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Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-Political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-Political Conflict in Southern Thailand

No. 5, August 2006 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio- political Conflict in Southern Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

East-West Center Washington WORKING PAPERS East-West Center The East-West Center is an internationally recognized education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen understanding and relations between the United States and the of the Asia Pacific. Through its programs of cooperative study, training, seminars, and research, the Center works to promote a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a leading and valued partner. Funding for the Center comes for the U.S. government, private foundations, individuals, corporations and a number of Asia- Pacific governments.

East-West Center Washington Established on September 1, 2001, the primary function of the East-West Center Washington is to further the East-West Center mission and the institutional objective of building a peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community through substantive programming activities focused on the theme of conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific and promoting American understanding of and engagement in Asia Pacific affairs.

Contact Information: Editor, EWCW Working Papers East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 [email protected] Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana is a faculty member of the School of Public Administration at the National Institute of Development Administration, , Thailand. During 2005, she was a Fellow at the East- West Center Washington, where this study was written. Details on the fellowship program can be found on page 49.

East-West Center Washington Working Papers This Working Paper is a product of the East-West Center Washington’s Southeast Asia Fellowship Program.

No. 5, August 2006 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio- political Conflict in Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

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Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio- political Conflict in Southern Thailand

The conflict in the Muslim-dominant area of For decades, but particularly since southern Thailand has been running for over a violence in the south began to escalate in 2001, century. It has waned and waxed, but by the scholars have offered a variety of explanations late 1990s there were good reasons to believe for the enduring separatist movements and that it was on an irreversible declining trend. associated conflicts. This paper contends that One of the reasons for such optimism was that analyses of the southern conflict have given the central government was set to implement insufficient attention to patterns of local and decentralization policies throughout Thailand regional governance as mechanisms that have that would give Thais more local control over mitigated violence in the south in the past and administrative, and personnel, though not offer hope again for quelling the conflict. necessarily budgetary, policies. Democracy Informal arrangements established during the was sinking deeper roots in Thailand and 1980s created an informal institutional setting Muslims were assuming high profile roles in tailored to the problems specific to the region. various parties and in ruling cabinets. And These arrangements were dismantled by the even before the implementation of formal new Thaksin government in 2001. The new decentralization policies, prior governments government also undermined the goals of had put in place unique institutional decentralization as outlined in the 1997 arrangements that afforded the southernmost constitution and in the 1999 implementing close cooperation among local elites legislation. Central government resistance to and the Thai military. decentralization was apparent throughout Thailand, but became particularly marked and Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

significant when increasing violence in the the effectiveness of the state machinery in the south diverted resources from local region. governments to security forces operating in The plausible hypothesis that decentral- the area, and to central government ization can diminish tensions rooted in local development priorities. opposition to externally controlled governance The Constitutional Drafting Assembly structures is supported by my survey and included the goal of decentralization in its field research in Pattani. That research 1997 draft in order to enhance local suggests that prevailing political attitudes and participation and to boost the quality of local behaviors in the far south may be distinctive. governance. The assembly was not primarily My empirical findings offer tentative support concerned for conditions in the far south. for the hope that decentralization may However, decentralization might have contribute to resolution of the conflict in the promised to alleviate further tensions in the south. At the very least, looking at the conflict area. Many prior studies had argued that the using a political and administrative cultural distance between Muslim-Malay framework can add to our understanding of locals and Buddhist officials of the central the conflict itself. state brought in from other of the Malay-speaking and bilingual Malay- created tensions in the region. Not Muslims, when compared with Thai Buddhist until the late 1970s were Malay-Muslims speakers in Pattani, have higher levels of appointed to official positions in the south in political efficacy, participate more in local significant numbers.1 politics, and have stronger beliefs in the The tensions in the three provinces of potential for local governments to address , Pattani, and Yala long have been their problems. Apparently, the cognitive rooted in the centralized nature of the state outlooks associated with a civil society and its forced assimilation policies. supportive of capable governance are more Administrative centralization dismantled the pronounced among the majority population of traditional local elite power structure and the far south than among the minority highlighted the linguistic and cultural population there, and perhaps than among the distinctiveness of officials drawn from the Buddhist majority in other parts of Thailand.2 majority Buddhist population operating While my findings are no more than among a largely Malay-Muslim populace. suggestive, they not only signal the need for Greatly enhanced local autonomy and further research, but also underline the governance under the terms of implementing potential of an effective decentralization legislation subsequent to the constitution policy that builds on the apparent local promised to boost the numbers of local potential for effective government to diminish officials and politicians who would have local the long standing sources of grievance in roots and would therefore be more likely to be Thailand’s far south. sensitive to the customs and worldviews of Armed separatist activities in southern the local population. And because the tensions Thailand are not new phenomena. However, between locals and central government after diminishing substantially over the 1990s, officials have long been such a central and the historically rooted conflict escalated persistent feature of this conflict, this paper gradually in 2001 and dramatically after argues that implementation of a fuller form of January 2004. The three southernmost decentralization continues to hold great provinces where the majority of the 1.5 million potential as a means of diminishing both the residents are Thai-Muslims,3 are suffering the resentments that tend to fuel the conflict and security, economic, social, and political the isolation of state officials that undermines consequences of the conflict. The causes of the conflict and its recent escalation surely are

2 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

complex, involving the interaction of many local antipathy to corruption appears to be factors. Scholars doing recent research on the particularly marked.6 ongoing violence in southern Thailand have This paper argues that violence in the emphasized many diverse forces such as south needs to be understood in terms of local ethnic identity, economic deprivation, administrative and political problems. In a criminal networks, conflicts between the army context that is perceived by many locals as and the police, the failures of the central essentially colonial, it surely makes sense to government’s development and assimilation consider ways in which enhanced self- policies, the central authorities’ discrimination government might contribute to better against Muslims, the impact of Islamism, government performance and to social peace. global Islamic terrorism networks, failures to A focus restricted to issues of religion, accurately analyze the situation, long term identity, and international terrorist networks conflict among central authorities, the simply is not adequate. Muslim separatist excessive use of force, and weak intelligence. movements in Southeast Asia are often held to Surprisingly given the long standing be motivated by concerns of identity and argument that the tensions were stimulated by community as well as those of economic and the insensitivities of central government political opportunity and the quality of local officials at sea in the local socio-cultural governance. Because the root cause of the context, analysts have not tended to give a conflict stems from the centralized state, great deal of attention to the impact of political, administrative, and fiscal administrative and political decentralization decentralization may be able to address both in the region. Yet in the broader comparative sets of concerns. If Muslims in Mindanao, political and policy literatures, southern Thailand, or have more voice decentralization continues to attract interest as in local governments that, in turn, have a means of reducing ethnic tensions and broader governance roles, many of the separatist sentiments.4 This research aims to concerns that fuel separatist goals might be put the issue of decentralization policy at the reduced. center of analysis of the conflict in southern Data gathered for this study during field Thailand. research in southern Thailand provides some If all regions in Thailand are distinctive, preliminary support for the notion that the the far south long has appeared to be more establishment of effective and representative distinctive than others. Southerners, for local political institutions has the potential to example, apparently are more apt than other reduce tensions in southern Thailand. Ending Thais to engage in party voting.5 Levels of the current violence in the south, however, lawlessness generally are higher. And my also requires addressing other causes such as research suggests, perhaps puzzlingly, that the lack of local input into central government local levels of participation and a sense of policies, the ignorance of central government political efficacy toward local institutions are officials of local governments in the south and comparatively high. These latter attributes of conditions more generally, and the top- seem to be particularly marked among down authoritarian style of Thai government bilingual (Malay and Thai speakers) locals, leadership today and in the past. suggesting the potential value of emphasis on As I argue at length below, the history of bilingual education policies locally. More the conflict in southern Thailand suggests that generally, however, my findings raise the the root cause of the problem stems from the intriguing possibility that the south may be centralized state itself. Therefore, political, particularly well suited, in terms of dominant administrative, and fiscal decentralization attitudes and behaviors, to produce good policies launched over the past decade should governance at the local level. For example,

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at least have some potential to address this Thailand. With the rapid implementation of cause. decentralization policy in recent years, local In the wake of the recent upsurge of governments (including and violence in the south, strategies to deal with Administrative Organizations, TAOs) the southern conflict have emerged from in Thailand have assumed more central government agencies, largely the responsibilities in managing their own military and the police. In this top-down, jurisdictions. But central authorities’ heavy-handed military approach to problem reluctance to implement decentralization solving, central government authorities view policies fully, and the lack of financial conflict in the south in terms of a separatist devolution8 may have made decentralization movement challenging Thailand’s territorial policies part of the complex set of problems integrity. This view may be in part justified, feeding the frustrations in the south. With but ignores the extent to which unrest stems more responsibilities and few resources, from the lack of political space and limited limited discretion over revenue and spending socio-economic development in the region, to may tend to make things worse. Moreover, say nothing of conflicts between officials TAOs and municipalities have been minimally brought in from other regions and local involved in any of the central government residents. Decentralization might be a means initiated conflict resolution processes despite of making local governments in the south their obvious relevance as locally constituted more responsive to local demands and better democratic institutions in Thailand. The expressions of local political identities. failure to include these local political Several scholars have argued that both institutions also stems from the longstanding democratization and decentralization tend to suspicion among central government officials dampen separatist conflicts. My research in of local government capacities. suggested that decentral- Beginning in the 1960s, a number of ization boosted cooperation between local comparative scholars of revolution argued governments and local residents, resulting in against prevailing approaches to the analysis higher levels of satisfaction with local of revolutions that focused their inquiries on government performance, and greater the causes and prevalence of a generalized accountability and responsiveness on the part sense of grievance and injustice. Instead, of local politicians.7 Contrary to expectations, argued subsequent scholars, a more political however, conflict and violence in the south approach was needed. Skocpol’s analysis of did not continue on their downward path of revolution insisted that the causes of the late 1980s and 1990s. Increasing levels of revolution should be sought not so much in violence in the south have coincided with government oppression, but in government increasing levels of democratization (through weakness.9 Here I argue the need to link these the 1980s and at least until 2001) and concerns. As the literature on state embedded- decentralization (since 1998). Violence began ness demonstrates, state capacities are linked to escalate in 2001 and exploded in 2004. Why to states’ abilities to sink roots into their so? surrounding social milieu. Government in the A number of policy analysts and scholars south of Thailand has the heavy hand of a sort have been trying to account for this upsurge in of colonial presence, but, being disembedded, violence. These analyses point to a broad is weak. Poor government then feeds the local range of factors, including factors that sense of grievance. Decentralization would emerged only in 2001: the new Thaksin seem to offer a means of breaking this cycle by government and the U.S.-led war against enabling more local political participation and, terror. This paper focuses on some of the in the process, enhancing the quality of major problems of decentralization policy in governance.

