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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission ofof the the copyrightcopyright owner.owner. Further Further reproduction reproduction prohibited prohibited without without permission. permission. HINDUTVA: REIMAGINING INDIA
by
Rakhi Sehgal
submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in
International Affairs
Signatures of the Committee:
Chair:
j t i Q - r D
Dean of the School Date
1995 The American University Hlb % Washington, D.C. 20016
TBS AMEBIC1N UNIVERSITY T.TfiTMtM
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1995
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table of contents
Introduction 1
I. "India" is bom 10 A. Imagining India 11 B. Nehru's India 14 C. Hindutva 23 i. Contemporary Resurgence of Hindutva 29 ii. RemodellingHindutva 50 iii. Creation of the Muslim "Other" 59
II. The Secularism Debate 65 A. The Secularist Argument 70 B. A Critique of Modernity 79
III. Hindutva as the Raison d'etre of New Social Groups 95 A. The Industry-Agriculture Contradiction 100 B. Shifting Roles of State and Civil Society 107 C. Seeking a 'Hindu' Identity 111 D. Hindu Identity or an Indigenized Identity? 118
Bibliography 122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Introduction
The starting point o f critical elaboration is the consciousness o f what one really is, and is "knowing thyself as a product o f the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity o f traces, without leaving an inventory.
Antonio Gramsci (1992, 1971), pp 324.
By the 1980s, it was becoming apparent that the Nehruvian project of a secular
and socialist country that had formed the core of Indian identity for the past forty
years, no longer served as the cement of society. National discourse in India today
reflects the introspective mood of the country, prompted by the search for a new
national project. This moment in contemporary Indian history has evoked a re
engagement with questions that were ignored during India's anti-colonial movement
as well as in the acts(s) of framing a national identity in the period immediately
following political independence.
The break with India's past attempted by Nehru in an effort to fashion a
modem India, has exhausted its potential. Alternative visions of India both within
and without the erstwhile Indian National Congress, have re-emerged in different
forms through the agency of new social groups. Concurrently, during this decade the
country has been faced with severe social and economic transformations, that have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. intensified the sense of malaise permeating the public mood. The most successful
movement in the decade of the eighties that has had a profound impact on the
direction and terms of the national discourse isHindutva the movement of the Hindu
Right.
Hindutva is the idea that Hindus constitute a nation coterminous with the
boundaries of the Indian State. The idea emerged in the early part of this century
along with other responses to British colonialism. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), a Hindu organization, has long championed this idea. Along with its
affiliates, the RSS was the primary force behind the re-emergenceoi Hindutva in the
1980s.
In this thesis I have chosen to examine the shifting contours of Indian identity
through a close examination of the rise of theHindutva movement. TheHindutva
movement has been successful in challenging the declining, yet substantial hegemony
of the Congress Party. A cursory look at the movement shows that it embodies many
contradictory impulses. Although the movement began with primary support from the
new social groups emerging in Indian society, by the end of the decade of the eighties,
the logic of Hindutva resonated among a diverse polity, divided across region, caste,
class, occupation, social status, gender and religion. Despite its rabid anti-Muslim
rhetoric and acts of co-option and violence against both the Muslims and the
Backward Classes, many among these communities support the movement.
Moreover, the Hindutva movement seems to anchor its logic in (Indian) Hindu
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tradition and religion, and yet advances a sophisticated and modem vision of India.
In this alternate view of India, a nation confident of its "real" identity, nurtured by the
strength of its ancient heritage and wisdom is better able to meet the challenge of an
increasingly competitive and interdependent world.
The first phase of the discourse of Hindutva, was marked by an extensive
deployment of "ideological propaganda, communal polarization and violence."1 An
arsenal of religious and nationalist images and symbols was dispensed by the Hindu
Right, in an effort to secure a political constituency. The newness of these claims
was sought to be 'naturalized' by appealing to a (fabricated) notion of the antiquity of
the Hindu community and its inherent claims on the Indian nation. In other words,
the proponentsoi Hindutva claimed that a Hindu India was the authentic and natural
essence of India, as opposed to a secular (Nehmvian) India that was merely an
imitation of the West. The self-proclaimed goal of Hindutva was to return the
country to its rightful glory by recovering and updating a pure, uncorrupted version
of India from ancient history.
The second phase of the discourse ofHindutva was marked by the Hindu
Right's challenge to Nehmvian secularists' monopoly over defining the axial principal
of Indian identity. The Hindu Right rejected the Nehmvian ideal of secularism as a
western practice adopted by Indian elites who were alienated from their own society.
1 Hasan (1994): 42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Instead, the Hindu Right expressed a desire to elucidate a "new" raison d'etre for India
grounded in indigenous values, idiom, history and social practices of Hinduism. This
challenge evoked a flurry of theorizing on the concept and practice of secularism and
most importantly, its aptness for India. As the debate progressed, two opposing
arguments, that I categorize as secularist and anti-modernist, came to dominate the
discussion on secularism. I discuss these arguments via the recent defense of
secularism by Ashutosh Varshney against Ashis Nandy's critique of modernity.
Varshney's defense of secularism is characteristic of the dominant view that
interprets the emergenceoi Hindutva as simply the consequence of corrupt practices
of unscrupulous politicians in the post-NehruvianHindutva era. is interpreted as a
rekindling of "old" antagonisms between the Hindu and Muslim communities, cloaked
in contemporary terms of discourse. Consequently, efforts have been directed toward
uncovering the 'real' (petty) motivations understood to be grounded in socio-economic
rivalry, but camouflaged by the rhetoric of lofty and idealistic goals of national unity
and glory. In this view, the popularity Hindutva of is explained as blatant
manipulation by self-serving politicians of a naive populace disoriented by the rapid
pace of transformations sweeping across the country. Unable to bear the stresses and
strains of a shifting political economy, the masses seek comfort and meaning in the
stability of an established authority and fixed expectations, that reinforces their place
in the social matrix.
While this view is correct in identifying the events surrounding the emergence
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the Hindutva, the argument is problematic on several counts. First, the argument
turns on an analysis of immediate events, while it ignores a historical understanding
of societal processes that underpin the emergence of a movement to reshape Indian
identity. Second, this argument privileges an essentialist understanding of society.
I understand essentialism as the idea that people and social institutions embody
immutable attributes that remain unaffected across time and space. Thus, not only do
people, societies and human institutions remain fundamentally the same; their core
attributes can be recovered once the superficial layers of subterfuge are eliminated.
This view allows for no human agency or co-constructiveness of reality by the agents
who live it. Truth, Reality and History are believed to be singular and preordained,
like the laws of nature that are simply repeated through the ages. Governed by the
assumption that people do not have the power to construct their own future; control
over one's destiny is sought by technocratic tinkering of existing structures. The
option of constructing one's life choices is denied. Hence, the emerging debates over
shaping a new Indian identity are either interpreted as false consciousness on the part
of a naive populace or reduced to political machinations.
On the other hand, Nandy locates the debate on secularism within a critique
of the larger project of modernity. According to him, an uncritical acceptance of the
terms of discourse and the inherited images of Indian society both on the part of the
secularists and the Hindu Right is problematic. Rather than accepting the governing
baseline for the debate on Indian identity, Nandy submits a penetrating evaluation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the principles and assumptions that sustain the hegemony of an 'alien' belief system
in the garb of universalism. In his view, the crisis of secularism currently witnessed
in India has deeper roots than the immediate events cited by the secularists. Nandy
interprets the current condition of Indian society as the result of the maturing of the
internal contradictions of the logic of modernity that came to India riding on the
coattails of British colonialism. According to Nandy, the western vision of
modernity, built upon a dualistic conception of the world is inherently flawed. An
exclusivist logic that allows no room for interconnection and intersubjectivity, is at
the root of the violence and injustice that pervades the modem vision. Nandy is
particularly critical of the idea of a singular History and a singular future that this
vision of modernity upholds. In this narrative, the past of the western countries is
projected as the future of Third World countries. An uncritical acceptance of this
narrative by many Indians has committed the country to a logic produced in the West
and that fails to take into account the local needs, desires, conceptions of the world,
values and social practices. Hence, the modernist (colonial) vision continues to
survive and has led to conditions of "internal colonization" by Indian elites.
Nandy's objective in examining the categories of thought that dominate the
debate on secularism is to raise self-consciousness and awareness of Indian society
so that the future that is taking shape may incorporate hitherto marginalized belief
systems that Nandy believes are more tolerant of diversity and pluralism than the
western logic of modernity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nandy's analysis provides the point of departure for this thesis. The situating
of the ideology of secularism within the larger project of modernity leads Nandy to
argue that Hindutva is based on modem assumptions similar to those underpinning
Nehmvian secularism. Hence,Hindutva cannot be understood as a "resurgence of
tradition," the dominant interpretation in mainstream analyses. Instead, Nandy
interprets the recent surge of violence, fundamentalism and zealotry as manifestations
of the maturing contradictions of the modem vision. However, I reject the
primordialist notion of identity and the romanticization of traditional communities
that characterizes Nandy's analysis. Most importantly, Nandy ignores the material
realm altogether and the changes within the Indian political economy that underpin
the changing consciousness emphasized by his analysis.
This thesis attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of the current
debate by synthesizing some of the elements within both these positions. I locate my
argument in a longer historical perspective that allows us to identify deeper structural
changes that are transforming the shape of Indian society. Contra the dominant
essentialist perspective in the literature, I posit an alternative that emphasizes agency
on the part of social actors, both at die individual and collective levels. Consequently,
social structures and identities are understood to be interactively constructed, multi
faceted and shifting in accordance with changing circumstances.
The condition in India today if framed by three developments—the decline of
Nehmvian secularism; the growth and differentiation of Indian political economy; and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the emergence of a cultural debate over the construction of an alternative Indian
identity. The thrust of my argument is that the movementHindutva of is one
expression of the process of constructing an Indian identity commensurate with the
changing consciousness of the Indian polity. The emerging consciousness has been
shaped in part by the enervation of the Nehmvian vision of a secular and socialist
India, and partly by the social and material transformations that had been in the
making for several decades and finally reached a turning point in the decade of the
eighties.
My analysis is informed by a dynamic notion of identity that recognizes the
agency of social actors. Identities are understood to be intersubjective constructions
{not fabrications) informed by historical social practices and material conditions
prevailing in the society. Self-identification is necessarily an act of empowerment
that involves the construction of a past that explains the present, particularly the
claims being made in the present. Hence, the search for an authentic past and the
rhetoric of establishing a "Ramrajya" (the ideal society governed by Lord Ram),
although expressed as the search for or the recovery of, a pure and fixed essence, is
an expression of the desire to embody an identity that relates closely to the value-
systems, morals and principles held by the society at a given moment of history.
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the birth of the
idea of "India" under conditions of colonial subjugation. Two constructions of India,
one by Nehru and the other by Hindu nationalists, are discussed. This section
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. demonstrates that the antinomies of the legacy of the nationalist movement,
particularly the uncritical acceptance of the western model of the nation-state and the
construction of India's past, anchored in Hindu culture, are at the root of the current
dilemma facing Indian society. The next section discusses the two dominant
interpretations ofHindutva, namely the secularist and the anti-modernist positions
articulated by Varshney and Nandy respectively. In the last section, I offer an
alternative interpretation of the riseHindutva, of located at the interstices of three
developments that form the current conjuncture of Indian history. The changing
Indian political economy, emergence of new social groups and the shifting roles of
the Indian state and civil society, particularly the emergence of alternative cultural
sites for public expression of diverse views and constructions of the self, are
discussed. This section concludes that the primary impetus for an alternative
construction of Indian identity is engendered by the expanding political economy,
specifically the development of expanded resources and multiplicity of cultural sites
autonomous of the state. While the debate on Indian identity is far from over, one of
its aspects is clearly the desire for recognition and respect of indigenous culture and
social practices, not merely Hindu culture but an amalgamation of India's diverse
heritage.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter!.
"India" Is Born
River for River, the Mississippi is nearly as good as the Ganga and its waters are not altogether bitter. The stones, trees and greens in Hindustan are just as good or bad stones and trees and greens o f the respective species elsewhere. Hindustan is a Fatherland and Holyland to us not because it is a land entirely unlike any other land in the world, but because it is associated with our history and has been the home o f our forefathers wherein our mothers gave us the first suckle at their breast and our fathers cradled us on their knees from generation to generation.
Veer Savarkar1
She was like an ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer o f thought and revery had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously. All o f these existed together in our conscious or subconscious selves, though we might not be aware of them, and they had gone to build up the complex and mysterious personality ofIndia. ... Though outwardly there was diversity and infinite variety among our people, everywhere there was that tremendous impress o f oneness, which had held all o f us together for ages past, whatever political fate or misfortune had befallen us. ...The essential unity had been so powerful that no political division, no disaster or catastrophe had been able to overcome it.
Jawaharlal Nehru (1946), pp 47.
1 Quoted in Keer (1966): 266.
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Imagining India1
Contrary to established "Indian history" the impulse to "imagine" into
existence the idea of "India" did not emerge until the after the arrival of British
colonialism. Kaviraj observes that the potential for nationalism preceded the
development of a nationalist consciousness.3 He argues that there was no
"immanent nation" called India, which was repressed. In fact, Kaviraj locates
nationalism and the construction of "India" squarely within the discourse of
colonialism and modernity. It was this very modernity of "India" observes
Kaviraj, that had to be cloaked in the artifice of antiquity and tradition to create a
"delusion of eternal existence" in order to legitimize its claims of uniqueness. The
context in which the idea of "India" emerged, namely British colonialism, dictated
that the India that was being imagined would be wholly original, distinctive and
"pure". It would in short, justify the struggle for sovereignty. Hence,
India and its history is not an object of discovery, invention.but of It was historically instituted by the nationalist imagination of the nineteenth century. The exact form this reality took wasone among many historical possibilities in that situation, though the fact that only this line of possibility came to be realized is so overwhelming that it is now difficult even to conceive of some of the others.4
2 I borrow here the title of Ronald Inden's book,Imagining India, (1990). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishes.
3 Kaviraj (1993).
4 Ibid: 1. Emphasis added.
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The British had identified India as a territorial entity, but it was the
nationalists who would imbue it with a history, a past and a raison d'etre. Krishna
argues that the anti-colonial and nationalist practice of rendering India with a past
involved several discursive maneuvers such that,
the central myths and mythologies of this region had to be reinterpreted along the lines of modem nationhood; successful examples of subcontinental conquest from the past were reinscribed as instances of national unification; peasant rebellions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the insurrectionary Revolt of 1857 against the British East India Company were now endowed with self-conscious, "patriotic" elements; Mughal regimes were now to be re-presented as a dark age in which "India" labored under "alien" rule; secular political adversaries of these Mughal mlers were now reanointed as nationalist heroes.5
Ironically, the "authentic past" attributed to India was based upon the
constructions of "India" in Orientalist writing. The nationalist authors of such
narratives of history were the 'Indian' middle classes, trained in the language and
political discourse of the colonizer but in whom this very education had awakened
the desire for freedom and sovereignty. The ambitious middle classes however,
were divided along religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional fault lines. Hence, the
visions of "India" that they authored reflected these internal variations of social
origins.
Kaviraj implies this diversity when he reminds us that "the exact form this
reality took was one among many historical possibilities in that situation."
5 Krishna (1994): 191.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Moreover, he emphasizes that the history of Indian nationalism has been
(re)written in a manner that 'naturalizes' the vision of the Indian National
Congress, and within it of the "Nehruvian stream" as if it were the only option that
would be realized. Other visions of "India" came to be measured against the
"norm" established by the principle of Nehruvian secularism, including the other
streams of thought within the Congress. While the reality of Gandhian vision, his
interpretation of secularism and use of religious idiom nurtured within the
Congress makes staunch secularists uncomfortable, it is the existence of communal
nationalists, that "disturbs the harmony of this official universe." The success of
the nationalist movement rested upon the mobilization of masses that was achieved
by appealing to their religious sensibilities and their segmented identities.
Resoulution of most differences and issues of social justice were deferred until
after the achievement of the primary goal ofSwaraj (self-rule). However, Krishan
intimates that it was the very interpretation of history and conception of India's
past that "was sowing seeds for later fractures." In Nehruvian India, these
differences were either relegated to India's dark past and forgotten or their
resolution was forever deferred in favor of the immediate goals of economic
development, industrialization and "catching-up" with the West. However, the
marginalized visions and questions regarding Indian identity have re-emerged in
contemporary India. One example is the movemento i Hindutva.
Thus, in this chapter I will discuss the construction of India by Nehru and
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by the Hindu nationalists. Then I will delineate the contemporary events and the
trajectory of the emergence of the movementoi Hindutva. The discussion will
establish that the translation of the antinomies of Nehruvian vision into practices
of the state in independent India have indeed had an uneven impact on the lives of
the people and informs the search for an alternative national project.
Nehru's India
India is a geographical and economic entity, a cultural unity amidst diversity, a bundle of contradictions held together by strong but invisible threads. Overwhelmed again and again, her spirit was never conquered, and today she appears to be the plaything of a proud conqueror, she remains unsubdued and unconquered. ...She is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive.
- Jawaharlal Nehru6
For Nehru, India's "spirit was never conquered," it was her 'body' that was
imprisoned in the chains of colonialism. An immediate reason for such a plight
was that India's "spirit" was burdened by the weight of her long history and lacked
a centralized source of authority that would rid her of the cobwebs and direct her
along the path of development. Nehru was convinced that "India must break with
6 Nehru (1946): 576.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. much of her past and not allow it to dominate the present."7 Of course, Nehru
advocated that all that was good in her past was to be 'recovered' and adapted to
the present circumstances. Nevertheless, when he looked at the success of
America, Russia and China, one devoid of the burden of an old civilization,
another having completely broken with its past, and the third filled with vitality
and creativity in spite of being an ancient culture like India’s-Nehru was
convinced that India's past had become an impediment. Nehru refers to this
predicament time and again.
