CAN CHINA REPLACE THE US AS A NEW HEGEMON? THE IMPACT OF THE ENERGY SECURITY IN CHINA’S HEGEMONIC POTENTIAL.
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY
NIGAR SHIRALIZADE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2016 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences
______Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz Director
I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. ______Prof.Dr. Özlem Tür Head of Department
This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
______Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç Supervisor
Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç (METU, IR) ______Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Fatih Tayfur (METU, IR) ______
Asst. Prof. Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp (Atılım University, Economics) ______
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
Name, Last name :
Signature :
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ABSTRACT
CAN CHINA REPLACE THE US AS A NEW HEGEMON? THE IMPACT OF THE ENERGY SECURITY IN CHINA’S HEGEMONIC POTENTIAL.
Shiralizade, Nigar
MSc., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç September 2016, 198 pages This thesis investigates the possibility of ‘change’ in the current world structure initiated by the rising power. The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate that China wants to be a hegemonic power through spreading its influence on societal and political domains supported by the economic might. Accordingly, it emphasizes the historical continuum of the same target, regardless of the changes in narrative and strategies followed by different governments. The thesis will use Gramscian approach of ‘hegemony’, as well as ‘transformismo’ and ‘historic bloc’ notions. The analysis consists of three intermingled circles – theoretical evaluation of the conceptions; the development of China’s ideological alternative; and the application of this research on the energy security spectrum. This thesis delineates the obstacles and opportunities of hegemonic ‘chains’ and emphasizes the utilization of energy concern as a ‘pretext’ for entering into the regions out of adequate hegemonic control. The thesis concludes by arguing that China is not yet in a powerful position to realize a hegemonic transition which it wants. Nevertheless, there are signs that if China is successful in establishing its hegemony it is likely to be, if not the only, but one of the hegemonic systems bringing ‘transition’ to the current world order.
Key words: hegemony, ‘historic bloc’, energy security, China, US
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ÖZ
ÇİN YENİ HEGEMON OLARAK ABD’İN YERİNE GEÇEBİLİR Mİ? ENERJİ GÜVENLİĞİNİN ÇİN’İN HEGEMONİK POTANSİYALİNE ETKİSİ
Shiralizade, Nigar
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç Eylül 2016, 198 sayfa Bu çalışma mevcut dünya sisteminde yükselen gücün etkisiyle gerçekleşen hegemonik ‘değişim’ olasılığını araştırıyor. Tezin en önemli hedefi Çin’in ekonomik gücünün ideolojik ve politik güce çevirme çabalarını göstermektir. Tez Gramsci’nin hegemonya, ‘transformismo’ ve ‘tarihsel blok’ kavramlarını kullanıyor. Tez üç bir- biriyle bağlı kısımdan ibarettir. İlk kısım teorik açıklamalar; ikincisi Çinin ideolojik alternatifi; üçüncü ise bu araştırmaların enerji güvenliği çerçevesinde incelenmesidir. Tezde Çin’in enerji güvenliğini etkileyen hegemonik ‘zincirlerin’ fırsata dönüştürülerek farklı bölgelere giriş için ‘bahane’ gibi kulanılması gösterilecektir. Son olarak, bu çalışma, Çin’in hegemonik sistem kuracak kadar güçlü olmamasına rağmen, yapısal değişim sağlamakta büyük etkide bulunduğunu vurguluyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: hegemonya, tarihsel blok, enerji güvenliği, Çin, ABD
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To my parents…
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.
I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur ad Asst. Prof. M. Gürsan Şenalp for their suggestions and comments.
Especially, I would like to express the greatest thanks to my mother Jamilia Aliyeva and father Telman Shiraliyev for their love, support and belief in me throughout this work.
My grandparents and dear friends who were with me and never stopped to believe in my success should also be mentioned.
Thanks to all the people who were next to me during one of the most tiring, stressful and responsible periods of my whole life.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLAGIARISM...... iii ABSTRACT………………………………………………..……………………..…iv ÖZ……………………………………………………..……………………………..v DEDICATION………………………………..……………………………………..vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………...... vii TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………..………………………viii LIST OF FIGURES ……..…………………………………...…………………...... xi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION………………..…………………………………....……...……..1 1.1. Research question and theoretical framework……….…………….…..…1 1.2. Synopsis and methodology ...……………… …….……………….……. 6 1.3. Conclusion ……………………………………………………….……... 8
2. THE CONCEPT OF HEGEMONY IN THE CONTEMPORARY DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS…………………….….……. 10 2.1 Introduction …………………………………………...……….………. 10 2.2. Theoretical background. What is hegemony? …………………..…….. 11 2.2.1 Hegemony in ancient history: arkhe and hegemonia ..………… …….12 2.2.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory ……………………...…………..………15 2.2.3 Gramscian understanding of hegemony ………….....……………….. 18 2.2.3.a. Gramscian Hegemony in the discipline of international relations………………………...…………………………….. 24 2.2.3.b. Gramscian analysis of counter – hegemonic movements and ‘transformismo………………………………………………….………30 2.2.3.c ‘Historic Bloc’ …………………....…………..………….………… 34 2.3. International ‘Historic bloc’ ……………………………..……………. 36 2.4. The US hegemony building – Transnational Capitalist Class …….….. 39 2.5. Conclusion ………………………………..…………………..………..53 3. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHED
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WORLD ORDER. CHINA AS A NEW HEGEMON? …………………....…...54 3.1. Introduction ………………….……………………….………………...54 3.2. Historical overview of Chinese perspective on the international society ……………………………………………………………………….…..56 3.2.1 China and humiliation era – ‘sick man’s development’.……….……..58 3.2.2. Mao’s ‘intermediary zone’ …………...……..………….....………… 61 3.3. The rise of China – Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic strategy ………...…..66 3.4. ‘Peaceful Rise’ doctrine and Harmonious World ….……...... ……….75 3.5. China model – the Beijing Consensus vs the Washington Consensus…………………………………………………………….....85 3.5.1. Beijing Consensus as an alternative path to economic development ……………………………………………………………………….….88 3.6. ‘Charm Offensive’ – China’s soft power development………….….….93 3.6.1. Historical roots of China’s peaceful development strategy and its influence in substantiating China’s impact at the societal level …………………………………………………………………………..94 3.7. Sub-optimization strategy – the path to a new ‘historic bloc’..…………………………………………………………………..100 3.8. ‘China Dream’ …………………….…………….…..…….……….102 3.9. Conclusion ……………………………………………..………….105 4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POTENTIAL ‘HISTORIC BLOC’ ALONG CHINA’S ENERGY ROUTES ……………………………………..….…..……..106 4.1. Introduction ……………………………………...………….………...106 4.2. The importance of energy security …………………………..………. 109 4.3. China’s involvement in the world energy market …………………… 113 4.4. The US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ – or supervision of China’s rise ……….….. 119 4.5. Impact of ‘Pivot to Asia’ politics on China’s energy security ………..130 4.6. China’s potential reactions to the US’s rebalancing strategy…………………………………………….……..……131 4.7. Accessing markets under limited hegemonic influence – China’s OBOR strategy…………………………………………………….…….....139 4.7.1. US attempts of realize ‘transformismo’ in the field of energy...... 153 4.8. Conclusion …………………………………………….……………...156 5. CONCLUSION ……………………………….….…….....…………….158
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5.1. Theoretical and Empirical Implications ………………….….. 161 5.2. China Model – a potential hegemonic alternative …….…...….163 5.3. The significance of ‘energy security’ on building ‘historic bloc’ ….……………………………………………….…166
REFERENCES..…………...……………………………………...….….………...168 APPENDICES A. TURKISH SUMMARY …………………………………..…………. 189 B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU ………………………...………….198
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES
Figure 1 National Humiliation Gymnastics ……………………………………….. 60
Figure 2 US Energy Information Administration ……………..…………………. 111
Figure 3 BP Statistical Review 2014 ……………………………………….……. 116
Figure 4 ‘Malacca dilemma’ …………………………..………………….……… 117
Figure 5 American bases in the Asia-Pacific ……………………..,……………... 127
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favor; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
1.1. Research question and theoretical framework
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the potential of China’s rise to a novel hegemonic status. It analyzes this issue with respect to the role of China in the domain of energy security. The thesis utilizes the Gramscian concept of hegemony and related notions such as the ‘historic bloc’ and ‘transformismo’ to investigate the change in China’s position in the world system. The thesis argues that China is increasingly integrated in the world capitalist system and benefits from the current international structure that promotes a state class1. Indeed, it has been argued that state organized capitalism may bring China to a hegemonic position within the world system.
The thesis strives to provide answers to the following questions: is China’s rise peaceful or not; what kind of challenges can China’s rise bring to the established order, or alternately, does this rise implicitly further a diminishment of the burden of the current system; at which scale do the interests of China function, are they regionally-bounded or global; is China limiting itself to economic influence or does it exhibit political, societal, and/or cultural intentions; and finally is China controlled or even constrained by the hegemonic actor. As a case study, the thesis concentrates on China’s energy security, which is considered to be the spine of a domestic economic boom that enables the country to potentially direct the spillover of its economic might into other domains globally.
1 Jerry Harris (2008) coins it as a statist transnational capitalist class: ‘Today’s statist TCC has a vision of China’s modernisation through its strategic engagement with global capitalism. This strategy is in harmony with TCC ideology the world over.’ (p.16) 1
Considering the long list of questions that the thesis aims to answer, the second chapter of this work will evaluate the concept of hegemony by formulating a comparative analysis of American ascendancy to hegemony and China’s current path thereto. The establishment of such a comparative framework will allow us to discern whether or not China is following a similar route to the US when it comes to the path to hegemony. Certainly, it should be noted that current hegemonic influence over all facets of the global system may exert control over the rise of a novel power, such as China, that seeks the ‘revision’ or ‘change’ of the current order. Moreover, proponents of ‘transformation’ argue that China’s current abilities and position within the system do not coincide. Though the People’s Republic of China (PRC) constitutes the world’s second largest economy, the owner of one of the world’s largest marine fleets, and the holder of the greatest sum of foreign exchange reserves, it is nonetheless unable to effectively effect change within the international organizations regulated by the established order (Wang 2012). It is argued here that Chinese ascendancy should not be regarded as limited to economic borders and that the country certainly aims to improve its position within the established structure. Regardless of the ‘organic’ interdependence between the US and China, which ultimately obliges them to act accordingly, it can be said with certainty that attempts at ‘hegemonic transition’ have already been observed.
In order to evaluate this possibility of a transition properly, the thesis utilizes the Gramscian approach and the concept of hegemony, as well as his notions of ‘historic bloc’ and ‘transformismo’. The application of Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony at the societal level within an international scope constitutes the main theoretical framework of this thesis. This emphasis on the Gramscian approach, rather than other explanations of ‘hegemony’, has been adopted here as Gramsci provides a broad framework on the concept that explores consent and coercion of ‘subordinate groups’ not only within the political or economic domains but also at the societal level. Therefore, transcending the reductionist views of conventional approaches to hegemony which produce solely state-centric analyses, the Gramscian viewpoint pushes the borders of traditional research and thereby allow the realization of a more substantial investigation. Consequently, in this work the focus will be on ‘hegemonic transition’ rather than ‘power-shifts’, which are the focal point of mainstream theories.
Henceforth, empirical articulation of the research behind this thesis will be realized in reference to the US’s rise to the hegemonic position after the end of the Second World War. The unique histories of both actors will decorate this comparative analysis as they
2 illuminate the similarities of both countries’ ascendancies as well as their differences from other rising powers employing aggressive politics to reinforce ‘transition’.
Accordingly, the US, with the aptitude to transform its economic might into political and societal power at moments of structural crisis, has become the commonly accepted dominant power of the international order. As with the US, the PRC also considers its economy as a driving force that can launch a spillover effect of its influence into other domains besides the economic. From here on, the thesis seeks to define China’s ability to adopt and repeat the same pattern of the US’s rise through an in-depth assessment and evaluation of the rhetoric and actions of Chinese officials and scholars.
The three decades-long rise and associated achievements of the PRC are often articulated as being evinced in the rising power’s successful usage of the hegemonic system’s benefits. Not surprisingly, China has been criticized by top US officials (e.g. US President Barack Obama and State Secretary Hillary Clinton) for being a ‘free rider’ that has not substantially contributed to the system by way of burden sharing.
Accordingly, the utilization of the advantages of the established system seems to constitute another common point shared by the Chinese and American paths to supremacy. Considering such a dynamic, it is useful to include Gilpin’s sub-optimization theory in this thesis’s body of research. Here, the sub-optimizer gathers relative gains within the bounds of the hegemonic system by following the system’s principles and by becoming a ‘responsible partner’, therewith actually consistently growing its own power. Without openly challenging the hegemonic structure, the sub-optimizer, through the use of the benefits of the system and by containing itself from eventual ‘integration’, can proceed in what may be deemed a ‘third way’. Indeed, this sub-optimization strategy can be seen as a very significant method leading to the birth, rise, and expansion of a novel ‘historical bloc’ that utilizes the advantages of the prevailing system as existing principles stemming from the hegemonic structure are pursued. Certainly, not all ‘historical blocs’ are able to substitute the hegemonic system, however, systemic crises accelerate the speed of its transformation.
The rising power which gathers relative gains more than other members of the formalized sub-groups increases its efforts to establish a novel sphere of influence by building bridges between other sub-optimizers and by utilizing the resentment against American hegemony that grows within those regions. The sub-optimization theory will accompany the thesis’s
3 investigation of consequential pathways that allow an actor to attain the initial creation and eventual establishment of a novel ‘historic bloc’.
The theoretical and empirical viewpoints depicted within this thesis can easily be applied to the case of energy security. The focus on this issue here is resultant of energy security’s influence on China’s enduring economic rise, which is considered to constitute the pinnacle of an ascending power’s possible intention to further its own impact. Therefore, the ability of China to convert its economic might into global political and societal influence depends on its capacity to sustain its economic rise, which directly pertains to its substantial supply of energy security. “If it cannot maintain this supply, problems pertinent to energy resources’ acquirement may seriously hinder China” (Kennedy 2005: 439). By evaluating the hegemonic impact on the global energy arena, this work will underline the obstacles and opportunities of the current system in preserving and even bolstering the PRC’s need for ‘unimpeded energy nourishment’.
By focusing on the politics carried out by China in order to meet its growing demand for crude energy resources, the thesis will try to pinpoint the country’s underlying aims and actions in various energy-rich regions of the globe. On the other hand, direct or indirect American influence in imposing hindrances on China’s ability to reach substantial resources, which constitute the backbone of its economy, will also be determined. Indeed, three terms – hegemony, ‘historic bloc’, and ‘transformismo’ – defined by Gramsci and then utilized within this thesis will be applied to the behaviors of these two actors within the domain of energy.
Control of the seas, the most salient center of energy resources, allows the US to retain leverage over Chinese growth. By assessing China’s steps to secure its energy supply, we can gain access to certain insight on the country’s intentions to alter the world system. Will China be satisfied with American incentives and fall into a ‘transformismo’ policy or will it draw ‘lines of flight’2 by building a ‘historical bloc’ along significant energy routes? These are the two main questions that need to be answered in order to reach informed postulations on the intentions of China when it comes to American hegemony.
Painting a picture of American hegemonic influence in China’s ‘backyard’, the thesis will try to examine Chinese relations with the actors that are able to supply it with the necessary resources to prevent energy ‘hungriness’. This point will be evaluated by calculating the
2 This term is borrowed from Deleuze: ‘creating lines of flight does not mean to flee but to re-create or act against dominant systems of thought and social condition’ in Robert Deuchars (2011) , Creating Lines of Flight and Activating Resistance: Deleuze 4 efficiency of China’s utilization of its ‘soft power’ in the crude reserve purchase agreements in these regions of importance. A particularly interesting point could be uncovered here by answering the question of whether it is possible for China to build a new ‘historical bloc’ with powers which deem the current system ‘unjust’. On the other hand, the thesis will also examine the possibility of China adopting a ‘transformismo’ approach, adhering to the arguments resonated by hegemony that emphasize the salience of the established structure in securing the supply of energy resources for China in order to sustain its economy.
As a continuation of this inquiry, the thesis will focus on questions pertinent to the consequences of a possible hegemonic transition: what alternative suggestions can be put forward by China in building a new world order, and what might trigger others to follow this path? Considering that the US was born of a system under British hegemony and that it made a number of revisions to this system, the next potential hegemon may also have a similar aptitude to persuade others in maintaining and strengthening its legitimacy.
In the past, a policy of colonization under the guise of bringing civilization to the global masses became the main tenet of British hegemony. The scope of this approach infringed upon commonly accepted features of today’s community of nations under US hegemony such as the concepts of self-determination and the application of a neoliberal democratic ideology. Taking into mind such aspects of this hegemonic transition of the past will work to expand the framework of this thesis’s body of research. During this time the US was able to build a multidimensional hegemony by initiating ideas that were dispersed by the international organizations of the time, delineating a widespread ‘transnational capitalist class’ that was effective on the economic-financial stages and in formalizing common ‘knowledge’ and ‘culture’ supported by societies all around the world. Taking all of these points into mind, the thesis analyzes the main features of a possible structure that is China’s alternative to the current hegemonic order.
Over the decades the PRC gingerly weaved together a strategy that this thesis considers as an alternative which has been formalized within the established structure. The objective here is to demonstrate that even though the modes of presentation of this alternative have been juxtaposed over the years, the ultimate goal of the power has been the same – China wants a ‘change’; it wants ‘more say’ to match its global economic might; and it wants to assume a more powerful and consistent position, all of which are more than likely to bring challenges to the current system.
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Indeed, by comparatively analyzing Mao’s ‘Three Worlds Theory’, Deng’s ‘Reform and Opening’ policy, Hu Jintao’s ‘Harmonious Society’, and Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ strategy, we can observe the same intention albeit concealed behind different narratives. Unsurprisingly, Zheng Wang (2013) articulates that this historical tendency to develop a continuous project has been present ever since the establishment of the Chinese state, with the country exhibiting a will to present “old wine in a new bottle”. Mao’s implausible targets and inconceivable policies to reach these aims were ‘normalized’ in Deng’s era through the latter’s pragmatic strategy. Thus, Deng’s pragmatic approach brought China closer to Mao’s vision, which was later developed by the contemporary generation of PRC rulers.
Economic power allowed China, which for decades followed Deng’s suggestion to ‘hide abilities and bide the time’, to unabatedly change its direction to that of a ‘rising head’ and ‘shining’ power. This ‘rising head’ period concluded with the birth of a new pattern that could be offered as a muster to other developing powers – the ‘China Model’. The common historical background and colonial past belonging to the Third World and the seemingly unimposing statements presented by China have made the country more attractive to other actors that have been unable to tap the benefits of the established structure. The ‘China Model’ can thereby be characterized by non-interventionism, the granting of aid with no political attachments, a South-South approach, and the formalization of a harmonious international society that relies on the motto of ‘respect to diversities’, which maintains the ‘self-exclusiveness’ of each power. Ultimately, some of these points countervail the demands of the existent order.
Indeed, by following the tracks of China’s suggestions we can form an impression of how this rising power intends to formalize a novel ‘historical bloc’ along the routes of energy resources that are occupied by actors which remain unsatisfied with the current hegemonic order. The growth of China’s alternative proves that energy shortages and China’s demands to feed its economy actually conceal a grand strategy that targets the assumption of other domains within Mao’s intermediary zone.
1.2. Synopsis and methodology
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter will strive to indicate the main assumptions of and approaches to the term ‘hegemony’ by constructing a comparative analysis of traditional and critical approaches and by referring to the historical path of the US to global primacy. Here, questions will posed that are pertinent to America’s rise to
6 hegemony, its efforts to overcome challenges along the way, and varying conceptualizations, legitimizations, and institutionalizations of its ultimate supremacy. In this sense, definitions of the terms ‘hegemony’, ‘historical bloc’, and ‘transformismo’, all utilized by Gramsci, will be explored and their relations with the current world order will be determined.
Furthermore, China’s transition from its hegemonic past to a state of humiliation will be investigated in the second chapter in order to provide a better understanding of its current ambitions. Different stages of the PRC will be grasped in order to more fully comprehend the contemporary situation. Therefore, an interrelated analysis of phases starting with Chairman Mao and ending with today’s President Xi Jinping will be regarded as small pieces of the same puzzle. Moreover, the depiction throughout this thesis of the ‘intermediary zone’ in Maoist theory as the arena of those ‘dissatisfied’ with the hegemonic order that are now ‘mature’ for China’s influence by way of global projects is employed to display a more holistic picture. China’s will to ‘change’ since the Mao era has never faded away. This chapter will focus on China’s phases, pragmatic policies, and strategies of influence intended to achieve long-term, formalized goals that have been concealed for decades. Therefore, China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ rhetoric embedded within notions of the Beijing Consensus (BJC) and ‘Harmonious Society’ will be reviewed in order to determine the framework of China’s transformative expansion of economic strength into other spectrums. China’s ability to widen its scope of influence, emphasize respect of diversities, denounce emulation and fetishization of one ‘supreme’ model, and involve dissatisfied actors as well as allies of the US hegemon are all crucial in this regard.
The final chapter will address contrasting points and interdependencies between the US and China in the realm of energy security. Delineating the importance of energy security, especially from the perspective of China, this chapter will explore the threats that this actor may face in maintaining its assiduously tended to economic growth in an environment in which a short-term interruption may play a very decisive role. Any damage to China’s energy sufficiency, which is the main source of the country’s economic might, would also function as a detriment to its ability to win political and social influence. Considering this, this section will evaluate obstacles before the PRC such as geographic distance, security concerns, and American presence in areas of strategic importance. In this sense, the US’s pivot policy will be examined in terms of it piquing Chinese concerns over energy supply disruption due to the US’s increased comeback to the region and ‘involvement’ in almost all issues pertaining to American allies’ security that does not necessarily overlap with that
7 of the Chinese. Henceforth, the advantages born from these difficulties will be examined in terms of China’s will to build ‘lines of flight’ that can be used as a path for relieving itself of the regions under the direct control of US hegemony. Lastly, China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative will be analyzed comparatively with the US’s ‘Marshall Plan’, as the research of this thesis delves into the development project’s possible contributions to solving China’s need for energy by emphasizing potentiality of building a novel ‘historic bloc’. Certainly, disadvantages and constraints imposed by the hegemonic order will be evaluated as the ‘pretext’ for a rising power such as China to turn its face to areas that are discontent with the established system and ready to become members of a ‘historical bloc’. Alternately, it should also be noted that the US’s actions which intend to realize a form of ‘transformismo’ in the face of China, by putting forth solutions for its own requirements (the securement of energy supply; pushing forward the ‘shale boom’), may be considered as measures of a hegemon that is interested in observing China’s growth more closely.
The thesis, benefiting from notions laid out by the body of ‘historical materialism’ literature, aims to formulate a comparative analysis between the ascendancies rising power and hegemon. In depth literature reviews and content analyses are conducted within each chapter. The third chapter includes a historical analysis that examines specific periods and issues in modern Chinese history in order to shine a light on varying aspects of the whole picture we see today. Though Western academia has granted much space to analyses of China, this research has examined books, periodicals, newspapers, and academic articles published not only in the English but also in the Turkish and Russian languages to avoid observing the topic from a single-sighted view. Views of neo-Gramscian and hegemonic stability theory (HST) scholars (Cox, Gill, Law, Worth, Strange, Keohane, Nye, Gilpin), prominent Sinologists (Callahan, Fairbank, Kuhn), and energy experts (Yergin, Vivoda) have also played a significant role in bringing this thesis to life. Finally, primary sources such as speeches of key actors and relevant legal documents (agreements, strategies, resolutions) have also been analyzed throughout this work.
1.3. Conclusion
This thesis will primarily focus on the issue of global ‘change’ in the realm of political economy, investigating what kind of innovations China, as the main challenger to existing US hegemony, can bring to the system. It will also delve into the question of how China might go about building a ‘historic bloc’ by compelling and convincing others to unite against the hegemon, that is, if it even has such an intention at all. Throughout the thesis, various definitions of the concept of ‘hegemony’ will be provided in an attempt to identify 8 the features of the notion and to evaluate its applicability in modern international relations. By employing empirical and theoretical approaches and by instrumentalizing energy security, this research seeks to conceive of the reasons for China to build ‘lines of flight’ and its intentions and capabilities to do so. Hand in hand with this potential, the thesis will also analyze the US’s tireless efforts to maintain its hegemony by avoiding what might be seen as menaces originating from the world’s ‘second greatest power’. The US’s emphasis on spurring a ‘transformismo’ by incorporating Chinese interests into the universal order from an energy perspective will also be deliberated by considering the geopolitical implications of maintaining control over regions and straits on which China’s energy security is most dependent.
Before continuing, it is important to stress that China’s growth seems increasingly inexpugnable, unquestionable, and unavoidable; indeed, it is now widely regarded as a fact of life. China’s path to ascendency has been lauded as a model for actors in different areas of the world, and many of these areas are now the site of gigantic projects put forward by the PRC. China’s ability to rearrange the current order in the face of today’s hegemonic power seems questionable, especially when considering the latter’s significant leverage in the field of energy; however, a Chinese-led ‘historic bloc’ formed through a ‘passive revolution’ under a ‘South-South’ banner among energy producers may yet chip away at the roots of the US-led hegemonic system we know today.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONCEPT OF HEGEMONY IN THE CONTEMPORARY DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
2.1. Introduction
The history of international relations has witnessed various incidents related to the race among actors to acquire a global leadership status. Though social relations and processes of interaction have changed (for instance, tribal communication has morphed into modern state affairs which later incorporated other agents) and gained a novel image throughout the years, only one thing remained constant – the competition to advance toward supremacy over others.
In the 21st century, the spectrum of the study of international relations expanded with the inclusion of new colors into the system, particularly in terms of actors and processes. Throughout history, various terms have been used to indicate the ‘supremacy’ of one power over others, whether ‘domination’, ‘hegemony’, ‘leadership’, or ‘authority’. Here, by evaluating the main tenets of contemporary leadership with reference to the term ‘hegemony’, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to outline the theoretical framework of the body of research on the topic. In this sense, Antonio Gramsci’s description of hegemony is particularly useful in defining the ability of an actor to transform economic power into political and societal might.
The empirical investigation laid out here will first address the US’s path to assuming the hegemonic position. The massive power that is the US still possesses the most significant quantitative and qualitative forces that no actor ever managed to gain previously. Therefore, this chapter will investigate the American path to global hegemony based upon theoretical assumptions put forward by a variety of approaches toward the definition of the concept of hegemony. After this, it will draw the borders of a framework for hegemony which will be applied in order to conceive of and measure the possibility of a transition of power that is the main concern of this research. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions:
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- What is hegemony? What are its historical definitions and conceptual approaches?
- How was hegemonic transition realized after the Second World War?
- How was the path to American hegemony realized? What role did the formation of a transnational capitalist class play in this case?
2.2. Theoretical background. What is hegemony?
There are a number of ways to apply the concept of ‘hegemony’ in the sphere of international relations. Here, the basic features of conventional and neo-Gramscian approaches will be indicated and their differences underlined in order to draw up the theoretical framework of this research. The first step in this regard is to clarify the scale and scope of hegemony – namely, does it encompass international leadership, regional supremacy, or ideological domination (Worth 2015).
As might be discerned, the concept of hegemony can be applied in a number of ways. In order to best comprehend the term, one should look to the experiences of the current hegemon. On the one hand, the US is considered to be the most powerful state which supervises and rules the international system. On the other hand, different regional actors such as China, Russia, and the EU have succeeded in building subsystems that may work to expand their influence in the future. Furthermore, throughout the 21st century, it is an undeniable reality that alternative values can be seen as ordering societies locally and globally, whether in the form of religious militancy, regional organizations, or transnational corporations (TNCs) and so on (Worth 2015). In this sense, various theoretical assumptions attempt to depict the behavior of actors or the impact of ideas in the quest for supremacy over others while also elucidating their contests and missions to challenge one another.
The inclusion of new actors and processes within the discipline of international relations altered the mantra of the term ‘hegemony’ over the years, which in turn resulted in the emergence of new reformulated definitions. As the traditional mindset evolved in this direction, it could be more easily understood how a powerful state could surrender its egotistical national interests at some level and consolidate or integrate with other actors. Therefore, ‘hegemony’ began to be voiced in terms of either state hegemony or ideological hegemony as a consequence of the merger of disparate approaches. Likewise, some consider hegemony not as control of one dominant state over a wider area, but rather as a type of institution (Clark 2011), while others argue that it is a preeminence of one social group of nations over others (Ravenhill 2005).
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2.2.1. Hegemony in ancient history: hegemonia and arkhe
According to ancient Greek scholars, ‘hegemony’ is related to a particular form of dominance; hence, in the Greek language ‘hegemonia’ roughly translates to ‘leader’ in English. Scholars depict the concept in Greek history as the control and influence of one city-state over others; thus, it became a crucial term in the development of disciplines seeking to explain international politics. The features of the ancient Greek perception of hegemony comprise two wings, namely dominance asserted through passive and coercive means.
Thucydides pointed out that hegemonic leadership is rooted in the necessity of justification (Lebow & Kelly 2001). In the classic work of ‘History of The Peloponnesian War’, he revealed the transformation of Athens from a successful ‘hegemonia’ towards a failed ‘arkhe’.
The essential difference between the terms ‘hegemonia’ and ‘arkhe’ utilized in the texts of ancient Greek scholars has been illuminated by contemporary researchers as the nuanced difference between hegemony and domination. Thucydides indicated that the ultimate deterioration of Athens’s long-lasting benevolent supremacy occurred as a result of the Peloponnesian War, as the city-state failed to persuade other major allies to join its cause and therefore lost the chance to gain the consent of other cities in the Greek system. The harmony previously enjoyed by Athens which enabled it to maintain supervision over different parts of the system faded as soon as ‘arkhe’ superseded its hegemony. Consequently, Thucydides saw hegemony, not in the form of military might but as a form of leadership that ultimately rested on consent and trust, hierarchy, and popularity as a whole (Lebow & Kelly 2001). On the other hand, ‘arkhe’ can be characterized by force and militarism that relies on fear and repression. The main point that can derived from this subtle juxtaposition is the stress that classical notions of hegemony place on soft power and influence in the hands of a dominant power.
As Gramsci underlined, the inability of an actor to retain balance between consent and coercion can lead to Caesarism as a leader comes to prefer the use of a state’s military might and personality to maintain legitimacy (Ayers 2008). This reliance on coercion is the last indicator of the loss of consent and the rise of an approach rooted in intimidation or obligation that is imposed on other actors, as opposed to gaining their faith and obeisance. It is not by coercion but by persuasion that a real hegemon can effectively demonstrate that ‘there is no alternative’ but to follow the rules set forth by the superior. Thucydides also
12 highlighted that while consent and coercion, or ‘hegemonia’ and ‘arkhe’, can exist together, the latter alone is most likely to lead to instability and ultimately dissolution.
Nonetheless, history has not witnessed any hegemon successfully manage to rely on consent alone in achieving its goals, rather it must attentively strike a stable balance between the two prongs of consent and coercion in order to retain control and legitimacy, a feat which, beginning with Athens, a number of actors have failed to effectively carry out. On the other hand, as did Athens, Pax-Romana also established a successful form of hegemony which ensured stability from conflict and sustained economic prosperity (Gilpin 1981). This systemic reality of the time is now regarded as an example of a historical international form of governance.
The most salient issue pertaining to the cases of the Athenian and Pax-Romana hegemonic periods is the potential to characterize them as imperialistic due to the expansionist tendencies of these two powers during their respective rises. Nonetheless, conflating these two hegemonies with empires would be a fallacy considering that the influence of both hegemons was constrained by limited territorial frameworks that did not allow them to become global empires. Therefore, several civilizations in different parts of the world continued to operate within their own systems during these periods (Williams 2005). As Worth (2015) points out, none of the ancient empires managed to provide the genuine international form of cohesion that religion, as a form of ideological control, later afforded during the Holy Roman Empire. Gramsci also emphasized that religion played a significant role in the construction and governance of specific hegemonies, and that it had been instrumental in channeling faith and belief from the bottom-up in the societal level (Worth 2015).
Yet with the emergence of modern states, the moral dominance of religion lost the impact and legitimacy it previously enjoyed. The formalization of nation-states began to be realized through the economic arrangements of mercantilism, when competition over the extraction of precious metals during the colonial Spanish and Portuguese hegemonies became more commonplace. In this sense, the strong intellectual and moral leadership of the nation-state was reinforced with the establishment of the Westphalian system, which finally erased the remnants of the era of medieval rule (Arrighi 2010). The Westphalian order supplied the state with the institutional legitimacy to employ violence at crucial times. In this way, this new dynamic came to constitute the focal point of hegemonic stability theory – an alter-ego of the concept of the international domain –, as it stressed that ‘hegemony needs to lead, dominate and police a system where necessary’ (Ikenberry 2006: 13
15). This period is often depicted as the inception of internationalization, and more precisely global Europeanization of the world.
Nevertheless, the period of balance of powers in Europe moved into the era of British hegemony based on European powers’ territorial expansion overseas on the one hand, and the development of the liberal economic doctrine and free trade on the other. Great Britain was fated to wear the mantle of the hegemon from the end of the Napoleonic wars until the outbreak of the First World War. This period is often regarded as the 100-Year-Peace, and is taken as a proof of the ability of one state’s capacity to bring stability to a wider system. Hence, British pre-eminence in international society became characterized by two distinct points:
1. The transformation of production as a result of the industrial revolution.
2. The transformation of the British economy and society through the liberalization of its economy from governmental control (Worth 2015).
Great Britain’s material and moral expansionism triggered a free trade movement across the globe which made other powers reduce their protectionist fortresses and willingly join the wave of industrialization that was thought to be able to bring them onto the same path of development as the British Empire. Thus, economic liberalization, industrialization, and free trade became the main traits of the hegemonic order under Great Britain and in turn strengthened the economies of competing nations. Additionally, the territorial expansion of European nations that was ultimately realized by way of coercion was nonetheless balanced with consent by offering mutual benefits to those followers of the dominant ideological preeminence of the time. Nevertheless, the 100-Year-Peace ended with the commencement of a new competition among rising powers within a system regulated by the liberal hegemony of the British Empire.
The ‘era of flag wavers’ came to substitute the century of relative stability. Robert Cox (1983) depicted this fracture within history as the stage of transition from the liberal system that aimed at protecting national empires through a reliance on welfare nationalism. Previously, British hegemony was not challenged territorially by new contenders. Yet with the rise of an economically and militarily strong Germany, Britain’s ideological power lost its previous strength. Britain’s hegemony was abated industrially and militarily. Hence, Germany surpassed the British superpower of the century in steel production and in the development of military and naval power. Contention within the international system burst into two tremendously destructive wars that resulted in the complete eradication of the 14 previously forged economic and financial hegemonic system, thus setting the stage for the emergence of a new one.
Therefore, Cox pointed out that British hegemony, built on the ideas of the liberal world order on the international stage by introducing the gold standard and free trade, was not contested by any ideological challenges until the US’s emergence as a global power. Indeed, the differences between these two actors may be stressed in this way:
Britain could assert a form of economic hegemony over the rest of Europe, while maintaining a position of ‘splendid isolation’ in its foreign policy. Lacking this physical empire, the US has sought to police the international system, either through providing conditional aid or by using force to contain potentially threatening regimes. (Gill 2008: 28) After this brief historical analysis of the varying definitions of the concept of ‘hegemony’, it would now be useful to establish the general framework that will be applied to the thesis in the coming chapters. In order to build a better understanding of the term ‘hegemony’, the following sections will expand on two previously mentioned salient theories of the concept: hegemonic stability theory and the Gramscian perception of hegemony. It should still be noted however that the roles of consent and coercion, and their balance, in regards to the establishment and resilience of a hegemony are present within all periods and granted importance within almost all theories that take hegemony as their analytical subject of examination. Thus, the successive articulations on hegemonic stability theory and the Gramscian understandings of ‘hegemony’ within the chapter will be realized with reference to both top-down and bottom-up levels approaches.
2.2.2. Hegemonic stability theory
As discussed above, the concept of hegemony traces back to ancient Greek history and has absorbed assessments from various theoretical approaches. Even today, scholars’ varied definitions of the notion are based on disparate arguments. Considering this, prior to commencing discussions on the ‘transition of hegemony’, it would be best to define the meaning of this term that will be utilized throughout the analysis. Keeping in mind the number of different assumptions on hegemony, the assessment below will seek to generalize the coincidental and similar points regarding the concept into a comprehensive whole. The term hegemony will primarily be analyzed within the scope of Gramscian theory. Nevertheless, to form a more holistic approach to the topic at hand, the following will address two well-known approaches to the notion of hegemony: traditional and critical.
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The conventional approach (hegemonic stability theory – or HST) focuses mainly on the state as the source and sole creator of global hegemony. The end of the Second World War brought unprecedented supremacy to the US, whose allies requested it to provide security. Without needing to oblige these requests through the application of force, the US gained ‘hegemonic’ status. Therefore, American hegemonic power reached its peak in synch with the rise of the economic and political advantages bestowed upon it in combination with its newfound ability to shape the world order as an accepted and benign leader of a global hierarchy consisting of other important and consenting powers such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. The interests and values promoted by the American hegemon were strengthened through the establishment of the Bretton-Woods system, which acknowledged the American-led management of an economic and financial regime supported by international organizations. Moreover, the US-led international security apparatus became formalized with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was explicitly charged with handling the communist threat that had been designated as the greatest threat to the stability of the existing order. This security umbrella was benevolently supported by its members and came to constitute the second circle of ‘hegemony’ (Halliday 1994).
Kindleberger (1986) expressed the importance of hegemony in providing systemic stability that allowed for the development of other actors. According to him, hegemony can be seen as the embodiment of two features of collective good: ‘non-excludability’ and ‘non- rivalry’. He goes on to point out that American hegemony was successful because it pursued these tenets. In this way, ‘non-excludability’ suggests that a hegemon could help others to benefit from the collective good without necessarily requiring their material contribution thereto; while ‘non-rivalry’ underlines that one actor’s utilization of the good does not decrease the amount available for others.
Nonetheless, changing realities brought new issues to the agenda and therewith shook the position and legitimacy of the US. The rise of economic powers such as Japan and the EU, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system as a result of financial fluctuations, the emergence of ‘oil price shocks’ as a consequence of political events in the Middle East, and the US’s defeat in Vietnam may all be considered as the main reasons for the downfall of American hegemony in the 1970s. Such a historical conjecture drove American scholars to seek reasons for this decrease in American influence and to shield the current order from ‘change’ while emphasizing the importance of stability under a unipolar world. Hence HST was born.
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Neorealist HST considers both tangible and intangible variables of the state – geography, natural resources, economic capacity, military capacity, population, morale and unity, quality of diplomacy, government, technological innovation, etc. – as the main features of hegemonic power. The focal point of neorealist HST is an emphasis on the salience of a sole hegemonic power as the stabilizer of the liberal world economy. As Gilpin pointed out, a hegemon is the one which can exercise leadership in or dominance over the international system.
Neoliberal HST, on the other hand, focuses on the regime, which is defined in terms of the ability of the international system to function through its international institutions even after the decline or collapse of a hegemon. Keohane furthers this argument by indicating that states can cooperate without a leader or a hegemon in that self-serving interests are often best served through the achievement of mutually beneficial outcomes. In the case of neoliberal HST, the shift away from focusing solely on the state as the primary subject, and in turn highlighting the conditions and mechanisms of its operation, can be summed up in the mantra ‘hegemony itself can outlive the hegemon’ (Keohane 1984).
Consequently, HST underlines the absence of leadership after World War I, during which time emergent instabilities concluded with the outburst of a subsequent war. Thus, only after the Second World War did the US establish its hegemony, just as Great Britain had done in the 19th century. In this sense, Kindleberger (1986) pointed out the salience of “one stabilizer in order to stabilize the world economy” (48). Here, we can easily discern that the expression and execution of American hegemony was presented as inevitable for international stability. The US-led ‘Marshall plan’ and international organizations supported by the US became the means for building American hegemony over the system, while the US’s provision of security to its allies assisted the superpower in acquiring consent.
During this period the US maintained power in different fields. According to Lukes (2005) these powers can be depicted with reference to three concepts, the first of which is widely accepted by realist scholars as a coercive power constituted by direct military influence. Structural power represents the second prong of American hegemony at the time, as the US came to possess the means to set agendas and shape institutions. Thirdly, Lukes emphasized the US’s power over knowledge, as it was able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of global authorities and therewith impose the same kinds of logic and methods of argument and analysis that were accepted by the hegemonic order while rejecting all others. Robert Gilpin also acknowledged the importance of one world power’s role in stabilizing the world 17 economy as was argued by Kindleberger, however, he formulated the theory of systemic evolution, which contends the possibility that the rules of the game can be altered with the entrance of new powerful actors into the system. Accordingly, as with Kindleberger, Gilpin considered hegemonic stability only achievable in a system free of challengers (Worth 2015).
The insufficiency of HST in explaining the entire picture rests on criticisms that it is unable to account for other actors besides states that may influence the establishment of a hegemony or a challenge thereto. HST’s overreliance on states as the sole players within the international structure relegated them to a devalued status among the IR theories of the 1970s as new occurrences in the world required new approaches to emerging questions.
Certainly, real changes on the empirical level affected the theoretical frameworks seeking to explain hegemony. Here, the neo-Gramscian approach emerged as a consequence of long-term research aiming to include different participants and influential factors in notions of hegemonic system building. Over time, the limited spectrum of international relations and state-centric approaches gave way to new viewpoints when the context of global processes swiftly outgrew the theories that had intended to explain them. Ultimately, antiquated theories of hegemony failed to explain the transnational nature of emergent problems in a discipline that had focused too much on the role of the state in most of its analyses. At this point, the neo-Gramscian perception of hegemony came to prominence in the critical schools of thought within the disciplines of international relations and international political economy. Therefore, taking a page from the book of Gramsci’s societal investigations, scholars set out to build a new front on the concept of hegemony. The insufficiencies of HST in explaining ‘hegemony’ as a result of its state-centric approach and sole concentration on the political spectrum began to be overcome by employing the Gramscian point of view. The next section will briefly lay out the definition of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and its main points of departure.
2.2.3. Gramscian understanding of hegemony
The concept of ‘hegemony’ within a state system revolves around the existence of one leading and dominant state that provides stability in the international sphere while promoting and necessitating the emulation of its path of development in order for other states to attain success. Nevertheless, an actor’s sense of comfort under the hegemonic roof, which is restricted to the frontiers of notions of the ‘state’, is only one version of several usages of the term ‘hegemony’ in the literature of contemporary international relations.
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Another important reading of hegemony can be revealed within the Gramscian framework, firstly at the societal level and later within the international domain. Hence, in this context hegemony was actually utilized by early Marxists as a term that conceived of a revolutionary process required for socialist transformation. Luxemburg and Kautsky expounded this term on the societal level as a salient notion which unified a working class along the lines of instilling a revolutionary spirit and consciousness that would serve as the basis for the construction of the proletarian state and its political society (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Furthermore, Lenin illustrated hegemony as the dictatorship of the proletariat, which came about as the result of a proletariat and peasantry-led revolutionary struggle against the Tsarist state and liberal and bourgeois forces (Bocock 1986). He explained the strategy that would lead to the acquisition of the ‘hegemonic’ position as the result of cooperation between the urban proletariat, represented by trade unions, on the one hand and the rural peasantry on the other. Moreover, Lenin emphasized that workers could exercise hegemony over the ‘enemy’ allied classes and their dictatorship. The resultant ‘historical bloc’ that was to be developed within the society would challenge the existing structure, which in turn lost its legitimacy in the eyes of various actors.
Accordingly, Gramsci tried not to move away from the historical inheritances of the doctrine of hegemony and maintained its basic analytical scope that had evolved in previous periods. In this sense, he indicated ‘hegemony’ as complementary to the theory of the state-as-force (Murray & Worth 2013). Nevertheless, he developed the concept while avoiding the reductionist assumptions of mainstream Marxists who simply neglected to incorporate non-economic factors such as ideology, education, and culture in the building of a hegemony. Gramsci’s investigation into hegemony underlined the class struggle between dominant and subaltern classes within society, whereby the former won over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the latter through the pursuit of consent (Hartley 1987). His revolutionary spin on the concept encompassed three important arguments from which novel approaches to hegemony appeared and based upon which new research was launched. Firstly, he expanded on the arguments of early Marxists by contending that politics should be discerned not only as the exercise of power by the state but also as the people’s perception of the world. Secondly, the platform underpinning the establishment of a hegemony was enlarged to include civil societies and institutions (Ives 2004). Thirdly, Gramsci’s success in extinguishing the purely negative understanding of the theory that was resultant of its equation with the notion of ‘arkhe’ facilitated the application of the concept to the international realm.