4 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

This paper draws on a variety of sources. more autonomous local governments. Finally, These include secondary sources and in-depth my conclusion briefly recaps my argument. and follow-up interviews, including a closed- door seminar at the Prince of Songkla Historical Overview University, Pattani campus. For the latter Thailand, known as Siam until 1939, is a purpose, I invited local politicians to discuss Buddhist country. Perhaps 95% of the the conflict, their roles in addressing it, and population is Theravada Buddhist, with the current administrative structure of local Muslims, concentrated mostly in the south, governments. In addition, the paper analyzes making up about 5% of the total population.12 survey research10 carried out in three Tambon Most Muslims in southern Thailand speak Administrative organizations and one - only Malay and are ethnic Malay. They used level in Pattani. (Two TAOs with to be part of the long flourishing, independent all Malay-Muslim residents, one with both sultanate of Pattani, later divided into the Thai Malay-Muslim and Buddhist, and one muang provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas, Satul municipality). 11 and part of in southern Thailand. The remainder of this paper is organized Most of the violence has been concentrated in in three parts. The first section that follows the three southernmost provinces dominated offers an analytical history of the conflict in by Malay-speaking Muslims. In and the south, highlighting shifts in the character Songkhla, Muslims are less dominant and of the conflict over time and the ways in more likely to speak only Thai, rather than which the conflict has been shaped by the Malay, or both. Thai state officials see centralized state’s periodic efforts to exert southern Thailand as a security vulnerability central control over the region, including as the Muslim Malay speakers live along the those under Prime Minister Thaksin. This northern border of and most hold history provides a basis for understanding the dual citizenship. However, state efforts to need to focus on the ways in which assimilate the into the dominant institutional flexibility achieved through central Thai culture created security threats of informal or formal means can ameliorate the their own.13 Ladd Thomas argues that deeply tensions in the south. We can trace the roots of rooted divisions between the Malay-Muslims local resistance from the initial efforts of and their Thai Buddhist counterparts cannot displaced elites to a broader, more be eradicated through assimilation policies. participatory, and more violent opposition Instead, those assimilation policies have against external control. The second section of always been perceived and interpreted by the paper outlines the institutions of Malay-Muslims as attempts to weaken their Thailand’s centralized state and the ethnic and religious traditions.14 And the implementation of decentralization legislation center’s promotion of enhanced the that followed the 1997 constitution. This roles of local religious leaders in the southern section also describes the ways in which resistance movement.15 decentralization has been put into practice Since the 1920s, Thai national identity has around Thailand and the specific problems been defined by the three pillars of the Thai that have confronted local governments all state, including nation, religion, and over Thailand. The third section reports the monarchy. During the 1930s, ‘nation’ was findings of my research in 2005 in Pattani. It redefined in ways that emphasized the emphasizes local elite grievances against identity of the dominant Thai ethnic group ongoing central state direction of local with Buddhism as the main focus of the Thai governance and the findings of survey national identity. However, because the research that hint at strong local support for monarchy sat at the top of social hierarchies and was not traditionally defined in ethnic

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terms, the potential of the divisive conflict was began in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat (and, somewhat counterbalanced. The monarchy less frequently, in Songkhla). In 1903 the has, for example, personally granted former sultans protested against the changes. recognition to the leadership of Thailand’s The Thai monarchy tightened its control over Muslim community,16 funded translations of the region, undermining the traditional Malay the Koran into Thai, and presided over ruling families, because the monarchy feared celebrations of the prophet’s birthday. The that the region would come under the control government also provided funds for building of British Malaya23 as had other sultanates on and renovating mosques. Recently, the queen the peninsula previously under Thai made several lengthy visits to the . southernmost provinces, while the king has The imposition of taxation, education, expressed his concerns about local conditions and and culture, including directly to Prime Minister Thaksin.17 Buddhism, onto Pattani by the Thai The Kingdom of Pattani, comprising the centralizing state during the 19th century was current Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun aimed at unifying the country and provinces, was a part of “Siam” between the overturning the “backward” culture in the 14th and 18th centuries. The first Chakri king in south.24 In the last third of the 19th century, 1786 conquered Pattani, but the Siamese King aimed for the first time to exercised little authority over the area. Siam centralize administration throughout the relied on indirect rule, sustaining the kingdom. The model of administration, traditional authority of political and religious grafted from indirect colonial regimes, aimed elites.18 The South was under the rule of the at centralized control over a limited set of kalahom, with the minister of that agency administrative tasks. The state-building responsible for all aspects of governance in the reforms enabled Bangkok-based officials to region. assume many powers previously exercised by Starting in the mid-1870s, Siam appointed local notables. The primary substantive aims commissioners to perform military roles in the of the reforms were centralized control of south19 and southern Islamic states were government finances and the establishment of under indirect rule called “.”20 effective territorial control. In the Longstanding separatist movements sought to southernmost areas, villagers, often advised remove the southernmost provinces from Thai by religious leaders, rallied against paying rule either to become a separate Pattani State , unpopular Siamese officials sent from or a part of one of the states of Malaya. Other the central government, and the central movements aimed for more self-rule.21 government’s aggressive assimilation policy Sporadic and spontaneous uprisings headed effected through its education policies during by religious leaders have broken out since the the first quarter of the 20th century.25 beginning of the 20th century when Siam took Unsurprisingly, the strongest resistance possession of the southern provinces. to the central government in this period26 Thailand officially incorporated the came from those whose power was Sultanate of Pattani in 1902 through the dismantled along with local power Anglo-Siamese treaty.22 Fearing that the Malay structures.27 Forced assimilation policies also states in Thailand might come under other engendered broader resistance as the policies foreign influence, the British pushed the were seen as directly threatening Malay- Siamese to exert more control over the area Muslim identities. For example, the Muslim and, as a result, local autonomy began to legal code, structured by the Sharia and adat decline. With the shift in jurisdiction over the (Malay custom), and administered by the local area from local kings to the Thai central Qadi (Muslim judge) was at least nominally administrative system, sporadic violence controlled by Thai Buddhist officials.28

6 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

With the end of the absolute monarchy in important, suggested Brown, are the gaps 1932, the new Thai leadership pushed for between Malays and Buddhists within these modernization and nation building. General provinces. Phibun Songkhram tried to further centralize Figure 1 shows that the three southern- and strengthen the state, and promoted Thai most provinces and the southern region in nationalism, and the creation of a homo- general are not as poor as the north and the genous Thai national identity based on central northeast regions. However, the differences Thai culture. By 1939, Siam was renamed between Malay incomes and those of well-to- Thailand.29 The new name specifically do Chinese and Thais in the region can be involved the identity of the state’s dominant striking. This situation encourages the Malays ethnic group. Phibul also required all Thais to to perceive that they are exploited by Thais adopt Western dress and to change many of and Chinese who extracted the region’s their traditional social practices. He extended natural resources for their private benefits.35 compulsory Thai-language education.30 Many And in the 1940s and 1960s the region faced Thais viewed these policies as offensive and economic crisis and rice shortages when idiosyncratic. For Malay-Muslims, they rubber prices fell sharply. 36 As a result, implied a direct attack on Malay-Muslim separatist sentiments grew stronger. Relative identities.31 economic deprivation, administrative central- Phibul’s Thai Custom Decree banned the ization, and forced assimilation policies wearing sarongs, and prohibited use of the created minority consciousness in the three , Malay names, and Sharia southernmost . law. Despite the state’s expanding ambitions, Violence in the south grew during and contact between Thai speaking Buddhist after World War II. While the Thais supported central officials and Malay speaking Muslims the Japanese, Malay-Muslims in the south in the south remained minimal.32 Penetration supported the British. They fought against the by the Thai state was perceived by Malay- Japanese with the British, ethnic Chinese Muslims as a threat and they refused to nationalists, and with support from the identify themselves with the Thai nation- Islamic Religious Council under Tun Mahmud state.33 The new policies were seen as putting Mahyuddin and Haji Sulong. Many Malay Malays into a “second class citizen” category, fighters hoped that the British would give as a marginal minority within somebody else’s them independence from Thailand after the homeland. As Brown puts it, “the state war.37 However, the subsequent Cold War policies of centralization and assimilation, and context convinced the British (facing strong the consequent disruption of communal pressure from the United States) to support a authority structures, thus, engendered a sense unified Thai state.38 of ‘minority consciousness’ in which the Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong took recognition of disunity itself provided a basis power in 1944 and softened Phibul’s harsh for unity, thereby modifying the sense of assimilation policies. He tried to co-opt group identity.”34 Centralization and assimil- Muslim leaders into the central state ation policies also nurtured links between the bureaucratic structure. The “Patronage of minority community and their brethren those Islam Act” created the ‘Chula Rajmontri’,39 across the border in . under the Ministry of Interior. The Chula The southernmost provinces have not always Rajmontri was appointed by the king to advise been the poorest in Thailand, although the him on Islamic matters. A 10-member Central provinces’ relative standings have slipped Islamic Committee was established and each over the past two generations. More mosque created a Mosque Council.40

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Figure 1. Poverty Map and the Headcount Index, Average Monthly Income and Expenditure per Household and Per Capita by Region: 2004 (January–June)

Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Office of the Prime Minister and National Statistical Office.

This initiative was of dubious several rebellions broke out. In the “Dusun effectiveness. To date no one serving as Chula Nyiur” incident in April 1948 in Narathiwas, Rajmontri has been a southerner and the local about 1,100 Muslim and 30 policemen were “Imam” and “Toh Kru”—religious leaders killed.45 Haji Sulong disappeared in 1954, and teachers—still have strong influence on apparently killed by the police.46 This incident southern Muslim communities.41 Pridi proved to be a turning point for the resistance introduced a system under which the Ministry movement in the south. Subsequently, of Justice appointed a couple of Islamic judges resistance was no longer concentrated among in each Muslim majority in order to dispossessed elites, but took on a broader, advise the state court regarding Islamic more popular quality. marriage law. Buddhist judges, however, still The Greater Pattani Malayu Association maintained ultimate authority.42 (GAMPAR) was organized in the 1950s to Haji Sulong formed the People’s fight for the incorporation of Pattani, Yala, Movement in 1947 aiming for self-rule, Narathiwas, and Satul provinces into Malaya. implementation of Islamic law and cultural Even though the group disintegrated after the rights.43 In response to the demands, the death of the group leader, it paved the way for government allowed the establishment of several other separatist groups that followed. Friday as a weekly holiday and the use of Amid continuing violence, Field Marshal Malay for instruction in private schools. In Sarit (1957–62) sustained heavy-handed November of the same year, Phibun retook policies, forcing local adoption of Thai power from Pridi and imprisoned Haji Sulong language and other parts of the national and several of his followers. Responding to curriculum under the 1961 Educational international pressure, Phibun later relaxed Improvement Program. The program forced his policies toward the south.44 However, all the “pondok” to convert into “Private

8 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

School Teaching Islam” (PSTIs)47 schools and of those believed to be cooperating with to take on a secular curriculum. Those that separatist groups, generated strong anti- resisted the change were closed down. As a government sentiment and gave an result, the numbers of pondok fell opportunity to the Pattani United Liberation dramatically. The pondoks were placed under Organization (PULO) to organize a mass the Ministry of Interior.48 In 1957, Haji protest involving about 70,000 Malay-Muslims Sulong’s son, Amin Tomina, an MP at that in December 11, 1975. The violence led the time, was jailed for three years for making government to declare a state of emergency.53 demands in parliament for better conditions in Rallies spread across the border to Kelantan the south. He was charged with planning a and the Malaysian government urged support separatist revolt.49 In this context, the Barisan for Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. The Revolusi Nasional (BRN or the National government offered the Malay-Muslims dual Revolutionary Front) was formed by Haji citizenship. According to Gunaratna, Acharya, Abdul Karim Hassan, an Ustaz (Toh Kru or and Chua, this period saw the beginning of Islamic teacher) in Narathiwas, with other cooperation between Malay-Muslims in young foreign educated Muslim intellectuals.50 southern Thailand and those in northern During the 1960s, the central government Malaysia. Violence in the south, on occasion encouraged landless Thai Buddhists to spreading to Bangkok, continued. migrate into the southern region, offering The PULO was founded by Tengku Bira incentives such as free land.51 This policy Kotanila as an armed group comprised mainly helped generate further local resistance, of foreign educated Malay-Muslims, with its including more radical and organized groups. headquarter in Mecca. The ideology of the While some of these groups were purely group is based on religion, race, homeland, political, others mixed their politics with and humanitarianism.54 The goal of the group criminal activities. Separatism continued at a can be described as ethno-nationalist rather fairly high level through the 1960s and 1970s. than Islamist. Most PULO fighters are foreign A Training Center for Malay Language and trained. It has training camps in Syria and Muslim Culture at Chulalongkorn University Lebanon.55 During the 1980s, PULO started a was established by the state in the late 1960s to more dramatic and violent strategy. However, train non-Malay central government officials. the group was weakened after they lost Saudi The center later shifted to Prince of Songkhla government support. And in 1992, the group University, in Pattani before the Ministry of split. A new group (New PULO) was formed Interior closed it in 1977.52 by Arong Mooreng and Haji Abdul Rohman In the late 1960s violence in the south Bazo in 1995. During this period, separatist increased dramatically as government groups were in decline and memberships buildings, schools, and police stations came sagged. Some groups then turned to criminals under attack. Kidnapping for ransom activities, particularly drug smuggling.56 The increased. As a result, the central government PULO and the New PULO jointly established relied heavily on military operations in a group called Bersatu in order to carry out a cooperation with both Buddhist and Muslim campaign called “Falling Leaves” targeting volunteers, in order to destroy the separatist government officials in the area. networks. Armed confrontation between The National Pattani Liberation Front insurgent groups and Thai security forces (BNPP) was formed in 1971 as a splinter rose. However, these military operations did group from the BRN to promote full not seem to reduce the violence. The failure of independence and a separate Islamic state. the Thai government to investigate the killing Group leaders include religious leaders, some of five Malay-Muslim youths by Thai Marines of them educated in Islamic studies abroad. on November 29, 1975, or the disappearances The BNPP focuses on militant and violent

