DOCSLIB.ORG

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking Edited by Rodney Edvinsson , Tor Jacobson , Daniel Waldenström Index More Information Index ABN AMRO bank 249, 255, 257, 259 Asmussen, Jörg, ECB 412 Adenauer, Konrad, German Chancellor 396, Azzolini, Vincenzo, Banca d’Italia 310, 313 401 agio, premium on Amsterdam bank money Baffi, Paolo, Banca d’Italia 319, 321 244 Bagehot, Walter 163 Agricultural Cooperative Bank (ACB), China Lombard Street 26, 339 422, 423, 424 Baker, James, US Treasury Secretary 354 Agriculture Development Bank of China 425 Banca Commerciale, Italy 304, 311 Aldrich, Nelson, and founding of Federal Banca di Genova 300 Reserve 372 Banca di Napoli 301 American War of Independence 362 Banca di Sicilia 301 Amsterdam, and DNB 250 Banca d’Italia 5, 298–326 Amsterdam Exchange Bank (Wisselbank) and 1907 financial crisis 304–305 (1609) 4, 243–246, 260 and 1921 banking crisis 308 and banco florin 22 and 1970s banking crises 319 and bank money 244, and 1970s economic problems 318–321 collapse (1795) 246 autonomy 305, 307, 319, 320 as exchange bank 12 bailout of universal banks (1930–31) 311 governance 245 Bank Act (1893) 27, 301, 302 influence on earliest banks 95, 242 Bank Act (1926) 309 and Lehnebank 95 Bank Act (1993) and new legislation as lender of last resort 245 322–323 lending by 244 Banking Act (1936) 312–313 and payments system 244 amended (1946) 315 and price stability 245 as central bank 301–305, 312, 324–326 primary aims 242 and convertibility 303, 310 profits 244 credit rationing 307 as proto-central bank 9 currency stabilization (1920s) 308–310 relations with city, regional and state and cyclical imbalances 317 government 245 devaluations (1990s) 323 reputation 244 disposal of illiquid assets (1890s) 301–302 and suppression of private banking 246 and European Monetary Union 323 see also De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB); exchange rates 306, 307, 311, 316, 319, 321 Netherlands financial controls 315, 324 Andrew, Piatt 372 and First World War 305–307 Antwerp, recaptured by Spain (1585) 243 and foreign exchange markets 305 489 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking Edited by Rodney Edvinsson , Tor Jacobson , Daniel Waldenström Index More Information 490 Index Banca d’Italia (cont.) Law of Autonomy (1994) 196, 198 and gold standard 303 Law of Discipline and Intervention of Credit governance 312 Institutions (1988) 195 and Great Depression 310–311 Law on the Governing Bodies (1980) 195 and inflation 306, 317, 318, 321 as lender of last resort and central bank inflation targeting 323 (1914–39) 185–190 and monetary policy 302–304, 315–316 liabilities 179 (figure), 181, 184 (figure), 187 monopoly note issue 309, 325 (figure) National Loans (First World War) 306 and Managing Society of Assets from Bank origins 299–301 Restructuring (2012) 201 and post-war economic policy 315–316, 325 and monetary policy (1874–1913) 182–185 relations with government 303, 306, 315, and monetary policy (1914–31) 189 320–321, 325 and monetary policy (1983–99) 197–198, reserves 310 199 (figure) staff 315, 317, 325 monopoly of note issue (1874) 14, 181 supervisory role 315 as national institution (1874–1913) 181–185 under Fascism 307–313 nationalization (1962) 193, 194 see also Italy origins 173–177, Banca Italiana di Sconto 308 overview 172–173, 201–202 Banca Privata Italiana 319 plurality of issue (1856–73) 177–181 Banca Romana 300 post-war regulation 190 collapse (1893) 5, 301, 302 regulatory measures (2012) 201 Banco Ambrosiano 319 relations with Treasury 173, 177, 187, 189, Banco de Barcelona 176 201 Banco de España 4, 172–202 sale of gold and silver reserves (1936) 190 assets 178 (figure), 181, 183 (figure), 186 and Stabilization Plan (1959) 192, 202 (figure), 195 (figure) state control (1939–62) 190–193 assets and banknotes 193, 194 (figure) see also Spain and bank failures (1920s) 188, 200 Banco de Isabel II, Madrid 176 and Banking Corporation (1978) 197 Banco de San Fernando (1829–55) 14, 175–177 Banking Law (1921) 187, 188 as government agent 175 Banking Law (1946) 191 merger with Banco de Isabel II 176 Banking Law (1962) 193 restructuring (1849 and 1851) 177 branches 177 Banco di Roma 308 as central bank in EMU 199 Banco Nacional de San Carlos (1782–1829) 4, and crisis of 1866: 178–180 173–175 Deposit Guarantee Funds 197, 201 and Spanish War of Independence depreciation of