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Furthermore, Gramsci highlighted two sides of the doctrine by illuminating the overlapping and divergent forms of both bourgeois and proletariat hegemonies (Ransome 1992). Gramsci related the achievements of hegemonies that were acquired by various forces to their concessions granted to subordinate classes in the form of social democracy. These concessions, he claimed, could maintain the basic principles of capitalism by making the system more palatable for the subordinate masses. Therefore, the transformation from the scale of economic-corporative consciousness to the political one facilitated lower classes’ acquiescence in progressing its knowledge based on common intellectual and moral awareness, thereby advancing a common culture along with an economic focus.
Likewise, Worth (2015) indicated that the fundamental distinction between domination and hegemony was generally emphasized by Gramscian scholars in this way:
Once political power is achieved, the ruling class is able to exercise coercive power over subordinate groups and social forces, however, to secure hegemony, the ruling class must maintain a system of alliances that will enable the continuation of their political and ideological domination. (43) Therefore, such a concept of hegemony emphasizes the requirements of maintaining an omnipresent influence over various domains as well as the fusion of various competencies into a single ‘bowl’. Vacca, who researched Gramsci’s thoughts on hegemony, emphasized:
Belief, faith, dogmatism may be understood as embryonic forms of hegemony, but a fully developed hegemony is a form of intellectual and moral leadership in which the mass of the population understands its own interests as being fundamentally compatible with the dominant social group. A fully developed hegemony cannot be a type of blind faith because it rests on the development of a critical consciousness in the mass of the population that can develop only in the context of substantial formal freedom. (Worth 2015: 74) When masses accept domination it means that they share certain overlapping interests with the dominator, a dynamic that makes the masses favor the hegemon in one way or another. Consequently, such an integration of the economic, political, and social realms led Gramsci to extend the framework of the traditional definition of the state. The main premise of Gramsci’s conceptualization of the state was based on its irreducibility to only one spectrum – whether economic, political, social, or ideological. Instead, he focused on its ability to manage all of these realms together without overemphasizing only one of its facets:
The leading group obtains consensus from the majority of the population and creates conditions for the development of a strong economic base which then provides a range of possible outcomes that can be shaped by political and ideological activity. (Cox 2007: 226)
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Gramsci repeatedly stressed the impossibility of maintaining a hegemony by relying solely on coercion. Likewise, neither leading state apparatuses nor civil societies could handle the maintenance of hegemony without mutual assistance. Gramsci indicated that hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; it cannot be reduced to simply one area but must encompass all. Otherwise, ‘hegemony’ can be mistakenly substituted with the word ‘domination’, which can be gained only with force without the need to acquire consent. In this sense, the acquisition of consent and exercise of persuasion can be seen as necessary in facilitating the establishment of legitimacy.
Gramsci’s hegemony looks like a formalized mechanism consisting of sophisticated gears and apparatuses, each exhibiting vital features. Any weakness in one element can lead to the deterioration of the entire system. On the other hand, the balance and timely utilization of this mechanism may ultimately enhance the endorsement of the hegemon.
Along these same lines, Gramsci’s hegemony doctrine tends to emphasize the consensual basis of the political system within civil society. As already argued, Gramsci contended that it is first necessary to escape reductionist tendencies, both empirically and theoretically, when attempting to understand hegemony; thus he pointed out:
When the administrative, executive and coercive apparatuses of the government in effect constrained by the hegemony of the leading class of a whole social formation, it becomes meaningless to limit the definition of the state to elements of the government. (Cox 1983: 52) This reading of the concept therefore denotes that understandings of hegemony cannot be reduced to analyses of dominance retained through sanctions, punishments, and incentives, nonetheless, it still grants explanatory power to intellectual and moral leadership in the establishment and maintenance of hegemonic positions. Likewise, Gramsci also strove to seek out the underpinnings of political supremacy within civil society by examining the construction of knowledge that was aided by institutions. These institutions could be considered as creators and promoters of certain modes of common behaviors and expectations among the masses which perpetuated the hegemonic social order.
Gramsci, utilizing Niccolo Machiavelli’s seminal work ‘The Prince’, built up his own modern understanding of a ‘Prince’, which appeared as a revolutionary party, as opposed to an individual, that engaged in continual and developmental dialogue with its own base of support (Worth 2015). Here, he emphasized the importance of Machiavelli’s basic points, reiterating that in order to achieve successful leadership one must gain the support and esteem of one’s subjects and form popular bonds. Gramsci’s adjustment of Machiavellian
21 principles to fit them into his own 20th century body of work by conceptualizing a modern socialist Prince triggered the depiction of his perception as the rival to the capitalist state at every level of the political and civil domain, as such an approach was thought to encourage understandings of how a successful revolutionary change might be achieved.
He also pointed out the importance of coercion, which he claimed should simultaneously exist alongside consent. Nonetheless, by referring to Machiavelli, Gramsci asserted that ‘successful and stable hegemony’ should be based primarily on the acquisition of the latter. Consequently, his perception of hegemony did not portray the picture of a single, all- powerful leader expressing its will, but rather as:
[An] organism, a complex element of society in which collective will has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, [taking] a concrete form. (Radice, Journal of Global Studies, 2014) Gramsci articulated the ideology which he called ‘culture’ as a foundation of hegemonic power, considering its aptitude to create and recreate the reality in which “practices are formed, diffused and reacted upon” (Hoare & Smith 2010: 56). He depicted culture as able to formalize collective understanding and shared notions of behavior and rules of conduct.
Consequently, the hegemonic process according to Gramsci constitutes the path to attaining an intellectual, moral, political, and economic order to which the majority of the masses subscribe. Throughout this process one or more social classes gain supremacy within a society, and the fusion of their tenets brings about their eventual hegemony. Gramsci argued that the path to hegemony consisted of several stages, and he outlined three basic steps in this regard:
1. The creation of a consciousness by a professional group that has designed a common framework of interests at the societal level.
2. The spread of this consciousness among all members of different classes.
3. The formalization of hegemony (Gill 1993).
These three steps will be referenced later in the chapters presenting research on the US’s attainment of hegemony and China’s potential formation of a ‘historical bloc’ that challenges the established structure. Certainly, this kind of stage-by-stage analysis will function to prevent this research from falling into the trap of state-centricism.
Gramsci’s allotment of equal importance to the political and civil societies arose as a novel approach to hegemony as it allowed for the inclusion of institutions and intellectuals in the
22 theoretical framework. Certainly, gaining the ‘hearts and minds’ of various social classes might be achieved by aptly utilizing the influence of intellectuals, which he separated into two components: traditional and organic. According to Gramsci, traditional intellectuals may be conceived of as formal leaders of institutions such as universities, religious bodies, and schools as well as influential professionals such as lawyers and politicians. Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, might be seen as inspirational leaders of social groups occupying a special place in local communities or popular culture. Building ideological supremacy at the societal level is regarded as an essential element in the establishment of hegemony for Gramsci, and it should be considered as the most effective tool in acquiring consent.
In brief, Gramsci dissected the concept of hegemony by referring to the political and civil sides of society, noting that power can be found in each. Therefore, the ability of an actor to pervade and influence both the political and civil domains is essential in obtaining and maintaining benevolent supremacy. Gramsci’s emphasis on the importance of these two spheres in substantiating the impact of the hegemony can be conceived of as follows:
- The political realm – in this domain the state’s impact is implemented through legislation comprising public service institutions such as the armed forces, government, police, and law.
- The civil society – in this domain the political and social landscape is established by private organizations, distinct from the government, such as churches, trade unions, political parties, media outlets, cultural associations, and so on.
Gramsci’s reference to Machiavelli peaked with his depiction of hegemony as a Centaur – the mythological creature that is half man, half beast –, for its two essential halves may be seen as coercion and consent (Gill 2003). The emphasis on the latter, or consensual, component of hegemony should also be considered as the main characteristic of the works of scholars applying Gramsci’s theory of hegemony within the discipline of international relations. In this way, Robert Cox’s application of the Gramscian notion of hegemony to the field of international relations opened the door to new methods that could be wielded by researchers in their attempts to break free from the bounds or earlier, more limited approaches.
2.2.3.a. Gramscian Hegemony in the discipline of international relations
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The need to move away from state-centric theoretical analysis was illuminated in the works of Robert Cox, as he criticized the sluggish transformation of perceptions in an academic system which was primarily led by the American School of international relations. This outspoken criticism destined him to become one of the most notable scholars of the British School of international political economy. Utilizing Gramsci’s way of depicting hegemony, he built a new image of international hegemony that was mostly associated with earlier conditions of the globe and constricted within boundaries of nation states. Cox transferred Gramscian analysis comprising societies to the international community. In this way, Cox emphasized the equal importance of gaining the consent of political and civil societies in establishing a power that intends to build supremacy on global domain. According to him, if an actor fails to gain the consent of these two spheres, it cannot acquire hegemonic status, and if an actor fails to balance the consent of one sphere against the other, the structure will be become more fragile and eventually give way to the collapse of the entire system.
Cox’s alternative to the existent theory of hegemony defended by conservative assumptions of the American School was laid out in detail in his article entitled ‘Social forces, states, world orders: beyond international theory’ (1981), an article that may be considered one of the most influential contributions to the critical school of thought in international relations. In this research, he successfully delineated problem-solving theory and critical theory and fleshed out the main characteristics and fissures of both.
His critiques of problem-solving theory were related to its timeframe firstly. Cox argued that this theory encompassed a very short period of time and ignored the past, which influenced the present and in most cases even the future that is realized due to transitions which occurred in the past. Moreover, he continued to criticize this theory due to its inability to account for major components of a system aside from the state, which itself is subject to fundamental change from within and without. Cox’s approach came about as a consequence of the need to account for ‘transformation’, whereas change within the framework of problem-solving theory failed to be explained and considered as ‘continuing presence’. The timeframe issue for the ‘problem-solver’ was depicted by Cox in relation to the ability of a strong state which can influence and control the international system to prevent ‘cracks’ from altering the existent order. Indeed, this assumption is tentatively analyzed by hegemonic stability theory, which explicitly excluded periods that were not deemed ‘hegemonic’ from its lens (Sinclair & Cox, 1996). Likewise, the inability of these prominent theories to account for ‘change’ stagnated theoretical development and hindered the formation of substantial analysis of empirical developments in the international arena.
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Cox pointed out that the main shortcoming of this theory was the result of its ahistorical character that placed emphasis on action, not limits, and its propensity to formulate solutions within the boundaries of the existing system without looking to other potentials. During this time even the international regimes advanced by hegemonic stability theory after incorporating liberal ideologies received their fair share of critiques due to their preoccupation with ensuring their own survival and aggrandizement instead of promoting innovative solutions to contemporary problems. Considering this context, Cox claimed that problem-solving theory’s tendency to reproduce knowledge made it ill equipped to explain emerging global realities.
If these (philosophy, politics, production) are constitutive elements of a single conception of the world, there must necessarily be, convertibility in the theoretical principles from one to the others, a reciprocal translation into the specific language of constitutive part: each element is implicit in the others and all of them together form a homogenous circle… For the historian culture and of ideas, this proposition leads to some important principles of research and criticism. (Gramsci 2011:196) Critical theory, on the other hand, was evaluated by Cox as unable to explain the existing relationships that comprise both the system’s origins and above all its potential to develop. Once again, Cox criticized this theory based on it temporal approach. Here, Cox claimed that critical theory was not only insufficient in accounting for developments of the past but also in expounding the continuing process of historical change (Cox 1981). He voiced the need for a theoretical framework that can effectively understand the past, which created the present and will ultimately shape the future. In this way, he called into question the sluggish and insufficient approaches of scholars of the American School. Cox’s alternative analyzes the structure-agency relationship and tries to discern how systems came into being in the past, what kind of transformations are occurring now, and what the impact of those transformations will bring to the world system in the future. In this sense, Cox underlines the basic feature of the ‘critical’ position in international relations by highlighting the global configuration of dominant states that proliferate their ideas through institutional structures that were initially constructed in order to embody and anchor the ideological reasoning of these states in the first place (Sinclair & Cox 1996). Certainly, Cox’s evaluation of the world order portrays a picture of a system that is organized by social forces through a combination of production, ideology, and institutionalism. Thus, Cox’s conceptualization of the world order, which envelopes international economic, social, and cultural trends, has been termed by Williams as indicative of the ‘hegemonic saturation’ of everyday life (2005).
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Cox’s approach, based largely on practical observations of international relations, has been lauded as a ‘counter-hegemonic alternative to the canon’ of academia. The main point of Cox’s arguments revolves around the inability of other outdated approaches to account for historical change. Indeed, addressing critical theory was important for him, because the framework focused on the potency of the realization of systemic development and transformation. Parting ways with mainstream approaches, Cox investigated world politics as a dialogue between past and present that offered alternative futures. It is apparent that his methods avoid taking issues as ‘given’ and instead strive to look critically at the conservative approaches of problem-solving theory which fail to question the underlying interests that are served by the system. He highlighted that problem-solving theories mostly indicate the obstacles pertinent to the management of the world as it is, without considering the possibility of transformation. His motto became ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, a fitting and succinct description of Cox’s overall perception of ‘common sense’.
A brief analysis of Cox’s thoughts on international relations can reveal the origins of today’s assumptions of hegemony in the discipline, for it was he who lifted the concept from the societal level and applied it to the international arena.
In his clarification of hegemony, Cox referred to the principle of ‘world orders’ as defined by a number of interrelated factors such as the organization of production, state formation, and the nature and form of social forces. According to him (1987), these elements could define the character of each world order at any given time in history. Specifically, production defines the political economy that is real and dominant at the international level and state formation indicates the type of states that make up the specific order; here, Cox questioned whether diversity of state formations might lead to a clash that would result in instability. Lastly, for Cox, social forces determine the form of political and civil movements within their respective states (Cox, 1987).
The question of ‘cui bono?’ – or for who or what’s gain? –, which was sought to be answered by critical theorists and investigated in terms of revealing who stands to benefit from the prevailing system, was addressed by Cox in his analyses of world orders. He substantiated his answer to this question by emphasizing the interrelations of three broad categories of influence within world orders: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions (Cox 1981). Cox instrumentalized these categories as part and parcel of the unique process leading to the formation of hegemony. In this way he argued that internationalization of material capabilities generated new intersubjective understandings of social relations and 26 new innovations in governing institutions. With this perspective in mind, Cox refuted the state-centric approach governing traditional international relations theory and refuted analyses that isolated the state from its constitutive societies. Likewise, he pointed out the salience of ‘social forces’, stating:
International production is mobilizing social forces, and through these forces that its major political consequences vis-à-vis the nature of states and future world orders may be anticipated. (Cox 1981:134) This general view of Robert Cox’s investigation of hegemony allowed him to draw the differences between the mainstream understandings of hegemony and the Gramscian approach toward the topic on a global scale. Cox (1983) opposed the misperception of hegemony as ‘the dominance of one country over others through the usage of relationships strictly among states’ (p. 63).
Cox examined three levels of Gramsci’s notions of legitimacy building in the societal domain by looking at the economic, political, and civil societies within the international sphere. His interpretations of the international order intermingled epistemological frameworks of the realist school of thought in which states and material capabilities were perceived as paramount and the liberal school of thought in which the same could be said of institutions and ideas. Forgacs (2000) stressed that “hegemony, in this sense, is an act of balancing among social forces, whether the agent that exercises it is a class or a coalition of classes, or a state or a coalition of states” (p.200). In other words, according to this view, dominant classes of politics and production within the international domain are required to establish consent among competing worldviews of hegemonic and subaltern groups by fusing various opinions of both sides if they want to succeed in building a cohesive state- society complex that is able to exercise supremacy. Gramsci (2011) depicted this process as the synthesis of consent, which is acquired through intellectual and moral leadership, and coercion, which appears in the event of crisis.
Cox’s analyses were enriched by his extensive historical research, as the scholar distinguished hegemonic periods of world orders from non-hegemonic ones. He illustrated this differentiation in four separate periods, namely 1845-1875, 1875-1945, 1945-1965, and 1965-present, all of which concluded before the end of the Cold War considering the publication date of his works. Accordingly, by taking a brief look at his historical references we can become more aware of the empirical perception of hegemony and the requirements needed to obtain this status at the international level.
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1. 1845-1875: This first period was characterized as a hegemonic one, with the empire of Great Britain at its center. British supremacy was reinforced as its rules spread through the promotion and universal acceptance of the principles of comparative advantage, free trade, and the gold standard. Britain’s coercive power was utilized at moments of necessity in order to prevent instability or challenges that could have disturbed the balance of power in continental Europe. Certainly, Britain’s mighty navy assured its dominance over the periphery overseas. During this time “no other state emerged to provide an ideological challenge to contest it” (Cox 1987:92). This era met nearly all the demands of hegemony under neo-Gramscian analysis, as the interaction between political, economic, and civil societies was sufficiently provided for within the territories under British influence. British hegemony successfully managed to build a ‘centaur’ and maintain it for several decades by way of the timely and balanced employment of consent and coercion.
2. 1875-1945: This period was deemed non-hegemonic due to the global instability that emerged as a consequence of challenges coming from rising powers within the system led by Great Britain. The previous order built on free trade and ‘cultural superiority’ and enforced by the British Empire’s military power lost its legitimacy with the emergence of new demands voiced by systemic actors. New conditions triggered waves of protectionism and nationalism within the order. Economic blocs were formed, the gold standard was abolished, and the rules imposed by the hegemon were no longer accepted by many.
3. 1945-1965: This period of fracture from the past is depicted by Cox as a hegemonic one. The basic features of this era will be illustrated in the coming pages pertaining to the rise and maintenance of American hegemony after the end of the Second World War. Cox often related this period to that of the British hegemony of the 19th century due to its aptitude to adjust its doctrines and institutions to “a more complex world economy and to national societies more sensitive to political repercussions” (Cox 1987).
4. 1965-1990: The final period addressed by Cox witnessed the deficiencies of the US- led world order. These deficiencies gave way to the rise of three potential ways to affect structural change: the reconstruction of hegemony into extended political management; the fragmentation of the world economy around big-power-centered economic spheres; and the demand for a new international economic order within the third world (Cox 1987).
Consequently, Cox indicated that in order to become a hegemonic power, an actor must establish and protect a world order that is universal in nature. This order should not be a system that is simply regulated by one state’s exploitation of others, but one that allows
28 other actors to consider the control of hegemonic influence compatible with their own interests. The consensual facet of the ‘centaur’ that was illustrated by Machiavelli was highlighted in Cox’s perception of hegemony insofar that the borders of ‘arkhe’ and hegemony within the world were attentively tended to. Thus, the combination of consent and coercion became regarded as the main feature of global hegemony, an idea that stood in stark contrast to conventional notions of ‘domination’ – the form of leadership void of moral justification and legitimacy. Some scholars argue that although consent and coercion were depicted as equal on a theoretical basis, in praxis consent was much more effective in constructing hegemony (Gill & Law 1989). Likewise, it should nonetheless be kept in mind that the lurking powers behind consciousness and ideologies that oblige consent-inducing measures in interstate relations cannot overshadow the salience of the coercive forces that underlie the entire structure (Cox 1981). Indeed, as briefly mentioned above, three categories of forces endorsing systemic stability and endurance of the hegemonic order may be conceived of as material capabilities, ideas, and institutions:
- Material capabilities affect consent and coercion, and according to Cox they exhibit productive and destructive potentials. Indeed, technological and organizational capabilities as well as natural resources transformed by technology and commanded through wealth constitute the first pillar.
- Ideas provide the general guidelines for expected behavior in terms of common beliefs and norms. Furthermore, they regulate localized beliefs and actions although they may not always agree with one another.
- The role of institutions is to ‘stabilize and perpetuate’ the established order and to facilitate the order’s access to legitimacy through the creation of a language and the interpretation of that language in a way that promotes common political action (Cox 1981).
This kind of order certainly cannot be constrained to the level of national interests and is most likely to give explanatory power to the forces of civil society across the globe. Thereby, within this framework, global civil society can be conceived of as one of the most important elements of the community of nations and thereby became the main area of concern in the study of hegemony. Again, this stands in contrast to the primary concern of inter-state conflicts found in earlier scholarship. Briefly, this kind of order indicates:
[A] certain way of life and thought, in which one concept of life is diffused throughout society, in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, religions, political principles and all social relations, in particular, their intellectual and moral connotations. (Worth 2015:117) 29
This assumption about the ‘certain way of life and thought’ that is constructed under hegemonic power sometimes clashes with the threatening, ‘egoistic’ appeals exemplified in the phrases of powerful leaders such as ‘you are either with us or against us’ (Bush 2001). While this issue will discussed in greater detail below, it should be noted that the above- mentioned definition of the hegemonic world order clarifies an important point, namely that all hegemonic periods throughout history embrace certain exclusive characteristics which define them and distinguish them from one another.
Each hegemonic power formulates its own suggestions on the regulation of the international system. Certainly, the existence of overlap between the model driven by the hegemon and the needs of actors in international society facilitate legitimacy and acceptance of the global hegemonic condition. For instance, the ‘American dream’, underpinned by the successful exertion of ideological influence, is one of the major factors that has allowed the US to become a power emulated by others.
According to this analysis, the power that succeeds in including ‘others’ and eliminating artificial ‘chains’ may be more attractive to others and therefore more suitable to build a ‘historical bloc’ that can substitute the hegemon and the international order it promotes. Certainly, dissatisfaction with the established system may be considered as the greatest reason for a system’s weakening and the acceleration of a transition therefrom. Nevertheless, only the strategy which avoids the pitfalls that challenged the previous system in the first place may be considered truly viable in offering an alternative. Henceforth, this approach will be utilized as the pattern for the analysis of a possible ‘Chinese hegemonic transition’ while referring to the US’s replacement of the British Empire as the global hegemon.
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the birth of a new hegemony must fulfill certain conditions. Indeed, a new hegemony needs to employ a strategy that is successful in affecting others. In the next section, two important terms within the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ – ‘historical bloc’ and ‘transformismo’ – will be analyzed first at the societal and later the international level.
2.2.3.b. Gramscian analysis of counter-hegemonic movements and ‘transformismo’
By analyzing hegemony at the societal level Gramsci illuminated the other side of the coin, seeking to pinpoint the path of alternative ascendancies of powers by locating them within the existing system. Indeed, his research on hegemony was triggered by his desire to better understand the reasons for different reactions to the establishment of hegemonies within 30 various societies as well as the reasons why ‘revolutionary change’ had failed to take root in European states after the end of the First World War while it succeeded in Russia. In his analysis, Gramsci pointed out certain counter-hegemonic actions, which will be the main focus below.
Gramscian thought identifies patterns of counter-hegemony that could arise within a society under two headings: ‘war of position’ and ‘war of movement’. Robert Cox expounded both of these expressions by referring to the divergent developmental tracks of Europe and Russia, as mentioned by Gramsci. He pointed out that the vulnerability of administrative and coercive apparatuses and the under-development of the civil society in Russia allowed a vanguard party to unite a resistance against the established order. The formidable connection among the elements of Russian society, which had been lost amidst the most recent hegemonic period, facilitated the new power’s acquisition of consent while also obliging other reluctant groups to obey when coercion was applied. This process was depicted by Cox in his investigation of the Gramscian perception of hegemony and was therewith coined as the ‘war of movement’ (1987). This strategy of resistance was evaluated as a full-frontal attack on the hegemonic state and its super-structural elements. Moreover:
In a war of movement, the entire legitimacy of hegemony is contested by an ideological attack not only on the major agencies and structures of the order but also on the complex forms of civil societal common sense that hold the order together. (Cox 1987: 139) On the other hand, a different form of resistance was realized in Western Europe under a more sophisticated bourgeois hegemony. Though supremacy over the state apparatus might have seemed easily achievable in this part of the world, waging a war of movement was infeasible due to the strength of the social base. Considering this context, Gramsci developed the idea of a ‘war of position’, which saw hegemony gained not through revolutionary transformation but through a slow intervention into the social foundations of the state. Here, it was argued that an alternative state and society oriented toward the working class could be built through the creation of alternative institutions and intellectual resources by “building bridges between workers and other subordinate classes” (Cox 1983: 53). This strategy aimed to resist control through subtle forms of contestation, achieving the strategic transformation of common sense and consciousness as the initial step in the building of a new hegemony (Gramsci 1996).
This method of counter-hegemonic behavior should be seen as a policy of making gains within an established order by following a long-term revolutionary strategy. Consequently, 31
Gramsci’s evaluation of alternative hegemonies argued that the states and societies which were built upon the leadership of the working class could create alternatives within an established order (Cox 1983). In this way, nascent counter-hegemonic forces were able to mature within the existing order when incremental and developmental gains were acquired by subaltern groups. At this moment it should be reminded that hegemonies of different eras which spawned new ‘historical blocs’ within the existing order were often able to substitute the prevailing hegemonies over time.
The later parts of this thesis will focus primarily on American hegemony in the period characterized by a growing relationship between material capability and super-structural institutionalization (Worth & Kuhling 2004). Throughout this period, the conditions perpetuated by the hegemonic power – the US – constantly feed internal ‘unsatisfied groups’, as these groups sub-optimize total gains by utilizing the suggested ‘benefits’ of the authority. The next chapter will stress this point once again, delving into how the sub- optimization strategy might be applied by a new rising power, namely China. Indeed, the actor that gathers incremental gains without openly challenging the current hegemon can be evaluated within the concept of the ‘war of position’. The coming assessment will investigate whether or not this dynamic is applicable within the international domain and whether the PRC is able to lead other dissatisfied actors in building a ‘historical bloc’ by employing this strategy.
Nonetheless, Gramsci did highlight the fact that not all societies in Western Europe were bourgeois hegemonies; and thus they could be separated into two groups. By presenting the main features of these two groups at the societal level the processes by which potential ‘historic blocs’ may be formed can be better comprehended. According to Gramsci:
- The first group of societies underwent social revolution and developed new modes of production and social relations to overcome the consequences thereof (Great Britain and France).
- The second group was comprised of actors that imported the new order created abroad, albeit without having it substituting their old systems. The societies stagnated as the result of their inability to fully adopt either the old or new order (Cox 1983).
The application of this societal analysis to the international domain allows researchers to observe the main shareholders of hegemonic power, and therewith to provide an answer to the question ‘Cui bono’. The extended network of beneficiaries of the established system can be seen in the first group as those who strengthened the base of hegemonic power, 32 whereas the second group encompasses the emulators of ‘certain rules’ which ultimately failed to gain efficacy. Certainly, the second group, which is left dangling between orders, can aptly represent those who may join a ‘counter-hegemonic’ movement in the future. Such will be touched upon later within the framework of the PRC’s potential establishment of an alternative system.
At this point it would be useful to touch upon certain definitions used in analyses of international relations in order build a bridge between the notions of hegemony at the societal and global levels. Indeed, the failure of the industrial bourgeoisie to attain hegemony in the second group of societies triggered Gramsci to develop another term to explain this phenomenon. He coined it ‘passive revolution’:
The resulting stalemate with the traditionally dominant social classes created the conditions that Gramsci called ‘passive revolution’, the introduction of changes which did not involve any arousal of popular forces. (Cox 1983: 54) A ‘passive revolution’ embraces caesarism and transformismo as they occur in standoffs with the prevailing system. Cox argued that ‘passive revolution’, accompanied with caesarism, requires ‘man-intervention’ in order to eradicate the stalemate between equal and opposed social forces. Hence, Gramsci identified two types of caesarism: ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’. The former explicates the strong rule exercised in an orderly fashion over the development of a new state, while the latter pushed for the stabilization of the existing power. Therefore, Gramsci noted that progressive caesarism could be observed in the period of Napoleon the First, while reactionary caesarism was more characteristic of the rule under his successor Napoleon the Third (Cox 1983). Subsequently, referring to Marx’s ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, Gramsci argued that the French bourgeoisie eventually welcomed the development of capitalism as the leadership of a political regime based on the peasantry established by Bonaparte was unable to rule through their own political parties. Modern Italy also went through the same experience when its state building process concluded with the formation of an intermediary sphere consisting of the industrial bourgeoisie in the north and the landowners in the south. As occurred in France, the industrial bourgeoisie became the main beneficiary of the order, and by becoming members of the political parties and state bureaucracy they shaped a buffer zone between Italy’s vast population and the state apparatus (Cox, 1983). Consequently, passive movements were depicted as the shortage of popular participation in the unification process. Overall, such a dynamic can be regarded as an ineffective utilization of the majority of the societal domain in gaining the consent that could be used to build a potential hegemony. 33
In addition, another essential trait of caesarism was defined by Gramsci as transformismo – a term first utilized by Italian statesman Giovanni Giolitti in his efforts to achieve a coalition of interests that integrated the northern industrial workers with industrialists through a protectionist policy under a common front. Consequently, ‘transformismo’ aims to acquire co-optation of leaders of subaltern social groups through:
Assimilating and domesticating potential dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and thereby obstruct[ing] the formation of class- based organized opposition to established social and political power. (Cox 1983: 55) In other words, ‘transformismo’ may be utilized by obedient social forces, led by the dominant coalition, to preempt notions that challenge the established order and absorb the potentiality of the rise of antagonistic powers.
Indeed, a ‘passive revolution’ that is observed in terms of its adoption of caesarism and ‘transformismo’ forms a unity with the theory of hegemony, as the two concepts account for each other’s insufficiencies. This means that in hegemonic periods the concept of hegemony emerges and that in non-hegemonic fractures of history the leverage of ‘passive revolutions’ are activated. Likewise, these two concepts are compatible and may be interchangeably substituted for one another throughout time. Considering this, Cox noted that ‘passive revolutions’ exhibiting features of caesarism and ‘transformismo’ may be appropriate in industrializing the Third World.
2.2.3.c. ‘Historic bloc’ (Blocco Storico)
Another salient conception utilized within the explication of hegemony is the ‘historic bloc’ (Blocco Storico). This notion was borrowed by Gramsci from Georges Sorel and can be conceptualized as an instigative component of a ‘transition’ of hegemonic order. Nevertheless, Cox indicated that Sorel applied this notion in a different way than Gramsci had done, however, he did note that overlapping points existed within their varying approaches. Here, the participation of people in collective action, in both Sorel and Gramsci’s definitions of the ‘historic bloc’, was considered by Cox as indicative of a confrontation of totalities – “in which they saw a new order challenging an established order” (Cox 1983: 59). Different from the concepts of ‘passive revolution’ and ‘transformismo’, the ‘historic bloc’ that is set out by the new order is able to transform its predecessor. Emphasizing Marx’s viewpoints, Gramsci also underlined that it was important for the old hegemonic order to be exhausted before a new one could replace it. Therefore, only after the hegemon’s full potential was worn out could a ‘historic bloc’,
34 whether dominant or emergent, come into power. Hence, a unified state and society could develop in the direction led by the ‘historic bloc’ and substitute the hegemony that has already seen its influence diminish and its capabilities wane. According to Gramsci, a ‘historic bloc’ which forms a cohesive whole by involving various elements through the coalescence and unification of social-political orders should be considered an intellectual defense against the co-optative power outlined by the concept of ‘transformismo’. With regard to the ‘historic bloc’, Gramsci referred to structures and superstructures – bodies that diffuse economic and politico-ethical tenets, respectively, through attempts to hinder any form of reductionism. Cox (1981) illuminated that the ‘historic bloc’ depicted by Gramsci encircles the bond between ideas and material circumstances.
These diverging elements of production discussed above (material capabilities and ideas) exhibit various features. Here, structures pervade material capabilities as social relations and physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology, on the other hand, along with political organizations are shaped by the development of both aspects of production, namely material capabilities and ideas. Hence, in separate investigations of each element within a structure and superstructure, one can uncover the distinct traits necessary for hegemony. On the economic basis that is enclosed within a structure, ownership of production is highlighted. Furthermore, civil society is seen as one of the two wheels of the superstructure. Within this context, “all dynamics of identity formation, ideological struggle, the activities of intellectuals, and the construction of hegemony (whether ethical or based on fraud) take place where the consensual behaviors prevail” (Gill 1993: 64). The second pillar of the superstructure is considered to be the political society, in which the state exercises coercive hegemony. Hence, the structure (economic forces) and superstructure (political and civil society) can act together in tandem to ensure the legitimacy and domination of the hegemonic power. In this sense, a rising ‘historic bloc’ should provide supremacy over the structure and superstructure in order to realize a hegemonic transition.
By outlining these definitions of terms which were initially determined at the societal level prior to their application within the international sphere, I would like to draw a picture that places the main actors of this research (the US and China) at the center of analysis. Thus, establishing dominance over structures and superstructures is an important factor in gaining hegemony at the global level. The next section will look into the US’s efforts to maintain its hegemonic status in the face of other ‘rebellious’ applications of the ‘transformismo’ policy. This dynamic will also be further examined within the realm of ‘energy security’ in
35 the fourth chapter. Furthermore, by analyzing the entrance of China’s state-operated enterprises (SOEs) into different markets in order to acquire the necessary energy resources for the country’s development, we can gauge China’s ability to build a ‘historic bloc’ by gaining the ‘hearts and minds’ of dissatisfied groups on global domain. In this way China can be evaluated as a possible initiator of a new ‘historic bloc’ that is able to preempt Chinese dependency on American favor as it is located along the route of those actors left out of the advantageous zone of the hegemonic order.
2.3. International ‘Historic bloc’
The neo-Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ indicates that the first requirement in building a new international ‘historical bloc’ is the existence of a hegemonic class. This class plays a crucial role in a country or a social formation where the cohesion and identity within the bloc are maintained by the hegemonic actor through the propagation of common culture. Gramsci also highlighted the roles of parties and intellectuals in achieving the establishment of an alternative ‘historic bloc’ that realizes some kind of revision of the current order. Here, Cox referred to two distinct approaches derived from the notions of ‘war of movement’ and ‘war of position’ in the societal domain. In the first case, or the ‘war of movement’, it has been suggested that the avant-garde party of Lenin assumed the burden of leading the callow working class. Such can also be seen as having occurred in China as exemplified in the Chinese Communist Party’s slogan ‘the party will do it for you’ under Mao Zedong. On the other hand, the ‘war of position’ strategy required the party of Lenin to intensify and develop dialogue between the working and other subordinate classes in order to build a more robust alliance.
Furthermore, another salient aspect observed in the establishment of a ‘historic bloc’ can be seen in the role played by intellectuals, who are evaluated as organically connected to the society. Here it is argued that intellectuals are committed to the improvement and sustainment of mental images, technologies, and organizations which bind together members of the ‘historic bloc’ under a common identity (Gill 1993). In this sense, organic intellectuals can contribute to the creation of a new ‘historic bloc’ within society during periods of bourgeois hegemony. Cox stressed that the evolution of distinctive cultures, organizations, and techniques as a result of constant encounters with the actors of the emerging bloc was the main indicator of the possible success of a future ‘hegemonic transition’. Indeed, the eradication of borders between nature and spirit (or structure and superstructure) conclude with the unification of different ideologies by challenging
36 understandings of hegemony that reduce the concept to the level of the epistemological and ontological research of Marxist economism or Hegelian idealism.
Consequently, Gramsci identified three kinds of consciousness in order to illustrate the basic aspects of a successful ‘historic bloc’ that could succeed in converging with the hegemonic power. As Gramsci emphasized, by moving up and down this three-step ladder, a new ‘historic bloc’ could either succeed or fail in gaining hegemonic status:
1. Economic-corporative consciousness – takes into consideration the specific interests of a particular group.
2. Solidarity or class consciousness – extends to a whole social class but remains at a purely economic level.
3. Hegemonic consciousness – harmonizes the interests of the leading class with subordinate classes and incorporates them within an ideology expressed in universal terms. (Gramsci 1996: 180-195)
After analyzing the assumptions attached the creation of a ‘historic bloc’, Gramsci explored how this notion could be converted into hegemony by way of structures transitioning into complex superstructures. With this clarification Gramsci sought to expound the stage-by- stage transformation of the interests of specific groups to the construction of the institution of ideologies:
If they reflect a hegemony, these institutions and ideologies will be universal in form, i.e., they will not appear as those of a particular class, and will give some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or vital interests of the hegemonic class. (Cox 1983: 168) This argument underlies the nascence of the ‘historic bloc’, which challenges the established system by emerging within the hegemonic structure itself. It should be reminded that novel ideas which countervail hegemonic notions are explicitly rooted in the existing system; indeed, by gaining might and winning confidence a ‘historic bloc’ can unify powers and succeed in spurring hegemonic transition.
Its main aim is to fundamentally contest the legitimacy of ‘common sense’ within a historic bloc by exposing and exploiting its weaknesses; thus, destabilizing its hegemonic consent. (Worth & Kuhling 2004: 35) Likewise, the dominant structure itself nourishes the rise of the ‘historic bloc’, as the two are organically associated with one another and so dialectically intertwined to the point that it would be difficult to terminate the growth of the latter without harming the former. If a current hegemon is unable to retain its supremacy as a result of its lack of strength and 37 legitimacy, spontaneously new political forces will rise to build and direct a new system. Accordingly, Gramsci indicated that “a new power may arise and fight against the existing political forces [and] reshape the balance of the social order as well as form new ideologies” (Worth 2015: 52).
If the organic crisis of a failing hegemon can neither be regulated successfully nor protected from the challenges of emerging forces, the eventual establishment of a ‘historic bloc’ seems inevitable. By providing an ‘organic link’ between the political and civil societies and by applying new hegemonic ideas, or ‘dominant ideologies’, a successful bloc can be established:
Any new historic bloc must have not only power within civil society and economy, but also persuasive arguments (ethical-political level) which build on and catalyze its political networks and organizations. (Gill & Law 1989: 487) In this context it would be prudent to examine the empirical application of the notions of hegemony and the ‘historic bloc’ with reference to the recent history of the US. By examining the US’s path to hegemonic status through the lens of the above theories, it becomes possible to observe the birth of a ‘historic bloc’. The observation of different phases of the US’s path to hegemonic development and its success in maintaining the order under its supervision by utilizing consent and coercion via the application of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions, will uncover the prime elements that constitute the core of American hegemony.
2.4. US hegemony-building – the transnational capitalist class
It is commonly accepted that the US’s hegemonic status does not resemble that of any previous dominant power. Its ability to maintain hegemony on such a massive scale and acquire widespread legitimacy through the incorporation of various groups and actors is unprecedented. US hegemony arose within a system that was based upon the spread of the liberal economy underpinned by the gold standard under the supervision of another power – the British Empire. In the beginning, the rise of the US was first restricted to the economic domain. The US’s economic might caught up with and surpassed that of Great Britain several decades before it became acknowledged by others as the hegemon of other non- economic spheres. In this way, by analyzing the US’s path to hegemony one can observe the spillover of economic might into other domains. Other rivals which challenged British hegemony politically and/or militarily, such as Germany and Japan, weakened Britain’s hegemonic status and created the necessary conditions for the emergence and sustainment of a new ‘historic bloc’. Nevertheless, these aggressors did not manage to provide 38 alternative economic, political, or societal frameworks that could substitute British hegemony.
Widely regarded as the early 20th century’s most destructive quagmires, two world wars set the stage for the gradual ascendance of the US to prominence. The US’s newly acquired economic might allowed it to utilize its financial means as a healing salve for the wounds of states suffering in various regions as a result of the Second World War. At this time, both the historical juncture and exhausted state of the British hegemon led to a context in which no other option was available aside from letting the US take the lead. Different from the period following the First World War, after the Second World War the demand for US assistance rose exponentially and the US’s will to peacefully transition its economic might into the political and ideological domains was apparent. The inevitable need for the reformulation of the global economic and political system was satisfied with the emergence of a new powerful actor that could win hegemonic legitimacy within a very short period of time (Gilpin 1981).
Therefore, there are several international elements pertinent to the US’s rise to hegemony, which, according to Gill and Law (1989), “generated economic growth through the industrialized capitalist world” as a result of:
1. The construction of US-centered economic, security, and political structures which ensured peaceful conditions revolving around a capitalist core.
2. The US’s maintenance of the growth of global aggregate demand through its balance of payment deficits generated by its overseas military expenditure (700 military bases all around the world in 63 countries; US military personnel in 156 countries) (Johnson, 2006).
3. The substantial congruence of ideas, institutions, and policies in a system of embedded liberalism.
4. The cheap and plentiful supply of raw materials.
Therefore, the US, following this step-by-step alignment, constructed a ‘new international historic bloc’ that was coined by Tom Ferguson as the ‘American multinational bloc’ (1995). The American-led international ‘historic bloc’ fit the basic norms of the Gramscian perception of the extended state in that its productive, financial, and state apparatuses could be seen as unified (Gill & Law 1989). Hence, it was argued that an ‘international historic bloc means more than the alliance of capitalist interests across national boundaries’ (Gill et. al., 1989: 487). The class pointed out by Gramscian theorists as the main source of a
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‘historic bloc’ gained a new meaning with the rise of the US, as it became accepted that such a bloc could consist of elements of more than one class. Likewise, Stephen Gill (1990) emphasized that these features rely organically on material and normative structures of society which encircle “governmental and social institutions and civil society of a number of countries, including weak states” (p. 113).
Briefly, this dynamic resulted in the theoretical and empirical extension of the concept due to the observed existence of the evolutionary stages of hegemony and the ‘historic bloc’. The creation of the global social class discerns the transformation of these concepts from the societal level to the international domain. New perceptions of hegemony evaded all forms of reductionism and provided salience to the influence exerted by the international hegemony which the US efficiently implemented in the post-war era.
American power created such a global environment by relying on its economic and military power. This might was later translated into the ideological domain and therewith legitimacy was brought to the US’s hegemonic status. The US, affording financial support to treat devastated European and Asian markets on one hand and highlighting the communist ‘red threat’ as a global menace and a source of possible disaster in the international political economic sphere on the other, provided security to weakened actors. Nevertheless, its efforts were echoed not only at the governmental level but also within civil societies. This occurred due to the US’s enduring ideological impact on structures and superstructures.
The US’s acquisition of hegemonic status was a consequence of its ability to build consent underpinned by explicit hard power. It has been argued that historical empires accompanied by dominions and colonial enterprises that achieved their goals through expansionism and the exploitation of resources resemble today’s US and its territorial dominance. The US is able to activate its hard power by virtue of the 700 military bases it has disseminated across the globe in addition to its ability to exert ideological influence. Its prevailing authority over structures and superstructures provides the US hegemon with ripe conditions in which its tools of consent and coercion can substitute each other when necessary. Consequently, the ‘international historic bloc’ led by the US since mid-20th century constitute a new hegemony that adheres to all of the guidelines stressed above:
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order amongst states. It’s an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production, which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony is describable as a social
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structure, and economic structure and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of those things, but must be all three. (Cox 1983: 171-2) Consequently, the driving force of American hegemony within the international domain was coined the transnational capitalist class. Gill (1990) argued that this class possesses the ability to “create the strategic class consciousness that involves long-term time horizon and consideration of the general conditions under which transnational capital operates” (p. 156). Henceforth, a transnational capitalist class representing transnational capital emerged as a part of the global bourgeoisie. It comprises the owners of the leading worldwide means of production controlled by transnational corporations and private financial institutions (Robinson & Harris 2010).
The increasing strength and confidence of this hegemon culminated in the demand that it regulate both political and economic domains. The principles of American hegemony – self-determination and the neoliberal economy – befit this class from the very beginning as it quickly gained support due to its efforts and aptitude to eradicate colonial anamnesis associated with British hegemony. By supplying a remedy to problematic issues pervading various domains, the new hegemon offered others salvation and solutions to their concerns without promoting servitude and exploitation as the previous hegemon had done. Subsequently, the US became the ‘regime type heretofore unknown’ (Odom 2005). This specific regime encompassed four distinctive characteristics that distinguished it from former world orders:
- American hegemony was built on the ideological basis of classical liberalism, rather than territorial expansionism.
- Its structure underlined the norm of moneymaking rather than moneylosing. Indeed, the US expended 25-30% of its total gross domestic product (GDP) on its European and Asian allies, triggering their economic boom and establishing its own supervisory influence of over 70% of the gross world product (GWP). All this even though the US only constituted 17% of the world’s population after the Second World War (Odom 2005).
- Other actors willingly joined the hegemonic order, which was constricted neither by formal nor representative boundaries; these actors tried to adjust their principles and norms in order to become appropriate members of the new international structure.
- Militarily, the supply of supranational politico-military governance within Europe and Northeast Asia prompted mutual trust among nations which had up until then suffered from
41 long-lasting animosity even after the end of the Cold War when the external military threat faded away (Odom 2005).