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activities and has strong ties to Muslims in the in the area. It has long been understood that Middle East.57 BNPP recruits members transfer to position in government offices in through its religious teachers who select the south could be a means to punish officials’ students in the area for military training, both misconduct or incapacity.60 To overcome this in the area and overseas.58 legacy, SBPAC was also responsible for applying a performance based personnel 1980s: The Period of Decline system within government offices in the During the early 1980s, the government and region.61 Even though SBPAC and CPM 43 did the military employed policies that had been not involve particularly democratic successful in weakening the communist institutions, they provided opportunities for insurgencies in Thailand in the 1970s. Prime local elites to engage with central government Minister General Prem Tinasulanond, with officials on an ongoing and systematic basis. long experience in the south, initiated several And the SBPAC offered local residents a social and economic development projects in venue in which they could voice their the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, grievances. such as the introduction of electricity and With the surrender in April 1987 and, water systems into remote areas. The asylum in 1989 for members of the Malayan government focused more on political than communist party, separatism among Malay- military means to deal with the violence. Muslims declined dramatically. Over 1,000 Efforts were made to boost local political received land near the Malaysian border as a participation and to include more local result of the asylum. A more open political civilians into the state administrative system. climate allowed those in exile to return from Most importantly, General Prem also Kelantan. As a result, strength among initiated two major partnership institutions to separatist groups declined and violence monitor and coordinate negotiations between dropped significantly. 62 By the mid-1990s, the the Thai government and separatist groups in ethnically based separatist movement seemed the south. The first was a Civil-Police-Military to be coming to an end joint headquarters (CPM 43) responsible for Separatist activity was on the wane by coordinating security operation and ending the mid-1990s and prominent Muslims the extra-judicial killing and kidnapping by emerged on the national political stage. Both security forces. CPM 43 had a strong the Democrat Party and a Muslim political intelligence network in the Malay and faction called “Wahdah,” previously within criminal communities.59 The Southern Border the New Aspiration Party, have strong Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) was southern bases.63 They have paved the way for formed in 1981 to enhance coordination Muslims to gain top positions in the among government agencies, reduce government. Wan Muhammed Nor Matha of corruption, diminish prejudice against Malays the Thai Rak Thai Party served as the first among government officials sent to the area, Muslim President of the National Assembly and to hear local grievances. It was a special and as Deputy Prime Minister. Surin Pitsuwan unit comprised of the army, police, and the of the Democrat Party was Foreign Minister. Ministry of Interior, and included several local Yet during this same period, separatist civilians. This unit focused on understanding groups with an identifiable religious identity Malay-Muslim culture and provided cultural emerged. According to Scheffler, Muslim and Yawi language training for non-Malay separatist movements in southern Thailand officials. stemmed from the local institutional and A significant source of local grievance historical contexts of religious and Malay since the 1940s had been abusive behavior and cultural expression.64 Separatist movements corruption by government officials operating predated Middle Eastern Islamic revivalism.

10 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Nonetheless, GMIP was formed in 1995 by The Recent Upsurge Nasoree Saesang. Although it focuses on While violence had not disappeared, it had creating an independent Pattani state, its ties diminished over the 1990s. According to with international Islamism are quite strong. Jitpiromsri, there were 2,593 incidents of Some of the members have announced their politically related violence between 1993 and support of Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. 2004.68 Of this total, well over two-thirds came Most of GMIP’s funding comes from during 2004 and January 2005. Violent charitable or religious foundations based in incidents were most common in Narathiwas, the Middle East. While the group has few following by Pattani and Yala provinces. 69 members, it has a close relationship with the Violence has escalated since 2001 and has BRN and is reported to be one of the most changed in character. Soft and civilian targets effective armed groups.65 However, the have been hit more frequently. In addition, the number of active armed fighters was police have been killed regularly since 2002. estimated to be no more than 3–500 during the Schools and other state institutions have been 1990s. targets. Buddhist temples and monks emerged One of the remaining critical problems in as targets beginning in October 2002, two the south concerned education. Officials were weeks after three Malay-Muslim were still prone to see commitment to a Malay sentenced to death by a Thai court. In identity as a sign of support for separatist December the same year, local residents groups.66 PSTIs did not offer Malay language protested against the proposed Thailand- as an option among elective classes. In Malaysia pipeline that threatened both addition, the growth of tourism and agricultural land and fishing grounds. Malay- entertainment industries generated hostility Muslims in general rejected the one million among some Malay-Muslims who perceived baht fund proposed by Thaksin’s in these developments an assault on their government. His brutal campaign against traditional culture. Resistance to new drug dealers in early 2003 caused many industries, however, reinforced a broader southerners to feel that they were particularly problem of poor relative economic favored victims of the extra-judicial killings. performance that had been evident from the Martial law was declared in 2003, enabling inception of the high growth era in the 1960s. indefinite detention. Commitment to traditional education meant In January 2004, about a hundred that few locals could find jobs outside southern separatists carried out a series of agriculture.67 Poor educational performance attacks that killed military and police officials also helped explain the shortage of state as well as civilian officials of the state, burned officials recruited locally. down 20 schools, and managed to steal some Prem’s recognition of southern 300 weapons from the Narathiwat Rajanakarin Thailand’s distinctiveness enabled the army camp.70 This marked a still steeper rise quelling of the conflict in the 1990s. His in violence and increased attacks on Buddhist development strategies and the creation of and other civilian targets.71 CPM43 and SBPAC helped to integrate On April 28, 2004 there were clashes southerners politically while also improving between organized but lightly armed young the quality of state intelligence. More Muslim militants (believed to be guided by a democratic governments in the 1990s offered splinter of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional or more sophisticated policy choices. Political BRN Coordinate) and security forces in Yala, space opened up for Malay-Muslims in the Pattani, and Songkla.72 April 28th marked the south and expanding roles for civil society anniversary of the clash in Narathiwas in 1948 helped to curb the violence. The separatist that killed 400 villagers and 30 policemen. The movement seemed to have disintegrated. militants carried on simultaneous pre-dawn

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raids on 10 police stations in Yala, Pattani, and capturing those responsible for the raid. He Songkhla provinces. However, the violence also deployed 3,000 more troops to support and symbolism around the historic Krue Se the Fourth Army Region in the south and mosque in Pattani was particularly striking as equipped them with powers to arrest suspects it underlined religious dimensions of the without a court warrant.73 Under these conflict. Militants gathered inside the mosque pressures, security forces arrested some while some of them went out and attacked religious leaders and teachers from PSTIs security checkpoints and policemen. The fight based on scant evidence. Somchai Neelpaijit, accelerated and ended with General Panlop defense lawyer for several defendants facing Phinmani’s order to attack the mosque charges for involvement in prior attachs, (against the advice of Deputy Prime Minister disappeared on 12, 2004 after his .) The result was 108 abduction by police. 74 The case remains Muslim militants and five security officials unresolved. dead. Subsequently the government gave far Central government officials blame the more attention to ustaz (or Islamic teacher) spiral of violence on the revival of armed network, many of them trained in Pakistan, separatist movements (BRN and GMIP) and Egypt, and other largely Muslim countries. corrupt local officials and politicians. The younger generation of teachers were However, for many locals, it is the security recruiting their students into active resistance forces that pose the greatest menace and who based on Islamist precepts. And the new are behind false arrests, disappearances, approach was signaled by increasing attacks bombings of empty police stations, fires in on civilians, dispensing with the traditional empty schools, and other random killings. The focus on state personnel and infrastructure. longstanding conflict between police and the On October 25, 2004, about 2,000 military seems to facilitate this belief. There is protestors gathered outside the no doubt but that corrupted officials are police station in Narathiwat, involved in various illegal businesses around demanding that authorities release defence the Thai-Malay border area and at times volunteers taken into custody. The authorities employ force to retaliate against efforts to packed arrested protestors into trucks and 78 intimidate their business ventures.75 Whatever of them died from suffocation and other the case, it is not very easy to separate causes during the 5 hour (150-kilometer) incidents of criminality from those of journey to Pattani. After this incident, the separatist violence. The complete distrust violence in southern Thailand reached a new between authority and local civilians makes peak. Attacks on innocent Buddhist civilians things worse.76 rose. Indeed, the Tak Bai incident seemed to After the incidents on April 28, 2005, signal a further increase in the ferocity and Thaksin praised the army for its fast reaction brutality of the violence and to represent a and claimed a victory of sorts. An critical turning point from which return investigation made public about a year after seemed increasingly difficult. the incident, concluded that the use of force at Krue Se mosque was excessive and those who Conflict Management Under Thaksin’s ordered should be held responsible. However, Government none of the officers responsible for the order After the January 2004 raid, Thaksin imposed were disciplined, though some were martial law in several of Pattani, Yala, transferred out of the region. Many and Narathiwas provinces. He declared that southerners were not mollified. those who were killed in the raid on Krue Se After the Tak Bai incident, Thaksin again mosque “deserved to die” and imposed an praised the army and suggested that the unrealistic deadline for identifying and scores of deaths were a result of the fasting

12 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

during Ramadan. Blame was later pinned on Deputy Prime Minister, was replaced in favor lower level military officers and families of the of General Chetta Thanajaro who has victims were offered 10,000 baht each. None of experience in army activities in the south in the higher level officers found guilty of the 1980s. In late September, Thaksin negligence faced penalties greater than appointed Chetta to take overall charge. Less transfers.77 than a week later he opted instead for Malay-Muslims view themselves as Chavalit. After another four days he decided victims of injustice. While there has been some on General Sirichai. However, the latest growth of feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity Supreme Commander of SBPPC is General and local anger about the wars in Afghanistan Khwanchart Klahan. The new Deputy and Iraq, and particularly Thai troops serving Minister of Education is Aree Wong-araya, a in Iraq, unmet basic need for social and Muslim.83 Under the new structure, the economic security, discrimination, and National Security Council was for strategic cultural suppression are much more powerful policy and planning in general and Sirichai forces stimulating violence in southern will coordinates the Fourth Army, Region Thailand. 78 Nine of the , and the Thaksin is responsible for some of the miscellaneous intelligence and development causes of the recent upsurge. The elimination agencies in the south However, in October of SBPAC and CPM43 (May 2002) did great 2004, General Samphan Boonyanant, close to damage to intelligence networks79, the state’s Thaksin, replaced General Chetta as Minister links to community leaders, and the balance of Defense. At the same time, General Sant between the security and intelligence agencies Suratanontl replaced Sunthorn Saikwan as in the region.80 His early 2003 campaign police chief. And the leadership of the Fourth against drugs (with extra-judicial killings) Army passed from General Ponsak Ekbansing resulted in over 2,500 deaths around Thailand. to Phisarn Wattananongkiri (with twenty Thaksin initially was reluctant to talk with years experience in the south). At the same local Muslim leaders concerned about security time, General Sirichai Thanyasiri, Deputy forces’ abuses. He offered no assurances that Supreme Commander, was appointed to take he would crackdown on abuses of power or overall command of security and intelligence try to redress grievances.81 To date, however, operations. The Southern Border Provinces Thaksin has paid no political penalty for his Peace Building (SBPPC)84 was led by General blunders in the south. Most Thais, shocked by Panlop Pinmanee, Deputy Director of Internal the violence, support his harsh policies. His Security Operations Command, until he party won an overwhelming majority of seats ordered the military assault on Muslim in parliament during the general election in militants holed up in a Kru Se mosque on early 2005. However, no candidate from Thai April 28, 2004. Because of the tensions Rak Thai Party won a seat from the between the army (Lieutenant General Pisarn southernmost provinces in Thailand. Wattanawongkiri, Fourth Army commander) Implementation of a credible government and police (General Kowit Wattana, strategy in the south would in any case have commissioner), the SBPPC never really got off been difficult, but was made hopeless by an the ground.85 incredible turnover among top levels of the Thaksin recently formed an independent agencies most directly responsible. In March agency called the National Reconciliation 2004, Bhokin Bhalakula replaced Wan Commission (NRC), led by Former Prime Muhammad Nor Mata as Minister of Interior. Minister Anand Panyarachun. The Chaturon Chaisang82 was given overall commission is composed of 48 members and responsibility for the south. Thamarak focuses mainly on the process of reconciliation Isarangura, hardline Minister of Defense and and negotiation among parties involved in the