Indian life becomes a sluggish stream, living in the past, moving slowly through the accumulations of dead centuries. The heavy burden of the past cmshes it and a kind of coma seizes it. It is not surprising that in this condition of mental stupor and physical weariness India should have deteriorated and remained rigid and immobile while other parts of the world marched ahead.8
Nehru, not unlike many of his contemporaries, believed that it was the lack
of a centralized source of authority in India that had resulted in its stagnation.
Fragmentation had long dogged 'Indian' existence and the lack of a strong state had
been a lacuna in Indian history not to mention the prime reason for the British
conquest of India. Moreover, Nehru looked around and saw that all the successful,
advanced nations were led by autonomous states. Failure of both British and
7 Ibid: 520.
8 Ibid: 42.
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Indian attempts at social reform convinced Nehru that incremental changes
undertaken within an old framework of knowledge and habits were doomed for
failure. Yet, new frameworks would not be instituted by the British colonial state
which was content to see India at the bottom of the ladder of development since it
served to protect its power and interests. Thus, the prime goal of the nationalist
movement became the establishment of a sovereign Indian State.
The path for India's future had already been designed by the logic of
"universal history." India's future lay in an sovereign nation-state, committed to
industrialization and the development of a 'scientific temper'. This is how the
successful nations of the world had emerged from the darkness of superstition,
underdevelopment and fragmentation. And this is how India was going to
(P)rogress. However, while he was committed to the nation-state as the obvious
choice of India's future, Nehru recognized that its form would have to be
determined by the rational leaders of the country after examining facts and
ascertaining the exact needs of the country as well as the best means of fulfilling
them. Nehru conceived of a state that would "embrace the whole people, give
everyone an equal right to citizenship" and would be "based on a consciousness of
national solidarity which includes, in an active political process, the vast masses of
the peasantry."9 Consequently, Nehru's nationalism centered upon the organizing
9 Ibid: 146.
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principle of an autonomous nation-state and the legitimizing principle of social
justice.10 These were not debatable 'choices' but historical 'facts' confirmed by the
success of the advanced western nations.
As the architect of'secular' India, Nehru's banishment of religion from the
public sphere did not result from a blind faith in western rationality. In fact, his
views on religion and science are more complex and even ambiguous and
confused. On the one hand, Nehru recognized that religion "supplied some deeply
felt inner need of human nature." However, he still conceived of it as an
otherworldly preoccupation that detracted attention from practical problems of
everyday life that could only be solved by scientific thought; and even resulted in a
"loss of self-reliance". On the other hand, Nehru understood that "[SJcience
ignored the ultimate purposes and looked at fact alone."11 In spite of this
weakness, Nehru supported his view of the centrality of science in providing a
basis for ascertaining "truth or reality." Moreover, the struggle for ascendence
between rational thought and the church "would have no reality in India," because
any changes affected from application of scientific thought would be rationalized
and assimilated within the Indian cultural milieu.
Nehru did appreciate the spiritual aspect of religion and even considered it
10 Chatteij ee (1993,1986): 132.
11 Nehru (1946): 523.
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to be a strong Indian trait that even the West could learn from. "Religious
differences," he felt, "do not come in the way, for there is a great deal of mutual
tolerance for them."12 The fault lay in the dogmatic aspect of religion, devoid of
spirituality and reduced to mere performance of ritual. The examples of
communalistic organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim
League that exploited people's emotions for narrow, sectarian gains in the name of
religion convinced Nehru that such manipulation of'religion' had to be countered
because of their divisive effect on Indian unity, which was of paramount
significance for him. Nehru firmly believed that religious, ethnic, linguistic and
other basis of difference would vanish with the onset of economic development
and material prosperity. In his view,
If there is one thing that history shows...it is this: that economic interests shape the political views, of groups and classes. Neither reason nor moral considerations override those interests.13
Hence, Nehru sought to eliminate the traditional causes of fragmentation in Indian
society by guaranteeing religious, cultural, linguistic and 'fundamental rights of the
individual and the groups' via constitutional provisions in a democratic state.
However, the problem of economic differences remained, that in Nehru's view
were presented in communal language as religious differences. However, Nehru
12 Ibid: 386.
13 Jawaharlal Nehru (1936).An Autobiography. London: Bodley Head. 544. Quoted in Chatteijee (1993,1986): 140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19
was well aware of the deep historical roots of such differences, particularly in the
Muslim community and among the depressed classes.
Abstinence from western education, trade and industry and "adherence to
feudal ways" had hindered the development of a Muslim middle class that lagged
behind the emergence of Hindu middle classes by almost a generation. The
condition of 'backward minorities' and 'depressed classes' was no better. Although
the institution of appropriate educational and economic policies to aid the lagging
communities were frustrated by the reign of petty differences, Nehru rejected the
British solution of creating separate electorates, first for Muslim minorities and
later for other minorities. This solution was more detrimental to the interests of
the communities it was intended to serve.14 First, it created vested interests of "the
most reactionary kind" that obstructed resolution of real economic problems.
More importantly, an unintended yet insidious outcome of creating separate
electorates was that the majority (mainstream) "forgot" about these minorities and
did not consider their interests while making decisions that had universal
consequences.15 Thus the very contradiction that was meant to be eradicated, was
further deepened. In spite of this acute perception, and unable to stem the flow of
14 While Nehru referred to Muslim and other minorities, he concluded that in India there were only religious minorities, distinct from the racial or national minorities of Europe. See Nehru (1946): 386.
15 Ibid: 387.
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history in this direction, Nehru sought to create "equal" citizens by providing
opportunities to backward minorities "so as to enable them to catch up to those
who are ahead of them."16 In addition to his philanthropic impulses, and his
perception that no group or race was "inherently" backward or inferior, but simply
lacked the chance to grow, Nehru's emphasis on equality was based upon the
rational realization that even pockets of underdeveloped or backward masses
would constrain the progress of the entire nation. In the modem world,
real progress and advances, whether national or international, have become very much a joint affair and a backward group pulls back others.17
Hence, it was in the interest of the entire nation to provide minorities (Muslims,
backwards, depressed classes) with special opportunities that would facilitate their
process of "catching-up" with the majority (Hindu) community.
The Nehruvian paradox however emerged from the simultaneous
identification of minorities as religious minorities and the firm belief that religion
had to kept out of the public domain. This incongruity translated into a practice of
marginalizing the religion of the majority community, i.e., Hinduism, while
seemingly encouraging the minority religions by way of extending special
opportunities for their (economic) advancement. Parekh affirms that Nehru’s
16 Ibid: 533.
17 Ibid.
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implementation of the secularism principle remained uneven and limited in
scope.18 Nehru was successful in maintaining a personal distance from religion
and from keeping religious symbols and rituals out of the public sphere.
However, State patronage of universities associated with religious communities
and observance of religious holidays continued. The State was also granted the
authority to intervene in religious matters if they proved to be disruptive, or
obstructed the achievement of national goals. Significantly, Nehru abstained from
amending Muslim personal law or implementing a uniform civil code on the
grounds that the trauma of partition was too fresh and the position of the Muslims
still precarious to initiate such drastic changes at the time. On the other hand,
Nehru did not hesitate "to pass the Hindu Code Bill and regulate the management
of some Hindu temples."19 Nehru felt justified in taking such measures and
presumed that they could not be construed as 'interference' with the internal
concerns of the Hindu community, since the majority of the parliament and the
cabinet, including himself were Hindus.
In Parekh's judgement "Nehru's state acted as, and claimed all the rights of a
Hindu state in its relation to the Hindus."20 Moreover,
18 Parekh(1991).
19 Ibid: 42.
20 Ibid.
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In claiming therights of a Hindu state, Nehru's government encouraged the Hindu expectation that it will also accept theobligations of such a state including defend and promote their religion and collective interests.21
However, the State acted to the contrary and refused to indulge these hopes, and
was denounced by the Hindu community for acting"both asa Hindu and a secular
state" towards them.
Nehru made a sharp break with the Indian past and sought to remedy the
nation's ills by privileging scientific and technocratic solutions. Unable to resolve
his own ambiguity regarding religion, he nevertheless attempted to keep the public
realm free of its disruptive influence. Even as he rejected the British influence and
practices, he affirmed, indeed internalized many western values that he believed
were the key to the success of any nation in the race to "catch-up" with the norm
established by the successful western nations. Nehru was persuaded that India
could beat the West at its own game by combining scientific western practices in
the economic and political realms with Indian spirituality in the social and cultural
realms.
Nehru did deliver on the first part of his promise, namely of fashioning
India on the key western concepts of the nation-state, development, industrialism
and secularism. However, Nehru reneged on the second part of his promise, to
temper the cold, empty harshness of the western model with the compassionate
21 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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and nurturing touch of Indian spiritualism. Rather than laying the blame on
Nehru, the appropriate question to ask is whether the possibility for the kind of
reconciliation he envisioned existed or was it precluded due to the underlying
assumptions of his framework? Nevertheless, it would not be stretching the truth
to argue that the maturing of the contradictions of the Nehruvian model have
raised the possibility of re-engaging with the questions regarding Indian identity
that were silenced at the time, and thatHindutva has given expression to some of
these antinomies.
Hindutva
Hindutva, the idea that "Hindus" constitute a nation was first articulated by
V.D. Savarkar in 1922 in a book by the same title.22 Savarkar gave expression to a
growing sentiment at the time that there was ample confusion in the use of the
term 'Hindu' making it unsuitable for the changing circumstances. The socio
religious reform movements that had begun towards the end of the 19th century
were switching gears. An anti-colonial (distinct from nationalist) consciousness
was beginning to take shape and the idea of the inevitability of western domination
was coming under scrutiny. Older categories, such as 'Hindutva' also seemed in
22 My discussion on the explicationHindutva of in Savarkar's thought is informed by Gyanendra Pandey's reflections on the construction of Hindu identity (1991). Also see Keer (1966), especially 263-268.
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need of revision to better serve contemporary needs. In his book Savarkar
acknowledged the validity of the argument that 'Hindustan' and 'Hindu' were first
used by foreigners to refer to the land beyond the river 'Sindhu' and its inhabitants.
However, he argued that the word 'Sindhu' was a phonological corruption of
'Hindu', a name that die people of this land had borne fromtime immemorial
Thus, in Savarkar's estimation 'Hindu' antedates the later epithet Sindhu.
According to him,
Hindutva, is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual of [sic] religious history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be..., but a history in full. Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva.23
Savarkar clarified that
A Hindu means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the seas as hisFatherland as well as his Holyland, that is the cradle of his religion.24
The word 'Hindu' did not encompass just Brahmanism as was popularly
believed, but extended to other communities such as the Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists,
Lingayats, and the Vaishnavas. These groups were not 'Hindu' in the religious
sense, but were acceptable within the notion of Hindutva (Indianness), because
their religions had originated in the 'Holyland' of Hindustan. However, even as he
made this argument, Savarkar distinguished between 'Hindu' and 'Bharatiya'
23 V.D. Savarkar,Hindutva, (1949) 4th edition: Poona, India, p 3. Quoted in Pandey, op. cit: 3000.
24 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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(Indian), the latter term being used to describe the various communities mentioned
above. Savarkar justified this move on the grounds that these communities no
longer considered 'Hindustan' their Holyland and Sanskrit their sacred language.
So despite his discursive argument, Savarkar does end up reserving the term
'Hindu' only to describe the adherents of Brahmanical Hinduism. Christians and
Muslims are excluded even from the notion of Bharatiya, on charges of being
foreigners since Hindustan is not the 'cradle of their religion'. Savarkar is firm in
his conviction even as he acknowledges the fact that many of the Christians and
Muslims have lived in 'Hindustan' for as long as, and some even longer, than the
'Hindus.'
K.B. Hedgewar a Congress worker was a supporter of Tilak. Tilak was a
prominent leader of the Extremist faction within the Congress who had walked out
of the party in 1907 when the accomodationist policies of the Moderate faction
under the leadership of Gandhi, advocated building a responsible government
within the British Empire rather than taking radical action to overthrow the
colonizers . In 1922, when Hedgewar emerged from a short stay in the prison, he
found that Tilak was dead and Gandhi’s promiseswaraj of (self-rule) by the end of
1922 was not in sight. Hedgewar was beginning to question India's plight and past
strategies of anti-colonial activity. He was convinced that the Indian National
Congress while committed to ridding India of colonial rule, did not have a
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"positive vision of the Hindu nation."25 In such circumstances, Hedgewar read a
copy of Savarkar'sHindutva and became deeply influenced by his message.
Hedgewar, understood the sad plight of Hindus to be the result of their internal
disunity and lack of solidarity which made them easy preys for foreign conquerors.
To amend such a situation Hedgewar established the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) in 1925.
Hedgewar conceived of the RSS as a cultural organization "concerned with
national renewal through character building."26 The members of the RSS were to
be trained in the 'shakha' (youth corps) and would embody
a passionate devotion to the motherland, a feeling of fraternity, a sense of sharing in national work, a deeply felt reverence for the nation's ideals, discipline, heroism, manliness and other noble virtues 27
Central to RSS ideology is the notion articulated by Savarkar that a "Hindu” nation
has existed from 'time immemorial' in the territory now identified by the British
and accepted by others as India. While emphasis on both canonical authority of
scriptures and a personal relationship to God is marginal or even absent in RSS
ideology, its leaders assert that "Hindus base every aspect of their existence on the
25 Embree (1994): 624.
26 Ibid: 621.
27 M.S. Golwalkar (1980). Bunch o f Thoughts. Bangalore, India: Jagarana Prakashan. 511. Quoted in Embree (1994): 624.
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Ultimate Reality called God, so that, properly understood, everything is an
expression of religion."28 The goal was to reform Hindu society and make it
suitable to cope with the new challenges it was faced with, without losing its
traditional moorings. The RSS maintained a strict distance from politics and
worked in the Hindu community through an extended organizational infrastructure
and an impressive hierarchy of leadership that has contributed to its success over
the years.
Andersen and Damle indicate that the social base of the RSS lay in urban,
high caste, middle-income groups, as well as middle-level government employees
and teachers.29 Between 1925 and 1948, RSS membership grew significantly in
the Hindi-speaking heartland. While the leadership continued to be primarily
brahmin Maharashtrian, the rank and file in Maharashtra were recruited "from
professional or middle-level service backgrounds," while in north India they were
recruited" from families engaged in small-scale entrepreneurial activities."30 At
the time of partition in 1947, RSS membership began to include refugees fleeing to
India, whose lasting goodwill and loyalty die organization earned with its efficient
and organized assistance during the period of crisis and subsequent adjustment to
28 Embree (1994): 629.
29 Andersen and Damle (1987): 39.
30 Ibid: 45.
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the changed circumstances. According to Andersen and Damle a large portion of
the RSS full-time workers came from the refugee community, many of whom were
businessmen who then prospered in post-independent India and continue to extend
financial support for RSS activities even today. While the RSS was marginalized
in the emerging power nexus and the Congress Party inherited the mantle of
governance of free India, RSS members remained steadfast in their conviction
that the new political order rested on foreign concepts which not only undermined India's Hindu identity, but were also contrary to India's historical, social and political legacies, and they were not prepared to admit that the ancient wisdom was irrelevant in the contemporary period.31
The RSS did not fare well in the era of Congress rule. It was banned in
1948, after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a former
member of the RSS. While the RSS was not charged, it became an outcast within
its own constituency after this incident. It spent the following years attempting to
rejuvenate the organization, reorganize its goals and methods, and its image.
During this time, the RSS operated on the fringes of the public sphere and
established a huge network in the rural and tribal areas through years of arduous
social welfare activities aimed at the upliftment of marginalized people. Embree
pegs the turning point in RSS fortunes as the period of National Emergency (1975-
77) when the organization was banned for the second time due to its alleged anti-
31 Ibid: 56.
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national activities.32 The RSS and Jana Sangh, its political affiliate, collaborated
with Jaya Prakash Narayan to spread the message of "total revolution," a populist
anti-government movement. After the 1977 defeat of the Congress Party in
national elections, the Jana Sangh merged with other minority parties to form the
Janata Party that replaced Congress rule. However, due to many disagreements
between the various factions comprising the Janata Party, especially the dual
membership controversy, the Jana Sangh and a few other supporters broke away
from the Janata Party to form their own Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980.33
Contemporary Re-emergence o f Hindutva
India began the decade of the eighties amidst sweeping changes. A
burgeoning middle class, constituting ten to fifteen percent of the population, had
emerged as the primary players in the economy and was becoming increasingly
32 Embree (1994): 621.
33 The dual membership controversy within the Janata Party emerged from the fact that the Jana Sangh faction within the Party was the largest single group that tended to vote together and thus had substantial leverage in affecting Party policy. Moreover, during this time the RSS had experienced a surge in its membership thus raising the possibility of RSS interference in the Janata Party via its influence over the Jana Sangh faction. To counter this threat, the non-Jana Sangh sections of the Janata Party stated that a condition of membership in the Party was that its members could not hold affiliations with other political or communal parties. The Jana Sangh countered this argument by asserting that the RSS was not a political party, but a cultural organization and hence associating with it was not contrary to the Janata Party constitution. However, this did not resolve the controversy, which continued to dog the coalition, until it finally collapsed with the Jana Sangh breaking away to form the BJP.
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assertive in the political sphere. 'Secessionist’ movements in Kashmir, Assam and
Punjab had gained renewed vigor. The country's political unity stood on shaky
grounds. Government ability to maintain law and order in the country was greatly
reduced. Social mobility and competition had intensified, but the economic pie
was not growing fast enough to keep pace with soaring aspirations. Nonetheless,
of all these changes that had appeared on India's horizon, it was to be the rise of
Hindu revivalism, and the cryHindutva of that would resound throughout this
decade.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a self-proclaimed Hindu cultural
organization, focused the country's attention on an incident of mass conversion of
lower caste Hindus to Islam in the Meenakshipuram district of Tamil Nadu in
southern India in 1981. While conversions from one faith to another occur
frequently, prompted by a desire to escape upper caste domination and to seek
fresh socio-economic opportunities, the VHP conducted a massive campaign
portraying the incident in Meenakshipuram as a threat to the Hindu community.
