed Figure 1: Public Support for Democracy by Level of Freedom 2010-2014 in this essay can help to better explain 100% democracy promotion as well as to guide practitioners. Some of these suggestions 90% are already part of our recent research 80% on democracy promotion at the German 70% Development Institute/Deutsches 60% Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 50% and the German Research Network 40% “External Democratization” while 30% others emerge from this research.1 20% DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY SUPPORT IN % 10% 0% The Micro-Context: Pay More Not Free Partly Free Free Total Attention to Individuals at Large High 76.4 78.66 84.05 79.92 Contesting democratic values and Medium 15.73 12.44 10.1 12.43 Low 7.86 8.9 5.84 7.66 norms has become the “new normal”. Democracy is under threat from within and from the outside. Autocrats Note: N=110,717 in 77 countries. Sources: World Values Survey Wave 6, challenge democratic norms openly in 2010–2014; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6. international fora. They pro-actively jsp), Afrobarometer Round 5, 2015 (http://www.afrobarometer.org/ promote repressive structures in other data/merged-data), Freedom House Average Scores, 2010–2015 (https:// countries while Western democracies’ freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores). international reputation and the global level of democracy decreased after in 2011, elite-centered approaches are respective country suggests that they 2014 to its lowest point since the end still the dominant analytical lens in are likely to feel free enough to take of the Cold War.2 Also within western the study of democratization and its a critical standpoint in the survey. societies, populist and nationalist promotion. But such a focus on elites’ There is a high correlation between leaders as Donald Trump in the contestation of democratic values is regime type and the perceived level USA or Viktor Órban in Hungary likely to mislead analysts of democracy of freedom of speech according to attack core democratic values such promotion. We should not assume that the Afrobarometer (e.g. more than 50 as political equality of all citizens. democratic values per se are contested. per cent feel completely free to speak To the contrary, according to various up in more democratic countries; An analytical focus on political elites sources as the World Value Survey or around 15 per cent say the same in less has become the common denominator the Afrobarometer popular support of democratic contexts). Democracy is of these studies. Authors argue democracy has never been as high in conceived to be the best alternative and that democratization and effective history as nowadays. Four fifth of the very relevant by 78 to 83 per cent of democracy promotion became more respondents in all world regions indicate the respondents amongst all religions difficult because these political elites that democracy is important for them and those who are non-religious. Only contest and refuse democratic values. or that they prefer democracy over Hinduism builds an exception with Although comparativists started to alternative types of a political regime, less than 70% favoring democracy study the relevance of social movements independent of the level of freedom and 16% indicating that democracy for the opening of authoritarian regimes in the respective country (Figure 1). has a very low relevance for them. in the aftermath of the Arab Spring Recent empirical research on the role
1. The German Development Institute/Deutsches Responses from authoritarian contexts of religious actors for democratization Institut fuer Entwicklungspolitik (www.die-gdi. might be biased because people in countries with different religious- de) is member of the “Research Network External might not feel able to respond openly majoritarian backgrounds backs Democracy Promotion” (http://www.external- democracy-promotion.eu/). and according to their political the argument that individuals convictions. However, a cross-check support democracy independent 2. Christine Hackenesch, “Not as Bad as it Seems? 3 EU and US Democracy Promotion Strategies Faces of the respondents’ assessment of the of their religious denomination. China in Africa,” Democratization 22 (Summer de facto political situation in their 3. Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy 2015): 419-437. Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global
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Figure 2: Religious Denomination and Support of Democracy anti-western discourse to call for more authentic political institutions, 100 90 often serving as democratic façades 80 for autocratic practices. But these 70 claims are not limited to the Global 60 South. Calls for more participative 50 and accountable democratic regimes 40 are also growing in Western societies. 30 20
DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY SUPPORT IN % 10 Promoting the “wrong” model of 0 Christian Muslim Buddhist Hindu Other None Total democracy has been frequently identified High 79.86 76.8 82.19 68.03 78.79 83.71 79.37 as one of the major obstacles for effective Medium 11.77 13.77 14.36 15.71 12.41 11.42 12.49 democracy promotion. Some scholars Low 8.37 9.43 3.45 16.26 8.81 4.87 8.14 argue that the “Western model” cannot be exported elsewhere. However, this Note: N=117,048 in 86 countries. Sources: World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010– finding lacks a solid empirical basis. 2014(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp), The process of democracy promotion Afrobarometer Round 5, 2015 (http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/merged-data). implies a constant contestation and (re-)negotiation of democratic models Democracy promotion’s success depends a crucial difference for the future between those who are involved in that on such general popular support for of open societies to understand process. Except for the literature on democracy. Democracy promotion better how democracy promoters liberal peacebuilding and international only has a chance to yield fruits if the can shape the formation of socialization (“localizing norms”) people in a recipient country are in individuals’ political attitudes. almost no research has focused on accordance with the idea of democracy. these local interactions between Neither scholars nor democracy The Cultural Context: Be Open for a democracy promoters and local elites.5 promoters themselves should fall into Re-Conceptualization of ‘Democracy We therefore know little about what the “cultural trap” and assume that Promotion’ kind of model or aspects of democracy specific cultural contexts are per se pro- If there is a general support for Western donors promote in practice. or anti-democratic as suggested in the democracy, another immediate question debate about the “clash of civilizations”. emerges: what kind of democracy? If we do not want to fall into the trap Liberal notions of democracy embrace of using stereotypes, we must engage Finally, there is an additional empirical individual freedom and are often in a more profound empirical analysis argument that makes the inclusion of linked to the idea of a market economy. of the cultural particularities of individual perspectives in the study Some political elites and protesters in democracy in non-western countries. of democracy promotion necessary in the Global South contest notions of This also implies a conceptual revision the future. Demographic change will liberal values associated with “western” of ‘democracy promotion’. The concept double the world population until culture, in particular individualism. of democracy promotion typically 2050 in the poorest – and often least Such challenges go hand in hand refers to an ‘external’ actor who aims at democratic – societies of the world. with ideas about non-western, locally influencing political processes inside a The political socialization of these genuine concepts of democracy.4 country from outside. However, I argue approximately 900,000 young “new Such ideas revolve around modes of that democracy promoters influence a arrivals” will be decisive for the future decision-making (consensus versus political regime from “within” and not of democracy. It will therefore make elections) or take the community from “without”. Democracy promotion Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Mirjam and not the individual as the basic does not start from scratch in a country. Künkler and Julia Leininger, “Religious Actors entity of society (community versus It is embedded in diplomatic relations in Democratization. Evidence from Five Young Democracies”, Democratization 16 (December 2009): individual). Some autocrats use this with local presence and makes part 1058-1092. Preliminary results of an ongoing project of the latter authors on “Religion in the Fourth Wave 4. Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western 5. For more research on the interaction in democracy of Democratization” also indicate that (pro- and Democracy (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for promotion see http://www.external-democracy- anti-democratic) political theologies only matter if International Peace, 2015). promotion.eu/. political institutions mediate these theologies. 9 Vol. 14, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2016
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of a larger and mostly longstanding deficiencies in all three dimensions.7 global urban population is likely to live. cooperation portfolio. In short, For instance, where the legitimacy of If we want to catch up with these international actors are in most cases the state decreases drastically – as in empirical trends in the study of interwoven with the recipient regime the dawn of the Arab spring of 2011 – a democracy promotion, we must shift and co-constitute its political culture. destabilization of the political regime is our attention to other units of analysis. Only an “inside-out perspective” likely. Comparative case studies showed Research can help to build scenarios to opens the black box of interactive evidence that democracy promotion in identify opportunities and challenges conceptual politics in democracy states with limited state capacity and of urbanization for successful promotion and allows for integrating decreasing state legitimacy is likely to democracy promotion such as the cultural factors more systematically.6 be effective – at least if international potential for political mobilization donors impose coordinated political and new social media in urban areas. The Political Context: Identify Patterns conditionality. As a consequence for Furthermore, urbanization is likely of (Fragile) Statehood the study of democracy promotion, to cause problems such as increasing More scholarly attention than to we need more efforts to systematize social inequality between the urban individual and cultural factors has been the relationship between (fragile) and rural areas or by creating new paid to state fragility and political statehood and democratization in cleavages within huge cities. Such conflict in the context of democracy comparative empirical analyses. social inequalities will shape future promotion. Most of these studies assume opportunities for democracy promotion. that democratization fosters conflict and The Spatial Context: Change Your that successful democracy promotion in Focus of Interest to Urban Spaces Ethical Perspective: Be Aware of the contexts of fragile statehood is unlikely. As seen above, when studying Shrinking Space of (Academic) Civil However, efforts to systematically democracy promotion, most scholars Society study fragile contexts were very limited refer to political context as macro- We have been observing a “shrinking in the past. Identifying patterns and structures such as political regimes, the space” for free action and assembly different intensities of fragility would state and geographical regions. These of civil society at a global scale in be an important factor to better judge units of analysis shape data-collection recent years. Legal regulation of non- the effects of democracy promotion. and analysis. However, such units are state actors such as NGOs or civic A research team at the German likely to become less important in the associations has become one of the Development Institute/Deutsches shadow of structural, global changes. standard toolkits of autocrats and to- Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) According to the United Nations the be-autocrats. They use legal regulations found that the effects of international global urban population is likely to to punish, demobilize and repress those support to democracy are likely to vary increase from almost 4 billion in 2014 who are perceived as threats to the according to the pattern of state fragility to 6.5 billion in 2050 due to internal survival or stability of a political regime. in which international interventions migration from rural to urban areas This trend has severe implications take place. Based on a typology of and by demographic change. Such for the planning and implementation fragile statehood developed at DIE demographic and migration dynamics of research but also for research we clustered countries according to will change urban infrastructure and partners in non-democratic contexts. three dimensions of statehood: capacity alter the dynamics of political rule and (provision of basic life chances), regime change. Mass-based collective Empirical research on democracy authority (control of violence) and actions in cities might facilitate political promotion is data-driven. Access to legitimacy (citizens’ trust in the state). mobilization and boost modernization primary sources depends on cooperation It finds that four groups of fragile states but could also foster political instability with local research partners, open- can be empirically distinguished: three and lead to an increase of violence in access state institutions and good groups each with serious deficiencies in urban areas. These trends will be most relations with local authorities and mainly one out of the three dimensions prominent in Africa and Asia, where associations. Cooperation with local of statehood, and one group with by 2050 almost three quarters of the research partners and authorities in 7. Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja, and Merle a context of shrinking space for civil 6. Julia Leininger, “‘Bringing the outside in’: Kreibaum, “Disaggregating State Fragility: A society implies more responsibility illustrations from Haiti and Mali for the re- Method to Establish a Multidimensional Empirical conceptualization of democracy promotion” Typology,” Third World Quarterly 36 (December of international researchers and of Contemporary Politics 16 ( January 2010): 63 – 80. 2015): 1281-1298.
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their funding organizations. While light on the effects of democracy influence political regime change. international researchers can choose promotion, but does not substitute for an Third, spatial transformation requires to leave a country when civil space is analysis of democratic institutions and a re-focus of the unit of analysis from shrinking, local research partners have collective behavior. Although we know purely state centered foci to urban spaces. no choice in most of the cases. State that attitudinal change is a precondition Analytical approaches of multi- authorities are likely to hold them of democratic consolidation we do not level governance and social network responsible for controversial research know how democracy promotion analysis will help to capture such results. Hence, researchers studying influences the formation of political spatial and migratory dynamics. democracy promotion should be aware attitudes.8 Given massive demographic of the consequences of their research change and at least 900 000 additional Fourth, awareness for the political and take responsibility for their actions. young people on earth until 2050 more nature of the empirical study of democracy knowledge is needed on how democratic promotion is important – and potentially Conclusion: Implications for the attitudes can be pro-actively shaped. even life-saving – for researchers in Future Study of Democracy Promotion repressive regimes. Research results I have identified five sets of individual, Second, the study of democracy feed into strategies of democracy societal, cultural, political and spatial promotion can contribute to identify promoters. Hence, the research process factors that will help to identify patterns different models and concepts of non- indirectly influences the space of civil of democracy promotion’s context. Such western democracy. This is of particular society in countries of the Global South. patterns serve to better understand and importance because the model of liberal Scholars of democracy promotion explain democracy promotion in the democracy has been contested in the are therefore “part of the political future. Four implications for a future Global South. Analyzing the interaction game” and have to take responsibility research program emerge from these between local and internationally for their actions that goes beyond observations on contextual factors. promoted concepts of democracy can the publication of research results. further inform the conceptualization First, through studying the influence of of varying types of democracy. At the Julia Leininger is Head of Department societal and cultural factors on political same time, a conceptual distinction “Governance, Statehood and Security” attitudes and, in turn, of political of political regimes and the state at the German Development Institute/ attitudes on institution-building and can help to identify if and how Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik on the behavior of political elites in different patterns of state fragility (DIE). Her reserach focuses on political (de-)democratization, we can learn transformation in Africa, peace studies 8. For more information see the webpage of DIE’s more about regime change in general project “What is democracy’s value? The Influence and religion in politics. She lectures at and how democracy promotion could of Values on the Effectiveness of Democracy the universities Duisburg-Essen and Promotion” (https://www.die-gdi.de/en/research/ challenge autocrats. Such actors- projects/details/what-is-democracys-value-the- Konstanz. The author would like to thank centered approaches can help to shed influence-of-values-on-the-effectiveness-of- Daniel Nowack for his support to collect democracy-promotion/).