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conflict based on a softer approach. The NRC Muslim should work on Fridays on penalty of emphasizes diversity and the need for Thais to having their ears cut off. The fact that this accept that they are not made up of one single, threat was so effective among Muslims shows monolithic, unified ethnicity. As Anand that local Malay-Muslim do not trust Panyarachun put it, “since nobody can claim authorities to protect them. The result was that they are pure Thai, who are we imposing further disruption of the already weak the concept of ‘Thainess’ to people in the economy in the region.87 south?” Despite its good work, the NRC’s These and other factors clearly help to influence on government policy has not been explain the ongoing conflict. However, these great. Disagreements among groups within factors must be understood within a context the NRC have come to light. And a group of that continues to have a colonial cast. By its Buddhist monks in Pattani proposed the failures to implement a decentralization elimination of the NRC and claimed that in its strategy vigorously, the Thaksin government advocacy of Malay-Muslim concerns, the NRC has missed the opportunity to address the core turned a deaf ear to the problems besetting causes of the conflict. Thai Buddhists in the region. On July 19, 2005 the Thaksin government The Root Causes of the Conflict and Ethnic imposed a state of emergency on the three Nationalism southern provinces. Even though there was no When looking back to the root causes of the evidence of the benefit, the Prime Minister conflict, it is clear that the impact of the renewed the decree for three months on centralized state itself explains the emergence October 19. Facing so much criticism, the of the separatist movement in southern decree was modified into a milder version of Thailand. As Brown argues, the movement martial law. However according to an ICG started with the state penetration into the report, the new version was worse in many peripheral areas of southern Thailand and the ways as there remained no progress in disruption of the local power structures. In strengthening police forensic capacity and response, these peripheral areas tried to guaranteeing lawyers’ access to administrative defend their autonomy. Local elites articulated detainees. These steps might help improve the an ethnic nationalist ideology and mobilized climate of fear in the region.86 communities against the central state in order Many factors seem to be interacting to to build communal unity, identity, and the fuel the continuing violence in the south in elite’s new form of legitimacy. Later on, recent years. However, a couple of the most factions within separatist groups emerged as significant causes may relate to the the younger and more educated generation elimination of effective intelligence and challenged the traditional figures as the negotiating institutions formed during Prem’s leaders of an ethnic nationalist movement. 88 administration: SBPAC and CPM 43. The The Thai modern state penetration resulted in ruthless, unsophisticated, and militarized major change and provoked ethnic group strategies backed by the Thaksin government consciousness within the peripheral Malay- have paralyzed rule of law and failed to Muslim community. deliver justice. Local civilians hesitate to The starting point of ethnic nationalism cooperate with state authorities in fear of in southern Thailand can be explained in possible random arrests and rough treatment terms of the “mono-ethnic” character of the by the authorities. They also fear the militants state. The state excluded ethnic minorities taking their lives if they are discovered from full membership and top positions in the cooperating with authorities. The insurgents state were monopolized by the dominant have been able to intimidate local citizens. For ethnic majority groups—Thais and assimilated example, insurgents announced that no Chinese. The fact that Thai national identity

14 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

has long been described in Thai-Buddhist was imposed. Internal communist insurgency terms tended to cast the Malay-Muslims as and the threat from neighboring communist aliens. 89 countries from the 1960s to the 1980s The state’s assimilation policies have reinforced commitment to strong central been commonly perceived by ethnic Malay- control. Muslim as supporting the regimes’ ethnic This pattern, when applied in the south, majority constituents over the minority. The eliminated the role of traditional elites within feeling of being inferior is the unquestionable local power structures. As a result, local elites result. The traditional center of local power, searched for new power positions from which the sultanate of Pattani, was incorporated to protect Islamic integrity, including social, through military means. Centralized policies economic and political interests.94 Haji during the early 1920s removed the sultanate Sulong’s demands included calls for system and replaced traditional local Malay administrative reforms and came in 1948 as a rulers with Thai officials sent from Bangkok response to the central government’s through the provincial governmental system.90 reinforced centralized administrative policies. Education assimilation policies, under In short, the strong resistance to Thai rule the 1921 Primary Education Act led to the among Malay-Muslims in the south has been emergence of a new class of educated Malay- mainly a result of administrative Muslims and the emergence of several centralization, the central government’s forced competing militant separatist groups such as education assimilation policies, the still low the BRN and PULO in southern Thailand. rate of Thai literacy, and the lack of local Although they are in a more privileged democratic institutions that provided position compared to the previous generation, opportunities for locals to express grievances. these new leaders see themselves as With no effective institutions within the disadvantaged relative to ethnic Thai and political system providing democratic Chinese in competing for jobs.91 Malay- participation for local activists, violent Muslim students do not embrace the imposed separatist activities tended to emerge.95 Thai language taught in the schools and this Violence in the south waned during the leads to low standards in education. It also 1980s as a result of the state’s development encourages many to travel to the Middle East policies and the creation of the CPM 43 and for Islamic education. At the same time, as the SBPAC. Although these were not these new educated Malay-Muslims were particularly democratic institutions, they still deviated from traditional culture through provided opportunities for, and engaged local secular education posed by the central traditional elites in, the central government- government, they do not have enough dominated governing structure. These legitimacy in gaining cultural prestigious institutions also enabled local residents to status within their own ethnic group.92 voice their grievances. The elimination of these cooperative partnership organizations The Promise of Decentralization helped trigger the recent upsurge violence in Centralized administrative policies of the Thai southern Thailand. state with tight central-provincial-local Having reviewed the historical context relations were patterned on British colonial and the nature of Thailand’s political and administrative regimes. This strong central administrative centralized state, I now look at state was designed to secure control over prescriptions advanced as means of resolving outlying rural areas. The high degree of the tensions in the far south. I argue that most centralization of the Thai state survived the proposals give surprisingly limited attention fall of the absolute monarchy in 193293 as a to the potential role of decentralization as system of strong provincial administration mechanism in resolving the crisis in the long

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run. This is true despite the prior commitment central government. And to the extent that to decentralization enshrined in the 1997 decentralization fosters democratic practices constitution. And decentralization is given at the grassroots level, political stability may relatively little attention even though the root be enhanced. These results, if realized, might causes of ethnic nationalism and violence indeed ameliorate conflict in southern separatist movements in southern Thailand Thailand. Results from my survey reported stem from the nature of centralized state.96 below offer some support for this expectation. Political, administrative, and fiscal Thais have been discussing means to decentralization can allow local governments enhance local governments’ performance for to govern with wide discretion and authority, several decades. Decentralization emerged as and with a minimum of guidelines or decision a clear goal with the Seventh National rules imposed by the central government. Economic and Social Development Plan Since the 1990s, decentralization of political (1991–96).99 Thailand’s more open political authority and responsibility has been widely system encouraged more sustained attention advocated and implemented in developing to the goal of decentralization. The economic countries as a means of improving and social crisis beginning in 1997 coupled governance, reducing poverty, and inducing with the growing challenges associated with development. Proponents view decentral- globalization further boosted the need for ization as important for administrative administrative reforms aimed at efficiency and political participation. decentralizing, downsizing and restructuring According to Arghiros, “taking fiscal and government at all levels. In this context, the administrative control from non-elected, importance of good governance at the local centrally appointed bureaucrats and giving it level is apparent. A popular campaign for to locally elected residents makes the strong political reforms led to the drafting and development process more effective, efficient, promulgation of Thailand’s 16th constitution in and responsive”.97 Crook and Manor also state 1997. that decentralization and democratization The constitution mandates a more together reduce the power and the size of decentralized and participatory structure in central state bureaucracies and eventually lead which government institutions at all levels are to improvements in the accountability of intended to operate in a more transparent, development planning and spending.98 accountable, and responsive fashion. Chapter Theoretically, decentralized administration is 9 of the new 1997 constitution prompted steps more apt to identify local priorities, and to to realize radical political, administrative, and recognize and exploit resources to achieve fiscal decentralization in Thailand. It calls for them. Local government can promote the rationalization of the assignment of democracy by expanding opportunities for administrative functions across central and political participation. Decentralization tends local administrative jurisdictions and the to enhance access to political institutions and creation of a decentralization committee to may bolster local feelings of political efficacy. oversee implementation of new parliamentary With fewer actors, tendencies to ride free may enabling acts. Political participation was diminish. Locals learn from the political enabled through the direct election of local process that it is their responsibility to push representatives and the introduction of recall their governments to serve local needs. This mechanisms.100 Increasing local administrative suggests stronger mechanisms of vertical autonomy was achieved by giving local accountability that may promote higher levels governments more freedom in generating of responsiveness and reduce goal their own administrative, personnel, and displacement. As a further benefit, enhanced financial policies. Local governments now local governance reduces demands on the have more control over local infrastructure

16 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

and services, arts, culture, education and four provinces and elected by the people” and training, managing natural resources and the “2) all revenue and income derived from the environment, and sanitation.101 To realize four provinces to be utilized within them.”103 these fundamental changes required The new decentralized institutions meet many significant changes in existing political and of these demands administrative institutions, processes, and There was considerable debate cultures. Under decentralization, local concerning how to implement communities have more opportunities to decentralization, in particular on the question organize and to demand services. Local of the scale of regional governments to which leaders, for their part, have incentives to responsibilities would be devolved. mobilize the participation of local constituent Ultimately the decision was made in favor of groups in service delivery as means of coping smaller units rather than provinces, in part with the need to provide an enlarged menu of because of the fear that granting major powers services with limited local revenues. to provincial units would have the effect of Nine different laws and policies serve as strengthening separatist sentiments. The new base for decentralization efforts, including: 1) direct elected local executive system in which the National Decentralization Act of 1999, the executive position of all local governments establishing the roles and responsibilities of are directly elected and the transferring of the National Decentralization Committee; 2) administrative powers to implement central the Provincial Administrative Decentralization government projects and manage local Act; 3) the Tambon Administrative government personnel, are designed to Decentralization Act; 4) the Municipalities enhance the autonomy of small local Act; 5) the Upgrade Status of Sub- communities. municipalities to Full Municipalities Act; 6) Under the new legal framework, many the Change the Status of Bangkok responsibilities haven been transferred to local Metropolitan Administration Act; 7) the democratic institutions.104 Local executives Change the Status of City Act; 8) the manage local personnel. Previously, the Master Plans and Procedures of Department of Local Administration under Administrative Power Act; and 9) the the Ministry of Interior had full jurisdiction in Establish a Centralized Personnel Body of transferring local government personnel Permanent Officials of Local Administrative through the Committee of Municipal Organizations Act.102 Personnel. Local officials tended to rotate jobs Under the new strong executive system, every two to four years. The Local Personnel chairs of executive committees (in the case of Administration Act was amended in TAOs and PAOs) and mayors (in the case of December 1999 to give local governments municipalities) are directly elected by local increasing authority in determining municipal residents. This critical change could be of personnel issues. Generally, the act gives local fundamental importance in the south. executives tremendous powers in making Concerns for enhanced local autonomy have decisions in hiring, promoting, and been expressed by local Muslims for decades. transferring local government officials and For example, Haji Sulong’s Patani People’s employees. Movement, established in 1946, called for “1) The push for fiscal decentralization the appointment of a single individual with predated the major changes engendered by full powers to govern the four provinces of the 1997 constitution. The Local Fiscal Master Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas and Satun, and in Plan, drafted by the Fiscal Policy Office of the particular having authority to dismiss, Ministry of Finance, was approved by the suspend, or replace all government servants— Chuan Cabinet in January 1997. The plan this official to have been born in one of the aimed over a five-year period to enhance local