The development of international institutions after the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II reinforced the principles of the new system. These institutions were regarded as the foundational might that underlie the newly designated hegemon. This order received international acclaim due to the rule-based decision-making procedures provided by the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), international courts, and others; and this entirely distinguished this hegemonic order from that of previous imperial actors (Odom 2005).
The material capabilities and normative principles of the US-led world order efficiently functioned throughout two decades without encountering any rivalries. Therefore, the success of American hegemony rested upon its accomplished incorporation of influence over the economic-political and civil societies of the globe. By spreading a common ideology and shared principles, this hegemony penetrated each cell of other societies; and the nascence of the transnational class already mentioned above facilitated this diffusion. This period was coined as ‘epochal shift’ due to the transition of capitalist system from nation-state phase to the transnational one (Burbach; Robinson, 1999). Indeed, capitalist classes grown within the protective cocoon of states formalized antagonistic interests to national capitals.
In order to understand the strength of this global class, the thesis refers to the analyses of Stephen Gill, who indicated that the rising hegemony occurred as the result of ‘double streamed’ waves between the domestic and international levels on the one hand and markets and governments on the other. He analyzed this dynamic within the Gramscian framework, avoiding state-centric accounts and looking at empirical socio-cultural formations (Murray & Worth 2013). His evaluation of the concept of hegemony points to a consensual set of processes influenced through an intellectual, moral, political, and economic order and persuasion of the majority of popular and subaltern masses. Therefore, it can be considered that the transnational capitalist class comprised “popular and subaltern classes […] co-opted into the system of thought and practice or […] subsumed into the ideological superstructures attached to the base of production” (Murray et. al. 2013: 734). In order to better comprehend the above-mentioned processes and their further application, a more detailed description of the American path to hegemony will be illustrated below.
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According to Gill, the emergence of a globally integrated capitalist economy was the critical juncture of American hegemony, as it facilitated the US’s political regulation and supervision over domestic economies. Capital was the strongest reinforcement of the American order as it allowed for the blurring of national borders among states by integrating them under one ideological umbrella. Here, Gill stressed the structural power provided by capital in order to better depict the construction of a new prevailing class. The deeply interwoven affairs of markets and political organizations, normally dictated by states, resulted in the former urging the latter to provide protection. On the other hand, the demand for finance coming from governmental institutions triggered much bolder interest in market regulation.
The renewed focus on liberal markets was achieved by easing mercantilist assumptions which had flourished since the early decades of the 20th century. This process was also facilitated by the gradual diminishment of technical obstacles that had hindered transportation and communication, thus enabling a system that benefited from the enhancement of capital mobilization. Nonetheless, the power of the state was still significant, even in this new era in which the definition, participation, and shape of the transnational hegemonic class centered on the regime of capital accumulation.
This discrepancy between authorities, which were associated with governments, and markets, which were connected to private enterprises, allowed new actors to proliferate the international domain. Therefore, Lindblom’s emphasis on the escalating status of transnational corporations that could become efficient in exerting authority over national boundaries via the implementation of behavioral power of capital in order to allot resources internationally should be considered as the turning point that led to the American era of hegemony (Gill, 1993). In this regard, Gill underlined the importance of the locations of transnational corporations’ headquarters and other developing states’ will to attract capital in order to become participants in the new transnational capitalist class. Such trends were accompanied by the motto ‘there is no alternative’ in the 1980s when states came to benevolently welcome capital into their borders (Gill & Law 1989). Throughout this process American hegemony attempted to persuade others that there really was no other alternative; it was either join or suffer…
Accordingly, under this US-led structure, transnational capital became one of the most important concerns of states, and of developing states in particular, as transnational companies came to use various states’ need for investment as leverage. Thus, the ability of transnational corporations (TNCs) to influence and direct decision-making procedures by 43 determining the amount and scale of financing launched a new phase in world history. The erasure of national borders – furthered by the later processes of integration and globalization – also facilitated the TNCs’ ability to maneuver on a global scale. Throughout this period, mutual interdependence prevented governments from implementing unilateral, protectionist economic policies as they were expected to uphold their obligations in the face of other states and TNCs that were critical actors in the decision-making processes relevant to internationally mobile capital (Gill et. al. 1989). States were wont to serve the interests of capital in this polyarchical capitalist system characterized by the deep intermingling of international and domestic spectrums. The emergence and primacy of global markets and super-structural organizations in this new era prompted states to pursue policies of economic deregulation which in turn led to the formation of a corporate elite. Such a dynamic nurtured hegemonic relationships between national subaltern classes across the global domain and promoted ‘historic bloc’ to the hegemonic status.
This historic bloc is composed of the transnational corporations and financial institutions, the elites that manage the supranational economic planning agencies, major forces in the dominant political parties, media conglomerates, and technocratic elites and state managers in both North and South. (Robinson ; Harris, 2000: 14) Nevertheless, the neo-Gramscian analysis of hegemony predicted that strong states would back transnational companies. Such is exemplified in Gill’s note that the “profit-making interests of BP and Shell and security interests of [the] British empire always overlapped (1993: 117)”. Regardless of the heterogeneous assumptions held by governments and business leaders of specific issues within the structure, the general outlook toward the established international order remained common. Gill (1993) depicted the features of this unified perspective held by governments and businessmen as characteristic of the general framework of the new system:
- Parent governments lobbied for TNCs. Therefore, TNCs were able to obtain favorable policies from native governments, operate their enterprises, and build good relations with host states and international organizations, and indirectly with their parent governments. Such interrelations simply ameliorated the incursion of novel players into the established structure.
- Well-developed financial networks such as the IMF, WB, and other international forums began to prevail in the US-led order.
- Elite interactions on the economic and political levels (among business people and governmental bureaucrats respectively) became an accepted norm in the international 44 domain, thereby increasing the influence of the international political economy. Such can be observed with the Bilderberg meetings, the Trilateral Commission, and other institutions alike.
- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other intergovernmental organizations came to represent the pinnacle of the new hegemonic order (Wallerstein 2006).
Another issue relevant to the states’ influence over the power of capital can be seen in these states’ ability to determine the international economic-political sphere. Under American hegemony the international structure was built on the principles of capitalist and liberal international economic policies. However, Gill emphasized that the Soviet Union’s understanding was quite divergent, and had it assumed the hegemonic throne following World War II the global order would have been fundamentally different. If this had become the case, the power of capital would have been severely constricted.
Previously, the relationship between transnational capital and states was articulated as antagonistic. Nevertheless, during the American hegemonic era common points between the two led to a reconciliation of contradictions. Indeed, possessing merely structural power, capital needed the state to supply it with public goods and to provide it protection by way of law and order and the exertion of coercive power. “For capital, structural power [alone] is insufficient to sustain hegemony” (Gill & Law 1989: 479), and considering this, capital requires the state’s force of relational power (Strange 1994), which can be activated when necessary.
Gill also examined the potentials of success of the global Leviathan as a hegemonic state in the international political arena by measuring the abilities of other emerging forms of politico-economic authorities and by illuminating the salience of capital holders in different spheres. Nevertheless, he still emphasized that “there is no clear-cut ideal international society which would promote the transnational hegemony on a global scale since alternatives involve contradictory elements” (Gill & Law 1989: 492).
The new US hegemony donned a mantle that had not been tried on by anyone else before; hence, by appropriating its regulatory forms to different conditions throughout different timeframes the US was able to efficiently adapt itself without encountering severe challenges along its rise. Reinforcing its power through the formation of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ and international organizations that served to proliferate its ideas throughout the political and societal domains of various states and regions ultimately 45 allowed it to acquire consent. Consequently, this transnational hegemon managed to harmonize the process of free market capitalism and globalization by mobilizing the popular consent of subaltern classes (Murray & Worth 2013) with the assistance of the aforementioned intellectuals’ (media, popular culture) ideological influence. Thus, the US’s achievement of hegemonic status can be summed up by looking at the rises and falls of its primacy after World War II:
- 1945-1971 – Economic-military supremacy. Gill pointed out that during this time the US was able to set the rules of the post-war international economic order. It formalized basic principles of a capitalist system that encompassed more than four fifths of the world economy, and organized and maintained a system of collective security to retain political and economic control. Both economic prosperity and security were promised by the new hegemonic power.
- 1971-1990 – Challenges to US hegemony. These years were characterized by financial turmoil and the enhanced influence of international organizations and institutions in spreading the hegemonic ideology. This period can be seen as a period in which the US’s transnational hegemony waned. Here, Joseph Nye depicted challenges to the US-led liberalized global economy as long-run (irreversible) and short-run (reversible).
1. Long-run challenges – The dispersion of world economic growth among major US allies. Financial assistance provided by the US to its main allies in Europe and Asia resulted in the economic growth of the latter, facilitating the development of their positive attitudes toward the US. This enhanced economic might of American allies brought about the birth of new conditions. Thus, a system of global management needed to be transitioned into a system of global governance that incorporated the newly emergent powers (Gilpin 2001). The threat to American hegemony came not from the east (i.e. the Soviet Union) but from within the system itself (i.e. Japan and the EU). Indeed, this challenge to the hegemonic system could be controlled and softened through the intervention of international institutions, whose establishment and principles were embedded by the hegemonic order under the US (Keohane 1984). Moreover, the breakdown of the bipolar global security order after the fall of the Soviet Union sparked a new wave of militarization, thereby shocking the system that had been predicated on the balance of powers.
2. Short-run challenges – The ‘Vietnam syndrome’ fanned the flames of anger within American society. At this time the hegemonic status of the US began to be questioned both from within and without American boundaries. Such was considered a crack in the
46 legitimacy of the established order. The US’s failure in Vietnam occurred concurrently with the rise of the Soviet Union’s military might. Indeed, such vulnerabilities were exacerbated as instabilities in the Middle East resulted in a worldwide breach of energy security and subsequent declines in economic productivity. Overall, such realities were evaluated as the beginnings of the downturn of the hegemonic system led by the US. Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye highlighted the role played by international regimes in allowing the US to maintain ‘benevolent supremacy’. They argued that the outright decline of the US’s transnational hegemony was avoided due to its earlier establishment of international regimes during the apex of its hegemonic influence.
- 1990-2001 – Victory and period of non-rivalry. The US managed to repair all frictions that had emerged after the economic and political crises of the previous two decades. The US adopted a flexible approach toward its conventional allies and developed a new policy that could help it cope with Third World countries by activating the strengthened capabilities of international rules and regimes. This new stage of hegemonic might can be characterized by what has come to be known as ‘Coca-colonization’ led by TNCs on the one hand and the reformulation of the structure via corporative involvement in the construction, development, and maintenance of institutions through the dissemination of ideas and signing of contracts across a wide range of national boundaries (Gill 2003), including those of the newly independent republics of the Soviet Union, on the other. The US’s newly acquired access to areas which were previously ‘forbidden’ under Soviet rule reinforced its hegemonic strength. Therefore, the existence of new markets ensured the flow of raw materials to the center and created plausible areas in which transnational corporations and banks could invest. Moreover, the omnipresent influence of the US was discerned not only at the economic level, via the application of free trade market rules, but also at the level of ideologies. Accordingly, authoritarian political cultures inherited from the former Soviet system of governance were vilified and discredited, whereas liberal democratic principles of American hegemony were emphasized as norms to be adopted and emulated by the newly independent countries.
- 2001-current – Recession of US hegemony. This period has witnessed the emergence of new actors and an increase in the number of shareholders in the world order. Indeed, this timeframe will be illuminated later in the thesis as we consider the rise of China and its ability and/or intention to build a ‘historical bloc’ to challenge the established structure as a consequence of the exhaust existing within the hegemonic order.
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Consequently, US hegemony utilized the combination of consent and coercion to encourage others to liberalize their economies in order to provide its transnational capitalist class with beneficial conditions. Instrumentalizing this class, the US employed a ‘mixed strategy’ which encompassed unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism to consolidate and promote a new global political and economic order that coincided with its own interests and extended the reach of its own firms (Worth 2015).
While investigating the period of US hegemony, one should take into consideration the US’s ability to adjust itself to even the most sudden of complications. Thus, by effectively utilizing carrots and sticks on the one hand and exerting influence over international organizations and TNCs on the other, the US hegemon evaded menaces with very few injuries and losses. Certainly, however, it could not manage to protect itself from the absolute reduction of its might at certain times. Nevertheless, in part due to its intense drive, US hegemony overcame frictions that emerged along its ascendance and endured without facing serious attempts to topple it supremacy through the establishment of new international ‘historic blocs’.
Aside from the structural power of capital that shaped the transnational capitalist class – the bulwark of American hegemony –, the intellectual luster of this class after the end of the Second World War also reinforced its hegemonic position in the world. Indeed, the involvement of mental talents from all around the globe contributed to the development of high-technology industries strengthening the economic tenacity and stability of both countries and transnationals (Cox & Sinclair 1996). Robert Cox (1983) also emphasized the explicit vitality of skilled workers who, by integrating, could be able to construct a transnational ‘historic bloc’ “that [forges] links across not only national boundaries, but also classes to create conditions for a hegemony of transnational capital” (p.129). Consequently, many of the ‘organic intellectuals’ stressed by Gramsci can be seen in this case as having migrated to the New World in the process of ‘brain drain’. They became involved in the advancement of the high-technology industries and adopted the principles of the established system.
On the other hand, this hegemony was formalized through the forging of organic links by intellectuals – representatives of different socio-cultural, economic, and class interests who could reinforce specific conceptions of individuals and social groups all around the world. Likewise, some scholars underlined the intellectuals’ ability to tap into the six realms of consciousness (namely, language, common sense, folklore, popular religion, philosophy, and religion of intellectuals), in turn facilitating the hegemon’s attempt to win the ‘hearts 48 and minds’ of broader societies throughout the international domain (Gramsci 1996). With regard to the realms of consciousness, Worth and Murray (2013) defined ‘hegemony’ as the central process embracing a ‘political constellation’ of various classes’ interests, philosophy, and religion of intellectuals. This intermingled process forged a type of consensual moral leadership and triggered the transmission of might into the layers of common sense and folklore through language. Indeed, the intellectuals’ penetration of these six realms of consciousness allowed them to reveal the underlying reasons and need for a hegemonic agent that provided for the interaction between and coordination of diverse groups.
Subsequently, American hegemony was ornamented with ‘media power’ that assisted it in creating a sweeping ideological climate at both the national and international level. It promoted satellite broadcasting, and later the rise of the internet and individuals’ access thereto all around the world facilitated the breaking of nationalistic efforts to control and even hinder foreign media influence over societies. Furthermore, the English language became the internationally acknowledged ‘lingua franca’ in satellite broadcasting and over the internet, thus serving to trigger waves of economic and political integration. Control imposed by way of the manipulation of ‘media power’ helped the hegemony to advance over the decades and facilitated individuals’ access to information that limned the ‘brightness’ of the ‘American Dream’ (Worth & Murray 2013).
To illustrate that all of the above-mentioned points pertain to the US-inspired hegemonic leadership, the thesis will adopt the term ‘nebulous’, as first depicted by Cox, in order to better define the international hegemony encompassing states, productive forces, and ideas. Though at first hegemony was articulated as the synthesis of class relations around a specific form of production, later it leaped up to a new stage characterized by the exertion of a special brand of intellectual and moral leadership that controlled and embedded economic production. Such a dynamic was first explored within the domestic spectrum, as portrayed by Gramsci, yet subsequently the pivot of research turned to the international domain. The thesis will work within the bounds of the latter level of analysis in depicting American hegemony.
Certainly, the power of transnational capital and military bases all around the globe constituted the groundwork of a two-layered material foundation of American hegemony. On the other hand, an ideological basis promoted by media manipulation and the might of the internet shaped the second pillar. It is ironic that the construction of this hegemonic structure directly after the defeat of the Axis Powers relied not only on US dominance over 49 the material and ideological pillars but also the threat posed by the Soviet Union. US hegemony was initially strengthened due to the challenge coming from the East, and even the eradication of the Soviet menace at the end of the Cold War translated into another kind of victory that stimulated hegemonic dissemination over the subsequent decade.
The end of the Cold War was equated with ‘The End of History’ as American hegemony regained its power over allies and gained access to new areas that it could influence. The “break of the autocratic state, the liberalization of its economy, and the increase of the structural power of transnational capital” (Gill & Law 1989: 487) became the main features of this new era directly after the end of the Cold War. New markets became more accessible to transnational capital which was employed to bring new members into the transnational capitalist class and facilitate the further proliferation of multinational corporations. Global neoliberalist winds emerged once again and the “internationalization of production and finance and the spread of consumerism resulted in an integrated world economy” (Gill et.al.1989: 493) that constituted the spine of the hegemonic order. Consequently, Gill stated:
Hegemony cannot be understood as simply a relation of dominance between states in the interstate system, it involves the construction of a relatively consensual form of politics with its combination of power and leadership giving due weight to subordinate forces in a series of institutionalized political settlements. Hegemony is forged in a complex set of historical blocs that link public and private power within and across nations in transnational political networks that seek to sustain, regulate and rule a global capitalist order. (Gill 2003: 95) This transnational hegemonic order, a synthesis of political and technical networks, highlights the complexities of the system (Gill 1986) that was envisioned, woven together, and maintained by the US. Indeed, Owen Worth drew a general framework of this complex web by emphasizing the features of international hegemony as they were conceived of by Gramscian scholars. The application of the notion of ‘World Order’ as an explanation of the first pillar of an American hegemony that was built by a transnational capitalist class, international organizations, and a strong military presence became commonplace (Worth 2010). Moreover, the power of the international hegemony has been seen as derived from its reliance on the consensual relationship forged between the transnational elites and respective ‘national subordinate classes’.
Consequently, the most salient success of American hegemony pertained to its ability to converge diversified interests, institutions, and movements through the globalization of values and production of a singular popular worldview and culture that facilitated the engineering of popular consent in order to regulate the global free market (Murray & Worth 50
2013). The production of this global free market within both the developing and developed states and societies can be seen as the touchstone of an American hegemony which has been perpetuated by social forces and intellectuals. Nevertheless, the most influential aspect of this hegemony lies in its interaction with civil societies.
The US’s hegemony benefitted authorities and civil societies more than that of the British Empire. In this way, it would be expected that a potential ‘historical bloc’ which seeks to challenge American hegemony should put forward fewer restraints than the current US order. Though American hegemony encircles a majority of the world with its hard and soft power, its political impositions on several countries and regions have functioned to set limitations on its abilities. Therefore, offers of a more inclusive, heterogeneous, and universally beneficial order may challenge, weaken, and even substitute the current prevailing order in time. Gill and Law have expounded such an idea in their proposition that “an effective counter-hegemonic challenge requires access to large financial resources, knowledge, information and degree of control over production and distribution processes” (1989: 495).
Various tenets of the American hegemonic order clarified above rest upon the proactivity of the transnational class which can influence the world order by forging policies that are embodied by international organizations, TNCs, and guarded by substantial military power. Certainly, the US hegemon has efficiently balanced consent and coercion, however, its greatest achievements are observed in the societal domain. The hegemon gave life to a successful model that could win the ‘hearts and minds’ of every individual in international society. People who suffered from destructive wars for decades eagerly embraced the ideals of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ that were promised by the ‘American Dream’ – a concept first labeled by James Truslow Adams in 1931 in his books published after the end of the First World War. He defined the term in this way:
That American dream of a better, richer, and happier life for all our citizens of every rank, which is the greatest contribution we have made to the thought and the welfare of the world. That dream or hope has been present from the start. Ever since we became an independent nation, each generation has seen an uprising of ordinary Americans to save that dream from the forces which appeared to be overwhelming it. (Cullen 2003: 4) At first, the American lifestyle seemed most attractive for the US’s European and Asian allies, yet following the commencement of the hegemonic wave, especially after the collapse of the Communist bloc, the ‘American Dream’ inevitably captured the imagination of almost all regions of the world. The importance of individual happiness underlined by
51 the hegemonic conception of the ‘American Dream’ was considered as the primary reason for other societies to accept the new hegemonic order.
Certainly, such a phenomenon distinguishes American hegemony from the hegemonies that preceded it. Indeed, the ‘American Dream’ became available for every person individually, as it did not target merely states but instead aimed to increase individual, personal hopes.
Not surprisingly, at the end of the Cold War, the US’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright emphasized that the US victory over the Soviet Union was a result of the US’s military, economic, political, cultural, and informational predominance. She stressed the US’s all- encompassing strength, which, implicitly, comprise the elements required of a hegemon. Of the ‘American Dream’ she said:
The American Dream means being part of a society that allows you to be or do whatever you want, and to have a sense that your individual optimism and hard work will be rewarded. (Eaves 2007: 24) Later, Brzezinski also outlined this point in his book entitled ‘The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives’, when he mentioned the Soviet Union’s backward ‘soft power’ approach toward culture, education, and information. He attributed the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War to its ultimate inability to build domination through consent. The one who gained the ‘hearts and minds’ with less effort eventually prevailed (Brzezinski 1997).
The concept of the ‘American Dream’, bolstered by the US’s soft and hard power, endured over the decades without hindrance. Nevertheless, the decline in the credibility of American hegemony, especially after the US’s unsuccessful forays into the Middle East, was reflected in others’ reactions toward the promoted pattern that should supposedly be emulated. Within the next chapter, the extent to which US policy exemplified in President George W. Bush’s declaration that ‘you are either with us or against us’ precipitated changes to the hegemonic world order will be examined.
Additionally, the next chapter will also underline the concept of the ‘China Dream’ through a comparative analysis with the ‘American Dream’.
Chinese involvement in international society and a domestic economic boom have pushed this actor to develop an alternative path to success for actors that failed to achieve the ‘dreams’ promised by the US-promoted pattern of development. Henceforth, the ‘China model’ will be discussed in the next chapter, particularly in regard to its appeal that stems from its open-ended framework. Here, the power of the ‘China model’, which aims to
52 extend the hegemonic scope without imposing restraints on political, social, or economic domains, will be comparatively examined. Accordingly, this model’s promotion of diversity on a global scale will be evaluated.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter the main traits of hegemony as explained by various theories of the concept were analyzed and depicted. Firstly, the analysis focused on the conventional evaluation of the term, and later turned to the critical approaches developed primarily by Gramsci. Considering the scope of this thesis, the Gramscian terms ‘hegemony’, ‘historic bloc’, and ‘transformismo’ that have traditionally been used to describe dynamics at the societal level have been adapted and clarified, with the help of a number of scholars, in order to allow for their application at the international level. By utilizing the Gramscian notions of hegemony, this chapter has sought to lay out a more holistic theoretical framework that avoids the pitfalls of state-centric approaches for use in the remainder of the analysis. Finally, the theoretical portion of this research has been supported by empirical approaches to the establishment and maintenance of the American hegemonic order.
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CHAPTER 3
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHED WORLD ORDER. CHINA AS A NEW HEGEMON?
3.1. Introduction
China is the assiduous economic power of the late 20th and early 21st century. The Communist Party has unabatedly been able to maintain its political authority over the country since the establishment of the PRC by effectively utilizing the benefits of the established economic-financial order. This country transitioned through different stages within a short period of history while retaining its originality at the same time. Interestingly enough, China’s path of development is unique in that the country has been able to adapt while simultaneously preserving exclusivity. The PRC first opened itself up to international society under the mantle of an authoritarian regime following the end of the Mao era. Without concealing itself or imitating political transformation and reform this state was able to integrate into the established US hegemonic order after the end of the Second World War. The rise of China, which has lasted three decades and is exemplified in its economic growth rate of 9-10% annually, is unprecedented. Therefore, questions revolving around the country’s attempts to build an alternative to the existing world order have racked the minds of diverse scholars and theorists. Each has replied to these questions with reference to either the history of China or to the world as a whole in order to account for the possible consequences of China’s rise that has been nurtured by the current order.
The effects of China’s economic boom have seeped into other fields such as industrial and military development as well as soft power accumulation. China’s economic growth has certainly given rise to outside concerns of the country’s ascendancy. China’s steady and incremental progress on the economic front and its vocal demands to have ‘more say’ in global affairs have sparked a debate over the country’s true intentions. Scholars have come to ask whether or not this actor seeks the same successes enjoyed by previous politically and ideologically dominant powers or if it actually aims to go one step further and eventually substitute American hegemony. Chinese-led institutions and the country’s proposals to launch new geopolitical and geostrategic projects are feverously researched
54 within American academia. This kind of reaction reflects the strict involvement and concern of the hegemonic power vis-à-vis the rise of China. In much of these academic analyses, the underlying intentions of the PRC’s government are observed superficially, or only on the surface, and they often fail to address all claims expressed by the political authority of China.
Beijing repeatedly expresses its will to rise peacefully, even exhibiting a preference of the term ‘coexistence’ over ‘rise’. It tries to assuage anxieties related to its impressive economic development yet its calming statements have failed to deescalate concerns.
It is apparent that the PRC wants its ‘say’, both politically and ideologically, to match its economic might. The Chinese do not hesitate to note that both China and the world are very different places than they were in 1945 – so ‘change’ is inevitable. Indeed, the exhaustion of the old system with its institutions that play salient roles in holding up the hegemonic structure is observed and implicitly criticized by contemporary China, a reality that will be further explored in this section.
Certainly, China’s official expressions on one hand and the practical steps taken by its government on the other create a dichotomy in some cases. The US, as the actor which built an unquestionable hegemony and was accepted as the leader of the current international system in part due to its ability to unify the voices of civil societies and political authorities on a number of issues across the globe, met the challenges posed by the new century. Furthermore, such a profound interrelationship between a hegemonic power and a rising one, as seen in the US-Chinese relationship, has not been witnessed before. Still, it should be noted that China’s capacity cannot be juxtaposed with that of the US at least within the non-economic domains. Nonetheless, in the coming period, it seems that China will continue to be a strong rival of American primacy as well as a manifestation of disquiet towards the current order.
This part of the thesis will juxtapose China’s official statements and it real behaviors in order to provide a better sense of the country’s true intentions. It will examine whether this actor aims to substitute the current order by way of mobilizing its allies that are dissatisfied with the system, or alternately whether it is actually content the hegemonic order. On the other hand, this section will also examine whether or not actors in the developing world with similar backgrounds of exploitation under Western colonization are precluded the advantages of the current hegemonic order, and in turn direct their political and societal choices toward the formation of a novel alternative led by PRC. Certainly, China’s
55 potential alternative, which can promote the path of economic development without restricting itself with political chains, may acquire more esteem among such newly- developing actors.
By engaging in a comparative analysis of the different historical stages of the PRC, this chapter will indicate China’s similarities and differences with other rising powers. Accordingly, China’s rise will be expounded through an analysis of the strategies developed by party leaders, who, by rooting their arguments in the Chinese state’s Communist and Confucian past, seem to seek the formation of an alternative to the current international order. In this regard, the ‘China Model’, which will be discussed below, encompasses China’s Confucian and Communist tenets intermingled with experiences of pride and shame in the historical experiences of the nation. Henceforth, these features are assumed to constitute a Chinese path to consent-building in regions that China might seek to penetrate with its economic might. Likewise, the emphasis of contemporary Chinese politicians on China’s peaceful intentions with reference to its amicable past as the heart of the country’s current strategy, will be utilized to measure the potentiality of China’s intention and capacity to build a new ‘historic bloc’. This chapter will strive to answer the following questions:
- What is China’s place in today’s international order that is led by a hegemonic power? What changes in China’s perception of the external world have been observed since the establishment of the PRC?
- What are the reasons that ‘the end of the history’ has not taken root? How has neoliberal ideology, as the hegemonic ‘common sense’, triggered the need for other modes of development? How might the nascent alternatives promoted by other powers be conceived?
- What kind of alternative might be suggested by the PRC? What are the characteristics of the ‘China Model’?
3.2. Historical overview of the Chinese perspective on international society
China’s tremendous rise over the last three decades has captured such a degree of attention from numerous and diverse international relations scholars and government officials that it has even come to be evaluated as the most ‘unprecedented escalation of all times’ (Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy, Mitchel 2008: 119). Therefore, China’s underlying intentions behind its economic growth have been increasingly questioned: are China’s ambitions constrained within the borders of the economy or will they leap into other arenas such as
56 the military and/or political spheres. Two main issues are taken into consideration by Western scholars in their analyses of China’s rise. The first is directly related to the history of China. China’s imperialist past, known as the Middle Kingdom, ended in what is largely considered a disaster, still remembered as the ‘humiliation era’. This period is attentively researched by contemporary Sinologists in a bid to better understand the country’s current actions, and often points to the existence of a type of vengeful spirit within the Chinese political and societal consciousness. In this vein, China’s economic boom is also considered to spark feelings of revenge due to the hatred that grown toward the years of Western intervention in the late 19th century. The existence of such a historical past intimidates both neighboring countries and the West alike as many ask: what if China wants retribution?
The second point widely taken into account regarding China’s rise relates to the actions of previous rising powers. It is often expected that China will repeat some of these behaviors, especially in the eyes of realists who contend that age old approaches tend to persevere, as exemplified in the dogmatic expression ‘plus ça change plus c’est la même chose’ (‘the more things change, the more they remain the same’). In this way, many scholars seek to uncover some clues on the PRC’s future actions by researching the aggressiveness of previous ascending powers such as Germany and Japan which brought about destructive wars and the ultimate collapse of the prevailing order. Indeed, it is anticipated that this new rising power will repeat similar behaviors.
By incorporating these elements into the following investigation, we will try to underline certain prejudices and suspicions toward China’s actions that are held within the established order. In this regard, two more points should be touched upon. Firstly, it should be recognized that none of the previous rising powers that challenged the British hegemonic system in the 19th and early 20th centuries (including Germany and Japan) were as economically powerful as China when they commenced the paths of militarization and industrialization that ultimately led to calamity (Arrighi 2008). Their economic growth was transferred into military power within a very short period of time, and though they challenged British economic power, the ideological underpinnings of the global order were not yet weak enough to be replaced. Neither Nazi Germany nor the Japanese Empire were interested in building a ‘hegemony’ by proposing an alternative system founded on the acquisition of consent. Conversely, they attempted to build ‘arkhe’ through their sole reliance on military dominance backed by economic capability (Arrighi 2008; Cox 1983).
The second point to be highlighted here is related to the power of the hegemon to realize a world order by spreading ideology, controlling international institutions, and influencing 57 societies. No state in history has ever possessed such massive quantitative and qualitative capabilities as the US had after the end of the Second World War. Moreover, the US-led system was reinforced with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thereby eliminating the US’s sole rival. “Political vitality, ideological flexibility, economic dynamism, and cultural appeal became the decisive dimensions” (Brzezinski 1997:38) of American hegemony that nurtured the country’s global supremacy over the years. In the first chapter, we have already become acquainted with the path of American hegemony. So now the question arises whether China is following the same path as the US in forming a new ‘historic bloc’ that can embrace more actors and extend the scope of the structure under its lead.
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, we should continually keep in mind that both the hegemonic power and the rising one are very different from their respective predecessors. Here, being aware of the characteristics of the American-led system will allow us to conduct a comparative analysis of China’s potential alternative regulation of the world order. Certainly, in order to understand the ability of the PRC to come up with some kind of alternative global system we should briefly focus on the country’s historic path, or how country transitioned from the ‘humiliation era’ to the ‘Century of China’. To better comprehend this transformation the thesis will examine the course pursued by the PRC since its foundation. While taking into account the uniqueness of China that distinguishes it from other regional powers, this chapter will explore the actor’s potential ambitions to gain global hegemony. This research will try to illuminate how China’s current stance on the international system is influenced by its historical background, regardless of the change in its official tone. It will be argued here that historical wounds and enthusiasm still shape the viewpoints of decision-makers in the PRC, which in turn triggers them to attempt to build a new ‘historic bloc’. Nonetheless, before coming to any kind of conclusion, we need to take a look at the development of China’s perspective on international society that has lead it to coming up with an alternative.
3.2.1. China and the humiliation era – ‘sick man’s development’
China’s history is full of rises and falls. The country that long considered itself the legitimate center of the world was confronted with Western intervention in the 19th century and Japanese aggression in the early 20th century. China’s ‘Century of National Humiliation’ (bainan guochi) is still remembered as a black stain on its history, characterized by invasions, massacres, and occupations.
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This dark page of Chinese history has today found a significant place in both Chinese academic thought and the rhetoric of Chinese political figures. The Opium Wars, humiliating trade and peace agreements with imperial powers, neighbors’ territorial invasions of the Chinese homeland, and the West’s ignorance of the Chinese people’s suffering are facets of China’s history that are repeatedly driven into the minds of the Chinese people through rhetoric. But for what purpose? Throughout this analysis, it will be observed that besides pride in Chinese civilization, unforgettable wounds of humiliation are highlighted by Chinese politicians in their views toward international society. Though fanatic Maoism was substituted by the pragmatic strategy of Deng Xiaoping, these two issues – pride in Chinese civilization and the bitterness of humiliation – have shaped the Chinese stance on the global domain throughout modern history (Callahan 2012).
Not surprisingly, this resistance towards Western values, inherited from Chinese history, appears in the majority of Chinese politicians and scholars’ statements on the international community. The majority of China’s population believes that economic prosperity will assist in healing the historical traces of the ‘humiliation era’ (Callahan 2012). For instance, Chinese people were satisfied with the organization of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and evaluated it as the most effective measure to date in amending the country’s past of humiliation. Moreover, Chinese scholars argued to the society during this time that China proved itself to the world as its athletes, volunteers, audience, and local residents firmly stood for their own values. Here, Professor He stated that the Beijing Olympics proved that the “Chinese people act according to their own mode of conduct and will not succumb to any allegedly superior Western values” (Ye 2008). Such a reaction from the academic, political, and societal spectrums toward the Olympics went to show how fresh the memories of humiliation were in the minds of the people and that antagonism toward Western influence was still in full force.
These historical wounds have reinforced China’s will to maintain its own values within both the political and societal domains without succumbing to the already established structure. Such has become a type of mantra for a powerful China, which was once deemed the ‘sick man of Asia’ during the ‘humiliation era’ (Bell 2008). Indeed, it has been apparent that the retention of Chinese uniqueness became the aim of this actor throughout the 21st century, as the sufferings endured by China during the ‘humiliation era’ are consistently reiterated. Chinese politicians persuade the people to maintain the self-exclusivity of their values within the societal spectrum as the state’s increasing military expenditures within the political domain are framed as a method by which the country can avoid falling into the
59 traps it had done so in the past. In this way, it has been argued by influential Chinese figures that China has no other option but to follow a path that leads to its own strengthening. Otherwise, a new form of Chinese ‘humiliation’ may arise as an inescapable consequence of hegemonic influence.
In this excerpt taken from Wang Huaigi’s text entitled ‘National Humiliation Gymnastics’ (1929) one can easily observe China’s history-based view toward Western intervention and emulation of the hegemon:
The robust Western man says: model yourself on my body and who will dare bully or humiliate you? My pharmacist, my physician and I tirelessly worked together to achieve this body, which is the result of vigorous physical training. The scrawny Chinese man replies: ‘I am not getting sick from having a weak body; I also suffer bullying and humiliation. Even little dogs can bully and humiliate me. (Callahan 2012: 8)
Figure 1. National Humiliation Gymnastics
Certainly, this perspective illuminated in the extract coincides with Chinese critiques of the hegemonic impact within the borders of the PRC since the Maoist era. Today, the PRC fears going back to that time and depicts all attempts to develop its power as efforts to prevent itself from being ‘humiliated’ again. Consequently, this fusion of pride and shame has come to shape a renewed national identity that inherently embodies an alternative to the established hegemonic system.
Indeed, the modern strategy of the PRC does not underline humiliation as passive ‘victimization’; conversely, it depicts China’s troubled past as a driver of development. This approach was stressed in the ‘Book of Rites’, an ancient Chinese text. It is argued here
60 that ‘a thing’s humiliation can stimulate it; a country’s humiliation can rejuvenate it’ (Callahan 2012: 16). Relatedly, Mao Zedong emphasized the aim of the state in healing the scars left by the ‘humiliation era’ in these words: “We will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up” (Mao 1977: 17). The constant reiteration of this black page of Chinese history is still thought by China’s elite to strengthen the unity of the people within the borders of the state and that it is in turn inevitably necessary in the construction of a strong international image for China.
China’s intermingled utilization of pride and shame has gone through different stages and has been evaluated in different ways. Therefore, in what comes to follow, different phases of China’s ascendency and evaluations of its international stance since its establishment will be emphasized. These periods will trace Mao’s ‘Three Worlds’ Theory, Deng’s pragmatic ‘Reform and Opening’ strategy, and the later-developed ‘China Model’ which embraces the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the concepts of ‘Harmonious Society’ and the ‘China Dream’, all embedded within the era of ‘peaceful rise’. Consequently, the intermingling of Communist and Confucian views that came to be the basis of China’s view of the global spectrum will be analyzed.
3.2.2. Mao’s ‘intermediary zone’
Mao Zedong – the hero of modern China and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – developed a new form of politics that he foresaw being implemented across the globe in the postwar era. During this time the PRC was isolated from the international community as a consequence of its intervention into the Korean War. Eventually, by maintaining affairs within a tight circle of countries under the influence of the Soviet Bloc, Mao’s China upheld its foreign policy. This kind of confinement gradually morphed into the state policy propagated by Mao and the Communist Party. By referring to the colonial past of the Western world, Mao and his peers warned the Chinese nation of the dangers of external actors’ impact within the country’s borders. They depicted this impact as an instrument intended to degrade ancient Chinese culture and as a means of manipulating the nation in order to rupture society from its history. By spreading socialist notions among peasants and urbanites alike, the Communist Party attempted to eradicate the bourgeois traces of the Chinese Empire; and by describing the West as a monster seeking to ‘extinguish the Red shine dawning from Asia’, the CCP attempted to unify people from different classes under hegemonic cooperation (Cheek 2007).
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Mao indicated his ideas on where he thought China should stand within the international order over the next century in his various writings and statements. Here, an excerpt taken from his writing entitled ‘Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions’ (1956) reveals some significant points of his strategy, particularly what he saw as the target of Chinese foreign policy in the future:
Given fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake the United States. This is an obligation. [...] If after working at it for fifty or sixty years [and] you are still unable to overtake the United States, what a sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don’t, the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a contribution to humanity. (Callahan 2012: 237) Throughout his time in power, Mao stressed the importance of quantitative aspects of power which should help the PRC to surpass all of its rivals over the next few decades. This was depicted not only as a national goal, but also as a responsibility bestowed on China by the world:
The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are favored with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to catch up with the United States. What are your 600 million people doing? Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why can’t you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons of steel when they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 million tons? (Callahan, 2012: 237) In this sense, four main approaches were driven by Chinese policymakers during the Mao era according to changes in international society. Reformulations of the state’s view were realized in various ways, one of which was exemplified in Mao’s main ‘Three Worlds’ theory, a mainstay of China’s state policy even today. Indeed, this theory is considered within this research as the initiator of China’s potential establishment of a ‘historic bloc’. The ‘Three Worlds’ theory was built upon four primary aspects or sub-concepts:
1. ‘Two worlds, four blocs’ – This idea was voiced in speeches of the supreme leader before the CCP came into power in China. According to this viewpoint, the first two blocs consisted respectively of German-Italian and Anglo-French imperialists in Europe which confronted each other in order to gain preeminence over access to the natural resources of the colonized world. Later on, Mao declared Central and South American countries headed by the American leader of the capitalist first world as the third bloc. The fourth bloc was thought to be the Japanese Empire, which dominated in the East. In his interview with Xinhua Daily in 1939, Mao lauded the leader of the second world (the Soviet Union) by
62 saying: ‘outside the capitalist world, there is a world of light, the socialist Soviet Union’ (Jiang 2013: 43).
2. ‘One intermediary zone’ – This concept came to the stage in the late 1940s or early 1950s and emphasized the vast zone, which had been intruded by a number of capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This zone separated the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao clarified that this zone supported the ultimate dominance of the US, as without it the US wouldn’t be able to attack and defeat the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the US would use various pretexts in order to win supremacy over the ‘intermediary zone’ that stretched from Great Britain to Japan:
The objective of the U.S. is to occupy the countries in this vast intermediary zone, bully them, control their economies, establish military bases on their territory, and see that they are increasingly weakened — with Japan and Germany included among them. (Jiang 2013: 49) This concept also put forward conclusions that made up the hallmark of Mao’s viewpoint toward the international society and formalized Mao’s ‘Three Worlds’ theory. Here, the headquarters of the political forces in the world were said to be located in the US and the Soviet Union based on comparisons of the national strength of these actors and their ability to shape global society. Moreover, stressing the ‘intermediary zone’, Mao stated that “the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, many capitalist countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, and the colonial and semi-colonial countries” systematized the current international order (Jiang 2013, 43). Likewise, he depicted the US as the reason for all confrontations within capitalist and non-capitalist states. He described the US as “the number one enemy of the world’s peace and democratic forces” (Jiang 2013: 37). The last salient point of Mao’s theory stressed the importance of national independence, sovereignty, and the struggle against imperialism. The ‘one intermediary zone’ theory constituted the main core of the later-developed ‘Three Worlds’ theory.
3. ‘Leaning to one side’ between two blocs – In his article entitled ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, Mao depicted two sides of the world, characterized as imperialist and socialist. Here, Mao argued that each state should be encouraged to choose between the two blocs. He emphasized that “all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neither sitting on the fence nor the third road is possible” (Jiang 2013: 41). Moreover, he pointed out that China was leaning to one side, or that it stood “together with the Soviet Union, which is equal” (Mao 1978: 176).
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4. ‘Two intermediary zones’ – This concept appeared in the late 1960s when relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union lost their closeness. At this time, the theory of ‘two intermediary zones’ gained preeminence in Chinese foreign policy-making. There were several features of this period in time which have been regarded as crucial in bringing into existence the ‘Three Worlds’ theory:
- Mao declared the US and the Soviet Union as members of the First World that were competing for world dominance.
- The US was once again depicted as the number one enemy and the main opponent of China’s national interests.
- China and the Soviet Union were declared members of different worlds and possessors of different international statutes in the global arena.
- Countries and nations located within the ‘intermediary zone’ came to be seen by Mao as major forces that opposed the supremacy of either superpower.
- ‘Intermediary zones’ came to be considered the centers of the struggle to transcend social systems and ideological supremacy (Jiang, 2013).
Consequently, the final form of Mao’s ‘Three Worlds’ theory shaped international relations studies by purporting the existence of three distinct politico-economic domains. The US and Soviet superpowers constituted the core of the First World, despite their clashing viewpoints of the international political system and attempts to dictate and steer the world order. According to Mao’s thesis, these two superpowers were on the same ship, whose direction was vague (Jiang 2013). In order to decide the course of the ship, the support of the other worlds was required. By referring to the perspectives of the ‘intermediary zones’, Mao saw middle powers such as Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada as constitutive of the Second World. Gaining legitimacy within the Second World served the ability of the superpowers to increase their gains relatively to one another. The last circle of Mao’s design incorporated the Asian countries, except Japan, and all of Africa and Latin America under the title of ‘Third World’. Therefore, Mao’s ‘Three World Theory’ encompassed the following components:
1. Superpowers – the First World.
2. Allies of superpowers – the Second World.
3. Nations of the non-aligned movement – the Third World.
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Certainly, these analyses are very important even today, especially when possible hegemonic transition seems to be on the agenda. In upcoming discussions, reference to Mao’s reading of the world order, and especially to the concept of ‘intermediary zones’, where China is currently very active, will be taken into account. Explicitly stated, these zones can be considered as the sophisticated arena in which a new ‘historical bloc’ might be built.
Mao’s analysis touched upon several points according to Jiang An’s narrative. Jiang stated that the alternative international society emphasized by Mao’s theories integrated Third World countries and universal respect for sovereignty, human rights, justice, freedom, and security. On the other side of the coin, the moral principle of the theory remains: the privilege of the nation-state, with regard to national independence, equality, self- determination, and liberation, is still infallible.
The second issue stressed by Jiang (2013) is related to Mao’s perception of leadership, where the importance of the opposition to hegemony is emphasized and hegemonic rule is equated with ‘arkhe’ (or forceful domination). Jiang identified the ‘Three Worlds’ theory as ‘anti-hegemonic’ from both the global perspective and from the stance of developing countries. The contest to win spheres of influence, which are equated with monopoly, expansion, and colonization, is the main trait of ‘hegemony’ in Jiang’s narrative. Here, it has been argued that by stressing China’s reluctance to seek such hegemony in the future, Mao tried to convince actors in the developing world of China’s ‘innocent’ intentions. Such ‘innocence’ was based on three assumptions:
1. China’s ethical standards.
2. The similar historical experiences of China and the Third World.
3. The calamity brought to the international community by hegemony (Zhao 2010).
In Mao’s strategy against hegemony, ‘befriending distant enemies while attacking the enemy near home’ was demonstrated as a ‘diplomacy of three dimensions’ (Jiang 2013: 39). The cornerstone of this policy was the strengthening of China’s relations with countries of the Third World. This approach also sought to facilitate the formation basic links and ease the tensions between China and the Western European countries of the Second World. Moreover, the establishment of better relations with one of the two superpowers belonging to the First World, particularly the United States, was considered another pillar of this multi-dimensional strategy (Jiang 2013). Accordingly, the passage of
65 time has revealed that the ‘Three Worlds’ theory has shaped China’s view of the international arena up until today (Jiang 2013).