peseta (1890–95) 184 (1808–14) 174 (figure), 185 Treasury rescue (1829) 174 deregulation 196 Bank of Canada, counterfactual experiments and European Exchange Rate Mechanism 79–84, 80 (figure),82(figure),83(figure) (1989) 198 Bank Charter Act (1844) (UK) 147, 157 in European Monetary Union (1999–2017) suspension (1847) 158 199–201 Bank of China (1912) 420 and financial crisis (1970s-1980s) 196 Bank of Communications (China) (1908) 420 and financing of Civil War 190 Bank deutscher Länder (BdL) (1948–58) 7, Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 394–395 Banking Sector (FROB) (2009) 201 and Bundesbank 397 and Great Depression 188 independence 396 inflation targeting (from 1995) 198 Bank of England 3, 143–170 and integration of financial market 181 1742 Act 144 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking Edited by Rodney Edvinsson , Tor Jacobson , Daniel Waldenström Index More Information Index 491 1979 Act 167 Bank of Japan Act (1942) 345 and 2007/8 crisis 168 amendment (1949) 349 as agent and adviser to government 148 Bank of Japan Act (1998) 353, 354 assets and banking reforms 341 as percentage of broad money supply 145 and Bretton Woods system 349, (figure) as central bank 338–339 as proportion of GDP 145 (figure) chronology 329 (Table) balance sheet 155 (Table) and coordination of international policies banknote issue 146, 156–157 353 Banks and Money Market Supervision and financial instability (1990s) 354–355 (1974) 167 financial liberalization (1980s) 353–354 as central bank 156 financial regulation 351 as commercial bank 154–156 financial repression (from 1937) 345 Court of Directors 156, 159 financing 1960s economic growth 350 currency to deposit ratio 157, 158 (figure) (figure), 350–352, 351 (figure) debt and cash flow management 150–152 foundation (1882) 27 and financial crises 147 and gold standard 340, 343 foundation (1694) as joint-stock company governance and goals 345, 349 18, 143, 144 and interest rates 339, 342 (figure) and Fringe Bank crisis (1973/4) 164, 165, as lender of last resort 339, 355 166 and liquidity 339, 357 gold losses (1927) 376 loans to private sector 342, 343 (figure) governance 144–150 money stock 356 (figure) Governors 160 monopoly of note issue (1884–5) 15, 338 inflation targeting 154 and National Bank of Belgium model 337 and international regulation 167 and Public Finance Act (1947) 348 as lender of last resort 27, 162–164 quantitative easing (2001–2006) 355, 356 life-boat rescues (1973/4) 164 (figure) and macro-monetary policy 152–154, 164 and Second World War 346 management of payment system 161–162 as semi-public institution 337 and monetary policy 147, 153 and silver standard 338 monopoly of note issue (1844) 14, 157 and war finance 328 nationalization (1946) 149 “window guidance” 351, 353 Parliamentary Charter 144 zero-interest rate policy (1999–2000) 355 private deposits 155 see also Japan profits (seigniorage) 146, 158 Bank of Japan Act (1882) 18 relations with London banks 161 Bank Laws (1824–64) (Sweden) 108 relationship with government 143, 147, Bank of North America (1781–83) 362 148–150 Bank of Norway see Norges Bank and rescue of Barings Bank (1891) 28, 156, Bank Rate Tribunal (1955) 160 163 Bank of Spain see Banco de España resolution of bank failures 169–170 Bank van Leening (1614) 246 and shareholders 158–159 bankers’ bonuses 169 staff 160 Banking School 146 supervision of banks 164–169 real bills theory 164 and Treasury Select Committee 161 banknotes see also United Kingdom and bills of exchange 211 Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 252 convertibility (France) 213 Bank of Japan 5, 328–357 and counterfeiting 157 and 1923 Showa financial crisis 341 monopoly issuance 14 Bank of Japan Act (1882) 336–338 private 10, 14 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19310-9 — Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking Edited by Rodney Edvinsson , Tor Jacobson , Daniel Waldenström Index More Information 492 Index banknotes (cont.) risk management 216 Treasury issue (Bradbury) (UK) 148 Second World War debt overhang 231 see also paper money sinking funds 207, 210 Banque de France 4, 14, 17, 27, 207 and sovereign debt 206 banking crisis (1930–33) 229 statute (1808) 216 Banking Law (1806) 210 see also France Banking Law (1936) 230 Banque Générale Privée (1716–20) 17, 208 banknote monopoly (1803) 209 Baring, Sir Francis 162 branches outside Paris 219 Barings Bank, rescue (1891) 28, 156, 163 as central bank 206, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and convertibility (of banknotes) 213, 214 (1974) 167 (figure) Basel I Accord 167 creation (1800) 206, 208 Basel II Accord 167, 168 crises (19th century) 234, 235 (Table) BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce per decade 220 (Table) International) 167 crisis management 217 Bear Stearns investment bank 382, 383 defaults of financial intermediaries 27, Belgium, secession from Netherlands (1834) 221–223, 222 (figure) 248 deliquency rates on bills 221, 222 (figure)