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revenues, clarify expenditure responsibilities, local governments and local communities, reform intergovernmental relations and to longstanding resentments in the three establish systems to transfer responsibilities, southernmost provinces should assume new to monitor and evaluate local governments’ institutional contours. Looking at the new fiscal administrations, and to build local institutional environment from the capacity to mobilize capital for local perspective of average municipal residents, investment.105 The master plan paved the way they have more access to the worlds of for the subsequent decentralization process officials and politicians than was the case in launched by the new constitution. the past.108 The 1997 constitution calls for increasing This has been the case in central the share of local government revenues and Thailand. It seems also to be true in southern expenditures, assigning more revenue sources Thailand and could be of critical importance to local governments, promoting local fiscal in diminishing separatist violence. In central autonomy, and revising the system of Thailand, I found that in the wake of intergovernmental transfers to provide grants decentralization, the social gap separating in a more transparent and predictable way. typical local residents from their leaders had According to the Decentralization Plan and diminished. In addition, social networks Procedures Act of 1999, local governments facilitated citizen access to decision makers. were to be allocated at least 20% of the Decentralization, and the new direct-elected national government budget by fiscal year executive system, gave local executives more 2001 (October 2000–September 2001) at the control over municipal officials and end of the Eighth National Social Economic encouraged grassroots participation so that Development Plan, and at least 35% by fiscal municipal governments were more accessible 2006 (October 2005–September 2006) at the to municipal residents. This suggests that end of the Ninth National Social Economic effective decentralization could ameliorate one Development Plan.106 These specific targets long-term source of grievance among Malays. have been subjects of heated debate. Central Local governments109 can become a place for revenues no longer flow solely through the local people to express their grievances. Department of Local Administration of the Survey results reported below suggest that Ministry of Interior. The Decentralization Plan these hopeful results have been realized in the and Procedures Act of 1999 enabled local south to some degree. governments to receive grants from other Decentralization has been under way for government agencies and ministries as well, several years and its results in the south beginning in fiscal year of 2001 (Thailand appear to have been positive in at least some Decentralization Plan and Procedures Act of respects. Yet, over the past four years, violence 1999). Under the 2003 National Budget, the has escalated dramatically. What went wrong? central government allocated 184,066.03 A number of factors including the impact of million baht, or 22.19% of the total national the Thai Rak Thai government and the global budget (829,495.60 million baht) to local war on terrorism clearly are overwhelming governments.107 It will not reach the 35% any beneficial effects that might have been target for fiscal year 2006. expected to accrue from decentralization. In Decentralization facilitates local addition, however, some features of the ways government engagement with local society. in which decentralization has been Theoretically, under decentralization, with implemented, both in general and specifically increased political space and local autonomy, in the south, may be contributing to the increased levels of responsiveness to local conflict. The weaknesses in the imple- constituencies, closer relations to local mentation of decentralization are linked to residents and the reduction of gaps between fundamental ambivalence on the part of

18 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

central government officials about the goal of pation, more rule of law and accountability, decentralization, particularly in the south. and less corruption and official malfeasance. The discourse about political decentral- While proponents of this vision are fairly clear ization has a somewhat ambiguous place in on what they want, they seem less certain how broader Thai discussions, however implicit, of to get it. They tend to resort to ethical appeals Thailand’s socio-economic and political for good behavior and the use of media to orders. Unger argues that three broad expose bad governance. Adherents of this perspectives on democracy in Thailand tend liberal view also tend to be ambivalent about to dominate contemporary thinking and that decentralization, favoring more local each is associated with distinctive attitudes participation, but not trusting that the process toward decentralization. The first perspective, will not be hijacked by the local special represented by Prime Minister Thaksin (construction) interests of local politicians.110 Shinawatra, accepts democracy as the name of Applying this broad framework to the the political game, but is not unduly situation in the south, the Thaksin concerned about the rule of law, the government’s top-down strategy clearly development of political institutions, or reflects the first perspective. It is highly widespread political participation. Unger doubtful that such a strategy can be applied suggests that this perspective draws its successfully to end the conflict in the south. inspiration in part from the development The root of the conflict in the south stems from trajectories of countries such as Singapore or the nature of centralized state. As the central South Korea and makes pragmatic judgments government perceives undue local autonomy about the means by which the state can be (particularly in the south) as a threat, used to foster an internationally competitive southerners have suffered from the disruption economy. The major goal of this perspective is of local power structures and unmet basic to spread entrepreneurialism, including needs for social and economic security. Efforts among more risk averse and traditional to suppress the force of local identities seem to farmers in rural areas as a means to boost offer only more conflict. Decentralization economic activity and reduce social and promises a better outcome, if implemented in economic inequalities. This view is not an effective way. particularly enthusiastic about decentral- The centralizing impulses of the Thaksin ization, but aims to retain the center’s capacity government are reinforced by the levels of to reshape Thai society and politics. violence and the inevitable central roles The second perspective, in contrast, accorded to security forces. The increasing focuses on drawing more on local inspiration levels of concern about violence in the south and wants to undo or to limit the great and the commitment of additional resources disruption experience by Thai rural have not been matched by efforts to engage communities beginning especially from the local governments in the area. Rather, 1970s as a result of more intense exposure to initiatives have aimed at closer cooperation international market forces. It aims to among police and military forces, central strengthen local communities’ capacities to government agencies, the Thai National shape their own futures through relatively Security Council, and numbers of intelligence self-reliant strategies and increased abilities to agencies at the center. These steps do not control access to and exploitation of local address the need to recognize the conditions natural resources. This perspective expresses specific to the region and to craft policies and strong support for decentralization. institutions appropriate to manage those The third, liberal, perspective focuses on conditions. what the 1997 Constitution seemed to The southernmost provinces of Thailand promise, including transparency, more partici- are relatively underdeveloped, have poor

19 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

infrastructure, and suffer frequent flooding. In authorities to handle much of anything. Much some provinces, as many as one third of the development money goes through military or population live below the poverty line. The provincial government channels, denying average household income in Narathiwat is TAOs experience in administering these one-tenth that of Bangkok and three-fifths of programs. the poor in the south as a whole are Decentralization is creating a new class of concentrated in the three provinces.111 The political elites in the region. Perhaps partly southernmost provinces are particularly poor, due to the competition they pose for although even there poverty is not as extreme traditional elites, religious leaders and the as in the Northeast of Thailand. Much new local politicians often do not get along economic activity in the south has centered on very well. The traditional, religious leaders tin mining, rubber, and fishing. However, and some other locals note disapprovingly most of the larger businesses in these areas, as that presidents of TAOs in the three elsewhere, are in the hands of Sino-Thais.112 southernmost provinces do not wear sarongs During the 1970s, 85 percent of village (a traditional piece of cloth worn as a long leaders could neither read nor write Thai, skirt), but t-shirts and pants instead. Some while the Buddhist central bureaucrats could residents perceive their political bosses as not speak Malay. While avoidance behavior overly secular and look disapprovingly on toward officials was common among all Thais, their consumption of alcohol and failures to it appears to have been particularly evident fast during ramadan. For their part, some among Malays.113 TAO politicians regard religious leaders as The south has a reputation for high levels being out of touch with local developments. of banditry and violence. Some scholars There also are complaints that some religious focusing on the region argue for distinctive leaders ask for money from TAOs to build leadership styles and for significant cultural mosques, but then pocket the funds.115 differences between Southerners and other When local politicians walk around , Thais, particularly in terms of a more they often are invited by local residents to aggressive and masculine style supposedly come in and chat and have coffee, and are widespread in the South.114 Many acts of expected to pay the bill. This modest violence apparently have been perpetrated by expenditure serves to show their generosity young drug addicts hired by separatists across and concern about the issues that local the border in Malaysia. The region is rich in residents have in mind. Politicians also have illegal activities, including protection rackets, to attend any social and religious ceremony kidnappings, smuggling, assassins for hire, when invited. These rituals reflect the degree and gangs. Security forces may have blamed to which local politicians are directly some of this background violence on connected to local people, depending on their separatists. The security forces themselves votes and political support. may have been responsible for some The politicians, however, complain that bombings of empty schools and police stations their budgets are inadequate. TAOs in general in a bid to boost their budgets. have very small budgets. More substantial Municipal and TAO officials and development funds pass through alternative politicians have now become targets of channels, as noted above. While some TAO violence as militants see TAO personnel as politicians acknowledge grounds for central stooges of central government authorities. government concerns about local Central government officials, however, often governments’ corruption, they note that the perceive TAOs as inefficient and incapable, military, police and other state officials too are and as assisting the militants. As a result, the corrupt. And they maintain that local central government tends not to trust local governments understand local conditions

20 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

better and are more apt to initiate and The security challenge in the south must implement those development projects that be met in ways that do not sideline reflect real local needs. Locals complain of a development priorities and local govern- “Bangkok knows best” mentality as the part of ments. Civilian bureaucrats from all agencies central government offcials.116 that are related to development projects are In 2003, the central government approved needed to implements projects and to a large budget for security projects in southern coordinate with local governments in the Thailand. Instead of allocating the money to south. In fact, however, even officials from local governments, the money was channeled provincial governments refuse to get involved through the military (SBPPC), the new entity at the grassroots level because of security created to replace SBPAC. Locals complain problems. that the resulting projects did not reflect local One of the problems that emerged most needs. For example, hydro-agricultural clearly from interviews with local residents projects allegedly wasted some 100 million concerned education. Several teachers in state baht. Seeds ordered from Singapore (and schools in the south have been killed by passing through Bangkok,) were insurgents. Some teachers now refuse to teach inappropriate to local soil conditions. Local because of the threats they face. Many locals leaders would have preferred funds to suggest they want to send their kids to regular promote vegetable production. Locally state schools so that they will be able to speak initiated projects, however, lack funding and both Thai and Malay. However, apparently have not been implemented. Such problems in many kids are unable to read even after six the south may relate in part to failures on the years of primary schooling. This is a result, part of the state to involve local people in argued locals, of the poor quality of the governance. Aggravating the problem, central teachers sent to the south. These teachers government officials understandably are allegedly are not interested in teaching, often reluctant to go into the field because of come late and leave early. Locals argued that security concerns. As a result, the govern- the problem of absent teachers (and other ment’s presence has an overwhelmingly officials) predates the intensified security security-dominated face, with only the mili- threats of recent years. Officials spend their tary and police in evidence. time, locals maintain, thinking about how to In March 2004, a cabinet meeting in secure a transfer back to Bangkok or some Pattani approved a 315 million baht budget other region. for development projects in the southernmost Teachers are selected based solely on provinces. The National Economic and Social scores on a single examination. Apparently, Development Board (NESDB) at that time was those with lower (but still passing) scores tend responsible for project details. All the project to be sent to the south. Few are actually from plans had already been initiated through the the region. Locals actually do receive ‘CEO development project’. preferences in the recruitment process, but However, Thaksin then initiated the SBPPC nonetheless relatively few do well enough on and designated General Sririchai to be the the exam to land jobs. The teachers coming in head of the new agency, giving it from other regions find the environment alien responsibility for the southernmost provinces, and are apt to feel insecure in the absence of a including the development projects initiated heavy security presence. earlier by the NESDB and the CEO project. Locals also complain that teachers have Authority over these projects was transferred patronizing views of southerners and that to the SBPPC. As a result, the projects were teachers tend to embrace the goal of making put on hold and both TAOs and provincial young Muslim kids into central Thais. This governments were bypassed. attitude breeds antagonism between Thai-

21 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Malay and Thai Buddhists in the south. As a Breaking this vicious circle requires result, locals tend to keep aloof from central looking at the conflict using a different authorities. framework. We have to search for ways to These problems help to explain why reduce the existing antagonism between local Malay-Muslim parents send their kids to society and the centralized state. Engaging Pondok schools. Ustaz (religious teacher local society through decentralized political teaching in Pondok school) are mostly institutions offers a promising alternative educated in the Middle East or South Asia. approach to reducing tensions. Integrating They often are committed teachers. They local people into political institutions as typically are intent on putting their charges on during the 1980s (albeit not in a broadly the moral path to reach God. Most pondok participatory fashion) proved promising. The schools use a curtain to divide the room, current violence represents in significant part separating male and female students, with a movement for political, social, and legal teachers teaching from the male side. space. The central state has failed to Resolution of the conflict in conflict in accommodate these needs, including the southern Thailand is more likely to result from provision of justice and human security.119 a bottom-up instead of top-down approach. Decentralization offers a solution as it Rohan suggests that some forms of political institutionalizes broader participation for local space and means to express socio-economic citizens. As the root cause of the problem grievance are necessary to reduce the level of stems from centralization of the state, conflict.117 The International Crisis Group decentralization seems a promising focuses on stricter application of the rule of alternative. law in order to ensure justice, including Thai government officials clearly do not human rights.118 It also addresses the understand the nature and the complexity of significance of mechanisms for addressing the conflict. Indeed, intelligence on just who political and economic grievances at the local they are fighting is very meager. Yet the level. central government must defeat insurgents’ Thailand’s current institutional structure efforts to win local Malay-Muslim support. To as defined by the 1997 constitution provides a date, the government has failed to do so. basis for more political participation through Instead of trying to make local residents feel the decentralization of state power to local comfortable expressing both their Thai and democratic institutions. However, this their Malay identities, the government has mechanism has been overlooked due to the tried to force locals to choose between them. lack of trust on the part of Bangkok officials This lack of comfort with alternative identities and their “Bangkok knows best ” & “CEO is then linked to a desire to radically curtail mentalities.” Adding to the problem is the effective decentralization of political very limited field research done at the institutions. grassroots level in southern Thailand. We do In addition, the central government tends not have enough detailed studies of not to trust the ability or the readiness of local developments on the ground in the south. governments to handle their new And among the small sample of available responsibilities. This further undermines studies, few are rooted in careful empirical central government commitment to decentral- analysis. This makes it more likely that ization. Indeed, most local governments in development policies will not be based on Thailand feature weak financial management, local realities and that local governments will insufficient resources, inefficient planning and be by-passed. These have in fact tended to be service delivery, and deficient public the results. infrastructure.120 Central government officials note widespread corruption, vote buying, and