Mao expressed that China was a Third World country, and should therefore try to stave off the influence of other countries, especially superpowers, in order to maintain its self- exclusive identity.
Consequently, the first three decades following the establishment of the PRC were ideologically predetermined in terms of the country’s international stance. Hence, Mao’s China devoted a large part of its resources to supporting revolutionary movements in developing states. Without solving domestic challenges, Mao’s China tried to leap into other regions and disseminate what it saw as its own ideological supremacy. Statistically, in 1973 China’s foreign aid to developing states comprised 6.9% of the state budget. Certainly, this approach adopted by the Chinese government was argued in terms of its negatives and its positives. Some emphasized its negative effect on the living standards of the Chinese people, as China dispersed its financial means to other states while ignoring internal problems (Cheek 2007). Indeed, Mao’s China overtly pushed its ideological proposals of ‘change’ on the international order due to the shortcomings of the structure. Nonetheless, some point out the positive aspects of China’s provision of assistance to Third World countries:
Generous aid helped a poor China gain political sympathy and support in the developing world, and with that support, China was able to regain its seat in the United Nations and the permanent seat in the UN Security Council. (Zhimin 2012: 87) Nevertheless, time showed that China’s domestic problems could not be resolved with Mao’s extroverted ideological strategy. Moreover, the ‘communism everywhere’ policy itself failed due to Mao’s extremely unrealistic expectations and targets. Therefore, the death of modern China’s founder led to the rise of a new, more pragmatic politician – Deng Xiaoping. Deng turned the wheel in a different direction, opening the doors of the Chinese state to the rules and regulations of the established hegemonic order.
3.3. The rise of China – Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic strategy
Deng Xiaoping assumed the political office previously occupied by Mao Zedong and ‘normalized’ its functions, trying to eradicate the ‘godlike’ image of the Chairman through revisions in internal regulations. Indeed, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ strategies of Mao, which had aimed to rapidly influence the most profound actors of international society, brought the state to the edge of disaster. While Deng 66 supported these strategies’ underlying principles, he emphasized a more reasonable, plausible, and less damaging path to gradual development.
Considering the actions of his predecessor, Deng Xiaoping inherited a China with deep- seated problems such as widening regional disparity, a tattered social and welfare system, massive unemployment, structural poverty, and increasing environmental concerns (Cheek 2007). Deng emphasized the need to create a favorable image of China on the international stage in order to overcome the internal challenges originating from the Mao era and to obtain economic development at home. Accordingly, the new government launched the ‘Reform and Opening’ policy, which aimed to promote a more pragmatic approach to the outside world. This strategy eliminated China’s foreign aid programs in the Third World in terms of their financial, material, and human capabilities, with pivoting all the means for solving domestic problems. Thus, in Deng’s era PRC did not jail itself within the ideological prison and launched affairs not only with the members of the Third World and started to utilize the established system for overcoming its obstacles (Peerenboom 2007).
Nevertheless, Deng’s strategy of ‘keeping a low head and doing something’ (tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei) (Fairbank 1987) manifested itself more so internationally than domestically. Here, without challenging the established structure of the international society, the PRC became increasingly drawn to maintaining one-party leadership. China’s path to economic success was launched in this period, as ideological and financial encouragement of the Third World was maintained. Keeping its head low along the way, Deng’s China mostly busied itself with finding solutions to internal problems and accelerating attempts to advance the economy. On the other hand, the isolation of China that had endured for two decades faded as the country was rapidly integrated into international society as a result of its increasing tendency to take on international responsibilities in front of an audience of international institutions and organizations. Certainly, China’s acceptance of such responsibilities helped to amend the earlier views of a ‘monstrous’ China in the eyes of participants in the hegemonic order. Subsequently, Deng’s China decided to utilize the benefits of the hegemonic order by contributing and sharing responsibilities.
Indeed, the notion of international responsibility stems from the fact that states live in an international society where their sovereign status is recognized by other members of the international society and their behaviors are bounded by the rules established by the states themselves. (Cane 2002: 31) Generally, responsibilities taken by states fall into two categories: rear-facing responsibilities like accountability, answerability, and liability, and forward-facing 67 responsibilities like the assumption of obligations, duties, and tasks which are rooted in legal, political, and moral norms. During the Mao era the PRC refused to recognize the hegemonic order and thereby assumed no responsibility.
Conversely, during Deng’s term the PRC accelerated its incorporation into the existing system by establishing relations with the major economic powers, neighboring countries, TNCs, and the West in particular. In this way China shed its isolationist roots. China’s reframing of its strategy around the established international economic and political order was also reflected in China’s approach toward the Third World states. Sympathetic to developing countries and aiming to keep close diplomatic relations with them, Deng’s China nonetheless played the long game, building so-called ‘lines of flight’ from the established order.
As other developing states had also done, China opened its gates to transnational capital and tried attract to investment by reformulating the strict regulatory and legislative legacies of the Mao era. Indeed, multinational companies saw China’s central geographic location and large population as advantageous. In addition to its cheap labor force, China’s virgin lands and raw materials whet the appetites of the transnational capitalist class. Not surprisingly, initial support for Deng’s ‘Reform and Opening’ policy came in the form of capital being sent to China by Chinese expatriates (Cheek 2007; Arrighi 2008). Consequently, China’s large, internationally integrated market became a major target for significant transnational companies. The Deng government’s political support for such inflows resulted in the softening of the ideological chains which had once restricted interested capitalist groups’ access to Chinese markets for over three decades. Such an opening facilitated China’s economic development during this period.
Henceforth, the process of allowing TNCs to access Chinese markets was implemented alongside strict Communist rhetoric, thus the founding principles of the CCP were adamantly voiced. This period has been depicted as another phase in the development of China’s unique form of Communism, as the country leapt forward economically without completely transitioning into a capitalist nation. Deng’s respect for Mao and his loyalty to the basic Maoist ideological principles at the domestic level could be observed in his actions after the mid-1980s in particular. Trying to evade the critiques of his strategy that were voiced by radical leftists within the PRC, Deng highlighted the ideological side of his politics by emphasizing his loyalty to Communism. Indeed, the ‘Opening and Reform’ policy was presented as a gradual and systematic way to ultimately attain Maoist targets through the smooth application of the most plausible and logical behaviors. Therefore, 68
Deng stressed the importance of his new strategy in triggering China’s economic development, the amelioration of its future international standing and welfare, and in maintaining its political stability under the continuing leadership of the CCP.
During Deng’s term in power, the Communist Party consistently reiterated the mantras of Marxism, which were innately accompanied by rigid class antagonism, hatred of the rich, and demonization of private property. Deng pointed out that the CCP was not shedding its commitment to Marxism in the long-term, but indeed transition through the capitalist stage was portrayed as an important step through which poor countries should certainly maneuver. Deng stressed the salience of implementing brutal capitalism and depicted richness as a glorious state that could be attained through this system. Likewise, this period saw China become more aware of the global system, viewed through the lens of Deng’s (1978) prominent motto: ‘it doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice’ (Cheek 2007).
The application of this kind of pattern ushered in a new phase in Chinese history, which will be discussed in the next chapter in greater detail. In brief, the ‘application of an appropriate economic policy at the right time without hesitation’ became the main motto of China’s further development vis-à-vis international society. Deng’s approach was presented to the domestic audience as a way to build “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (12th Central Committee, 1982).
This new China did not shy away from any actions that countervailed its ideological stance so long as it could benefit the country’s economy.
In the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978, Deng’s strategy was formalized, with the transformation of China’s system and methods of economic management occupying the top of the agenda. Accordingly, several decisions which encompassed the extension of economic cooperation and diplomatic affairs with other actors in international society were taken into consideration. Furthermore, Maoist era educational, scientific, and technological programs began to be redrawn, as their earlier forms shunned the adoption of the world’s advanced technologies and equipment based on ideological and political grounds (Naughton 2009). Therefore, Deng’s project aimed to realize a transformation in China’s economic regulations in order to allow China to take the steps to enter an era of modernization by adjusting itself gradually to the demands of international society.
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This project was to be efficiently realized through the implementation of the ‘four modernization theory’, which was first initiated by Zhou Enlai at the Fourth National People’s Congress in 1985 and sought to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense, science, and technology. Here, three basic conclusions can be drawn from the abovementioned changes to the fundamental economic-political assumptions of the PRC:
1. The Open Door Policy opened the Chinese economy to foreign investors.
2. China began to witness an ideological struggle between communism and pragmatism.
3. China set out to build ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (12th Central Committee, 1982 (Hsu 1990: 41-44))
Deng’s strategy has come to be evaluated as the ‘Second Revolution’ in Chinese history. Indeed, opening doors to the international arena and finding the common points of Communist ideology and pragmatic economic policy brought about the birth of a new perspective that in turn reinforced Deng’s worldview. Victor Lippit described the situation in this way in his 1993 article entitled ‘Rethinking Marxism’:
China can be thought of as a society potentially in transition to socialism. The movement away from central planning is a movement away from statism and bureaucracy, not a movement away from socialism. The dramatic gains in living standards, growing rural-urban equality, and the rapid decrease in poverty suggest that substantial gains in the reform era are accruing to the working population, both rural and urban. It is also true that some capitalist entrepreneurs have become quite prosperous, as have some bureaucrats through various forms of corruption. Nevertheless, it appears that the lion’s share of the rising surplus has been garnered by people who work for a living. This suggests that the reform era is at least consistent with an ongoing transition to socialism. (p.32) Victor Lippit also acknowledged the salience of China’s reforms and the gradual implementation of steps advised by Deng (Shawki, 1997). The application of Deng’s vision allowed China to become a more ‘modern and normal’ state while also facilitating its acceptance by international society. Indeed, controversy also arose as transnational capital entered the borders of the PRC. While the ‘Open Door’ policy did awaken China’s painful historical memories of the 19th and early 20th centuries, during which time the country suffered from the exploitative politics of colonial powers, in the minds of some, it was presented as a novel and necessary step on the path of Chinese development that facilitated the country’s collection of common benefits and integration into the international community.
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Supporting this approach, Deng underlined the reasons why ‘open door’ politics needed to be implemented in all fields by illuminating the weaknesses brought about by ‘isolationist’ strategies. Thus, Deng justified China’s official revisions, and the rapid implementation thereof, and the country’s interaction with the West on academic and empirical domains as necessary. Indeed, the need to relinquish China’s earlier ‘isolationist’ strategy and ‘open up’ to the Western world without fearing the loss of ‘self-exclusiveness’ were emphasized in his words:
Realizing the four modernizations is a many-sided complex and difficult undertaking. The task of the ideological and theoretical workers cannot be confined to the discussion of the basic principles. We are confronted with many questions of economic theory, including both basic theory and theory applied to particular spheres such as industry, agriculture, commerce, and management. Lenin called for more talk about economics and less about politics. In my opinion, his words are still applicable with regard to the proportion of effort that should be devoted to theoretical work in these two spheres. I am not saying of course that there are no more questions to be studied in the political field. For many years we have neglected the study of political science, law, sociology and world politics, and now we must hurry to make up our deficiencies in these subjects. Most of our ideological and theoretical workers should dig into one or more specialized subjects. All those who can do so should learn foreign languages, so as to be able to read important foreign works on the social sciences without difficulty. We have admitted that we lag behind many countries in our study of the natural sciences. Now we should admit that we also lag behind in our study of the social sciences, insofar as they are comparable in China and abroad. Our level is very low and for years we haven’t even had adequate statistical data in the social sciences, a lack that is naturally a great obstacle to any serious study. (Deng 1979: 188) Through the ‘four modernizations’ Deng aimed to catch up to the developed world as soon as possible, a strategy that caused some to believe that a ‘fifth modernization’ within the political sphere would be enacted as the Chinese answer to democratization.
From the perspective of hegemony theory, Deng’s pragmatic policy of ‘Reform and Opening’, though it emphasized the importance of gradual development in attaining the ultimate goal of Communism, was articulated as a victory of American diplomacy. This policy was seen as a method by which all challenges to the hegemonic order originating in the PRC were vanquished, as seen in China’s entrance into the international community (Legro 2007). In Gramscian terms, the ‘Reform and Opening’ policy under Deng can be considered the first phase of ‘transformismo’, in which the possible challenging powers that sought to escape the prevailing order eventually surrendered before the robust tenacity of hegemonic influence. China’s entrance into the world order, which was shaped by American hegemonic influence, quickly reflected itself in the economic domain of the PRC. Therefore, China became a rapidly advancing economic power within the established
71 international sphere as it tried to keep pace with the responsibilities and obligations imposed upon it by international institutions and organizations. China’s ‘rise’ endured for over three decades, and at accelerated speeds, as witnessed in the country’s unprecedented annual economic growth rates of 9-10%. Deng’s China managed to adapt itself to the rules of the system, and by ‘keeping its head low’ it benefited greatly from the transnational capitalist system while still preserving its political immunity.
The anticipation of the ‘fifth modernization’ in terms of democratization can be assumed to be the last circle of ‘transformismo’, yet the application of it as continuation for Zhou Enlai’s ‘four modernizations’ theory ultimately failed in practice. Economic reforms did not spill over into the political spectrum. Here, Deng, by utilizing coercive and authoritarian forces, was able to maintain the position of the CCP and the endurance of its basic principles. The first outburst of demands for democracy in China that occurred in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were quickly squelched by military forces without hesitation. Neoliberal democratic actors throughout the global system have often seen these events in Tiananmen Square as a betrayal, as their hopes of ultimate democratization in China were dashed. Though democratization has been regarded as the final stage of China’s complete integration with the international community, China’s refusal to realize it has failed to have any deep effect on the country’s established external relations or to hinder its continued economic and financial integration.
The Chinese state’s forceful termination of democratic protests at Tiananmen Square dashed the hopes of democratic powers both in and outside of China. The crackdown signaled to the international community that China had not yet been fully ‘transformed’. From that point on, it became apparent that Chinese economic openness had not translated into a political opening, and furthermore, that there was no such will to go down this path. Demands coming from within and without the country culminated in political turbulence with people gathering in Tiananmen Square to request democratic rights alongside economic liberalization. Differently from the Soviet Union, such a social movement did not lead to the collapse of the Communist Party of China. Instead, China declared with its actions and words that it would not be ‘assimilated’ into the prevailing order and turn into a democratic state. In part, it justified its seemingly contradictory economic and political approaches by stating that its economic policies aimed to establish a ‘socialist market with Chinese characteristics’ and nothing more.
Certainly, the upcoming decades revealed more details of the alternative path that came to be proposed by the PRC, but at that time the international society could only observe that 72 this actor was in the process of sorting out its decision-making procedures while attentively attempting to balance its self-interests on the one hand and its international responsibilities on the other. After this period of history every actor in the world system began to see that China was not following the Japanese or South Korean paths of development, even though the Chinese state economy gradually adopted a more neoliberal stance which did in fact affect the political sphere. In this sense, new assumptions emerged as new research investigated the possible repercussions of China’s path and the aims of its approach.
Within this context it became undoubtedly accepted that the PRC was rising under the protection and support of the hegemonic order, whose rules and regulations could not be neglected. Here, China even came to be described as a ‘free rider’ (Obama 2014) who utilized the benefits of the international order while ‘cherry-picking’ its responsibilities under the umbrella of global society. The PRC refuted these condemnations and emphasized its willingness to thoroughly integrate into the system, however, it also urged adherence to the principle of non-interference in a state’s internal affairs in order to ensure that its political structure remained intact. In this way, China has been able to protect its ‘private zone’ while simultaneously integrating into international society. Throughout this period, the relations between the members of the developed world and the PRC advanced as a result of the latter’s strong economic growth and integration into the world order, thus it became impossible for the latter to even think of pursuing a punitive policy that would aim to ‘isolate’ China.
China’s growth has brought new discussions to the agenda, with its position in the established structure perhaps being the most prominent. Though Mao perceived the PRC as part of the Third World, the economic boom realized in the country during the Deng era made it more difficult to determine China’s place in the established structure. Economic prosperity, which is considered to be a source of power and determinant of a state’s position in the international domain, has given China four new sets of responsibilities:
1. Internal responsibilities as a large developing state.
2. Legal responsibilities as a national sovereign state.
3. Additional responsibilities as a great power.
4. Unique responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Zhimin 2012).
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Certainly, these responsibilities been observed with respect to China’s changing role in the world arena subsequent to its economic boom. Indeed, during the era of Mao the PRC was considered to be located among developing states within the Third World, while other countries in the system were sorted out according to their economic and military power and the living standards of their people. Nevertheless, after China began to undergo such unprecedented economic growth as a consequence of Deng’s reforms, locating China’s position in the international domain became a bit more convoluted. To better illustrate where the country stood within the order, several approaches were adopted:
- China as a minor power – China is still a developing socialist state and a member, if not the leader, of the Third World. Chinese state policy exhibits a Marxist, socialist, isolationist, hyper-nationalist orientation. The ‘reform and opening’ policy eradicated Chinese culture and compromised its autonomy after allowing Western influence to breach its borders (Shambaugh 2011).
- China as a regional power in Asia – In the 1980s, China formulated the ‘periphery policy’ or the ‘good neighbor policy’ in order to build better relationships with its neighbors and assume a leadership role in its own ‘backyard’. It established bilateral and multilateral relations with neighboring states. This view of Chinese power will be investigated in greater detail in the third chapter, during which the possibility of a Chinese-led ‘historic bloc’ will be analyzed (Shambaugh 2011).
- China as a major power – China seeks to remove the dark stains of the humiliation era by reestablishing its hegemonic past. The PRC is therefore proposing and engaging in projects that will or are suggesting alternatives to the American-led world order (Shambaugh 2011).
The sole rival of the neoliberal ideology which constituted the foundation of American hegemony was expunged with the end of the Cold War, thereby brining new questions to the agenda. In this context, China’s ascendency and the first indications of its evasion of the rules of the neoliberal democratic ideology coincided with this period in which the new lands recently emancipated from the coercive yoke of the Soviets became the newest site for the spread of the US’s economic, political, and ideological hegemony by way of the advancement of the transnational capitalist class. It should be noted that all possible challenges originating from within the established order, with respect to the economic booms of the US’s allies in Europe and Asia, became apparent before the Soviet ideological enemy was defeated. In this way, the post-Cold War order came to be described as ‘the end of history’, as no challenges were seen on the horizon directly following the collapse of the
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Soviet Union. Nonetheless, such an optimistic reading of the future came into question as China’s rise and its ability to build a ‘historic bloc’ in opposition to the hegemonic system began to be better understood and investigated.
Though China’s official statements argue that the Chinese government has sought to stubbornly ‘keep its head low’ and follow Deng’s pragmatic policies and establish close relations with other actors, the real and observable steps of the country have, more often than not, been evaluated differently. Here, the behaviors of China’s Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao governments stand out as uniquely important due to their organized transitions which were not characteristic of authoritarian regimes. Hence, it has been argued that the behaviors of these governments intended to ‘hide the brightness’ of China’s economic boom, just as Deng had advised. Though no democratic elections were held under the Jiang and Hu governments, peaceful transitions of government occurred (the lack of which can be seen as a reason for the Tiananmen Square protests) and the PRC continued to adopt various viewpoints in order to evade domestic crisis, or ‘luan’ in Chinese. Moreover, these governments attempted to build a strategy that would help China to prove to the international community that it had peaceful intentions regardless of its economic ascendency. Consequently, China’s doctrine of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful coexistence’ took hold just as it began to transform into a great power as a result of its enduring economic development.
3.4. ‘Peaceful Rise’ doctrine and Harmonious World
China’s government and academics launched the ‘peaceful rise’ doctrine as both a motto and target, seeking to convince other actors within the international community of China’s good intentions.
According to Buzan, a peaceful rise is realized by a growing power which is able to make both absolute and relative gains in order to revise physical and ideological positions, in relation to the other powers in the international system without precipitating major hostilities with its neighbors and major powers (2010). Likewise, Sun Zi’s statement that “every battle won or lost before is ever fought” can be seen as the best description of the ‘peaceful rise’ of the US after the Second World War, a process which the PRC may wish to repeat in the new era. Here, common traits of peaceful risers in the past have been the aptitude to ascend without challenging the current system, the optimization of gains within the order, and the peaceful sale of one’s own model with marketable ‘success stories’.
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China’s economic rise has been evaluated as the most significant dynamic of the 21st century and it has been seen as the harbinger of undeniable global transformation. Gerald Segal (1999) said of China’s ascendency that it is ‘no more avoidable or engageable, it is a fact of life. No matter what happens in the end, the rise is enough to remake the physics of our world (p. 28).’ Indeed, China’s emergence as a ‘great power’ will have an inevitable effect on the chemistry of the international order. This is significant, especially considering that the promotion of a new actor to a crucial player in the established order has historically been a painful process.
Accordingly, Barry Buzan emphasized two points that should be focused on when studying the rise of a new power: the strategy pursued by the rising power as an indicator of its peaceful intentions, and the policies realized by others that encourage the former. For Buzan, on the one hand, the rising power should adhere to the rules and structures of international society, and on the other the hand, the rest of the actors should acknowledge the changes to the overall allocation of power by adjusting themselves to the new arrangements of might and status (2010).
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the PRC has enhanced its works aimed at proving its peaceful aims. In 2003, the Chinese government commenced ‘heping juengi’ (the ‘peaceful rise’ doctrine). The main point underlined by Hu Jintao within this doctrine was the importance of avoiding aggressive stances and the reiteration of mistakes of previous rising powers (Cheek 2007). Moreover, instrumentalized to placate fears revolving around China’s perceived challenge of the established order, the term ‘harmonious society’ – where the depiction of economic growth was linked to the advancement of all without upsetting any – began to be increasingly voiced at the domestic and international level.
Moreover, in order to avoid the intimidation tactics of the international community the ‘peaceful rise’ doctrine was marketed as a pattern to be emulated by others. Under this doctrine, the approach of Hu Jintao’s China toward international domination and hegemony was revealed. It equated hegemony with ‘arkhe’ and emphasized that China would never follow the path of previous hegemons (Pei 2006).
Certainly, the ‘heiping juengi’ strategy took on the burden of presenting China’s official stance to the international community, while two sub-doctrines enriched this context by explicating certain ‘official dos and don’ts’ of the new rising power. Here, the ‘four no’s’ and ‘four yes’s’ doctrines can be considered as auxiliary tools of the ‘heiping juengi’ strategy which were underlined by Hu Jintao. Indeed, with these two sub-doctrines China
76 tried to break all beliefs which were associated with previous rising powers. Therefore, the first sub-strategy emphasized the ability of a rising power to say ‘no’ to certain temptations regardless of the state’s potential or power to actuate them. The ‘four no’s’ doctrine encompassed the following points:
- No to hegemonism - No to alliances
- No to arms races - No to power politics
On the other hand, the ‘four yes’s’ strategy highlighted causes that should be actively pursued:
- Yes to confidence building - Yes to reducing difficulties
- Yes to developing cooperation -Yes to avoiding confrontation
These features of the ‘heiping juengi’ strategy (Pei 2006) were intended to soothe the concerns and anxieties of the international community which feared the transition of Chinese economic power into military and ideological power and the potential resultant destruction of the established world order. Though China continued to pursue the ‘hide the bright’ policy in this new era, Hu Jintao was also eager to convince others, by efficiently implementing ‘heiping juengi’, that China’s intentions differed from those of previous rising powers. His stress on China’s economic growth alone and the country’s pure hearted desire to share its experience with others has been regarded as an attempt to paint a portrait of a China that does not seek world domination or hegemony.
On the other side of coin, utilizing the confidence that China had acquired as the result of its economic development, Chinese officials formulated new doctrines which were concerned themselves not only with internal issues but also with suggesting solutions to global problems. Such a reality has led many to conclude that the PRC’s ‘rising head’ will not be constrained to the economic domain alone. The following passages will touch upon ideas born in contemporary China that are assumed to illustrate ways in which China can access various societies in order to ‘conquer the fortresses from within’ (and therewith the societal wings of consent required for the building of a ‘historic bloc’) as the current hegemon did previously.
Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie) doctrine was revealed in September 2005 at the UN headquarters in New York. It prescribed the transition of the PRC’s domestic policy of ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) to the international domain. According to Hu Jintao, the experience of building a ‘harmonious society’ in the PRC through the exercise of state 77 power triggered ‘just’ wealth allocation and reduced social stratification. Thus Hu contended that this domestic approach could be applied at the international level, in what he deemed the ‘harmonious world’ doctrine (Zheng & Tok 2007). The fundamental aim of the ‘harmonious world’ strategy can be seen the promotion of ‘lasting peace and common prosperity’. Such can be achieved, Hu argued, by respecting the diversities of the multitude of civilizations within the global community and abolishing all barriers to their coexistence. Therefore, Callahan (2010) emphasized these points of Hu’s strategy as ‘laudable goals’ which could not be resisted by any actor in the international domain.
After 2005, it has been argued, that the weakening of the US’s hegemonic status, as a result of its ‘war on terrorism’ policy and its implementation of imperialist waves of ‘neo- colonization’, has led this actor to rely more heavily on coercion in order to conceal its loss of legitimacy. It should be remembered here that declines in the power of a hegemon may trigger the erection of new ‘historic blocs’ within the established system. Indeed, in such a context, any suggestion coming from China, as an increasingly significant rising power, should be taken into seriously. In this sense, it can be argued that China’s attempt to transplant its ‘harmonious society’ doctrine from the societal to the international level as an alternative path of development might be considered China’s first step in surrendering Deng’s principles (1978) of ‘keeping a low head’ and ‘hiding one’s capacity while biding one’s time’.
Hu’s emphasis on the international community’s need to respect a country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, selected path of development, and its freedom to choose its own socio- political system can be regarded as an attempt to widen the scope of the current international system. Thus, the ‘harmonious world’ doctrine can be read as China’s comment on the insufficiency of the hegemonic power in highlighting the importance of ‘universal rules’.
Historically, American hegemony capitalized on the opportunities provided to it by a British hegemonic system that concealed its colonial intentions under the cover of a ‘civilizing mission’. The American hegemonic structure managed to marry production and the financial and state apparatuses of various actors with the transnational bloc that had arisen under the British system. Thus, the US built upon the system it inherited while recognizing the salience of self-determination and the neoliberal democratic principles in its application of universal regulation. After 9/11 the opportunities and advantages enjoyed by American hegemony transformed into the constraints of its influence. Excluding those who did not meet the requirements of the neoliberal ideology, this hegemonic power blamed and 78 punished those who could not successfully emulate the established pattern. Consequently, areas beyond the reach of the direct or indirect influence of the hegemonic power emerged, and it is these lands that should be considered most prone to future integration into a ‘historic bloc’ within the established system. Ensnared by the politico-ideological chains of its own making, the US may have instigated the possible transformation of the 21st century into the ‘era of China’, as the latter continues to suggest alternatives to or revisions of the existing order while simultaneously garnering the support of other ‘unsatisfied’ groups. Just as the US successfully filled the cracks of the hegemony before it, so too might China. Such a potential can be discerned in the official strategies of the PRC which highlight the insufficiencies of the current hegemonic order and offer to repair them. Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ (2005) policy, underlying the universality of China’s historical and contemporary developmental trajectory, can be considered one such strategy.
It is apparent that China has become more active in foreign affairs since 2005. This year Hu Jintao revealed the ‘harmonious world’ doctrine, which illustrated China’s vision for the 21st century. Thus, the scope of China’s goals can be seen as having undergone a transition from ‘saving China’ to ‘saving the world’ (Callahan 2009: 2). Such a transition should also be contextualized within the broader historical and theoretical scope that has often been described as the post-Western world order.
The disclosure of the ‘harmonious world’ strategy coincided with an important date according to the ancient Chinese calendar. Callahan emphasized that in Chinese culture, sixty year-periods constitute what are considered natural cycles, signifying both the end of one era and the birth of another. Callahan noted that Hu’s declaration of the concept of the international ‘harmonious society’ coincided with the 60th anniversary of the United Nations. In the same year, the white paper entitled ‘China’s Road to Peaceful Development’ was published, outlining new approaches to be led by China at home and abroad. Here, signs of China’s ‘rising head’, which encompassed visions for China on the one hand and international society on the other, can be traced in the following sentences:
Looking back upon history, basing itself on the present reality and looking forward to the future, China will unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development, making great efforts to achieve a peaceful, open, cooperative and harmonious development. (China Daily 2005) In this sense, China’s proposal to build an international ‘harmonious society’, which accounted for recent developments in the new era. President Hu revealed the general framework of China’s perception of international society and the principles of his ‘harmonious world’. Here, he detailed the way the Chinese people and government see the 79 current system and their potential to reform it. Notions of lasting peace, development, and universal security, which are considered the basic goals of all actors within international society, were incorporated within the ‘harmonious society’ doctrine (Zheng & Tok 2007), later depicted as a China’s alternative to the established system. Indeed, Hu Jintao underlined the importance of already existing universal norms, yet he did still highlight specific principles that would allow certain actors to maintain ‘uniqueness’ and ‘lines of flight’ that would insulate them from the eventual ‘transformismo’ imposed upon them by the hegemonic system.
Hu’s speech on the international ‘harmonious society’ echoed the prevalent principles of the immediate post-World War order, yet it also stressed how these principles could be conceived of differently in the new era. Here, he stated basic principles of the international ‘harmonious society’ in his speech at the UN:
- Common security – This first principle highlighted the importance of peace in ensuring the endurance of development in various fields. Accordingly, to achieve this goal, a new concept of security which encompassed mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation was needed (Hu J., 2005) in order to build a fair and collective security mechanism that would focus on the prevention of all kinds of conflict and war and safeguard world peace and security.
- Common prosperity – This second principle is related to upholding mutually beneficial cooperation in the pursuit of common prosperity:
The deepening of economic globalization has made countries’ interests mutually intertwined, and their respective development depends more closely on global development. But such globalization should benefit all countries, developing countries in particular, instead of leading to a more polarized world where the poor become poorer and the rich richer. (Hu 2005: 4) Therefore, Hu labeled the 21st century as the ‘era of development for all’, in which equal benefits, opportunities, and advantages could be afforded to all individuals regardless of their economic-political or social viewpoints. Hu also noted that the UN’s Millennium Development Goals needed to be more attentively implemented:
We should work actively to establish and improve a multilateral trading system that is open, fair and nondiscriminatory, and further improve the international financial regime with a view to putting in place a healthy and orderly trading environment and a stable and efficient financial environment conducive to global economic growth. (Hu 2005: 6)
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Throughout the speech, Hu stressed the importance of the developed world’s role in revising the fractures that had emerged in the system. Specifically, Hu claimed that only through the developed world’s assumption of proportional responsibility could the world begin to see universal, coordinated, and balanced development. Consequently, Hu noted that developed countries should be expected to supply the developing world with high-tech technology in order to allow them to gain access to the developed markets. Furthermore, further debt forgiveness, which can help developing economies flourish, was proposed, in particular for heavily indebted states. Another important point expressed by Hu in his description of the principles of ‘harmonious society’ was related to the developing world’s agency, or in other words, the developing world’s need to better utilize its own opportunities in order to achieve mutual development. Such statements can be seen as promoting a form of South-South cooperation in which ‘actors sharing the same fates’ (Callahan 2009: 38) are encouraged to work together and ‘promote across-the-board progress in their own society’ (Callahan 2009: 38). This last point in particular has been considered the primary bulwark in the establishment of a new ‘historical bloc’ within the established system.
In the end, the Chinese President emphasized his country’s will to become a responsible power that is ready to take on the burdens of global development. He revealed that the aim of the Chinese state and society was to enforcedly contribute to the international system in order to overcome all the abovementioned hindrances to equitable development.
- Inclusiveness – This third principle of the ‘harmonious world’ strategy is related to the spirit of inclusiveness. In this sense, ‘harmony with differences’ is highlighted and equality among civilizations, regardless of their history, culture, social system, or mode of development, is stressed. This principle points out that barriers to inter-civilizational affairs should be avoided as each civilization complements one another:
We should endeavor to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make international relations more democratic and jointly build towards a harmonious world where all civilizations coexist and accommodate each other. (Hu 2005: 8) Certainly, such an idea suggests a path that denounces the fetishization one particular kind of model (i.e. the American model) and instead promotes a type of mutual emulation in which each actor has its ‘own say’ in building its own model and maintains its right to equitably and unconditionally integrate into the international system. In this way, the notion of superiors among civilizations is outright rejected in the Chinese conceptualization of ‘harmonious society.’ 81
- Reform of international institutions – This fourth principle relates to idea of reforming the United Nations, which has been considered as the supreme guardian of international peace, development, cooperation, and security for over six decades. Hu argued that the improvement of the efficacy and the structure of the UN would empower and reinforce the abovementioned principles and rules within the international domain. According to Hu, new challenges and threats can be overcome only through the establishment of stronger cooperation under the aegis of reliable international institutions rather than the domination of one single state. By highlighting the salience of organizations and consensus within the decision-making process, Hu once again stressed the PRC’s rejection of ‘hegemony’.
In Hu’s reading, opportunities emerging over the six decades since the creation of the new world order, and the entrenchment of its universal rules and principles, led a number of previously failed actors on the international domain to prosperity and security subsequent their near total destruction. President Hu stressed that these perks of the system triggered the creation of the globalized economy and its reliance on advanced technology and science, which in turn formed the multipolar world. Nevertheless, he reiterated that the weaknesses of the established structure did not allow it to solve all the challenges that it had inherited from the former hegemonic system. Hu stated that issues such as international conflict, civil war, and terrorism on the one hand and the widening gap between the North and South, environmental degradation, and border disputes on the other, were the new challenges of the new century. According to Hu, these challenges exacerbated uneven development within international society, as they allowed one side to benefit while disallowing others from enjoying the same successes, therewith relegating them to a life of suffering, poverty, and hunger. Hu’s doctrine came to the fore as a Chinese proposal for solving contemporary issues through structural revision and the promotion of principles of shared and ‘win-win’ development.
Hu Jintao laid out an approach to reaching solutions to all obstacles rooted in the deficiencies of the current system, as enduring peace and common prosperity could be attained by seizing the opportunities provided by the system and diminish the obstacles that prevent some regions from benefitting therefrom. In his words, hidden ‘injustices’ and uneven development were resultant of American hegemonic regulation. The existence of the current system, in which all actors are required to adopt the ‘given’ principles in order to benefit, seemed repugnant to officials in Beijing. Not surprisingly, since its release, China’s alternative development approach grabbed the attention of the international community.
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Accordingly, the Chinese alternative illuminates the possibility of maintaining the ‘uniqueness’ of various societies within the political and ideological domains without requiring these societies to waste their efforts in attempting to fit the mold that is promoted by the hegemonic power. Considering that uneven political, economic, and social development has run rampant, to the point of being on par with systemic ‘discrimination’, within the world order under American hegemony, the revision of this weakness is assumed to be the main distinction of the China-initiated alternative model (Zhao 2010). Hu Jintao, by describing the advantages of the international ‘harmonious society’ at the UN summit in 2005, actually referred to the cracks of the American-led system, or more explicitly, the inability of the system to incorporate every actor equally.
After 2005, three tremendous events revealing China’s ‘rising head’ were observed, namely, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the PRC’s celebration of its sixtieth anniversary in 2009, and the 2010 World Expo. Indeed, this period concurred with the fall of American hegemonic power after 9/11 when consent in its legitimacy began to be questioned. Certainly, discussions on China’s recent developments have depicted the ‘harmonious world’ doctrine as the tip of the iceberg when it comes to China’s true, underlying intentions.
After indicating the basic principles required for ‘peaceful coexistence’, Hu Jintao pointed out that China aims to use its progress in the socio-economic domain for the common development of mankind. He confessed that China’s quickly acquired successes were certainly the results of its utilization of the advantages and opportunities provided by the current system. Additionally, Chinese leaders and officials continually underlined their unwillingness to ‘dominate’ the world order, no matter how powerful China became:
China will keep to the path of peaceful development. We have just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese aggression and the world anti-fascist war. An important lesson history teaches us is that peaceful development is the right path, while any attempt to seek domination or hegemony through force is against the historical trend and doomed to failure. The Chinese recognized as early as 2,000 years ago that though a country is now strong, varicosity will lead to its ruling. China’s defense policy is defensive in nature and its military strategy features active defense. Let me reiterate here that no matter how developed it could become, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion. To demonstrate our commitment to peaceful development, I announced not long ago that the size of China’s military will be cut by 300,000. China is ready to work with other countries to build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation at its core, replacing confrontation and domination with win-win
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cooperation and adopting a new thinking of building partnerships so as to jointly open a new vista of common development and shared security. (Xi 2015) As scholars devoted their works to the analysis of Gramsci’s perception of hegemony emphasized the importance of ‘exhauster’ in the existing hegemonic system as a driving force for the novel ‘historic bloc’, China’s rise turned into the main subject for empirical research. It should be indicated here that the transition in China’s official and academic rhetoric on the one hand and their practical steps on the other began to be increasingly observed in the period of the decline of American hegemony.
When it became apparent that China was rising economically and proposing alternatives for a better world order, the question arose as to whether or not China intended to challenge the current system politically and ideologically. The ‘harmonious world’ doctrine first revealed some basic traits of a Chinese-proposed alternative, and this in turn later formed the basis for the ‘China Model’ strategy as revisions at the global economic, ideological, and societal levels were further developed.
3.5. China Model - the Beijing Consensus vs. the Washington Consensus
The question of China’s true intentions began to concern both politicians and scholars who wondered whether China was going to challenge the established hegemonic system by actively promoting and enforcing the ‘harmonious world’ strategy. China’s economic rise and statements on peaceful development led the country to be compared with German and Japanese historical precedents (Arrighi 2008; Mearsheimer 2014; Buzan 2010; Sutter 2013; Moore & Chache 2013). In this way, China labeled its own path as ‘the peaceful rise’, which in turn became reflected in its promoted notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’. These strategies were implemented in part to decrease the level of anxiety of certain actors within the structure. Though China maintained a soft tone, other actors attentively observed China’s actions with suspicion and a critical eye. Certainly, China’s political and ideological developments that were supported by economic factors morphed into an immense source of cultural pride. In this part of the chapter we will examine various perspectives on China’s rise at the theoretical level by referring to Western and Chinese academia while also analyzing the concrete actions of the Chinese government; in this way it will be possible to measure to what extent China’s words match its actual actions.
First off, it would be prudent to explore the basic framework of China’s rise. Considering that Mao and Deng pursued principally different paths to reach similar goals, in the end, their successors inherited a much stronger China, by utilizing the benefits of decades’ worth of growth and international integration. As Hu Jintao emphasized in his speech at the UN, 84 all Chinese officials reiterated the fact that they were not interested in any kind of traumatic change to the international order, nevertheless, they did note that revisions are necessary due to the prevalence of harmful, inhibitive, outdated regulations. Indeed, the harmonization of communist values and capitalist economic demands has been realized very successfully in today’s China. China’s persistence in maintaining the basis of the CCP from the top-down by accepting and embracing certain rules of the neoliberal economy, can be seen as a new pattern that could be exported. This pattern can be characterized by the successful co-existence of the free market and an authoritarian state, a novel idea which has resonated throughout the system as various political systems across the globe seek to efficiently utilize the developments provided by the current order.
Each hegemonic system extended the scope of the previous one. Therefore, a possible substitution of the current system can be attained as more actors and issues are incorporated into the ‘transnational class’ as a new ‘historic bloc’ is formed from within the current system.
In order to better conceive how China’s current, and future, development diverges from that of earlier hegemonic actors, it would now be advantageous to explore three potential paths that China may follow:
1. First Road – This developmental path exhibits the characteristics of the Western-style developmental model, or the American model, adhering to the principles of the Washington Consensus, which will be explored in greater detail later. Indeed, Western-style competitive elections and liberal-democratic approaches are the main features of this path. Cheng Li argues that China did not veer from this established pattern throughout its ascendance.
2. Second Road – This path is followed by those who could not implement the demands of the first road due to their communist or authoritarian pasts. Nonetheless, these countries are expected to trigger ‘shock therapies’ to grasp the same successes entailed by adherence to the first road. This road is thorny and wrought with turmoil and instability (Latin America, Southeast Asia, former members of the Soviet Empire).
3. Third Road – China’s current developmental path in which the authoritarian regime is fused with the market economy (Zhao 2010).
China’s path to economic development, characterized by the setting aside of ideological dogmas to rescue oneself from any kind of politico-ideological chains, became the pattern for developing states “from Vietnam to Syria, from Burma to Venezuela, and all across
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Africa” (Ramo 2004: 14). Here, admiration for the ‘China Model’ and efforts to emulate it reached their climax during the first decade of the 21st century. Imitation of Chinese economic ascendancy was assumed to occur in two stages:
- The first stage saw states adopt successful elements of liberal economic policy by opening up much of their economies to foreign and domestic investment, allowing labor flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burdens low, and creating a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private and state spending.
- The second sage saw states permit the ruling party to retain a firm grip on ‘government, the courts, the army, the internal security apparatus, and the free flow of information’ (Zhao 2010: 420).
During this time, China began to be considered the biggest potential ideological rival to the existing liberal-democratic hegemonic system since the end of the Cold War and the deterioration of the Communist bloc (Ash 2008). Indeed, it has even been deemed the primary menace to the Western model of modernization, which encompasses the free market on the one hand and liberal democracy on the other. The American model has been criticized by Chinese officials as a stagnant and fetishized pattern that ignores the inability of the developing world to overcome the burdens that are built into the system. Therefore, China’s promotion of state political control’s fusion with neoliberal economic rules as a path to economic growth and political stability is considered the main success of the Chinese developmental alternative. The American developmental model’s focus on the economic and financial domain can be discerned in the Washington Consensus. After pinpointing the main principles of the Washington Consensus, we can then better understand the divergent road offered by China’s economic approach as illuminated in the Beijing Consensus.
The Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson at the end of the 1980s. He underlined ten principles which should be adopted by actors in the developing world in order to attain ultimate prosperity in the economic domain, and furtive political and societal frameworks. Many third-world countries in these years as part of the drive to implement neoliberal, free market policies have facilitated capital inflows by establishing or liberalizing their stock market exchanges. It triggered a dramatic transnationalization of national firms and assets that accelerated the formation of the TCC (Robinson; Harris, 2000). Williamson emphasized the importance of realizing some items in order to acquire
86 development. The ten principles/regulations assumed under the Washington Consensus are as follows:
1. Fiscal discipline.
2. Reordering public expenditure priorities.
3. Tax reform.
4. Liberalizing interest rates.
5. Enacting a competitive exchange rate.
6. Trade liberalization.
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment.
8. Privatization.
9. Deregulation.
10. Property rights. (Williamson 1990: 4)
Certainly, all these adjustments stressed by Williamson were experienced in the form of ‘shock therapy’ for many actors in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and in the newly-independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union:
These policies stressed the primacy of the market and the limited role of the state and were later presented as ‘one size fits all’ for developing states facing an economic crisis (Zhao 2010: 428) Nevertheless, in a very short amount of time, it became apparent that ‘one size did not fit all’ as the Washington Consensus failed to ‘cure’ emergent problems within the international domain (Palma 2010). Thus, the Washington Consensus should be considered as an attempt by the American-led hegemonic system to precipitate its influence in newly emerging actors, and therewith to embed its legitimacy. Therefore, James Mann (2007) emphasized that “US foreign policy [...] has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. This has not only failed, but also undermined support for democracy” (p. 14).
Gradually, it became better understood that achieving prosperity by implementing the will of the hegemonic power would favor the ‘transnational hegemonic class’ that selected winners and losers within the structure (Gill, 2003). Emulators of neoliberal and free market principles that liberalized their economies and ‘democratized’ their regimes were expected to experience rapid development in all domains as they grew and prospered.
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However, ‘‘shock therapies’ aimed at transferring assets from public to private hands at bargain prices and at liberalizing foreign trade and capital movements’ (Arrighi & Zhang 2011: 3) did not, in practice, facilitate developing actors’ ultimate development, as had been promised (Palma 2010). As this became realized, this loss of confidence in the ideas of neo-liberal doctrines propagated what was coined by Arrighi and Zhang as the ‘strange death’ of the Washington Consensus at the hand of mixed causes and consequences (2011). Consequently, this failure of the Washington Consensus to deliver on its promises led developing actors to search for new alternatives, hence giving credence to the idea that ‘Consensus cannot be made only in Washington’ (Ramo 2004:11).
