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Is Conscious Will an Illusion?* Disputatio 16, May 2004 Is conscious will an illusion?* Jing Zhu Chinese Academy of Sciences Abstract In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (MIT Press, 2002). I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which con- siderably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsi- bility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This substantially diminishes its implications and significance for some profound philosophical issues. 1. Introduction Normally, we have the experience that we consciously will what we do: we are the authors or originators who make our actions happen. Actions are generally understood as what we voluntarily do, perform or bring about, instead of what we undergo or merely happen to us. We do things, and when we do them, we experience the actions as coming * I would like to thank Andrei Buckareff for many helpful comments on the first draft of this essay. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at The 95th Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, on April 17, 2003, in Atlanta, Georgia, 2003’ APA Central Division Meeting, on April 25, 2003, in Cleveland, Ohio, and The 29th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, on June 19, 2003, in Pasadena, California. I am grateful to the audiences for valuable feedback, and especially, to Eddy Nahmias and Thomas Polger, who were my commentators respectively at the latter two meetings. 59 JING ZHU seamlessly from our thoughts (e.g., intentions) and consciousness. The experience of willing indicates a sense of agency that some of our con- scious thoughts causally bring about our actions. In a rich and fascinating book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, the psy- chologist Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will, which encompasses both the experience of willing and the perception of the causation of action by conscious thought, is in fact an illusion. ‘It is an illusion in the sense that the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action’ (p. 2). This idea is not entirely new. David Hume, for example, conceives the will as ‘nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new percep- tion of our mind’ (Treatise of Human Nature, II, 3, 1, 2). Well informed by historical and contemporary psychological studies and neuroscientific research, Wegner develops a detailed and engaging account on how this illusion is created by the mind and brain. According to Wegner, the illu- sion of conscious will arises when people mix up the experience of willing and the apparent causal efficacy of our conscious thoughts on our actions. So conscious will is essentially a construction or fabrication. But it is a useful illusion, for it signals personal authorship of action to the individual and therefore serves as the basis for personal achievement and moral responsibility. In this essay, I will critically examine Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion. I will show that there are unwarranted leaps in Wegner’s argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibil- ity and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some distinctive features of the experience of willing, which are essential to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s discussion of conscious will. This substantially diminishes its implications and significance for some profound philosophi- cal issues. 2. The generation of conscious will How does conscious will arise? Here is a sketch of the story that Wegner tells in great detail in his book: First, the agent has a certain thought, most commonly an intention. Then the agent experiences a voluntary action. If there is a constant conjunction between the occur- 60 IS CONSCIOUS WILL AN ILLUSION? rence of the thought and that of the action, the agent tends to perceive that the thought caused the action, just like his perceiving causation in general as one billiard ball strikes another. ‘People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action’ (Wegner 2002, p. 64). That is, When we think that our conscious intention has caused the voluntary action that we find ourselves doing, we feel a sense of will. We have willfully done the act. (p. 68) Some specifications are in order. First, for an agent to infer that his own thought causes his action, the relation between the thought and the action must satisfy some requirements. Three principles on the relation between the thought and the action are essential to support the perception of mental causation: the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Wegner 2002, ch. 3). More specifically, the thought should occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other potential causes. Similar principles have been derived for the perception of causality for external physical and social events. And the absence of any of these conditions tends to undermine the perception that causation has occurred. ‘The application of these principles to the experience of conscious will can explain phenomena of volition across a number of areas of psychology’ (Wegner 2002, p. 70). Secondly, Wegner thinks that the experience of willing is necessary for an agent to act voluntarily (2002, pp. 3-4): Without an experience of willing, even actions that look entirely voluntary from the outside still fall short of qualifying as truly willed. Intentions, plans, and other thoughts can be experienced, and still the action isn’t willed if the person says it was not. … Consciously willing an action requires a feeling of doing, a kind of internal ‘oomph’ that somehow certifies authentically that one has done the action. In short, the experience of willing, which may consist of a feeling of doing and a sense of authorship of one’s own action, is essential for an agent to perceive some of his bodily movements as voluntary actions. Wegner’s account of the generation of conscious will, however, is insufficient in several respects. First, our experience of willing does not 61 JING ZHU exclusively depend on the perception of causal efficiency of our thought on our action. Sometimes even if the intended action fails to occur in accor- dance with our intention, we can still have a sense of willing. For instance, in an attempt to move a heavy box, your strength may not be strong enough to make the intended movement occur, but you can still experi- ence a feeling of doing or trying. In The Principles of Psychology, William James described a case: Close the patient’s eyes, hold his anaesthetic arm still, and tell him to raise his hand to his head; and when he opens his eyes he will be astonished to find that the movement has not taken place. (1981, p. 1101) Why was this patient surprised? Because he tried to raise his hand, and under normal condition, his hand should be over his head; but unknown to him, his paralyzed arm failed to move in accordance with his intention and attempt. He tried, but failed. But even if he cannot physically raise his arm, he can still try to move it. It seems that a typical voluntary action consists of at least two distinctive components: an inner mental event or process of trying, and the corresponding overt bodily movement. By viewing actions in this way, it seems that we can provide a suitable answer to the well-known question put forward by Wittgenstein: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm? (1953, sec. 621) The answer is trying. Trying seems to be essential for an agent to experience that he willed his action. Wegner suggests that the experience of will could be a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally: ‘The person experiencing will, in this view, is in the same position as someone perceiving causation as one billiard ball strikes another’ (2002, p. 64). The similar principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity are also embodied in the perception of causality in general. However, whereas the causal perception of the movements of billiard balls will not generate any sense of agency—the experience of one’s own doing something—why is the constant conjunction between one’s own thought and action, from which apparent mental causation is inferred, sufficient to generate the experience of conscious will and the sense of agency? That is, through the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality in general, one can infer apparent mental causa- tion (e.g., my intention to raise my arm causes my arm’s raising) from the 62 IS CONSCIOUS WILL AN ILLUSION? constant conjunction between a thought and an action, but how can the experience of willing and the sense of agency, which are totally absent in the perception of causality in general, be generated by the same mental processes? It seems more plausible to assume that some additional mental processes may be essential in generating the experience of willing. In many intentional actions, the contribution of the causing intentions is not limited to triggering or initiating the intended actions.
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