22 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

patron-client relationship at the local level and local governments in the region. As a result, argues that these factors slow down the the government tends to exercise its direct implementation of decentralization policy. influence through central administrative These major problems, in turn, result from channels. inadequate revenue resources, poor Disbursement delays are common mobilization of existing revenues, lack of problems for the new local governments all technical capabilities and personnel, and a over Thailand. Although municipal lack of clarity concerning the responsibilities governments now receive more funds from transferred from the central government. Even the central government, their discretion in those who are responsible for implementing administering those funds is very restricted. the policy at the central, provincial, and local Local governments all over the country are levels lack a full understanding of the facing severe constraints and difficulties in processes of decentralization. As a result, coping with these rapid changes. Problems central officials tend to sustain their key roles also result from confusion over jurisdictional and control over local democratic insti- issues, the limited capacities of some local tutions.121 governments in coping with more Across Thailand, decentralization suffers complicated hiring and ordering processes, from the surviving influence of the former and a lack of local interest in some initiatives regional administrative structures. This previously launched by officials at other levels phenomenon impedes new local government of government. The greatest obstacle lies in structures. A problem particularly pro- the overlapping duties assigned among nounced in the south is that central municipalities, TAOs, PAOs, and provincial development funds often go not to local and central governments. Responsibilities for governments directly, but via regional the tourism industry, cultural preservation, governments and military and other agents of disaster prevention and security, for example, the central administrative structure are assigned not only to municipal (provincial governments, Ampor or district, governments, but also to TAOs, and PAOs. Tambon or sub-district, and Mubaan or Regardless of fiscal decentralization ). Given the redistribution of political policies, local governments still do not have authority entailed in the decentralization authority to set priorities and make decisions policy, many of the recent losers strongly on expenditure allocations. Local government oppose these initiatives. Sub-district headmen budgets need to be approved by the provincial (kamnan) and village headmen (phu yai baan) governor or district council which are the are affected directly by the establishment of arms and ears of the central government. the new direct elected chairman of executive General and specific subsidies to local committee of TAOs. Kamnan and phu yai governments allocated from the central baan previously dominated development government are strictly monitored by central planning in tambon or sub-district councils. agencies. Even though there has been a Their authority has been transferred to TAOs, significant increase in the portion of the but they remain ready to work directly with national budget allocated to local the central government, bepassing the new governments, most local government outflows political institutions. are mandated by the central government as Further problems facing decentralization, most of the transferred funds are earmarked and specific to the south, are the Thai Rak Thai for specific functions. 122 party’s weakness in the region and the The problem lies not with decentral- severity of the security crisis. Having no seats ization but the ways in which decentralization in the region, the party has few hopes of policies have been implemented. This paper reaping gains by championing the cause of points out that effective decentralization tends

23 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

to be hindered by institutional arrangements political participation. Respondents’ satis- and weak support from the central faction with their TAOs’ performances and government. their beliefs in TAOs’ abilities to curb the Despite the many difficulties associated violence in the south also are high. with the early years of decentralization, the Respondents register support for the notion policy continues to hold the potential of that TAOs may help to ease violence in the having a positive impact on southern south. 64.4% of respondents believe that the Thailand. Decentralization seems the logical transfer of central government responsibilities solution for resolving violence in the south by to local democratic institutions such as TAOs addressing its root cause. More attention may help ease the conflict and violence in the needs to be given, however, to the south. Furthermore, 63% of respondents implementation of the policy, in southern report that they believe that decentralization Thailand. The central government needs to can help local governments such as TAOs and support more coordinated planning and municipalities to be more responsive to local capacity building at the local level.123 needs. In the context of ongoing violence, the These results portray local attitudes implementation of decentralization in the strongly supportive of decentralization. Other south has been relatively limited compared to findings support a general picture of high other regions in Thailand. Martial law and the levels of civic attitudes. For example, over deployment of police and military forces in three-quarters of respondents indicated they the area limit flexibility and delay pay attention to local election campaigns in decentralization. Suspicious of the roles of deciding how to vote. And while more of local schools (Pondok), and convinced of the them are influenced in their vote choice by importance of regional development vote canvassers (33%) than by the mass media programs, the central government is hesitant (13%,) they are most apt to be swayed by to relinquish regulatory authority over family or friends (62%.) A very large plurality primary education or development spending. (41%) suggested that candidates’ policy Central government officials fear, not without platforms determined their votes, as against some basis, that local control will result in 12% citing candidates’ reputations or more local students lacking the skills personalities. appropriate for employment in a modern We have found a statistically significant economy. The result could then be continued relationship125 between education and income slow economic growth in the region. Despite (with a chi-square value of 339.991, at the .01 these concerns, however, a stronger and level). We also found a statistically significant sustained commitment to an effective relationship between religion and income in decentralization policy is necessary. the region (with chi-square value of 20.52, at the 0.01 level). Buddhists respondents tend to Current Socio-political Landscape in earn more than Muslims, and to have more Southernmost Thailand education (with chi-square value of 11.483, at My survey research124 (see Appendix 1 for the 0.01 level). more detailed results drawn from the survey) When we shift our focus to attitudes and gives a general picture of the socio-political behaviors (see Figure 1 in appendix 2), we characteristics of residents in three TAOs and found that higher incomes are associated with one city-level municipality in Pattani higher levels of interest in local politics. Those province. Respondents’ average levels of earning 20,000 baht a month or more had interest in local politics have risen during the significantly higher levels of interest (8.33 on a past 5 years, along with feelings of political 10-point scale) than the mean for all efficacy and assessments of the importance of respondents (6.83). The average level of

24 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

interest among the majority concentrated in highest levels (ranging from 6.49 to 7.18) and the lowest income group (under 5,000 baht a levels of interest falling from that peak as the month) was 6.45. age of respondents rises. Those in their 20s Income also influences levels of also record the highest levels of political participation in local government (see Figure 2 efficacy in response to a question asking in appendix 2). Those whose incomes are respondents to indicate the extent of their 20,000 and higher are most apt to participate agreement with the statement “If we all vote in local politics. Levels of education also are in local elections we might be able to change related to interest in local politics (see Figure 3 local political conditions”. And this age group in appendix 2). While respondents with only a was prone to endorse the importance of voting primary level education (or less) scored 6.26 in local elections. The same group is most on this scale, the highest level of education likely to believe that TAOs could curb (B.A. and above) was associated with a 7.4 ongoing conflicts and violence in the south level of interest. More educated respondents (see Figure 12 and 13, Appendix 2). Of course, also tend to report higher levels of efficacy, many of the militants engaged in violence are though here the differences are less drawn from the age cohort in their 20s that pronounced (7.74 for the highest of the five records the highest levels of interest in groups, 7.22 for the lowest.) Figure 4 in politics. This may reflect the ineffectiveness, to appendix 2 also shows that levels of education date, of alternative local political institutions also are related to tendency to vote at the local as channels through which residents can voice level (on a 4-point scale). While respondents political grievances. If this interpretation is with only a primary level education (or less) correct, it suggests that putting more emphasis scored 3.15 on this scale, the highest level of on local governance could be a means of education (B.A. and above) was associated engaging militants in local politics. with 3.74 level. When looking at levels of satisfaction Respondents were asked to what degree toward TAOs’ performances on different they agreed with the statement “local politics issues, we found that the Mean score of are matters for everyone, not only for overall satisfaction toward TAOs management politicians or specific special interests.” While and services are high (2.92 on a 4-point scale, we cannot offer a comparative (regional) score see Table 1, appendix 1). Those residents aged against which to assess the mean score for the 41-50 are those who are most satisfied. whole sample (8.72), it certainly seems to Respondents aged between 21-30 are most suggest a high level of agreement. When we satisfied with TAOs’ public health services, differentiate among respondents, we find that registration and record services, and TAOs levels of education predict higher levels of abilities to solve local problems. However, agreement with the statement (8.97 for the they give TAOs a very poor grade for their highest group, 8.36 for the lowest.) Not work in maintaining security. (see figure 6, surprisingly, the most educated were also the Appendix 2). most prone to endorse a statement referring to When we considering the differences in the importance of local politicians’ formal levels of satisfaction toward TAOs’ abilities to educational qualifications. solve local problems among those who speak Age also proved to be a variable different languages (see figure 7 and 8, predicting differences in attitudes among Appendix 2), we found that those who speak respondents (see Figure 5, Appendix 2). The both Thai and Malay are more satisfied (Mean relationship between age and interest in local = 2.23, statistically significant at .01 level). At politics is curvilinear, with the youngest (18– the same time, Muslim respondents are more 20) group indicating the lowest levels of satisfied than are Buddhists. This implies that interest, those in their 20s recording the

25 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Muslims who speak both Thai and Malay are respectively, see Figure 14, Apendix 2), a the most satisfied group. larger gap is evident when we look at Summarizing some of the findings bilingual respondents (7.69.) Here again reported above, Buddhists tend to have higher further analysis is required to discover levels of education and income; and higher whether this gap can be explained by other levels of education and income are associated variables such as income or education. Similar with higher levels of political efficacy and results are evident when we look at levels of interest in local politics. We found, however, political participation (see Figure 15, that we cannot then assume that Buddhists Appendix 2). Again the highest scores go to tend to have higher levels of political efficacy the bilingual group and the lowest to the Thai (see figure 9 and 10 in Appendix 2) or to speakers. participate more in local politics. On the contrary, the survey reveals that Muslim Conclusion respondents hold higher levels of political The southern Thai conflict is long running, has efficacy than do Buddhists (7.49 against 7.17, deep historical roots, and engages issues of statistically significant at the .05 level). All else identity. It also threatens to spread over equal, the lower income and education Thailand’s borders by creating tensions with Muslims should score lower than the Malaysia and by linking up with global Buddhists on these measures. However, the Islamist networks. We might therefore expect results suggest convincingly that significant the conflict to represent grave challenges to differences between Buddhists and Muslims the Thai state. However, it also seems possible in levels of political efficacy and levels of that the conflict can be managed and political participation more than offset the mitigated through competent political effects of the gaps in income and education. management. Chief among the policy Indeed when we look at political instruments available to quell the conflict is participation scores, greater Muslim activism central government encouragement of is evident (statistically significant at the .01 decentralization. If this argument sounds level.) Muslims also report the highest levels unduly optimistic, it is worth reminding of opposition to corruption. Muslims are most ourselves that only five years ago the conflict likely to believe in TAOs’ abilities to curb the seemed to be following a stable path of ongoing violence in the south (see Figure 13, declining intensity. And it also is important to Appendix 2). These findings are consistent keep in mind how limited is our with qualitative ones that emerged from understanding of the causes underlying this interviews and observations. And they conflict, though this last point can be used suggest strong support for the argument that either to bolster or to undermine any specific the central government should be prescription. championing local governments and A successful political strategy to contain decentralization. High levels of local political the southern conflict, including emphasis on interest and involvement might facilitate, via decentralization, should be based on an enhanced accountability, better governance. understanding of conditions specific to the far And higher levels of mobilization in the south. At one level, these differences concern absence of improved governance are likely to matters of identity. The majority of the continue to breed frustration. residents of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala are We also see potentially important Malay-speaking Muslims with a history linked differences when we shift our attention from to the Kingdom of Pattani. These factors religion to language. While differences differentiate them from other Thais and often between Thai and Malay speakers on political have been sources of conflict between locals efficacy scores are modest (7.14 and 7.36, and central government officials who have

26 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

come from other parts of Thailand to govern the area. It may also be important, however, to consider differences between Thais of the far south and those of other regions in terms of more abstract political attitudes and behaviors. While the research findings reported here are no more than suggestive, they provide hints of significantly higher levels of political efficacy and participation among Malay speakers and Muslims in the south, as well as more positive evaluations of experience with decentralization. Also, these same groups report attitudes more strongly opposed to corruption. These differences may simply be the response of many locals to a sense of being victims of unjust political arrangements. However, they may also stem from broader differences in political culture that have roots in a separate history and, perhaps, even Islam itself. Islam’s daily reenactment of communal commitments to solidarity and its abstract commitment to the equality of all members of the ummah may, at least in Pattani, tend to foster political identities conducive to a stronger civil society able to sustain links with local political institutions and, in the process, to nurture better governance. It seems likely that decentralization would at least enable forms of local governance superior to those experienced by most locals in recent decades.