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What Is Democracy Aid and Who Figure 1: Total Aid for Democracy, Rule of Law and Governance by Level of Receives It? Electoral Democracy (V-Dem) Leading scholars have included aid for governance and rule of law in their measures of democracy aid. For example, in their widely cited study on U.S. democracy aid, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Mitchell A. Seligson have counted aid to rule of law, governance, civil society, human rights, media and elections as democracy aid. Sarah Bush, Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright proceed similarly, but with global scope.3
Donors themselves tend to use narrower definitions of democracy aid. For example, USAID does not subsume all governance or rule of law- related activities under the label of Note: DRG= Democracy, Rule of Law and Governance; democracy aid, but explicitly refers to Source: Author calculation with data from V-Dem and OECD. this sector as “democracy, rule of law and governance.” This makes sense. It is clearly serve primary purposes other legislatures and political parties. debatable if and to what extent aid for than enhancing democratization. For governance and rule of law contributes example, the United States included Figure 1 depicts the total amount of aid to democratization particularly in large-scale counter-narcotics and law for democracy, governance and rule of closed autocracies. Scholars argue that enforcement programs in countries such law – 106 billion USD - across political effective state administrations and the as Mexico, Afghanistan or Colombia as regimes (dashed line). 25% of that total rule of law are key or even a prerequisite aid in the sector of “legal and judicial amount is core democracy aid (26.8 for democratization. However, we also development.” Evidently, such projects billion USD). The figures shown here have evidence that strengthening the are less likely to directly contribute to include aid provided by all donors based public administration does not directly democratization than aid allocated to on the records of the OECD database contribute to democratization– if at all. civil society or elections – or might on official development assistance. Dictators also use their state apparatus even have counter-intended effects. Earlier studies have often focused on for repression and cooptation. Hence, US democracy aid. While the United even if international support to these For conceptual and analytical clarity, I States is the largest single donor of sectors might have some long-term therefore follow the USAID approach democracy aid, other donors account benefits for democratization, such and disentangle democracy aid from for more than two thirds of all aid for benefits might be out-weighted by aid for governance and rule of law. Aid democracy, rule of law and governance counter-intended paybacks for the for governance and rule of law includes from 2002 to 2012. Hence, in order to ruling elites. Furthermore, donors projects in the realm of public sector gain a comprehensive picture of such labeled and reported activities as aid for and administrative management, public aid, we need to move beyond analyzing governance and rule of law, which finance, legal and judicial development, the US engagement only. 3. Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and anti-corruption and decentralization Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign and subnational governance. As indicator for political regime, I Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003,” World Politics 59 (April 2007): 434; Sarah Bush, Democracy aid is limited to activities use the Electoral Democracy index The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy targeting key institutions and processes from the new Varieties of Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators (Cambridge: of democratic governance such as data set (V-Dem).4 Based on Robert Cambridge University Press, 2015): 57; Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation elections, democratic participation and 4. The V-Dem project has compiled a data set on Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa,” Journal of civil society, human rights, media, 400 different aspects of democracy with the help of Politics 77 ( January 2015): 222. more than 2600 expert coders from the entire world.
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Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, this Closed autocracies receive 15% of could be that democracy aid has become index aggregates relevant expert- overall aid for democracy, governance “tame” – to use Sarah Bush’s words - coded V-Dem indictors - such as clean and rule of law, a total of 15.9 billion and tends not challenge authoritarian elections, full suffrage and freedom between 2002 and 2012 (see black line rule.7 This notion resonates with of association - to a continuous index on Figure 1). In closed autocracies comparative studies shedding light of electoral democracy ranging from – as defined here - the head of on the difference between de-jure 0 (not at all achieved) to 1 (fully executive is not subjected to multi- and de-facto democratic institutions. achieved). The V-Dem Index distributes party elections and/or the space for Many authoritarian governments observations over the full spectrum of civil society substantially restricted. have introduced de-jure democratic its scale as illustrated by grey bars on Other scholars – for example Andreas institutions such as elections and Figure 1. Conversely, on the widely Schedler - have used the notion of parliaments but manipulation, used Polity Indicator, most observations closed autocracies to refer to countries repression and clientelism restrict their are clustered in the higher or lower that do not hold multiparty elections implementation in practice. Staffan end of the spectrum (see Sarah Bush’s for the head of the executive. However, Lindberg and others have argued that contribution in this newsletter). Hence, from my perspective, the mere holding such institutions may nevertheless the V-Dem index reflects nuances of of multiparty elections is not a contribute to democratization provided regime characteristics better and hence sufficient criterion for some degree of that rulers allow for some degree of allows highlighting of and analyzing openness of a political regime, because openness. However, scholars such the grey zone between democracy and many governments hold multiparty as Ellen Lust and Andreas Schedler autocracy more thoroughly, which is elections while severely restricting warn that in highly repressive political a considerable advantage particularly space for civil society. Therefore, in contexts – in particular without for understanding allocations patterns my operationalization, in order to lose multiparty elections for the head of of democracy aid. As discussed above, their status as closed autocracy, political the executive – de-jure democratic we expect democracy aid to be mainly regimes need to hold multiparty institutions such as parliamentary allocated to the grey zone where neither elections for the head of the executive elections are unlikely to contribute to democratic nor autocratic regimes are and exert not more than moderate the subversion of authoritarian rule. fully established. In line with these control over civil society. Based on the Conversely, such institutions may expectations, aid for democracy, rule operationalization of this definition help dictators to stabilize their rule by of law and governance peaks in such with V-Dem data, between 2002 and refining legitimation and cooptation hybrid regimes with scores on the 2012, 42 countries qualified as closed strategies.8 The same might apply for V-Dem index between 0.35 and 0.65.5 autocracies such as Jordan, Rwanda, democracy aid. The expert coders are typically academics from the Sudan, Eritrea, Tajikistan (from 2004) respective country and are recognized experts on 6 a specific sub-set of V-Dem indicators. To ensure and Belarus (from 2005). Therefore, it seems puzzling that reliability of the indicators, five expert coders per democracy aid providers would target country are typically assigned to each indicator and What Kind of Democracy Aid Do also record their confidence in their assessment. These 7. Sarah Bush, ibid. ratings were then aggregated based on a Bayesian Closed Autocracies Receive? ordinal item response theory model – which takes One reason why dictators may allow 8. Potential democratizing effects of elections are the reliability of individual coders into account - to analyzed in Staffan I. Lindberg (Ed.),Democratization the point estimates used in the regression analysis of democracy aid within their borders by Elections: A New Mode of Transition (Baltimore: paper. For further details see Micheal Coppedge, John the Allocation of Democracy Aid” (Unpublished Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). In particular, Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Manuscript, 2016). in this edited volume take note of Ellen Lust- Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Okar’s analysis of legislative elections in hegemonic M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl 6. The lack of direct or indirect multiparty elections authoritarian regimes (p. 226-245) and Andreas Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, for the head of the executive is indicated by a score Schedler’s critical discussion on the limited role of Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, of 1 or 0 on the applicable V-Dem indicator (see elections in hegemonic and closed autocracies (p. Frida Andersson, Valeriya Mechkova, and Farhad FN 6) on multiparty elections (v2elmulpar_ord). The 291-314). On authoritarian institutions see Jennifer Miri. “V-Dem Codebook v6” (V-Dem Institute, head of the executive is either the head of state or Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections under 2016) and Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L Marquardt, the head of government, depending on who is more Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political Science Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang. “The V-Dem powerful, as identified in the V-Dem variable hosw. 12 (2009): 12: 403-422; Jennifer Gandhi, Political Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Closed civil society space is indicated with a score of Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Expert-Coded Data.” V-Dem Working Paper 21 0 (“monopolistic control”) or 1 (“substantial control”) Press, 2010); Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian (V-Dem Institute, 2015). on the V-Dem indicator capturing the control of Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Andreas government over entry and exit of civil society Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining 5. For further discussion, Agnes Cornell and Anna organizations (v2cseeorgs_ord). and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford Lührmann, “The Role of Democracy Levels for University Press, 2013).
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Figure 2: Share of Total Aid for Democracy, Governance and Rule of Law Therefore, such aid is likely to support per Sector 2002-2012 in Closed Autocracies the status quo and not to challenge the incumbent regime. Conversely, one might expect that independent NGOs could use democracy aid to create a push for democratization. However, in recent years the romanticized image of NGOs as champions of democratic norms has somewhat suffered. In particular in the restricted context of closed autocracies, we can find many Government Owned NGOs (GONGOs) that are only pro- forma independent entities, but in reality controlled by the government. Furthermore – as Sarah Bush argues convincingly - many increasingly professionalized NGOs avoid challenging ruling elites in order to not to risk losing their contracts and permissions to work, which are their 10 Note: The category “Other core DA” includes aid for women equality (2.7%), media main source of income. Hence, (2.3%) legislatures and political parties (0.6%). “Other” includes aid for decentralization NGOs receiving democracy aid in (4.9%) and anti-corruption (0.7%). Source: Author calculation with OECD data. closed autocracies might not have the incentives to do their best to such political regimes. Donors governance and rule of law tends to enhance democratization. The Eritrea might in fact pursue aims different be granted more frequently directly National Association of the Blind, from democratization when giving to the recipient government or other for example, received 117 000 USD democracy aid, such as stabilization, public sector entities. Conversely, from the Norwegian government in fighting terrorism or opening channels NGOs are more often the recipients 2012. Likewise, the EU supported the of cooperation and communication. In of core democracy aid. Arguably, if Confederation of Eritrean Workers order to investigate such suspicions, governments directly receive aid they with 962 000 USD in 2012. Given we have to understand better to what are in control of its implementation and the highly repressive character of the kind of democracy aid is allocated to can make sure the respective projects Eritrean regime, it seems likely that closed autocracies and how democracy are implemented to their benefit. the government controls every formally aid providers operate in such contexts. 9. 30% of aid for governance and rule of law to closed registered NGO. Hence, immediate Figure 2 shows a breakdown of this aid autocracies was delivered through the recipient effects of aid to such (GO)NGOs on government or other public sector entities and 1% by sectors. It indicates that most aid to through national or international NGOs. Conversely, democratization seem unlikely. democracy, rule of law and governance 11% of democracy aid to closed autocracies was delivered through the recipient government or other to closed autocracies targets public public sector entities and 14% through national or Conclusions sector and administrative management international NGOs. Furthermore, aid is delivered Nevertheless, judging aid for (40%), followed by public finance (14%) through multilateral institutions (35% of core democracy, governance and rule of democracy aid/ 14% of other), donor governments and democratic participation and civil (1% of core democracy aid/ 4% of other) and research law to closed autocracies across- society (13%). institutions (0.9% of core democracy aid/ 0.4% of the-board as ineffective seems too other). However, for a large proportion of aid projects the information about the channel of delivery is generalizing or even misleading. Only 28% of aid for democracy, missing (40% for core democracy aid/ 51% for aid If transition processes come into for governance/rule of law). Therefore, this data has governance and rule of law to closed to be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, I believe motion, the capacities of people with autocracies is actually allocated to core it is important to highlight that the data we have experience in internationally supported democracy aid sectors.9 Aid to indicates different patterns of delivery for democracy civil society sector may enhance the aid and aid for governance/rule of law. 10. Sarah Bush, ibid, p. 131-159.
