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New Waves in Philosophical Logic New Waves in Philosophy Series Editors: Vincent F New Waves in Philosophical Logic New Waves in Philosophy Series Editors: Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard Titles include: Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION Michael Brady NEW WAVES IN META-ETHICS Thom Brooks (editor) NEW WAVES IN ETHICS Otavio Bueno and Oystein Linnebo (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS Boudewijn DeBruin and Christopher F. Zurn (editors) NEW WAVES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Maksymilian Del Mar NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW Allan Hazlett (editor) NEW WAVES IN METAPHYSICS Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (editors) NEW WAVES IN EPISTEMOLOGY P.D. Magnus and Jacob Busch (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Yujin Nagasawa and Erik J. Wielenberg (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger and Soren Riis (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY Thomas S. Petersen, Jesper Ryberg and Clark Wolf (editors) NEW WAVES IN APPLIED ETHICS Greg Restall and Gillian Russell (editors) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC Sarah Sawyer (editor) NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones (editors) NEW WAVES IN AESTHETICS Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen and Cory D. Wright (editors) NEW WAVES IN TRUTH Future Volumes New Waves in Philosophy of Mind New Waves in Formal Philosophy New Waves in Philosophy Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–53797–2 (hardcover) Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–53798–9 (paperback) (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England New Waves in Philosophical Logic Edited by Greg Restall University of Melbourne, Australia and Gillian Russell Washington University in St Louis, Missouri, USA Selection and editorial matter © Greg Restall and Gillian Russell 2012 Chapters © their individual authors 2012 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-25173-1 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-25174-8 ISBN 978-1-137-00372-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137003720 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data New waves in philosophical logic / edited by Greg Restall, Gillian Russell. p. cm. Summary: "Philosophical logic has been, and continues to be, a driving force behind much progress and development in philosophy more broadly. This collection by up-and-coming philosophical logicians deals with a broad range of topics, including, for example, proof-theory, probability, context-sensitivity, dialetheism and dynamic semantics”– Provided by publisher. 1. Logic. 2. Philosophy. I. Restall, Greg, 1969– II. Russell, Gillian Kay, 1976– BC50.N49 2012 160—dc23 2012011174 10987654321 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 Contents Series Editors’ Preface vi Notes on Contributors vii Introduction 1 Greg Restall and Gillian Russell 1 How Things Are Elsewhere 8 Wolfgang Schwarz 2 Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic 30 Barteld Kooi 3 Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic 39 Francesca Poggiolesi and Greg Restall 4 The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge 63 Daniel Cohnitz 5 From Type-Free Truth to Type-Free Probability 84 Hannes Leitgeb 6 Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty 95 David Jehle and Brian Weatherson 7 Skepticism about Reasoning 112 Sherrilyn Roush, Kelty Allen and Ian Herbert 8 Lessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligationes 142 Catarina Dutilh Novaes 9 How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion 169 Francesco Berto 10 Lessons from the Logic of Demonstratives 190 Gillian Russell 11 The Multitude View on Logic 217 Matti Eklund Index 241 v Series Editors’ Preface The aim of this series is to gather the young and up-and-coming scholars in philosophy to give their views of the subject now and in the years to come, and to serve a documentary purpose that is, “this is what they said then, and this is what happened”. It will also provide a snapshot of cutting-edge research that will be of vital interest to researchers and students working in all subject areas of philosophy. The goal of the series is to have a New Waves volume in every one of the main areas of philosophy. We would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for taking on the entire New Waves in Philosophy series. Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard vi Contributors Kelty Allen is a PhD candidate in the Group in Logic and the Method- ology of Science at U.C., Berkeley. She is writing a dissertation on algorithmic randomness and Brownian motion, and she also works on recursion theory and epistemology. Francesco Berto is Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, UK. He has been a fellow of the Universities of Notre Dame, Indiana, Vienna, Padua, and the Sorbonne-Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris. He has writ- ten various books on ontology, philosophy of logic, and continental rationalism, and essays for Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Philosophia Mathematica, Dialectica, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, European Journal of Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Daniel Cohnitz received his PhD from the University of Düsseldorf, Germany, in 2005 and is now a full professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu, Estonia. He is the author of Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie [Thought Experiments in Philosophy], and co-author (with Marcus Rossberg) of Nelson Goodman, and (with Manuel Bremer) Information and Information Flow: An Introduction. He has also written on philosophy of language and logic, history and philosophy of science, and philosophy of linguistics. Catrina Dutilh Novaes received her PhD from Leiden in 2006 and is now an assistant professor of Philosophy at Groningen University. She is the author of Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories – Suppositio, Consequentia and Obligationes (2007) and Formal Languages in Logic – A Cognitive Perspec- tive (2012). She has published in journals such as Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of the History of Philosophy and Synthese. Her interests range from the history of logic (Latin medieval logic in particular) to naturalized philosophy, drawing on results from psychology and cognitive science for the discussion of philosophical issues pertaining to logic. Matti Eklund is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Cornell Univer- sity. He has published articles in many areas of philosophy, primarily metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of logic. vii viii Contributors Ian Herbert is a PhD candidate in the Group in Logic and the Method- ology of Science at U.C., Berkeley. He is writing a dissertation on Kolmogorov complexity and mutual information of reals. His other interests include recursion theory and epistemology. David Jehle received his PhD from Cornell University in 2009. His dis- sertation focused on probability and Bayesian confirmation theory. In 2010, he studied international affairs and national security policy at Texas A&M, graduating with honors. In 2011, he graduated from the Police Academy in Colorado and now works as a police officer for the Oklahoma City Police Department. Barteld Kooi is Lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Univer- sity of Groningen. After his PhD he worked on topics in dynamic epistemic logic, probabilistic logic, deontic logic and related subjects. Together with Hans van Ditmarsch and Wiebe van der Hoek he wrote Dynamic Epistemic Logic, the first textbook on the subject. He leads the NWO-Vidi project “Logics for Intelligent Interaction: Expressivity and Succinctness”. Hannes Leitgeb received PhDs in Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of Salzburg. After five years at the University of Bris- tol he moved to Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich where he is now Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Language. He is especially interested in the applications of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy; since 2011 he has also been the editor-in-chief of Erkenntnis. Francesca Poggiolesi received a double PhD at the University of Florence and at the University of Paris 1-Sorbonne. She has been a researcher at the Free University of Brussels and at the IHPST of Paris. She is the author of the book Gentzen Calculi for Modal Propositional Logic, as well as of many articles in journals such as Synthese, Review of Symbolic and Studia Logica.
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