View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Allard Research Commons (Peter A. Allard School of Law) The Peter A. Allard School of Law Allard Research Commons Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2011 Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation Wei Cui Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs Part of the Tax Law Commons Citation Details Wei Cui, "Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation" (2011) 3 World Tax J 455. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons. Wei Cui* Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation1 The recent policy literature on fiscal federalism in China has concentrated on the large “vertical fiscal gap” resulting in inadequate local provision of public goods and services. Thus there is an evident interest in giving local governments more taxing powers. After a brief historical survey, the article discusses a 1993 State Council directive that centralized taxing power. This has led local governments to make use of their control over tax administration to alter effective tax rates, and to the practice of “refund after collection”, whereby local governments disguise tax cuts as expenditures, following a logic opposite to tax expenditures. This study concludes, firstly, that the allocation of taxing power is still done outside the framework of the law, and secondly, that the government has not been able to settle on a stable allocation.