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prospects for sustained democratization against NGOs. This trend makes communication with authoritarian – provided donors chose the right it even more difficult for genuinely regimes open and improving prospects people to support. Furthermore, some independent and pro-democracy for long-term democratization. Future democracy aid projects targeting NGOs in authoritarian contexts to research could provide for a more closed autocracies are openly regime- receive international funds and reduces detailed assessment of how political subversive. For example, in 2012 the the number of credible partners in context and specific types of aid for US-American National Endowment closed autocracies further. In light of democracy, rule of law and governance for Democracy allocated 1.2 million the described challenges, design and interact in order to provide better USD of democracy aid targeting North partners of democracy aid projects in assessments of risks and benefits. In Korea, which – according to the OECD closed authoritarian contexts have to particular it seems fruitful to expand data - supported the broadcast of radio be carefully selected in order to ensure the rich, recent comparative research programs from outside to North Korea a positive impact and avoid the risk on authoritarian rule to the subject of and unconventional civic education of strengthening authoritarian rulers democracy aid in such context. activities such as training of North through democracy aid. Particularly Koreans active in informal private democracy aid that is channeled directly Anna Lührmann is a Post-Doctoral markets. Such examples illustrate to the recipient government and to Research Fellow at the Varieties of that donors may find innovative ways sectors such as public administration Democracy- Institute (V-Dem) at the of circumventing official barriers to and law enforcement seems likely to University of Gothenburg (Sweden). Her channel democracy aid to innovative be beneficial mainly to the survival research focuses on democracy assistance, projects targeting closed autocracies. of the dictator and not for immediate elections in autocracies, and comparative regime transformation. Nevertheless, democratization. However, in recent years authoritarian such aid might serve other important regimes have intensified their repression purposes such as keeping channels of
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contractors, consultants, and academic offs, generating numbers at the expense democracy aid, but is critical for institutions comprising what scholars of more nuanced understandings of understanding how aid works in practice. refer to as a ‘democracy industry’ or the indirect and time-delayed effects ‘democracy establishment’.1 Scholars of democracy aid. For example, one of Other challenges extend beyond data have since developed increasingly the most common measures used by issues in understanding the parameters sophisticated methods to explore scholars to assess progress on democracy and possibilities for democracy aid. In the impact and effectiveness of is the ordinal scale, FHI, developed by her examination of aid and activism democracy aid on democratization the advocacy group Freedom House. in the Arab world, Carapico observes and have found a positive relationship Ordinal measures like the FHI though that such aid may function both “as a between the two. A cross-national mask complex changes within states mode of empowerment and a modality quantitative study commissioned by receiving aid and often relay a superficial of power.”4 This viewpoint though USAID to assess the effectiveness understanding of reform trajectories. is seldom engaged seriously in the of its spending for democracy in its Scholars using the FHI and similar literature on democracy aid. Democracy programs worldwide from 1990-2005 indices acknowledge the limitations is often understood as a good in and concluded that spending for democracy inherent with such measures yet of itself with little interrogation about ‘works’.2 Though methodologically continue to use them in their research. its meaning. As Hobson and Kurki sophisticated, the actual politics These points are not meant to castigate remind us though, defining democracy embedded within democracy aid is often quantitative approaches to the study “is an avoidably political and normative absent from findings in studies like that of democracy promotion or dismiss act with serious ramifications both for commissioned by USAID. Indeed, one findings from such studies altogether; democracy promotion and the role of of the limitations for aggregate cross- instead, they are meant to attune us to scholars studying the subject.”5 In the national studies is their inability to what is missing in the extant literature next section, I discuss how the meaning give sufficient attention to the form or on democracy promotion. of democracy matters in my research structure of democracy programs, the on democracy aid in the Middle East, context in which they were executed, Donor transparency in the area of particularly in thinking about how such and the negotiations between both democracy aid would seem to be an aid may serve to reinforce rather than donor and recipient states. imperative given the purported aims challenge restrictive regimes. of such aid. Yet, information provided Evaluating the impact of democracy by donors like USAID, for example, A Political Economy of US Democracy programs on democracy—a contested seldom includes project level data on Aid in the Middle East concept in itself—has also been a democracy programming or information In my book manuscript, I offer a different notoriously thorny endeavour for both about contractors executing the projects, approach to understanding the practice scholars and aid practitioners. What the recipients of the aid, and the process of democracy promotion that challenges does it mean to say a democracy program behind how grants and projects were how we think about the impact and is working? For whom is it working? selected. Finding such data is possible, effectiveness of aid.6 The book began as Institutional and bureaucratic pressures but difficult. Donor reluctance to share doctoral research motivated then by the imposed by donor agencies and other details makes it challenging to evaluate puzzle that despite more than $2 billion aid organizations to produce results how democracy aid really works in practice expended by the US for democracy often lead to compromises and trade- and implicitly raises questions about across in the region since 1990, little 3 7 1. Robert Springborg, “The Democratization Industry donor intentions. The constellation of impact seemed to exist. Scholars and and the Middle East” (paper presented at the Inaugural actors engaged in democracy promotion 4. Sheila Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism: Professorial Lecture, School of Oriental and African is vast. Each actor though may hold Democracy Promotion, Justice, and Representation Studies (SOAS), London, May 24 2005); Sarah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 200. Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance(Cambridge: very different ideas about democracy Cambridge University Press, 2015). and its conceptualization and the best 5. Milja Kurki and Christopher Hobson, The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion (New York: 2. Steven E. Finkel et al., “Deepening Our approaches to advance their particular Routledge 2012), 5. Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign interpretation. Careful consideration Assistance on Democracy Building: Final Report,” of such differences and motivations is 6. Erin A. Snider, Securing Democracy: The Political (2008). Results drawn from this study were also Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East. Book published in World Politics: Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal seldom found in scholarship on Manuscript Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects 3. Erin A. Snider, “The Ethics of International of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, Democracy Assistance.” Working Paper (May 2016). 7. Finkel et al., “Deepening Our Understanding of 1990-2003,” World Politics 59, no. 03 (2007). the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy
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analysts seeking to understand economic more pointed question though is one that programs did little to challenge state and political drivers of protest in 2011 extends beyond regimes in the Middle power in the region. In both states, revisited this aid, asking whether East: Why would an authoritarian democracy programs were framed in international support, particularly state even allow democracy programs? terms of their benefit to the economy. that from the United States, played After all, democracy aid programs, This framing reflected an institutional an instrumental role as it had for civil according to Thomas Carothers - one preference in the US for a market society groups in Eastern Europe in the of the foremost scholars in this field, oriented democracy as well as a strategy years preceding the collapse of the Soviet fundamentally aim to challenge the used to sell democracy programs to Union. Attempts to link democracy aid structure of power in a recipient state.9 resistant regimes. I show how regimes cleanly to uprisings in the Middle East Answering this question connects us have been able to appropriate elements met with challenges. Initial reports noted to core issues of power and political of US aid to bolster their control over that some protestors active in organizing economy absent from recent studies society, for example, by using support and participating in protests such as aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of for civil society to help fulfil social Egypt’s April 6th movement, attended such aid. It also requires a more complex welfare functions. US programs aiming conferences outside of Egypt with consideration of the relations between to promote democracy often served to support from the quasi-governmental the US as a donor and recipient states in reinforce regime structures they aimed to National Endowment for Democracy the region and the actors engaged with challenge. The ability for states to resist (NED). Others observed that in Tunisia, such aid in the bureaucracies of both. this strategy and dilute programs to where protests began, then President their benefit was shaped by their level of Ben Ali had forbid all US democracy In my book, I tackle these questions by dependence on and strategic importance programs. The difficulty of tying that advancing a political economy framework to the United States. I argue that aid to the 2011 uprisings reflects a that considers how ideas, interests, dependency matters in understanding more complicated story that challenges and institutions mediate and shape an authoritarian regime’s ability to resist the way we think about the origins and the form and function of democracy democracy aid programs, but that it is foundations of the protests, as well as the programs. Examining the role of ideas, contingent on the availability of other ways in which US democracy programs interests, and institutions connects us potential patrons to act as a surrogate evolved in the region and what those to concerns about how actors within a for donor aid. programs supported. democracy establishment interact to shape the form and ultimate function My findings are developed from That strategic and security interests of democracy programs. How do the extensive field research in Egypt, may explain the limited impact of ideas individuals hold about democracy Morocco, and Washington DC, and democracy aid in the region would influence the strategy advocated by an draws from archival work, Freedom come as little surprise to scholars and aid institution? Who decides which of Information Act (FOIA) requests, observers of politics in the region.8 How conception of democracy is to be used and over 150 interviews in Arabic, do geostrategic concerns shape the form in programs? What criteria are used to French, and English with development and function of democracy aid? Strategic select aid recipients? How much agency practitioners, diplomats, contractors, imperatives have long shaped the US’ do local actors have in the construction activists, and US Embassy and USAID relationship with states in the region. A and execution of democracy programs? staff to understand how programs and Building: Final Report.” Jeremy M. Sharp and Carla projects in the region evolved since E. Humud, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the I engage with these questions in 1990. Beyond suggesting the limits Fy2016 Request,” (Washington, DC: Congressional developing a framework to examine of linkage politics and foreign aid, my Research Service, 2015). the design, evolution, and impact of work underscores the importance of 8. Recent work by Amaney Jamal, Sheila Carapico, and democracy aid informed by historical further research on the micro politics Jason Brownlee relay how democracy programs in the case studies of efforts in Egypt and animating the democracy bureaucracy region were often subordinated to strategic concerns, particularly in states like Egypt. Amaney A. Jamal, Of Morocco, two of the highest recipients both in Washington and in the field. Empires and Citizens (Princeton: Princeton University of democracy aid in the region. In For example, I detail how ideas about Press, 2012); Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (Cambridge: doing so, I find that US democracy aid democracy emerge and are reproduced Cambridge University Press, 2012); Sheila Carapico, even with evidence of learning that Political Aid and Arab Activism: Democracy Promotion, 9. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: they don’t work, drawing from novel Justice, and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie University Press, 2014). Endowment for International Peace, 1999). data of more than 1,700 professionals
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working in the democracy promotion Many practitioners and activists that in how democracy aid programs are field. Security concerns also alter the I’ve spoken to in the region have also formed and delivered in restrictive way aid practitioners in DC and in the advocated for a more social democratic states. For the United States, a big field approach democracy programming. approach to democracy aid that would question is whether a donor should be As an example, in my interviews in focus more on deficits in human engaged in democracy aid in a state the Middle East, staff within USAID development and social justice issues. if its security interests therein make spoke frequently about frustration over Advocates for such an approach make it unwilling to protect recipients of framing any potential aid program in compelling arguments that investments that aid in the event of a government counter-violence or terrorism terms to in education and health are critical crackdown. What responsibility do gain the reception and by extension, to the foundation and quality of donors have to local recipients in the funding from Congress. democracy and are less likely to incite wake of a government crackdown? pushback from restrictive regimes.11 Would multilateral democracy aid efforts This dimension is not new or particular Practitioners have shared with me that have more credibility and legitimacy in to the Middle East. In my book, I in an ideal world absent of funding and restrictive environments? Is it possible recount a staff member admonished by bureaucratic obstacles, the composition to speak of an ethical democracy his director in USAID’s Latin America and direction of such programs would strategy in authoritarian states? One bureau in the 1980s for his modest respond to local demand rather than of the most promising ways for scholars assessments about program impact, the imperatives of donors. Even if that to navigate the complex ethical debates which he felt would jeopardize future dynamic prevailed, there are still other and dilemmas of democracy aid in any funding from Congress. As he recalled: dimensions to consider. context is to adopt a consequentialist …I argued that even though there had been approach in weighing the merit of any this wave of democratic elections in Latin As scholars, we should be clear-eyed one form of such aid. This approach America, it was clear from this historical and critical about the motivations, logic, would, as Kathryn Sikkink has written, record that that had happened before and rationale animating the actions of “try to evaluate the relative importance and then democracy failed to take root donors and organizations engaged in and weight of…progress and regress… and that there was no assurance that the democracy aid. In asking and debating in order to make an ethical judgement countries were going to stay democratic… the important question of whether some about action in the future, we need to [the director] didn’t like that…His concern types and approaches to democracy have an idea of the relative balance was that if Congress read it my way, they are better suited for more restrictive of the different consequences, or the would think that any money we put into states, we should also be honest in conditions under which certain benefits this could go down the drain and therefore acknowledging the opacity and gaps that or costs will be more likely.”12 That no why do it. I’d argued, and my office argued, remain in our own understanding of how easy answers or solutions exist should that unless we indicated their weaknesses democracy emerges. Understanding the not dissuade us from the important work and vulnerabilities and deficits that needed practice of aid also attunes us to how of deepening our knowledge of how to be dealt with, why have a program. We good intentions often have unintended democracy aid works in autocracies. never agreed on that.10 and sometimes perverse consequences for the citizens donors aim to support in Erin A. Snider is an Assistant Professor Moving Forward—Implications for restrictive regimes. In one example from of International Affairs at Texas A&M Scholarship and Research my work, a senior advisor to a US funded University’s George H.W. Bush School of Given the challenges and uncertainty civil society program in Egypt noted that Government and Public Service. Her of democracy promotion in autocracies, a project meant to act as a concentration research focuses on the political economy of some of which I’ve described, how point for all NGOs, ultimately made it aid and development in the Middle East, should aid strategies be adjusted? easier for the Egyptian government to democracy assistance, and comparative Electoral observation is frequently cited exercise control over them. democratization. as an ideal strategy in more restrictive environments as it is both less contested A final point from this example concerns
than other forms of democracy aid and ethics. Scholars should engage with 12. Kathryn Sikkink, “The Role of Consequences, carries a lighter political footprint. important ethical questions embedded Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist 10. Peter O. Sellar, former USAID officer. Interview 11. Erin Snider and David M. Faris, “The Arab Ethical Thought,” in Moral Limit and Possibility with the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt,” in World Politics, ed. Richard M. Price (Cambridge: Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 1999. Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011). Cambridge University Press, 2008), 93-94.