Moreover, the Washington Consensus was seen by some scholars as another instrument of American hegemonic expansionism (in terms of ‘arkhe’). The benefits acquired by the transnational capitalist class were embedded in international institutions like the IMF and the WB, and therefore, all components encompassed within the Washington Consensus became regarded as instruments aiming to promote US economic and financial interests:
They argue not only that it failed to achieve its goals, but also that it may actually have made the social and economic conditions of many of the region’s citizens worse [...]. The World Bank and the IMF, two institutions in which the United States is the major decision-maker, are accused of adopting Washington Consensus policies to benefit the US economic and financial interests. (Roett & Paz 2008:10) The failure of the Washington Consensus was attributed to various causes, the most commonly acknowledged of which pertained to governmental bankruptcies and oversights of significant market disruptions. In this sense, Joseph Stiglitz argued that measures that improve both market and governments together should be adopted. Such an approach can be seen in the model depicted in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, who married his notions under the title of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ after observing and analyzing China’s unique developmental path.
3.5.1. Beijing Consensus as an alternative path to economic development
Ramo coined the Chinese model of prosperity as the ‘Beijing Consensus’. Since its inception, the concept has been regarded as set of notions that could be applied by countries within the developing world as a sufficient mode of economic development. Certainly, the most attractive features of the Beijing Consensus can be seen in its advocacy of preserving the political choices of governments and its demand that different societal lifestyles be respected. Called the ‘Beijing’ Consensus and marketed as a Chinese developmental pattern, Ramo emphasized the notion’s ability to endorse the evasion of all kinds of political or ideological constraints associated with the Washington Consensus. Indeed, the 88
Beijing Consensus has aimed to widen the spectrum of those who can benefit from the established order without excluding any power. In more explicit terms, this model of behavior has become a new hope for much of the developing world that has been disappointed by the impositions and failings of the current hegemonic order. Consequently, Ramo expounded three theorems of the Beijing Consensus that, if realized or adopted, should provide for the successful development of various actors:
- Innovation-led growth.
- Sustainable and equitable development.
- Desire to control own national destiny. (Ramo, 2004)
The developing world’s respect and even admiration of China’s path towards economic development has even bled over into other non-economic areas. Firstly, American-led hegemony constrained its own expansion as a result of its demands for political transformation. This approach has sparked concerns among authoritarian states that their loss of power was ultimately a consequence of US-promoted economic liberalization and political democratization. The ‘China Model’ is thus presented as a fast track to economic growth which is free of the social and political disorder that often comes as a by-product of democratization (Zhao, 2010). On the other side of the coin, civil societies of many developing states have voiced concerns that the US’s demands for political transformations seek to lay the groundwork for the US’s soft entrance into other countries’ domestic spheres and subject them to a form of ‘neo-colonization’.
Therefore, the economic structure proposed by the ‘China Model’ exhibits several features expressed in Kurlantzick’s article (2016) in which he lays out the framework of what he describes as ‘state capitalism’:
- The actors pursuing ‘state capitalism’ comprise elected autocrats, the likes of which cannot be reasonably compared with the harsh rulers of authoritarian states such as Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China. The mild repression employed by these autocrats can be regarded as an instrument that is imposed simply to maintain the timely intervention of the state into the market when necessary. - The preemptive tools of the ‘state capitalism’ policy are intended to hinder financial crises that culminate in global financial recession. Those who pursue
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and promote this policy consider today’s financial downfalls the result of the combination of the free market and democracy. - Proponents of this model see ‘state capitalism’ as a more sophisticated method of development as it facilitates the coordination of statist strategies with the free markets, an arena that they consider the shared playground of SOEs and multinational companies.
The popularity of the Beijing Consensus among less-developed actors has also been seen as a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, which dealt a critical blow to the image of old- fashioned Washington Consensus notions of prosperity. For the first time in modern history an approach that differed from that promoted by the US hegemon became the treatment for the financial woes of damaged and endangered powers. Here, the China Model fused the authoritarian regime with the market economy, thus allowing the state not only to supervise but also to intervene in the economy when necessary so as to prevent its total collapse. Such resulted in fewer wounds being inflicted upon China during the crisis. During this time Ramo argued that this strategy could provide others with essential assistance and even later become the driving force of China’s possible attempt at ‘hegemonic transition’. Some scholars even declared that the time was ripe for systemic transformation when observing China’s financial strength and the decline of US legitimacy after its forceful interventions into the Middle East based on the pretext of its ‘War on Terror’.
Certainly, the overreliance of American hegemony on ‘arkhe’, especially after 9/11, undermined the legitimacy that the system had acquired and managed to retain for decades. This dynamic has been amplified considering the rising popularity of China’s proposal for ‘less chains and more prosperity’. Theoretically, the accelerating strength of another actor can easily fracture the order, and here, the main difference between the ‘China Model’ and the hegemonic structure is aptly depicted by Suisheng Zhao (2010):
Given the many problems confronting developing countries, China seems to offer a new model on how to fight poverty and ensure good governance, albeit one that challenges the conventional wisdom offered by Western countries and the international financial institutions they control. (p. 432) Indeed, Suisheng emphasized that the most crucial point embedded within the so-called Beijing Consensus was its ability to promote strong governments as a ‘remedy’ for poverty. Similarly, by stressing the ‘real needs’ of actors in the developing world, another scholar underlined:
What they usually need is not a liberal democratic government, but a good government capable of fighting poverty and delivering basic services and security 90
because the paramount task for most developing countries is how to eradicate poverty, a root cause of conflicts and various forms of extremism. So long as the American model remains unable to deliver the desired outcome, the Chinese model will become more appealing to the world’s poor. (Wei-Wei 2006) The fundamental failure of American developmental path stemmed from its perfunctory approach to ‘non-Westerners’ in general and the Third World in particular. The experiences of the developing world starkly differed from those of the developed world, as it was only in the latter that Western institutions could automatically take root and yield fruit. The American path emphasized liberalization before safety nets were erected, privatization before regulatory frameworks were set up, and democratization before cultures of political tolerance and the rule of law were established (Suisheng, 2010). Not surprisingly, developing actors’ efforts to emulate the American path often resulted in devastation and discouragement, which in turn led them to look more seriously at the pattern of a different actor who understood and overcame the difficulties they had.
Certainly, authoritarian regimes in Asia, Latin America, and Africa would willingly choose a path that had already been tested before by an actor which came from their same position as a member of the Third World and a subject of Western colonization. Here, this idea of a ‘mutual historical fate’ can be seen as a trigger for actors within Mao’s ‘intermediary zone’ to cooperate with China in order to build a novel ‘historical bloc’ and challenge the established hegemonic system.
Ramo emphasized that China’s fervent engagement with and influence over the developing world were prompted by the country’s economic ascendency; and so, like iron grains attracted to a magnet, developing countries began to align themselves with China in the name of economic interest. Another attractive point of the ‘China Model’, as stressed by Ramo, is the Chinese government’s exercise of ‘value-free diplomacy’ with Third World states, as opposed to the US’s preferred diplomacy of ‘conditionality’. Considering this, China’s ‘no-strings-attached’ economic and financial aid programs can be read as a major ameliorator of the developing world’s acceptance of China, and thereby increased their possibility of becoming involved in an international ‘historical bloc’ if necessary.
The Beijing Consensus has been considered the best instrument for China’s acquisition of legitimacy and the best promotion of its peaceful rise. Ramo emphasized that this developmental model plays a crucial role in strengthening national pride and security for those who adopt it. At the historic moment when American-led hegemony began to evoke memories of the exploitative practices of previous Western colonial powers, actors that had suffered under these earlier systems became increasingly attracted to the ‘shine’ of China’s 91
‘rising head’ that was not afraid of concealing its strength anymore. Here, China relinquished not only the strategy of hiding its might, but also felt ready to propose its own alternative by pinpointing its own successful practices.
Certainly, such an approach eventually constituted the basis of criticisms of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’, a concept which became increasingly discussed with skepticism in a number of cases. Here, China’s ability to sell its model without implementing any coercive measures has been depicted as the most important feature of this potential hegemon. Ramo (2004) stressed that the “Beijing Consensus offers a hope that every nation can be a power […] maybe not for domination, but strong for self-determination” (p. 32). The type of approach delineated here has been set in stark contrast to recent American hegemonic expressions exemplified in statements such as ‘you are either with us, or against us’ (Bush 2001). Ultimately, the most influential tools of the ‘China Model’ may be considered the provision of unconditional assistance to those in need and the promotion of the strong role of the state. Effectively utilizing the benefits granted to it by the international order, China’s decision to develop and implement these instruments came after the country became more aware of and confident in its power.
3.6. ‘Charm Offensive’ – China’s soft power development
China’s rise was first observed in the beginning of the 21st century as the country shed its shell of ‘modesty’ and began to seek to expand its economic might into other fields. Ever since China suggested the formation of the international ‘harmonious society’ and conceptualized the Beijing Consensus, various Chinese governments and scholars increasingly vocalized the desire for ‘change’ within the established order. Accordingly, positive feedback from developing states toward the revisionist approaches and doctrines of the PRC piqued concerns throughout much of the developed world, despite China’s insistence of its peaceful intentions.
Indeed, China’s new posture has been seen by Western academia as indicative of a ‘charm offensive’ strategy, whereby soft and hard power are fused as rhetoric promotes the maintenance of the peaceful status quo. The principles of the ‘charm offensive’ implicitly overlap with the ideals laid out by Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’. In this way, it can be said that this strategy encompasses growing military power and economic clout on the one hand and ‘knowledge production’ on the other. China’s ability to win ‘hearts and minds’, as Gramsci conceives them, has been facilitated through this ‘charm offensive’ that combines aspects of consent and coercion:
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The Chinese have wisely learned one key lesson from studying the experiences of other previous powers: genuine global powers possess multidimensional strength. Chinese strategists have observed the failings of other powers that possessed strength in only a single dimension or a few, not at all. Thus, they have concluded that it is important to build and cultivate power comprehensively across a variety of spheres: the economy, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy, and other sectors. (Shambaugh 2013: 427) By following this path, China indicated to the world that it has abandoned Deng’s ‘low- head diplomacy’. Throughout the course of the new century, this new rising power has increased the speed at which it is ‘buying love’ from others. As former US diplomat Dustin Roasa (2012) wrote in Foreign Policy magazine: “Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinese diplomacy, language and culture – and, yes, pop songs – are playing a major role in Beijing’s quest to be understood and, if all goes well, win the affection” (Moore & Cashe 2013) of thousands, if not millions, of people all around the world. Such an observed reality has signified the ultimate end of China’s policy of ‘modesty’ that suggested it hide its own ‘brightness’ (Sutter 2013).
China’s ‘charm offensive’, as well as Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ strategy, was articulated by Callahan as a reconceptualization of globalization in a new and different way. China developed these strategies to augment its soft power, and has recently also sought to bring its hard power to the same level by pursuing a policy of military modernization. Within this context these two items (soft and hard power) have not been emphasized by China as crucial tools intended to promote Chinese interests, but as means to spread the country’s ideals across the globe. Improvements to China’s institutional soft power, in terms of teaching the Chinese language and culture in various countries for example, have nonetheless been considered insufficient for acquiring supremacy. Still, for Callahan, a state’s normative soft power should be developed so that it can build and export its perceptions about the world order, such as ‘harmonious society’ in this case, to the regions which are ready to accept it (Moore et.al., 2013). By doing so, an actor may acquire the ability to set the agenda of international politics and to utilize its values to define not only world problems but also the range of possible solutions (Nye 1990).
Certainly, this perceptional transformation of Chinese politics affected the political and academic rhetoric of the PRC, which soon came to contain numerous references to the historical background of imperial China and the Marxist school of thought (Bell, 2008). Callahan noted that throughout this period Chinese intellectuals have sought to revitalize ancient concepts on the one hand and synthesize various ideas, institutions, and models on the other. Such an approach has resulted in the emergence of a hybrid notion of the Chinese
93 role in the world that instrumentalizes ancient and modern times to clarify China’s foreign and domestic responsibilities (Callahan 2010).
Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ rejuvenated the widespread remembrance of traditional Chinese culture that had been forbidden under Mao, reformulating it in such a way as to elucidate China’s position and direction in the new era. Hence, by developing both its hard and soft power, China altered its behavior and began to promote what it claimed to be “universally desirable values” (Park, 2009). Ever since China began to actively push for a greater role among the community of nations, it began to refer to the history of ancient Chinese empires and the writings of Confucius in its official statements justifying its demands. Utilizing the historical background of its rise, the contemporary PRC set out on a journey to gain the ‘hearts and minds’ of different societies by promoting what many have come to call the ‘China dream’.
3.6.1. Historical roots of China’s peaceful development strategy and its influence in substantiating China’s impact at the societal level
Just as concerns over China’s expanded, non-economic rise began to be voiced, Chinese officials began to allude to their nation’s history in official statements. Indeed, referring to China’s historical background, Chinese officials increasingly compared Western hegemonic periods to China’s historical imperial tributary system that saw its apex during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. This juxtaposition has been successfully analyzed by a number of scholars, such as Arrighi, whose research delves into Chinese officials’ current statements that portray China’s hegemonic past and peaceful regional development as going hand in hand.
Employing rhetoric revolving around notions of Chinese history, the current government has come to promote the advancement of the country’s national defense policy, for example by restructuring the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), based on ideas of self-protection while denying that it seeks to optimize its power position in relation to other countries. Within this context, China’s historical imperial tributary trade system, which efficiently functioned for centuries, was pinpointed as proof of China’s peaceful intentions in the 21st century. According to some scholars, the tributary system can be considered the most salient reason why Asia avoided significant quagmires similar to those that were observed in Europe (Zhao 2006; Dreyer 2015; Kang 2010; Arrighi 2008). During these times, the closer a nation or people was to the Chinese Empire the greater their welfare and economic
94 prosperity. Thus, Arrighi indicated that China gained legitimacy in these times with its trading power. Historically, the China-centered system consisted of three zones:
1. Sinic Zone or Chinese Cultural Area – Korea, Vietnam, and Japan
2. Inner Asian Zone – Mongolia, Tibet, and Central Asia
3. Outer Zone – Russia, Sulu, Portugal, Holland, and England (Khong 2013: 32)
China declared itself the natural center of the globe in those eras. Therefore, territorial proximity to this center was considered a gift due to the great benefits that came with trading with the hegemon. The members of the Outer Zone were evaluated as ‘barbarians’ during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, however, the Sinic and Inner Asian Zones were ‘beneficiaries’ of the established system. These actors were called ‘vassals’, though they were not forcefully incorporated into the system (Zhao 2006; Kang 2010).
China’s historical hegemony and its politics toward tributaries bring to light two specific issues that have been utilized by another hegemon from another region centuries later. American hegemony, by providing military protection of its Asian allies, gained access to this region’s markets. Such resulted in the acknowledgment of the hegemon’s supremacy and indicated the legitimization of its structure. According to Arrighi, vassals’ acceptance of the hegemon, whether American today or Chinese in the past, has always translated into advantages for them in various domains, from trade to security. The earlier Chinese system formalized in Asia allowed the continent to avoid minor and major wars due to the ability of the hegemon to supervise and balance the system, as opposed to the state of affairs in multipolar Europe. Nonetheless, Chinese officials state that peaceful eras in Asia should be attributed to the nature of the Chinese people and their deep opposition to the emergence of imbroglios.
By keeping all these issues in mind, Arrighi juxtaposed the China-led tributary trade system with the European interstate system and emphasized the differences and similarities between them. These structures’ main similarities can be seen in their multiplicity of political jurisdictions that occupy a space beside common cultural heritages and interdependent trade affairs. Another salient issue that can be regarded as common for both systems is the competition among structural agents, though in different contexts of rivalry, especially considering that the Sino-centric system was quite different from the dispersive European order.
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Further, Arrighi (2008) concentrates on the divergent points that distinguish these structures from one another:
1. The European system was characterized by military competition, and therefore long periods of peace became the exception in this part of the world historically. Even the 100- Year-Peace could not last long and was impeded by a number of conflicts. Conversely, East Asia was characterized by the absence of intra-systemic military competition and extra- systemic geographical expansion, which was very familiar to the European system. This region witnessed 300 years of peace bracketed with tiny wars that emerged as a result of Japanese aggression and China’s invasion of Vietnam to maintain the legitimacy of the Tran Dynasty’s between 1406-1428.
2. The absence of the tendency to build overseas empires, which could trigger regional competition and inflame arms races, also functioned to promote peace in the East Asian region. This expansionist tendency was extremely prevalent in Europe and led the states of this region to go in the direction of war-making and territorial expansion, whereas East Asian actors mainly focused on the promotion of the state and national economy-making.
3. The European states’ expansion overseas resulted in resource extraction from the peripheries, thus their expansion was sustained at the expense of other peoples and lands. China’s tributary system, on the other hand, was evaluated as very different. Hence, Wang pointed out that rather than extraction, Chinese governments invested in the peripheries in order to make them prosper.
Arrighi emphasized that vassals of the Sino-centric system started to gain more than they actually gave to the center, therefore China’s costs eventually surpassed its benefits. Vassal states of the tributary trade system offered only symbolic gifts to the center yet they received more valuable and more numerous gifts in return. Subsequently, as Hobbes stressed, ‘riches joined with liberality’ became the main source of the regional legitimacy of the Chinese Empire for centuries. Therefore, Chinese economic power, characterized by generosity, became the focal point of the Sino-centric system, which can be comparatively analyzed in the 21st century. Arrighi’s application of Hobbes’ statement on the tributary system was supported with this statement:
[The] Chinese economy had to generate the resources necessary to buy the allegiance of vassal states. [The] Chinese state had to be in a position to command these resources, and surrounding states had to be persuaded that attempts to seize resources from China by means that challenged the authority of the Chinese government would not pay off. (Arrighi 2009: 48)
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Here, American Sinologist John King Fairbank (1968), in his text entitled ‘the Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations’, analyzed the hierarchical Sino-centric world order of the Chinese Empire. This structure, consisting of loyal tributary states around China and ‘barbarians’ in the outer circle, was depicted as a more peaceful and ideal order that differed from Europe’s egalitarian Westphalian world order.
The Chinese system, also called Pax-Sinica, endured under the aegis of a benign hegemonic state that was personified by the emperor as the Son of Heaven and was administered for the benefit of all vassals under the Empire’s shelter. Chinese cultural supremacy at this time influenced not only the actors which shared common Chinese values such as Confucianism, but also other groups such as nomadic tribes whose interests were also integrated into the system (Kang, 2010). Therefore, Chinese hegemony, maintained over the span of several dynasties, pertained to the recognition of its cultural achievements and legitimate superiority, not due to its sheer size or military or economic power:
The tribute system, whether regarded as symbolic or disguised trade, was considered as central to this world order. This system saw the periodic journeys of the principals or their envoys to the Chinese capital bearing precious gifts, performing the ketou of obeisance to the ruler of all under heaven, and being presented with costly items in return, as well as with the dynastic calendar and confirmation of their legitimacy as a ruler of their states. The proper performance of these rituals was intimately involved with ordering relations—whether political, economic or cultural in the world writ large. (Dreyer 2015: 183) The power sources of Sino-centric and European systems were different – the China-centric structure of East Asia received nourishment from internal engines, whereas the European order relied on external forces for its maintenance (Arrighi 2009). The introverted character of Chinese hegemony guarded it against colonial enlargement, a dynamic that forms the basis of much of the PRC officials’ statements nowadays. Therefore, the expressions of many Chinese statesmen have come to instrumentalize Western hegemony’s extroverted and exploitative past and present by framing it in direct contrast with China’s innocuous past and present international stance.
Chinese officials continually reiterate their good intentions on all platforms. Indeed, by referring to the nature of the Chinese people and the Chinese state’s historical inheritances, they insist that China’s rise is peaceful and will not transform the country into a destructive power. Furthermore, Chinese Philosopher Zhao Tingyang depicted the features of the three- thousand-year-old empire in accordance with the concept of Gramscian hegemony, while noting that Western Empires were characterized by a type of ‘arkhe’ in Machiavellian terms.
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By emphasizing the benevolent union of vassals under the Chinese Empire that constituted the core of the system, Zhao (2006) formulated the term ‘Tianxia’ (All-under-Heaven), a notion that resonated with the desires of various people from different backgrounds and reflected the ‘general will of the people’. Therefore, Zhao highlighted the cultural, institutional side of the Empire, aside from its geographical connotations. Referring to the ancient philosopher Xunzi’s essay ‘On Kingship and Supremacy’, Zhao pointed out certain salient points of Tianxia:
Enjoying all under heaven does not mean to receive the lands from people who are forced to give, but to satisfy all people with a better way of governance. (p.48) Another definition of this term was indicated in the opening passage of Daniel Bell’s piece referred to ‘Great Learning’:
The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended, when knowledge is extended, the will is sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there is peace throughout the world. (2010: 96) The term Tianxia was emphasized as the voluntarily formalized institutional world whose principles overlapped with the hegemony discussed in the first chapter. The Gramscian take on the concept of Tianxia can be observed in China’s attitude toward nation-states. The viewpoint of ‘the world as one family’ bespoken by Tianxia can be seen as fundamentally divergent from the Westerners’ perception of the world order. Indeed, the Western imagination of the world order as a network of international alliances and unions of nation- states served to illuminate the ideological difference of Tianxia for Arrighi and Fairbank. Chinese scholars emphasized that the historical background of the Chinese Empire, which was accompanied by regional peace and a mutually beneficial relationship between the Chinese core and its consenting vassals, may reflect the true intentions of China’s current and future policies. Zhao underlined that China never attempted to exploit others as its European counterparts had done in the past.
Moreover, in ancient texts which have inspired today’s scholars in China, the historical meritocratic regime was boasted with reference to Tianxia, where the term ‘Tianzi’ (Son of Heaven) was placed front and center. Here, the notion of Tianxia was adjusted to put political meritocracy before liberal democracy as the idea of ‘one person, one vote’ was approached with suspicion. In this vein, scholars that referred to Tianxia elucidated the inability of most everyday people to know the best path to pursue. The supporters of this approach based on political meritocracy indicate that the elite are most aware of real 98 concerns and the needs of the society and also best equipped to intervene and decide for the majority (Bell 2008). According to Thomas Friedman (2009) “one-party autocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages”. The main feature of this ‘one party autocracy’, which brought China to the position where it is today, is its preference to follow a policy of ‘appropriateness’.
Therefore, it can be argued that by utilizing such historical references China has tried not only to keep its political viewpoint intact but also to ‘legitimize’ and ‘normalize’ its own system within the prevailing order.
Furthermore, Zhao Tingyang further explicated Tianxia by highlighting three of its implicative principles that conveyed the traits of the meritocratic ruling system analyzed by Daniel Bell. The founder of Daoism, Laozi, interpreted the notion of Tianxia, or ‘All-under- Heaven’, in this way: “A king could rule a state by his orders, win a war by strategies, but enjoy All-under-Heaven only by doing nothing to decrease the freedom and to deny the interests of people” (Zhao 2006: 52). The fundamental principles of Tianxia can be defined as follows:
- The political legitimacy of Tianxia reign is free from and antecedent to any constraints put forward by ideology and religion.
- Qualified candidates who are aware of the ‘best way’ (Dao) to improve the happiness of all people all around the globe can find a position within the reign of ‘All-under-Heaven’.
- Being the Tianzi does not mean being a dictator. Nonetheless, the one who can acquire the power and right to govern should justify their status in relation to the ‘All-under- Heaven’ structure. (Zhao 2006: 25)
Relatedly, the last point demonstrates that discrimination should not be experienced by any nation with a Tianzi. Indeed, it also elucidates that any actor may obtain the opportunity to tak charge of the ‘All-under-Heaven’ structure (see: Hu Jintao’s ‘Harmonious Society’ speech).
On the other side of the coin, Zhao also points out the importance of ‘kinship’ in China’s historical, ethical-political consciousness. Therefore, the inheritances of the ‘China Model’ might be seen as rooted in these perceptions, especially considering that ‘kinship’ is “the universal framework for interpreting all possible cases of harmony, cooperation, common interests and happiness” (Zhao 2006: 25). This approach has played a critical role in
99 suppressing oppositional voices within China, a fact that can weaken the order maintained by the CCP. Nonetheless, such widespread reference to the terminology of China’s ancient history in official rhetoric has not only sought to intensify domestic unification and squelch antagonistic views, but also to create the foundations of a China-led conceptualization of the international order.
Highlighting familial traditions, Chinese scholars and politicians point to the importance of the wholeness and harmony of the world, with Tianxia being depicted as the ultimate global family that incorporates all diversities. This approach will later be discussed in terms of its constitutive role in forming what has come to be known as the ‘China Dream’, China’s answer to the ‘American Dream’ that emphasizes the happiness of the individual rather than the happiness of the community. Here, Zhao argued that the Chinese perception of the world order should not be misread as offering no place to the individual. Nevertheless, it does not take the individual as the foundational political building block, as it instead prefers ‘co-existence’ over ‘auto-existence’. The path to garnering influence for Tianxia was depicted by Zhao (2006) as follows:
The world’s effective political order must progress from All-under-Heaven to state, to families, so as to ensure universal consistency and transitivity in political life, or the uniformity of society, whereas an ethical order progresses from families to states, to All-under-Heaven, so as to ensure ethical consistency and transitivity. (p.26) Consequently, this ideological premise stresses the maintenance of the order (‘Zhi’), which is evaluated as the first condition for the happiness of each living body within the good society, for the eruption of disorder or crisis (‘Luan’) can morph into a hindrance and even completely destroy individual happiness in society.
3.7. Sub-optimization strategy – the path to a new ‘historic bloc’
Throughout this analysis, the fundamentally different stances of the PRC and previous ascending powers (aside from the US) have been observed. This research on rising powers’ novel strategies and doctrines has shown that the PRC maintains its ‘own alternative’ that stands ready to be taken up by interested groups if need be. Additionally, the ‘historical trip’ outlined above allows us to observe how politicians present “old wine in a new bottle” (Zheng 2013) – as the China Dream of Mao’s era has not undergone any truly substantial change. Here, China ‘bides time’ while setting the foundations of a ‘historical bloc’ (Deng, 1978) that could be able to challenge the current order. In this sense, this section of the chapter will explore the sub-optimization theory (Gilpin, 1981), which can be considered a tool for states in their efforts to build new international ‘historic blocs’. 100
At this point it would be useful to briefly focus on the main components of the sub- optimization theory with reference to the work of Vlad Vivoda (2009). Vivoda argued that within the system based on the free market rich, Western countries increased their gains due to their open policies that aimed to attract the international investment of large multinational corporations (MNCs):
The rules of this hegemonic system have been set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and in particular by the United States through Washington-based institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. This hegemonic system has been based on neoliberalism and [the] ‘Washington Consensus’ – open markets (‘free’ trade), privatization, deregulation, trade and financial liberalization, individualization of welfare, and constraining the role of the state – and liberal democratic values. (Vivoda 2009: 26) The main theoretical aim of the sub-optimization policy is to facilitate the acquisition of gains by subgroups at the expense of a larger group within the Western-dominated capitalist system. Here, Vivoda’s subgroup encompassed the actors belonging primarily to the developing world, such as China, Southeast Asia, and many energy-producing and energy-exporting countries like Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and so on.
The rising power which gathers relative gains at a more rapid rate than other members of the subgroup sees increases in its ability to establish new spheres of influence, as it becomes more able to build bridges between other sub-optimizers by utilizing these actors’ resentments against the US’s neoliberal attempts at democratization which clash with regional autocrats.
This theory illuminates the fact that non-Western subgroups led by China pursue sub- optimization strategies within the structure that is characterized by liberal and democratic values. China’s unique developmental path does not exclude it from the hegemonic system, and by applying sub-optimization theory (Gilpin 1981; Vivoda 2009) to this research the possible consequence of China’s gradual ascendency can be better understood. The sub- optimizer gathers relative gains within the hegemonic system all the while following its own principles and becoming a responsible partner that consistently grows its power.
Indeed, the sub-optimization strategy is very useful in allowing research to observe the birth, rise, and establishment of new ‘historic blocs’ that utilize advantages resultant of their pursuance to the principles of the hegemonic structure. Certainly, not all ‘historic blocs’ are able to substitute the hegemonic system, nonetheless, each systemic crisis accelerates the speed of the said system’s transformation. Though China’s official political
101 stance exhibits claims of ultimately different intentions, China’s real actions show that the PRC is efficiently implementing a sub-optimization strategy.
3.8. China Dream
President Xi Jinping’s approach to the international community encompasses aspects of the Mao and Deng era, as he makes use of China’s economic boom while combined rhetorical devices reminiscent of Chinese communism and Confucianism (two ideologies that, interestingly enough, have been considered antagonistic of one another for decades). Employing a more multi-dimensional approach than his predecessors, Xi also emphasizes the importance of the principles of the current system.
Xi Jinping’s referential fusion of the teachings of Chinese communism and Confucius in promoting China’s domestic and international identity eventually resulted in the birth of the ‘China Dream’, which encompasses all of the abovementioned developmental strategies. China’s rapid integration into the hegemonic system prompted concerns within the country, particularly on the part of the New Leftists who raised questions of whether or not China was on the path to losing its uniqueness and self-exclusivity. A clash emerged between China’s New Left, military intellectuals, and traditionalists on the one hand and liberals on the other, with the former blaming capitalism of having prompted a ‘values crisis’ due to its ‘destructive ability’ to push a society to engage in ‘money-worship’. The capitalist shift that allowed China to achieve economic prosperity piqued social anxieties in China, as some began to question if China could truly envision and champion a Marxist future based on the principles of social justice, welfare, equality and sustainable development.
During this time, assuaging these anxieties became another burden for the CCP government, considering that domestic fractures would certainly impact its international status. Certainly, the PRC boasted Marxism and Confucianism and described their fusion as a critical feature of the country in order to undermine the assumption that capitalism would destroy modern China. Moreover, the nascent China Dream strategy stressed China’s need to maintain ‘self-exclusiveness’ without falling into ‘transformismo’.
By evaluating the current situation within the framework of sub-optimization theory, it can be observed that recent developments in the PRC are accompanied by the revitalization of Maoist rhetoric. This resurgence has become a prominent feature of contemporary China. Considering that Mao’s perception of the world order was ultimately at odds with the hegemonic world order, the reapplication of Maoist thought to modern politics will certainly affect both Chinese understandings of its own posture and other actors’ 102 perceptions of China’s position in the global arena. Current President Xi Jinping has rejuvenated Maoist ideals and notions in his rhetoric and even pursued what might be considered Maoist actions. Such has been observed in his implementation of strict domestic policies that have proven to the global community that contemporary China under the CCP will not ‘transform’ into a conformed member of the current order. China’s suppression of civil society organizations (like the pro-constitutionalist New Citizens’ Movement), its detainment and prosecution of over 300 human rights lawyers, its shutdown of international NGOs operating within Chinese territory, and its intimidation of small religious groups (such as Falun Gong), feminist activists, labor rights advocates, internet celebrities, and journalists during Xi’s presidential term indicate that China’s current government aims to attain certain targets by revitalizing a communist narrative and stance (Freedom House, 2016). By implementing such a suppressive strategy within the country, the contemporary government seeks to prevent all kinds of oppositional voices within China from questioning and criticizing the PRC’s stance and actions in the international domain. Indeed, China’s ‘risen head’ has begun to become much more visible during Xi’s term when compared with other eras. During this time, China has become more aggressive in its domestic policy and more offensive in its approach to regional problems (e.g. the South China Sea dispute and Taiwanese claims of sovereignty) both in rhetoric and in its actions.
Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’, which promotes authoritarian state structures that adopt market capitalism and highlights the importance of harmonization while maintaining diversity, is the last circle of ideological development inherited from the assumptions of Tianxia. This strategy aims to form a basis for China’s societal influence beyond its borders. Xi Jinping indicated that the “China dream is for great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which means achieving a rich and powerful country and the revitalization of the nation and people’s happiness” (Callahan 2015: 984).
Quite different from the American model of development, the ‘China Model’ emphasizes the importance of escaping ‘greedy’ desires and individualistic interests. As Bell (2008) argues, in this model, social success trumps individual happiness. Here, many of this model’s constitutive notions, including the ‘China Dream’, can be attributed to Confucius’s ideals that portend that social cooperation can easily be devastated as a result of human desires. According to this reading, individual ambitions should not be suppressed per se, but should instead be civilized. The ‘China Dream’ was formed based on the fundaments of Confucianism, which holds that universal solidarity can be attained by extending ties from the family to the state and ultimately to the entire world (Callahan 2015). Accordingly, two
103 mechanisms are stressed here: “the first is to learn care and compassion within the family and [the second is to] apply family-like labels and norms to non-family members” (Callahan 2015: 101). It is believed here that these principles constituting the roots of a possible ‘historic bloc’, initiated and led by China, can undermine the rapacious interests of the current hegemonic system.
Since Deng’s presidency China’s concealment of its ideology in order to promote economic growth gradually faded away as new presidents of the PRC were confronted with the challenges arising from this form of convoluted secrecy. Was China surrendering to neoliberalism or was it actually attempting to revive its Marxist and/or Confucian backgrounds? This question was asked far beyond the borders of China, gaining international significance, as the answer would have severe implications for China’s role in the global arena for the foreseeable future. China’s blurred ideological foundations, characteristics, and intentions began to fade most rapidly during Xi Jinping’s term as Maoist rhetoric fused with Confucian assumptions to form the basis of a novel ‘Chinese alternative’ to the current order that could be realized with the help of a ‘historical class’.
Though it seems that socialism challenges Confucianism, and that modernization challenges history, Xi’s ‘China Dream’ was peculiarly able to synthesize of all these tenets. Seeking to explain this ability to harmonize these seemingly divergent notions, William Callahan refers to this passage from the two-millennia-old ‘Book of Rites’:
When the Great Way prevails, the world will belong to all. They chose people of talent and ability whose words were sincere, and they cultivated harmony. Thus people did not only love their own parents, not only nurture their own children. ... In this way, selfish schemes did not arise. Robbers, thieves, rebels, and traitors had no place, and thus outer doors were not closed. This is called the Great Harmony. (2015: 992) Philosophically, such references to ancient Chinese texts often emphasize the provision of support to the disadvantaged whether domestically or internationally. By instrumentalizing such subliminal messages, the ‘China Dream’ underlines the importance of social and economic rights as explicated within the framework of Confucian ideas. Accordingly, the ‘China Dream’ approach employed by Xi declares that the poor and humble who have been deprived of resources and key social goods will be prioritized. China’s supposed desire to battle injustice within the hegemonic order has never been clearly defined as it has in the ‘China Dream’.
The ‘China Dream’ can be seen as the crest of China’s developmental path depicted within this chapter. It is the last piece of the puzzle comprising the ‘China Model’. Throughout the 104 decades, various strategies implemented within and without the PRC, culminating with the ‘China Dream’, have attempted to gain the ‘hearts and minds’ of various societies. The ‘China Model’ is considered to be the alternative to the established order within the regions that will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.9. Conclusion
This chapter primarily sought to formulate an analysis of the development of a possible alternative driven by China, an actor that isolated itself from the international society for such a long period of time only to rebound with extreme rapidity. By delving into the history of the PRC, it has been possible to observe how this actor benefitted from the established hegemonic order without falling into ‘transformismo’. Its fusion of Confucian and communist approaches can be seen in what is now termed the ‘China Model’, a suggested pattern of development that highlights that authoritarian states were excluded from garnering the privileges of the current hegemonic system led by the neoliberal democratic powers. Indeed, the Chinese alternative seems to incorporate today’s transnational capitalist classes albeit without excluding authoritarian regimes.
Furthermore, China’s good relations not only with the Third World nations but also with other major powers are very important in promoting the effective application of its model. Its efforts to avoid all kinds of conflicts with neighboring states and major powers can be regarded as a success as such proves the loyalty of the Chinese government to its doctrine of ‘peaceful ascendancy’.
Certainly, if this model is to relieve itself from the constraints that exist within the established system, China could come to lead a new ‘historic bloc’, the possibility of which will be discussed in the upcoming chapter with particular reference to the domain of ‘energy security’.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POTENTIAL ‘HISTORIC BLOC’ ALONG CHINA’S ENERGY ROUTES
4.1. Introduction
China’s tremendous, three-decade-long economic boom has caused many to view this actor with concern. Its rise triggered the emergence and evolution of a new model. Certainly, when comparing China’s ascendency with that of the American hegemonic order after the end of the Second World War, the question of whether the Chinese pattern could be as successful as its predecessors began to be seriously explored.
China’s path to progress gave way to concerns over the country’s future actions, as many asked whether China would fight to sit upon the ‘global throne’ or whether it would simply remain comfortable under the shelter of the established hegemonic order. In order to better predict the answers to these questions and anticipate the path that will be pursued by this new rising power down the road, one needs to consider the various scenarios. Jeffrey W. Legro emphasized several schemes of Chinese development in his book entitled ‘What will China want, the future intentions of a rising power’ (2007). In this work, Legro laid out three patterns that could potentially be assumed by the PRC:
- Revolutionary revisionist – By assuming this position China would reject the ideational grounds of the hegemonic order in terms of international institutions. Indeed, it would either want to completely detach from the world order or become a new vanguard that would challenge the fundamental normative content of international society. In this way, such a path would likely lead China to take destructive steps in an attempt to overthrow both the established status and scope of international society. Such is reminiscent of China’s approach under Mao.
- Orthodox revisionist – Adopting this mantra, China would act as though it were happy with the existing hegemonic order comprising the institutional structure and the ideational content of international society. Nevertheless, different from the status-quo power, the rising actor is most likely to be unhappy due to its position within the structure.
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- Reformist revisionist – Adopting this approach, China would accept some of the institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and international reasons, but it would resist and even seek to reform others while also aiming to change its status.
Indeed, regardless of which path China chooses it will still be argued that ‘China accepts an ideational basis [of] the pluralist coexistence institutions. It accepts at least instrumentally the market, resists the more politically liberal institutions and wants to increase its status’ (Buzan 2010:17). Certainly, China’s alternative that is bolstered by the country’s economic power is different from those of the previous challengers of the hegemonic order which focused primarily on military strength.
By referring to the sub-optimization strategy pursued by previous rising powers, it can be discerned that China’s pattern of development cannot be deemed an exception. As discussed above, Legro argued that China possesses the ability to effectively utilize the current system and its advantages without significantly straying from the main premises of the order. This reality has led some to conclude that the Chinese economic boom was realized due to the country’s successful application of the standards imposed by the established order, or in other words, due to the country’s successful emulation of the American model (Nathan 2003). Nevertheless, the third chapter outlined that the main difference between the ‘China Model’ and the American model can be seen in China’s employment of a ‘weighing’ strategy, wherein it seeks to balance its interests on the one hand and the responsibilities that the established order expects its members to fulfill on the other. Its ‘appropriation’ policy and capacity to build an alternative path of development for other developing countries seems to attract those who are already discontent with the hegemonic system. The main drawing point of the ‘China Model’ pertains to its ability to involve and incorporate self-exclusive tenets which would otherwise be deemed unacceptable by other ‘ideologies or strategies’. This model is attractive to those who don’t adhere to certain norms within the international arena and are therefore barred from reaping the benefits of the hegemonic order.
Certainly, China’s ability to produce and even export its ‘alternative’ without escalating tensions within the existent world order is due to its extraordinary economic might. China’s economic success ultimately translated into its demands for greater international status, which in turn triggered questions related to the possibility of a ‘hegemonic transition’. It should be noted here that any kind of transition in the upcoming decades will differ from the transitions witnessed in the era of our ‘grandfathers’ (Brooks & Wohlforth 2016) in that hard power will most likely not be the main determinant of change. China’s attempts to 107 improve its soft power through hegemonic projects, aid programs, and alternative development models on one hand and its will to advance its militaristic, technological, and innovative power on the other hand bring China’s true intentions, which have been hidden for so long, to the surface. Theoretically, China’s alternative model for the established order seems to be ready for export, just as Chinese officials begin to underline the notion of ‘change’. China has begun to voice its desire for ‘change’. It wants a better position in the international domain. It wants dominance within, at least, its periphery without any kind of hegemonic intervention. Such is apparent, but how far is this rising power from achieving these dreams?
In order to pinpoint where China stands relative to its goals, the chains that are able to hinder China from making revisions to the world order must also be pinpointed. Certainly, the obstacles that stand in China’s path cannot be examined apart from China’s relations with the current hegemon. Never before in world history have a rising power and a hegemon been so integrated and interdependent.
Restraints on the economic, financial, political, cultural, and societal levels imposed by the hegemonic power and the increasing demands for change being voiced by a new rising actor seem mutually exclusive, however, there still exists an inherent need to cooperate. Nevertheless, one of these levels in which the rules of the hegemonic structure still work to maintain control over and even ‘contain’ the ascendancy of the rising actor will be discussed in this chapter. Explicitly, strong ‘energy security’ can be considered as one of the many reasons for China’s contentious economic rise. In this regard, this chapter will evaluate China’s potential to build a ‘historic bloc’ along its energy routes and the US’s ability to maintain control over China’s ascendancy through the implementation of a ‘transformismo’ policy that would provide China the necessities for its continued development and eventual return to the established hegemonic fold.
This chapter will explore the main framework of energy security that is so necessary in facilitating China’s enduring economic growth, which is in turn extremely determinant of its success in gaining political, ideological, and societal influence across the globe. Hence, this chapter will engage in a comparative analysis examining the US’s pivot policy to Asia and China’s growing interests in its own peripheries while instrumentalizing the case of energy to highlight the main points of contention arising in the relations between the two powers. Indeed, the US’s continued application of leverage in the domain of energy by way of its allied proxies throughout the region will be investigated.
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Furthermore, China’s hegemonic One Belt One Road (OBOR) project, which aims to encompass a gigantic geographic area and grant China access to areas with a plethora of natural resources, will be discussed in order to evaluate China’s relations with actors that are most dissatisfied with the current order. It should be noted that any obstacle before China’s access to much needed energy resources can negatively influence the appeal of and rationale behind the ‘China Dream’. Nevertheless, it can be seen that obstacles imposed by the hegemonic structure are being transformed into advantages for China as the latter begins to persuade other countries along its energy routes to apply its developmental model discussed above. Here, China’s application of a strategy that focuses on a route of energy resource-rich countries which have been unable to benefit from the established order due to their socio-political choices will be analyzed. These points will mainly concentrate on measuring the acceleration of China’s attempts to build a ‘historic bloc’ that can eventually bring about a ‘hegemonic transition’.
4.2. The importance of energy security
Energy security is one of the most important and vulnerable branches of internal and external security for any country. The undisrupted supply of energy resources is at the top of the agenda of every state, though some assess this issue within the scope of low politics, as opposed to the security-focused realm of high politics. Nonetheless, industrial development enhances each state’s dependence on crude energy resources and therefore promotes energy security as a high politics issue. Considering the scarcity of crude oil and gas resources in the world, states are searching for new centers or technologies that can provide them with opportunities to decrease their dependence on others.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security in this way:
Energy security is defined as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. To provide solid economic growth and to maintain levels of economic performance, energy must be readily available, affordable and able to provide a reliable source of power without vulnerability to long-term or short-term disruptions. Interruption of energy supplies can cause major financial losses and create havoc in economic centers, as well as potential damage to the health and wellbeing of the population. (World Energy Outlook 2015) It has been observed over time that consumers and suppliers of energy resources have divergent approaches toward energy security. Consumers follow two strategies in order to provide for their own energy security based on the duration of supply: long-term security and short-term security. As might be discerned, the former denotes longer-term resource
109 availability without any interruptions, while the latter involves preventing or halting supply disruptions of fuel or electricity within limited or temporary timeframes.
Problems pertinent to the energy policies of consumers are usually the result of two global realities:
1. The main energy supplying states are located in geographically complex and politically vulnerable places.
2. The unequal share of resources in the world creates special challenges, especially for consumers in terms of transportation, price control, etc. (Yergin 2007: 13)
According to Daniel Yergin, a well-known scholar working on energy issues, only 15 states in the world have sufficient enough oil reservoirs to export ‘black gold’. However, their positions on the map, unguaranteed policies, and autocratic regimes have been a constant concern to energy consuming states. It is for this reason that states are interested in diversifying the sources of their energy supply. As Winston Churchill stated during the First World War, “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” This aphorism still holds weight today, not only for consumers but also for producers. Therefore, energy exporters are also interested in selling their resources for profitable prices, and accordingly interdependence among states and a lack of reliability in the current energy market is easily observed.