This was followed by the Ekatmatayagna (Integration rite or Sacrifice for Unity)
in 1983, a combination of ninety-two yatras (marches) that crisscrossed the
country and travelled through approximately five lakh (500,000) villages, carrying
the message that "Hinduism was in danger." The VHP asserted that Hindus
needed to unite against the threat of Muslims, whose expansion in their view, if
left unchecked would result in reducing the Hindu majority to a minority in their
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'own' country.
The VHP was not the only institution in the eighties that was seeking to
create a segmented constituency on the basis of religion, although it was the most
active. In the aftermath of the period of Emergency 1975-77, when Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi curtailed civil rights, censored the press and jailed numerous of her
opponents, the Congress (I) Party lost its traditional support base among Hindu
elites, sections of the Muslim community and scheduled castes who no longer felt
protected by the Congress Party. In an effort to shore up the legitimacy of the
Congress Party, Indira Gandhi began to fust lean towards and then openly
cultivate a 'Hindu' constituency. This was reflected in her accommodating attitude
towards the Ekatmatayagna of 1983 which marked a radical departure from past
policy when any mobilization based on religion, ethnicity or caste was dealt with
severely by the State. This was not the first time however that Indira Gandhi had
toyed with politicized religion. There was precedence to such actions with severe
repercussions in store for her.
A decade earlier, Indira Gandhi had begun to cultivate a religious leader in
Punjab, Sant Bhindranwale, in an attempt to undercut a Congress opponent, the
Akali Dal, a moderate Sikh party. At the time of partition in 1947, the Akali Dal
as the representative of Sikh nationalists had demanded a Sikh nation, which was
ignored. Ever since, Sikhs have been demanding an independent Sikh state within
India. The Sikh community feels very strongly about maintaining a distinct
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identity, particularly in face of a refusal by most Hindus to recognize Sikhism as a
religion in its own right, rather than as an offshoot of Hinduism. By the eighties,
success of the Green Revolution Program implemented in the mid-1960 had
induced an emigration of Sikhs from Punjab while attracting an in-migration of
Hindu workers. In addition, there was growing ferment in Punjab as prosperity
resulted in a changing social matrix and social norms.
Conservative segments including religious leaders like Sant Bhindranwale
felt that the Sikh community was becoming depraved and steps had to be taken to
halt this decadence. In this climate, Indira Gandhi came into conflict with the
Akali Dal who had lost the elections to the Congress Party in 1980. Following
their ouster from office, the Dal submitted a number of demands to Indira Gandhi
that included claims for instating Chandigarh as the capital of Punjab and the
settlement of a dispute over waters for irrigation, between Punjab and the
neighboring states of Haryana and Rajasthan. However, Mrs. Gandhi ignored the
Akali Dal's demands but she conceded right wing calls to pronounce Amritsar a
Holy City, ban smoking there and authorize Sikh religious broadcasts over state-
controlled radio.34 Such actions by the Congress Party succeeded in weakening the
moderate Akali Dal. However, it was the Congress-nurtured Sant Bhindranwale
and his followers who now posed a problem, increasingly indulging in violence
34 Varshney (1992).
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and attacking 'heretics' and 'infidels.' By 1984 the problem had become so grave
that Mrs. Gandhi chose to use the Army against them to flush out their stronghold,
the Golden Temple in Amritsar.
A more tolerant attitude towards religion at the State level indicated by such
practices was capitalized upon both by the VHP and the RSS. In April 1984,
VHP-sponsoredDharma Sansad (an assembly of religion) launched a movement
to "liberate" the birthplace of Lord Ram. According to the VHP, an ancient
mosque located in the town of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, a north Indian state, had
been the site of Ram's birth marked by a temple built in the eleventh century.
Local tradition has it that the temple was destroyed by the invading Mogul ruler,
Babar, in the sixteenth century and replaced by the existing mosque, popularly
referred to as Babri Masjid (Babar's Mosque). Historical accounts trace a number
of disputes centered around this site.35 In recent history, in an attempt to forestall
Hindu-Muslim conflicts in Ayodhya, the British upon annexation of the region of
Awadh (present-day Ayodhya) fenced off the mosque. Thereafter, Muslims were
allowed to offer prayers in the mosque and Hindus on a raised platform outside the
fence. This arrangement continued undisturbed until 1949, a couple years after the
creation of independent India and Pakistan. On 22 December 1949, an idol of
Ram was surreptitiously placed inside the heavily guarded mosque. Riots ensued
35 Peter van der Veer (1987) details the history of such conflicts. Compare with the official BJP version in White Paper on Ayodhya (1993).
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upon its discovery the following day. However, the idol remained in its place and
the mosque/temple was locked up and both communities filed court claims for
ownership of the site. The case had been languishing in Indian courts ever since,
with little public knowledge or attention directed to it. Nineteen eighty-four was
perhaps the first time that the public became aware of such a dispute or the
existence of the mosque/temple, when the VHP started a campaign to demand
Hindu ownership of the disputed site. In the next few years, numerous national,
regional, and local demonstrations would be launched around this issue and the
Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) would emerge as the national
opposition party with its party platform built around this concern.
The emerging Hindu right consisted of the B JP-VHP-RSS nexus which
formed the core, and numerous other affiliated organizations that constitute the
Sangh Parivar (the RSS family). During its early years, the BJP attempted to
constitute itself as the national alternative to Indira Gandhi's Congress Party. It
kept its distance from the Sangh Parivar and emphasized its secular credentials
instead.36 However, this strategy proved to be an abysmal failure. The BJP won
only 2 of the 508 Lok Sabha (House of Commons) seats it contested in the 1984
parliamentary elections. Internal deliberation in the aftermath of its poor
36 Manini Chatterjee points out that this decision was influenced by the Jana Sangh's precedence and its failed attempts to become a national level party by championing "Hindu" interests. See, Chatterjee (1994): 15.
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performance and an examination of the Congress strategy produced a party
consensus that it was time to return to the folds of the Sangh Parivar and promote a
hardline stance on issues related to "Hindu" interests.37 Contrary to popular
opinion, which attributes the results of the 1984 elections to a "sympathy vote" in
favor of the son of a martyred Prime Minister, Chatterjee argues that the verdict
was a sign of the changing mood in the country, and that the BJP was well aware
of this change.38 In addition, Chatterjee asserts that talk of a "Hindu vote" did not
refer as much to a sudden communalization of the Hindu community, as it did to
the intensification of the crisis faced by the ruling class following the slow disintegration of the Nehruvian enterprise to build a quasi-socialist, liberal, humane socio-economic order with secularism as one of the primary bases of the Indian republic.39
From the BJP's perspective, one of the lessons it had learned was that the
party could not discount the strength of RSS cadre-based organization which did
not approve of the secular strategy advocated by BJP leadership. While there is no
clear evidence that the RSS campaigned against BJP candidates in the 1984
elections, there are indications that it did withhold its support and organizational
37 If one recalls from our earlier discussion, it was around this time that Mrs. Gandhi had begun courting the "Hindu vote" in an effort to consolidate a fresh voter base to compensate for the erosion of her traditional support base among Muslims, scheduled castes and parties of the Left.
38 Manini Chatterjee, op. cit.,:16.
39 Ibid.
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capacities from BJP candidates. There was no official RSS directive to the effect,
however many individual members even voted for Congress candidates. Hence, it
would be appropriate to indicate that the BJP was not bom as a political party of
the Hindu right. In the formative years it was experimenting with various
strategies, as it continues to do so even today. There were a number of
developments starting with its 1984 electoral rout that caused it to gravitate
towards the RSS and the VHP. By the same token, Chatteijee points out that the
RSS would have extended itself to any party, not necessarily the BJP, that would
enable it to realize its goal of establishing a Hindurashtra (nation).
The BJP's shift in strategy was indicated in its post-1984 agenda that
included demands for revocation of the controversial Article 370, dissolution of
the Minorities Commission and establishment of a uniform civil code. Article 370
grants special constitutional status to Jammu and Kashmir, with the Kashmiri state
government endowed with more powers vis-a-vis the Center, than states in the rest
of the country. This concession was part of the bargain struck with the Indian
government at the time of independence, in exchange for acceding to India. The
official government account argues that economic neglect, refusal of the Indian
government to hold a long-promised plebiscite, continued conflict between
Muslim and Hindu sections of the population, a disregard for the Kashmiri
people's demands, a callous handling of the situation and refusal to resolve the
continuing impasse were some of the reasons that insurgency in Kashmir grew in
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the 1980s. In light of the 'secessionist' threats by Kashmiris, the continuation of
special status for Kashmir has been portrayed by the Hindu right as a threat to
Indian unity and as a blatant case of placing minority interests above national
interests by the ruling establishment.
The demand for a uniform civil code is based on the impression that the
government is biased in favor of minority communities who at the time of
independence were granted constitutional protection with the aim of safeguarding
their distinct identity and cultural diversity. Hindu grievances center around the
charge that the state tends not to hesitate in interfering with matters of the Hindu
community while it privileges other religious minorities.40 In an interview,
Niranjana Dev Tirtha, the 144th Jagadguru Shankaracharya, a highly revered
Hindu leader gave expression to this popular perception in the community of
"daily interference" in Hindu social affairs.41 In particular, the Jagadguru
expressed consternation over the minimum marriage age law and the Hindu
Religious Endowment act which grants the government the authority to take over
temple land. In his estimation,
The Government has taken away 550 acres of land in Orissa...But can you imagine the Government touching even an inch of mosque or church property. ...[The Government has] negated secularism. There must be a
40 Compare with Parekh's argument discussed earlier on p. 21 -22.
41 India Today, 31 May 1986:33.
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common law for all inhabitants of this country.42
The demand for a uniform civil code received additional fillip in light of
two decisions made by Rajiv Gandhi's government in 1986. In February 1986, a
Faizabad district judge ordered the unlocking of the disputed Babri Masjid in
Ayodhya and allowed puja (prayer ritual) to be performed at the shrine inside.
The Ramjanmabhoomi "liberation" movement that had begun with VHP initiatives
in 1984 had languished in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi's assassination in
October 1984 at the hands of her Sikh bodyguards. The VHP nevertheless
continued to organize forums, yatras (marches), and prayer rituals in order to
develop mass opinion in favor of Hindu ownership of the disputed site. The
February 1986 decision by the district judge fueled the dispute and the balance
seemed to tilt in favor of the "Hindus," provoking Hindu-Muslim violence across
the country. Significantly, Rajiv Gandhi's government declared its support for the
February 1986 decision and for VHP demands. Even though the Babri Masjid-
Ramjanmabhoomi issue was overshadowed by the controversy over the Shah Bano
case later that year, the dye had been cast. It is after this incident that the
mosque/temple issue began to play a greater role in the political strategies of all
contending parties, with the BJP making it a pivotal issue in the 1989 elections.
However, it was the Shah Bano case that dominated public discourse in
n Ibid.
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1986. Shah Bano, a 73 year old Muslim woman, had filed a case under the
country's civil law to claim maintenance after being divorced by her husband of 43
years. Although Bano’s husband claimed that maintenance was not permissible
under Islamic law, the Supreme Court ruled in her favor on the grounds that the
country's civil law overrode religious codes. The decision provoked an outcry
from conservative Muslim groups across the country, while progressive Muslims,
secularists, feminists and Hindu nationalists celebrated the decision. Rajiv Gandhi
initially endorsed the Court's decision, but balked under increasing pressure from
orthodox Muslim leadership. The Congress Party with longstanding ties with the
conservative sections of the Muslim community, then sought to overturn the
Supreme Court judgement and passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Bill in parliament that would grant Shariatthe (Islamic personal code)
the right to pass judgement over and above civil law in matters of divorce of
Muslim women.43
Varshney argues that the Shah Bano case was a turning point for Hindu
nationalists.44 Rajiv Gandhi's decision provided them the opportunity to argue that
Hindu belief regarding the Babri Masjid was enough justification to seek
43 For a summary of the implications of this case for the Muslim community itself, see the introduction to the South Asia Bulletin, XIV: 1,1994.
44 Varshney (1993): 249.
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ownership of the site. The government was caught in a contradiction of its own
making, whereby it could not place religious codes above civil law for one
religious community and not another. The situation resulted in an impasse. If the
government were to rule in favor of Muslims, it would give the Hindu right,
further ammunition for its charges of "appeasing the minorities". However, if the
government were to grant the rights to the Babri Masjid to Hindus, its actions
would feed an already delicate communal situation and further alienate Muslim
and other minority communities. Although, legal experts pointed out that the
secularists and Muslim leaders had legal right to claim Babri Masjid as Muslim
property, these arguments were lost in the hysterical fervor whipped up by the
Hindu right on the issue.45
Rajiv Gandhi's capitulation to pressures from Muslim clergy on this issue
lent credence to BJP claims of government "pandering of the Muslim vote" and
charges of "minorityism." This enabled the BJP to demolish the sacrosanct liberal
bastion of secularism by portraying it as "pseudo-secularism." Secularism in India
according to BJP President L.K. Advani is pseudo-secularism, since it sanctions
excessive appeasement of minorities. Moreover, according to this argument
Muslims and other minorities are treated as vote banks and not as humans.
45 See John Mansfield, "Personal Laws or a Uniform Civil Code?," in Robert Barid,Religion ed., and Law in Independent India. (1993) Delhi: Manohar Publications. Citedin Varshney (1993). Furthermore, see footnote 70 in Varshney (1993) for an encapsulation of Mansfield's argument in this regard.
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Minority communities are believed to vote en bloc. Over the years, they have
been courted by all political parties, a strategy dictated by the competitive
demands of a first-past-the-post style parliamentary system. Advani and other BJP
leaders are at pains to demonstrate that Muslims are welcome to their party
membership. In fact, in 1983 Arif Beg, party secretary in charge of minority cells
asserted that "Every tenth new member joining the party now is a Muslim."46 K.R.
Malkani, editor and RSS supporter maintains that
Our essence is tolerance. We do not want a Hindu Rashtra or a theocratic State. But we revel in the essence of Hinduism that keeps us anchored to our roots as we modernise so we don't lose ourselves in a tidal wave of westernization.47
While this may be true of the BJP, its allies the RSS and VHP are opposed to such
a moderate vision and remain committed to the establishment of a Hindu nation.
The "Hindu wave" that was becoming increasingly visible across North
India, received a significant boost by the decision of the department of information
and broadcasting to telecast theRamayan serial, that was aired from January 1987
to August 1989. This decision marked a significant departure from past policy and
"clearly signalled an attempt to formulate a cohesive, Hindu upper-caste
u India Today, 15 August 1983:17.
47 India Today, 31 March, 1990:27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dominated cultural identity for the nation."48Ramayan The is an Indian epic
attributed to sage Valmiki that narrates the life and adventures of Lord Ram. The
secretary of information and broadcasting S.S. Gill justified the decision by
describing the epic as a cultural rather than a religious artifact, converging with the
arguments of the Hindu right who claim that Lord Ram is a national hero and not
just a Hindu god. The telecasting of the serial met with huge success, as streets
grew deserted and shops shut down during the time that the serial was aired. A
major consequence that followed and prepared the ground for the take-off of the
Ram Janmabhoomi issue is that via the television serial, Ayodhya as Ram's
birthplace was brought into the audiences' homes, eliciting a more immediate and
palpable identification with the geographical location of Ayodhya, rather than
merely as a distant birthplace of Ram. Ayodhya, along with Ram are now
translated into venerable icons of'national' (Hindu) pride. Subsequently, notes
Anuradha Kapur, there has been an extensive revision of the images of Ram
himself.49 Ram is transformed from a gentle, youthful, serene deity with
androgynous looks and temperament to a more strident, angry, aggressive,
"masculine" god, wearing armor, pulling his bowstring and ready for action.
Rajagopal describes the maneuver as commodification of Ram, with his image
48Rajagopal (1994): 1661.
49 Anuradha Kapur (1993). Also see Arvind Rajagopal (1994).
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being plucked out from what was traditionally shown as a pantheon and
presented as a solitary hero, ...striking a range of poses as if to suit the varying mood of the consumer: child-like, adult and war-like, benevolent and godly, and so on.50
Public opinion was further influenced when the Muslim community's most
visible leaders, Shahabuddin and Imam Bukhari issued a national call for
boycotting India's Republic Day. While Shahabuddin and Bukhari justified their
actions on the grounds that the boycott call was an attempt to draw attention to
Muslim demands, it adversely affected their cause. Many Indians who had thus
far remained unimpressed by the arguments of the Hindu right, were disturbed by
this move, interpreting it as dissension with the 'Indian nation' and not just Hindu
chauvinism. Public opinion thereafter became more sympathetic towards the
Hindu right.
By 1989, a bitter battle had ensued between parties of the Left (CPI-M and
CPI) and the BJP over the BJP's rising potential to become the national opposition
parly; eventually resulting in the BJP's isolation from the National Front, an
alliance of non-Left parties.51 The BJP was left with no alternative but to forge it
alone. It countered its isolation with a strategy that portrayed it as the only
national party that was united, disciplined, stable and free from in-fighting unlike
50 Rajagopal (1994): 1663.
51 CPI is the Communist Party of India, the name of the original party that was retained by the more moderate faction after the 1964 split. CPI-M is the Communist Party of India-Marxist, the more militant offshoot of the original CPI, that has been in power in Kerela and West Bengal since 1977.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. both the Congress and other opposition parties. Moreover, although the BJP had
been isolated it could not be ignored by the National Front at the time of seat
adjustments, an indication of its growing political strength. In spite of this
awareness, the BJP felt it was time for drastic measures, resulting in its decision to
jump of the bandwagon on the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhoomi issue, taking
advantage of the ground prepared at the grassroots level by the RSS and VHP. In
parliamentary elections that November, the BJP won 88 of 525 parliamentary
seats, while 192 seats accrued to the Congress, 143 to the Janata Dal, and 52 to the
Left Front.52 The Janata Dal-led National Front, with V.P. Singh as its leader,
formed a minority government with tacit support from both the BJP and the Left
Front. However, the coalition reminiscent of the Emergency period, was proving
to be frail. The BJP "started distancing itself from the government and allied itself
more closely with the Ramjanmabhumi agitation."53
The coalition fell apart and the country was thrown into disarray as another
bout of violence spread across the country with V.P. Singh's announcement of
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. The Report which had been
collecting dust since 1980 contained recommendations to reserve 27 percent of all
central government jobs for the backward castes, in addition to the 22.5 percent
52Omvedt(1990): 723.
