TABLE OF CONTENTS MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PART I: Strategy CHAPTER 1 - THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY PART II: Today’s Armed Forces CHAPTER 2 - U.S. FORCES CHAPTER 3 - CONVENTIONAL FORCES CHAPTER 4 - SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CHAPTER 5 - STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES CHAPTER 6 - MISSILE DEFENSES CHAPTER 7 - SPACE FORCES CHAPTER 8 - COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CHAPTER 9 - TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION CHAPTER 10 - PERSONNEL CHAPTER 11 - READINESS CHAPTER 12 - QUALITY OF LIFE PART III: Transforming U.S. Armed Forces for the 21st Century CHAPTER 13 - THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JOINT VISION 2010 CHAPTER 14 - NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS CHAPTER 15 - IMPLEMENTATION PART IV: Transforming the Department of Defense for the 21st Century CHAPTER 16 - DEFENSE REFORM CHAPTER 17 - FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM CHAPTER 18 - ACQUISITION REFORM CHAPTER 19 - INFRASTRUCTURE CHAPTER 20 - INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS PART V: The FY 1999 Defense Budget and Future Years Defense Program CHAPTER 21 - THE FY 1999 DEFENSE BUDGET AND FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM PART VI: Statutory Reports Report of the Secretary of the Army Report of the Secretary of the Navy Report of the Secretary of the Air Force Report of the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board APPENDICES A - DoD Organizational Charts B - Budget Tables C - Personnel Tables D - Force Structure Tables E - Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report F - Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Report G - Personnel Readiness Factors by Race and Gender (Text only) H - National Security and the Law of the Sea Convention (Not included) I - Freedom of Navigation (Not included) J - Government Performance and Results Act (Not included) K - Information Technology Management Goals (Not included) L – Glossary (Not included) 1 MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Having inherited the defense structure that won the Cold War and Desert Storm, the Clinton Administration intends to leave as its legacy a defense strategy, a military, and a Defense Department that have been transformed to meet the new challenges of a new century. Our strategy will ensure that America continues to lead a world of accelerating change by shaping the emerging security environment to reduce threats and to promote our interests and by responding to crises that threaten our interests. We will execute the strategy with superior military forces that fully exploit advances in technology by employing new operational concepts and organizational structures. And we will support our forces with a Department that is as lean, agile, and focused as our warfighters. Toward this end, the Department of Defense last year conducted perhaps the most fundamental and comprehensive review ever conducted of defense posture, policy, and programs. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined the national security threats, risks, and opportunities facing the United States today and out to 2015. Based on this analysis, we designed a defense strategy to implement the defense requirements of the President’s National Security Strategy for a New Century. Our defense strategy has three central elements: • Shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests by promoting regional stability, reducing threats, preventing conflicts, and deterring aggression and coercion on a day–to–day basis. • Respond to the full spectrum of crises that threaten U.S. interests by deterring aggression and coercion in a crisis, conducting smaller–scale contingency operations, and fighting and winning major theater wars. • Prepare now for an uncertain future through a focused modernization effort, development of new operational concepts and organizations to fully exploit new technologies, programs to ensure high quality personnel at all levels, and efforts to hedge against threats that are unlikely but which would have disproportionate security implications such as the emergence of a regional great power before 2015. This is not mere rhetoric. It is the basis for what our defense planners and military forces do every day. Since the QDR was undertaken: • We have shaped the international security environment by maintaining significant overseas force deployments and enhancing options for future forward presence; acting to enlarge NATO and to enhance the Partnership for Peace; establishing the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the NATO–Ukraine Charter; implementing the revised U.S.–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation; reaching agreement with the Republic of Korea on the long–term, post–unification need to sustain the alliance; initiating a trilateral U.S.– Japanese–South Korean security dialogue; establishing a defense dimension to the ASEAN Regional Forum; establishing Defense Consultative Talks and enhanced 2 military–to–military ties with China; and normalizing defense cooperation with Latin American democracies. • We have responded to crises around the globe, containing Saddam Hussein; participating in the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia; evacuating noncombatants from west Africa and from Albania; and fighting fires in Indonesia and delivering emergency humanitarian assistance to China. • We have accelerated preparations for the future by conducting warfighting experiments to test new systems and operational concepts and by greatly enhancing our efforts to defend against asymmetric threats—such as chemical, biological, and information attacks—through exercises, new programs, additional resources, organizational change, and outreach to other governmental and private sector organizations facing similar threats. As a result of the QDR process, the Department’s plans and programs were changed to reflect and carry out this strategy. And as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative, undertaken as a follow–on to the QDR, the Department’s organizational structure and business practices also are being changed to reflect and carry out this strategy. Finally, the Department of Defense budget for FY 1999 and future years, which I am now presenting to the Congress and the American people, is based upon and designed to meet this strategy: • To meet the strategy’s requirement to shape the international environment, this budget funds the deployment of about 100,000 troops in the Asia–Pacific and European theaters, as well as continuous carrier and amphibious task force deployments; supports NATO enlargement and the enhanced Partnership for Peace; and funds such efforts as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. • To be able to respond to the full spectrum of crises as required by the strategy, this budget supports the necessary force structure and maintains those forces in a high state of readiness. To ensure this high state of readiness in both the near term and the long term, it also streamlines support and base structure to free DoD resources for Operation and Maintenance and acquisition accounts. In this regard, two additional rounds of base realignment and closure are essential. • To fulfill the strategy’s requirement to prepare now for the future, this budget meets the QDR’s modernization funding goals, including exceeding the QDR’s target of $60 billion in FY 2001; implements Joint Vision 2010, including accelerating programs such as the Force XXI digitization; devotes additional resources and programs to meet asymmetrical threats; and pursues programs to ensure the continued high quality of personnel, who take as long or longer to develop into key leadership positions at various levels as it takes to develop and deploy major weapon systems. 3 It is critical to note that successfully executing this strategy requires that resources be reallocated from overhead and support activities to our fighting forces. Failure to do so will threaten the readiness of our forces today and in the future. It also threatens our ability to maintain an adequate force structure because, one way or another, we must ensure that we are ready to respond. If we are not permitted to pay for readiness by cutting unneeded spending, then we will pay for it by cutting needed but lower priority spending—knowing full well that this would entail greater risk. This is not an option that I, nor in my view the American people, find acceptable. Given the strong encouragement Congress has given to our reform effort in the abstract, I trust that we will continue to receive support now that concrete decisions have been made. America begins the new millennium as the world’s sole superpower, the indispensable nation. The responsibilities are heavy and the choices difficult. But with those responsibilities and choices come enormous opportunities and benefits for our nation and our people. Our defense strategy and the National Security Strategy it supports will enable us to seize those opportunities and reap those benefits if we have the right assets to execute our strategy. Having the right assets means much more than receiving the requested topline—it also means spending those resources on the right programs and having sufficient flexibility to be able to wisely manage those resources in a complex and fluid environment. This budget charts the path for ensuring that our defense enterprise and military forces are fully modern, in every sense, and fully capable of executing the strategy in order to protect and promote America’s interests in a challenging and changing world. /signed/ William S. Cohen 4 Chapter 1 THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Since the founding