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Brierley and Ofosu, continued (continued from page 3)
Randomization presents scholars estimate the effect of international (pg. 50). A significant difference in with a powerful tool to eliminate bias election observers in Indonesia’s 2004 the time observers spend at “red flag” and estimate the effects of observers presidential polls.4 She assigned 482 polling stations can introduce bias in on fraud, because it creates a clean villages to treatment and roughly 1,700 the estimation of the effect of observers, counterfactual. A simple difference- to control. However, problems with potentially overestimating their effects. in-mean analysis between treated implementation meant that observers Second, as was the case Hyde’s second (observed) and control polling stations visited only 94 of the treatment villages study, some control stations may end (stations with no observers) can indicate and accidentally visited some (23) of up accidently receiving monitors as election fraud, even when political the control communities. Despite the international observers move around parties employ fraudulent tactics that small number of observations, Hyde looking for their assigned stations. are hidden from onlookers. To measure finds that, contrary to her finding in Again, such behavior has the potential fraud, scholars can use otherwise benign Armenia, the assignment of villages to introduce bias to the estimation of electoral outcomes such as turnout to treatment (i.e., the intent-to-treat the treatment effect. rates and political party vote shares at effect) resulted in a 6.5 percent increase in polling stations. When organizations votes cast for the incumbent candidate, Lastly, as in all experiments, to estimate deploy observers at random, all else President Megawati Sukarnoputri (who an unbiased effect of treatment, equal, electoral outcomes should be the eventually lost the election). Hyde units must only respond to their own same, on average, across treatment and explains this finding by suggesting treatment assignment. That is, the control stations. Significant differences that observers ensured that polling outcome at Polling Station A must between treatment and control units officials kept polling stations open be a result of it’s own assignment to are then suggestive of fraud. until required by the election laws. She treatment or control, and should not argues that this potentially increased be influenced by the treatment status The Impact of International Observers the turnout rate among the incumbent’s of Polling Station B. The technical on Electoral Fraud supporters, who were a more apathetic term for this assumption is Stable Unit To our knowledge, Hyde was the first group compared opposition parties’ Treatment Value Assignment (SUTVA). scholar to use tools of randomization supporters. An important takeaway of Violations of SUTVA are potentially to measure the impact of observers Hyde’s results is that observers appear serious because it could plausibly be the on fraud.3 Hyde analyzes Armenia’s to increase polling officials’ compliance case that in the presence of observers, 2003 presidential election, leveraging with electoral laws. political parties simply move fraud to the near-random assignment of 233 stations without observers. international election observers to While these two experiments over 1,000 polling stations. Her represented a significant step forward The Impact of Domestic Election Observers results show that observers reduce the in the literature estimating the effects on Electoral Fraud incumbent vote share in the first round of observers, challenges still remain. Later experimental studies have of the polls by 5.9 percent and by 2 First, it is not clear whether polling attempted to overcome some of these percent in the second round (pg. 54). stations that receive international challenges by studying the impact of Moreover, polling stations that were observation experience the same domestic, as opposed to international visited by observers in the first round treatment. The transitory nature of election observers, on fraud. The of the election, but had no observers in international observers means that they advantage of studying domestic the second, saw a 4.4 percent decrease usually spend varying amounts of time observers is twofold. First, domestic in the incumbent’s vote share in the at different stations. These differences observers generally stay at one station second round (pg. 55). The latter result may confound the treatment effect. for the entire day. This arrangement suggests that observers’ effects can For example, Susan Hyde suggests that helps ensure uniformity in treatment persist over electoral rounds. observers spent about twenty minutes across treated stations. Second, at polling stations but were “instructed domestic observers usually observe A year later, Hyde mounted the to stay as long as they think is useful” at polling stations in electoral districts first fully-randomized experiment to a station when they witnessed problems where they reside. This protects against
3. Susan D. Hyde “The Observer Effect in 4. Susan D. Hyde “Experimenting in Democracy: them inadvertently “observing” control International Politics: Evidence From a Natural International Observers and the 2004 Presidential stations. Scholars working on the Experiment” World Politics 60(1):37–63. Elections in Indonesia.” Perspectives on Politics impact of domestic election observers 8(2):511–27.
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have also began to acknowledge, These two studies highlight the need levels of randomization.8 First, we and explicitly measure, violations of for scholars to account for the response randomly assigned constituencies in SUTVA and account for the potential of political parties to the presence of our sample to a treatment saturation spillover effects of observers. observers to avoid bias in estimates. level. The saturation level indicates One potential weakness of prior work the proportion of polling stations in a Ichino and Schundeln provide the first is that the authors assume a limited constituency that will receive observers. empirical analysis of the causal impact spatial model of spillovers. In other We assigned constituencies to three of domestic election observers.5 Their words, they assume that political agents levels of treatment: low, medium, and study is novel in two important ways. will respond locally to the presence of high. At the second stage, we randomly First, Ichino and Schundeln study observers. If party agents operate across assigned polling stations within these the effect of observers during the entire constituencies, however, it need constituencies to be observed or pre-election period as opposed to on not be the case that spillovers are unobserved. election day. Specifically, the authors contained within very localized spatial measure the effects of observers on the boundaries. Our unit of analysis is the individual manipulation of the official voter list polling station. To measure the direct ahead of Ghana’s 2008 general elections. The Effect of Observers on Fraud effect of observers we compare outcomes Registration fraud is important as it can and Violence during Ghana’s 2012 at treatment and control stations. Our result in ineligible voters being able to Election measure of fraud is polling station vote on election day. Second, their study In our own work (co-authored with turnout. To measure intimidation, we directly addresses potential violations Joseph Asunka, Miriam Golden and use reports from observers (at treated of SUTVA by attempting to measure Eric Kramon) we study the effects stations) and party agents (at control the spillover effects of observers. of domestic election observers stations) on intimidation during voting. during Ghana’s 2012 presidential To measure spillovers, we compare Ichino and Schundeln find that the election.7 We extend previous work outcomes at control stations in high presence of observers during the to measure the impact of observers and medium saturation constituencies voter registration process reduced the on both electoral fraud and election- to control stations in constituencies we number of registered voters in electoral day violence at polling stations. assigned to the low saturation condition. areas (EAs) between 2004 and 2008 Additionally, our research design allows We do this because the low saturation by 3.5 percentage points (pg. 302). In us to directly account for and measure control units are the least likely to be addition, the authors find evidence of the potential spillover effects of impacted by spillover effects. spillover. Specifically, polling stations observers within entire constituencies. in untreated electoral areas less than 5 By measuring spillover effects we can Our findings are twofold. First, kilometers away from treated electoral also assess whether political parties observers reduce fraud and violence at areas see an increase in registered respond differently to the presence of polling stations. Figure 1 displays these voters by 2.7 percentage points. This observers – whether through enacting results. The presence of an observer result suggests that when encountering fraud or violence – across electoral reduces turnout by 5 percentage points, observes parties displaced registration constituencies with different levels of a 6 percent decrease. Similarly, the fraud to nearby stations without electoral competition. presence of observers reduces voter observers (pg. 302). Interestingly, intimidation during the voting process later work has shown that observers To account for potential spillover by 7 percentage points, a 58 percent can also have negative spillover effects effects, we adopt a research design decrease. (i.e. a deterrence effect). In Russia, from Baird et al., which involves two polling stations located within the same Konstantin Sonin, and Alexei Zakharov. “Field Second, levels of local electoral building as a station with an observer Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian competition shape party activists’ Parliamentary Elections.” Proceedings of the National witness lower levels of fraud than other Academy of Sciences 110(2):448–452. response to observers. In stronghold control stations.6 constituencies, parties are able to use 5. Naomi Ichino and Matthias Schundeln, “Deterring 7. Joseph Asunka, Sarah Brierley, Miriam Golden, local party networks to relocate or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects Eric Kramon, and George Ofosu, “Electoral Fraud of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party 8. Sarah Baird, J Aislinn Bohren, Craig McIntosh, Ghana” Journal of Politics 74(1):292–307. Manipulation Strategies”British Journal of Political and Berk Ozler. “Designing Experiments to Measure Science: forthcoming. Spillover Effects” World Bank Policy Research 6. Ruben Enikolopov, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Working Paper (6824).
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Figure 1: The Effect of Domestic Election Observers on Fraud and Violence Finally, in future studies scholars should at Polling Stations in Ghana consider the possibility that observers simply push election fraud or violence to later or earlier stages of the electoral process.9 In a new paper, Ofosu and Posner, find that the presence of observers reduces the likelihood of the public posting of results at polling stations and increases the probability of fraud at the aggregation stage during Malawi’s 2014 presidential election.10 Progress in this area will shape our thinking about the equilibrium effect of observers on election quality. Source: Asunka et al. (2016). Sarah Brierley is a PhD candidate in political science at the University fraud to stations without an election civil society groups should pay greater of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). observer. In contrast, party activists attention to the bureaucratic processes She studies political accountability in relocate intimidation to stations through which election commissions developing democracies, with a regional without observers in competitive areas. hire polling station staff. focus on sub-Saharan Africa. George This finding suggests that the degree Ofosu is a Ph.D. candidate in Political of electoral competition at the local Secondly, we distinguish between a Science at the University of California, level can significantly influence the legal-sanctioning and a community- Los Angeles (UCLA). He studies electoral effectiveness of democracy promotion sanctioning mechanism through which integrity and democratic accountability interventions such as observation. observers may influence fraudulent of politicians in new democracies, with a activities. Observers reduce fraud even regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Avenues for Future Research on in contexts where the threat of legal Election Observers and Electoral Fraud punishment for wrongdoing is low. As we demonstrate, the literature on The fact that observers are effective election observation has progressed in such environments suggests that immensely over the last 15 years. observers’ effectiveness may be a However, there is still enormous product of potential social sanctioning potential for future work in this area. (or shaming) within communities. If a Many studies document the positive party agent wants to attempt fraud, the effects of observers on reducing presence of an observer may deter her electoral fraud and violence. The because she is scared that the observer next step is to nail down the precise will report this behavior to local elites. mechanism through which observers If the threat of community shaming, are effective. Doing so should increase rather than legal sanctioning, is the the effectiveness of observer missions. mechanism through which observers are effective, this implies that observers To understand how observers reduce who are embedded in local, social fraud, we need to know who the main networks may be more effective in perpetrators of fraud are. The two reducing fraud than observers who do 9. Ursula E. Daxecker, “All quiet on election day? International election observation and incentives for likely contenders are political party not have local ties. It would also suggest pre-election violence in African elections” Electoral agents and election officials. If election that domestic observers are likely to be Studies 34 (2014): 232-243. officials are the main perpetrators of more effective than their international 10. George Ofosu and Daniel Posner, “Domestic fraud, this suggests that scholars and counterparts. election observers and election day fraud in Malawi’s 2014 elections.” Working Paper (2014).