53 Chatteijee (1994): 19.
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already reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. This action was perceived
as V.P. Singh's attempt to undercut his rivals in the Janata Dal by attempting to
capture a large constituency of backward peasant castes. There was an outbreak of
violence among urban students of higher castes, some of whom registered their
protest by acts of self-immolation. The BJP and the Left Front withdrew their
support from the V.P. Singh government for not having been consulted in the
decision. Moreover, the implementation of the reservations would have been
disastrous for the BJP's efforts of forming a united Hindu vote since the
community would undeniably become divided over caste issues. The Hindu right
has consistently glossed over intercaste disputes in an attempt to present a united
front. A shaken BJP announced that the BJP president L.K. Advani would
immediately embark on arathyatra (chariot march) from Somnath to Ayodhya.
The rath yatra met with huge success and Advani received widespread support
from businessmen, and upper castes who were shaken by the implications of the
Mandal Commission controversy.
By 1991 the BJP had emerged as a national opposition party with 21% of
the votes and 119 parliamentary seats. A year earlier, the BJP had formed state
governments in Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh and had been a
significant coalition partner with the Janata Dal in Gujarat and Rajasthan. In
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Table 1: The Growth of the BJP, 1984-1991 Lok Sabha Elections
1984 1989 1991 Seats Contested 229 255 461 Won 2 85 119 Percentage of vote 7.4 11.4 21 Source: Hardgrave and Kochanek (1993): 293.
1991, it formed a state government in Uttar Pradesh too, the most populous state in
India. In a significant development, in 1991 supportHindutva for began to spread
from its traditional base in urban trading communities to the rural areas.
However, at the same time, differences within the BJP-RSS-VHP family
began to surface as well. BJP's victories had cast it in the dual role of a national
opposition party and an establishment party in the states in which it had formed
governments. Thus, it was forced to temper its strident tones and play by the rules
in an attempt to prove itself and deliver on its promises of a stable, responsible,
efficient government. However, the VHP rank and file constituting primarily
sadhus (holymen and women) were becoming impatient to realize their goal of
constructing a Ram mandir in Ayodhya and hence were unwilling to understand
BJP's predicament or to cooperate with its calls for moderation. The RSS had to
intervene and use its influence to keep the family together. However, internal
tensions, differing agendas and a taste of success and power continued to chip
away. Cracks had surfaced in the very party that had once distinguished itself
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from its opponents on the moralistic claims of solidarity and a lack of infighting
and squabbling. Furthermore, BJP state governments were failing miserably to
live up to their promises, illustrating the inadequacy of a single-issue party
platform and BJP's lack of a coherent plan of action once the goal of capturing
political power had been achieved.
In spite of promises to the contrary, once the Ramjanmabhoomi campaign
achieved an autonomous momentum, neither the BJP nor the RSS proved capable
of reigning it in. This was sufficiently demonstrated in the December 6, 1992
incident in which the entire Babri Masjid was reduced to rubble in a matter of
hours, as party leaders (BJP, RSS and the Congress) and law enforcement officers
stood by, unable or unwilling to interfere in the frenzy. The incident resulted in
immense violence, riots, deaths, recriminations, finger-pointing, court
investigations, reports, world attention, and a climaxing of a sense of crisis that
had been brewing for a number of years. The approximately 60,000 kar sevaks
(volunteers for a holy cause) assembled at Babri Masjid on that day were a
concoction of sadhus (holy men), young boys-many of whom were new initiates to
the Bajrang Dal (youth army), shopkeepers, peasants, excited students, and
reverent elderly folk who had travelled from all over the country.54 There is much
controversy and speculation that the destruction of the edifice was preplanned and
54 India Today, 31 December 1992.
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not a spontaneous act as has been claimed by some of the leaders of the Hindu
right given that many of the 'kar sevaks' were equipped with pickaxes, hammers,
shovels and iron rods and prepared for the mammoth job.
Since the destruction of the Babri Masjid, the BJP has experienced
uncertain fortunes. Advani had himself at one point divided up BJP followers into
religious and political supporters.55 The former group consists of the elderly who
were attracted to the BJP because of its use of religious and vernacular idiom,
while the latter group consists primarily of young, upwardly mobile, educated,
professionals, and businessmen. With the demolition of the mosque and due to a
growing awareness and aversion to politicized (debased) religion, the former group
of religious supporters seem to have withdrawn their support from the BJP. While
the latter group of political supporters, for whom the BJP was an organ of
assertiveness and a picture of modernity, efficiency and sophistication, now claim
shifting allegiances and are no longer enamored of the BJP since it has failed to
articulate a vision for the economic development and globalization of India. Many
in this group are more concerned with the integration of India into the increasingly
interdependent global market and fear India's lack of action may result in its being
left behind once again. The BJP (not unlike other political parties) in a condition
of drift since the 1992 incident, fails to evoke unfailing confidence characteristic
55 Times o f India, November 20,1990. Cited in Manini Chatteijee (1994): 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 3.9 45.8 49 11.4 SC/ST Muslim Community 30.6 44.1 46.3 20.8 Backward 32.2 36.4 Caste Caste and Upper 36.1 20.5 9.5 Urban 11.3 9.8 5.7 15.9 9.8 24.9 38.6 41.6 44.2 Rural 18.3 19.3 13.8 20.0 17.9 16.3 17.5 27.7 16.9 17.7 38.0 40.1 37.3 11.6 9.8 8.0 31-50 50+ Age Location 10.7 11.8 9.3 37.8 39.9 41.2 18.4 35.8 22.4 27.3 18-20 21-30 16.1 20.2 37.9 32.2 10.9 13.2 12.1 9.0 11.1 18.3 36.6 11.9 20.9 Women Men Gender 17.8 19.3 39.5 37.8 41.5 37.5 21.0 Votes (actual) (I) Dal 1989 Party % of 1991 37.6 BJP 1989 1991 11.6 12.1 1989 11.4 1991 Janata Congress Table 2: HowIndians Vote: Exit Polls, and1989 1991 Source: Hardgraveand Kochanek (1993): 341. SC/ST: Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
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of its heyday. However, the party continues to be a formidable political force
with an established presence. It continues to net gains at local and regional
elections, indicating that it is not a spent force. Neither has the BJP given up its
aspirations of capturing national power. However, for the moment the issue of
'Hindu India' appears to have exhausted its potential and economic development
has come to occupy centerstage again. Latest reports indicate that the BJP-RSS
are switching gears to organize a "swadeshi" (indigenous) movement to counter
the Congress Party's continuing efforts to liberalize the Indian economy.56 The
VHP has been replaced at the forefront by theSwadeshi Jagaran Manch. The
theme of a besieged Hinduism has been replaced by the message that the
government's "liberalisation policy spells the end of India's economic
sovereignty."57 However, the BJP remains closely identified with the failed temple
movement.
Remodelling Hindutva
Hindutva—Hae notion that "Hindus" constitute a nation-is built upon three
central themes: the unification of a fragmented Hindu community; the conflation
56 "Swadeshi" is a term coined by Mahatma Gandhi in his Quit India Movement against the British. The concept and the Swadeshi movement referred to the use of indigenous resources and commodities in an effort to repudiate India's reliance on imported British goods.
57India Today, December 31, 1994:15.
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of Hindu with India; and the construction of a Muslim "Other." The central
message has been that (Hindu) India is endangered, and has be to be defended
from their common enemy, identified to be "the Muslims". Successful defense
against this threat rests on presenting a united Hindu front which pivots upon two
issues: construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya and the quest for an indigenous
meaning of secularism.
The quest for a Ram temple at Ayodhya was presented by the Hindu right
in the idiom of Ramrajya (era of Ram's rule), historically associated with Mahatma
Gandhi and the nationalist movement in the earlier part of this century. In Hindu
mythology, Lord Ram represents the ideal of conduct, and Ramrajya the ideal of
governance. Conflating the idea of a Hindu community with an Indian nation, the
story of a Hindu God as interpreted by the BJP-VHP-RSS, translates into the story
of the Indian(/Hindu) nation. A 'subjugated' Lord Ram is portrayed as a metaphor
for a Indian(/Hindu) nation held hostage by 'foreigners' (Muslims); enabling the
Ramjanmabhoomi liberation movement to transcend its narrow, sectarian character
and rendering it into a 'nationalist' struggle.
The Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in BJP parlance is an "ocular symbol" of this
country's subjugation to foreign invaders. The BJP claims that some structures
built by the invading Mogul rulers, such as the mosques at Ayodhya and
Somanath, unlike the mosque at Saranath were not "built as symbols of the purely
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religious sensibilities of Muslims, which every Hindu ought to respect."58 Rather
these structures were "testimonials of the victory of the political order" of the
invaders and symbols of the "defeat of our countrymen and their spiritual and
political humiliation."59 Moreover, the BJP proclaims that it had maintained that
in spite of the fact that the edifice at Ayodhya was not a 'mosque', as most
Muslims had been "led" to believe, rather than advocating its destruction, the BJP
was willing to relocate the "super-imposed" structure "with all reverence to
another place." Such a gesture established BJP's non-communal credentials,
allowing it to declare that it was motivated by the national interest of vindicating
India's "cultural heritage and national self-respect." The BJP explains that the
movement had developed,
not just to construct yet another temple, the object became to put our country back on its feet, to purify our public life, our public discourse.60
This meant correcting the (Congress) State's double standards in its practice
of the principle of secularism. The State encouraged Muslims to cultivate a
distinct, exclusive identity since it "regarded the Muslims merely as captive votes,
and not as co-citizens of Hindus."61 Moreover, forty odd years of imposing an
58 BJP White Paper on Ayodhya (1993): 9.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid: 2.
61 Ibid: 11.
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alien (western) concept on a multi-religious society had corrupted public discourse
to the point that the word "Hindu" became something to be ashamed about. In the
public discourse of Nehruvian secularists "everything that inspired this nation in
the past" was discredited as "communal and even anti-national."62 These included
Bankim Chandra's chant of Vande Mataram, Gandhi's goal of Ramrajya,
Vivekananda's ideal of Spiritual Nationalism, Sri Aurobindo's spirit of Sanatan
Dharma and Tilak's mass devotion to the mother-land symbolized by his revival of
the festival of Ganesh chaturthi. All these key moments and symbols of India's
nationalist movement were now appropriated by the Hindu right. Hence, emphasis
on an alien practice (secularism) by the ruling elites had resulted in a contempt for
the very "soul" of the freedom movement. Such a severe rupture with the nation's
past, felt the BJP, had resulted in a "greater erosion of our national identity and
national consciousness than even under the rule of the invaders."63
Hence,
The Ayodhya movement symbolised the re-establishment of these roots of our nationhood which had dried up due to post-independence politics and a spiritually bankrupt idiom.64
Moreover, argues the BJP it was "pre-Moghul India" ruled by Hindu and Buddhist
62 Ibid: 7.
63 Ibid: 13.
64 Ibid: 7.
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kings that showed the greatest tolerance for religious diversity. The prejudice and
intolerance introduced in India by 'Semitic' traditions had to be repudiated by
restoring the indigenous values of'Sarva Pantha Samabhava' (equal respect for all
religions)--the 'true' meaning of secularism.
Despite of its rhetoric, the success of the Hindu right did not gain ground
until it was able to shed its image of "knickerwallahs", Hindi speakers and
reactionary Jan Sanghis.65 In theirHindutva campaign, the Hindu right had spared
no efforts at packaging themselves ingeniously and presenting a 'modem' image.
Andersen and Damle's investigations demonstrate the result of much soul
searching within the RSS. They report,
The "typical" pracharak is recruited in his early twenties. He is well educated, usually a college graduate. He is fluent in English and Hindi, besides the language of the area in which he works. Most of those we met were science graduates. He tends to come from an urban middle-class, upper-caste background. He has participated in RSS activities since his early adolescence....He has extensive travel experience either on his own or on RSS related business. He is a bachelor, and he has no outside employment.66
This 'modem' image of a pracharak or RSS volunteer, use of latest
technological innovation, polished video and audio productions, t-shirt, memorial
button and bumper-sticker campaigning and safari-suited BJP politicians appealed
65 India Today, May 15,1991:18. "Knickerwallahs" refers to the RSS members who sport khaki shorts.
66 Andersen and Damle (1987): 88.
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tremendously to the younger generation who could identify with the images and
the marketing techniques.67 The tradition-bound audience was approached by the
more traditionally attired volunteer, probably a local resident, and videos were
produced using local and folk theater techniques, as leaders spoke on relevant
issues.68
The differences between the BJP and the VHP were successfully
capitalized upon during the early stages to seek support from a diverse audience.
The VHP with its strident, religious rhetoric and brash style appealed to the sadhus
and to the more religiously-oriented and activist-oriented sections of the audience.
While the BJP's moderate, low-key rhetoric, with an emphasis on political
Hinduism and an assertive Hindu identity appealed primarily to the urban,
upwardly-mobile professional who probably did not care much for religion, but
saw no harm in affirming their Hindu identity.69
The Hindu right has been able to build upon the ambiguous meaning of
"Hinduism." The term has both religious and cultural connotations. The literature
on this subject amply demonstrates the nebulous character of this term that is used
varyingly to refer to a civilization, a culture, a religion, and later a nation allows
67 See India Today, May 15,1991:16-17.
68 Ibid: 17.
69 'Garv se kaho hum Hindu hein' (Assert with pride that we are Hindus), was one of the most popular BJP slogans.
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the Hindu right to appeal in many voices to a divided polity and yet assimilate
diverse interests, under the bannerHindutva. of Hindutva means very different
things to different people as do the words Hindu and Hinduism. Pradip Datta
reports that interviews with 'satyagrahis' (protesters) in Ayodhya illicited diverse
interpretations of Ram.
Some said they did not believe in religion but were inspired by the prospect of unifying Hindus, many dwelt on the history of the mandir/masjid, others extolled the divine virtues of Ram. What appeared to tie together all these meanings was the commitment to the principle of universalism, that, on the face of it, enabled everyone to cherish their own meanings.70
The persuasive motif of "Hindu India" struck roots first in the hearts of
many of the 200 million middle class Indians that had emerged in the 1980s and
were ready to assert their political might and to shape "their" country, India, in
their own image. We will return to this issue later. The argument of "Hindu
India" articulated and built upon the reality of the situation in post-independence
India wherein "Hindus" constitute the majority community comprising of
eightyfive percent of India's population by popular estimation. While the Hindu
right includes Buddhists, Jains, Dalits, Sikhs, tribals, scheduled castes and tribes to
come up with the figure of eightyfive percent, its critics contest the inclusion of
those groups who do not consider themselves Hindu (Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs
for example) or are non-denominational (such as some groups of tribals or
70 Pradip Datta (1991): 251.
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scheduled castes). Thus in the critics' estimates, the revised strength of the Hindu
community would range between forty and sixty percent, depending on the groups
included or excluded.
Mainstream literature interprets the Hindu right strategy as a play upon the
widespread sense of insecurity regarding India's territorial integrity. As our earlier
discussion illustrates, the 1980s was the time when conflicts in Kashmir and
Punjab were gathering momentum. At the same time, problems arose in Assam
over refugees from neighboring Bangladesh, as well as tribal demands for a
separate Bodoland. Tribal groups demanding the creation of a separate Jharkhand
in Bihar since the time of independence had intensified their demands while
Gurkha minorities began to call for the creation of a separate Gurkhaland in West
Bengal. Separationist movements in Nagaland, Mizoram, and Uttarkhand were
also demanding attention. A combination of pockets of'Separationist' conflict all
over India, combined with the Government's inability to resolve the issues or
establish law and order, increased the already growing sense of unease regarding
India's political and territorial integrity.
Moreover, the institutional strength and legitimacy of the Congress had
declined drastically since the mid-sixties. It no longer had the mantle of authority
that Nehru's Congress enjoyed. There were growing incidents of breach of law
and order and violence across India. Indira Gandhi's strategy of personalized
power had weakened the infrastructure of the Congress Party and Rajiv inherited a
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beleaguered Congress. The distance between the Center and the grassroots level
was further widened under Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as prime minister and local and
regional satraps were fast becoming the norm. The country seemed to be coining
apart at its seams. It was this sense of insecurity, pessimism, lack of direction and
a growing frustration with the establishment that the VHP and then the BJP
capitalized upon to propagate the belief that if something was not done
immediately to halt India's downward spiral it would spell disaster for the country.
The RSS-VHP-BJP argue that the contemporary state of affairs is a result of
the corruption of the ruling elites, their practice of "pampering" minorities,
particularly the Muslims, and their failure to deal with the meddling by
neighboring Pakistan (the 'foreign hand' argument). The ruling elites were
portrayed as corrupt due to their excessive westernization and ill-conceived
notions of secularism that made room for 'pandering to the minorities.' The
minorities in turn were blamed for appropriating benefits that rightfully accrued to
the majority by forming themselves into an easily identifiable voting bloc, a
strategy to be emulated by the "Hindus" in order to counter their slipping position.
Savarkar and Hedgewar’s image of a weak and fragmented Hindu community was
evoked by the Hindu right along with assertions that the community would soon be
overwhelmed and turned into a minority in its own country.
Among the minorities, the non-Muslim and non-Christian minorities were
forgiven by the proponents of Hindutva, as errant children that had to be wooed
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back into the folds of Hinduism, as demonstrated by the intensified efforts of the
VHP and the RSS in the aftermath of the Meenakshipuram conversions of 1981.