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Sustainability Strategy for the Riksbank
    Strategy DECISION DATE: 16/12/2020 SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm DECISION BY: Executive Board (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 [email protected] www.riksbank.se Sustainability strategy for the Riksbank The Riksbank is a public authority under the Riksdag. The state’s core values guide the Riksbank’s work. The Riksbank takes account of sustainability in both its internal operations and its policy work. This document describes the principles the Riksbank follows in this work. The document also provides a more solid description of how work is conducted in different areas of policy work. Sustainable social development By sustainable development, the Riksbank means what has by now become a commonly-used definition: Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, and in which consideration is given to economic, ecological and social aspects.1 This definition of sustainable development comes originally from the United Nations and is used by the Government of Sweden and the Riksdag, among others. The 2030 Agenda - a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2015 - identifies 17 goals for sustainable development. Several of these goals have a bearing on the Riksbank’s operations, for example those concerning climate change, sustainable consumption and production, decent working conditions, equality and global partnership. The Riksbank’s mandate According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Riksbank is to maintain price stability and promote a safe and efficient payment system. The Riksbank therefore needs to understand and take account of sustainability issues if these affect the Riksbank’s ability to carry out its policy tasks.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2001
    Sveriges Riksbank A R Contents INTRODUCTION SVERIGES RIKSBANK 2 2001 IN BRIEF 3 STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNOR 4 OPERATIONS 2001 MONETARY POLICY 7 FINANCIAL STABILITY 13 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 16 STATISTICS 18 RESEARCH 19 THE RIKSBANK’S SUBSIDIARIES 20 THE RIKSBANK’S PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES 22 SUBMISSIONS 23 HOW THE RIKSBANK WORKS THE MONETARY POLICY PROCESS 25 THE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION ORGANISATION 32 THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 34 EMPLOYEES 36 IMPORTANT DATES 2002 Executive Board monetary policy meeting 7 February THE GENERAL COUNCIL 38 Executive Board monetary policy meeting 18 March Inflation Report no. 1 published 19 March ANNUAL ACCOUNTS The Governor attends the Riksdag Finance Committee hearing 19 March Executive Board monetary policy meeting 25 April DIRECTORS’ REPORT 40 Executive Board monetary policy meeting 5 June Inflation Report no. 2 published 6 June ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 43 Executive Board monetary policy meeting 4 July Executive Board monetary policy meeting 15 August BALANCE SHEET 44 The dates for the monetary policy meetings in the autumn have not yet been con- PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 45 firmed. Information on monetary policy decisions is usually published on the day following a monetary policy meeting. NOTES 46 THIS YEAR’S PHOTOGRAPHIC THEME FIVE-YEAR OVERVIEW 50 Sveriges Riksbank is a knowledge organisation and the bank aims to achieve a learning climate that stimulates and develops employees. Employees can acquire SUBSIDIARIES 51 knowledge both through training and in working together with colleagues and ex- ternal contacts. The Riksbank’s independent position requires openness with re- ALLOCATION OF PROFITS 53 gard to the motives behind its decisions.