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Bubeck and Marinov, continued (continued from page 3)
we speak of “Election Hegemon” if not Figure 1: Incumbent Vote Gain Figure 2: Election Bias (Nelda11) of “Election War.” For our two outcome (Nelda27) dimensions, incumbent vote gain and bias, we use the information contained in the NELDA dataset. We code our variable ‘Nelda27’, incumbent vote gain, with 0 if the item ‘NELDA27’ – Was the vote count a gain for the opposition?’ is coded as ‘yes’ in the NELDA dataset, as 1 if ‘NELDA27’ is coded as ‘no’ and we code it as NA if it is coded as ‘uncertain’ or ‘N/A’
in the NELDA data. Accordingly we code ‘NELDA11’, the election bias, as 3 The central result of the paper is the a comprehensive listing of all elections. 1 if the NELDA item ‘NELDA11’ – relationship between the relative ‘Before elections, were there significant position of the platforms parties adopt Systematic data on policy divisions concerns that the elections would not in an election vis-a-vis the outside power between the main domestic actors is be free and fair?‘ was coded as ‘yes’, 0 if (political polarization) and the spending not available. For a simple illustration ‘no’ was coded in NELDA, and NA for mix chosen by foreign influencers. We of the logic of our argument, we ‘N/A’ and ‘uncertain’. argue that investments in processes and selected at random 63 election parties are mutually dependent: an extra cases from NELDA, and we asked The two Figures are based on the results dollar for a candidate buys more or research assistants to code whether displayed in Table 1. Table 1 shows the less depending on election bias. When the government and main opposition mean, standard deviation and number parties adopt platforms that differ from party were divided in their position on of observations conditional on the the point of view of the outsiders, at cooperation with the United States, variables ‘War_usa’ and ‘Polarization’. least some resources are invested in as well as whether another power was candidates. This does not preclude active pre-election.4 The data is a small We see that, when the incumbent is democracy promotion. Especially when sample, and yet, when merged with the friendly to the U.S., i.e. the variable geo-political importance of a country is NELDA dataset, it reveals patterns, ‘Polarization’ is coded as 1, the high, candidate support increases the shown on the figures below. Thanks to incumbent also does better in elections. overall investment in a clean political a research grant by the DFG (German We also see that this is correlated process by liberal outsiders. Research Foundation) we will be able with significant bias (in favor of the to significantly expand the coverage of incumbent). Election war cases show Our work helps us understand an this dataset in the near future. a pattern that is different, and is important and recurring challenge: consistent with a conflict between, that of aiding democracy in a world We code the variable ‘Polarization’ in what we call a liberal and an aliberal of overlapping spheres of influence analogy to our model parameter. It power in our theoretical model. among powerful outsiders. Testing has a value of 1 if the U.S. prefers the Conflictual interests are associated systematically the insights of the model incumbent, -1 if the U.S. prefers the with the opposition doing better when in elections is a matter of identifying opposition, and 0 otherwise. ‘War_usa’ the U.S. likes the government, and appropriate data. In this case, such indicates if the USA faces an external the incumbent winning when the U.S. data would include election-level data, opponent in an election war scenario. prefers the opposition. ‘Wars’ lessen the with divisions among the opposition If the US and its allies are the sole importance of being close to the United and governing parties on policy issues international actors involved in elections States for winning elections. The rapid
important to the outside powers. The 3. Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov,”Which decrease in bias in ‘war’ cases where the National Elections Across Democracy Elections Can Be Lost?” Political Analysis 20(2):191– U.S. likes the incumbent is somewhat and Autocracy (NELDA) data has a 210. surprising, possibly indicating the need number of election-level variables, and 4. Section 1 of the Online Appendix of the working to adjust for covariates. paper (see Footnote 2) shows the cases and the raw codings.
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add to the list of vulnerable countries those that are former colonies, or occupy the periphery of powerful states’ regions of influence.
Our study shows that the limited impact of democracy-promoters might arise from the clash of complex interests. It does not, however, mean that Western states do not contribute positively to democracy elsewhere.
Johannes Bubeck is a doctoral student at the University of Mannheim’s Department of Economics. Nikolay Marinov is a professor of political science at the University of Mannheim.
Based on V-Dem data, one in ten domestic political competition.5 We can elections occurs under conditions of 5. Based on V-Dem data variables v2svdomaut and diminished domestic or international v2svinlaut (values <2), out of 3174 elections with sovereignty, implying that an outsider competition (per NELDA), we have 388 occurring has very wide leeway in influencing in countries with limited domestic or international autonomy. This includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, post- war Poland, Greece. See: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya Mechkova, and Farhad Miri. V-dem codebook v6. University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2016.
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Section News
2016 Section Award Winners Best Book Award developed countries of the region. One of Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in Kenneth Roberts for his book, Changing the principal—and paradoxical—insights the Comparative Study of Democracy: Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the of the study is that contrary to European Bryn Rosenfeld (Nuffield College, Oxford) Neoliberal Era (Cambridge University Press, experiences, labor-mobilizing party systems for her dissertation on ” Varieties of Middle 2015). proved less resilient to drastic economic Class Growth and Preference Formation.” adjustment and market reform, the major Committee Members: Kurt Weyland shock highlighted in this structuralist Committee Members: Henry Thomson (University of Texas at Austin); Sheena account. How “neoliberalism” was enacted (Nuffield College); Mai Hassan (University Chestnut Greitens (University of Missouri); then shaped the degree and type of of Michigan); and Christian von Soest and Rachel Beatty Riedl (Domaine change that Latin American party systems (GIGA German Institute of Global and Universitaire) underwent especially during the last two Area Studies) decades: where conservatives spearheaded Committee’s Remarks on the Award market reform (as in Brazil and Chile, Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winner: The award committee received e.g.), party-based opposition from the left Winner: Bryn Rosenfeld’s Dissertation, thirty-one submissions this year. We led to a programmatic alignment in the “Varieties of Middle Class Growth and conducted the selection process in two party system. By contrast, where leftists or Preference Formation” is an insightful and rounds and at least two of us assessed each populists were compelled to impose tough fascinating study of economic development, entry. We read a number of very good, even adjustment, this unexpected policy switch the growth of the middle class and excellent books – so academic production produced programmatic de-alignment, democratization. Rosenfeld engages with on political regime issues continues to be soon prompted a radical backlash, and canonical theories of economic and political vibrant and exciting! thus threw party systems into turmoil. change to question the link between the In sum, as Roberts shows, the collapse of middle classes and demands for democracy. In the end, a clear winner emerged easily and state-led development and the transition Drawing on evidence from the former by consensus: Kenneth Roberts, Changing to neoliberalism fundamentally reshaped Soviet Union, she argues that contemporary Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the the character and purpose of state power, autocratic regimes often control access to Neoliberal Era (Cambridge University Press, the patterns of association in civil society, the middle class, particularly through public 2015). What makes this book stand out is and the nature of state-society relations. sector employment. They use this control to the author’s ambitious and successful effort And this reshaping occurred in different exert a pernicious influence on individuals’ to “make sense” of and bring theoretical forms according to the extent of lower- support for democracy and propensity to order to a topic of massive cross-sectional class political incorporation and elite party engage in collective action. Throughout, this and longitudinal scope, namely party control. dissertation carefully and rigorously analyzes systems in Latin America over the course of new and interesting data on both public several decades. This is a difficult analytical Roberts carefully develops these arguments opinion and protest behavior, using advanced challenge, given the volatility and variation and supports them with a multi-methods quantitative methods. It also makes a major that these party systems have experienced. approach that combines statistical analysis contribution by implementing a novel case- Roberts develops a complex argument that with a set of country cases. In drawing control design for drawing inferences on systematically weaves together economic, together a variety of causal factors, Roberts the characteristics of protest participants social, political, and institutional factors and parses out their specific contributions which can be adopted by other researchers. thus accounts for the historical constitution and speaks to a number of important Rosenfeld makes a significant contribution of Latin American party systems and their literatures, all focused on the interrelation to our understanding of democratization in later transformations—a topic of crucial of market reform, party systems, and the post-Soviet world and to our theories significance for the emergence of democracy, democratic development. The author linking economic development and its consolidation, and its potential erosion. systematically explains the causal linkages democratic reform. Her key findings also between these diverse factors, producing a shed light on developments in authoritarian By going beyond the usual focus on the superb theoretical synthesis. He develops a states outside the post-Soviet world and will “major” Latin American countries, most of sophisticated argument that bridges political be of interest to all scholars of comparative which used to have labor-mobilizing party economy, democratic transitions, and party politics. She is a very worthy recipient of the systems, Roberts identifies a second broad politics to shed light on a series of crucial 2016 Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in type, namely elitist party systems, which developments in Latin American politics. the Comparative Study of Democratization. prevailed mainly in the smaller and less
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Section News
By tracing historical processes over a long Winner: Treisman tackles one of the University—announces that Pia Raffler time frame through the effective, thoughtful foundational questions in comparative of Yale University and Kathleen Klaus of use of a “critical junctures” framework, the politics – does economic development lead to UW-Madison are co-recipients of the 2016 book offers a broad canvas that richly covers democratization? – and adds novel insights to APSA Fieldwork Award. important dimensions of Latin America’s a long-enduring debate. How is it that after socioeconomic and political development. decades of studies, no consensus has been Pia’s dissertation develops and tests a novel While the historical paths before and after reached about this fundamental question? theory concerning the relationship between the challenges arising from neoliberalism Treisman shows that in part it is because political oversight of bureaucrats and service do not neatly align by forming a “branching the debate has paid short shrift to critical provision by local governments, combining tree,” Roberts puts fundamental categories distinctions between the short and medium qualitative and experimental methods that of historical institutionalism to excellent use term, changes in and levels of economic involved 18 months of in-depth fieldwork and provides an insightful overview of party development, and the role of structure and in Uganda. evolution in Latin America from the 1930s agency. Offering a theoretical framework to the 2010s. The book presents a masterful centered around the impact of leader The theory developed in Ms. Raffler’s blend of deep history, comparative case study, turnover, Treisman impressively manages dissertation addresses a critical question in succinct and innovative theory, and broad to integrate these disparate considerations political economy, with particular relevance connections to the literature. In its focus into a unified theory. While the structural to emerging democracies: how and under on Latin America, the analysis speaks to pressures of economic development may what conditions increased democratic current global debates on democratization, have a democratizing effect, regime change accountability affects the provision of critical junctures, political party systems, will occur when entrenched dictators leave government services at the local level. and neoliberal reform. It engages relevant office. Employing rigorous econometric Pia posits that increased oversight will debates from across the field, and offers techniques, Treisman shows that data are improve service delivery, conditional on the new insights into how the interaction of remarkable consistent with his theory’s underlying issue impeding effective service state, market, and party competition can predictions. Along the way, he helps to delivery and the integrity of bureaucrats and have dramatic consequences for democratic explain a number of underappreciated yet officials. This theory is directly informed stability and volatility. important stylized facts, such as the stronger by hundreds of in-depth, semi-structured relationship between economic development interviews that Ms. Raffler conducted with Condensing many years of thinking and and democratization in the middle term (10 local government officials and civil society research, Changing Course in Latin America to 20 years) than in the short term. Overall, representatives. is exceedingly well-crafted. The committee Treisman’s article is a major contribution to unanimously felt that among all of the books the study of comparative democratization, To test this theory, Ms. Raffler used we received, this volume stood out with its and to comparative politics more broadly. extensive contacts with government agencies enormous scope and academic contributions. and researchers to design and implement Kenneth Roberts has written a magnificent Best Field Work Award a field experiment involving the rollout of book that richly deserves the 2016 award Pia Raffler, Yale University for her fieldwork a reform that affected local politicians’ and of APSA’s Comparative Democratization in Uganda. Kathleen Klaus, University of challengers’ access to budgetary information section. Wisconsin-Madison, for her fieldwork in and capacity to exercise oversight vis-à-vis Kenya. bureaucrats in 260 localities nationwide. Best Article Award Working in close collaboration with the Daniel Treisman (UCLA) for “Income, Committee Members: Barry Driscoll Ministry of Finance, Ms. Raffler managed Democracy, and Leader Turnover” (Grinnell College); Michael Broache an extensive logistical operation, including (published in the American Journal of Political (University of Tampa); and Colm Fox the recruitment and training of local Science in 2015). (Singapore Management University) facilitators to administer training workshops to over 3,000 local government officials Committee Members: Jordan Gans-Morse Committee’s Remarks on the Award and challengers and the dissemination of (Northwestern University); Sebastian Winners: It is with great pleasure that local budgetary information, while at the Mazzuca ( Johns Hopkins University); and the Fieldwork Award Committee—Barry same time organizing an impressive data Simeon Nichter (UC San Diego) Driscoll of Grinnell College, Michael collection effort that involved a panel survey Broache of the University of Tampa, and of over 2,800 politicians and bureaucrats, Committee’s Remarks on the Award Colm Fox of Singapore Management physical inspections of over 1,200 local