The Christians who proselytized tribals in the northeastern section of India were
troublesome and had to be countered. However, the community as a whole was
not considered to pose a significant threat as it had been for the most part
assimilated into the Indian culture. However, it was the Muslims who continued
to pose a threat to Indian unity today, as they had done since the dawn of history.
The principle of inclusion and exclusion laid out by Savarkar inHindutva his book
in 1922, had been revised and applied to contemporary Indian situation in the
1980s.
Creation o f the Muslim "Other"
During the partition of 1947 many high ranking, urban Muslim elites
migrated to the newly created Pakistan.71 A large percentage of those left behind
were poor, economically backward and lagging in education compared both to the
Muslim population that had migrated and the Indian population, primarily the
Hindus in India. However, growth and development in post-independence India
created many opportunities for advancement and upward mobility that benefitted
71 Engineer (1991) and Imtiaz Ahmed (1984).
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Muslims (and Dalits or untouchables). With such changes came an awareness of
their bargaining strength and political assertiveness that threatened the entrenched
upper caste Hindus who had traditionally dominated. According to Engineer, this
development and violent retaliation by upper caste Hindus were the reasons for
riots in Ahmedabad in 1960 and in Jabalpur a year later.
In the 1970s, following the oil revolution and the defeat of Syria and Egypt
by Israel, an Islamic sense of solidarity was on the rise globally and Indian
Muslims were influenced by it. By the 1980s the results of the remittance
economy established by the large numbers of Indians working in the Gulf were
becoming apparent. The families of these workers left behind were able to educate
themselves, even own and operate small businesses and move up the ladder of the
social division of labor. Increasing social visibility, new religious schools and
mosques, and new businesses were contributing to increasing tensions between
Hindus and Muslims. The Moradabad riots of 1980 were largely attributed to the
'Arab connection1 and the 'petro-dollar economy' as were the Meenanshipuram
conversions of 1981.
The VHP took advantage of the tensions and grievances of Hindus who had
not fared as well as some of their Muslim counterparts. Muslims were accused of
'stealing' what rightfully belonged to Hindus, and of benefitting from unfair
advantages that accrued to them on account of their minority status. Longstanding
rivalry with neighboring Pakistan, rumors of its assistance in training Kashmiri and
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Sikh militants were dragged out and put into service of whipping up anti-Muslim
sentiments. A slew of anti-Muslim rhetoric and propaganda was disseminated
effectively, using cutting-edge communications technology. History was co
opted to verify the 'foreignness' of Muslims in India and to exclude this community
from the concept of the community of Indians. Rewriting history is located at the
heart of any ideology. However, the potency of the ideologyHindutva of lies in
its use of the powerful memory and "legitimate" history of the Indian nationalist
movement to deliver its most powerful blow to Nehruvian secularism.
Kaviraj's argument at the beginning of this chapter established that India
was given a past and hence an identity by reinterpreting the past to serve the needs
of the present. In another instance of a critical evaluation of this narrative of
history, Partha Chatterjee elucidates the underpinning logic that sustains this
conception of history.72 Chatterjee's argument rests on three links: the modem
historiography associated with the nation-state; the contestation between
indigenous and colonial forms of knowledge and the nineteenth century imagining
of an Indian nation constructed around the core of the history of "the Hindus."
Nandy's argument discussed in the next section, address the first two points
raised by Chatterjee. Hence, I will limit myself to a discussion of the construction
of Indian history that furnishes the Hindu Right with the authority to argue that the
72 Chatteijee (1992).
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essence of India lies in Hinduism. According to the history "discovered" by the
British, India's past could be divided into three periods: the golden age of Hindu
rule; the dark ages of Muslim rule; and finally the age of renaissance under British
rule. This interpretation of India's past constructed from Indian sources, with the
help of educated Brahmin priests, elevated the prejudices of both the Brahmins
and the British against Muslims to a verity, a "fact" of history. Hence, "the
Muslims" are translated into enemies of "the Hindus" since the dawn of history,
subjecting the latter to the indignities of conquest with their "immoral rule" that
results in the decline of "the Hindu country." The possibility of restoring India to
its proper glory and place in history seemed to have appeared under the
benevolence of progressive British rule. The narrative also came to include many
instances of Muslim tyranny and the brave resistance by Hindus.73
Chatterjee argues that it was the acceptance of the "ideology" of a nation
state as the criteria for self-determination; the resultant demand of nationalism that
the nascent nation-state have a homogeneous, unitary collective past; combined
with the newfound awareness of "Indian history" and the proportionately large
numbers of "Hindus" involved in the nationalist movement, that gave birth to an
India constructed around 'the history of the Hindus'. It is this reinterpretation of
history and of the nationalist movement that allows the Hindu right today to argue
73 See BJP White Paper on Ayodhya (1993) for details.
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persuasively that India has always meant Hindu India and that the past forty odd
years of Indian existence have not been true to India's history and to the primary
agents of her history, "the Hindus". Moreover, the antinomies of Nehru's vision
and the uneven practice of secularism in his era discussed earlier in this chapter,
encourage such an interpretation. It is on this combined strength of the nationalist
and Nehruvian legacies, thatHindutva has emerged as a challenge to the
Nehruvian ideology of secularism, that Chatterjee rightfully points out defined the
fundamental character of the nation-state which the constitution called "India, that
is Bharat."74
To recapitulate, the idea of "India" was bom amidst the stresses of the
experience of colonialism. There was no pre-existing nation of "India" that was
being "recovered" during the anti-colonial straggle. Rather, as an act of self
definition, the newly constructed entity of "India" was imbued with a past and
with a history. The needs of the present, namely resistance against colonialism,
influenced the visions of India. Contrary to established views, there was more
than one conception of India prevalent at the time. Each of the visions of India
was multifaceted and emphasized diverse impulses and aspirations of a
heterogeneous polity, that had put their differences aside temporarily to defeat a
common oppressor-the British.
74Ibid: 111.
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Each vision privileged a specific interpretation of India's sad plight and
hence constructed specific trajectories for India's future. Nehru gave primacy to
the modem logic of the nation-state and deferred on questions of social justice and
Indian past. The Hindu nationalists on the other hand sought to make sense of
colonialism by privileging indigenous culture and belief systems.
Due to historical contingencies, Nehru's vision came to define India in the
aftermath of independence and it took forty years to fulfill the promise of this
vision. However, today the Nehruvian vision of a secular and socialist India is
falling apart as the contradictions between its promise and reality are no longer
sustainable. The re-emergence Hindutvaof is premised upon this context. The
Hindu Right argues that a Hindu India is the true essence of the Indie civilization.
The denial of this truth by misguided secularists has intensified India's decline that
began with the 'alien' rule of Muslims. The deep resonance of the logic of
Hindutva necessitates an examination of the various interpretations of the rise of
the movement that is addressed in the next chapter.
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The Secularism Debate
Morality and meaning in politics, first o f all, do not have to emerge from religion; they can also emerge from a modernist, liberal conception o f ethics. ...Secularism by itself thus does not make one amoral or unethical. I f this is how secular politicians o f the 1980s behaved, it is not what secularism as a principle entails. This distinction is crucial for explaining the events o f the last decade.
Ashutosh Varshney, "Contested Meanings," pp 253.
As the modem nation-state system and the modern thought machine enter the interstices o f even the most traditional societies, those in power or those who hope to be in power in these societies begin to view statecraft in fully secular, scientific, amoral and dispassionate terms. The modernist elites in such societies then begin to fear the divisiveness o f minorities and the diversity which religious and ethnic plurality introduces into a nation-state. These elites then begin to see all religions and all forms o f ethnicity as a hurdle to nation-building and state-formation and as a danger to the technology o f statecraft and political management.
Ashis Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism," pp 191.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The central challenge ofHindutva has been directed at the core principle of
India's identity as envisioned by Nehru, namely the principle of secularism. The
recent debate on secularism in India has thrown into relief several interpretations
of secularism, challenging a simple acceptance of secularism as separation of
church and state. We can abstract two typical meanings and three traditional
approaches to the issue of secularism for a comprehensive overview.1 The first
meaning of secularism refers to the conventional western notion of a separation of
religion and politics advocated by Nehru and enshrined within the Indian
Constitution. In practice, this approach translates into a banishment of religion
from the public sphere and the recent attempts at religious 'revivalism' are
interpreted as an endeavor to alter the terms of the discourse. Hence, the
secularists argue that the solution to contemporary problems lies in strengthening
the very forces of secularism that are being threatened by the resurgence of
religious movements.
The second meaning as advocated by Gandhi, and officially by Hindu
nationalists, interprets secularism as 'equal respect for all religions' with an
accommodating attitude by the state towards religion. This approach advocates
not simply a place for religion in the public realm, but an active role for the state
in nurturing diverse faiths. For Gandhi there could be no separation of religion
and politics; just as the king upheld and embodieddharma so should the state
1 The following discussion is informed by the introduction in Allen (1992). Also see Parekh (1991), especially 39-40.
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embody religion and promote tolerance, syncretism and diversity.
The third approach shares the view that religion and politics are
inseparable; however it rejects the concept of secularism as it has primarily come
to represent a separation of church and state. It is important to recognize two
types of anti-secularists. The first type of anti-secularist is typically represented
by the chauvinists and fundamentalists who advocate an exclusive notion of
(political) identity based on the absolute authority of religion. The second set of
anti-secularists, reject the claims to authority both by a modem, rational state and
by dogmatic religion. In this view, the exclusive and absolute belief systems
advocated both by the state and the church result in chauvinism and intolerance in
one form or another. This argument is exemplified in some moments of Gandhi an
thought, and seeks precedence in pre-modem and traditional ways of life
understood to comprise of virtues such as tolerance, pluralism and flexible
boundaries.
The Hindu Right has consistently argued that Nehruvian secularism with its
roots in Christian Europe is an alien concept, incompatible with the Indian gestalt.
The BJP's conception of "true secularism" rejects the separation of religion and
politics, but accepts the ultimate authority of the state. Their formulation stands
on the interstices of all three approaches to secularism outlined above. It appeals
to the modem, secular, westernized sections of Indian society with its acceptance
of the dominance of the State; it appeals to the anti-secularists by providing room
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for religion in politics; and it appeals to the second group of secularists with
claims of equal treatment of all religions. By the same token, the westernized
elites reject the inclusion of religion in the public realm; the anti-secularists reject
the failure to consecrate the ultimate authority of religion; while the second group
of anti-secularists reject Hindutva because its privileging of Hinduism and
assimilative tendencies are perceived as threats to the distinct identity of minorities
as well as antithetical to the principles of tolerance and pluralism.
The deep resonance of the logic ofHindutva resists easy dismissal and
necessitates a deeper inquiry. However, the debate has been shifting away from a
confrontation between the Hindu Right and all those opposed to it, to an internal
debate within the latter group. The contestation is now located between the so
called modernists (and secularists) and anti-modernists (and anti-secularists). It is
worth remembering that these positions are not without their share of internal
variance. I have chosen to approach the debate via Varshney's defense of
secularism against Nandy's penetrating critique of modernity that invokes a
(re)engagement with the enduring consequences of colonialism and questions the
institution of secularism in India along with the domain of knowledge within
which this concept is situated.2
Varshney's account represents the mainstream modernist argument, while
2 Varshney (1992) and Nandy (1988).
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Nandy’s argument exemplifies the contrasting perspective posed by anti-secularists
(not to be confused with anti-secularists who are also the proponentsHindutva). of
Varshney's account is helpful in locating the immediate catalysts Hindutvaof the
movement, but he fails to accord any significance to the movement, reducing it in
a characteristically Nehruvian manner to a contestation between socio-economic
interests. Nandy on the other hand is very critical of the modernist project
perpetuated in India by the elites and middle classes, that in his view engenders an
internal colonialism no different than that of the erstwhile colonizers. Nandy
extends a sophisticated critique of modernity and of the ontological basis of the
construction of knowledge in India. However, the central lacuna in both
arguments is the failure to account for the transformations in the material realm
that are instrumental in constructing cultural spaces that allow for a confrontation
between alternative belief systems. Ideas are not formed in a vacuum, and neither
are all conflicts effected by economic interests alone. Action and thought are not
divorced but constitutive of each other, while retaining a reciprocal relation with
the production process.
I locate the recent movement for a Hinduized identity within the process of
a changing social order, shaped by the growth and differentiation of Indian
political economy. This transformation has engendered new social groups and
new cultural spaces for the articulation of diverse notions of self and collective
identity. The new social groups bear a distinctive consciousnesstheir of place in
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society ando f the society in which they are situated and seek to shape "India" in
their own image. The possibility for such a project to not only emerge but to
dictate the terms of the discourse are afforded by the new cultural domains of
interaction and affiliation that have emerged within Indian society allowing the
articulation of diverse opinions, ideas, beliefs and ways of life. The unravelling of
the hegemonic project of the Nehruvian state has accorded a new significance to
the sphere of civil society that has been assuming more and more responsibilities
left untended by the state. Hence, the current movement to reshape Indian culture
and Indian identity is not so much a state-directed venture, as it is a product of
public discourse, camouflaged and obscured as it is by the deployment of a
diversity of idioms. Hence, I argue that an examination of the changing material
transformation and social configuration is indispensable as it enables us to
conceive of identity and religion in dynamic terms, rejecting essentialism,
primordialism and economic reductionism.
The Secularist Argument
Varshney protests the tremendous interrogation that Nehruvian secularism
has been subjected to recently. He contends that the attacks are misdirected.
Rather than focusing attention on the credibility of the principle of secularism,
Varshney argues it is the recent distorted practice of secularism by the ruling
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establishment that should be examined as a precursor to the rise of
fundamentalism. Varshney acknowledges that the potential of Hindu nationalism
has endured since the early days of resistance against British colonialism in India.
In his view,
In imaginations about India's national identity, there was always a conceptual space for Hindu nationalism. Still it remained a weak political force until recently, whencontext the of politics changed?
Varshney also locates the recent success of this strain in Indian national
identity in the changing configuration of political practices and fortunes and
situates the debate over the "national question" alongside the reactions engendered
by the quickening pace of the extensive social and economic transformations
currently witnessed in India. Hence, Varshney interprets the prevailing conditions
as the "politics of anxiety" generated by the "simultaneity of change at several
levels."4
Varshney rejects the argument that the challenge of Hindu nationalism
necessarily heralds the failure of the principle of secularism in India. Instead, he
argues that,
India's secularism looks exhausted not because secularism is intrinsically unsuited to India and must, therefore, inevitably come to grief. ...The secularism of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi was not a logical culmination of the secularism of Nehru. Politics over the last decade discredits the kind of secularism practiced by the various regimes in the 1980s. It does not
3 Varshney (1992): 227. Emphasis added.
4 Ibid.
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discredit secularism per se.5
Varshney distinguishes between three competing identity principles in India-a
territorial notion, a cultural notion and a religious notion. Both Nehruvian
secularism and Hindu nationalism are based upon a spatial notion of identity and
the idea of national unity or territorial integrity is common to both visions and the
concept of a "sacred geography" has become an "inalienable part" of Indian
identity. According to Varshney, the competing visions differ on the issue of the
defining principle of the nation. While secularists base it on an inclusive concept
of culture, Hindu nationalists advocate an exclusive principle of religion.
Varshney explains that the cultural notion of India is comprised of the "ideas of
tolerance, pluralism and syncretism," a combination that defines the Indian cultural
ethos. This cultural notion translates into a political policy of pluralism-of
language and of religion-that is, principles of federalism and secularism
respectively. The principle of federalism was developed "to respect the linguistic
diversity of India" while the principle of secularism guaranteed constitutional
freedom to all religions while reserving the right of the State to intervene in
religious disputes. Varshney argues that these ideals, including the notion of
secularism, are not incongruous to Indian ethos as they are grounded in the
inclusive unity of culture rather than the exclusive unity of religion. "[F]or a
5 Ibid: 228.
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secular nationalist, the two terms-religion and culture-are clearly separable" while
"[F]or Hindu nationalists, the two terms-India and Hindu-are synonymous."6
Although the first phase of conflict between these two 'imaginations' of India was
won by secularists, the outcome today may be very different. However, Varshney
reiterates that it would be erroneous to understood such a verdict as a failure of
secularism. It is the distortion of the principle of secularism after Nehru's era that
is fraught with problems. Varshney advances Indira Gandhi's repeated attempts
to supersede federalism as an illustration of this thesis.
In the 1970s after the Congress split, in an attempt to fortify her position
and to minimize threats to her authority, Indira Gandhi maneuvered to concentrate
power at the Center, undermining the federal political arrangement established by
Nehru as an essential characteristic of Indian national identity. This action in turn
spawned resistance in the form of "separatist nationalisms" that may be perceived
as a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation, creating a climate of anxiety in
the country. In addition, Varshney submits that an overextension of the principle
of pluralism may have generated a similar counter-reaction. In his opinion, the
government's concession to minority demands on the issue of Article 370 in
Kashmir and in the debate of uniform civil code, are "harmful for national
integrity," raising the specter of fragmentation, and thereby engendering a majority
6 Ibid: 240-41.
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reaction against "pluralism." However, Varshney affirms that it would be
erroneous to perceive such reactions as opposition to the principles of pluralism or
secularism per se. Instead, he argues, it would be more accurate to understand
them as reactions to the excesses in the implementation of the doctrines.
In Varshney's understanding India's heterogeneity results in the persistence
of "multiple strains of a national identity," and that an "excessive shift towards one
of the strains produces a reaction" from the other strains in an attempt to restore
equilibrium in society. Both, Indira Gandhi's undermining of the principle of
federalism and the overstating of the case for pluralism, generated countervailing
reactions to restore the balance of the system. The particular form of Hindu
nationalism adopted by these counteracting reactions are the results of the immoral
and unprincipled practice of politics by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi that
created a legitimate space for religion in politics and paved the path for the rise of
Hindu nationalism (and its fundamentalist impulse). Varshney asserts that,
When secularism was equated with secular tolerance and legitimated by Nehru's principled behavior, arguments that it was the responsibility of the majority community to make minorities secure could be openly made. Despite such open arguments in favor of minorities, Hindu nationalists, were not able to win against Nehru. When principled secularism—not legitimating religion in political mobilization but maintaining a concern for minority welfare—was replaced by unprincipled secularism, the secular project began to unravel.7
Nehruvian secularism established its authority when it superseded Hindu
7 Ibid: 253.
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nationalism as the hegemonic vision of India at the time of political independence.