    [Show full text]
  • Sweden's Approach to Monetary Policy
    Sweden’s Approach to Monetary Policy he Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, is an authority under the Riksdag (parliament) with responsibility for monetary Tpolicy. Its objectives are to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. With the advent of the new regime, which went into effect in January 1999, the Riksdag appoints the Riksbank’s Governing Council, which, in turn, appoints its Executive Board, including its Chairman, who serves as Governor of the Riksbank. A member of the Executive Board may not be a member of the Riksdag, a government minister, or an employee of the Government Office. Further, Executive Board members may not take or seek instructions with regard to monetary policy. Thus, the Executive Board has instrument, but not goal, independence. Jane Sneddon Little Central Bank Assets Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The author In the week of June 15, 2000, the Riksbank held assets of 219 billion is grateful to Magnus Vesterlund kronor, of which 64 percent were foreign currency claims on residents and Anders Vredin of the Sveriges outside of Sweden. These claims were mainly balances with banks and Riksbank for helpful comments and to investments in securities. Gold accounted for an additional 7 percent. Oksana Nagayets for excellent research Lending to monetary policy counterparties denominated in Swedish assistance. kronor made up another 16 percent of the Riksbank’s total assets. Main [email protected] refinancing operations, or regular repo transactions, accounted for the great bulk of this entry. Assets related to fine-tuning lending facilities available at a single unified interest operations were a very small fraction of total assets.
    [Show full text]
  • Banking Globalization, Monetary Transmission, and the Lending
    The International Banking Research Network: Approaches and Initiatives Claudia M. Buch (Deutsche Bundesbank) Linda Goldberg (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) Joint IBRN-IMF Workshop | Washington DC | October 15, 2019 National Bank of Poland Oesterreichische Nationalbank Deutsche Bundesbank Sveriges Riksbank Norges Bank Central Bank of Russia Bank of Danmarks Nationalbank Canada Bank of England Central Bank of Ireland De Nederlandsche Bank Banque de France US Federal Reserve Banco de España Bank of Japan Banco de Portugal Bank of Korea Reserve Hong Kong Swiss National Bank Bank of Banco de Monetary Authority India México Banka Slovenije Banca D’Italia Central Bank of Central Bank of the Bank of Greece Colombia Republic of Turkey Banco Central do Brasil Bank of Israel Reserve Bank of Australia Central Bank of Chile International Organizations Bank for Organisation for Economic Financial International International European Central Bank European Systemic Risk Board Cooperation and Stability Board Monetary Fund Settlements Development 2 How does the IBRN operate? 3 Collectively determine policy- relevant issue Analyze (confidential) bank- level datasets Use common methodology, complement with cross- country perspective Share code, results, and perform meta analysis 4 What are the key research questions and outputs? 5 International transmission Adjustment of bank of monetary policy lending to liquidity risk through bank lending Interaction between Cross-border lending monetary and prudential effects of policies for bank lending macroprudential
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Macroprudential Conference 15-16 June 2018, Stockholm, Sweden
    Sveriges Riksbank, De Nederlandsche Bank, and Deutsche Bundesbank ANNUAL MACROPRUDENTIAL CONFERENCE 15-16 June 2018, Stockholm, Sweden PROGRAMME DAY 1 FRIDAY, JUNE 15 11:00-12:45 Registration & Lunch (drop in) 12:45-13:00 Opening remarks: Stefan Ingves – Sveriges Riksbank 13:00-14:15 Session 1: Does a currency union need a capital market union? Chair: Bengt Holmström – Massachusetts Institute of Technology Authors: Thomas Philippon – New York University (joint with Joseba Martinez – NYU and Markus Sihvonen – Aalto University School of Business) Discussants: Patrick Bolton – Columbia University Philip Lane – Central Bank of Ireland 14:15-14:30 Short coffee break 14:30-15:45 Session 2: The impact of pensions on global yield curves Chair: Richard Portes – London Business School Authors: Annette Vissing-Jørgensen – University of California, Berkeley (joint with Robin Greenwood – Harvard Business School) Discussants: Ulrich Bindseil – European Central Bank Tano Santos – Columbia University 15:45-16:15 Coffee break 16:15-17:30 Session 3: Fiscal implications of pension underfunding Chair: Fritz Zurbrügg – Swiss National Bank Author: Joshua Rauh – Stanford University Discussants: Deborah Lucas – Massachusetts Institute of Technology Michala Marcussen – Société Générale 17:30-18:15 Keynote speech: Elke König – Single Resolution Board 19:00-19:30 Pre-dinner drinks 19:30-22:00 Dinner – Welcoming remarks – Kerstin af Jochnick – Sveriges Riksbank DAY 2 SATURDAY, JUNE 16 09:00-10:15 Session 4: Cryptocurrency and non-bank intermediation: innovation and regulation in e-payments and e-platforms Chair: Carolyn Wilkins – Bank of Canada Author: Rob Townsend – Massachusetts Institute of Technology Discussants: Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden – University of Mannheim James McAndrews – Wharton Financial Institutions Center 10:15-10:45 Coffee break 10:45-12:00 Panel discussion on CCP resolution Chair: Randall Kroszner – University of Chicago Panellists: Susan O’Flynn – Morgan Stanley Dennis McLaughlin – LCH.
    [Show full text]
  • Monetary Policy Surprises, Central Bank Information Shocks, and Economic Activity in a Small Open Economy
    SVERIGES RIKSBANK WORKING PAPER SERIES 396 Monetary Policy Surprises, Central Bank Information Shocks, and Economic Activity in a Small Open Economy Stefan Laséen October 2020 WORKING PAPERS ARE OBTAINABLE FROM www.riksbank.se/en/research Sveriges Riksbank • SE-103 37 Stockholm Fax international: +46 8 21 05 31 Telephone international: +46 8 787 00 00 The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. The papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments. The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank. Monetary Policy Surprises, Central Bank Information Shocks, and Economic Activity in a Small Open Economy1 Stefan Laséen2 Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 396 October 2020 Abstract In this paper I study the effects of monetary policy on economic activity and asset prices in Sweden, separately identifying the effects of a conventional policy change from effects of new information about economic fundamentals. Recent research has shown that high-frequency changes in policy interest rate futures prices around central bank policy announcements might not only contain monetary policy shocks but also central bank information shocks. I add to this line of research by studying a case where the central bank, in contrast to many other central banks studied in this literature, is very open and transparent about the monetary policy decision and publishes a full set of forecasts including the interest rate at the same moment as the decision is revealed.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating Monetary Policy
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EVALUATING MONETARY POLICY Lars E.O. Svensson Working Paper 15385 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15385 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 September 2009 Prepared for Koenig, Evan, and Robert Leeson, eds., From the Great Moderation to the Great Deviation: A Round-Trip Journey Based on the Work of John B. Taylor, forthcoming. A first version of this paper was presented as a speech given at Uppsala University on March 13, 2009. I am grateful to Björn Andersson, Mikael Apel, Carl-Andreas Claussen, Paolo Giordani, Gabriela Guibourg, Tora Hammar, Neil Howe, Eric Leeper, Lina Majtorp, Mattias Villani, Staffan Viotti, and Anders Vredin for assistance and helpful comments. The views presented here are my own and not necessarily those of other members of the Riksbank’s executive board or staff. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2009 by Lars E.O. Svensson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Evaluating Monetary Policy Lars E.O. Svensson NBER Working Paper No. 15385 September 2009 JEL No. E52,E58 ABSTRACT Evaluating inflation-targeting monetary policy is more complicated than checking whether inflation has been on target, because inflation control is imperfect and flexible inflation targeting means that deviations from target may be deliberate in order to stabilize the real economy.