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government project sites, and review of that did not. Given the sensitivity nature of Committee’s Remarks on the Award local-level budgeting and voting data. the survey, Kathleen utilized list experiments Winner: In her compelling paper, “Ruling and also used experimental questions that Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Theory The Committee also wishes to be clear that randomized an “ethnic cue”. of Endogenous Institutional Change”, Anne while Pia’s fieldwork is unusual in its very Meng argues that weaker autocrats create high levels of funding, it was neither the Ultimately Kathleen finds that when the institutionalized ruling parties whereas magnitude of the study nor the resources allocation of land was unequal and lacked stronger ones rely on personalist regimes. at her disposal that made Pia’s work stand legitimacy, ‘contentious land narratives’ Moving away from Huntington’s notion out. Rather, what made it stand out was the developed. Politicians could then draw on of party institutionalization as the infusion complexity involved in carrying out such these narratives to mobilize for violence. of value by its members, Meng argues that ambitious work, and in doing so in such a But this only occurred if voters believed the institutionalization of authoritarian careful and methodical way. Ms. Raffler’s their land access and rights hinged on the incumbent parties should be understood as research provides valuable insights into outcome of the election. a commitment to resource-sharing between the conditions under which interventions a dictator and his support coalition. As she to enhance democratic accountability In preparation for fieldwork, Kathleen shows with careful formal modeling, strong may promote the effective provision of developed a deep knowledge of Kenya rulers can survive by doling out patronage government services at the local level. These and learned Swahili. During fieldwork at will whereas weaker ones must commit insights were only possible as a result of Ms. she spent a significant amount of time to a permanent minimum level of resource Raffler’s rigorous fieldwork, which required engaging with Kenyans in urban and rural sharing through a “a semi-autonomous deep knowledge of the country context, areas, and managed a team of enumerators organization that can enforce joint rule”. extensive cooperation with local officials, and to implement a sophisticated survey management of a highly complex logistical under difficult circumstances. Overall, the She tests her argument on one-party project. Ms. Raffler’s work is therefore a sophistication in the planning and execution regimes in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to deserving recipient of the Best Fieldwork of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of 2005, arguing that initially strong autocrats Award. Kathleen’s research is truly remarkable and were leaders of independence movements represents the very best in fieldwork. or created their own dominant parties, Kathleen’s dissertation looks at the making them more difficult to remove than connection between land allocation and Only through extensive fieldwork at the weaker autocrats who were more closely electoral violence in Kenya. Her research uses micro-level, was Kathleen able to develop aligned with outgoing colonial powers. a multi-staged research design implemented an original argument that placed ordinary Meng’s paper is an important advance in during 15 months of fieldwork. citizens and their experiences at the center the study of autocratic regimes. The existing of the analysis. It moves beyond simplistic literature agrees that institutionalized ruling In the first stage, Kathleen employs an in- explanations based on instrumentalism parties generate political stability, but Meng depth qualitative approach using intensive or ethnicity, to explain how history, land presents a thoughtful argument about micro-comparative case studies. To build access, local understandings, and political the origins of such parties. Her work also her argument from the ground up, she did competition can result in electoral violence. implies a cruel twist of path dependent fate. hundreds of lengthy interviews and dozens It richly deserves the prize as joint-winner of Initially strong leaders are compelled to go of focus groups across numerous carefully the Best Fieldwork Award. it alone, failing to broaden their support selected cases. Through this, she finds that coalition and to establish clear lines of land was often allocated unevenly, that it Best Paper Award succession. As a result, subsequent regimes created ‘contentious land narratives’ in some Anne Meng (UC Berkeley) for her paper on may be surprisingly unstable. At the same regions, and ultimately, that these narratives “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: time, initially weaker autocrats survive by resulted in electoral violence in some of A Theory of Endogenous Institutional distributing political and economic power these regions, but not in others. Change.” to regime supporters and thus may sew the seeds of stability. The committee was For the second stage, Kathleen drew on her Committee Members: Ken Greene impressed with the methodological rigor qualitative research to designed context- (University of Texas at Austin); Allen and incisiveness of Meng’s work and we look relevant questions for a 750 household Hicken (University of Michigan); and forward to seeing it appear in journals and a survey. The survey was implemented across Edmund Malesky (Duke University) book in the years to come. regions that experienced violence and those
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Australian Voter Experience Project: include “strategic electoral manipulation” Archie Brown, emeritus professor of politics The Electoral Integrity Project has which occurs long before polling-day, and at the University of Oxford, was guest editor partnered with the Australian Electoral “executive aggrandizement” whereby heads of the Summer 2016 Daedalus, the journal of Commission in July 2016 to launch the new of state use legal channels to legitimate the the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Australian Voter Experience (AVE) project. erosion of checks and balances. Bermeo “On Political Leadership”. He authored The survey gathers public feedback about has also published Parties, Movements the Introduction to the issue (pp. 5-8) and Australian experiences and perceptions of and Democracy in the Developing World the article, “Against the Führerprinzip: the administration of elections, especially (Cambridge University Press, 2016) along For Collective Leadership” (pp. 109-123). the integrity and convenience of the with co-editor Deborah Yashar, professor of Contributors include Nan Keohane, process. The Electoral Integrity Project politics and international affairs, Princeton Laurance S. Rockefeller Distinguished was also awarded the 2016 Lawrence and University. The book examines the limits Visiting Professor in the Woodrow Wilson Lynne Brown Democracy Medal by the to class-based approaches to understanding School and the Center for Human Values, McCourtney Institute for Democracy at regime trajectories in the developing world and Al Stepan, Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Penn State in May 2016. The Brown Medal and argues that parties and movements Government, Columbia University. is awarded annually to a project that works deserve more attention as key (and often to advance democracy in the United States autonomous) collective actors throughout Nathan J. Brown, professor of political and around the world. the democratization process. The project’s science and international affairs, George contributors include Erik Kohunta, Ellen Washington University, and nonresident Conference on “Varieties of Democracy: Lust, Rachel Beatty Riedl, Ken Roberts, Dan senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for Nature, Causes, and Consequences”: Slater, Maya Tudor and David Waldner. International Peace, will publish Arguing The Kellogg Institute for International Islam after the Revival of Arab Politics (Oxford Studies at the University of Notre Dame Catherine Boone, associate professor University Press, 2016) in November 2016. is sponsoring a conference on “Varieties of comparative politics, London School The book examines various sites of Arab of Democracy: Nature, Causes, and of Economics, published Property and public life to explore how politics operates. Consequences” November 11-12, 2016. Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Its goal is to promote interaction between Structure of Politics (Cambridge University Matt Buehler, assistant professor of selected V-Dem researchers (Michael Press, 2014). The book recently won the political science, University of Tennessee, Bernhard, Michael Coppedge, Adam Gregory Luebbert Award for the Best Book published “Do You Have ‘Connections’ at Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl-Henrik Knutsen, in Comparative Politics published in the the Courthouse? An Original Survey on Pamela Paxton, Dan Pemstein, and Vello last two years from APSA’s Comparative Informal Influence and Judicial Rulings in Pettai) and democracy or regime researchers Politics section. Co-winner Michael Morocco” in an upcoming issue of Political who use or may decide to use V-Dem data. Albertus, assistant professor of political Research Quarterly (available now online). The conference includes a mix of panels science, University of Chicago, published and roundtables featuring Zachary Elkins, Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Michael Buehler was promoted to Jennifer Gandhi, Gary Goertz, Amy Erica Land Reform (Cambridge University Press, associate professor in the department of Smith, and Milan Svolik, among others). 2015), which also focused on land reform. politics and international studies at the A complete list of papers and participants Property and Political Order also won the University of London’s School of Oriental can be found at kellogg.nd.edu. For further Best Book Award from the APSA-ASA and African Studies (SOAS). Buehler’s information, contact [email protected]. African Politics Conference Group and specialty at SOAS is Southeast Asian was Honorable Mention for the Melville politics with particular reference to state- NEWS FROM MEMBERS Herskovitz Award, the Best Book Award of society relations during democratization Nancy Bermeo, Nuffield Professor of the African Studies Association. and decentralization. He recently published Comparative Politics, University of Oxford The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist Activists published an article on Democratic Dawn Brancati, assistant professor of and the State in Democratizing Indonesia Backsliding in the January 2016 Journal of political science, Washington University (Cambridge University Press, 2016), in Democracy. It shows that the most blatant in St. Louis, published Democracy which he provides a new framework for challenges to democracy, such as election- Protests: Origins, Features, and Significance understanding how Islamist activists gain day ballot fraud and military coups, are (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The and maintain influence in democratizing becoming less common but that more vexing book highlights the role of economic crises Muslim-majority countries. challenges are taking their place. These in triggering protests
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Buehler and Dani Muhtada, lecturer Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political published, with Ricardo Tranjan, policy of law at Semarang State University, also science, European University at St. development officer for the City of Toronto, published “Democratization and the Petersburg, and Finland distinguished “Environment and Consultation in the Diffusion of Shari’a Law: Comparative professor, University of Helsinki, published Brazilian Democratic Developmental State” Insights from Indonesia” in Southeast Asia an edited volume titled Authoritarian in the July 2016 Comparative Politics. Research. Based on an original dataset Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, established during years of field research in and Policies (Routledge, 2017). Donald L. Horowitz, James. B. Duke Indonesia, this article analyzes the spread of Professor of Law and Political Science shari’a regulations across the world’s largest Ezequiel Gonzalez Ocantos, associate Emeritus, Duke University, and senior Muslim-majority democracy since 1998. professor of politics and international fellow, International Forum for Democratic relations, Nuffield College, University of Studies, recently published “Time for Joan Cho received her Ph.D. in political Oxford, published Shifting Legal Visions: a New Primary Electoral System” on science from Harvard University’s Judicial Change and Human Rights Trials in RealClearPolitics.com on a more appropriate department of government in May 2016. Latin America (Cambridge University Press, electoral system for primary elections. In In July 2016, she began an appointment as 2016). Through an in-depth exploration of September, he delivered the Castle Lectures the Korea Foundation assistant professor the interactions between judges, prosecutors, on Ethics, Politics, and Economics at Yale of Korean political economy at the College and human rights lawyers in three countries, University. The overall topic for the series of East Asian Studies and the department the book asks how changing ideas about the was “Constitutional Design for Severely of government at Wesleyan University in law and standards of adjudication condition Divided Societies: Many Architects, Few Middletown, Connecticut. the exercise of judicial power. Buildings.”