The energy market seems to compel all actors to look at the world through the same ‘lens’, as the need for energy is a common demand, and in the end, the lack of a common approach would spell out disaster for all. The establishment of a zero-sum game in the domain of energy is extremely risky, as the consequences for the world order would be incurable at best and utterly lethal at worst. There is no other material in the world besides energy resources that plays such a valuable role in directly defining the economic and indirectly defining the political position of a state. Consequently, according to some scholars, China and the US – two giant economies and ‘eternal’ rivals – seek to respectively attain and maintain world supremacy, yet the have also become ‘perpetual friends’ as a result of their recent energy interdependence. Energy markets are rapidly shifting, therefore the following section will explore how these shifts change the balances between powers and alter their influence over others. Furthermore, the probability of Chinese-US clashes and/or cooperation will be analyzed with respect to China’s attempts to establish a ‘historic bloc’ in collaboration with energy-rich countries that are discontent with the hegemonic structure.
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The past three years have seen significant events occur within the international economic- political arena. However, the most significant occurrence for this research is related to the shifting balances in the energy market. New gas reserves have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, the US’s shale boom has decreased its dependence on foreign states, and increases in China’s demand for oil and gas have led it to sign enormous contracts with third parties. Moreover, tensions between Europe and Russia have undermined their cooperation and resulted in the termination of construction of one of the largest gas pipelines of all time (the South Stream). In such a context, Europe looked to the Caspian region to fulfill its gas demand and thus formed relatively moderate relations with Turkmenistan and Iran to provide for its energy security. On the other hand, US-Chinese energy relations entered a new phase in light of the US’s efforts to become self-sufficient and China’s attempts to capitalize on the fall of oil prices in order to acquire maximized benefits by signing agreements and entering new markets.
Figure 2. US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook, 2014
If we were talking about energy interdependence before, which pushed the US and China to observe energy policy from the same perspective, these new developments have certainly facilitated the divergence of these two states to different sides of the aisle. The US is now one of the largest producers of energy resources thanks to its shale technology, while China’s growing industrial base requires and consumes an ever growing amount of energy (Yergin 2014). It should be underlined here that the competition between these actors is not only characterized by their race to access to energy markets. Conversely, until recently both China and the US sought to cooperate during the times in which both were strictly dependent on foreign energy imports. Nonetheless, the situation in the energy markets has
111 changed and thereby attracted the curiosity of experts seeking to predict what steps these two energy ‘giants’ might take next.
The World Energy Council released a document depicting the main issues in today’s energy markets:
- Commodity prices and volatility; High prices and inflationary risks are emerging.
- Energy prices and volatility; High price volatility and investment uncertainty is emerging (sparking concerns around ‘security of demand’).
- Growth of China/India – Demand is shifting to the East, competition for scarce resources is emerging, markets are becoming more uncertain, and growth rates are unsustainable.
- Russia’s energy diplomacy – Russia has been able to adapt to the shale gas boom and maintain its importance in the natural gas sector. This has implications for regional/global gas markets.
- EU cohesion – The absence of a common EU energy policy may negatively effect the common energy market and regional interconnection.
- Fragility in the Middle East/North Africa – Political fragility and potential conflict (e.g. around the Suez Canal) may affect the global security of supply.
- US trade policy’s influence over global energy markets – US-driven innovation and policies are influencing global energy trade and affecting priorities in bilateral relations and international security policies. (World Energy Council 2015)
Another complex issue related to changes in the energy market can be observed in the shifting perceptions of energy security in China and the US. China’s energy relations are primarily run by national companies. Some scholars see this as indicative of China’s use of properties as strategic tools, however, the Chinese government declares that it considers this issue to be a matter of low politics (or an aspect of its commercial relations, not related to national security). Conversely, the US runs its energy affairs primarily through private companies, which sometimes fail to gain access to certain markets due to the ‘constraints’ imposed by the hegemonic structure. Therefore, while China claims that its energy policy is not bound to ‘national interests’ alone it also argues that the US market is not necessarily ‘free’ from government intervention (Zhang Jian 2011). To better understand these
112 dynamics, the next section will outline the evolution of China’s modern energy policies as well as the extent to which the hegemonic system has exerted influence thereon.
4.3. China’s involvement in the world energy market
China – the rising global power and shining star of Asia-Pacific region – sees energy security as the most vulnerable aspect of its rapidly growing economy. The Chinese economy has set out to search for a ‘remedy’ or ‘treatment’ for its energy ‘wound’ in almost every corner of the world. China, as pragmatic actor within the world order, has supported some principles of the market economy and this has in turn influenced the country’s journey to attain strong energy security.
Modern China has answered changes in domestic and international markets by disregarding its communist foundations when necessary, as explained above. China’s policies toward energy markets have never been fixed, on the contrary, they have been flexible perceptive, bending to regulations and solving challenges in a timely manner. To better comprehend this flexibility in Chinese energy policy, one needs only look at the historical sequence of its development.
Chinese energy security policies underwent three distinct phases: the autocratic stage (1949-1977), the limited opening stage (decentralization and corporatization of market- oriented players from 1978-2002), and the coordinated state capacity stage (2003-2013). According to Monique Taylor (2014), oil is mostly accepted as a strategic good rather than a regular commodity and the energy sector is considered “far too important to be left to market forces alone” (p. 28). As might be easily observed, these three stages of Chinese energy policies coincide with China’s general political evolution.
During the first stage, the PRC’s energy policy was developed with regard to the centrally- planned economic system and industrial development under the direct command of the government. This stage encompasses two distinct periods: the period of Chinese dependency on Soviet influence (1949-1959) and the period of energy independence under conditions of economic self-reliance (1959-1978). China’s application of the Soviet model in the energy domain, which demanded the strict allocation of resources, setting targets for production quantities, and state determination of pricing, met with failure. It was during this time that the first cracks emerged in Soviet-Chinese relations, as the Soviet Union sought to prove its dominance by using oil as a ‘political tool’ in China and thereby lost its credibility as the PRC terminated purchases of oil from its neighbor and instead began to develop its own oil fields. Later, “Mao’s theory of national self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and 113 economic autarky” drove the rapid development of the country’s oil sector (Taylor 2014: 59). The Daqing oilfield (88,600 bbl/d) was discovered in 1963 and quickly became a symbol of China’s modernization. However, China’s attempts to ‘win propaganda plaudits’ by trying to find and extract oil as rapidly as possible resulted in 90% waste of these resources as a consequence of the application of reckless methods and underdeveloped technologies.
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘second revolution’, characterized by the ‘Reform and Opening’ policy, marked the beginning of China’s transition from a planned to market-oriented economy as well as the commencement of the second stage in the evolution of China’s energy policy. From 1978-2002, foreign investment in China, the establishment of Chinese-Western joint ventures, and the decentralization of China’s oil production dotted the main trajectory of the Chinese energy sector. Mao’s ad-hoc policy of purchasing foreign oil equipment was substituted with a more long-term, extroverted policy in the 1970s as “international engagement was an essential requirement to stimulate exploration, production, and exploitation of offshore oil” (Taylor 2014: 102).
Another prominent feature of this stage of China’s energy policy was seen in the birth of the ‘Go Global’ policy in the 1990s and the development of Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs), which would later enter the competitive international market. The main target of these endeavors was “to separate government from enterprises, create new institutions to control the market, [and to] transform large state firms into modern corporations” (Taylor 2014: 98). Later, newly developed Chinese businesses were divided according to their activities in the market, hence, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) became involved primarily in offshore exploration and production, Sinopec Group became involved primarily in the processing and distribution of petroleum production, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) became involved primarily in onshore exploration and production as well as governmental and administrative matters related to the energy sector. Chinese companies were mostly involved in the downstream sector of the energy market.
Chinese liberalization attempts during this period were nonetheless never naïvely taken at face value, as it was still apparent that “oil price always served not only to economic interests, but also for political purposes” (Taylor 2014: 109). Chinese companies, receiving backup from the state, became significant players in the international markets, eventually becoming major rivals to more established MNCs.
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Energy security in modern China is defined as the domain that ensures the existence of a sufficient amount of energy resources to maintain and sustain China’s political, economic, and ecological development. Therefore, new approaches to energy usage and development in China have aimed to diminish threats to the survival of human and ecological systems (Zhang 2011). Considering that China’s economic boom is directly tied to the security of the country’s energy supply, it should be argued that any challenges to the latter can explicitly hinder the former, and therewith China’s regional and global ambitions overall.
Gradually shifting from a self-sufficient, net oil exporter to a net importer of crude oil and petroleum products since the early 1990s, China has embarked down a new path. In 2013 the PRC surpassed the US as the largest net importer of oil and petroleum products. Accordingly, China’s oil consumption constituted 43% of all global oil consumption in 2014. Today, there are two fundamental concerns related to China’s energy security, according to Robert Lawrence Kuhn (2011). The first challenge is linked to China’s extremely high coal consumption, which generates massive amounts of greenhouse emissions; the second challenge relates to China’s increasing oil and natural gas imports from the most turbulent and distant regions of the world.
As the most dynamic power in the world, China’s sustainability ultimately depends on the free flow of energy resources. Though the country’s economic growth has slowed from 9- 10% annually to 7.5% annually primarily due to domestic and international economic downturns, such has not impacted China’s increasing demand for crude energy imports. Besides oil and petroleum imports, China’s natural gas demand has skyrocketed over the past decade, as witnessed in its increased purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and it signing of pipeline agreements with a number of countries.
One of the fundamental reasons for China’s new journey to acquire crude energy resources is related to its overutilization and extreme dependence on coal, which has resulted in a stark lack of diversity in the Chinese energy market. Indeed, 64.2% of China’s energy consumption is coal-based according to a 2014 report published by China’s National Energy Agency. Here, the Chinese government set a target to raise non-fossil fuel energy consumption to 15% of the energy mix by 2020 and to 20% by 2030 in an effort to ease the country’s dependence on coal (US EIA, 2015). Nonetheless, with China’s rapidly increasing demand for energy, coal consumption seems to keep pace, however, obstacles such as environmental sustainability have ultimately led China’s authorities to diversify the country’s sources of energy.
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China’s achievement of the target set in 2005 to reduce its CO2 emissions by 40% until 2020 seems unreachable as a result of the country’s overall coal consumption. This issue has also become all the more salient as it has been revealed in a recent analysis that China’s carbon emissions are expected to rise by more than one-third their current levels and eventually peak in 2030. Certainly, such a rise would be extraordinarily dangerous for a state that already suffers from extreme pollution and is accused of being one of the main actors responsible for global warming.
Therefore, recent shifts in China’s energy security priorities certainly cannot be attributed to one reason alone. The graph below shows the proportions of China’s energy consumption by resource. The aim of China is to reduce its reliance on coal in the coming decades by building a more energy-efficient economy.
Figure 3. BP Statistical Review 2014
The crucial point of Kuhn’s second concern related to China’s energy security is intertwined with the transportation of oil, petroleum products, and LNG. Certainly, geopolitical and geo-economic obstacles such as long distance transportation and problems with suppliers are the source of serious anxieties in Beijing, as disruptions to the flow of energy to China can slow or completely halt the decades-long economic success of the country.
According to the International Energy Agency (2011), 75% of China’s total energy consumption will be acquired from imports by 2030. Such a jump in its energy imports will most definitely make the rising power more vulnerable to international disturbances. Considering this, China’s ability to control its own growth will be severely diminished, unlike in the previous era in which its rise was often attributed to ‘self-sufficiency’.
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Considering that resources from the oil-rich Middle East, African states, and Venezuela are transported to China mainly by ship, challenges to their safety and timely arrival in China may emerge. Indeed, 85% of China’s energy resources are transported via ships that pass through strategic shipping lanes, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Suez Canal, which can be depicted as volatile and insecure due to their proximity to instable regions.
Even above problems that may arise in the regions where China’s energy exporters are located, the Malacca Strait issue occupies the top echelon of China’s energy security agenda. Thus, acts of piracy, oil spills, shipping accidents, and regional disputes within the Malacca Strait could easily delay and even disrupt the flow of energy resources to China and therefore negatively impact the Chinese economy in a very direct manner. Not surprisingly, Hu Jintao, in his description of the situation existing in the Malacca Strait, coined the term ‘Malacca dilemma’, problematizing China’s overreliance on this waterway between the Malaysian Peninsula and Sumatra Islands of Indonesia that sees the passage of 75-80% of China’s total crude energy imports. Hu Jintao argued that ‘certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the Malacca Strait’ (US, EIA, 2015). He went on to suggest a solution to the dilemma:
Therefore, in considering solutions to resolve the Malacca Dilemma, an obvious step, and one currently being undertaken, is greater cooperative naval diplomacy with other international actors to maintain good order at sea, and counter unconventional non-state threats to maritime security such as piracy and maritime terrorism. Beijing also could support capacity building for littoral states, intelligence exchanges, and multi-national training through regional security architecture such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (Davis 2014)
Figure 4. ‘Malacca dilemma’, Brookings, 2014
Though there are some alternative routes that unite the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea islands which can ease the traffic through the Malacca Strait, their feasibility is 117 nonetheless questionable. For instance, the shallow waters of the Sunda Strait make navigation for tankers all but impossible while the Lombok Strait route is economically implausible when compared with the trans-Malacca route (Brutlag 2014).
This problem is augmented by China’s lack of sufficient energy storage. Indeed, the construction of expanded strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) is anticipated to begin in 2020. These reserves are expected to meet China’s energy demand for at least 90 days, and the conclusion of their construction will no doubt ameliorate at least some anxieties. According to recent data published by the National Bureau of Statistics, by mid-2015 China’s strategic reserves had doubled its national oil stockpiles, accommodating 191 million barrels, or 26.1 million metric tons (Spegele 2015). Whereas the US has the capacity to store around 700 million barrels within its strategic petroleum reserves, China still aims to construct SPRs with the ability to store 500 million barrels of oil. According to the International Energy Agency’s recommendations, such preventative measures are necessary in overcoming unexpected breaches in energy security particularly, and national security generally.
All these points, encompassing China’s environmental, geographical, and technological challenges, emphasize the importance of energy security in the enduring rise of China. Having such an ‘Achilles heel’ obliges this power to calculate each step it takes, otherwise one simple miscalculation could have a significant negative impact on its ascendency. If it were to face any type of breach to its energy security, China – the rising power of the international order, the second greatest economy in the world, and the possible challenger of the current hegemonic structure – would be unable to maintain the economic leverage that forms the foundation of its ambitious future projects.
With such a crucial need for energy security, the PRC has accelerated its hunt for a solution to the above challenges. Here, it can actually be said that China has reached an impasse, as its growth in the economic domain requires unhindered access to energy resources. Certainly, China’s era of self-sufficiency is long gone. Its reliance on domestic coal still generates serious internal challenges, yet its attempts to diversify its energy resources away from coal has given rise to another problem, namely insecurities along the route of energy transportation.
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If a solution to this problem cannot be found, China could fall prey to this catch-223, as it will be unable to cure the wounds of the environmental degradation spawned by coal usage if it cannot resolve its overdependence on precarious water routes.
In addition to these challenges which certainly impact China’s national security and future strategies, certain regional restrictions imposed by the hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific after the end of the Second World War further complicate the already complex situation. In this context, the necessity to create ‘lines of flight’ from the geostrategic trap hindering its independent economic ascendency has become all the more apparent for this rising power.
Considering this state of affairs, China’s ability to transform all of these obstacles into opportunities by building a new ‘historic bloc’ along the route of new energy sources will be investigated below. With diminishing reliance on the established system that now appears to actually be restraining and controlling its development, China can take a great leap forward in the domain of energy security by gaining the consent of regions relatively unaffected by the hegemonic power.
Therefore, the following section will discuss the current regional system that has been shaped by the US by illuminating obstacles that have been placed before China’s economic progress. The ultimate eradication of dependence on other powers is nearly impossible for all actors in today’s contemporary era of interdependence. Nevertheless, the chance to utilize other alternatives can still bring about new confidence, especially for China. By analyzing the US’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific region from the energy security perspective, we can later determine the level of China’s concern in its own backyard as it potentially seeks to form a ‘historic bloc’ in such parts of the world that grant the current hegemonic system less legitimacy.
4.4. The US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ – or supervision of China’s rise
This section will try to draw the general framework of American involvement in the Asia- Pacific region in order to underline the reasons that could have prompted this hegemonic power to engage in ‘pivot’ politics. By engaging in a short historical analysis, this section will evaluate the return of the US to the region after its very brief digression to the Middle East. Certainly, the influence of the US’s resurgence in the region will be explored with particular reference to China’s energy security.
3 Urban Dictionary “A requirement that cannot be met until a prerequisite requirement is met, however, the prerequisite cannot be obtained until the original requirement is met.” 119
The US successfully managed to entrench its hegemony in the Asian-Pacific social, economic, and political structures. Indeed, Gramsci’s world hegemony that refers to the erection of universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which impose general rules of behavior for states and for forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, has been efficiently instated in the Asia-Pacific regional domain (Gill 1990; Kim & Jones 2007). Therefore, this Gramscian notion of hegemony, which is acquired through the passage of the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures (Cox 1987), or transformation from the specific interests of a group or class to the building of institutions and elaboration of ideologies, has successfully taken root in the Asia-Pacific in all aspects. Henceforth, Robert Cox’s description (1987) of hegemony like ‘a pillow’ that is able to absorb blows and make the situation comfortable for the would-be assailant is an apt description of the American path in the Asia-Pacific region. The US’s approach in this region went through all the phases of ‘hegemony’ depicted in the second chapter.
The US’s hegemonic activity in the Asia-Pacific spans a long history, beginning after it gained the leadership of its own continent by the end of 1898 Spanish-American War. The US first entered the markets of Asia with commercial intentions, proclaiming it only sought to pursue its trade interests, however, during the 19th century the US established a strong diplomatic, cultural, religious (missionary) presence in East Asia. Likewise, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II became the greatest reason for the US’s intervention into the War, which ultimately granted it world leadership. Certainly, the US’s regional hegemony was strengthened as it established permanent military bases throughout the Asia- Pacific, and as it built warm relations with Asian allies, it was also able to achieve ever increasing consent to its leadership throughout the Cold War years (Cox& Pipe 2005).
Specifically, American involvement in the region in the post-Korean War era encompassed five main points:
- A series of strong strategic partnerships
- Intensive bilateral and multilateral diplomacy
- Deep cultural ties
- Enormous soft power
- Growing Asian-American population
The US supplied its allies with security. Countries that lacked the ability to provide for their own security, to maintain a military, or even to develop without the assistance of the US 120 became bound to the superpower and accepted it as the hegemon of the region. Indeed, Professor Yuen Foong Khong, in his work entitled ‘American Tributary System’ (2013), touched upon this point as he juxtaposed the US presence in the region since the end of World War II with the Chinese tributary system that had prevailed throughout centuries. He defined the Chinese tributary system as follows:
The tribute system was a set of institutional structures that provided an overarching framework for organizing external relations among political actors in early modern East Asia. A set of rules and institutions developed over time that regulated foreign diplomatic relations, social and economic interaction, and provided a clear sense of order to the system. (p.37) The establishment and maintenance of a ‘tributary system’ in this region was considered very crucial for the hegemonic power for several reasons. Indeed, the Asia-Pacific region actually surpassed Europe as the leading trade partner of the US, with US-Asian commerce reaching 14.2 billion dollars in 2012. Since the 2000s, Asia has become the largest source of imports and the second largest export market for the US. The US has five significant allies in the region, three of them – Australia, Japan, and South Korea – provide the superpower with facilities that allow it to fulfill its commitments to the region and beyond.
Therefore, US hegemony in the region underwent two stages after the Second World War. Firstly, the US punished the aggressor, i.e. Japan, and later presented it with assistance in order to build beneficial regional governmental and economic structures. In this sense, US hegemony in the region could be depicted as Machiavelli’s centaur (half man, half beast) due to its utilization of the ‘consensual aspect of power’, in the form of economic assistance and institution building, in combination with the coercive aspect of its demilitarization of the aggressor. Moreover, by granting them support on the one hand, the US improved the circumstances of its allies in the region, but on the other hand it also created a ‘hub and spokes’ policy (Ikenberry 2004) with regard to its provision of security to the states in the region, an arrangement that has been criticized by numerous scholars. According to the critics, the US’s infantilization of its allies in the region triggered increases in US expenditures, however, the supporters of this approach point out that the benefits received by the US exceeded its spending. Actually, the ‘hub and spokes’ policy of the US in the Asia-Pacific has been compared to the Chinese tributary system (Lee 2015) in addition to being analyzed for its feasibility. Sometimes the expenses of ‘buying loyalty’ from tributes supersedes profits, nevertheless, as Fairbank argued, the “important thing to the rulers of China was the moral [not material] value of the tribute.” (Fairbank 1968: 13)
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The establishment of a ‘tributary system’ within the region required various arrangements in which the flow of expenditures can be observed. For instance, Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution forbade the country’s rearmament. Thus, Japan could spend only 1% of gross national product (GNP) on the military, as its security was provided by the US hegemon. Those actors that agreed with the US-imposed regulations were rewarded with the US’s support of their economic development. Consequently, the ‘Asian miracle’ was realized and Japan became the second largest economy in the world. Here, South Korea and Taiwan received similar benefits for their acquiescence, as these countries allocated only 3% of their budgets to the military and were thus assured through a number of agreements that the US would provide for their security. These arrangements allowed the social and economic conditions of the US’s regional allies to flourish, forced them to rely more and more on American financial and military assistance, and facilitated their ultimate acceptance of the US’s domination in the region.
With the end of the Cold War, as the structural threat embodied in the Soviet Union faded, the importance of the Asia-Pacific region began to be questioned as a result of other priorities on the US’s agenda. During this time US theorists and policy-makers began to mull over their policy options with regard to the Asia-Pacific and various other regions of the world. Hence, Joseph Nye Jr., in his article entitled ‘East Asian Security: The case for deep engagement’ (1995), laid out five different strategies that could be employed by the US in Asia following the fall of the US’s Soviet rival from the international arena:
1. Withdrawal from the region and pursuit of a northern hemispheric or Atlantic-only strategy. This approach seemed the most implausible due to the historic, geographic, demographic, and economic reliance that the actors of the time had on one another and as a result of the US’s self-identification as a Pacific power. Likewise, the organic relations that the US had built with Asian-Pacific actors obliged the former to refrain from abandoning the region. Nye argued that the existence of the US’s three island territories (Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marinas), whose people live closer to Asian capitals rather than Washington D.C., was a strong indicator of the impossibility of this policy.
2. The US withdrawal from its alliances in the region and support of a standard balance of powers strategy. Nye emphasized that the US’s surrender of its leadership in the Asia- Pacific would be the lowest-cost option, at least initially, as it could then try to play one state off one another. Nevertheless, the most complicated challenge entailed by this option was the possibility of destabilized relations among states, which could certainly bring about 122 an arms race and escalate antagonism in the region. Nye indicated that this policy would be the most dangerous for the US, and could ultimately become the most expensive, as the US would inevitably be required to interfere into the region in cases of war or crisis. The US’s return to the region would require more financial spending after it had already retreated from its bases. Moreover, the 5 billion dollars per year that the US acquired from these states for hosting its military bases would be void if it decided to depart from the region.
3. The US should try to create loose regional security institutions to substitute its structure of alliances in East Asia, ultimately supplementing the UN system. However, such organizations would need time to solve ancient problems in the region, according to Nye. Considering that ancient enmities among regional powers had not yet been fully overcome, it seemed like a stretch that new common security organizations could supplant US domination.
4. NATO-like regional alliances could be allowed to emerge in Asia. Nonetheless, Nye argued that these organizations could be perceived as aiming at Russia and China, whose intentions toward the US and its allies were still ambiguous. Therefore, with the establishment of such organizations, these two ‘suspicious’ states could be portrayed as enemies, thus leading to insecurity and unpredictability.
5. The US should continue to act as a leader in the region. This approach, first assumed by the Clinton administration, was thought to be the best path for both the US and its allies in the region according to Nye.
As Nye tried to determine the best path for US policy-makers, China began to grow its economic power. During this time, the mid 1990s, it would have nonetheless been difficult to predict that the Chinese economic boom would translate into Chinese influence over other domains within only a few short decades.
All the strategies mentioned by Nye show the importance of the Asia-Pacific in US policy calculations; nonetheless, the 9/11 attacks, deemed ‘The Second Pearl Harbor’ by some, brought the attention of the hegemon to another region of the world. Thus, the US, seeking to ‘provide international security’, became involved in a perpetual quagmire in its fight against terrorism and its attempts to substitute ‘evil’ governments with more ‘amiable ones’ in the Middle East. The US’s ‘omnipresent illusion’ collapsed soon thereafter, constituting a huge blow to the hegemonic structure ruled by this power (Cox, 2004). Consequently, the US, as the leader of the neoliberal world, began to see the importance in avoiding miscalculations and exaggerations of issues pertaining to the Middle East, as the 123 repercussions of its actions there echoed all around the world. Indeed, the US’s will to expand its influence and strengthen its position in the Middle East resulted in a variety of unintended consequences as the order that it had formalized came into question for the first time.
Such a reality went to show the dangerous fact that ‘the end of history’ was not yet in sight, despite arguments of Francis Fukuyama to the contrary. Indeed, the substantial failures of neoliberal values and the repercussions of the misuse of American hegemonic influence across the globe showed that ‘history’ was still in full swing, and moreover, that new actors would certainly play a significant role in shaping this ‘history’. This fact prompted American forces to revitalize their ambitions in the Asia-Pacific with the aim of maintaining, or taming, order.
Though the US never truly lost its interest in the Asia-Pacific, ultimately, its involvement in the Middle East after 9/11 indirectly decreased its level of engagement with actors in the Asia-Pacific. However, the continuing ascendancy of China prompted the need for Washington to develop a new vision of US-Asia-Pacific relations. Approaching the situation from the realist point of view, American policy-makers decided against allowing the rising power to feel free within its own ‘backyard’ (Mearsheimer 2014).
Furthermore, considering that the US gained traditional allies for whose security it took responsibility after the end of the Second World War, the US hegemon sought to increase its influence by applying new strategies. In this way, the second decade of the 21st century saw revisions made to the US’s list of priorities. The possibility that its position in the most dynamically developing corner of the world could weaken frightened the US, especially at a time in which its legitimacy was already increasingly questioned.
US President George W. Bush’s relative disregard of the Asia-Pacific’s importance for American hegemony was corrected by the Obama administration. Indeed, Obama shifted the US’s priorities, deeming it absolutely necessary to salvage the rapidly ‘sinking ship’ of American policy in the Middle East. When the Obama administration replaced the Bush administration, the geographical direction of the US’s gaze shifted. In 2011 Obama unveiled his ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy (at the Australian Parliament), whereby he reiterated the importance of the Asia-Pacific region.
This strategic concept, which was later labeled the US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’, envisioned the mutually beneficial opportunities that could be seized by both the US and Asian actors through increased interaction. Regardless of their philosophical or ideological backgrounds, 124 nearly all theorists pointed to the same reason why the US would launch such a strategy in the age of China’s rise: to control, and if necessary, contain China’s influence in its own ‘backyard’.
Two issues triggered this policy. Firstly, the US’s responsibility to ensure the security of its allies prompted the formulation of the strategy. Secondly, and perhaps more important, the US saw the need to pivot to the region due to the rise of China as a potential challenger to the established system.
With this strategy the US disclosed its intent to pivot to Asia and revealed its plans for the future of US-Chinese relations. Here, the US stressed the importance of mutually beneficial ties, as exemplified in US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a Chinese proverb denoting that it was necessary for the two countries to use ‘the same boat’ in order to cross ‘the same river’ peacefully. Clinton, with this metaphor, put emphasis on the importance of coexistence and cooperation. This kind of statement was evaluated as a signal of the US’s desire to further and fully integrate China into the hegemonic system by applying ‘transformismo’.
Later, Clinton’s famous article ‘America’s Pacific Century’ (2011) was published in Foreign Policy magazine, where she evaluated all aspects of the US’s new pivot and gave important hints as to the future of American regional policy.
Secretary Clinton highlighted the value of American engagement with Asia and emphasized the eagerness of regional powers to engage with American leadership and businesses in the future. The Asia-Pacific’s benevolent acceptance of US leadership over the decades was especially illuminated in her explanation of the US’s new approach. She extoled the US as the only power in the region’s network of alliances without any sinister territorial ambitions and as an actor with a bountiful record of providing for the common good. Clinton lauded the US’s maintenance of security in the region, highlighting the US’s regular patrols along sea lanes and its history of preserving stability and spreading common values in the region through its integration of billions of people, its arousal of economic productivity, and its journey to augment social empowerment. As a protector of human rights, a source of innovation, and a host of 350,000 Asian students per year, Clinton depicted the US as the benevolent leader of the region.
Emphasizing the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, Clinton also argued that the US saw systematic and smart policies as the best options to utilize in its engagement with the Asia-Pacific. She underlined the importance of wisely applying one’s 125 energy and attention in sustaining US supremacy, securing its interests, and advancing its values within the region. Her article came to be seen as the official voice of the US administration on the topic, and the Secretary utilized this pulpit to criticize those scholars who stressed the need for the US to retreat into its shell, focus more on domestic challenges, and avoid drains on its strength resultant of its involvement in other parts of the globe. Here, Clinton argued that downsizing the US’s presence in crucial regions of the world and reverting its focus to domestic issues alone would be detrimental to US interests. ‘From opening new markets to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home’ (Clinton 2011). Therefore, drawing a connection between domestic and international security, Clinton strongly refuted the arguments of the ‘go home’ policy supporters.
With reference to the abovementioned strategic typology laid out by Nye, the pivot policy launched by the Obama administration can be seen as an adjustment falling within the 5th category.
Consequently, the US’s new pivot has been coined as a ‘forward-deployed diplomacy’, where key lines of policy are characterized by:
- Strengthening bilateral security alliances
- Deepening working relationships with emerging powers
- Engaging with regional multilateral institutions
- Expanding trade and investment
- Forging a broad-based military presence
- Advancing democracy and human rights
Therefore, the US’s new strategy has been supported by its traditional regional allies, which have been increasingly unable to conceal their concerns over China’s rising power. Indeed, the transformation of China’s economic might into military strength has intimidated the US’s allies in the region (particularly Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia). The existence of territorial disputes and unresolved historical conflicts between the PRC and American allies, augmented by the latter’s lack of effective hard power, has facilitated the hegemon’s return to the region. Here, the US has emphasized the basic goals for its alliances in the Asia-Pacific as follows:
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1. Maintenance of political consensus on the primary objectives of alliances
2. Assurance of adaptable and flexible policies of alliances in the region that can overcome all kinds of challenges and seize new opportunities
3. Provision of defense capabilities and communication infrastructure to the alliances to guarantee these allies’ abilities to preempt provocations from state and non-state actors
Figure 5. American bases in the Asia-Pacific
Nonetheless, it should be noted that this region is not comprised only of friends and allies of the US, therefore, pivot policy drawers also emphasized the US’s need to maintain good relations with other powers. American policy-makers also considered the importance of maintaining peace and stability and of preventing discord in the region in large part due to the fact that Asian markets account for of over a quarter of American exports in goods and services (Asia Matters for America 2013). In this way, the US seeks to increase its relations with other states in the region aside from its traditional partners. In this context, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines have become strategic partners of the US and have supplied the superpower with new military bases. The US also intensified its relations with Vietnam and Myanmar as part of its ‘forward-deployed diplomacy’. In short, the US has begun to pursue a proactive policy that aims to engage ‘every corner and every capital’ of the Asia- Pacific. Obama’s speech that first introduced the pivot strategy occurred simultaneously with his declaration that 2,500 US Marines would be deployed to Darwin, Australia. Here, Obama outlined the features of the US’s leadership of the Asia-Pacific order:
Every nation will chart its own course. Yet it is also true that certain rights are universal, among them freedom of speech, press, religion, freedom of citizens to 127
choose their own leaders. This is the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific – security, prosperity and dignity for all. So let there be no doubt: in the 21st century, the US is all in. (Remarks in Australian Parliament, 2011) The formulators of the pivot strategy repeatedly emphasized that the policy did not target any one actor in particular and that it instead only emphasized ‘certain universal rights’. However, critics beg to differ.
Not surprisingly, the US’s need to maintain strong relations with the most crucial rising power of the 21st century was underlined in this strategy. Indeed, a path to engaging China more efficiently in the global arena was laid out. By putting emphasis on the benefits that could be and had been acquired by the rising power as a result of its adherence to the established order, strategists of the pivot policy stressed the importance of China’s greater contribution to solutions of challenges occurring within the current structure.
Voicing that ‘a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for the US’ (2011), Clinton indicated that the undisturbed Chinese development was a goal of US policy. Undoubtedly, the US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy can be seen as an effort to supervise and control China’s enduring ascendency. Sensing this, the majority of China’s political and societal actors believed that US intercession into regional issues, as well as its attempts to direct China’s attention to the quagmires of North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, ultimately aimed to weaken China. Consequently, the US’s explicit intent to become more involved in the region awoke concerns in China. In order to preempt possible clashes between their country and the US, Chinese authorities pointed to the most crucial detail of their model of development, namely respect for differences and the avoidance of placing unrealistic expectations on others.
Nonetheless, cooperation between the two powers improved through bilateral initiatives such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, however, the US’s increased presence in China’s ‘backyard’ was still considered problematic. Indeed, the security umbrella provided by the US to its traditional regional allies still depicted the threat of North Korea as one of the main reasons for American military presence in the region. Here, Chinese scholars excoriate such a justification and claim it to be a reiteration of the ‘Cold War’ rhetoric utilized in Europe when the ‘red menace’ was still on the horizon.
On a separate note, the state of human rights in China was always a target for critics in the US, as restrictions imposed by China within its own domestic political system have long been considered in violation of international law. The US’s approach can thus be seen as an attempt to make its main challenger’s policy more adaptable to its own interests by 128 supervising China’s growth and granting it advice on how to ‘mature’ under the security umbrella of the US.
The US’s ‘will to control’ is presented to Chinese society as part and parcel of this superpower’s arrogant narrative enshrined in its earlier ‘with us or against us’ approach, which had already devastated American legitimacy. Therefore, employing such a stance, the Chinese government has intended to prevent the US from exerting impacts on the domestic domain by way of its ‘pivot’ policy. Nevertheless, in official statements and documents, US policy-makers try to counter the Chinese government’s rhetorical advances by referring to other regional actors’ acceptance of US domination. Accordingly, the large- scale comeback of the US to the Asia-Pacific and its enhanced material presence in the region are presented by US officials as mutually beneficial for all sides based on other states’ need and calls for American engagement and leadership (Clinton 2011). Indeed, the hegemonic power, even amid the worst decline of its global legitimacy, did not expect to utilize the same type of passionate rhetoric that it had used after the end of the Second World War, yet by insisting on the universality of neoliberal values, the US’s pivot strategy is a substantial challenge to China’s traditional modus operandi:
We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal – that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia cherish them – and they are intrinsic, stable, peaceful and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world. (Clinton 2011) Accordingly, the US believes that a ‘go home’ policy would be unacceptable, as it strongly believes that it can overcome any challenge by promoting innovative notions and by endorsing the prosperity and progress of humankind. According to American politicians, the US, with its superior military, economy, productivity, and universities, is unstoppable, and it can therefore sustain its global leadership in the 21st century. It is easy to discern the conflation of soft and hard power in this attitude, and thereby to understand why the US seeks to rebalance or pivot toward Asia.
Consequently, the foreign policy shift of the US hegemon overlapped with the ascendency of emerging China just as the former came to evaluate the latter as a threat to the established order. Indeed, the strategy led by the Obama administration has been justified in the following ways:
- The US needs to assure its friends and allies that it will provide them a safe haven under its security umbrella. 129
- The US needs to uphold the international norms relating to freedom of navigation in the face of China’s aggressive approach to neighboring states, especially when it comes to territorial disputes.
- The US’s interests have shifted away from the Middle East due to the former’s newly acquired self-sustaining supply of energy resources as a result of the shale boom and alternative energy.
The word ‘pivot’ itself gives rise to significant concerns in China, as it has caused many to ask questions about the intentions behind the US’s growing presence in the region. Still, China’s concerns have not been assuaged even though US policy-makers substituted the term ‘pivot’ with ‘rebalancing’ in all official statements and documents in order to deescalate tensions. Moreover, such a move on the part of American officials has failed to convince many, especially China, that the US’s newfound strategy is not simply a measure intended to ensure ‘security against China’. While the true success of this policy is still questionable as Obama leaves office, the following section will try to evaluate the impact of the pivot strategy on Chinese energy security.
4.5. Impact of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy on Chinese energy security
After Obama’s announcement that the Asia-Pacific region would top the US’s national security priority list, in the Shangri-La Dialogue conference, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed the primary practical steps that would flesh out the US’s new approach:
By 2020, the navy will posture its forces from today’s roughly 50-50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans […] That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, combat ships, and submarines. (BBC 2012, June) Secretary Panetta emphasized here that cutbacks to the US military budget would not impact its strategic targets in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the US aims to enhance the frequency and size of its training exercises with its regional allies in the upcoming decade (BBC 2012, June).
The US’s pivot strategy is based on increasing already extensive diplomatic, economic, development, people-to-people, and security ties with its regional allies. Nevertheless, such a refocusing of US policy has been evaluated as dangerous by Beijing. Here, by analyzing the current dynamics of the geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the Asia-Pacific, we are able to determine the effects of the pivot strategy on Chinese energy security.
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The increasing demand for imported oil and gas in China has triggered the country’s concerns about the US’s high-profile return to the region. Indeed, the American naval fleet’s increased presence in the Pacific Ocean, in addition to the existence of sophisticated US military bases in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia, is a clear indication of the US’s attempts to bring its forces physically closer to China (Index of U.S. Military Strength, 2015). China’s military actions – including its infrastructural development, building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, and territorial disputes with American allies – are harshly criticized by a US that has declared itself the guarantor of peace and security in the region. Thus China, which depends on the undisrupted flow of energy resources in order to maintain its growth, is obviously concerned about the increased presence of the hegemonic power in its ‘backyard’. Chinese officials openly criticize what they see as the US’s hegemonic interventions, or ‘repairing of fences’, in the region. They argue that China’s refusal to ‘dance to the American tune’ caused the US to refocus on the Asia-Pacific, a reality that, they claim, ultimately challenges China’s national security in general, and its energy security in particular (Xinhua, 10/07/2016).
4.6. China’s potential reactions to the US’s rebalancing strategy
John Mearsheimer, in his analysis on the probability of China’s peaceful rise, compared the paths to prominence of the US and the PRC, arguing that the latter is following the path of the former by firstly seeking hegemony within its own ‘backyard’. He emphasized in his article ‘Can China rise peacefully?’ (2014) that in order to gain global hegemony a rising power first needs to guarantee regional supremacy.
The potential reactions of the PRC toward the US’s return to the Asia-Pacific, accompanied by the latter’s massive human and technological advantages, can be placed into three categories based on the works of scholars from Western and Asian academia. These reactions from China can lead to three different scenarios:
1. Disregarding its ‘peaceful rise’ rhetoric, the PRC could attempt to reorder the world system by attaining supremacy in Asia, openly clashing with prevailing international norms (Gilley 2004). If it follows this route, China could be evaluated as a revisionist state that intends to reformulate the established system by reframing its yet to be attained regional hegemony to better fit the multipolar world. Here, China’s military modernization and development of hard power capabilities in addition to its utilization of soft power instruments could allow it to establish informal alliances on the one hand and veto resolutions in international organizations on the other. Many perceive such a scenario as a
131 potential threat (Ross 2009; Shaumbaugh 2000; Gill & Huang 2006; Sutter 2007, Pape 2005; Walt 2005). Supporters of this approach emphasize China’s aim to challenge the current system openly and directly by gaining the throne of supremacy in its own region first and foremost.
2. The PRC, by developing its economic and military power, could become a responsible member of international society and therewith come to shoulder its fair share of burdens. The proponents of this approach emphasize China’s ability to contribute to global peace and stability without challenging the established structure. Indeed, such commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation, and avoidance of confrontation with the hegemonic power and other regional powers on the part of the PRC depicts the country as a status-quo power (Bergsten & Gill 2006, Pye & Goldstein 2006). Accordingly, China’s potential reactions are not evaluated as hard or soft attempts to balance the US’s grand strategy within the region; conversely, such behavior would be better understood as ‘bandwagoning’. This scenario is characterized by China’s potential contribution to regional security and stability in terms of it supporting international military operations in various parts of the world, and can therefore be evaluated as contrary to arguments claiming China intends to challenge the existing system. Moreover, this scenario contends that China’s increasing military budget pertains only to the Taiwan case, which occupies the top ranks of the Chinese security agenda, and not to the strategic presence of the US in the region. Consequently, this rather optimistic school of thought emphasizes China’s unwillingness to build anti-US alliances or undermine US regional or global hegemony (Johnston 2013).
3. This scenario sees the ascendency of China as fitting within the US dominated global order, which ensures the rising power’s secure future. Supporters of this scenario are often portrayed as ‘sitting on the fence’ as they do not want to constrain themselves to the balancing vs. bandwagoning dichotomy (Foot & Walter 2011; Goh 2005).
Accordingly, Robert Gilpin emphasized that the increase in the scale of a state, an empire, or a market economy prompted the emergence of subgroups at the expense of the larger group or the whole system (Vivoda 2009). In other words, the process of sub-optimization, by which subgroups attempt to enhance their relative gains by benefitting from the acquirements of the larger group, stands at the core of the third scenario. Gilpin defined this kind of consequence as the result of spontaneous and unintended actions, rather than the outcome of conscious and explicit strategy. He went on to argue (1981) that the driving
132 forces of the sub-optimization process are mainly developing states, which, through economic nationalism, aim to decrease their reliance on more advanced economies.
Vivoda stressed that soft-balancing and sub-optimization were often confused, a characteristic trait of the works of scholars that focus on China’s rise. Here, Vivoda claimed that China’s application of soft-balancing, not sub-optimization, would look more like ‘actions that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies’ (Pape. 2005:64). Indeed, such an approach can be seen as very distinct from sub-optimization, as soft-balancing is characterized by the indirect challenge to a hegemon’s military supremacy through the utilization of non-military tools. Alternately, the sub-optimization policy does not merely attempt to ‘delay, frustrate, and undermine’ aggressive unilateral military policies of a hegemonic power, but instead aims to create and utilize opportunities in order to increase relative gains. Indeed, soft-balancing should be articulated as a subordinate tier of the greater sub-optimization strategy, considering that the latter can be read as an expression of frustration with hegemonic policies in general without pushing for military involvement in the struggle.
Therefore, Gilpin’s definition of the sub-optimization strategy overlaps with the third scenario above, as it indicates that China could garner relative gains as part, or leader, of a subgroup within the Western-dominated capitalist structure. Indeed, the larger group, whose tenets were expounded in greater detail in the second chapter, mainly consists of those stalwart adherents of the Western-dominated capitalist system that was formalized after the end of the Second World War under US stewardship.
Considering all these points laid out above, it can be argued that China, the strongest sub- optimizer of the established order, will not accept its ‘encirclement’ by the US, as such would decrease its relative gains. Even though the members of the sub-optimizing subgroup may not share values as assiduously as the adherents to the neoliberal hegemonic order and even though they are not linked through formal treaties and organizations, their dissatisfaction with the established structure nonetheless unites them.
Certainly, the occurrence of energy shortages can directly influence the ability of China to sub-optimize its gains within the hegemonic order, and this drives it to find other areas that will provide it with the necessary resources. Any energy insufficiency can result in a serious economic slowdown that would undermine China’s future plans to increase its
133 influence. When analyzing China’s energy security through the lens of sub-optimization, one should refer to Vivoda’s analysis in which two significant conclusions were drawn:
- China’s neo-mercantilist strategy of competing for access to and control over resources (which challenges the rules-based international order of trade and investment) is accompanied by the return of resource nationalism in energy-exporting states.
- The rise of neo-mercantilism triggered an increase in the validity of SOEs in China and a number of other non-Western countries. Indeed, this process is evaluated as a challenge to the future preeminence of the private sector and globalization, two significant tenets propagated by the international hegemonic structure. As Vivoda pointed out:
China’s neo-mercantilism in the energy markets, and the resource nationalism in energy-exporting states is reintroducing energy security concerns for Western countries, which were prevalent in the 1970s and are causing a major crisis for Western international oil companies (IOCs). (Vivoda 2009: 23) Throughout certain phases of China’s history, contradictory beliefs pertaining to the roles of markets and the ‘dominant’ state sector have emerged; such has been evaluated as a fundamental barrier to China’s economic progress. Under Xi Jinping, China released a ‘reform paper’ in 2013 that indicated, for the first time, the importance of granting a ‘more decisive role’ to markets and resource allocation. As Arthur Kroeber (2016) pointed out, the globalized and connected Chinese economy needed to open up and make its markets more transparent, therefore Xi’s document has not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, the government in China considers the functions of the market as a tool of the state that can be utilized to enhance the efficiency of SOEs. In this way, China can be considered as an actor that is able to play in two playgrounds. Its fusion of the benefits of open markets and its apt utilization of the state’s economic power has allowed China to suggest its model to the developing world as a step in the formation of a new ‘historic bloc’ that can countervail persistent hegemonic rules and regulations.