    [Show full text]
  • Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Co-Rona Crisis – We Need to Think
    SPEECH DATE: 23/02/21 SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm SPEAKER: Anna Breman (Brunkebergstorg 11) VENUE: Swedbank Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 [email protected] www.riksbank.se Monetary policy in the wake of the co- rona crisis – we need to think along new lines1 The coronavirus pandemic has cost more than 2.4 million human lives and caused great suffering for those who have fallen ill and their families. It has also caused a deep crisis in the real economy and last spring was close to triggering a new finan- cial crisis. The pandemic is not over. The focus for the Riksbank is to continue to provide support to the economic recovery and to maintain price stability. I am cautiously optimistic about economic developments, provided that vaccinations reach large parts of the society. But we should not count our chickens before they hatch. And even during the present crisis, we need to think about how the conditions for monetary policy are changing in its wake. We can hope that it will take time be- fore a similar crisis occurs again. But we know that a new crisis can happen at any time and from an unexpected direction. The pandemic shows that we must be prepared, must be able to act decisively and must have the courage to use new and untested tools. I think the Riksbank has so far managed to think along new lines during the crisis, and this is illustrated not least by the new monetary policy tools we have used.2 Without the Riksbank’s measures, the crisis would have been both deeper and more prolonged.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Participants (As of 25.11.2013)
    EURO AREA BUSINESS CYCLE NETWORK (EABCN) Inflation Developments after the Great Recession Eltville (Frankfurt), 6-7 December 2013 Hosted by the Deutsche Bundesbank and sponsored by the EABCN www.eabcn.org List of Participants (as of 25.11.2013) Ragna Alstadheim , Norges Bank Giovanni Amisano , European Central Bank Guido Ascari , University of Oxford and University of Pavia Jonathan Attey , Erasmus University Rotterdam Marta Banbura , European Central Bank Gregor Bäurle , Swiss National Bank Roberto M Billi , Sveriges Riksbank Boele Bonthuis , Deutsche Bundesbank Günter Coenen , European Central Bank Roberta Colavecchio , University of Hamburg Ben Craig , Deutsche Bundesbank Calebe de Roure , Deutsche Bundesbank Rupert de Vincent-Humphreys , Bank of England Davide Delle Monache , Queen Mary, University of London Sandra Eickmeier , Deutsche Bundesbank and CAMA Friedrich Fritzer , Oesterreichische Nationalbank Annette Fröhling , Deutsche Bundesbank Ana Beatriz Galvão , Warwick Business School, University of Warwick Juan Angel Garcia , European Central Bank Marc Giannoni , Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR Refet S. Gürkaynak , Bilkent University and CEPR Arne Halberstadt , Deutsche Bundesbank Klemens Hauzenberger , Deutsche Bundesbank Heinz Herrmann , Deutsche Bundesbank Johannes Hoffmann , Deutsche Bundesbank Mathias Hoffmann , Deutsche Bundesbank Josef Hollmayr , Deutsche Bundesbank Daniel Kaufmann , Swiss National Bank Oleg Kitov , University of Oxford Martin Kliem , Deutsche Bundesbank Malte Knüppel , Deutsche Bundesbank Michael
    [Show full text]
  • Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2018:3 Special Issue on the E-Krona
    Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review Special issue on the e-krona 2018:3 SVERIGES RIKSBANK SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECONOMIC REVIEW is issued by Sveriges Riksbank. Editors: JESPER LINDÉ AND MARIANNE NESSÉN Advisory editorial committee: MIKAEL APEL, DILAN OLCER, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden Telephone +46 8 787 00 00 The opinions expressed in signed articles are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank. The Review is published on the Riksbank’s website www.riksbank.se/Economic-Review Order a link to download new issues of Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review by sending an e-mail to: [email protected] ISSN 2001-029X SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECONOMIC REVIEW 2018:3 3 Dear