Thus, Varshney interprets the recent success of the Hindu right and the attacks on
Nehruvian secularism as the outcome of amoral, unethical politics. Moreover, in a
climate of crisis engendered by a spurt of'secessionist nationalisms' and the
"simultaneity of change at several levels" induced by sweeping economic and
social changes, a collective experience of "anxiety" and "fear of the unknown" has
been politically translated into Hindu nationalism. "Politics," in Varshney's
opinion, "remains central to this enterprise."8
However, Varshney does raise an important point by acknowledging that
Nehru's break with the past caused a severe rupture in India's collective existence.
Nehru was convinced that "creating a national idea in terms of India’s past was
inherently problematic" and thus he chose to "forget the traditional past."9
However, Varshney argues that the lacuna in Nehru's thought can be rectified by
recovering notions of political pluralism, tolerance and syncretism from "Indian
historical and cultural traditions" a responsibility that Nehru was faced with but
chose to shirk as it called for an engagement with India's past which Nehru
believed was weighing India down and had to be forgotten.
While Varshney's analysis provides a rich descriptive narrative, his
8 Ibid: 229.
9 Ibid: 239.
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argument is problematic on several accounts. His analysis focuses on the
conjunctural and fails to address the issue of deeper structural changes that are
transforming Indian landscape. Gramsci differentiates between conjunctural
phenomena and organic movements. According to him, conjunctural phenomena
do not have any very far-reaching historical significance; they give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities.10
Whereas, organic movements are relatively permanent and if correctly identified,
result in "socio-historical criticism." Gramsci asserts that there is a relation
between the conjunctural and the organic phenomena, however most analyses are
marked by the common error of incorrectly identifying the relation between the
two. Varshney's account lacks a deeper sense of history and hence he is incapable
of recognizing structural transformations that have matured and are surfacing after
a lag of numerous years. While he alludes to the social and economic
transformations currently underway in India, their only significance in Varshney's
analysis is that of having a dislocating effect that contributes to a "politics of
anxiety." This misreading stems from another shortcoming in Varshney's analysis.
Varshney understands thought and action to form completely separate
realms without any reciprocal relations between the two spheres. He abstracts the
practice of secularism from the theory and affirms the universal applicability of
10 Gramsci (1971): 177.
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the theory while decrying its distorted practice. This maneuver is reminiscent of
Nehru's maneuver with regard to industrialization and modernization. Nehru
deflected the strong opposition articulated by Gandhi and Tagore against
industrialization as a means of developing India, on the grounds that "[T]he fault is
not of industrialism, but of foreign domination."11 It was outside the realm of
Nehru's thought to conceive the possibility of a relationship between an industrial
vision and its needs that may be the motivation behind the search for colonies and
foreign domination. Similarly, it appears to be outside the realm of Varshney's
understanding, that the assumptions and philosophical and social goals that inform
the principle of secularism cannot be decoupled from the principle itself in an
instrumentalist manner. According to this reading, concepts do not support a
particular worldview, but are imbued with meaningonly when applied to a specific
context.
It would be erroneous to believe that ideas, concepts and theories are
innocent. According to Cox, "theory is alwaysfor someone andfor some
purpose."12 Concepts and theories support a particular worldview and a specific
philosophy, since they are intersubjective constructions, embedded in a particular
social milieu. Moreover, concepts are not fixed entities with unchanging meaning
11 Jawaharlal Nehru (1939).An Autobiography. London: John Lane. 520. Quoted in Krishna (1994): 196.
12 Cox (1986): 207.
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across time and space. They are conditioned by their situation within particular
historical contexts and the meaning is continually modified. Nehru's uncritical
acceptance of western theories failed to take this aspect into account, embracing
the illusion of universalism formulated by the West. Varshney perpetuates the
same bias in his analysis by failing to recognize the implicit hierarchy of power
embodied within the western versions of modernity, development and progress; or
that the ideas of secularism and industrialism are historical products conditioned
by the circumstances of their origins, namely the specificities of Western Europe
during its modem development. Varshney's analysis implicitly assumes that
stability is the normal feature of existence and conflict arises merely to restore the
equilibrium of the (closed) system. Thus, the agitations in Kashmir, Punjab,
Assam and other parts of the country as well as the movementHindutva of are
interpreted as movements to restore stability in the system. Varshney's analysis
cannot admit that these movements may have deeper significance; that the conflict
may not simply arise from petty differences; that the challengeHindutva of may
not be as much as the conflict between religion and rationality per se, but the
challenge of a "different collective image of a social order" that goes beyond the
issue of religion and secularism. Varshney concludes thatHindutva the movement
is merely a 'political' issue and ignores the possibility that conflict may be a source
of structural change rather than a simple power-grabbing mechanism.
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A Critique o f Modernity
Nandy addresses the issue of secularism at several levels. At the core of
Nandy's argument lies a critique of the vision of modernity itself. He locates the
flaw in the modernist vision in the exclusivist logic of dichotomous thought
constructed as "binary dualisms". He emphasizes that we are witnessing the
maturing of the contradictions of this perspective, a development that creates room
for the "recovery" of alternative conceptions of society and culture based upon
traditional forms of knowledge. In the context of India, Nandy examines the
consequences of the psychological contestation under conditions of colonialism,
that resulted in the dominance of the colonizers and their belief system, that is, the
establishment of western modernity as the norm while marginalizing the ways of
the colonized. Finally, Nandy considers the immediate crisis faced by the
ideology of secularism in India today, partly due to the increased participation of
the polity in the practices of democracy and the growing perception that even the
marginalized traditional ways of life can no longer be sustained in the face of the
spreading acceptance of modernity within India.
Located in the western conceptual domain which is constructed upon the
logic of binary dualisms, secularism according to Nandy necessarily embodies a
power hierarchy implied in the very construction of the dyads, in this case
secularism/religion.
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Dichotomous binary thought is a central characteristic of Western liberal
philosophy. Rooted in Baconian theory of "objective, scientific, 'true' knowledge,"
this conception of knowledge strictly partitions off,
the observer from the observed, the subject from the object of knowledge, the enlightened agents of history from the passive ahistorical laity, the rational from the nonrational.13
In the pre-modem era, Nature was understood to be the text upon which God's will
was inscribed.14 With the coming of the modem age, the need to distance oneself
from a transcendental authority and seek mastery over the world became dominant,
translating into a drive to subject Nature to human will. The locus of authority
shifts from God to the individual and a severe rupture is established between the
domain of nature and the domain of individuals. This philosophy underlies the
notion that individuals are autonomous, self-enclosed entities, possessing the
power to influence nature while remaining impervious to "external" influence,
including that of other individuals, society and nature. In the human/nature pair,
the human is privileged, while nature is subordinated to the former; and the power
hierarchy is envisioned in favor of the human. The realm of GoJ-nature and
religion-is to be necessarily subjected to the authority of (human) Reason, even as
the imminent threat of an alternative source of authority is recognized but
13 Nandy (1994): 20.
14 Nandy (1994). The discussion is also informed by Connolly (1988): 1-15.
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seemingly denied. However this cognizance of incomplete mastery translates into
the exclusion of the possibility of reciprocity or commonality between the two
realms (human/nature). Hence, according to Nandy, binary thought necessarily
upholds difference and exclusivism that in turn spawns violence, intolerance and
subjugation.
In his view, the dominant strain of western knowledge derives its meaning
from this dualistic ontology and upholds an exclusivist logic that necessarily
privileges the first category of the dyad while the second category measured
against the "norm" (i.e., the first category) is found wanting, and in some readings
even pronounced to be inferior. The dyads are conceived to be constructed of
autonomous units of analysis with the only relationship between the two units
being one of negation. In such a domain of knowledge, 'secularism' necessarily
implies an absence or a negation of'religion' and religion is simultaneously
subordinate to secularism. This is true of other dyads as well, East/West,
self/other, reason/faith, center/periphery and civil/primordial, that shape the way in
which we order the world.
The drive for mastery and absolute control limit the internal capacity of this
construction of modernity to withstand difference, which is perceived as a threat,
undermining the authority of modernity (i.e., of modem institutions such as
Universal Reason, Progress, History, Science, Nation-state). Quest for
homogeneity and a perfectly ordered world that would result as soon as all
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difference was expunged from it. All that is different is understood to be "in need
of punishment, reform or destruction."15
Nandy is critical of this modem worldview, particularly the rigid
dichotomization, subjugation, intolerance and violence engendered by it. He
argues that every concept is co-constituted both by its positive and its negative
moment, each of which contain a different element of truth.16 Thus the West is to
be found in the East, the East in the West, a center in the periphery, a periphery in
the center, the barbaric within the civilized and the civilized within the barbaric
and so forth. When one aspect of the concept is dominant, the other, though
seemingly absent, nevertheless endures as a recessive moment that may at a future
stage become the dominant strain. Thus, every concept embodies its own
contradictionwithin itself rather than external to itself. Such an understanding of
reality is more tolerant of difference, recognizing itself in the "Other" while
allowing for identification of the "Other" in itself. Nandy envisions continuity
between concepts contrary to the autonomous, self-enclosed definitions of modem
thought. Hence, constitution of a "self' is not conceived to be a solitary project,
but one that embodies the "Other" as a recessive moment of the self. Such a
process of self-identification allows for tolerance of diversity and pluralism.
15 Connolly (1988): 14.
16 See Nandy (1993, 1983).
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In India, modernity arrived on the coattails of colonialism and influenced
the dominant classes who bore the burden of not only repudiating the colonizer but
also of assimilating the colonizer so as to make sense of the predicament that faced
Indian society.17 In this struggle, some of the modem prejudices were internalized
and are perpetuated via the dominating classes, resulting in a form of internal
colonialism that continues to erode indigenous forms of knowledge, categories of
thought and diversity of meanings from the collective memory. In Nandy's
opinion, the fracture in die collective Indian self results from a disjuncture
between a reality grounded in the cultural practices of the society and the reality as
constructed via alien structures of thought and knowledge. The dominance of the
latter forced Indian society to alter its cultural basis in accordance with the
worldview embodied in the vision of the colonizers. Hence, many Indians came to
believe that their inherited belief systems were backward. However, the elites as
in Nehru's case, firmly believed that once the ideas of the colonizers were imbibed
and "implemented," corresponding material consequences would follow,
stabilizing the authority of these "progressive" ideas. Hence, along with other
modem ideas, the western meaning of secularism was given a prominent place in
the Indian Constitution, while the indigenous interpretation of secularism, as
advocated by Gandhi was 'forgotten.'
17 ibid.
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Nandy underscores the prevalence of these two meanings of secularism in
South Asia.18 He characterizes one as the western meaning of the word, and the
other as the non-Westem meaning. The western meaning of secularism "chalks
out an area in public life where religion is not admitted" while the non-western
meaning of secularism implies "equal respect for all religions."19 Nandy argues
that the western meaning has come to dominate South Asian discourse, having
won the endorsement of westernized elites and modernizing middle classes. These
sections of the population in turn view the non-western meaning of secularism
accepted by the majority of the population "as adulterated and as compromising
true secularism."20 The hidden political hierarchy embodied by the dominant
meaning of secularism, puts the non-believer (both in public and private life) at the
top, while the believer, whose public and private lives are based upon her/his faith
is relegated to the bottom of the political order.
Nandy argues that the disjuncture between a tolerant and pluralistic Indian
culture and the western meaning of secularism stems from the fact that the latter is
"defmitionally ethnophobic and frequently ethnocidal."21 The logic of western
secularism portrays the ideologies of religion and statecraft as contradictory and
18 Nandy (1988).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid: 181.
21 Ibid: 179.
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religious protest as a cover-up for socioeconomic conflicts. Philosophical
differences based in religion or expressed in a religious idiom are denied
legitimacy. Nandy views the western conception of secularism as "incompatible"
and "uncomfortable, with the somewhat fluid definitions of the self' characteristic
of South Asian cultures.22 The recent challenge to the hegemony of (the western
meaning of) secularism is indicative of its weakening hold in Indian society.
Reasons for such a development stem, in part, from the deepening processes of
democracy as well as the surfacing of contradictions inherent in the concept of
secularism.
The expansion of the democratic ethos among the population has expanded
the volume and quality of participation in the political process. There is an
explosion of opinions, interests and ideologies within the political arena that no
longer allows for the kind of coordination that marked the politics of the early
years of independent India. Civil society has increasingly gained in strength and
there has been a gradual, yet consistent shift in authority away from the state to
civil society. The exercise of the electoral might of the voter has been partially
successful in checking the authoritarian tendencies of state and bureaucracy. The
plurality of interests finding expression in the public sphere and the inability of
political parties to keep opposing views out of the political arena, Nandy
22 ibid.
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concludes that "[R]eligionhas entered public life but through the backdoor."23
Nandy rejects the popular characterization of religious protest and violence
as "retrogression into primitivism and as a pathology of traditions."24 Instead, he
argues that fundamentalism and zealotry are a "by-product and a pathology of
modernity."25 Nandy points out that RSS ideology is constructed around the
values of semiticized Hinduism of the reform movements of the nineteenth
century. Influenced by the seeming superiority of the Western culture, particularly
the privileging of masculinity (West) over femininity (East), some Indian reform
movements
stressed kshatriyahood as the future core of post-colonial Hinduism... some Indians desperately sought instances of hyper-masculinity in the Indian past; others accepted the order and sought to excel their rulers in martial valour.26
The RSS has appropriated the legacy of many historical movements that sought to
model Hinduism on the one Book, one God, one Church concept of Semitic
religions, in addition to embracing the concept of the nation-state. In Nandy's
opinion, such a revision of Hinduism is contrary to its inherent spirit of diversity,
heterogeneity and tolerance. More importantly such a maneuver imbues Hinduism
23 Ibid: 184.
24 Ibid: 187.
25 Ibid.
26 Nandy (1987): 39.
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with the biases of the modem perspective, converging with the secular vision of
the westernized elites rather than being opposed to it, as the proponents of
Hindutva are wont to claim. This is an important insight offered by Nandy that
partly explains the modem vision of India advanced by the movementHindutva. of
However, Nandy does not examine the contradiction between the modem vision
and the traditional idiom in which it is expressed. This is an issue that I will
examine in my analysis.
Nandy firmly believes that tension between the inherent intolerance and
coerciveness of the nation-state and its desire to be the ultimate source of
authority, political and moral, results in the very negation of ethical and moral
ideals embodied in the principle of secularism. Tolerance, diversity, protection of
the weak and the preservation of the public good become secondary to the
demands of maintaining political authority. Ironically, the concept of the nation
state was accepted during the Indian nationalist struggle as a congealed locus of
power, protective of the local culture. However, even at that moment of history
there was considerable ambivalence regarding the acceptance of the ideology of
the nation-state, articulated by prominent anti-colonialists such as Tagore and
Gandhi. Nandy writes that neither Tagore nor Gandhi wanted the very Indian
culture "to protect which the idea of the nation-state had supposedly been
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imported," to be subjected to "social engineering guided by a theory of progress."27
The current situation manifests a realization of these fears. Rather than
delivering on the promise of superior guidance to society, the ideology of the
modem nation-state has become "intolerant of other faiths." Secularism as part of
a larger package of modem ideology has come to promote a culture of "violence
against the weak and the dissenting" akin to the practices of ecclesiastical
institutions of the past. Nandy concludes that the contradictions of modernity and
of secularism have become apparent and the ideology can no longer be sustained,
in spite of the attempts to defend and preserve the status quo.
Critical of the terms of discourse used in the current debate, Nandy argues
that in the post-colonial Third World,
a conceptual domain is sometimes hegemonized by a concept produced and honed in the West, hegemonized so effectively that the original domain vanishes from our awareness.28
Local options and wisdom are overshadowed by the priorities of the dominant
belief system, 'naturalizing' the supremacy of the latter. Hence, recovering the
domain of "tolerance" from the "hegemonic language of secularism" has become
crucial. While Nandy does not deny that secularism has contributed to "humane
governance and to religious tolerance" this tendency has receded into the
27 Nandy (1994): 3.
28 Nandy (1988): 177.
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background while the more violent and xenophobic moment of the ideology has
increasingly come to dominate the discourse in recent times. According to Nandy,
Once given intrinsic legitimacy, violence converts the battle between the two visions of the human society into a contest for power and resources between two groups sharing the same frame of values.29
This is a drawback in the secularist argument, that does not view the prevalence of
violence as problematic.
Nandy's penetrating analysis of the epistemological, ontological and
methodological basis of the construction of modernity challenge us to rethink the
social and philosophical goals embodied by such an ordering of the world. Nandy
rejects the western meaning of secularism, not merely because it is a western
construction. He confronts the manner in which the priorities, beliefs and cultural
strategies of Indian people were "altered" via the power hierarchy embodied in
colonial practices. Nandy perceives a disjuncture between the official policy of
secularism instituted with the help of Indian elites and the indigenous meaning of
secularism shaped in daily lives of the majority of the masses. Nandy's rejection
of secularism and of the western script of modernity (the industrial vision) in the
context of India stems from his perception that the western meaning of secularism
has marginalized, indeed subjugated indigenous belief systems, robbing the subject
peoples of their ability to shape their own world, according to local needs and
29 Nandy (1987): 34,
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priorities rather than to serve the purposes of imperialism. Nandy is particularly
concerned with the insidious manner in which imperialism is sustained via an
internalization of the priorities of the dominant culture, and a continuation of the
reproduction of the consequences, biases and prejudices, the violence, intolerance
and prejudice against the indigenous constructions of the world. The indigenous
"self1 continues to be marginalized and even forgotten. In Nandy's opinion such a
severe rupture with the past cannot be sustained for long without grave
repercussions for the society as a whole. The past continues to shape our present
and our future, even when marginalized from our consciousness.