Consequently, the revitalization of SOEs’ importance occurred concurrently with the relative decline of the current structure that was built upon the principles of privatization and globalization. This decline directly affected the legitimacy of the transnational capitalist class – the fulcrum of the American hegemonic order. Such a challenge emerging from non-Western countries is often seen as a signal of the dawning of an age of long transformation (bifurcation) as a result of the outbreak of structural crisis within the Western-dominated capitalist system (Arrighi 1994, Wallerstein 1995). In this new era, neo-mercantilist methods applied by Chinese national oil companies in the energy markets
134 could threaten the rules-based international order of trade and investment ‘which is based on the US-designed market arrangements and sponsored institutions’ (Vivoda 2009: 28).
The unsuccessful attempts of developing states to boost their economies by embarking on a path of openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s, as recommended by the Washington Consensus, resulted in a surge of resentment, which in turn also led to “the pendulum [swinging] in the other direction” (Vivoda 2009: 29). In order to protect their main industries from being damaged by conditional flows of ‘transnational capital’ – a process which was associated with ‘recolonization’ –, much of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa as well as Russia and Venezuela enacted new hydrocarbon legislations in order to renationalize these sectors.
As was already outlined in the previous chapters, the hegemonic order was formed on the back of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ and reached its peak in the era of globalization. Nevertheless, the resurgence of nationalization of oil and gas industries in the developing world indicated that states could not be eliminated as robust regulators of FDI in the coming decades. Here, Vivoda underlined that the new era saw a decrease in the bargaining power of Western international oil companies (IOCs) vis-à-vis non-Western host governments and Chinese national oil companies (NOCs), which may result in the eventual decline of the ‘Big Oil’ companies that dominate the Western-led capitalist system.
Historically, the technological advancements of the 1970s enhanced the power of mobile capital, as opposed to immobile state capital, and thus ushered in a new era in which the US hegemon was able to more or less triple its might. Certainly, the ‘exit’ power manipulated by transnational capital supplied TNCs with greater bargaining power, which in turn forced immobile actors (states) to adjust their policies according to the MNCs’ whims. Here, the implicit menace of the ‘exit’ incentive prompted the growth of biased economic policies that favored business’s preferences, which in turn resulted in these businesses receiving a political ‘voice’ (Gill 1995; Hirschman 1970).
Such a dynamic stood at the root of the hegemonic power, which drew its strength from the transnational capitalist class that it had assisted in spreading across the globe. Nevertheless, this order received numerous blows with the revival of nationalist policies, especially in the energy sector that was entrusted with the lifeblood of economic development all around the world. This transition will not wane without impacting the established structure. Not surprisingly, SOEs have come to constitute the main challenges to the standard assumptions on the future of globalization, as it was once argued that the private sector would maintain
135 its predominance. Consequently, many scholars came to the conclusion that globalization had already passed its peak and was now facing a downturn as a result of the increasing role of SOEs for both oil exporting and importing states.
SOEs came to act as consolidators of control domestically by expanding their influence abroad. Oftentimes, SOEs were even successful in reversing waves of privatization that were considered crucial necessities by the hegemonic world order. In this context, national oil companies in both energy importing and exporting states throughout the developing world were guided not only by profit maximization but also by governmental prerogatives. Therefore, these national oil companies entered the world stage accompanied by tacit diplomatic privilege and soft government loans.
While the transition of China’s economic-political paths over time were examined in chapter three, at this point it would be useful to revisit China’s path of development. Though certain adaptations to the market economy were sensed during Deng’s era, Chinese officials made it clear to the rest of the world later that their country’s subjection to an ultimate ‘transformismo’ would not happen. Certainly, China’s reacceptance of mercantilist methods since the start of the 21st century became further proof of this fact. Never in history have Chinese officials voiced their interest in transitioning into a completely free market economy. Indeed, the allowance of foreign investment into the country and the acquisition of Chinese firms by foreign companies were considered necessary for the state’s economic security. Regardless of China’s reluctant acceptance of foreign corporations within its borders, the Chinese government tried to maintain control over all levers of power, therefore, when obstacles emerged the state could intervene without hesitation. Subsequently, the government-endorsed idea of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ bore an economy whose sustainability and competitiveness largely relied on government- linked companies that accounted for 50% of the country’s GDP. Comparatively, China’s private sector accounts for no more than 30% of the entire economy (The Economist 2015, September). Contrary to the decades-long assumptions of the epistemological and empirical hegemonic order, China’s state sector facilitated the country’s developmental progress, superseding a struggling local private sector. Chinese officials see privatization of the economy and purchases of assets as the propaganda of western capitalist values. Not surprisingly, current President Xi Jinping, in his comments on Deng’s ‘Reform and Opening’ policy, compared the advantages and disadvantages of truly ‘opening up’ to the system. Emphasizing ‘unwanted foreign influence’ (that was a consequence of opening up
136 beyond governmental control), Xi claimed that “when you open a window, of course the flies come in, along with the fresh air” (Economist 2016). Relatedly, Pei (2006) indicates:
The state remains […] securely in control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy: It is either a monopolist or a dominant player in the most important sectors, including financial services, banking, telecommunications, energy, steel, automobiles, natural resources, and transportation. (p. 37) Meanwhile, China’s newly-launched ‘Go Global’ policy, which is expected to solve problems pertaining to the waning speed of China’s economic growth, pushed its most advanced state-led energy companies, CNPC, Sinopec, and CNNOC, to enter a new phase in the international markets. Indeed, the greatest advantage of national oil companies, when compared with multinational ones, is their freedom from the politico-social ‘constraint’ of needing to earn profits. The financial and political support of their government has eased the burdens of China’s NOCs. Their main role after gaining access to new markets is to realize the advancement of the state’s policy and to promote its image globally.
Consequently, new ‘mutant’ players that are ‘transnational’ in appearance yet supported by soft governmental loans have started to appear in international energy markets. It is apparent that Chinese NOCs are spending billions of dollars to enter the global competition over energy resources in order to feed China’s booming economy. Their ability to easily acquire government loans with little or no interest has facilitated Chinese NOCs’ intrusion into energy-rich markets (Vivoda, 2013). The characteristic tenet of China’s NOCs is seen in their keen interest in obtaining equitable oil stakes and long-term crude oil contracts with energy resource-rich states, a process that will likely shape new strategic alliances within various regions across the globe. Here, Vivoda equated this reality with the victory of Chinese NOCs in bidding and negotiating with actors in the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Russia, as Western multinational companies were ‘restrained’ by the ‘rules of the order’.
Another factor which has influenced the success of Chinese NOCs is their advantage over Western multinationals when it comes to being favored by the host governments (Pei 2006). China’s governmental agencies and financial institutions do not impose any political conditions on their loans and aid packages associated with oil deals that are signed with ‘un-democratic’ and ‘illiberal’ regimes. Indeed, by striking from its agreements items emphasized by the UN Global Compact (on transparency and external monitoring of operations affecting human rights and ethical issues), China has put itself a step ahead of major Western IOCs in regions with abundant energy resources (Pei 2006).
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Therefore, China’s official modus operandi is to use governmental assets to build state-run companies in various strategic sectors from petrochemicals through power generation, auto- making, steel, and mining all the way to finance and beyond. Indeed, the global successes of China’s state-owned and financed enterprises seem to boost China’s insistence on reforming, and possibly challenging, the hegemonic system.
Consequently, Vivoda emphasizes that such a shift in the oil and gas industry is a significant facilitator of the sub-optimization process realized by the subgroup while still adhering to the hegemonic order. Indeed, in discussing this subgroup we are exploring the possibility of the establishment of a ‘historic bloc’, led by China, that could potentially manage to rid itself, and its constitutive members, of the hindrances to its maintenance of energy security.
The subgroup’s sub-optimization in the energy domain has been evidenced in China’s strategy of gaining access to and control over hydrocarbon resources while violating the free trade and investment rules of the international order. Indeed, it could even be considered that this subgroup has now united under the shelter of an alternative order and begun to generate obstacles for the US-designed market, which was formalized by US- designed institutions. In this way, this subgroup can be assumed to consist of non-Western authoritarian, rule-breaking regimes that aim to undermine the established economic and political structure.
Throughout the sub-optimization process in the energy domain, the politics realized by Chinese SOEs point to confrontations among the prevailing international norms (Gilley 2004). On the one hand, the PRC behaves like a ‘normal’ player in the international energy market by buying crude resources and investing in resource-rich regions (Vivoda 2009). On the other hand, it makes use of a subgroup, consisting of energy-rich actors in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America which can provide for its growing energy needs, and thereby overcomes the challenges of the rules-based international order. Such has meant that China relies on “neo-mercantilist strategies to secure access to hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on international markets to meet its energy needs” (Vivoda 2009: 32).
As already discussed in previous chapters, the attractiveness of the ‘China Model’ is embodied in the country’s ‘no-strings-attached’ policy. Its aptitude in building commercial relations with many non-Western states facilitates China’s ability to create a ‘historic bloc’ from the regions that are not under the control of the hegemonic order. Here, the state-
138 orchestrated strategy to attain ‘secure’ access to energy resources in different parts of the world led the PRC to build multi-faceted relations with regional powers like Russia, Iran, and Venezuela as well as with other small actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. The commonality among all of these actors is their dissatisfaction with the prevailing order.
By building efficient relationships with these energy-rich actors, China can solve its problems related to energy security on the one hand and launch a greater project of ‘hegemonic transition’ through the application of components of the ‘China Model’ on the other. Thus, China is expected to be welcomed by the actors mentioned above. The supporters of China’s slogan ‘markets without democracy’, which have been unable to access the established system’s benefits due to their inability to ‘exit’, can no longer be ignored. It is a fact that China and non-Western energy-rich actors are integral parts of the system, just as it is a fact that they want to develop their own wellbeing. Indeed, due to several factors related to the US’s ‘pivot’ to its ‘backyard’, the PRC became concerned for its energy security and began to look for solutions further abroad. Emphasizing its need for energy, China is able to enter markets previously classified by Mao as part of the ‘intermediary zone’ and influence non-economic domains at an international level. Its quest to attain more energy resources can be evaluated as the first phase of China’s multidimensional hegemonic aspirations in geographic regions that have been ‘insulated’ from the impact of the current hegemon.
In the following section, China’s prominent OBOR project will be examined. More specifically, the extent to which this initiative could assist China in establishing a subgroup along a vector of energy resource-rich regions that could constitute the basis of a ‘historic bloc’ will be considered.
4.7. Accessing markets under limited hegemonic influence – China’s OBOR strategy
China’s One Belt One Road (Yi dai Yilk) initiative is a project aimed at reviving the ancient ‘Silk Road’ in a new format, comprising eastward, westward, and southward extensions. Indeed, by launching this project, policy-makers in China seek to evade the forecasted decline in economic growth that has already been observed in Japan and the so- called ‘Asian Tigers’ since in the end of the 1990s. The decade-long fadeout of economic booms in neighboring states pushed Chinese officials to consider ways to avoid suffering the same fate in coming years, especially considering that economic deceleration in the region has already begun.
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Xi Jinping’s unveiling of the ‘Silk Road, Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ on his trip to Kazakhstan in 2013 undoubtedly brought to mind the ‘Reform and Opening’ policy for many. The name of the project described the aspirations of the rising power: “The belt refers to the land trade route linking central Asia, Russia, and Europe. The road, oddly, is a reference to a maritime route via the western Pacific and Indian Ocean” (Clover & Hornby 2015).
The Silk Road projects can provide China with a new opportunity to advance its development. Therefore, it has been assumed that these undertakings will grant greater assistance to Chinese companies in order to facilitate the improvement of their transnational operations, foreign trade strongholds, and production bases (Tiezzi 2014). Certainly, this strategy aims to pivot Chinese firms ‘abroad’ and thereby to help China solve its problems relevant to surplus production.
The idea behind the initiative was first emphasized by Professor Wang Jisi at Beijing University when he pointed out how the revitalization of the ancient ‘Silk Roads’ could further advance the Chinese economy. According to the scholar, the projected ‘Silk Roads’ comprise a very large territorial area (Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia), a reality that could raise the concerns of other powers. While the US is currently in the process of pivoting to the East, just as Russia, India, and the EU are also expressing their interests in doing the same, the PRC marches to the West. Thus, Wang is sure that China should ‘march towards the West’ without detracting from its strategic vision for the Asia- Pacific (ECFR, 2015).
The OBOR initiative launched a new phase of China’s ‘Go Global’ policy that aims to accelerate the spread of Chinese investment throughout the world. According to recent data, Chinese investors are active in different capacities in 184 states, including resources-rich developing countries as well as countries of the developed world. Nonetheless, targeting the developing world, the OBOR focuses on states with relatively weak infrastructures. As the OBOR is realized, China’s outgoing FDI is expected to triple, growing by 10% over the next five years.
Xinhua News Agency outlined the official platform of the Chinese government with regard to the OBOR in the article ‘How Can the World Be Win-Win? China Is Answering the Question’. The Agency outlined the promises of the new ‘Silk Road’ projects in this way: ‘dig up the historical and cultural meaning of the Silk Road, and spread awareness of
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China’s friendly policies towards neighboring countries.’ This article also drew the crude map of the ‘New Silk Road’ project:
[It will start in] Xi’an in central China before stretching west through Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi (Xinjiang), and Khorgas (Xinjiang), which is near the border with Kazakhstan. The Silk Road, then runs southwest from Central Asia to northern Iran before swinging west through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. From Istanbul, the Silk Road crosses the Bosporus Strait and heads northwest through Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Germany. (Tiezzi 2014) On the other side of the coin, the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ would encompass:
Quanzhou in Fujian province and also hit Guangzhou (Guangdong province), Beihai (Guangxi), and Haikou (Hainan) before heading south to the Malacca Strait. From Kuala Lumpur, the Maritime Silk Road heads to Kolkata, India then crosses the rest of the Indian Ocean to Nairobi, Kenya. From Nairobi, the Maritime Silk Road goes north around the Horn of Africa and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice. (Tiezzi 2014) The author stressed that the map published on the official media platform of the Chinese government (i.e. Xinhua News Agency) presented all the ambitions of a rising power that had long concealed its will to once again become the ‘Middle Kingdom’ through cultural exchange and trade.
Recently, the One Belt One Road strategy transformed from a general outline to a concrete project. Certainly, the booming economy of China resulted in the increase of the financial and technical strength of Chinese enterprises, which in turn prompted their search for resources worldwide. Indeed, in launching this large-scale project, China enthusiastically applied the advantages of the current hegemonic order, while maintaining its growth within the structure. The OBOR project encompasses three main features:
- Establishing stronger cooperation and common policies with OBOR participants through frequent high-level visits; providing governmental support to China’s financial sector through the ‘Go Global’ policy; forming international cooperation in production.
- Shaping the framework of a new development strategy by engaging in and supporting overseas infrastructure, production, and financial collaboration.
- Circumscribing Siberia and the Pacific Ocean all the way to Latin America by way of Chinese investment. (Hoffman 2015)
The March 2015 statement of the State Council clarified certain issues pertaining to the OBOR and reiterated that these projects were not arranged just to be left on paper. The statement also stressed that revisions to the financing of the projects consisted of three core 141 aspects – simplifying approval procedures; expanding access to funding; perfecting policy systems. The document also aimed to explain how the ‘Go Global’ strategy would be facilitated:
In light of the enormous opportunities produced from the enterprises’ ‘Go Global’ strategy, Chinese financial institutions [have been] required to speed up their expansion overseas, develop multiple financing channels, tailor their services and products to industry needs, and provide all-around financial services including financing, investment banking, risk control, and financial management. In this way, they can become powerful enablers and partners for enterprises’ ‘going out’ and develop into strong global companies alongside these enterprises. (Ng 2015: 23) Consequently, the OBOR project aims to transit more than 60 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa by promoting cooperation in policy coordination, facilities, connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people relations.
The OBOR has been met with different reactions in the international domain. Some evaluate it as an attempt to change the current order, whereas others assess it as an attempt to ‘supplement’ the existing international order rather than revise it. Indeed, scholars have three primary readings of the project:
- China’s OBOR plan aims to further develop the somewhat underdeveloped regions of its western and southern frontiers. In this regard, the Chinese government is attempting various distinct policies and strategies in a variety of regions within its borders in order to enhance their efficiency. Therefore, this project aims to unite different appropriable policies according to the demands of each region. Nonetheless, the projects will be implemented within China’s least and most developed regions alike. In this way, the model’s provision of distinct development paths for Chongqing and Guangdong will provide for the formation of a better understanding of the framework of the ‘New Silk Road’ strategies (Ferchen 2013; Mulvad 2014). Indeed, for an extended period of time the Chongqing region has played a crucial role in sustaining the development of Hong-Kong, whereas it later transformed into a relatively liberal economic and social center by following the path of the latter. On the other side of the coin, the less developed region of Guangdong in southern China pursued more equitable economic and social policies, different from Chongqing province. Chongqing emphasized the importance of liberal policies and market forces, heeding Deng’s words “We should let some people get rich first, both in the countryside and in the urban areas. To get rich by hard work is glorious.” One (Guangdong) illuminates the equity of wealth with the overutilization of socialist pathos and rhetoric, while the other (Chongqing) stresses economic growth as the most important component of China’s development. Indeed, these two fundamentally different models may be evaluated as 142 irreconcilable; nevertheless, it has been argued that they are actually complementary, not confrontational, of one another. The economic differences between developed and less developed provinces within China prevent the government from applying only one model, that’s why Deng’s slogan “it doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice” is still applicable. Consequently, spreading its influence by marching towards the West with its OBOR project, China aims to include members of the developing world within its zone of impact. As Chongqing supported the development of Hong-Kong with its manufacturing industry, so too did Guangdong support Chongqing’s development. Thus, the OBOR project is expected to provide the less developed western and southern regions of China with the necessary support in coming decades, just as in the cases of Guangdong and Chongqing (Ferchen 2013; Mulvad 2014).
- Another reading of the project depicts it as a Chinese effort to catch up with the developed world in all domains. The initiators of the project never fail to emphasize China’s current position in the international order, as they consistently underline the country’s developing status and will to comprehensively catch up with the members of the developed world. Definitely, China’s need for resources and markets in order to maintain is growth, which is seen as the best method for catching up the developed world, prompted it to launch such an enormous project. This understanding of the OBOR has also been adopted by cynical scholars who cite the vague future of Chinese growth and the country’s status as a middle income country as reasons why this project might not ultimately be realized.
- The final reading of the project depicts it as a novel mechanism of a new strategic ideological concept and initiative aimed at launching a new developmental era. In this way, it is expected that the support that the project will grant to China’s less developed regions will bring the country to the level of most developed states. Definitely, this kind of achievement would facilitate the acceptance of the ‘China Model’ by regions encompassed within the project.
Whatever China is planning to achieve with this enormous geopolitical and diplomatic offensive, the OBOR will play an undeniably crucial role in China’s further development. The OBOR is a project that aims to establish multiple economic corridors through countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, North Africa, and East Africa, linking the dynamic East Asia economic zone with the advanced European economic zone (Yafei 2015). This means that the ‘New Silk Road’ project has been extended beyond its original geographical scope that was to include only Western China
143 and Central Asia. Jin Qingguo claims that this project marks a ‘new wave of opening’ or a second ‘Reform and Opening’ era in Chinese history. Nonetheless, it is also quite distinct:
Unlike in the past, when China opened itself up to participation from outside, attracting foreign investments, technologies, management skills, China should [now] reverse its role by opening [itself] outward. (Zhang 2011: 11) Previously, the historic Silk Road was a route traveled by buyers who were interested in carrying Chinese commodities to the rest of the world. Now, however, it is a Chinese initiative with its own intentions. Recognizing this, Professor Zhang Yunling indicates that as the largest developing country, China seeks to utilize such projects to capitalize on its unique history and trigger partial reform of global governance and international cooperation mechanisms. Hence, the concerns of China’s rivals within the region can be quelled as China convinces them that it has no intention to weaken the current hegemonic system but instead simply seeks to empower the developing world. Regions encompassed within the OBOR project have been regarded by China as an appropriate territory in which to investment its huge foreign exchange reserves.
The problems pertaining to the vague timeframe in which this initiative should be realized was touched upon by Zhang. He noted that China could calculate the success or failure of its projects by developing a decade-by-decade timetable of the necessary workload it needed to complete. ‘Inclusion’ and ‘integration’ with the established organizations have become the basic tenets of the OBOR project. Therefore, private capital also finds a place in funding the project. For instance, the ‘Maritime Silk Road Investment Fund Management Center’ is a private firm which is expected to set up a ‘Maritime Silk Road Bank’ to invest as it sees fit in the projects within the countries, regions, and cities along the OBOR.
China’s Vice Minister of the State Council’s Office for Overseas Chinese, He Yafei, (2015) depicted the project in this way:
First, immersed in the idea of building a new network of global partnership, OBOR provides a totally fresh way of thinking in regional and global cooperation, in that it is all-inclusive of both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other fields. It emphasizes the adaptability of developmental strategies of China and other participating nations so that it can produce benefits that are shared by all in a win-win outcome. (Huffington Post) Accordingly, the OBOR project revolves around the promotion of five main elements: policy consultation, infrastructure connectivity, free trade, free circulation of local currencies, and people-to-people connectivity. Such aspires the designation of economic
144 globalization and socialization, the information revolution, and sharing economic growth (He, 2015).
The current project budget of 100 billion USD has been allocated into three parts:
- 40 billion USD to the Central Asia-focused Silk Road Fund
- 50 billion USD to the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB)
- 10 billion USD to the BRICS-led New Development Bank (ECFR 2015)
The OBOR projects are an indicator of the power of money, in that this strategy based on loans and aid could give China more ‘say’ in the financial sector, in addition to enforcing its trading might. The OBOR initiative is arranged so as to involve a number of private firms and investors alongside public-financers and state-owned enterprises. The government announced its intention to complete the project by the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s foundation. Indeed, in the end, the project is expected to build a strategic bridge between two complementary economies (Asia and Europe) that can decrease China’s reliance on US influence in maintaining its economic growth. Certainly, the creation and possible successful completion of the ‘Silk Road’ projects will diminish certain obstacles related to the geographical, and political, distance between these two essential regions (ECFR, 2015).
Significantly, the proposed OBOR projects, supplemented by the ascendency of China, have been presented as the Chinese ‘Marshall Plan’. Once again, this initiative should be considered as a new wave Chinese opening that requires a clear-cut strategy in order to be realized, otherwise its success will fall into question.
The comparison of the Marshall Plan and the ‘New Silk Road’ projects was depicted in the Financial Times in this way:
If the sum total of China’s commitments is taken at face value, the new Silk Road is set to become the largest program of economic diplomacy since the US-led Marshall Plan for postwar reconstruction in Europe, covering dozens of countries with a total population of over 3bn people. (Clover 2015) This hegemonic project reveals that the long-anticipated time in which China leaves behind its low-profile diplomacy has finally arrived. Similar to the the Marshall Plan, the OBOR initiative seems to be designed to use economic coercion as a way to address other vulnerabilities (Clover & Hornby 2005).
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Aside from the similarities between the US’s Marshall Plan and China’s OBOR project, salient points also reveal their differences, which are most obviously observed in their vastly varying politico-military dimensions. However, the most distinct difference between these two projects lies in their foundational logics. Indeed, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to invest in Western European states to contain the influence of the Soviet Union. Harsh political conditions were imposed on the countries covered by the Marshall Plan just as countries with pro-Soviet visions were excluded from its reach. Such an approach indicated the US’s interest in building a hegemonic stance. As is clearly seen today, the political intentions behind the financing procedure that was the Marshall Plan surpassed all other aspects of this strategy in terms of importance. Conversely, China’s OBOR initiative does not levy any political conditions against any actors based on their political or ideological points of view at least on paper, and quite different from the American strategy it is not attached with the establishment of any kind of security alliance. Therefore, the OBOR does not exclude any actor based on its political standpoint. On the contrary, this initiative even goes as far as to disregard China’s relations with relevant parties, offering unconditional assistance to the states under its wing. Moreover, Zhang emphasized that the OBOR should not be regarded as a strategy that aims to isolate or counteract any state or group of states: “China’s OBOR is not directed against any specific country or organization, nevertheless it is a useful complement to the established international and regional institutions.” (ECFR 2015: 15)
Furthermore, the OBOR initiative can be considered a crucial component of the ‘China Model’ discussed in the previous chapter. The reasons for this project are presented in terms of mutual benefit, thus by employing a ‘win-win’ strategy, China seeks to share the wealth acquired by way of its economic growth and receive participants’ support for said growth in return. China emphasizes the equality of all those involved in OBOR and claims that they will benefit from the project without needing to ‘sell their souls to the devil’; or in other words, OBOR participants will not be required to surrender their political or ideological positions in order to gain financial support. For many, this unconditional nature of the project is considered it greatest selling point. In brief, it seems as though the PRC will accept all as ‘they are’ without demanding they ‘revise’ their politico-economic stances.
Nonetheless, in reality, the OBOR initiative actually concentrates on China-friendly markets in which competition is relatively low, therefore, China’s public and private investment may have greater effect in these regions. Here, Chinese scholars have lauded the
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OBOR as an opportunity for Chinese companies to gain experience and economic strength in markets that might fall under different and more regulated economic and legal environments. Certainly, the political situations in the developing states encompassed by the project will have an impact on economic regulations and legislation. It should be noted here that some of the countries that fall along the OBOR even have a tendency to avoid working with non-Chinese companies.
For all its potential, the OBOR initiative still exhibits some problems, as was the object of research for the scholars of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Indeed, the regional scope of this project spans Mao’s intermediary zone, which may reflect China’s further ambitions in the political, ideological, and societal domains.
Aside from all of the positive results expected from this project, the PRC is still likely to face a host of internal and external challenges throughout its realization:
- The ‘New Silk Road’ projects, which intend to encompass China’s adjacent regions, may intimidate neighboring states and therefore make them reluctant to cooperate.
- China’s existing territorial disputes with maritime neighbors (in the South China Sea and the East China Sea) may hinder the ability of China to avoid or deescalate crises and thereby prevent it from creating a new regional trading order (as envisioned in the Maritime Silk Road).
- Domestic political risks within the developing states expected to take part in the OBOR project may dampen China’s ambitions to initiate structural transition. Indeed, “large Chinese companies investing on the ground in these countries [might] not necessarily understand the political nuances of the environments in which they are operating” (ECFR, 2015: 34).
- The affordability, feasibility, and overall benefits of the OBOR project are still questionable, especially considering the risk that China may allocate massive amounts of financial resources for ‘low-return projects in high-risk countries’.
- The geographic and demographic terrain encompassed by the OBOR project poses a problem in and of itself, as countries located in certain geographies along the ‘New Silk Road’ suffer from poverty and sparse populations. Here, corruption and the limited administrative efficiency of immature markets within these underdeveloped regions might result in less than ideal yields for Chinese firms.
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- The political-social security of the countries participating in the OBOR, and hence Chinese investments, may be compromised as a result of the three evils of ‘terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism’.
- In April 2013 Beijing announced plans to inject 62 billion USD of its foreign exchange reserves into three state-owned policy banks that would finance the expansion of the new ‘Silk Road’ in order to ease the transportation of resources through newly constructed pipelines and roads. Nevertheless, Scott Kennedy argued that this sum of governmental funding is insufficient. This is worrying, especially when considering that the extent to which the private sector will be involved in the project is still uncertain.
- Reactions coming from great powers interested in the regions outlined in the OBOR could lead to potential conflicts and geopolitical tensions. On the one hand, the US hegemonic power is continuing to focus ever-increasing attention on Central Asia and its ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’ is often regarded as a ‘counter-attack’ to China’s ambitions beyond the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy described above. On the other hand, Russia, as an important regional power, is seen as another potential resister of China’s ambitions. It may consider the OBOR in fundamental opposition to its recently launched Eurasian Union. Here, Chinese scholars such as Hu Zhiyong indicate that these two initiatives serve extremely different intentions in that “one is a trade and economic corridor initiated by Beijing, while the other is a new economic zone controlled by Moscow.” Even India’s ‘Mausam’ project is regarded as a potential challenge for China’s Maritime Silk Road. All of these issues are indicative of significant powers’ potential skepticism toward the OBOR, as these states aim to increase their relative gains just as China does.
Regardless of the assumptions about the advantages and challenges expected to come as a consequence of the implementation of the ‘New Silk Road’ projects, it is a commonly accepted conclusion that these projects will provide new opportunities to China that is expected to lose its previous developmental speed in the coming decades. Therefore, this ambitious plan aims to bring benefits to China’s financial markets and technological and production sectors as the country seizes the opportunities afforded it by less developed markets.
At this point it would be useful to put to the side the general advantages and disadvantages or pro and cons of the OBOR and return to the main subject of this thesis, namely energy security. As noted above, China is overly dependent on volatile regions when it comes to providing for its energy security, and therefore the route outlined by the OBOR may help to
148 topple this challenge. China’s will to attain the realization of this project is directly linked to its thirst for energy, the satiation of which is necessary for the maintenance of its lasting economic growth that supports its regional and global influence. Considering that China is dependent on oil and gas imports from an instable Middle East, alternative paths are increasingly attractive for a country that wishes to continue its economic ascendance. The project encompasses 70% of the global population, 55% of the gross world product (GWP), and 75% of the world’s known energy reserves (Tiezzi 2014).
In recent years the allocation of China’s overseas investments has transitioned from focusing on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to different domains. Thus, China moved away from focusing all of its energy on the purchase of crude resources and began to explore more heavily other industries such as technology, media and telecommunications, financial services, and the automotive sector. Not surprisingly, while the energy sector accounted for 66% of China’s external M&As in 2010, it only accounted for 11% thereof in 2015 as China began to shift its attention to other industries (EIA, 2015).
The above analysis on the costs and benefits of the ‘New Silk Road’ project will allow us to better understand how the initiative might contribute to China’s energy security and the spillover of Chinese economic influence into other domains. Here, the implementation of the ‘New Silk Road’ will usher in a new era for China’s SOEs, as it will facilitate their access to new markets, provide for the supply of crude energy resources, and pave a path for increased Chinese influence. Certainly, China’s formation of a ‘historic bloc’ along the energy vector will enroot private and public Chinese companies within the regions they engage.
Currently, it could be argued that China seeks to facilitate the access of Chinese companies to markets that are relatively unaffected by the hegemonic order in an effort to build a ‘historic bloc’ along its energy vector. This bloc may then be able to demand that revisions be made to the current hegemonic order. The Chinese economy, standing at the heart of the country’s future political, cultural, and societal ambitions, depends on the maintenance of energy security. Similarly, China’s shortcomings in the field of energy can be resolved through the realization of a project that diminishes obstacles to its influence over other domains previously governed by the hegemonic structure. Consequently, geographical obstacles embedded in the order and issues arising from the US’s ‘hub and spokes’ policy in the region have now come to top China’s energy security agenda. Their solution can be realized as China strengthens its relations with participants in the OBOR project.
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A brief analysis of China’s energy relations with certain actors who are dissatisfied with the current order could provide us insight into why China has come to disregard many of the appeals of the international community. This actor, which stresses the strict separation of political and economic issues, tries to evade the limitations on its behavior embodied in the various sanctions imposed by international institutions. A huge portion of the OBOR project aims to strengthen China’s already established relations with energy resource-rich actors through the implementation of a multidimensional strategy.
China’s establishment of relations with actors that have been unable to benefit from the hegemonic structure due to their political trajectories raises the question of whether or not the country may seek to build a ‘historic bloc’ consisting of countries along its route to energy resources. Indeed, its gigantic projects aim to expand the framework of Chinese relations with OBOR participants based on energy politics. This section will analyze China’s relations with Russia and Iran – two significant players in the energy market – and energy-rich actors in Central Asia, all of which can be regarded as supporters of China’s purported attempts to establish a ‘historic bloc’ that could countervail the hegemonic system. The PRC’s path to winning ‘hearts and minds’ in the politico-economic arena requires its establishment of better energy relations with other dissatisfied actors first and the diversification of its relations with these actors by way of the OBOR second.
Different from the US hegemon, China aims to escape all kinds of attachments and constraints that could hinder its economic ascendency. Thus, US restrictions which such as the US government’s ‘Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act’, which banned foreign firms from purchasing from or exporting energy technology to Iran, have been seen by China as troublesome. Similarly, the EU’s blocking of the realization of the Russia-initiated pipeline that would transport gas toward Europe (South Stream) was also evaluated by China as an intervention of the hegemonic hand into the international arena of energy security. The ‘Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act’ passed the US Senate in September 1995. It sanctioned foreign investments in Iran’s energy sector in response to the country’s nuclear program and its support for terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad Organization. Moreover, US influence over international organizations triggered the issuance of new sanctions that hindered others’ ability to purchase Iranian crude resources. Such a pattern has been utilized in the Russian case as well.
For China, the realization of proper monitoring of all trade relations with Iran seemed absurd. China’s distaste for the sanctions was further augmented by the fact that they prohibited Chinese SOEs’ entrance into the Iranian market. Here, some scholars argued that 150 by preventing others from buying energy resources from Iran, which is estimated to host the world’s second largest natural gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves, the hegemonic power aimed to maintain its leadership in the future after the overthrow of the ‘mullah regime’ (Фан 2012). Likewise, Alexander del Valle claimed that by imposing sanctions that restricted other transnational companies from accessing Iranian markets, the US was actually interested in facilitating future US-Iran cooperation and therewith access to its energy resources. Disregarding these impositions, demands, and warnings, Chinese SOEs continued to purchase from ‘forbidden’ markets for over two decades.
China continued to import from Iran despite the sanctions, which eased China’s energy security burden. However, geographical challenges in terms of Iran’s threats to shut down the Hormuz Strait on the one hand and the incessant insecurity of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ on the other came to be considered as ‘red alarms’ for China’s energy security. The solution for this impasse necessitated the lifting of obstacles along the maritime path of energy resources destined for the Chinese mainland. This required that Chinese authorities build energy-based relations with its neighbors and construct land-based pipelines that could freely transport energy resources.
This approach that came to be assumed by China can also be seen as an attempt to establish ‘lines of flight’ from the ideological and material influence of the hegemonic order in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions. Indeed, China’s relations with Central Asian states, especially Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan (both oil and gas-rich post-Soviet states), and Russia (the retired superpower whose economy was extremely dependent on the revenues generated by crude resources but who failed to maintain its position in the energy market due to its frequent utilization of the ‘oil weapon’ and subsequent loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the adherents of the current hegemonic order) are seen as potential realms opportunity, as they could allow China to alleviate the Malacca and Hormuz Strait problem. Here, Chinese companies attempted to accelerate their entrance into new markets that were left out of the hegemonic fold in order to resolve China’s overreliance on the Malacca strait, which normally provide passage to 80% of China’s oil and gas imports. Indeed, it should be noted here that the energy resource-rich actors that are shunned by the hegemonic order are still highly dependent on energy profits. Therefore, China, as a player in need of energy resources that suggested signing oil and gas agreements without any political conditions, was ‘welcomed’ wholeheartedly by these energy exporters.
As for Russia, China became the main consumer of this country’s energy resources following its loss of access to the European market due to its political course. As Russia 151 was renounced by Western transnationals, which attentively pursued the rules of the hegemonic order, one of the world’s biggest energy producers become open to Chinese SOEs, with less competition.
Recently, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine increased tensions in Europe, ultimately resulting in the enactment of aggressive energy sanctions against the former. Simultaneously, Europe’s heavy energy dependence on Russia jumped to the top of the agenda just as the region was trying to get over the dashing of its last hope, the ‘Nabucco’ gas pipeline. Russia’s decision to cut the flow of natural gas to Eastern Europe in the winter of 2006 intimidated European powers. With this act of aggression still fresh in the minds of many Europeans, the ‘European Energy Security Strategy’, which was released by the European Commission in May 2014 during Russia’s clash with Ukraine, sought to preempt the repetition of Russia’s rash behavior. This document envisioned new pipelines, increased natural gas storage, the development of alternative resources, and other physical and market infrastructures that would exclude Russia from the mix. This conflict between the supplier and its consumers resulted in the dismissal of the South Stream gas pipeline that would have provided Europe with 65 bcm of Russian natural gas per year. On December 1, 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared that the South Stream project had been shelved. Certainly, this tumultuous period should be considered as a potential opening for the establishment of better relations between Russia and China in terms of energy policy.
In the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese companies began to rapidly construct land- based pipelines between itself and Central Asia and Russia respectively. The first of these two international natural gas pipeline connections to China, the Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP), transits natural gas to China through three parallel pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The first two stages of this project were already completed in 2010 and then linked to China’s domestic West-East pipeline. The CNPC is the most active company in Turkmen market, therefore it was able to sign an agreement with the Turkmen government extending its gas supplies from 1.4 tcf per year in 2013 to 2.3 tcf per year by 2020. Furthermore, Russia and China signed a gas deal in 2014 after a decade of negotiations. Though the full details of the agreement have not been announced, the main parameters are known – China agreed to buy 1.3 tcf of gas per year from Gazprom’s East Siberian fields for 400 billion USD over a 30-year period. This proposed pipeline, expected to come online in 2018, will connect Russia’s East Siberian gas field and Sakhalin Island to Northeast China. Certainly, debates over the price of gas delayed the conclusion of the final agreement, and here it is apparent that the crisis in Ukraine pushed Russia to take a step
152 back and agree to China’s conditions. Additionally, the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline will to transport 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Eastern Siberia to China each year for 20 years as of 2009. Indeed, the CNPC constructed 15.657 miles or 70% of the physical pipeline.
The two main characteristics of contemporary China’s energy policy that facilitate its establishment of a new ‘historic bloc’ through the application of the ‘China Model’ along its energy corridors are as follows:
- Chinese SOEs instrumentalize certain ‘crises’ in order to gain access to markets that are shunned by the hegemonic order.
- Chinese SOEs concentrate on signing long-term oil and gas agreements.
Therefore, the first attempt of China to decrease its dependence on geographically hazardous parts of the globe for its energy transportation can be seen in its construction of the abovementioned pipelines as well as its endeavors to improve bilateral relations with third parties in non-energy spectrums in order to guarantee its energy-based relations.
This section has sought to explain how China’s grand OBOR strategy is expected to benefit the country, not only by easing its energy burden, but also by facilitating the growth of China’s influence over various domains after it gains access to new markets by way of SOE contracts. This analysis of the OBOR has shown how the PRC launches its multilateral strategies at the economic, political, and societal levels by emphasizing its thirst for energy. Consequently, it should be kept in mind that the entrance of Chinese SOEs into new markets in order to satisfy China’s need for energy cannot be conceived of at the ‘economic’ level alone, as the country aims to utilize it energy policy to advance its influence within other domains as well.
4.7.1. US attempts to realize ‘transformismo’ in the field of energy
The US hegemon and the rising Chinese power play indisputably prominent roles in shaping the energy market and the prices of energy, and they are certainly more sensitive than other states to shifts in this field due to their powerful economies and developed industries that are in deep need of an undisrupted flow of energy. While collaboration between these two states under one roof seemed unfathomable in previous decades, their common concerns over the supply and price of energy resources facilitated their eventual energy interdependence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. However, things are different today.
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Here, the US’s ‘shale boom’ decreased the country’s reliance on foreign imports, though it did not completely terminate it, while China became the biggest consumer of energy in the world as its dependence on crude resources increased. Accordingly, these two powers’ interdependence diverged. This marked a remarkable turn in the dynamic between these two countries, as increased prices for one could now actually benefit the other.
Firstly, we still don’t know the exact capacity of the US shale boom, nor how long it will last. According to the 2015 Annual Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Agency emphasizes:
In the High Oil and Gas Resource case, the EIA projects that domestic crude oil production will increase to nearly 13 mb/d before 2035, whereas in the Low Oil and Gas Resource case, US oil production is expected to reach 9.1 mb/d in 2017 before falling to 6.6 mb/d in 2040. The large difference in these two scenarios reflects uncertainty about the potential of tight oil production. In the High Oil and Gas Resource case, tight oil production would peak at 8.5 mb/d in 2035 – in comparison with the Reference case peak production rate of 4.8 mb/d in 2021. In contrast, in the Low Oil and Gas Resource case, tight oil production peaks at 4.3 mb/d in 2016 and then declines through 2040. Not regarding the duration or capacity of the US shale boom, it is a reality that the US’s application of increasingly effective hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques, which had been in development for decades, ultimately brought prosperity to the US energy sector. Such constitutes a significant scientific discovery not only for the US but also for other actors seeking to develop similar technologies.
The PRC, with its untapped energy resources, can be considered as one of the actors that could stand to benefit the most from such techniques and know-how. In this sense, China’s technically recoverable shale gas resources are estimated at 1.115 tcf. However, the exploration and shale drilling of economically recoverable reserves in China will be largely dependent on the market price of natural resources from foreign sources, “including both pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas, as well as the capital and operating costs and productivity of shale gas production in China” (EIA 2015: 13). Hence, by cooperating with China in the development of this technology the US hegemonic power could supervise the rising Chinese power.
On the other hand, the falling prices of energy resources as a consequence of the US’s shale boom is certainly affecting China in a good way as the largest consumer of energy resources worldwide. Still, some analysts warn that this bubble will burst when US companies no longer see profit in drilling more wells. Today, as the US continues its production, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cannot come to 154 consensus on whether or not to decrease its production and thereby increase energy resource costs. Therefore, crude oil is circulating around the market at a very cheap price, which is a dream for energy importers such as China. Nonetheless, most agree that this situation will not last forever. So, what will happen when the energy resource prices go up? Considering that China’s industrial costs would double should oil prices reach 150 USD/barrel (they are now at 43 -46 USD/barrel), what kind of arrangements could China come up with if oil prices increase as a consequence of US actions? Will there be a Third World War? No, the situation is not yet that dire.
Firstly, the US is still an energy importer and, as already mentioned, it will always be interested in its allies’ energy security, therefore ‘letting the price fly’ is still not on its agenda. Secondly, the US and China will always share certain common grounds within the energy domain – which the US may come to instrumentalize to realize a ‘transformismo’ in China. The common grounds of the two states in the realm of energy are:
1. Environmental sustainability
2. Trust-building between states
3. The US’s lift of its ban on oil exports
4. Efficient utilization of energy
Firstly, environmental degradation is a common concern for both actors. Thus, the US and China – the two most significant ‘defectors’ of the Kyoto Protocol and the two biggest producers of greenhouse gases – came into agreement on the environment in 2014 as they stated their intent to reduce their emission of greenhouse gases (China by 20% by 2030 and the US by 26-28% by 2025).
Secondly, international security issues such as interstate war, ethnic, religious, or ideological conflict, terrorism, and trade and economic battles are strongly condemned by both the hegemon and the rising power. Accordingly, Robert Hormats (2014) indicated that the US’s presence in the Middle East and its pivot to the Asia-Pacific should not be associated with the US’s securement of its own energy security but also with securement of the energy security of its allies. For this reason, he noted that China should be convinced that the presence of the US’s Fifth Fleet in the Pacific Ocean is not meant to be a threat to China, but is, by contrast, a reassurance of the protection of the sea lanes through which 17 million barrels of oil transit per day. He added that trust-building between states needs to be further realized. Thus he recommended that China involve itself more in finding resolutions
155 to the problems in the Middle East, especially considering that China is profoundly dependent on the oil coming out of this volatile region, unlike the US. Indeed, this kind of emphasis on the challenges to China’s energy security stressed by scholars and officials in the US indicate their attempt to convince the PRC that ‘there is no other alternative’ besides the ‘hegemonic order’, whose influence inevitably pervades every domain.
Thirdly, the probability of the US reversing its lift on the ban of its export of oil and gas, or simply put, the probability that it would ban its export of oil and gas once again, is one of the most salient topics on the American agenda after the shale boom. The possibility that the US could export crude oil to China seems very probable; in Larry Summers’s words from the US perspective:
Do we want others to depend on us, and have all the consequences that come with that dependence—which includes a certain amount of influence on our part—or do we wish them to depend on the Middle East? If we wish to have more power and influence in the world, in support of our security interests, and in support of our values and if we wish to have an influence that we pay for with neither blood nor taxes, I do not see a more constructive approach than permitting the export of fossil fuels. (Summers 2014) Indeed, it is proven that China has more shale resources than the US, however, its exploitation thereof will require time, technology, and investment. Here, Hormats recommended US companies to become more involved in this dynamic so as to enhance China’s dependence on the US’s provision of its energy security.