Javier Corrales, Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Shelley McConnell was granted tenure Professor of Political Science at Amherst Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies and promoted to associate professor in the College, published “Can Anyone Stop the and director of the Korea-Pacific Program, department of government at St. Lawrence President: Power Asymmetries and Term and Robert R. Kaufman, professor of University in August 2016. Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016” in the political science, Rutgers University, Summer 2016 Latin American Politics and published Dictators and Democrats: Elites, Kelly M. McMann, associate professor Society. Masses and Regime Change (Princeton and director of the International Studies Jennifer Raymond Dresden has been University Press, 2016). Examining Program, Case Western Reserve University, appointed as an assistant teaching professor seventy-eight cases of democratic transition published “Developing State Legitimacy: and the associate director of the Democracy and twenty-five reversions since 1980, The Credibility of Messengers and the and Governance Program at Georgetown the authors show how differences in Utility, Fit and Success of Ideas” in the July University. authoritarian regimes and organizational 2016 Comparative Politics. capabilities shape popular protest and elite Thomas E. Flores, associate professor of initiatives in transitions to democracy, and Anne Meng is now an assistant professor conflict analysis and resolution, George how institutional weaknesses cause some in the department of politics, University Mason University, and Irfan Nooruddin, democracies to fail. of Virginia. Her paper, “Ruling Parties Al-Thani Chair in Indian Politics and Haggard and Kaufman, along with in Authoritarian Regimes: A Theory of professor at the School of Foreign Service at Terence K. Teo, assistant professor of Endogenous Institutional Change” won Georgetown University, published Elections political science and public affairs, Seton the 2015 Best Paper Award in the APSA in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies Hall University, also published “Distributive Comparative Democratization Section. in the 21st Century (Cambridge University Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Dataset.” (Descriptive narratives of changes Christoph Mohamad-Klotzbach, a 2016). The book argues that elections fail to to and from democratic regimes, 1980- research assistant and PhD student, promote democracy when held in countries 2008). University of Wuerzburg, Thomas Kestler, with little democratic experience, scant fiscal professor of political science, University space, and violent civil conflict. Kathryn Hochstetler is now professor of Würzburg, and Hans-Joachim Lauth, of international development at the chair of the political science and sociology London School of Economics. In July, she department, University of Würzburg,
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had their article “Comparative Politics 1970s-80s gave birth to these new actors. recent presidential election there. He also and Comparative Research on Latin published two new book chapters: “Timing America in Germany” featured in Política Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in and sequencing in post-conflict elections” in latinoamericana comparada (Rosario: UNR Comparative Politics at the John F. Arnim Langer and Graham Brown (eds), Editora, 2015). The article examines current Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and research fields in the German trend and University, ARC Laureate Fellow, professor Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction comparative research on Latin America by of government and international relations and Peacebuilding (Oxford University Press, German scientists. at the University of Sydney, and director 2016), and “Centripetalism” in Karl Cordell Mohamad-Klotzback also published of the Electoral Integrity Project, and and Stefan Wolff (eds),The Routledge “State Fragility in the Democratic Republic Andrea Abel van Es, research associate at Handbook of Ethnic Conflict (Routledge, of the Congo 1960-2014: A New Approach the Electoral Integrity Project, published 2016). for Assessing the Quality of Statehood Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in by Analysing the Relationship between Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Julio Ríos Figueroa, associate professor Capacities, Challenges and State Actors” Press, 2016), which presents an original of political science at CIDE-División de in The Democratic Republic of the Congo: theory for understanding policies regulating Estudios Políticos, published Constitutional Problems, Progress and Prospects (Berlin: political finance, reflecting the degree to Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil- LIT Verlag / LIT Publishers, 2016) with which laws are laissez-faire or guided by Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Oliver Schlenkrich, professor of political state intervention. Latin America (Cambridge University Press, science, University of Würzburg, and Lukas 2016). The book offers a new theoretical Lemm, graduate student at the University of Elizabeth Pisani, director of Ternyata Ltd, framework for understanding the mediator Würzburg. and Michael Buehler, associate professor of role played by constitutional courts in politics and international studies, University democratic conflict solving. Lee Morgenbesser, research fellow at the of London School of Oriental and African Centre for Governance and Public Policy/ Studies, published “Why Do Indonesian Oxana Shevel, associate professor of Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Politicians Promote Shari’a Laws? An political science, Tufts University, published published Behind the Façade: Elections analytic framework for Muslim-majority “The Battle for Historical Memory in under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia democracies” in the Third World Quarterly. Postrevolutionary Ukraine” in the October (SUNY Press, 2016). The book examines Taking the discussion in the existing 2016 Current History. the question of why authoritarian regimes literature on the adoption of shari’a laws in in Southeast Asia bother holding elections. democratizing Muslim-majority countries David S. Siroky was granted tenure Morgenbesser also published “Theas a starting point, the authors identify and promoted to associate professor of Autocratic Mandate: Elections, Legitimacy two broad motivations for democratically- politics and global studies at Arizona State and Regime Stability in Singapore” in The elected politicians to adopt shari’a laws and University. He recently published “Random Pacific Review (2016). regulations. or Retributive? Indiscriminate Violence in the Chechen Wars” in the October 2016 Illan Nam, associate professor of political Benjamin Reilly, Dean of the Sir Walter World Politics with Emil Aslan Souleimanov, science, Colgate University, published Murdoch School of Public Policy and associate professor of international studies, Democratizing Health Care: Welfare State International Affairs, Murdoch University, Charles University of Prague. Building in Korea and Thailand (Palgrave gave invited presentations to the ‘Making Macmillan, 2016). The book examines the Democracy Work’ conference at Central Oisín Tansey, senior lecturer in international process of health reforms that resulted in European University in Budapest, the Asia relations, King’s College London, published universal health insurance coverage in the Research Centre at Murdoch University a new book, The International Politics of two countries during the early 2000s. It in Western Australia, the University of Authoritarian Rule (Oxford University attributes these outcomes to the emergence Canterbury in New Zealand, and the Perth Press, 2016), which offers a typology of of new welfare actors in Korea and Thailand USAsia Centre. He also worked in the different international forms of influence that possessed both the political resources Philippines with the Australian Embassy on authoritarianism, and examines the ways and ideological beliefs to pursue expansive in Manila to produce a series of on-line in which external forces shape autocratic welfare initiatives and argues that the articles about electoral reform options rule at the domestic level. Tansey also co- countries’ democracy movements of the for the Philippines in the lead-up to the authored an article with Kevin Koehler,
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research associate, King’s College London, University, published a Korean translation Front has sought to recast itself for electoral and Alexander Schmotz, research associate, of Democracy, Inequality and Corruption: success. How will Marine Le Pen fare in the King’s College London, entitled “Ties to Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines Compared 2017 presidential race? the Rest: Autocratic Linkage and Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2016) in Survival”, published online at Comparative September 2016. You’s chapter entitled IV. “Populism and Protest in Poland” by Political Studies in September 2016. “Corruption and Inequality in Asia” is Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk forthcoming in November 2016 in the Once the poster child for successful Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia, postcommunist transitions to democracy, Poland Lund University, Daniel Ziblatt, professor edited by Ting Gong and Ian Scott. is now governed by populist nationalists. What of government, Harvard University, and happened? Fabrice Lehoucq, associate professor of political science, University of North New Research V. “The Lost Left” by Sheri Berman Carolina-Greensboro, published the online Post-1945 Western Europe benefited greatly article “Introduction to Special Issue: The Journal of Democracy from center-left parties offering real solutions to Causes and Consequences of Secret Ballot real problems. Where has the left gone? Reform” in the April 2016 Comparative The October 2016 (Vol. 27, no. 4)Journal Political Studies. of Democracy features clusters of articles on VI. “Surging Illiberalism in the East” by “The Specter Haunting Europe” and “The Jacques Rupnik Sultan Tepe, associate professor of political Vote in the Philippines,” as well as a number The crisis of liberal democracy is Europe-wide, science, University of Chicago, published of individual studies on transition in China, but it has assumed an especially intense form in “Contesting Political Theologies of Islam Tunisia, Iraq, and Peru. Central and Eastern Europe. and Democracy in Turkey” in the Journal of Religious and Political Practice. It won the “Transition in China? More Likely than You VII. “The Unraveling of the Post-1989 2016 APSA Weber Best Paper Award from Think” by Minxin Pei Order” by Ivan Krastev the Religion and Politics section. Evidence from social science and history suggests What some had thought would be the “end of that China is entering a “transitions zone” that history” has instead turned out to be the “new Ashutosh Varshney, director of the Center will threaten its capacity to maintain both world disorder.” Deocratic liberalism may have for Contemporary South Asia and Sol authoritarian rule and high levels of economic no new ideological rival, but older identities are Goldman Professor of International Studies growth. powerfully reasserting themselves. and the Social Sciences, Brown University, published with Patrick Barron, regional The Specter Haunting Europe director of conflict and development at I. “Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s “Tunisia: Ennahda’s New Course” by Abdou the Asia Foundation, and Sana Jaffrey, Challenges” by Takis S. Pappas Filiali-Ansary PhD candidate in political science at the Liberal democracy in Europe today is under Tunisia is a small country, but its influential University of Chicago, “When Large siege from a variety of political forces, but it Islamist party has taken a big step by separating Conflicts Subside: The Ebbs and Flows of is critical to recognize the distinctions among its political wing from its religious activities. Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia” in the them. July 2016 Journal of East Asian Studies. “Iraq’s Year of Rage” by Mieczyslaw P. II. “Will the German Center Hold?” by Boduszynski Kurt Weyland, Mike Hogg Professor in Timo Lochocki Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian stripes are Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin, Europe’s democratic stability hingers on fed up with the ineptitude and corruption of published “Crafting Counterrevolution: Germany, but a far-right challenger is on the their political leaders, parties, and government How Reactionaries Learned to Combat rise. Can the country’s long-dominant centrist institutions. Change in 1848” in the May 2016 American parties hold on? Political Science Review. The Vote in the Philippines III. “‘Heritage Populism’ and France’s I. “Electing a Strongman” by Julio C. Jong-Sung You, senior lecturer of political National Front” by Dominique Reynie Teehankee and Mark R. Thompson and social change, Australian National Once a protest party, the right-wing National The surprise victory of Rodrigo Duterte in the
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Philippines’ May 2016 presidential election “Procedural Justice and Perceived Electoral Michael Christopher Marshall and John represents a major shift in the liberal-democratic Integrity: the Case of Korea’s 2012 Ishiyama regime established thirty years ago after the Presidential Election” by Youngho Cho and “people power” revolution. Yong Cheol Kim “From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties: Prospects for Post- II. “Elite Democracy Disrupted?” by David “Does Democracy Reduce Corruption?” by War Democratization” by Terrence Lyons G. Timberman Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig Duterte promised voters that he would “The Guatemalan National Revolutionary swiftly reduce crime and poverty and enact “Local Determinants of an Emerging Unit: the Long Collapse” by Michael E. constitutional change. But will he violate Electoral Hegemony: The Case of Justice Allison democratic norms and the rule of law in the and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey” process? by Kursat Cinar “Rebel-to-Political and Back? Hamas as a Security Provider in Gaza between “Peru: A Close Win for Continuity” by “Informal Interference in the Judiciary Rebellion, Politics and Governance” by Eduardo Dargent and Paula Munoz in New Democracies: A Comparison of Benedetta Berti and Beatriz Gutiérrez Peru’s economic boom is over and newly Six African and Latin American Cases” elected president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski faces by Mariana Llanos, Cordula Tibi Weber, “Dealing with Populists in Government: a Congress dominated by opposition parties, Charlotte Heyl, and Alexander Stroh the SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece” putting him in a more precarious position than by Paris Aslanidis and Cristóbal Rovira his predecessors. “Horizontal Accountability and the Kaltwasser Challenges for Democratic Consolidation “When Dictators Die” by Andrea Kendall- in Africa: Evidence from Liberia” by Landry SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES Taylor and Erica Frantz Signé and Koiffi Korha ON DEMOCRACY What political consequences can we expect when aging dictators die while in power? A fifth of the “Democratic Inclusiveness, Climate Policy African Affairs, Volume 115 Issue 460 July world’s autocracies are facing such a possibility, Outputs, and Climate Policy Outcomes” 2016 but the evidence shows that this may not augur by Tobias Böhmelt, Marit Böker and Hugh “Contested ANC Hegemony in the Urban well for democracy. Ward Townships: Evidence from the 2014 South African Election” by Marcel Paret Democratization (Volume 23, no. 7, 2016) “Arab Spring Constitution-Making: Polarization, “The African Group on the United “Holding the State at Bay: Understanding Exclusion, and Constraints” by Ester Cross Nations Human Rights Council: Shifting Media Freedoms in Africa” by Peter Von and Jason Sorens Geopolitics and the Liberal International Doepp and Daniel J. Young Order” by Eduard Jordaan Democratization (Volume 23, no. 6, 2016) “Authoritarian Backsliding and the “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘From “Electoral Campaigns as Learning Concentration of Political Power” by Bullets to Ballots: the Transformation of Opportunities: Lessons from Uganda” by Jennifer Raymond Dresden and Marc Rebel Groups into Political Parties’” by John Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz Morjé Howard Ishiyama American Political Science Review, Volume “Between Entrenchment, Reform and “Political Party Formation by Former 110, Issue 2, May 2016 Transformation: Ethnicity and Lebanon’s Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War” “Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Consociational Democracy” by John Nagle by Carrie Manning and Ian Smith Learned to Combat Change in 1848” by Kurt Weyland “Recall Referendums in Peruvian “Rebel-to-Party Transformations in Civil Municipalities: a Political Weapon for Bad War Peace Processes 1975–2011” by Mimmi “Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Losers or an Instrument of Accountability?” Söderberg Kovacs and Sophia Hatz Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion” by by Yanina Welp Güneş Murat Tezcür “Does Political Inclusion of Rebel Parties Promote Peace after Civil Conflict?” by