It is important to point out that Nandy rejects the western script of
modernity, not modernity per se. Nandy locates the reason for such violence not
simply in the exclusivist logic of modem thought, but also in the predominance of
the modem institution of the nation-state, and the growing hegemony of science
since World War II as the raison d'etre of state action as well as of the ideologies
of development, national security, technology and secularism supported by the
nation-state.30 The responsibility of nation building directs the state to construct a
homogenized, unified society that can be managed by the scientific art of
statecraft. Hence, the goal of self-perpetuation demands that alternative sources of
authority and identity be suppressed either through violence or co-option, by
30 The hegemony of science as the new raison d'etre of the State is examined elsewhere in detail by Nandy. See Nandy (1993,1988).
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interpreting culture either as artifacts to be "ghettoed, museumized or preserved in
reservations" or as substandard cultures that are best left to wither away.
Contrary to popular reasoning, Nandy argues that zealotry and chauvinism
are pathologies of modernity, not of tradition. Faced with the challenge and
indeed the possibility of annihilation of her/his faith that provides the ordering
principle for the world, the zeolot attempts to shut out the corrupting influence, by
turning inward into a closed system of belief. However, Nandy argues this is not a
simple process of regression into an earlier stage of development, since the zealot
comes to measure his/her faith according to the 'norm* as presented by the
challenger. In India, in the face of the overwhelming power of the colonizer, the
zealot's response was to,
decontaminate Hinduism of its folk elements, turn it into a classical Vedantic faith, and then give it additional teeth with the help of Western technology and secular statecraft, so that the Hindus can take on, and ultimately defeat, all their external and internal enemies...31
The assumptions and cultural criteria of the zealot are not grounded in tradition,
but rather are based upon an appropriation of the ideals of western modernity.
Hence,Hindutva cannot be understood as a resurgence of tradition. Instead,
Nandy argues that both Nehruvian secularismHindutva and are a response to the
passage of modernity into Indian society.
Nandy contends that the alternative to the violence and chauvinism lies in
31 Nandy (1988): 186-87.
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the "recovery" of principles tolerance and humane governance from "traditional
ways of life". Nandy clarifies that the objective is not to establish the older
tradition in present day society, but rather to tease out alternative possibilities that
were silenced during the encounter between indigenous and modem/colonial
worldviews. Nandy rejects the western conception of the past as a closed system,
without any bearing on the present. His call to re-examine the past is based on the
key philosophical assumption that there is continuity between the past and the
present, and that there is more than one way to interpret the past and history. In
his view,
Some societies locate their visions of the good and the ideal in the past because the past they see as open-ended and renewable; some others explain the present in terms of the idiom of the past; the past for them is an allegory. Still others go back to the past to bypass cultural defeat in the present.32
Hence, Nandy interprets the use of an idiom of a utopian past, as a form of cultural
critique of present circumstances and a yearning for a more equitable and just
social order. Nandy argues that this language is decried by the modernists as the
language of romantic traditionalists that cannot help solve pragmatic problems,
because the refusal to speak in the modem idiom and a refusal to play by the rules
of the game as delineated by the modernists (colonialists), results in undermining
their claim to be the sole authority in society.
32 Nandy (1987): 19.
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Moreover, a call to return to the past displaces the modernist conception of
a "linear, progressive, cumulative" Universal History that denies an equal space to
societies operating with different philosophies. Nandy applauds the 'traditional'
response as a means of preserving alternative visions of life, uncorrupted by the
violence and intolerance of the modem, industrial vision of life.
Nandy raises many fundamental issues regarding the underlying
assumptions of modernity and highlights the antinomies of this philosophy that
have surfaced and become unsustainable. Nandy's argument that the language of
tradition, and the seemingly ahistorical perspective embodied by it are a defensive
maneuver on the part of marginalized peoples and cultures seeking to hold onto
indigenous ways of life and categories of thought, provides an alternative
explanation for the massive support expressed for the movementHindutva. of
However, Nandy’s romanticization of per-modem and traditional ways of life
ignores the coercion, hierarchy and inequity prevalent in such forms of society.
The history of traditional India comprises of many instances of violent
subsumption of dissent and critique embodied by diverse religious orders that
continues even today in the form of denial of autonomy to Buddhism, Jainism and
Sikhism and the subjugation of lower castes and tribals contradict the absolute
innocence of tradition and indigenous ways of life assumed by Nandy.33
33 See Romila Thapar (1989) for an excellent discussion of the construction of the dominance of Brahmanical Hinduism by repression and co-option of dissenting movements.
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Moreover, Nandy assumes that this heritage of tolerating pluralism and diversity is
somehow unique to the East and is deficient in western culture. This primordial
notion of identity and culture fixes the subject in a specific moment of history
denying change and dynamism through time and space. In repudiating a linear and
cumulative conception of history and seeking to establish continuity with the past,
Nandy ends up with a static notion of history and of humanity, devoid of
movement and change. The indigenous subject is placed outside history,
untouched by the changes around her/him both in cultural and socio-economic
realms.
Similarly, Nandy argues that the idea of western secularism has exhausted
itself and that the logic of modernity seems to be becoming dominant in India,
even as it is being subjected to intense scrutiny worldwide. However, Nandy fails
to delineate the process by which this outcome becomes possible, who the agents
of such transformation are and why these ideas are now becoming dominant, at
this point of time, even though trenchant critiques of both colonialism and the
modernist vision have been advanced since the anti-colonial struggle.
I would argue that both the secularist and the anti-modernist arguments
suffer from one critical weakness, namely a failure to take into account the
developments and transformations that are co-constitutive of the kinds of
developments delineated both by Varshney and Nandy, namely the transformation
of Indian political economy.
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Hindutva as the Raison d'etre of New Social Groups
The promise of the Nehruvian national project has been undermined and a
new national project is yet to be established.Hindutva is one expression of the
transition Indian society is experiencing. It is at once a congealed expression of
the failures of the Nehruvian enterprise as well as of the aspirations for the future
envisioned by the Indian polity. The imaginations of the future that find
expression inHindutva are certainly dictated by the existing power structures of
the Indian society. The movement originated with the new social groups asserting
their presence in the early 1980s, and indeed embodies a particular worldview.
However, by the end of the decade, the logic ofHindutva had transformed into a
movement with widespread support. Thus,Hindutva indexes a changing social
consciousness in India and provides a lens to examine the complexities of a
changing Indian identity.
A longer historical perspective allows us to identify deeper structural
changes that are transforming the shape of Indian society. Since the early 1970s,
there have been numerous expressions of dissent against the Indian state and the
cultural hegemony of the brahman and bania (merchants and trader) Hindu elites.
The forms of resistance have been varied as in the dalit (downtrodden) or the
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anticaste movement, the farmers' movement protesting the unequal terms of trade
vis-a-vis the industrial and the urban sector, the women's movement protesting
patriarchy, numerous forms of environmental movements against degradation of
nature, regional movements demanding autonomy from a centralized state and
religious movements seeking to establish alternative identities. While the forms
and even the local contents of the movements vary across time and across the
movements, some of the common themes consistently articulated have been a
rejection of the increasingly concentration of power and wealth by the state and
state related elites and demands for autonomy in constructing life options. I place
the emergence ofHindutva within this social space, to emphasize that contrary to
popular perception there has been growing ferment in the social consciousness of
the Indian polity even beforeHindutva appeared on the horizon. In fact, Hindu
assertiveness has even partly built its momentum upon the ground prepared by
such social movements, and by co-opting their language, goals and expression of
discontent.
However, Hindutva is unique in its broadbased appeal, its success in
politically challenging the status quo and culturally altering the terms of the
national discourse. Contrary to popular interpretation,Hindutva is not based upon
the typical constituency of religious fundamentalism, namely the illiterate and
backward segments of society and nor is it merely the expression of increasingly
aggressive and articulate "intermediate castes." The movement originated in
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urban centers, within new social groups spawned by the increasingly expanding
and differentiating Indian economy. It has since spread from cities to the
countryside, from upper and middle castes and classes to the lower ranks, even to
the minorities such as dalits, adivasis (tribals) and Muslims who have been targets
of the movement.Hindutva speaks in a traditional and religious idiom, but paints
a sophisticated and modem vision of India and the future. It embodies a
contradictory consciousness that expresses the fundamental nature of the
movement and encapsulates the spirit of the times in which it has emerged.
I situateHindutva at the interstices of a crumbling national project, namely
Nehruvian socialism; a changing political economy and the emergence of a new
but as yet undefined new national project. State-led industrialization and
development programs initiated in post-independent India have resulted in sizeable
growth and differentiation of the Indian economy. Some consequences of this
growth are the emergence of new social groups, greater consolidation of Indian
society in the social and cultural realms, and a strengthening of the intermediate
sphere of civil society allowing for diversity in self-expression autonomous of the
state.
In this section I will outline an alternative interpretationHindutva of by
synthesizing some of the elements within both the secularist and anti-modernist
positions. While Varshney's analysis is rich in description and analysis of the
immediate causes, he fails to address the conditions or changes that create space
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for such practices in the Indian public realm or identify the social base for the new
ideology? Moreover, while Varshney locates the motivation for "Hindu
nationalism" as social and economic discontent, he fails to explain why this
discontentment is articulated in a religious idiom? In other words, why is it that
Hindu-ness is given salience and not caste, class, regional or linguistic identities?
Nandy, on the other hand understands the current ferment in Indian society as the
result of the maturing contradictions of the modem vision, which in broad terms I
accept. However, his analysis is incomplete as it does not account for the
processes or the actors who give agency to the vision.
Nandy's analysis is also problematic as he privileges religion as faith and as
a way of life over religion as ideology, by understanding religion as a primordial
attribute of Indian society. Instead, if religion is understood as a social formation
that arises at a specific moment in history and will at some point in the future
exhaust its potential to serve as the ordering principle of society, we may be able
to locate a continuity between religion as faith and religion as political ideology
that Nandy’s own model suggests should exist, but which his analysis ignores. A
static conception of identity precludes any possibility for liberation and
emancipation to be sought within the system. Instead, it dictates retreat from the
system. In Nandy's model, rejection of western modernity dictates a retreat into
traditionalism and invokes a need to establish a repressed society based on a
nostalgic and romanticized moral order characterized by egalitarianism, tolerance
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and plurality. As an intellectual exercise, exiting an oppressive system appears
attractive. However, for people who live the reality, such an option may be
precluded by the very marginality of their existence.
On the other hand, a dynamic conception of identities (religious, ethnic,
regional, national) allows us to discern that in the face of continued oppression and
lack of institutional mechanisms to wage a struggle, the very same identities that
have been the source of oppression can furnish the basis for a struggle for justice
and equitywithin the social system. In the process, the identity that has been
elevated becomes transformed by the struggle. Nandy's analysis is incisive in its
grasp of the intellectual processes and in the recognition that the potential for
dissent and revolution co-exist and indeed underpin the affirmed idea. However,
Nandy fails to consider the processes by which spaces for dissent emerge and the
potential for resistance is consummated.
It is this lacuna in the existing analysis that I wish to address. Having
located the source of the ferment in Indian society as the maturing of
contradictions of the vision of India constructed with the parameters of colonial
and modernist discourse, the first objective is to trace the structural process that
have engendered the conditions within which a new Indian identity is being
constructed. What is the specific historical context that compels a redefinition of
Indian identity? How is that the Nehruvian vision has realized its immanent
potential and stimulated its own destruction? What are the ontological conditions
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that inform the search for a new national project? Who are the agents authoring
the emerging script of Indian identity?
The second task entails explaining the appealHindutva of for a significant
segment of the Indian population. Specifically, an explanation is required for the
seemingly religious form in whichHindutva manifests itself. IsHindutva an
assertion of a religious identity or is it a cultural identity expressed in a religious
idiom? I distinguish between a religious identity based on a confessional faith and
a cultural identity that is a social construction based upon a historically contingent
configuration and practices of religion, language, caste, race, history and
ethnicity.34 If indeedHindutva is the assertion of a specific cultural identity as I
submit, then we have to explain the religious idiom that dominates the rhetoric of
Hindutva. Hence, it becomes essential to understand the ontological conditions
within whichHindutva emerged and the diverse, though widespread support that it
has received across the country.
The Industry-Agriculture Contradiction
As Indian economy has grown and expanded over the last four decades, it
has provided opportunities for occupational and social differentiation. Given the
34 Friedman (1992).
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uneven nature of growth across regions and sections of society, the impact of
changes has been asymmetrical. Consequently, different groups and regions of the
country have been at the forefront of the movementHindutva. of It first struck
roots in the hearts of many of the 200 million Indians comprising the new social
groups who emerged as active actors in the 1980s. Among these are rich farmers,
petty traders, shopkeepers, small-scale entrepreneurs, labor elites, mid- and lower-
level government employees, doctors, teachers, increasing numbers of
professionals and families of thousands of workers in the Gulf countries and
salaried employees of every kind—an indication of the extensive differentiation of
Indian economy and expansion of the social division of labor.
At the time of political independence, Indian society was politically
dominated by westernized elites and a growing indigenous bourgeoisie, while the
masses, including the peasants and landowners, had little presence. Nehru's vision
for India was one of industrial development, with agriculture playing a supportive,
albeit marginal role. In Nehru's perception, industry not agriculture was the key to
rapid economic development that would rid India of its poverty and infuse the
country with new vigor. Consequently, the golden decade of development (1956-
66) concentrated on basic and heavy industries, import substitution and capital-
intensive development. Policy orientation toward capital-intensive
industrialization, favored primarily the private-sector industrialists and the
westernized middle class professionals who staffed the government bureaucracy.
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Moreover, Nehru had secured the support of the landlords who had evaded or
survived the land reforms, by granting them control over state governments and
hence over the allocation of resources and policies that enabled this powerful
social group to promote their own interests.
However, by the mid-1960s this strategy of had exhausted its potential.
Agricultural neglect, combined with the dual strain of the Indo-Pakistan war and
restricted food supplies from the United States on account of the Vietnam war,
resulted in a massive food crisis that clearly altered national priorities. Substantial
amounts of capital and technological investments were shifted to the agricultural
sector. One manifestation of these policies was the Green Revolution that
provided new high yielding seeds, tractors, irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides for
improved agricultural production. The middle peasants who had obtained land as
a result of the first wave of land reforms in the 1950s, were now able to take
advantage of the new policies and their increased political leverage within the state
governments to improve their position. At the same time the landless and poor
peasants were further marginalized, increasing the gap between the haves and the
have-nots. Advances in agricultural production were uneven in impact across the
various parts of the country as well. The major beneficiaries were Punjab,
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh in northwestern India and Andhra Pradesh in the
southern India. In other parts of the country, agricultural production either
remained stagnant, declined due to excessive dependence on the vagaries of
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monsoon rains or has been unable to keep pace with tbe population growth.
During the shortlived Janata era in 1977-79," agricultural interests were,"
for the first time since independence "powerfully represented at the center as well
as in the states," shifting the balance of power in favor of the rich middle farmers
and backward classes.35 The Janata Party instituted policies that sought to reverse
the city and industry focus of the Nehruvian era, and agriculture was promoted as
an autonomous realm for development and creation of new jobs for the poor.
Attention was also focused on the backward castes and classes for whom
reservations in government jobs, educational and legislative institutions was
sought.
By the 1970s the prospering middle groups were beginning to make their
political presence felt.36 The decade began with the emergence of a farmers'
movement. In 1972, small landholders in the southern state of Tamil Nadu began
an agitation protesting the high rates for electricity, low prices for their produce
and forcible collection of outstanding loans. In Gujarat, farmers organized to
oppose land ceilings while in Punjab, farmers resisted high electricity prices, cuts
in power supply and low cotton prices.37 Omvedt emphasizes that these
35 Rudolph and Rudolph (1987): 51.
36 The following discussion is based on Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) and Omvedt (1993).
37 Omvedt (1993): 100.
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movements were initiated by "big farmers" and supported by smaller cultivators,
but that
these were not sharecroppers or poor peasants fighting landlords; they were "independent commodity producers," peasants caught up in the throes of market production, dependent on the state and capital for their inputs of fertilizer, pesticide, seeds, electricity, and water and for the purchase of their products.38
Squeezed between rising input costs and low returns for cash crops, the farmers
were campaigning for remunerative prices. However, the farmers remained
divided along region and areas of specialization, and the potential for a national
level movement was limited. By the same token, since their ascendence during the
Janata rule, the agrarian faction had established its presence and could not be
ignored thereafter by any political party seeking power at the national level.
Most importantly, government subsidies for the agricultural sector had left
the farmers with surplus money that enabled them to purchase the prized
commodities of housing and education for their children. Increasingly, prosperous
farmers were sending their children (primarily the sons) to the cities to study law,
medicine, engineering, business management, who then pursued professional
careers and government service. Compared to the civil services at the time of
independence, when candidates were recruited primarily from the literati who had
no links to the countryside or the landed gentry, the civil servants today often have
38 Ibid.
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organic links to the lower echelons of society, many of them with families based in
small towns and villages.