27 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

28 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Endnotes

1 Alagappa, Muthiah. 1987. The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publication.

2 Albritton, Robert B. et al. 1996. ȈElectoral Participation by Southern Thai Buddhists and Muslims.Ȉ South East Asia Research 4 (2): 127-156.

3 Girling, John. 1981. “Thailand: Society and politics,” Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 265; Yegar, Moshe, 2002. “Between integration and secession: The Muslim communities of the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and western Burma,” Oxford: Lexington Books, p. 73.

4 As in the case of Sri Lanka where the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority contributes to the attempt to draw in decentralization and devolution of power in the political structure of Sri Lanka (See Gamini Samaranayake’s ‘Ethnic conflict and the process of decentralization and devolution of power in Sri Lanka’ Dept. of Political Science, University of Peradeniya Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, www.decentralization.ws/icd2/papers/decent_srilanka.htm)

5 Albritton, Robert B. et al. 1996. ȈElectoral Participation by Southern Thai Buddhists and Muslims.Ȉ South East Asia Research 4 (2): 127-156.

6 Albritton, Robert B., and Thawilwadee Bureekul. 2003 . Measuring Democratization in Thailand after Political Reform . : King Prajadhipokȇs Institute. (based on surveys on 2001 and 2002)

7 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana, 2004. “Decentralization, Social Capital, and Municipal government in Thailand”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University.

8 1997 constitution along with the implementation of decentralization Act projected that 35% of the national budget go to local government by 2006. However, it is clear that this is not to be reach (now only 25% so far).

9 Skocpol, Theda, 1994. “Social Revolutions in the Modern World..” Cambridge University Press.

10 The questionnaires include questions on 1) the existing levels of local resident’s political participation, 2) their perspective on decentralization and conflict in the south, 3) levels of residents’ political efficacy, 4) political culture scale, 5) levels of satisfaction toward local government’s provided services, 6) levels of resident’s confidence toward their local governments ability in dealing with conflict in southern Thailand, 7) attitude toward the effect of decentralization on conflict in southern Thailand, 8) resident’s evaluation of quality of local politicians, 9) residents’ evaluation of the change of the quality of local politicians and local governments after decentralization, and 10) attitude toward local political participation.

11 Scientific randomly selection process is not practical due to the lack of trust, according to number of scholars down there. If researchers went to a specific household and told them they are randomly selected to answer all the questions in the survey, they would be panic and will not cooperate believing that they are on either government or separatist group’s black list and refuse to cooperate. As a result, systematic random sampling was employed.

12 Mostly Sunni with small number of Shi’a sect.

13 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

14 Ladd Thomas, 1974. ȈBureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims,Ȉ Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly, 3(1): 545-568. Cited in Raymond Skupin, 2005, “Understanding South Thailand: Contributions by Ladd Thomas,” Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on Thai Studies, April 2005, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

15 Later harshly suppressed by authorities and fled to Malaysia. (Che Manh; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, 1995. Thailand: Economy and Politics, p. 271, Oxford University Press).

29 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

16 Called the ‘Chularajamontri’

17 New York Times, November 2, 2004.

18 Alagappa, Muthiah. 1987. The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publication.

19 Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, 1995. Thailand: Economy and politics, Oxford University Press. P.224.

20 Vickery, Michael. 1970. “Thai Regional Elites and the Reforms of King Chulalongkorn .” The Journal of Asian Studies 29 (4): 876.

21 Suhrke, Astri. 1977. “Loyalists and separatists: The Muslim in southern Thailand.” Asian Survey. 57:3: pp. 237-50

22 This treaty demarcated a border between Patani (of Thailand) and Kelantan, Perek, , and (of the at that time).

23 Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker. 1995, Thailand: Economy and politics. Oxford University Press. p. 270; Yegar, Moshe. 2002 . Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/ . Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, p. 87.

24 Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina, 2005, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb p. 3.

25 For example, the Education Act of 1921 forcing Muslim in the south to receive secular education through state primary schools in order to learn Thai language for 4 years. The curriculum also included Buddhist ethics taught by Buddhist monks. Islamic schools were forced to closed down and Muslim scholars were undermined.

26 1903—revolving against Bangkok led by Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin, the last Sultan of Patani. (the revolt was defeated and Imprisoned, later fled to Kelantan in 1915 to regroup, and then organized the biggest campaign against the Education Act of 1921). Two more unsuccessful revolts against Thai government were led by Sufi Sheikhs. See ICG “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad”; Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, 2005.

27 International Crisis Group Report, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

28 Scupin, Raymond. 2005. “Understanding South Thailand: Contributions by Ladd Thomas.” Paper prepared for 9th International Conference on Thai Studies, April 2005, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

29 Policies under the name of ‘Cultural Mandates’ or ‘Thai Custom Decree’ were imposed in order to forced assimilate all ethnic minority especially in the south. Malay language was prohibited to be used in government offices, all government employees were forced to take Thai names, traditional Muslim Malay dresses were prohibited. Islamic law was also withdrawn.

30 True, Linda Jane. 2004. “Balancing Minorities: A Study of Southern Thailand,” Paper Presented at the Concil on Thai Studies, October 2004, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

31 Skupin, Raymond. 2005. “Understanding South Thailand: Contributions by Ladd Thomas,” Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on Thai Studies, April 2005, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

32 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988) , p. 62

33 Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand (Singapore, ISEAS Occasional Paper 28, April 1975, p. 26-27).

34 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988) , p. 63.

30 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

35 Suhrke, Astri. 1977. “Royalists & Separatists: The Muslim of Southern Thailand,” Asian Survey 57:3 P. 241.

36 Forbes, Andrew. 1982. “Thailand Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence?” Asian Survey, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1982), p. 10.

37 True, Linda Jane. 2004. “Balancing Minorities: A Study of Southern Thailand,” Paper Presented at the Concil on Thai Studies, October 2004, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

38 Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina. 2005, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb, p. 5.

39 Chula Rajmontri’s duty is to give advice to the king regarding Islam issues.

40 True, Linda Jane. 2004. “Balancing Minorities: A Study of Southern Thailand,” Paper Presented at the Concil on Thai Studies, October 2004, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

41 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

42 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

43 For more detail, see International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

44 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

45 From Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina. 2005. Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb, but estimated numbers vary. For example, in ICG report, 400 Muslim were killed and thousands fled to Malaysia.

46 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

47 PSTIs have become more prestigious than the pondoks, but also the place where militant organizations and activities have been taken place.

48 Pondoks or Ponohs are religious boarding school and the most significant institution to strengthen Malay-Muslim Identity.

49 Surat Horachaikul, “The far south of Thailand in the era of the American empire, 9/11 version, and Thaksin’s ‘cash and gung- ho’ premiership,” Asian Review, 16, 2003, p.137

50 A splinter group formed from BRN’s political arm is believed to be the only organization capable of organizing and carrying out the raids of January 4, 2004, and the demonstrations that triggered the Tak Bai incident on October 25, 2004. This BRN splinter actively promotes militant operations and building its influence within the pondoks. ICG Report, 2005, P. 8

51 About 160,000 Buddhists moved down to the southern part of Thailand, Yegar, 1977

52 Surat Horachaikul, “The far south of Thailand in the era of the American empire, 9/11 version, and Thaksin’s ‘cash and gung- ho’ premiership,” Asian Review, 16, 2003, p.137; also cited in Daniel Unger’s Symposium on “Divided States and Contested In Southeast Asia: Retrospect and Prospect” December 4, 2004, Michigan State University.

53 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

54 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

55 Yegar, Moshe. 2002. Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar . Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. p. 146

31 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

56 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

57 Che Man, W. K. 1990 . Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand . Singapore : Oxford University Press. p.99.

58 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

59 True, Linda Jane. 2004. “Balancing Minorities: A Study of Southern Thailand,” Paper Presented at the Concil on Thai Studies, October 2004, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, U.S.A.

60 M. Ladd Thomas, 1974, “Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims,” Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly, 3(1), pp. 545-568.

61 As a result, over 100 civil servants, most of them were policemen, were transferred out of the region over 17 years.

62 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

63 Members of the Wadah faction running under the Thai Rak Thai Party were defeated in the in the 2005 general elections

64 Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina. 2005, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb, p. 9.

65 Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina. 2005, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb.

66 Educational curriculum in PSTIs does not offer Malay language as one of several options for students to choose for their elective classes. This implies the suppression of Malay culture. (ICG report, 2005)

67 95% of Thai-Malay-Muslim are in agricultural sector.

68 Jitpiromsri, 2005, Quandary of Deep South’s Conflicts: Structural or Ideological Determinant?, paper prepared for 9th International Conference on Thai Studies, April 2005, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, April 2005.

69 Jitpiromsri, 2005, Quandary of Deep South’s Conflicts: Structural or Ideological Determinant?, paper prepared for International Conference on Thai Studies, April 2005, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, April 2005.

70 Nation, January 9, 2004

71 Possibly for their sin value (nightclubs, etc.)

72 Nation, April 29, 2004

73 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005. 74 He had been campaigning to get 50 thousand signatures necessary to end martial law. He had claimed that the army was behind the January raid and was involved in a conspiracy (True). Somchai also claimed that his clients had been tortured by the Thai police.

75 Surat Horachaikul, “The far south of Thailand in the era of the American empire, 9/11 version, and Thaksin’s ‘cash and gung- ho’ premiership,” Asian Review, 16, 2003, p.139

76 As seen in the situation when the two Thai marines were abducted, tortured, and killed by young militants in Tan Yong Li Mo village. (Kom Chat Luk, September 20, 2005)

77 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

78 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

32 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

79 According to Panitan Wattanayakorn, there are numbers of intelligence agencies operating on southern Thailand issues (such as the forth army Intelligence Division, Internal Security Operations Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Armed Forces Security Center, the Royal Thai Police, etc.) However, the cooperation among these agencies is proved to be problematic. Problems regarding their expertise (and the accurate source of information) and the collaboration of all intelligence information gathered from each agency led to the inaccurate analysis of the situation.

80 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

81 Surat Horachaikul, “The far south of Thailand in the era of the American empire, 9/11 version, and Thaksin’s ‘cash and gung- ho’ premiership,” Asian Review, 16, 2003, p.144

82 He is a former student radical during the 1970s.

83 Davis, A. 2004. “School system forms the frontline in Thailand’s southern unrest,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, November 1, 2004

84 To cope with situation in the south, the government announced the Prime Minister’s Order 68/2547 and formed the SBPPC on March 24, 2004. It later, under the Prime Minister’s Order 260/2547 and 261/2547 dated October 4, 2004, gained a new status as a Committee on Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Policy supervised directly to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister also nominated its Supreme Commander. He also has been empowered to propose reward or punishment to civil servants, military, police officers, and others who are assigned to assist that mission of the Committee. (http://www.southpeace.go.th/eng/Origin_of_SBPPC.htm)

85 Unger, Daniel. 2004. “Religion and Ethnic Conflict in Thailand” Symposium on “Divided States and Contested Territories In Southeast Asia: Retrospect and Prospect,” December 4, 2004. Michigan State University.

