The flooding ofthe Yser plain Guido Demerre & Johan Termote The northwesternmost part of Belgium played an important part in the First World War, as it was there, on the plains of the river Yser, that the advance of the German Fourth Army came to a halt. This was thanks to a tried and tested method: flooding or inundation. The flat Flemish polders, situated below sea level at high tide, were ideally suited for such a scheme. It was sufficient to manipulate the Ganzepoot sluice complex at Nieuwpoort, which controlled the inflow of seawater and the drainage ofthe polders in the hinterland. In those dramatic days of October 1914 the flooding of the Yser valley did not go smoothly at all, however. But after the war, these early setbacks were soon forgotten and the actual events were embellished. This inspired many romanticised patriotic stories, reinforced by all sorts of vanity documents written by those involved. What follows is an as objective as possible representation of the facts. Nieuwpoort viewed from the east. Aerial photograph made by a German scout on 19 August 1917. (Bundesarchiv, Koblenzj 1 Sluice at Nieuwendamme creek through which the inundation of Nieuwendamme polder took Water as a means of defence place in the night o f 21 to 22 October 1914 2 Oude Veurnesas sluice, through which the first inundation attempt was made in the night o f 26 Inundation is a means of defence that has to 27 October 1914 been used frequently in the Low Countries 3 Spillway of the Noordvaart canal, through which the flooding was carried out on 29 October at least since the end of the 16th century. 1914 It has primarily been used to defend ports, as was the case during the Siege of Ostend World War, which was no longer the case for given a makeover. Flowever, this system was (1600-1604). The city of Nieuwpoort has also Nieuwpoort. With the exception ofthe sluice not perfect: priority had been given to navi­ regularly adopted these tactics throughout at Nieuwendamme creek, the fortifications gation instead of drainage. Nevertheless, the history. The floodgates around the city were around the city had been systematically de­ system was flexible enough to allow the navi­ opened several times to flood the area dur­ molished from 1853 onwards. gable waterways to be used for drainage in ing the French-Spanish wars in the second Of great importance was the fact that the case of abundant rainfall. All these hydraulic half ofthe 17th century. The last flooding drainage system ofthe Yser basin had been works were to play a crucial part in the war took place in 1813-1814 when French troops completely altered between 1861 and 1880, and helped facilitate the continued flooding defended the city. So the military command­ so shortly before the First World War. This ofthe Yser valley. ers were sufficiently familiar with flooding large-scale project was aimed at improving as a means to halt the German advance at drainage as well as navigation. The Lovaart the onset of the First World War. The British canal was widened, deepened and em­ and French high command were also aware banked, a sluice gate and spillway were con­ ofthe possibilities. British engineers had structed at the confluence of this canal with helped to fortify the city of Nieuwpoort with­ the Yser river near the hamlet of Fintele, and in the scope ofthe completion ofthe Wel­ siphons were constructed under the Lovaart lington Barrier between 1815 and 1830. This canal for drainage (see map). The project was fortification was equipped with a system of completed with the construction of several floodgates. In addition, French military engi­ sluices and spillways at Nieuwpoort. The neer Vauban had drawn up detailed inunda­ Veurnesas sluice on the new Veurnevaart tion plans for the port of Dunkirk in 1694. canal as well as the sluices and spillways on The floodgates of this fortification were the Noordvaart canal (1875) and the leper- still operational at the outbreak of the First vaart canal (or the canalised Yser river) were VLIZ IDE GROTE REDEI 2 0 1 3 • 3 6 4 7 Inundations Culvert or siphon Railway Sluice or spillway German line ■ : ; G rote Bam b u rg f a rm Raised dam 1. Oude Veurnesas sluice 2. Spillway of Nieuw Bedelf 3. Sluice on the Plassendale-Nieuwpoort canal 4. Sluice on the Nieuwendamme creek 5. Spillway and lepersas sluice on the Yser 6. Spillway on the Noordvaart canal MityWPûûl 7. Veurnesas sluice and spillway on the Veurnevaart canal 8. Siphon under the Yser 9. Siphon under the Veurnevaart canal Kool hofvaart embankment. 1914 Dam on the Veurnevaart canai. 