Fourthly, the US plans to ‘offer its hand’ in assisting China to develop the technologies required to increase its energy efficiency by supplying the necessary know-how and equipment that would allow the country to exploit its untapped shale reserves. Here, the lift of the US’s ban on oil and gas exports in combination with this US assistance may be considered as one of the greatest opportunities for the US to push forward a new wave of ‘transformismo’ in China; as, paradoxically, it could ensure the safe and secure provision of China’s necessities which in turn would directly influence China’s economic development. Hegemonic ‘supervision’ over China’s rise can only be attained in this way, that is, unless China first succeeds in developing a ‘historic bloc’.
4.8. Conclusion
This chapter examined the potential of China to build a ‘historic bloc’ along its energy vector that could substitute the current hegemonic system. By evaluating China’s increasing energy demand, the fulfillment of which is a prerequisite of its continued development, we
156 investigated the geographic, technological, and political challenges to its energy security. Therefore, the ‘American Tributary System’, with its efforts to rejuvenate US influence in the Asia-Pacific region through the application of a ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, became one of the PRC’s most crucial concerns. Moreover, China’s reliance on energy imports that are largely transported through precarious sea-lanes can be seen as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the PRC’s energy security. In the end, it was concluded that energy resource-rich actors that have been subjected to sanctions or isolation by the hegemonic system due to their politico- ideological trajectories constitute the main components of the PRC’s ‘historic bloc’ as they are also the most suitable sites for the application of the ‘China Model’. By establishing bilateral and multilateral relations, the PRC engages in a two-phase policy: it enters ‘forbidden markets’ by way of SOEs and it strengthens its presence in these countries by pursuing a multi-dimensional approach. In this way, China’s One Belt One Road project clearly demonstrates how China uses its economic power to garner influence in other, non- economic domains.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The Only Thing That Is Constant Is Change.
- Heraclitus
Changing balances within the world order as a consequence of the emergence of various state and non-state actors with new demands for ‘revision’ and ‘change’ is one of the main issues in the contemporary discipline of international relations. Certainly, such a reality has led many to ask whether the current, post-war hegemonic order, which is based on neoliberal democratic ideals and the maintenance of economic efficiency, is giving way to a systemic transition.
5.1. Theoretical and Empirical Implications
This thesis aimed to clarify the possibility of a hegemonic ‘transition’ within the system by analyzing the constraints imposed by the current system under the US hegemon as well as China’s impressive three-decade-long economic growth, its intentions to better its position in the system, and its potential alternative to the system that has been marketed to the developing world. The main concern of the thesis was to explicate that China’s future ambitions will not be restricted to the economic sphere; therefore, this rising power, garnering might from its rapid economic development and utilizing the advantages of the existing hegemonic system, has employed a strategy that targets the realization of incremental reformulations of the global ‘common sense’ which cumulatively culminate in grand revisions. The thesis, examining issues pertinent to the domain of Chinese energy security, outlined both the ability of the hegemonic power to ‘supervise’ China’s ascendency and China’s instrumentalization of its energy ‘hungriness’ to build relations with actors that have been unable to reap the benefits of the current system. In this way, China’s ‘energy dilemma’ can be characterized by three fundamental pillars:
- China requires an uninterrupted flow of energy resources to sustain its economic rise.
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- China is most concerned about the US’s great ‘pivot’ to its ‘backyard’ as well as its own ability to maintain and establish influence over energy resource-rich regions and control over key chokepoints through which its energy resources are transported.
- China seeks to use the restraints imposed on it and others by the US hegemon to its advantage by ‘marching West’, launching grand strategies such as the OBOR projects which allow the PRC to spread its influence by offering unconditional economic support to regions that are ‘unsatisfied’ with the current order.
Transformations occurring within the order prompted this research to focus on the new rising power’s role therein, through the application of hegemony theory. Firstly, the theoretical framework drafted in the beginning of the thesis aimed to clarify the most salient points of the theory that would be utilized throughout the remainder of the research. Hence, a comparative presentation of hegemonic stability theory and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony served the purpose of determining the borders of the scope through which the investigation was handled. Gramsci’s reading of a ‘hegemony’ that intrinsically pervades the political, economic, and social domains enlarged the general spectrum of the term and was also deemed useful in allowing the research to overcome the obstacles presented by traditional state-centric concepts.
The terms ‘hegemony’, ‘historic bloc’, and ‘transformismo’ that were originally used by Gramsci at the societal level were later applied to the international sphere by neo- Gramscian researchers, an approach that became an integral component of this thesis. These concepts were salient in terms of their ability to aptly illustrate the American path to ‘hegemony’, to describe the US’s will to push for ‘transformismo’ in suppressing all voices challenging the established order, and to illuminate China’s attempts to revise the current system through the formation of a new ‘historic bloc’.
The application of all of these processes has been observed in the US’s attainment of hegemony, which spread by way of ideas that brought about political and societal consent within various regions that were persuaded of their own ‘need for a hegemon’. Certainly, the formation and nourishment of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ and the establishment of rules-based international organizations became the fundamental tenets of the hegemonic order.
Therefore, references to the empirical examination of Gramscian hegemony in the American case gave us an opportunity to comprehend the terms’ adaptation to the international domain much more precisely. Throughout the US’s journey to supremacy, the 159 balance between hard and soft power maintained by the American hegemon proved the key to its acquisition of consent while it tried to avoid applying coercion in order to keep its position. As Gramsci pointed out, a very simple miscalculation between consent and coercion may trigger the transformation of a hegemony into an arkhe (domination), wherein coercion prevails and thereby undermines the legitimacy of the hegemon. Consequently, American hegemony advanced its soft power in the ideological domain by offering the glittering promises of the ‘American Dream’ in order to acquire the consent of societies; alternately it guarded its position with hard power through the establishment of military bases in various parts of the world. The US hegemon’s material and moral presence in almost all corners of the globe, especially after the end of the Cold War, was evaluated as indicative of the ‘end of history’ or as the apex of American hegemony.
Applying Gramscian terms to the process of American hegemony-building ended with the conclusion that the most important success of this hegemony was its ability to accumulate relative gains in the economic-financial sphere, a practice that had been promoted by its predecessor (the British hegemon). Rising within the shell of another hegemonic structure and building a ‘historic bloc’ consisting of actors that suffered under the rules of the existent order became the main feature of hegemony-building.
Here, we witnessed a rising power’s ability to successfully translate its economic strength into ideological strength without openly challenging the system. This conjuncture allowed it to become a powerful player that could hide behind the curtain and develop its own model of ‘change’ by evading the constraints imposed upon it. By illuminating the weaknesses of British hegemony, the US augmented its might and realized a ‘hegemonic transition’. Never before had any actor gained such unquestionable leadership. Hence, if one follows this same path and sequentially fulfills the conditions emphasized by Gramscian scholars can it too provoke a hegemonic transition? The application of this theoretical articulation on the empirical sphere was subsequently employed to ask if China could follow the same route and incite the same outcomes.
5.2. The China Model – a potential hegemonic alternative
The historical investigation of China’s rise provided insight into this power’s deeper intention and ability to seek the translation of its economic might into other domains. Mao’s isolationist strategy that sought to disseminate China’s ideological beliefs through the provision of financial support to the Third World kept the PRC from establishing ‘normal’ relations with other members of the international society for approximately two
160 decades. His emphasis on the ‘intermediary zone’ as the site of the hegemonic power’s exploitative actions became a foundational notion in China’s perception of the world. Nevertheless, with the end of the Mao era came a new age in Chinese history, as the country began to strive to attain ‘down-to-earth’ targets while ‘keeping its head low’ without challenging any power. China’s realization of the ‘Four Modernization’ policies in the end of the 1980s caused many to ask whether the country would pursue a ‘fifth modernization’ in terms of democratization, a step that would bring ultimate ‘transformismo’. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 proved to the world that China had no interest in bending to all the demands of the international order regardless of its apt utilization of the benefits provided by the system. In this sense, employing a sub- optimization strategy, China weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the system and acted accordingly. Perceptions that China was able to refuse to realize certain requirements imposed by the established structure sparked concerns that the country’s economic boom was indeed a consequence of its sub-optimization policy.
Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, many international relations scholars concentrated their analyses on China’s rise and its various potentials, even though the official statements from Beijing repeatedly emphasized China’s peaceful intentions. In this context the ‘Peaceful Rise’ doctrine formulated during Hu Jintao’s presidency sought to convince others that the PRC would not repeat the mistakes of previous aggressive rising powers. Moreover, referring to Chinese imperial history in general and to the tributary system’s historical prevalence in Asia in particular, Chinese officials and scholars aimed to assuage the concerns many had vis-à-vis the ascending ‘Dragon’.
This brief historical analysis lays out the key junctures that culminated in the formation of the ‘China Model’, which is intended to be applied by actors that are discontent with the established order and ready to partake in a new ‘historic bloc’ that may lead to a ‘hegemonic transition’. This description ended up countering the beliefs of scholars who argue that China is sharing the burden and responsibility of the current world order only as a result of its benign willingness to serve without any desire for ‘change’. Explicitly stated, these scholars believe that the US hegemon has attained success in its ‘transformismo’ policy.
Certainly, the emergence of the ‘China Model’, which was later considered China’s recommendation on how less developed actors could progress and break free from hegemonic influence, turned into the most important proof of our assumption. The PRC, touting the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and its notion of the ‘Harmonious International Society’, 161 attempted to reassure the US hegemon of its peaceful rise. Simultaneously, it also urged others to improve their positions in the international arena by utilizing the system’s advantages and maintaining diversity without surrendering to all the demands of the hegemonic order.
Indeed, the Beijing Consensus offered a path to economic development while the ‘Harmonious Society’ aimed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of various societies by emphasizing the loss of diversity under the hegemonic system. Therefore, during this time bold statements coming from the US such as ‘you are either with us or against us’ were evaluated by China as indicative of yet another attempt at ‘colonization’ by yet another hegemonic actor. This more vocal approach assumed by China undermined the pillar of consent that bolstered American hegemony and prompted many to search for new paths with respect the wide availability of cultural and political options. Sure enough, China came to welcome these actors without attaching strings or demanding their ‘emulation’ of any normative standards of a certain ideology.
During this time the Chinese path gained esteem in the developing world not only due to its appreciation for variety, but also because of its familiar historical background that bore the mark of a painful colonial past. Consequently, China’s ability to utilize the benefits of the current hegemonic order to ensure the endurance of its economic development further facilitated the rising power’s increased legitimacy in the eyes of dissatisfied actors. Offering unconditional, no-strings-attached economic assistance to various countries with various domestic political arrangements, China extended the scope of application of the ‘China Model’. Such stood in stark opposition to the foreign aid and investment programs of the American hegemon, whose strict conditions and redlines crippled its stance.
The ‘China Model’ can be seen as attractive for others, i.e. members of the potential ‘historic bloc’, for the following reasons:
- It rejects other (‘superior’) powers’ ideological influence and intervention within state borders. - It entails the ability to utilize the advantages of the established order. - It voices no political-preferences and respects diversity. - It fuses different models without ‘fetishizing’ just one in particular.
The stable rise of China as a new power coincided with the term of hegemonic decline in the first decade of the 21st century as US actions in the Middle East frustrated not only its enemies but also its friends. The Chinese call for a ‘harmonious society’ overlapped with 162 this timeframe. Indeed, the new era commenced with the ‘exhaustion’ of the hegemonic power, while the actions of the rising actor pointed to its potential establishment of a ‘historic bloc’.
5.3. The significance of ‘energy security’ in building a ‘historic bloc’
Attempts to revise the hegemonic structure in order to acquire a ‘transition’ cannot be fully realized without ending one’s dependence on the system. Never before in history had a hegemonic power and a rising power been entangled in such a profound network of interdependence; thus, the survival of both actors depended on the other. Considering that the scope of these two powers’ interrelations is very large, the research area of this thesis was focused to energy security alone.
Firstly, China’s ascendency, which grants the country greater influence in various domains, is fueled by its ability to maintain energy security. If China’s energy security is not provided for, any interruption to its incoming energy flow, no matter how short-term, could wreak havoc on China’s economic ascendency. Here, the US’s physical presence in the Middle East – the main source for China’s imported energy resources – and the Asia- Pacific region – the site of China’s primary energy corridor, i.e. the Malacca Strait – has been a source of anxiety for China. Such a scenario has pushed China to look for ‘lines of flight’ from the constraints of American hegemony. A significant reason for the selection of energy security as the primary topic of research is due to the ability of this domain to provide the necessary elements for the smooth application of both the ‘historic bloc’ and ‘transformismo’ concepts emphasized by Gramsci.
Turning the obstacles imposed by the hegemonic order into opportunities to deepen relations with actors that Mao’s would have considered to be part of the ‘intermediary zone’ can be regarded another attempt of the rising power to break free of its chains and accelerate the speed of the translation of its economic might into the political and societal domains at a global level. Here, the opportunity to build a ‘historic bloc’ emerged as a result of Chinese SOEs’ involvement in regions that have been subjected to less hegemonic influence. Such activities have been supplemented by China’s signing of bilateral energy agreements and its launching of the ‘New Silk Road’ projects that are more global/multilateral in scope.
Certainly, the importance of the ‘New Silk Road’ projects directly pertains to China’s growing energy demand. When analyzing China’s new collaborations that were formed in order to provide for its energy security along the route of this project, we mainly focused on 163
China’s attempts to build a ‘historic bloc’. In this way it makes sense that this project encompasses regions that account for 75% of the world’s known energy resources. China’s ability to enter the markets that were off-limits to the ‘honorable’ members of the neoliberal hegemonic order made the country all the more successful a player. Therefore, sub- optimizing its gains in the system and freely exploring markets without competition, China’s economy, and its influence, gradually grew. Though the PRC is restricted in its periphery by the hegemonic power which will not surrender its Asian interests, it now has the ability to enter energy resource-rich regions without serious competitors.
On the other side of the coin, the US’s interminable attempts at provoking ‘transformismo’ were taken into consideration in terms of the ability of the US to provide the PRC with the necessary utilities in support of its own energy security, and indirectly its economic development. Sharing the benefits of the shale boom in the US, the assurance of uninterrupted oil and LNG imports to China, and the provision of substantial technologies that could promote China’s acquisition of alternative energy and shale resources were also considered as steps that the hegemon could employ to deviate the PRC from pursuing regional adventurism, as embodied in its gigantic projects, and to pull it back into ‘safe shelter’.
Thus, the ‘Rise of China’ became a ‘success story’ for actors in Mao’s ‘intermediary zone’, i.e. those who suffered from colonialism in the past and were today still barred access to the benefits of the current structure due to their political ‘otherness’. Indeed, this geographic arena seems to be just right for the rising power, as it is able to provide ample energy resources to fuel China’s economic ascendency. Moreover, the quest for the satiation of its energy ‘hungriness’ can be assumed to be a ‘disguise’ donned by China to conceal its more profound ambition to establish a ‘historic bloc’ along its energy vector.
All of the behaviors of the rising power starting from its sub-optimization policy through its appropriation strategy to its ‘weighing out’ of the benefits and obstacles of the current structure and ‘cherry-picking’ its international obligations without being ‘punished’ confirm that the PRC is growing under the umbrella of the hegemonic order instead of being properly ‘transformed’. Furthermore, it is incrementally winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of developing states with its proposed alternative. This actor has been able to open a ‘window’ to the hegemonic system and breathe in the ‘fresh air’ without letting the ‘flies’ in (Xi, 2015), and it has thus seemed to preempt the US’s desired ‘transformismo’. China’s intentions are pragmatic and apparent. It has developed an alternative. Nonetheless, its
164 ability to undermine the current order is insufficient due to its direct dependence on the system.
This research has sought to analyze the current situation by looking to history and offering some predictions. A ‘hegemonic transition’ should not be expected for decades. Nevertheless, within this amount of time we could still see the concrete establishment of a ‘historic bloc’ that is able to chip away at and eventually completely destroy the hegemonic chains restraining China’s mobility. The success or failure of China’s ambitious ‘New Silk Road’ projects over the next three decades will certainly give us an indication of the chances of a ‘hegemonic transition’. Nevertheless, in order for this transition to become a reality, American hegemony within the political, economic, and societal domains must be completely exhausted; and this is not expected in near future. By gaining supremacy over the realms of security, production, finance, and knowledge via consent and by protecting its preeminence with coercion, any actor can become a hegemon. Consequently, the ‘Century of China’ seems to be witnessing the beginnings of a ‘historic bloc’ that will help this rising power to prosper, gain influence, and ultimately utterly reformulate the world as we know.
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APPENDİCES
A. TURKISH SUMMARY
Bu çalışmanın amacı Çin’in yükselişinin mevcut sistemde hegemonik değişimle sonuçlanıp sonuçlanmayacağını sorgulamaktır. Yapılan araştırma Çin’in enerji güvenliği alanındaki durumunu göz önünde bulundurularak yapılmıştır. Tez Gramsci’nin hegemonya, ‘tarihsel blok’ ve ‘transformismo’ kavramlarını kullanarak teorik çerçeve çizmiş ve bunun içerisinde Çin’in statüsünde gerçekleşen değişikliği araştırmaktadır. Çalışmada Çin’in dünya kapitalist sistemine başarılı entegresi, onun avantajlarını kullanması gösterilerek, aynı zamanda nasıl hegemonik sistemin taleplerinden kaçabilerek devlet kapitalizmiyle kendi kazancını yükseltmesi açıklanmaktadır.
Tez şu sorulara cevap arıyor: Çin’in yükselmesi barışçıl mı; bu yükselme mevcut sisteme nasıl etkide bulunuyor – hizmet mi ediyor yoksa meydan mı okuyor; Çin’in hedefleri hangi skalada sınırlandırılabilir; bölgesel mi yoksa küresel mi; Çin etki alanını ekonomik alanla sınırlandırıyor mu, yoksa politik, ideolojik ve kültürel çevrelerde değişim mi hedefliyor. Son olarak da, hegemonik gücün Çin’in ulaşmak istediği hedeflere doğru gitmesindeki etkisi, onu kontrolü ve hatta sınırlaması sorgulanmıştır. Çin’in enerji güvenliğinin onun ekonomik gücü üzerinde olan etkisi ve diğer alanlara tesiri ile potansiyel hegemonyanın belkemiğini oluşturabileceğine inanıldığı için yapılan araştırma bunun üzerine odaklanmıştır.
Tez üç kısımdan ibarettir. İlk kısımda ‘hegemonya’ kavramının geleneksel ve eleştirisel teorideki yeri araştırılmış ve ABD’nin küresel liderliğe ulaşımı açıklanmıştır. ABD’nin hegemonya tahtına yükselişi, karşılaştığı sorunlar, liderliğini meşrulaştırması ve örgütlendirmesi tezin bu kısmında açıklanmıştır. Hegemonya, ‘tarihsel blok’, ‘transformismo’ kavramları önce Gramsci’nin açıkladığı gibi toplumsal çerçevede, sonra ise uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde açıklanmıştır.
İkinci kısımda ise Çin’in aşağılanma asrından yükselen güce çevrilme hikayesi anlatılmıştır. Beijing Uzlaşmasından Uyumlu Topluma kadar Çin’in geliştirdiği ve hegemonik sistemden memnun olmayan aktörleri içinde barındırabilecek farklı stratejileri araştırmakla bu modelin özellikleri dikkate alınmıştır. 189
Son bölümdeyse enerji güvenliğinin özellikle Çin açısından değerlendirilmesi, en küçük bir kesintinin onun ekonomisindeki negatif etkisi vurgulanmıştır. Coğrafi mesafenin, güvenlik sorunlarının, ABD’nin önemli stratejik bölgelerdeki üstünlüğünün Çin’in ekonomik yükselişini yavaşlatabilecek tehditler olarak değerlendirilmesi onun hegemonik potansiyeline de darbe vurabilir. Bu yüzden Çin’in gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflediği Yeni İpek Yolu projesi incelenerek, onun ‘tarihsel blokun’ kurulmasındaki rolü sorgulanmıştır. Mevcut düzenin sağladığı kısıtlama ve baskıların yükselen güç tarafından bahane olarak kullanılması ve bu şekilde avantaja çevrilerek hegemonik sistemin zincirlerinden kurtulmuş bölgelerde etkisinin yayılması için kullanılmıştır.
Araştırma tarihsel materyalizm edebiyatından faydalanarak yükselen güç ve hegemon arasında mukayeseli bir analiz gerçekleştirmiştir. Tez içerisinde tarafsızlığı koruyabilmek için Batı ve Çin akademisyenlerinin araştırmalarına, İngilizce, Türkçe, Rusça literatüre, kitap, gazete ve dergi makalelerine, resmi açıklamalara yer verilmiştir. Geleneksel ve eleştirel teorisyenlerin ‘hegemonya’ kavramlarını yorumlaması (Cox, Gill, Law, Worth, Strange, Keohane, Nye, Gilpin); önemli enerji (Yergin, Vivoda) ve Çin uzmanlarının (Callahan, Fairbank, Kuhn) düşünceleri teze büyük katkıda bulunmuştur.
Yukarıda belirtilen soruları cevaplamak için tez, hegemonya kavramını Amerika’nın bu statüye ulaşmasıyla Çinin şuan gittiği yolu karşılaştırmalı olarak mukayese etmektedir. Şöyle ki, bu şekilde gerçekleştirilen bir kıyaslamalı analiz bize Çinin gerçek niyetlerinin açıklanmasında yardımcı olabilir. Çin Halk Cumhuriyetinin son yıllarda dünyanın en büyük ekonomisine çevrilmesi, döviz rezervlerinin en önemli sahibi oluşu, en büyük deniz filosundan birini yönetmesi onun sistemdeki pozisyonunda bir değişim isteminin habercisi olarak algılanabilir. Çin yetkililerinin dünyanın İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonraki sistemle aynı olmadığının altını çizerek değişimin kaçınılmaz olduğunun iddia ediyor (Wang, 2012).
Tezin teorik kısmı hegemonya kavramı üzerinde kurulmuştur ve Gramsci’nin ‘tarihsel blok’ ve ‘transformismo’ konseptlerini ele alıyor. Gramsci’nin kavramlarının toplumsal çerçeveden uluslararası seviyeye yükseltilmesi liderlik konseptine farklı bir bakış açısı kazandırmış ve sadece güce bağlı üstünlük değil de, madun grupların da rızası ile politik, ekonomik ve kültürel alanlarda elde edilen üstünlüğün önemi vurgulanmıştır. Çalışmanın bu konseptlere başvurma nedeni ABD’nin hegemonya yolunun tasviri, onun ‘transformismo’ politikasını uygulayarak karşıt seslerin susturulması ve Çin’in sistemde
190 değişiklik yapma istemiyle yeni ‘tarihsel blokun’ kurulması imkanlarını araştırmaktan ibarettir.
Tezde Gramsci’nin hegemonya kavramına başvurmanın en önemli sebebi devlet-bazlı, indirgemeci yaklaşımlardan uzaklaşarak teorik yapının çerçevesini genişletmekten ve daha verimli analiz yapmaktan içindir. Bu yüzden de araştırmanın amacı ana teorilerde belirtildiği gibi ‘güç değişimi’ değil de ‘hegemonik değişimdir’. Tarihsel araştırmaya başvurarak iki konsept mukayeseli şekilde incelenmiştir ki, farklılıklar arkhe (üstünlük) ve hegemonia terimleriyle ifade edilmiştir. Şöyle ki, ilk konseptte mecburiyet rızanın üzerinde yer alıyor ve hegemonyanın oluşumunu engelliyor.
Tezin ampirik kısmında ABD’nin hegemonik zirveye ulaşması Gramsci’nin bakış açısından incelenerek, bu yükselişin diğer güce dayanan aktörlerin statü değişimi için gerçekleştirdikleri agresif çabalardan farkı anlatılmaktadır. ABD’nin ekonomik gücünü siyasi ve toplumsal alanlarda barışçıl yollarla çevirebilme yeteneği aynı olayın başka bir güç tarafından gerçekleşebilme ihtimali sorusunu akıllara getiriyor. Şöyle ki, tez bu örneği dikkate alarak Çinin farklı dönemlerde gerçekleştirdiği politikaları, resmilerin retoriği ve akademisyenlerin araştırmalarını dikkatlice incelemiş ve yükselen gücün aynı yolda ilerlediği iddiasındadır.
Çin’in 30 yıl devam eden yükselmesi sonucu elde ettiği kazanımlar Batı edebiyatında hegemonik sistemin getirisi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Hiç şaşırtıcı değil ki, ABD başkanı Obama, Devlet Sekreteri Klinton Çini ‘beleşçi’ devlet olarak damgalamış ve sistemin faydalarını kullanmasına rağmen yük paylaşımında bulunmadığı için suçlamıştır. Aslında Çin’in mevcut sistemin avantajlarını kullanması ABD’nin hegemonik tahta çıkması için geçtiği yolu hatırlatmaktadır. Bu kısımda Gilpin’in alt-optimizasyon teorisine başvurularak hegemonik sistemin ilkelerini kullanan aktörün sorumluluk sahibi ortak görünüşünde göreli kazançları artırarak nihai entegrasyona uğramadan kendi seçkinliğini koruyabilmişliği gösteriliyor. Tezde Gilpin’in açıkladığı alt-optimizasyon metodu uygulanarak yeni bir ‘tarihsel blokun’ doğumu, büyümesi ve genişlemesini izleyebiliyoruz. Yükselen güç her zaman göreli kazancını diğerlerine göre daha fazla arttırarak hegemonik sistemin avantajlarından faydalanamayan grupları etrafında birleştirme çabası göstermiştir.
Tezde gerçekleştirilen teorik ve ampirik analizler enerji güvenliği çerçevesinde inceleniyor. Çin’in artan ekonomik gücünün başka alanlara etkisi enerji güvenliğinin potansiyel ‘hegemonik değişim’ için önemini bir kez daha vurguluyor. Hegemonik sistemin Çin’in
191 enerji ihtiyacına ulaşması için ortaya çıkardığı engeller ve onların yükselen güç tarafından avantaja çevrilmesi tezin üçüncü kısmının en önemli bulgularındandır.
Çin’in ham enerji kaynaklarına olan artan ihtiyacı onun dünyanın enerji zengini bölgelerde hegemonik sistemin avantajlarından faydalanamayan aktörlerle çok boyutlu ilişkilerini araştırarak gerçek niyetlerinin bulunmasında faydalı olacaktır. ABD’nin en önemli enerji kaynaklarına sahip merkezlerde oynadığı rol Çin’in büyümesi üzerindeki baskı olarak algılanabildiği için bundan kaçış yolunun bulunmasında yükselen gücün çabaları araştırılmaktadır. Çin’in kendi enerji güvenliğini korumak için gerçekleştirdiği politikaları inceleyerek onun dünya düzenindeki değişimle ilgili niyetlerine ışıklandırabiliriz. Bu zaman Gramsci’nin kavramlarına geri dönersek, Çin’in mevcut sistemde mutlu olmadığı için ‘tarihsel blok’ kurmakta niyetli olduğunu mu, yoksa Amerika’nın sağladığı olanaklardan memnun olup ‘transformismo’-a yenik düştüğünü mü sorgulayabiliyoruz. Amerikan hegemonyasının Çin’e etkisini algılamak için bu soruların cevabını bulunması kaçınılmaz gözüküyordu.
ABD’nin İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra Çin’in ‘arka bahçesinde’ kurmuş olduğu hegemonik sistemin yükselen gücün enerji ‘açlığından’ kurtulmak için başka bölgelere yönelmesiyle sonuçlandı ki bu tezin doruk noktalarından biridir. Çin’in bu bölgelerde yumuşak güç kullanarak siyasi ve toplumsal alanlarda ‘kalpleri ve zihinleri’ kazanmak istemi onun ‘enerji açlığı’ perdesi arkasında saklanan niyetlerinin göstergesi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Sonuç olarak en önemli konunun Çin’in bu bölgelerde mevcut sistemin adaletsizliğinden şikayetçi aktörlerle yeni bir ‘tarihsel blokun’ temelini atabileceğinin sorgulanması duruyor. Diğer taraftan, Çin’in mevcut düzenin getirilerinden faydalanarak kendini güvencede hissettiği için ‘transformismo’ politikasına teslim olduğu belirtiliyor.
Bu çerçevede Çin’in sistemde değişime ihtiyaç duyduğunu vurgulayarak, bu aktörün ne biçim bir alternatif geliştirdiğini sorguluyor. Şöyle ki, Çin’in nasıl bir farklı düzen teklif ettiği ve diğer güçlerin neden bunu takip etmek istediği de tez içerisinde farklı referanslarla belirtilmiştir. Çalışmada ABD’nin Britanya hegemonyasının içerisinde yeşerip büyüyerek, onun çerçevesini genişleterek meşruluk kazanabildiğinin altı çizilerek belirtilmiş ve bir sonraki potansiyel hegemonun da aynı şekilde mevcut yapıda düzenlemeler gerçekleştireceği ifade edilmiştir.
ABD’nin ekonomik, politik, toplumsal, kültürel ve ideolojik alanlardaki üstünlüğü onun İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra kazandığı hegemonyanın meşruiyetini artırmıştır.
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Uluslararası örgütlerde hegemonik sistemin ilkelerinin güçlendirilmesi, onların yayılmasına hizmet etmesi, yumuşak gücün başarılı kullanımı, medya ve aydınlar sayesinde ortak ‘bilgi ve kültürün’ oluşturulması Amerikan hegemonyasının anahtar kelimelerine dönüşmüştür. Ulus ötesi kapitalist sınıfın oluşumu özellikle Amerikan hegemonyasının belkemiğine dönüşmüştür. Şöyle ki, neoliberal demokratik ideolojinin prensiplerini 1980lerden sonra gelişmekte olan bölgelerde uygulanmasında bu sınıfın çok önemli rolü olmuştur. Amerikan Rüyası konseptinin kabullenilmesi ise bu hegemonik gücün toplumların her hücresine dokunma imkanının göstergesine çevrilmiştir. Bütün bu konuları dikkate alarak Çin’in potansiyel alternatifinin hangi özellikler taşıdığı tezin diğer kısmında incelenmiştir.
Çin’in düzendeki bugünkü yerini incelediğimizde onun yıllar içerisinde nasıl dikkatlice ve detaylı bir şekilde biçimlendirdiğinin şahidi olabiliriz. Tezin bu kısmında amacımız yıllar içerisinde oluşan politikaların sunuş şeklindeki farklılıklara rağmen Çinin son hedefinin aynı olduğunun altını çizmektir – Çin sistemde ekonomik gücüne uygun ‘değişim’ sonucu daha fazla söz sahibi olmak istiyor.
Mao’nun ‘Üç Dünya Teorisi’, Deng’in ‘Reform ve Açılım’ politikası, Hu Jintao’nun ‘Uyumlu Toplum’ konsepti ve Xi Jinping’in ‘Çin Rüyası’ stratejisi dikkatlice incelendikten sonra aynı niyetin farklı retoriklerle açıklanmasına şahitlik ediyoruz. Zheng Wang (2013) Çin Halk Cumhuriyetinin kuruluşundan itibaren aynı projenin farklı şekillerde takdiminin altını çizerek, ‘eski şarabın yeni şişede’ verildiğini söylüyor. Mao’nun Üçücü Dünya devletlerinde ideolojik yakınlık kurmak için uğraşları Çin’i 20 yıla yakın sistemin diğer üyeleriyle normal ilişkilerden kesmiştir. Aslında Mao’nun mantıksız ve ulaşılması güç hayalleri Deng’in pragmatik politikalarıyla hayat bulmaya başladı ki, onu takip edenler ekonomik ve finansal gücü farklı alanlarda kullanmaya karar verdi. Deng döneminde Zhou Enlai’ın ‘Dört Modernleşme politikasının’ takibi, Çinin kapılarını ulus ötesi sınıf için açması Batıda beşinci modernleşme yani politik demokratikleşme beklentilerini artırmıştır. Bu olayla Çin’de hegemonik sisteme ‘transformismo’ olunması hedefleniyordu ki, yeşeren umutlar 1980lerin sonunda Tiananmen olaylarının patlak vermesi Çin’in Komünist Partisinden vazgeçmeyeceği ve düzenin çıkarlarını kullanmasına rağmen politik değişimi kabullenmeyeceğini açık bir şekilde gösterdi. Bununla da Deng’in Çini sistemin avantaj ve dezavantajlarını ölçerek hareket edeceğini bütün dünyaya bir daha tekrarladı.
1990larda Çin yöneticileri ekonomik yükselmenin sonucu olarak uluslararası sistemde ortaya çıkan rahatsızlığı azaltmak için barışçıl niyetlerinin altını çizmeye başladılar. Onlar
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Çin’in eski agresif güçlerden farklı olarak liderlik peşinde olmadığını ve kendi sorunlarını çözmek için ekonomik güce ihtiyaç duyduklarını vurgulamışlardır. Şöyle ki, tezin içerisinde Çin’in tarihi haraç sistemine referans verilerek aslında bugünkü politikacıların geçmişi meşruiyetlerini artırmak için nasıl kullandıkları gösterilmiştir.
Aslında Deng’in ‘baş eğip, zaman kazanmak’ politikası 21-ci yüzyılda ‘Çin Modelinin’ ortaya çıkmasıyla son buldu. Şöyle ki, bu model ekonomik, politik, ideolojik alanlardaki alternatifiyle dikkatleri üzerine çekebilmiş, siyasi müdahaleye karşıtlığı; çıkarsız yardım programları; Güney-Güney yaklaşımı; ‘farklılıklara saygı gösteren’ uyumlu uluslararası toplum özelliklerini kendinde birleştirmiş ve mevcut düzene alternatif olarak değerlendirilmiştir.
Çin Modelinin bu kadar dikkat çekme sebeplerinde biri de Amerikan hegemonyasının eski meşruiyetini özellikle 11 Eylül olaylarından sonra gerçekleştirdiği Orta Doğu politikaları sonucunda yitirmesi olmuştur. Gramsci’nin de belirttiği gibi yeni ‘tarihsel blokun’ yükselmesi yalnız mevcut hegemonyanın gücünün tükenmesiyle aynı süreçte olabilir. ABD’nin ‘ya bizimlesiniz ya da bize karşı’ açıklamaları Çin’de ve gelişmekte olan birçok devlette sömürgeciliğin yeni hali olarak değerlendirilmiş ve eleştirilmiştir. Bu dönem Amerikan’ın hegemonyasındaki rıza sütununa ağır darbe olmuştur. Hegemonik gücün düşüşte olduğu bir süreçte Çin Modeli farklı politika ve stratejilerle dikkatleri üzerine çekmeyi başarmıştır. Şöyle ki, Beijing Uzlaşmasının ekonomik gelişim için model rolü oynaması ve Uyumsal Toplum ve Çin Rüyasının farklı toplumlardaki insanların kalplerini ve zihinlerini kazanmak için kullanılması ve başarılar elde etmesi aslında Çin Modelinin önemini bir daha kanıtlıyor. Bu modelin farklılıklara verdiği değerden başka Çin alternatifinin Mao’nun Üçüncü Dünya bölgesinde kazandığı popülaritenin nedenlerinden biri de ortak tarihi sömürülme geçmişinin olmasıdır. Batılı güçlerin sömürgeci politikalarının kurbanı olan ve neoliberal demokratik ilkeleri kabul etmeyen devletler ve diğer aktörler Çini kendilerine daha yakın hissetmeye başladılar. Çinin kendinden taviz vermeden mevcut sistemden faydalanabilmesi, politik şartlar konulmadan ekonomik yardımların gerçekleştirilmesi onun teklif ettiği modelin önemini bir az daha artırmıştır. Aslında Çin Modeli hegemonik sistemden memnun kalmayan güçler için bir sıra sebepten çekici gözükebilir:
- Bu model ‘üstün’ güçlerin ideolojik ve siyasi müdahalesini kabullenmiyor.
- Bu model sistemin avantajlarını kullanmayı önemli bir unsur olarak değerlendiriyor
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- Farklılıklara ve siyasi tercihlere saygının altını çizerek sınırlar içindeki olaylara karışmaya itiraz ediyor.
- Farklı modelleri birleştirerek herhangi bir gelişim stratejisinin fetişize edilmesine karşı çıkmıştır.
Peki Çin bu modeli hangi bölgelerde tatbik etmek imkanına sahiptir? Bunu cevaplamak için enerji güvenliği konusunu dikkate alarak hegemonik baskıların avantaja çevirmek için uğraşan bir yükselen gücün hikayesini anlatıyoruz.
Aslında Çin’in alternatifini inceledikten sonra yükselen gücün enerji kaynaklarına ulaşım yolu üzerindeki mevcut sistemden rahatsız güçlerle beraber ‘tarihsel blok’ düzenlemek istemi dikkatleri çekiyor. Çin’in alternatifinin bu şekilde gelişim göstermesi onun enerji açlığının arkasında saklanan büyük stratejinin göstergesidir.
Eğer bir değişimi anlatıyorsak o zaman yükselen gücün mevcut sistemden bağımlılığını tamamen aradan kaldırmasını beklemek gerekiyor. Aslında tarihin hiçbir döneminde hegemon ve ikinci güç arasında bu kadar bağımlı bir ilişki olmamıştır, şöyle ki her ikisinin mevcudiyeti diğerini direk etkiliyor. İki güç arasında sayısız alanda ilişkini göz önünde bulundurursak ve tezin de bir kapasitesi olduğunu düşünürsek araştırma alanımızı enerji güvenliğiyle kısıtlamak kararını alıyoruz.
Peki, neden enerji güvenliği? İlk olarak Çinin bütün alanlarda büyümesi güçlü ekonomisine hiçbir mani olmadan enerji akımının gelmesi ile sağlanabilir. Eğer enerji akımında kısa veya uzun soluklu bir kesinti oluşursa bu Çinin farklı alalardaki yükselişine direk olarak etkide bulunabiliyor. Bundan başka Amerika’nın Asya Pasifik ve Orta Doğudaki fiziksel mevcudiyeti Çini kendisine kaçacak alan aramaya itiyor. Mallakka ve Hürmüz boğazlarından bu kadar fazla bağımlı olmak, denizlerde oluşabilecek bir güvenlik sorunu durumunda Çinin zor bir durumda kalabileceğinin göstergesidir. Çinin ithal ettiği petrol ve gazın yüzde 85-i bu boğazlardan geçiyor ki, rakamın büyüklüğü olayın ciddiyetini açıklamaya yeterli gibi.
Çin kaçış yolunu Amerikan hegemonyasının dokunamadığı bölgelerde aramaya başladı. Hegemonik gücün dokunmama nedeni ise bu bölgelerin ‘transformismo’ politikalarından kaçabilme eylemleri yüzünden. Aslında enerji güvenliği içerisinde hem ‘transformismo’, hem de ‘tarihsel blok’ konseptlerinin önemli özelliklerini yakından inceleme şansımız oluyor. Hegemonik sistemin oluşturduğu zorlukları yeni bir şansa çevirerek mevcut
195 düzenden politik nedenler yüzünden faydalanamayan aktörlerle, özellikle enerji zengini olanlarla yakın ilişkiler kurma çabası kendisini bağlayan zincirlerden kurtarmak istemiyle açıklanabilir.
Çin’i enerji güvenliği bir dilemma olarak değerlendirilebilir ve ABD’nin yükselen gücün büyüme hızı takibine, Çinin de enerji açlığını nasıl avantaja çevirdiğini gösteriyor. Bu dilemma üç kısımdan ibarettir:
- Çinin ekonomik gücünün devam ettirmesi için kesintisiz enerji akımına ihtiyacı var
- Çin ABD’nin Pivot Stratejisi ile ‘arka bahçesinde’ mevcut güçlerini arttırmasından, körfezler ve Orta Doğunun enerji zengini aktörleri üzerindeki tesirinden rahatsızlığını ifade etmiştir.
- Hegemonik baskı ve kısıtlamaların Çini Batıya yönlendiren hareket verici kuvvet olarak değerlendirmesi, ‘kayıtsız-şartsız’ ekonomik destekle mevcut sistemden rahatsız aktörleri etrafında birleştirilebilir.
Teknik, coğrafi ve güvenlik sorunları Çin’i enerji ihtiyacını karşılaması için farklı yöntemler kullanmaya itiyor ki, bunlardan biri de sistemden ‘kovulmuş’ ve memnuniyetsiz enerji alanını milli şirketlerle kontrol eden ülkelerle yakın ilişkilerin kurulmasıdır. Çinin İran, Rusya, Orta Asya, Latin Amerika’sının enerji zengini devletleriyle ilişkileri Vivoda (2009) tarafından alt-optimizasyon gruplarının oluşumunda ilk aşama olarak değerlendiriliyor. Çinin Yeni İpek Yolu projesi tez içerisinde bu konunun ışıklandırılması için çok önemli rol oynuyor. Xi Jinping hükûmeti tarafından ileri sürülen projenin amacı Çinin Asya ve Avrupa arasında tarihsel ticaret yolunun yeniden canlandırılmasıdır ki, birçok akademisyen bu stratejinin aslında hegemonik açılım olduğunu söylüyor. Yeni projenin enerji güvenliği açısından önemi dünyanın yüzde 75% bilinen enerji rezervleri üzerinde olmasıyla açıklanabilir. Çinin devlet şirketlerinin neoliberal demokratik kavramları ulus ötesi şirketler kadar önemsememesi onun farklı pazarlarda daha fazla gelir elde etmesiyle sonuçlanıyor ki, bu da ‘tarihsel blokun’ kurulma imkanını akıllara getiriyor. Çinin kendi arka bahçesinde sıkıştırılması Mearcheimer’in (2014) dediği gibi onu hegemonik yükselişten durdurmamış, tam tersi onu şansını yeni bölgelerde denemesi için tetiklemiştir. Şöyle ki hegemonun giremediği pazarlara önce enerji şirketleriyle, sonra da Yeni İpek Yolu projesinin çok boyutlu stratejisi ile giren yükselen güç aslında çoktan sadece ekonomik çıkar peşinde koşmaktan vaz geçtiğini göstermişti.
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Diğer taraftan, enerji pazarında ABD’de şeyl rezervlerinin kullanımıyla son birkaç yıl içerisinde gerçekleşen değişiklikler de tez içerisinde incelenmiş ve ‘transformismo’ politikası çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Şeyl kaynaklarının Çine satılması, Çin’de bu alanın araştırılması için teknoloji yardımın gerçekleştirilmesi mevcut sistemin üstünlüklerini kullanmaya çağırış aslında yükselen gücü ‘güvenli sığınacaktan’ çıkmadan büyümeye davet ediyor. Larry Summers (2014) bu konuyla ilgili diyor ki; ‘eğer Çin’in Orta Doğudan değil bizden daha fazla bağımlı olmasını istiyorsak enerji alanında daha yakın ilişkiler içerisine girmeliyiz.’
Çinin Yükselmesi tarihsel sömürgecilikten acı çeken ve şuan da ‘farklı’ oldukları için düzenin avantajlarını kullanamayan aktörler için ‘başarı hikayesine’ dönüşmüştür ve bu yüzden de Mao’nun teorisinde belirtilen bölgenin bu gün de Çinin gündeminde bu kadar önemli yer tutmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Aslında tez Çinin enerji açlığı bahanesini farklı pazarlara girmek ve daha derin ilişkiler için bahane olarak kullandığını ifade etmektedir. Yükselen gücün çıkarları ve sorumlulukları arasında dikkatlice seçim yapabilmesi onun hala zaman geçtikçe ‘transformismo’ politikasından daha fazla uzaklaşacağını gösteriyor.
Sonuç olarak, Çinin mevcut sistemden bağımlılığı göz önünde bulundurularak herhangi bir hegemonik değişimin gerçekleşmesinin yakın gelecekte beklemediğimizi ifade etmek isteriz. Ama bu zaman çerçevesinde Çinin liderliğiyle tarihsel blokun kurulması ve sistemi köklerinden sarsması beklentiler içerisindedir. Aslında Çinin Yeni İpek Yolu projesinin başarısı veya fiyaskosu sistemik değişimle ilgili bir şeyler söylemek için önümüzü açacaktır. Ekonomik gücün güvenlik, üretim, finans, bilgi ve ideolojik alanlarda üstünlüğe dönüştürülmesi Çinin diğerlerinin kendi liderliği için rızaya çevrilmesi ile sonuçlanabilir ki, bu dünya sisteminin yeniden yapılanmasını kaçınılmaz yapacaktır.
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B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU
ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü
YAZARIN
Soyadı : Adı : Bölümü :
TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :
TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora
1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.
TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:
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