86 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Thailandȇs Emergency Decree: No Solution,” Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005.

87 Thaksin’s campaign is to organize the tour to the south and bring along superstar from BKK to show local people that it is ok to go to the market and shop and do business on Friday.

88 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988) , p. 54-55.

89 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988) , p. 54-55.

90 There are three levels of government in Thailand: central (suan klang), provincial (suan phumipak), and local (suan tongtin) (Thailand National Public Administration Act of 1991). Provincial governments (76 in total--75 changwats and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) are headed by a provincial governor appointed by the central government (except for an elected governor of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration). generally are officials within the Ministry of Interior. The governor serves as head of the provincial administration (sala klang changwat) and is responsible for implementing central government policies. (In effect, however, the governor largely acts as coordinator of agencies under the direct control of other central government ministries.) Down one level are the district offices (amphor) headed by district officers (nai amphor) appointed by the central government. Further down the hierarchy are sub-districts (tambon) and villages (mubaan). Village headmen (phuyai baan) are directly elected by the villagers and the sub-district headmen (kamnan) are generally chosen from among the village headmen in each sub-district. These local leaders, however, are directly guided and supervised by provincial governors and district officers under central government control. In short, province (changwat), district (amphor), sub-district (tambon), and village (mubaan), are parts of provincial government which are viewed as parts of the central government apparatus.

91 Suhrke, Astri. 1979. “Thailand: Politics as Usual.” Current History 77 (452): 210.

92 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,”Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988) , p. 54-55.

93 Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2001, Government Decentralization Reform in Deveoping Countries, March 2001, p. 49.

33 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

94 Brown, David. 1988. “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,”Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988).

95 Huntington, Samue. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press)

96 For Example, when former PM Mahathir was in Thailand in late November, Anand Panyarachun asked him to refrain from referring to local autonomy as a possible means of defusing tensions. In Thai translation, Anand suggested, the phrase suggested the dismembering of the Thai state.

97 Arghiros, Daniel. 2001 . Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand . Richmond , Surrey : Curzon Press, p. 4.

98 Crook R. C. and Manor J. 1995. “Democratic decentralization and institutional performance: Four Asian and African experience compared.” The Journal of Commonwealth & comparative politics, 33(3), 309-335

99 The World bank, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPDECEN/0,,contentMDK:20538 141~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1169052,00.html

100 Sections 285 – 287 of Thailand 1997 Constitution.

101 Sections 289-290 of Thailand 1997 Constitution

102 Cauchon, Nora. 2002. Thailand: Continuing Quest for Local Autonomy, Sourcebook on Decentralization in Asia.

103 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

104 For more information on the list of responsibilities transferred, see Thailand Transferring Responsibility Act of 2000.

105 Wiest, D. 2003. Fiscal decentralization in Thailand. Retrieved January 3, 2003, from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/External/Urban/UrbanDev.nsf/0/8092DB20ECEC3F8885256937006EC6F9?OpenDocument.

106 Before 2001, only 9% or national budget was allocated to local government all over Thailand, where half of the amount went to Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. (Nora Cauchon, Thailand: Continuing Quest for Local Autonomy, Sourcebook on Decentralization in Asia. 2002, pp. 147.

107 Thailand Office of Prime Minister, 2002

108 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana, Social Capital, Decentralization, and Municipal Government in Thailand, Doctoral Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, May 2004.

109 There are altogether 7,951 units of local governments categorized in five different types—Municipality, Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO), Tambon (or Sub-district) Administrative Organization (TAO), Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), and the City of Pattaya.

110 Unger, Daniel. 2005. “Reflexion on Prime Minister Thaksin’s Long Term Impact,” King Prajathipok Institute, Bangkok, Thailand, September 15, 2005.

111 Unger, Daniel. 2004. “Religious and Ethnic Conflict in Thailand,” Symposium on “Divided States and Contested Territories In Southeast Asia: Retrospect and Prospect,” Michigan State University, December 4, 2004

112 McCargo, Duncan. 2004. “Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview,” POLIS Working Paper No.3, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, February 2004

113 McCargo, Duncan. 2004. “Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview,” POLIS Working Paper No.3, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, February 2004

34 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

114 McCargo, Duncan. 2004. “Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview,” POLIS Working Paper No.3, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, February 2004

115 Interviews with local residents.

116 Interviews with local politicians and residents, May-June 2005.

117 Gunaratna, Rohan, Acharya, Arabinda and Chua, Sabrina. 2005, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Marshall Cavendish Corp/Ccb

118 International Crisis Group, 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005.

119 For more on concept of human security, see ‘Human Secutiry Now,’ by the Commission on Human Security, 2003.

120 Decentralization and Local Government in Thailand, p. 23, King Prajathipok Institute, Bangkok, Thailand, 2002.

121 Decentralization and Local Government in Thailand, p. 24, King Prajathipok Institute, Bangkok, Thailand, 2002.

122 Amornvivat, Sutapa. 2004.“Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Thailand,” Thailand Ministry of Finance. February 15, 2004.

123 Cuachon, Nora. “Thailand” The Continuing Quest for Local Autonomy,” Sourcebook on Decentralization in Asia, p. 143.

124 Data analyses based on One-way ANOVA

125 Data analyses based on Pearson Chi-Square and One-way ANOVA

35

Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Appendix 1

Table 1. Mean and Frequency table

Mean Std. Deviation N

Interest in local politics during the past 5 6.83 1.89 997 years (10-point scale) Political efficacy (10-point scale) 7.45 1.66 990 Importance of taking part in local politics 8.71 1.80 998 Attitude toward corruption at local level 7.45 2.34 997 Importance of casting vote at local elections 6.41 2.89 998 Importance of certain characteristics of candidates in local elections that affect local voting behavior: (4-point scale) Ɣ Helping local residents 2.93 0.30 996 Ɣ Level of education 2.42 0.63 997 Ɣ Financial capability 1.53 1.64 998 Ɣ Vision 2.82 0.44 997 Ɣ Reputation of being Honest 2.94 0.28 997 Ɣ Ability in solving local problem 2.93 0.29 997

Level of satisfaction toward TAOs performance: (4-point scale) Ɣ Overall 2.92 0.56 999 Ɣ Public health 2.57 0.60 999 Ɣ Registration & records 2.69 0.66 999 Ɣ Maintaining security 2.95 1.20 999 Ɣ Solving local problems 2.12 0.79 999 Belief in TAOs’ ability to curb the violence 5.01 1.89 999 in the south (10 point scale) Evaluation of how much do respondents 2.45 0.96 988 believe local politicians care about what local people want (5-point scale) Evaluation of how much do respondents 2.58 0.85 987 believe local politicians really understand what local people want (5-point scale) Evaluation of changing levels of closeness 3.04 1.32 987 between local politicians and local residents compared to 5 years ago (5-point scale) Evaluation of changing levels of how much 3.59 0.69 987 local politicians care about local residents’ opinion compared to 5 years ago (5-point scale)

37 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Evaluation of changing levels of 3.57 0.72 987 transparency TAOs operate compared to 5 years ago (5-point scale) Political participation: (10-point scale) People should caste their vote every time there are local elections 8.91 1.22 992 People should pay attention to local political activities 7.88 1.59 992 People should take part in encouraging other people to caste their vote in local elections People should provide local information and 6.90 2.14 992 needs to local governments

7.87 1.64 992 Gender Male 435 Female 558 Age 18-20 97 21-30 178 31-40 282 41-50 259 51 and above 174 Education Primary & lower 168 Secondary 118 High school/technical 368 Certificate 182 BA & above 156 Income 5,000 and lower 247 5,001-10,000 612 10,001-20,000 114 20,001 and above 21 Religion Buddhist 124 Muslim 870 Language Thai 170 Malay 439 Thai & Malay 380

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one municipality in .

38 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Appendix 2

Figure 1. Income & interest in local politics during the past 5 years

9

8

7

6

5 interest in local politics 4

3

2

1

0

0 0 0 e 0 0 0 or ,0 ,0 ,0 m 5 10 20 d an 1- 1- n th 0 0 a s ,0 ,0 1 s 5 0 00 le 1 , 20 Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

39 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Figure 2. Income & levels of participation in local politics

2.5 2 1.5 1 Level of participation 0.5 in local politics 0 00 00 00 ve ,0 ,0 ,0 o 5 0 0 ab n -1 -2 d ha 01 01 n t ,0 ,0 a ss 5 0 01 le 1 ,0 20

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 3. Education & interest in local politics, political efficacy, and importance of taking part in local politics

10 interest in local 9 politics 8

7

6

5 political efficacy

4

3

2

1 atitutde toward political 0 involvement r er te e w a c igh /lo fi rti e secondary c rimary BA & h p

highschool/technical

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

40 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Figure 4. Education & voting behavior 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 voting 3 behavior 2.9 2.8 l er ry a te ve w a ic ca o o d n fi b /l n h ti a ry co ec r d a se l/t ce an im oo A r h B p sc gh hi

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 5. Age & interest in local politics, political efficacy, and importance of casting vote in local elections 8 interest in local politics 7.5

7 political 6.5 efficacy

6

5.5 attitude toward 5 18-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 and up casting vote in local elections

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

41 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Figure 6. Age & satisfaction toward TAOs performance

3.5 Overall satisfaction toward TAOs management and 3 services Mean = 2.92

2.5 Registration and Record, Mean = 2.69 2

1.5 Security, Mean = 2.94

1

0.5 solving local problem, Mean = 2.12 0 18-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 & up

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 7. Language & satisfaction Figure 8. Religion & satisfaction

2.5 2.5

2 2

1.5 1.5

1 1 0.5 0.5 0 Muslim Buddhist 0 Thai Malay Thai& Malay Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

42 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Figure 9. Religion & political efficacy

7.6

7.5

7.4

7.3 political efficacy

7.2

7.1

7 Muslim Buddhist

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 10. Religion & local political participation 2.1

2.05

2

1.95

1.9 Political participation at local 1.85 level

1.8

1.75

1.7

1.65 Buddhist Muslim

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

43 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Figure 11. Gender & political efficacy

7.6

7.55

7.5

7.45

7.4 Political efficacy

7.35

7.3

7.25

7.2 Male Female

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 12. Age & belief in TAOs’ ability to curb the violence in the south 5.6

5.4

5.2

5

4.8

4.6

4.4

4.2 18-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 &up

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

44 Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern Thailand

Figure 13. Religion & belief in TAOs’ ability to curb the violence in the south

5.1 5 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 m st sli hi u dd M Bu

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

Figure 14. Language & political efficacy

7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3

7.2 political efficacy 7.1 7 6.9 6.8 Thai Malay Thai & Malay

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

45 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana

Figure 15. Language & local political participation 2.15

2.1

2.05

2

1.95 political participation at local level 1.9

1.85

1.8

1.75

1.7 Thai Malay Thai-Malay

Note: Data gathered from survey questionnaires in three TAOs and one city-level municipality in Pattani province.

46 Program Information

The Southeast Asia Fellowship Program

Purpose The Southeast Asia Fellowship Program is designed to offer young scholars from Southeast Asia the opportunity to undertake serious academic writing on the management of internal and international conflicts in the region and to contribute to the development of Southeast Asian studies in the Washington area by bringing Asian voices to bear on issues of interest to a Washington audience.

The annual fellowships are awarded to two to three scholars and will finance two to three months of fieldwork in Southeast Asia, two months of residence at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and three months of residence at the East-West Center Washington in Washington, D.C. During the period in residence, the primary goal of the fellows is to complete a monograph or article that can be published in a peer-reviewed outlet. Fellows will also give seminars sponsored by the East-West Center Washington, partake in Southeast Asia related scholarly activities organized by other institutions, and interact with scholars and policy makers in Singapore and Washington, D.C.

Funding Support This program is funded by a generous grant from The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., with additional support from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and the East-West Center.

2004 Fellows

Evelyn Goh Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Herman Kraft University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines

Merlyna Lim Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia

2005 Fellows

Joseph Chinyong Liow Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand

2006 Fellow

Kyaw Yin Hlaing National University of Singapore

49 Working Papers

Previous Publications

Working Paper Number 1, May 2004 Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949 Stanley Toops

Working Paper Number 2, October 2004 China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy Warren W. Smith

Working Paper Number 3, January 2005 Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions Soliman M. Santos, Jr.

Working Paper Number 4, July 2005 Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Search for Regional Norms Herman Joseph S. Kraft

50

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