readers, The Riksbank has for almost two years been conducting a review into the possibility and consequences of introducing a Swedish central bank digital currency, a so-called e-krona. This third issue of Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review in 2018 is a special theme issue discussing the e-krona from different perspectives. Cash is becoming increasingly marginalised in Sweden and the Riksbank needs to consider the role public and private actors should play on the payments market in a digital world. The Riksbank has drawn the conclusion that a digital complement to cash, an e-krona, could be one of several ways for the bank to pro-actively meet the new digital payment market. The Riksbank has published two interim reports (The Riksbank’s e-krona project, Reports 1 and 2, available at riksbank.se) which summarise the conclusions of the project.
    [Show full text]
  • Sweden Joins ECB's Instant Payments Settlement Platform
    Press release 3 April 2020 Sweden joins ECB’s instant payments settlement platform ECB and the Sveriges Riksbank conclude agreement on settlement of electronic payments in Swedish krona on the Eurosystem’s real-time infrastructure, TIPS Sweden is European frontrunner in use of instant payments ECB President Christine Lagarde says cooperation of central bank community in Europe works effectively - also in times of crisis Today, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Eurosystem and Sveriges Riksbank concluded a cooperation agreement offering Sweden access to the Eurosystem’s TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) to support the Swedish instant payment service, called RIX-INST. Based on this agreement, electronic payments made in Swedish krona can be settled on the settlement platform for instant payments operated by the Eurosystem. Payments will be cleared under the agreement as of May 2022. TIPS enables providers of payment services to transfer and settle their customers’ funds in real time, around the clock, every day of the year, and it settles the payments in central bank money. It has been in use in the euro area since November 2018 to settle instant payments in euro. It had been conceived from the outset to also be able to settle other currencies. Sweden is one of the most advanced European countries in terms of use of instant payments, with significant daily volumes. Currently, the daily average number of instant payments in Sweden is 1.5 million per day. The agreement is being signed by ECB President Christine Lagarde, the Governors of the Eurosystem’s 19 national central banks, and Sveriges Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves.
    [Show full text]
  • Withering Cash: Is Sweden Ahead of the Curve Or Just Special?
    SVERIGES RIKSBANK WORKING PAPER SERIES 393 Withering Cash: Is Sweden ahead of the curve or just special? Hanna Armelius, Carl Andreas Claussen and André Reslow August 2020 WORKING PAPERS ARE OBTAINABLE FROM www.riksbank.se/en/research Sveriges Riksbank • SE-103 37 Stockholm Fax international: +46 8 21 05 31 Telephone international: +46 8 787 00 00 The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. The papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments. The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank. Withering Cash: Is Sweden ahead of the curve or just special?∗ Hanna Armeliusy Carl Andreas Claussenz Andr´eReslowx Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 393 August, 2020 Abstract There is much in our increasingly digitized economies to suggest that the use of cash should fall. However, in almost all countries, it is constant or rising with a few notable excep- tions. Sweden, in particular, displays a divergent development. In this paper, we explore the drivers behind this development. We use a data set consisting of 129 developed and de- veloping countries and an extensive set of possible explanatory variables to estimate panel regressions for cash demand. In line with earlier studies, we find that economic develop- ment, demography, and the interest rate are important factors. A new finding is that our estimations point to a negative relationship between cash and corruption, and between cash and trust in government and financial institutions.
    [Show full text]