1916 12. Dam on the Oostvaart canal Sas van Dierendonck or sluice of the Oostvaart canal —1 Diksmuide - Nieuwpoort railway • Edge ofthe polder area 1. Flooding planned by the British (10 October 1914) between the Plassendale-Nieuwpoort canal and the dunes 2. Flooding of Nieuwendammepolder on 21-22 October 1914 3. Flooding of the Dunkirk area by the French on 25 October 1914 4. Flooding planned by the Belgians on 27 October 1914 5. Flooding on 28 October 1914 6. Flooding of the Handzame valley on 15 November 1914 7. Flooding of Bamburgpolder on 16 November 1914 8. Flooding in early 1915 9. Flooding of the Yser valley in the spring of 1918 J-a -Il J 1-1 r * ïf c r flk # 'Ba­ lita -I! mc-wirf V o I h i -■!. .ic c tii.jp « !t Overview o f the different inundations (VLIZ, Nathalie De Hauwere) 48 VLIZ ■ DE GROTE REDE 2 0 1 3 • 3 6 Why was flooding resorted to in that a more defensive strategy was the only extremis? way to stop the German advance. Only then were the Belgian inundation plans taken into The question of who came up with the consideration. Furthermore, an inundation idea of flooding is not very relevant. Yet it on Belgian soil was of vital importance to still is the subject of numerous discussions. France for the defence ofthe Channel ports A much more intriguing question is why this of Dunkirk, Gravelines and Calais. Even if means of defence was only used in the final they were protected by a flooding on French stage ofthe Battle ofthe Yser and not earlier. soil, the French ports would still be within The Battle of the Yser started on 15 October the range ofthe German artillery, which when the port of Ostend fell into German would result in their gradual destruction. An hands and the Belgian high command inundation on Belgian soil would create an decided to defend the natural boundary additional buffer and could safeguard the formed by the river Yser at any cost. The French ports against such a catastrophe. French high command sent reinforcements: Nieuwpoort would not be so lucky. French fusiliers marins defended the bridgehead of Diksmuide. The German army mounted a massive attack on 18 October. Heroes just for one day With the help of French troops, the battered Belgian army held out at the expense of Bargee Hendrik Geeraert heavy losses. Because they had waited for On 17 October the Belgian troops had so long, the opportunities for flooding had taken control ofthe sluices, but there was General Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929} did not give his consent to an inundation on Belgian declined considerably by now. a breakdown in communication with the soil until 24 October (Wikipedia} The fact that the decision was taken sluice operators, and in particular sluice so late raises questions. British officers keeper Gerard Dingens, who was disregarded - probably including Colonel Tom Bridges - and sent away. As a result, the sluice had already contacted sluice keeper Gerard operators joined the stream of refugees Belgian engineers carried out a first limited Dingens at the Nieuwpoort sluice complex without keeping in touch with the military flooding at Nieuwendampolder (just east of on 10 October. They asked him to flood the commanders. The failure to requisition the Nieuwpoort) in the night of 21 to 22 October. area between the Nieuwpoort-Plassendale sluice operators turned out to be a huge This flooding was not very difficult to achieve canal and the coastal dunes with a view to mistake later on. Fortunately, an attentive from a technical perspective, as the sluice on the defence of Ostend. The sluice keeper, bargee called Hendrik Geeraert (1863- the Nieuwendamme creek, which also served however, was clearly more concerned about 1925) stayed on the scene and advised and as a floodgate, could be used. This is where the human and economic impact ofthe assisted the Belgian troops. His practical Hendrik Geeraert made his first appearance. flooding and pointed out the inefficiency mentality and attentiveness made him Thanks to his knowledge ofthe terrain, a of such an operation. When on 13 October the perfect substitute for the discharged limited area could be flooded with seawater. Commandant Prudent Nuyten asked him to sluice operators. Fie would be part ofthe This prevented the Germans from encircling draw up an inundation plan, Mr Dingens was special engineer company that managed the Nieuwpoort and protected the sluice complex conspicuously reluctant. In theory it was still hydraulic structures throughout the war. in particular. Mr Geeraert proved his worth fairly easy to flood both banks of the Yser at by pointing out that the siphon under the that moment, which would have prevented The first limited inundation canalised Yser had to be closed off if the or at least shortened the bloody Battle ofthe In the brief window of opportunity inundation was to be successful. So the Yser. There was still another reason why this allowed by the French offensive strategy, the siphon was closed off.