All Along the Watchtower: Linear Defenses and the Introduction of Serfdom in Russia Preliminary, please do not cite Andrea Matranga∗ Timur Nathkovy August 29, 2018 Abstract Why did Russia enserf its previously free peasants, just as Western Europe was un- dergoing the opposite transition? Domar argued that Russia's low population density would have resulted in a high equilibrium wage, and therefore created the incentives for the nobility to restrict labor mobility, so as to appropriate the agricultural surplus. However, while this explains the cross-sectional pattern, it cannot explain why serfdom was not reintroduced in the west after the Black Death. In this paper I propose a new theory, that argues that serfdom was necessary to ensure that the defense cordon against the Tatar slave raids from the south could be effectively manned. In support of my the- ory I demonstrate a geographic association between serfdom and the sequence of linear defenses employed. I also deploy spatial methods to calculate the optimal invasion routes for Tatars, as well as the optimal defense lines to block the raids. I find that modern patterns of development are significantly correlated with calculated defense lines towards the South, where nomadic raids made the cordon defense necessary, but not towards the West, where invaders had extensive logistical tails and could be effectively parried by blocking only the major roads. ∗Chapman University yHigher School of Economics 1 1 Introduction Until approximately 1550, the Russian lands were overwhelmingly farmed by free tenant labor (Klyuchevsky, 1911). The Russian peasant did owe rent to his landlord, but he was free to move at any time, and as a result his rent was determined largely by market forces. These freedoms were gradually removed over the course of the following century, so that by 1650 the peasant was bonded to his landowner, and essentially at his complete mercy (Khodarkovsky, 2002). This tragic loss of freedom is all the more puzzling given that most of Europe was experiencing the opposite trend, abolishing the worst strictures of feudal societies, and letting the peasants relocate at will. The traditional explanation for the enserfment of the Russian peasant was provided by (Domar, 1970), who argued that since land was abundant in Russia, free agricultural labor would have resulted in very high equilibrium wages. Landowners therefore had very strong incentives to collude and keep the labor force enserfed. In the West on the other hand, population density was much higher, so that wages were in any case reasonably close to the subsistence limit. Under these conditions, it made no sense to spend a lot of time and effort controlling peasants and restricting their movement, and it was easier and cheaper to simply pay them the fair market wage. The problem with this theory (as Domar himself pointed out), was that it would predict a return to serfdom in Western Europe after the Black Death essentially halved its population, while instead the process of serf enfranchisement continued, indeed in many cases accelerated. Domar therefore proposed that the effect of population density on the conditions of the farming population was fundamentally ambiguous: on the one hand, a lower population density increases the equilibrium wage that agricultural labor would receive if it were free, but on the other it also increased the incentives of the landed class to dramatically restrict their freedom. I propose a new theory for the introduction of serfdom in the Russian lands, which generates unambiguous predictions on which types of societies should adopt serfdom, and which should allow free movement of agricultural labor. Central to my theory is the fact that the decision of laborers to locate in different areas can impose important defense externalities on their fellow citizens. In the Russian case, the primary threat came from Tatar raiders to the South, who would regularly scour the countryside in cavalry raids up to 80,000 men strong (Khodarkovsky, 2002). Their primary objective was capturing 2 slaves, which were then mainly sold onwards to the Ottoman empire. Since the raiders had superior mobility and no logistical tail, it was impossible to block these raids by building fortresses on the main lines of communication { the raiders could simply bypass such point defenses. An efficient way to defend against such raids was by adopting a cordon defense (Clausewitz and Howerd P., 2007), which in the Russian case meant building { and manning { a continuous series of ramparts and palisades stretching over 1000 km. The fundamental theory advanced by this paper is that while this system could po- tentially secure an enormous area, it was unfortunately incompatible with the free move- ment of labor. Crucial to the security of this system was its spatial continuity: the Tatars would certainly find any gaps and exploit them, putting in jeopardy the entire population of the state. Inevitably, parts of the defense line would need to cross areas that were less fertile than others, where the marginal productivity at any given popu- lation density would necessarily be lower. If peasants decided to leave for more fertile areas { which paid higher wages { the allocative efficiency of the economy would increase, but a dangerous gap would have been opened in the defenses. For the labor of those peasant was necessary to ensure that the local land owners/soldiers had the means to afford horses and arms, as well as report for duty on the wall for months at a time. A theoretical alternative would have been to let peasants reallocate as they pleased, and then tax them (or the landowners), so as to pay salaries to a dedicated military class. Indeed this was the system towards which nearly every Czar from Peter I onwards tried to laboriously maneuver Russia. But in the 16th century, no European country had the state capacity to efficiently tax a country as agrarian and dispersed as Russia. To support my theory, I first analyze the Russian defense system, and show how the military and productive spheres interacted within the region. Then I draw on records of serfdom from the 19th century to show that the regions with the highest prevalence of serfdom were those that had to support fortification lines. Specifically, areas that were part of the active defense line in the 16th century { when the army was organized along strictly feudal lines { maintained the highest percentage of private serfdom, while areas that were part of the 17th century defense lines { when the army was undergoing a series of centralizing reforms { maintained a very high percentage of state serfs (a more liberal land tenure regime). 3 The possibility exists that the correlation between serfdom and the defense lines may be due to some other underlying variable, which has a causal effect on both. For example, certain areas might be more fertile, making both their defense important, and the use of serfs profitable. To avoid possible endogeneity concerns, I construct a novel measure for the suitability for fortifications, which combines the direction of the main nomadic threat, their most frequent target, and the network of rivers which determined both the best axis of attack, and the cheapest fortification construction costs. I then show that areas that were more suitable for fortifications still have more night lights today. This is because the defense line was punctuated by fortified towns, which then persisted, becoming the cities of today. This finding highlights the extent to which the Czar was willing to compromise the economic efficiency { in this case, the placement of towns { to achieve defense goals, and that this particular compromise was only enacted on the southern front, the direction of the nomadic threat. This research improves on the existing literature along several axis. First of all, I introduce a new theory for the introduction of serfdom, that differs from the existing the- ories by assuming that { aside from distributional considerations between social classes { rulers had strong preferences over the actual geographic location of their agricultural labor force, and that these preferences were related to the need to efficiently defend the borders. Essentially, I argue that whenever the free movement of labor would result in a geographic distribution of the population which severely complicates the defense of the state, rulers will have a powerful incentive to limit the mobility of the population, poten- tially by enacting serfdom. Another way of viewing this is by saying that in deciding to move away from low-wage (but strategically important) districts, workers are neglecting the negative security externality that they are imposing on the rest of the population. In this interpretation, accepting a ruler which imposes serfdom is a crude coordination device in the face of an enemy more fearsome than indentured work. I also show how this theory can help understand the differential impact of the intro- duction of gunpowder on serfdom between Eastern and Western Europe. In the West, medieval warfare was based on extended cavalry raids (DeVries, 2003). While soldiers lived as settled landowners during peacetime, for the purpose of warfare they became effectively pro tempore nomads, scouring the land untrammeled by supply lines or fixed bases of operations. While the European topography did not require continuous lines of 4 fortifications, defending effectively against such a threat still required some soldiers (and their support population) to live in some areas where it was not economically efficient to do so. When artillery was introduced, cavalry armies were robbed of their operational mobility advantage, and in particular became dependent on roads. Thus, strong fortifi- cations along the main trade routes were sufficient to create impermeable frontiers, even though the space in between was technically passable. As a result, Western European states concentrated resources in improving their urban centers, and could afford to let the rural population allocate according to productive efficiency.