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“Political Characterology: On the Method “Pride Parades and Prejudice: Visibility of Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no. of Theorizing in Hannah Arendt’s Origins Roma and LGBTI Communities in Post- 10, September 2016 of Totalitarianism” by Hans-Jörg Sigwart Socialist Europe” by Aidan McGarry “Tribal Mobilization, Fragmented Groups, and Public Goods Provision in Jordan” by “The Organizational Roots of Political “State-building and Local Resistance Eleanor Gao Activism: Field Experiments on Creating a in Kosovo: Minority Exclusion through Relational Context” by Hahrie Han Inclusive Legislation” by Jelena Lončar Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no. 9, August 2016 “Systemic Representation: Democracy, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, “Coup d’État and Democracy” by Curtis Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives” Volume 49, no. 2, June 2016 Bell by Jonathan W. Kuyper “The Politics of Citizenship in Divided Nations: Policies and Trends in Germany “Colonial Migration and the Origins of “Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to and China” by Choo Chin Low Governance: Theory and Evidence from Government Performance Information” by Java” by Thomas B. Pepinsky John Holbein “Regional Differences in Political Trust: Comparing the Vysocina and Usti Regions” “Mass Organization and the Durability “Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The by Daniel Čermák, Renáta Mikešová, and of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Jana Stachová Evidence from Venezuela” by Samuel Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion” Handlin by Vincent Phillip Muñoz “From the Communist Point of View: Cultural Hegemony and Folkloric Comparative Politics, Volume 49, no. 5, “The Limits of Political Representation” by Manipulation in Albanian Studies under October 2016 Howard Schweber Socialism” by Enika Abazi and Albert Doja “Blame Avoidance and Policy Stability in Developing Democracies: The Politics of “Party Policy Diffusion” by Tobias Böhmelt, “Evaluations of Perestroika in Post-Soviet Public Security in Buenos Aires” by Hernán Lawrence Ezrow, Roni Lehrer, and Hugh Central Asia: Public Views in Contemporary Flom and Alison E. Post Ward Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” by Timur Dadabaev “Democracy by Example? Why Democracy Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Spreads When the World’s Democracies Volume 49, Issue 3, September 2016 Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no. Prosper” by Michael K. Miller “Mapping the Substance of the EU’s Civil 12, October 2016 Society Support in Central Asia: From Neo- “Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion “Between Adaptation and Breakdown: Liberal to State-led Civil Society” by Vera in Post-Communist Regions” by Tomila Conceptualizing Party Survival” by Jennifer Axyonova and Fabienne Bossuyt Lankina, Alexander Libman, and Anastassia Cyr Obydenkova “Development of Citizen Participation in Comparative Politics, Volume 48, no. 4, July Central and Eastern Europe after the EU Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no. 2016 Enlargement and Economic Crises” by 11, September 2016 “Democratizing Democracy? Civil Society Petra Guasti “Timing Is Everything: Changing Norms of and Party Organization in Bolivia” by Minority Rights and the Making of a Polish Santiago Anria “Chasing the Green Buck? Environmental Nation-State” by Sarah A. Cramsey and Activism in Post-Communist Baltic States” Jason Wittenberg “Environment and Consultation in the by Timofey Agarin and Miķelis Grīviņš Brazilian Democratic Developmental State” “Conciliatory States: Elite Ethno- by Kathryn Hochstetler and J. Ricardo “Protest and Participation in Post- Demographics and the Puzzle of Public Tranjan Transformation Poland: The Case of the Goods Within Diverse African States” by Committee for the Defense of Democracy Erin Metz McDonnell “Immigrant Political Economies and (KOD)” by Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski Exclusionary Policy in Africa” by Lauren Honig
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“Developing State Legitimacy: TheComparative Lessons from Brazil” by André “Political and Economic Accountability in a Credibility of Messengers and the Utility, Borgesa and Ryan Lloydb Delegative Democracy” by Rollin F Tusalem Fit, and Success of Ideas” by Kelly M. McMann Government and Opposition, Vol. 51, no. 4, “Remarkable Economic Growth, but So October 2016 What? The Impacts of Modernization on “The Electoral Environment and Legislator “Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Chinese Citizens’ Political Satisfaction” by Dissent” by Yael Shomer Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets” by Yida Zhai A. Carl LeVan and Assen Assenov East European Politics, Vol. 32, no. 4, 2016 “Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages and “Deepening Democratisation? Exploring Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 38, Experience with Democracy” by Christopher the declared Motives for “Late” Lustration Number 3, August 2016 D Raymond, Michael Huelshoff, and Marc in Poland” by Aleks Szczerbiak “NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo- R Rosenblum Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide” by “The EU and Rule of Law Promotion Luc Reydams International Studies Quarterly, Volume 60, in Western Balkans – a New Role for Issue 3, September 2016 Candidate States’ Parliaments” by Alexander “Women’s Progress and Women’s Human “The Wisdom of the Many in Global Strelkov Rights” by Martha C. Nussbaum Governance: An Epistemic-Democratic Defense of Diversity and Inclusion” by East European Politics, Vol. 32, no. 3, 2016 “Rethinking What is Necessary in a Hayley Stevenson “Russian Patronage over Abkhazia and Democratic Society: Militant Democracy South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict and the Turkish State” by Kathleen “Aid Modalities Matter: The Impact of Resolution” by Andre W. M. Gerrits and Cavanaugh and Edel Hughes Different World Bank and IMF Programs Max Bader on Democratization in Developing “Translating Law into Practice: Museums Countries” by Kassandra Birchler, Sophia “Power Ideas and Conflict: Ideology, Linkage and a Human Rights Community of Limpach, and Katharina Michaelowa and Leverage in Crimea and Chechnya” by Practice” by Jennifer A. Orange James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse “Do Resource-Wealthy Rulers Adopt “Freedom of Religion and Apostasy: The Transparency-Promoting Laws?” by Krishna “Linkage and Leverage Effects on Moldova’s Malaysian Experience” by Nehaluddin Chaitanya Vadlamannati and Indra De Transnistria Problem” by John Beyer and Ahmad, Ahmad Masum, and Abdul Soysa Stefan Wolff Mohaimin Ayus “Stateness, Contested Nationhood, and “Built to Last: Understanding the Link Imperiled Sovereignty: The Effects of “Linking Discourse and Practice: The between Democracy and Conflict in (Non-Western) Linkages and Leverage Human Rights-Based Approach to the International System” by Mark J.C. on Conflicts in Kyrgyzstan” by Matteo Development in the Village Assaini Program Crescenzi and Kelly M. Kadera Fumagalli in the Kongo Central” by Tine Destrooper “A Menace to the Democratic Peace? “Diffusion and Default: A Linkage and International Political Science Review, Vol. Dyadic and Systemic Difference” by Seung- Leverage Perspective on the Nagorny 37, no. 4, September 2016 Whan Choi Karabakh Conflict” by Laurence Broers “Who to Punish? Retrospective Voting and Knowledge of Government Composition in Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume Electoral Studies, Vol. 43, September 2016 a Multiparty System” by Lauri Rapeli 54, Issue 3, September 2016 “Trading Old Errors for New Errors? The “The Changing Religious Composition Impact of Electronic Voting Technology on “Policy Choices in Tough Times: The Case of Nigeria: Causes and Implications of Party Label Votes in Brazil” by Cesar Zucco of Democratization and Currency Defense” Demographic Divergence” by Marcin Jr. and Jairo M. Nicolau by Byunghwan Son Stonawski, Michaela Potančoková, Matthew Cantele, and Vegard Skirbekk “Presidential Coattails and Electoral “Electoral Authoritarianism and Political Coordination in Multilevel Elections: Unrest” by Ryan Shirah
33 Vol. 14, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2016
New Research
“Peace from Below: Governance and Middle East Policy, Vol. 23, no. 2, Summer Thomas M. Holbrook. Oxford University Peacebuilding in Kerio Valley, Kenya” by 2016 Press, 2016. 213 pp. Emma Elfversson “Libya since 2011: Political Transformation and Violence” by Hanspeter Mattes American Surveillance: Intelligence, Privacy, “Censorship or Self-Control? Hate Speech, and the Fourth Amendment. By Anthony the State and the Voter in the Kenyan “Egypt’s Future: Status Quo, Incremental Gregory. University of Wisconsin Press, Election of 2013” by Warigia M. Bowman Growth or Regional Leadership?” by Robert 2016. 263 pp. and J. David Bowman Mason Defenseless Under the Night: The Roosevelt Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 58, “Sisi, the Sinai and Salafis: Instability in a Years and the Origins of Homeland Security. no. 3, Fall 2016 Power Vacuum” by Lyndall Herman By Matthew Dallek. Oxford University “Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Press, 2016. 340 pp. Women in Cabinets?” by Catherine Reyes- “Mission Accomplished? Russia’s Housholder Withdrawal from Syria” by Emil Aslan Dreams Deferred: A Concise Guide to Souleimanov the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the “Laboring Under Chávez: Populism for the Movement to Boycott Israel. By Cary Nelson. Twenty-first Century” by Paul W. Posner “Erdogan’s “New Turkey” Slides into Indiana University Press, 2016. 396 pp. Turmoil” by Jeremy Salt “Contemporary Left-wing Populism in Obama’s Guantánamo: Stories from an Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, “Turkish-Iranian Energy Cooperation and Enduring Prison. Edited by Jonathan and Postdemocracy in Chávez’s Venezuela” Conflict: The Regional Politics” by H. Akin Hafetz. New York University Press, 2016. by Yannis Stavrakakis, Alexandros Unver 229 pp. Kioupkiolis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos “Globalization and Its Discontents in the Our Compelling Interests: The Value of MENA Region” by Robert Springborg Diversity for Democracy and a Prosperous “Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Society. Edited by Earl Lewis and Nancy Wartime Social Order: A Process-driven Party Politics, Vol. 22, no. 5, September Cantor. Princeton University Press, 2016. Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil 2016 263 pp. War” by Ana Arjona “Political Parties, Ideology and the Substantive Representation of Women” by The Risen Phoenix: Black Politics in the “Malapportionment and Ideological Bias Silvia Erzeel and Karen Celis Post–Civil War South. By Luis-Alejandro in Chilean Electoral Districts” by John M. Dinnella-Borrego. University of Virginia Carey “Representing Women Voters: The Role Press, 2016. 281 pp. of the Gender Gap and the Response of Middle East Policy, Vol. 23, no. 3, Fall 2016 Political Parties” by Rosie Campbell The Vanishing American Dream: “Oman and the GCC: A Solid Relationship?” Immigration, Population, Debt, Scarcity. by Giorgio Cafiero and Adam Yefet “Feminist Allies and Strategic Partners: By Virginia Deane Abernethy. Transaction Exploring the Relationship between the Publishers, 2016. 333 pp. “‘Early’ Transitional Justice in the Arab Women’s Movement and Political Parties” World: Lessons Learned” by Eric by Elizabeth Evans AFRICA Wiebelhaus-Brahm Civil Society, Conflict Resolution, and SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON Democracy in Nigeria. By Darren Kew. “Lebanon’s Electoral System: Is Reform DEMOCRACY Syracuse University Press, 2016. 422 pp. Possible?” by Benjamin MacQueen ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES ASIA “The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Altered States: Changing Populations, China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics Its Rise and Fall” by Pelin Telseren Kadercan Changing Parties, and the Transformation of Regime Decay. By Minxin Pei. Harvard and Burak Kadercan of the American Political Landscape. By University Press, 2016. 365 pp.
34 Vol. 14, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2016
New Research
Democratization in Hong Kong—And LATIN AMERICA AND THE The Antiegalitarian Mutation: The Failure of China? By Lynn T. White III. Lynne CARIBBEAN Institutional Politics in Liberal Democracies. Rienner, 2016. 275 pp. The Limits to Citizen Power: Participatory By Nadia Urbinati and Arturo Zampaglione, Democracy and the Entanglement of the translated by Martin Thom. Columbia Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and State. By Victor Albert. Pluto Press, 2016. University Press, 2016. 191 pp. the Asia-Pacific War. By Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider. Stanford University Press, MIDDLE EAST Demands on Democracy. By José María 2016. 356 pp. Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Maravall. Oxford University Press, 2016. Uprising. By Gilber Achcar. Stanford 135 pp. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE University Press, 2016. 226 pp. FORMER SOVIET UNION Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Countries. By Bumba Mukherjee. University Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Contention and Conciliation. Edited by of Chicago Press, 2016. 315 pp. Ukraine. Edited by Henry E. Hale and Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi. Robert W. Orttung. Stanford University Indiana University Press, 2016. 318 pp. Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Press, 2016. 322 pp. Institutions and State Violence. By Sheena COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, Chestnut Greitens. Cambridge University The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, GENERAL Press, 2016. 324 pp. Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 2000–2015. America Abroad: The United States’ Global Edited by Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. Role in the 21st Century. By Stephen G. Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self- Edinburgh University Press, 2016. 424 pp. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. Oxford Rule in European and American Thought. By University Press, 2016. 274 pp. James T. Kloppenberg. Oxford University The State as Investment Market: Kyrgyzstan Press, 2016. 892 pp. in Comparative Perspective. By Johan The Anglo-American Tradition of Liberty: A Engvall. University of Pittsburgh Press, View from Europe. By Joao Carlos Espada. 2016. 230 pp. Routledge, 2016. 212 pp.
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Editorial Committee
is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and APSA-CDexpanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.
Executive Editor Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science Ellen Lust is the Founding Director of the Programs on and director of the V-Dem Institute, University Governance and Local Development at Yale University of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of and at the University of Gothenburg, and Professor in Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; the Department of Political Science at the University selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research of Gothenburg. She has authored Structuring Conflict in the Arab Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of Democracy and World as well as articles in Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections: Political Studies, and other journals, and edited The Middle East A New Mode of Transition?, and has also worked on women’s and several volumes. The Moulay Hicham Foundation, NSF, the representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral Swedish Research Council and other foundations have supported systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian her research on authoritarianism, political transitions, and local legislature and executive- legislative relationships. governance.
Members Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the Adam Harris received his Ph.D. from New York V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies University in August 2015. He specializes in ethnic and identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His African politics. Adam has conducted research on ethnic current project uses data from extensive field and survey identifiability (recently published in the Journal of research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between Conflict Resolution), ethnic and immigrant prejudice, the language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list determinants of political protests, ideological ideal point experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and estimation among African legislators, and the effects of foreign Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social aid in recipient countries. His research has been supported by the identities. National Science Foundation, New York University, and Columbia University. Rachel Sigman is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg and an Kristen Kao is a Research Fellow with the Program Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School on Governance and Local Development (GLD) at in Monterey, California. She studies African politics the University of Gothenburg and a PhD Candidate and the political economy of development. Her current research in Political Science at UCLA. In 2014, she ran a investigates the ways that political financing shape patronage nationwide survey in Jordan in collaboration with practices and governing outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. She is Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead funded by the GLD program at also working on projects that develop new measures of state Yale. She has served as a program consultant and election monitor capacity and revisits the relationship between state-building and for a variety of international organizations, including the Carter democratization. Center and the National Democratic Institute. Managing Editor Anna Lührmann is a post-doctoral fellow at the Melissa Aten is the senior research and conferences V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at International Forum for Democratic Studies and Humboldt University (Berlin) - studies the causes and effects of associate director of the Network of Democracy Research United Nation’s electoral assistance. She currently works on Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion. focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.
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