The rural elites who were largely landowners, derived their wealth and
power from their positions in the state and district bureaucracy, as contractors and
as middlemen for inputs necessary for commercial agriculture such as pesticides
and fertilizers.39 Meanwhile, the poor peasants who were on the receiving end of
the patronage of the rural elites, attempted to hold onto their small plots of land
even as the were being squeezed between rising prices of inputs and low prices for
their produce. Under such circumstances, the poor peasants supported the protest
movements organized by the big farmers and rural elites, even though the benefits
accrued primarily to the latter group. At the bottom rung were the destitute
laborers who had been forced off the land and were increasingly drawn into
service of the local landlords, farmers, "small factory owners, bureaucrats
managing relief work projects, contracts, road-builders, forest officials."40 At the
same time, industrial growth had created jobs for the landless laborers flocking to
urban centers. Growth of the small-scale industrial sector, including
subcontracting and ancillarization, while generally extensions of the larger
industrial houses, did allow for ownership by small entrepreneurs as well as
39 Omvedt (1993): 188.
40 Omvedt (1993): 188.
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provide employment opportunities for a small section of landless laborers.41
Government policy of investment in heavy industries and import
substitution having run its course, in the 1970s production was diversified into
mass consumer goods, to be supported by an altered pattern of agricultural
productivity that would both supply raw materials for the production of the
consumer goods as well as the demand for the same goods.42 1980s saw the
maturing of four decades of state-directed economic growth. The decade was
marked by the emergence of new social groups, commonly grouped together as the
"new middle class," and an attendant consumer boom that changed the face of
Indian society. In urban areas new range of processed foods, domestic appliances
such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, electric cookers and mixers,
televisions, VCRs and twowheelers had become common sights in many homes.43
The Maruti car emerged as the new status symbol of upwardly mobile families.
Construction of new hotels, housing complexes, shopping centers and temples was
booming. The press, increasingly owned by the emerging social groups, came to
reflect their hopes, aspirations, fears and interests. Government policies of
lowering incomes taxes, excise and custom duties on many consumer and
41 For a brief discussion of the growth of the small-sector and subcontracting and ancillarization, see Bardhan (1984): 43.
42Frankel(1978): 509.
43 India Today, "Rise of the Middle Class," December 31,1985.
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electronic goods, and permitting foreign collaborations in select industries reflect
the increasing leverage of the new social groups.
Rural India, including adivasis (tribals) and dalits were also affected by the
consumer boom. Televisions, radios, movies and videos had penetrated the
hinterlands exposing the masses to the lifestyle of their urban counterparts. City
life and consumerism was also brought back by the younger generation who had
been packed off to the city and a life off the land. All in all, by the 1980s no
section of Indian society was left untouched by the changing political economy. In
Omvedt's assessment, every segment of society was displaying signs of
simultaneously being "attracted and repelled by aspects of the new society."44
Along with a capitalist consumer boom, another aspect of this new society was the
shifting balance between state and civil society.
Shifting Roles o f State and Civil Society
At the time of Independence due to historical contingencies, the State was
"overdeveloped" in relation to civil society.45 This predominance of the state in
India stems from the underdevelopment of the national bourgeoisie and the lack of
44 Omvedt (1993): 189.
45 Alavi (1972).
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a hegemonic class at the time of independence. Given the inability of the
bourgeoisie to take on the responsibility of capital accumulation, saving and
investment, the state inherited this responsibility and worked closely with the
emerging capitalist class. Nehru's emphasis on the centrality of the state in
overseeing the direction and process of development fitted in with the prevalent
world opinion regarding the role of a state, as well as with the image of a
protective state made popular by the recently concluded nationalist movement in
India.
However, by the mid-1970s the supportive role of the state was beginning
to constrain the development private capitalism, which was calling for increasing
deregulation and autonomy from state control. The very group of indigenous
bourgeoisie that the era had engendered were now seeking to divest the public
sector of controls that now were an impediment for their further growth. Control
of many entrepreneurial enterprises and industries came to be vested in the hands
of many traditional trading families and communities. Today, these corporations
are increasingly managed by a younger generation that has been educated abroad
at American and European universities and are well-versed in modem management
techniques.46
An oft neglected indication of an increasingly active and assertive civil
46 Hardgrave and Kochanek (1993): 359.
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society are the changing electoral patterns since the 1967 split of the Congress and
the emergence of social movements that have organized around specific issues
since the 1970s. The 1967 election was the first election in which it became
apparent that the masses could no longer be coerced into voting as per the dictates
of local patrons and party bosses. Bardhan observes that
as the aura of special legitimacy of leaders derived from the participation in the freedom movement and from serving in British prisons waned in the wheeling-dealing of day-to-day post-Independence politics... [the politicians] could get away with fewer and fewer of the autonomous policy directives.47
Ever since then, the masses have expressed their approval and disapproval by
exercising their electoral right. However, given the continuing dominance of the
state, those whose voices went unheard or were left out of the system increasingly
took to other avenues of organization and association. As mentioned earlier, the
decade of the seventies witnessed the emergence of several movements organized
by the farmers, dalits, women and environmental groups. Omvedt’s analysis of
these social movements demonstrates that alternative spaces were being carved out
in civil society to not only air grievances but to change the very terms of the
discourse.48 After three decades of independence social issues and questions that
had been raised during the nationalist movement remained unresolved. The
47 Bardhan (1984): 38.
48 Omvedt (1993).
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weaker sections of society could no longer view the state and state elites as the
sole protectors and arbiters of their fate. In such circumstances, it was the cultural
forums that provided the space for deliberation and collective action. Omvedt
emphasizes that
for the large majority of dalit, adivasi, peasant and women artists, cultural programs were not so much a means of spreading revolutionary culture as searching, debating, coming to grips with their own identities, their own history and from this basis working out in a collective process their relations to one another, to the entity known as "India," and to strategies of change.49
Moreover, the 'secessionist' and 'nationalist' movements that began to proliferate
did not always begin as movements demanding a separate nation-state. Rather,
many of the movements of the last two decades in Assam, Kashmir, Punjab,
Nagaland, Mizoram, Jharkhand to name a few, began with demands for equitable
distribution of surpluses produced in the regions rather than their being siphoned
away by the Center, demands for autonomy (for the region or community) to have
more control over their local circumstances and their future and questions of social
justice and equity. Varshney is correct in pointing out that the increasingly
centralized and personalized power at the Center can be faulted for exacerbating
the situation and the resultant shift toward more radical expressions, either as
nationalist or religious-fundamentalist movements. However, the systemic
momentum of a country committed to an industrial vision, state dominance and
49 Ibid: 255.
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intervention in service of the ideology of'development' and a bias against the
agricultural sector and people working on land combined with the individual
choices of politicians and other conjunctural phenomena were at work. In an
environment of social discontent that had been gradually congealing, the intensity
of changes unleashed by the economic juggernaut, a lack of alternative
institutionalized mechanisms or powerful social movements, religious
fundamentalisms (Hindu and Muslim with other minorities co-opted into these
movements) filled the vacuum by giving expression to these sentiments.50 Of
these, it was Hindutva that was the most successful in gathering support of a broad
section of society and in challenging the status quo.
Seeking a 'Hindu'Identity
The new social groups that had emerged with and fed the consumer boom
of the 1980s with their new found wealth were the primary constituency of the
logic of Hindutva. The outlook of the new social groups differed significantly
from that of the older elites and westernized middle classes, who shunned
association with indigenous Indian culture and attempted to emulate secular forms
50 Social movements mentioned earlier were organized around single issues and hence failed to appeal to a broad segment of the population. Moreover, due to their infrastructural weakness and tendency to remain outside the political arena (except for the farmers' movement and later developments in the dalit movement) even as they came into conflict with the state, these movements were unable to make an impact at level of national politics.
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of cultural expression as in the West. The new social groups on the other hand
enthusiastically embraced the material benefits accruing from the an economy
expanding along capitalist lines and they bought into a consumer society modelled
on western trends. However, these groups expressed their desire for a unique
identity in an indigenous (religiousand ethnic) idiom ofHindutva. A changing
consciousness was manifested in the growing attendance at temples; 'consumption
of culture' via newly established 'culture clubs' that feature more Indian cultural
events than western; the immense popularity in recent years of ethnic attire, art,
music and theater; popularity of theRamayan andMahabharat television serials;
the 'Hindization' of English on college campuses across urban India and the
popularity of Indian rock bands on MTV-Asia and of ZeeTV, a Hindi television
channel. "Along with the electronic marvels and bright plastics of a Western
centered capitalism," the new social groups observes Omvedt, "wanted an Eastern
identification; they seized on Indian/Hindu symbolisms."51
This is the result in part, of the location of the new groups in the social
matrix. In analyzing the role of the petit bourgeoisie in championing Islamic
fundamentalism, Gellner notes that in North Africa, their emergence as a new
social group is governed by the dynamics of the dual movement to secure social
51 Omvedt (1993): 189.
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distance.52 The new social groups attempt to create a unique self-identity by
simultaneously distinguishing themselves from the peasant or working class roots
from which they have emerged, as well as from the established elites whom they
seek to displace. Identification and rejection occurs simultaneously at two levels.
The new social groups aspire for a social status commensurate with their
economic development and as they climb up the social ladder, in a move to
differentiate themselves from their erstwhile roots, these group reject, indeed are
even hostile towards the very social groups where their roots lie. With regard to
the elites, the new social groups would like to emulate their success and hence
identify with them and may even internalize some of their values. However, since
the trajectory of their emergence pits them in conflict with the (usually) western-
educated elites, their westernized norms and behavior are rejected as forms of
corruption of the 'traditional', 'pure', 'indigenous' culture. Hence, it is possible to
understandHindutva not as false consciousness, but as a reflection of real material
and moral conditions prevailing in the society. Meszaros argues that
ideology is not an illusion or a religious superstition of misdirected individuals, but a specific form of - materially anchored and sustained - social consciousness.53
Moreover, the antecedents to the emerging social consciousness can be
52Gellner, Ernest. (1981)Muslim Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Fischer(1982): 111.
53 Meszaros (1989): 10.
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traced to the cultural activities of the RSS and the VHP dining their years on the
periphery of mainstream public life. After the ban was lifted on the RSS in 1948,
it became very active in social welfare projects in
rural India establishing veins of influence starting at the grassroots level. In the
1960s, the activities of RSS and the VHP picked up momentum and the
organizations were engaged in tireless social work among the marginalized
sections of society, upliftment of tribals, establishment of schools, temples,
cultural organizations, neighborhood associations, relief groups and youth training
camps (shakhas). Most of these activities were financed from within the Hindu
community from groups that had remained loyal to the RSS in the aftermath of the
partition, as well as from the newly prospering sections of the community.
The proponents ofHindutva have made substantial use of the media,
particularly the Hindi print media, television, and audio and video production
technologies to propagate their message. Increased prosperity among the new
social groups enabled an expanded ability within the realm of civil society for
autonomous association and ideological reproduction via cultural and leisure
events, ownership of press and media units, establishment of schools, temples,
cultural organizations that reflected their worldview, interests, needs, desires and
ambitions; articulated however in universal terms. To say this is not to imply that
the other social groups that support Hindutva suffer from false consciousness. The
perspective of each group differs according to their location in society and their
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objective reality.
Indira Gandhi's alignment with and encouragement of a Hindu identity
towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s has to be understood as apolitical
strategy that tapped into the changing perspectives in society, but more
importantly, the sentiments resounded within Gandhi's own ranks. In other words,
what Vanaik assesses as the "adoption" of a Hindu identity by the ruling elites in
order to secure their eroding political base, was more than a pragmatic strategy.54
The declining legitimacy of the official ideology of secularism is evidenced in the
massive support for the B JP by retired high-ranking bureaucrats, army generals,
ministers and judges that became visible by 1991.55
The above discussion establishes that the cultural activities of the Hindu
community span a number of decades. Thus, it is inaccurate to portray the recent
assertiveness of sections of the Hindu community as the 'sudden' emergence of a
Hindu consciousness. It is a lack of a historical perspective that informs this
mainstream view. Additionally, we have to distinguish between the cultural
activities of the Hindu community and the politicization of a Hindu identity. The
latter is of recent origin, although it builds upon the foundations laid by cultural
organizations and activities. BJP President, L.K. Advani argues that the cultural
54 India Today, May 15,1991:13.
55 BJP White Paper on Ayodhya (1993): 13.
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momentum for the Ayodhya movement was well established before the BJP gave it
political representation by aligning with the movement.56 It is very likely that had
the BJP not allied itself with the RSS and the VHP, some other political party
would have, as is suggested by the Congress Party’s encouragement of the forces
of the Hindu Right.
It is also pertinent to emphasize that the social base ofHindutva
encompasses a much broader segment of the Indian population than the traditional
basis of fundamentalism. The chauvinistic elementHindutva of cannot be denied.
However, privileging this aspect of the movement shadows the more fundamental,
yet subtle and dispersed sources of support for the movement effected by deep
structural social transformations.
The contradiction between economic growth and social justice that had
dogged Nehru throughout his tenure as Prime Minister and the reaction it
fomented in terms of the explosion of social movements. These movements raised
the very issues of social justice that during the nationalist movement Nehru had
deferred until the primary task of establishing an independent state was achieved.
The contradiction lay in achieving independence by aggregating segmented
identities of religion, caste and ethnicity rather than constructing a new identity
that would encapsulate the spirit of diversity and pluralism of Indian society that
56 Ibid.
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the freedom fighters were in fact fighting to protect. Nehru's own fears that the
creation of separate electorates in fact further marginalized the minorities it sought
to protect have been realized. Many Muslims in fact feel that their minority
identity places them outside the ambit of full citizenship of the country and treated
as step-children and not as equal heirs to a legacy that their ancestors fought and
died for, alongside other communities. Hence, the call of the BJP to treat Muslims
and other minorities as "humans" not as "vote-banks" appeals to this sense of
injury and injustice experienced by the minority groups in India.
Similarly, the rhetoric of a caste-less society appeals to the lower castes and
backward classes who are attempting to transcend these identities that have
impaired their opportunity for material benefit and social mobility. By the same
token, the minorities who have benefitted from the policies of reservations in
educational institutions and government employment, feel that they are unable to
secure social status commensurate with their newfound mobility. This latter group
is more inclined to either assert their minority identity via autonomous movements
(such as the dalit movement) or even when incorporated withinHindutva the
combine seek to alter the power configuration and agenda within the combine by
asserting their dalit identity (based on their strength derived from numerical
preponderance).
The point that I wish to emphasize is that no single group or community can
be understood as a monolith, with all actors seeking the same goal. There is
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considerable variation within the communities that can not be ignored. A nuanced
understanding of the movementHindutva of reveals a very heterogeneous social
base, and suggests multicausality that has to be distinguished.
Hindu identity or an Indigenized identity?
Identities are constructed in world that is already defined. Our
consciousness does not comprise of a tabula rasa and identities are not constructed
in a vacuum. Instead, the process is informed by the historical legacies and
cultural practices of a society that impart a uniqueness to our imagination and our
conception of the self. Similarly, within the society itself, varying locations in the
social matrix influence the varying perceptions and self-identifications that social
groups construct. This is not to imply an instrumental connection between one's
location in society and the identity that one subscribes to. Rather, it is to argue
that the exigencies of one's occupational station and the ambit of social relations in
which one engages, interact with specific elements of the cultural heritage and
practices already mentioned, to inform the worldview held by an individual or a
group. Moreover, the cultural heritage is selectively appropriated and organized
into a narrative that explains the present as a teleological realization of the past,
establishing a continuity at the precise moment that a severe disjunctive is
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experienced. Thus, self-definition and a reinterpretation of the past are acts of
empowerment dictated by the needs of the present.57
The present in India is framed by a number of developments that in
combination have engendered conditions that necessitate a new national project for
India and the search for a new internal meaning for the entity called "India." At
the time of independence, the vanguard of the nationalist movement believing
themselves to be the sole heirs of the state they were inheriting, sought to construct
a modem India along the western model of a nation-state committed to the
industrial vision of society, the dominance of the state in directing the country
towards success and glory via economic development, national security and
defense, secularism, technological development, democracy and national unity
premised on the idea of nation-building. Under Nehru's leadership, the Indian
state was defined as secular and socialist. However, secularism came to mean
equi-distance from all religions, not the separation of church and state or the
embodiment of diverse religions within the state structure. While, socialism was
translated into a huge public sector under the dominance of the state with the
masses increasingly marginalized from and within the system rather than a
classless society with an equitable distribution of benefits. The industrial vision
had turned agriculture into its handmaiden, with a minority of the population
57 Friedman (1992).
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reaping the benefits, while the fate of the majority, the toiling masses was ignored.
Nandy situates the maturing of Indian society and its contradictory logic within a
system of knowledge based upon a dualistic conception of the world. Nandy
demonstrates that the biases and assumptions of the western model of modernity,
that came to be internalized by many of the Indian elites who were fighting the
colonial power that sustained the modernist worldview, are at the base of the
contradictions currently surfacing in Indian society.
The exhaustion of the Nehruvian enterprise and the eroding legitimacy for
his model of development began to surface in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but
climaxed in the 1980s amidst widespread material and social transformations,
prompted by the increasing penetration of a capitalist system. A changing social
consciousness that embodies both the material logic of the society and the
maturing insight of a society coming to terms with its past, is manifested in the
search for a new Indian identity.Hindutva is a congealed expression of the
emerging consciousness, that indexes the collective aspiration to be anchored in
indigenous ('Indian') cultural practices and history. Public discourse in India
reflects the debate over the precise form of'Indian' identity. While the proponents
of Hindutva want to shape India as a Hindu nation, grounded in Hindu cultural
traditions and practices, their vision continues to be debated and challenged by
other social groups. Portrayal of Shivaji as the founder of a "Hindu raj" by the
Hindu Right is challenged by farmers in Maharashtra who characterize him as a
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"peasant king."58 The depiction of Ram and Arjun as heroes and Shambukh (a
dalit boy in theRamayari), Ravana (the demon-king who abducts Sita, Ram’s wife
in the same epic) as villains is challenged by dalits who portray the latter as heroes
and refuse to accept the established hegemony of Ram and Arjun. These protests
and trends are not new, however their place in the spotlight is new and coincides
with the increasing demonstration of'Hindu' power.
The debate on Indian identity is far from over. The emergenceHindutva of
has raised many questions and provided a platform to air grievances and challenge
the forty-year long dominance of the elites. The heterogeneous and contradictory
character of the movement appropriately captures the prevailing condition,
engendered by the material and social transformations sweeping across the
country.
58 Omvedt (1993): 114.
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