A Better, Safer Railway

Train Operations 2019/20

A summary of health and safety performance, operational learning and risk reduction activities on Britain’s railway. 1 Introduction Most of the time the railway runs well, everything goes to plan, and everyone gets to where they should be at the time they need to be there. Sometimes, though, things don’t run so well. Trains are delayed because of problems with the train itself, the traction supply, a trespasser, a broken rail, signal failure, human error and a whole host of other issues in between. Fatal derailments, collisions and buffer stop collisions have become increasingly rare over the last 60 years, thanks to improvements in the integrity of our equipment, but also in the training, process and safety management system improvements that come about as we continue to learn from past incidents and present precursors. However, the refreshed LHSBR has highlighted a number of strategic challenges, noting (among other things) that there is still inconsistency across the industry in how signal passed at danger (SPAD) events are managed, and calling for an increased understanding of where they are most likely to occur. As well as stopping trains ‘going too far’, though, there is also a growing need to understand why trains sometimes ‘go too fast’. The challenges identified in this document will help us direct resources to improve operational safety in the future.

Headlines 2019/20

• On 31 March 2020, the annual moving total number of SPADs was 362.1 This is the highest such figure since March 2005. • At the end of January 2020, the indication of underlying SPAD risk reached 91% of the September 2006 baseline. This is the highest value since June 2011. • There were 277 fewer recorded signaller errors in 2019/20 than in 2018/19. Most of the errors involved wrong-routing. • The Red Aspect Approaches to Signals (RAATS) Toolkit was launched in October 2019. RSSB is setting up a RAATS user group to share best practice and drive further development and implementation. • is looking at ways to improve safety critical communications. The Train Accident Risk Group (TARG) supports the development of a national strategy and will be working on this with the industry, taking initiatives already under way into account.

1 For more information on this and all the other data in this report, please see the Data transparency document.

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• Work to understand the hazard of ‘going too fast’ is under way. The next phase involves creating an overspeeding risk bowtie through a workshop and industry collaboration and a potential R&D project to understand future mitigations. • This year the recorded number of major injuries to passengers on trains has fallen, but is still higher than the preceding years. As well as the on-train conditions seen before, analysis has found sudden braking and intoxication to be causal to a number of incidents.

2 Train accidents

2.1 Safety overview This section presents the wider picture of safety per the Safety Management Intelligence System (SMIS).

2.1.1 Precursor indicator model Figure 1 Twenty-year trend in the passenger PIM

The passenger precursor indicator model (PIM) shows the PIM indication of potentially higher-risk train accidents (PHRTAs) risk to passengers broken down by theme (figure 1).2

2 The PIM indication of PHRTA risk to members of the public and workforce is shown at an aggregated level.

3 The overall PIM has a large component which indicates the risk of level crossing usage to members of the public, this is discussed in the Level crossing report. The passenger part is a better indication of trends in train operations risk. At the start of 2000/01 the PIM indicator of passenger PHRTA risk stood at 9.6 FWI; at the end of 2019/20 it was at 3.3 FWI. This represents a decrease of 6.3 FWI (65%) over 20 years. Much of this can be explained by changes to the SPAD risk indication in the first six years, during which time TPWS was being rolled out. As a result, between 1 April 2000 and 1 April 2006, the figure fell by 3.5 FWI. At the start of 2000/01, the PIM indicated the greatest PHRTA risk to passengers to be from SPADs. By the end of 2019/20, this had changed to infrastructure failures. From 31 March 2019 to 31 March 2020 the indicator of infrastructure asset PHRTA risk to passengers has increased by 0.68 FWI, or 83%. This is explored further in the Infrastructure asset integrity report.

2.1.2 SPADs Figure 2 Trend in SPADs and SPAD risk

On 31 March 2020, the annual total of SPADs was 362—the highest since March CIRAS 2005. By the end of January 2020, the A breakdown of CIRAS reports over the last indication of underlying SPAD risk had three fiscal years shows that 20%-24% of reached 91% of the September 2006 incidents cited had the potential to lead to a baseline. This is the highest value since June SPAD, collision or derailment. 2011. By March 2020, however, the underlying risk indication had fallen to 71%.

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2.1.2.1 SPAD causes To identify any consistent causes or underlying causes related to the increase, RSSB risk and human factors practitioners analysed over 150 SPAD investigation reports from 2018 and 2019. The results were compared to a study of underlying causes of SPADs from 2016 and 2017. Figure 3 Proportions of identified factors leading to SPADs in 2016-2017 and 2018-2019

The analysis uses the ten incident factor classification system and was conducted on subsets of SPADs from each set of years. The subsets were selected to represent the overall distribution of SPADs over operator type and time of year. As there was less detail in the available investigation reports for the 2018 and 2019 SPADs, a lower number of factors was identified. That said, the distribution of factors over factor type appears similar for both datasets. The rise in the proportion of environment and infrastructure, vehicles and equipment were investigated further, but neither was found to be a strong candidate for explaining the overall rise in SPAD frequency. Indeed, the analysis did not identify any single, strong candidate to explain it. A further ‘deep dive’ is therefore being conducted for more clarity.

5 2.1.2.2 Approaches to red aspect signals Figure 4 Estimated stopping approaches to red signals in 88 train describer areas

Figure 4 shows the estimated number of stopping approaches (approaches to red aspects that did not clear before the train reached the signal) for 88 train describer areas (see Appendix A for a list). There is no noticeable trend, but note that the estimate is taken from the Red Aspect Approaches to Signals (RAATS) Tool. RAATS is a relatively new tool and further work is needed to validate and understand its outputs. The underlying SPAD risk metric is calculated by aggregating systematic risk rankings assigned to each SPAD. The underlying SPAD risk metric is comprised of the number of SPADs in the previous year, how close each SPAD train came to a location at which an accident would be possible, and how severe the most likely accident at each location would be. Most signals on the rail network can be passed by a certain distance before there is any possibility of an accident. This means the risk implications of each SPAD, and therefore how much each SPAD contributes to the underlying SPAD risk metric, vary greatly. A freight train passing a stop board by a metre or two at walking pace is significantly different from a fully loaded passenger train passing a signal at danger and coming to a stand on a junction with a route set for another train. This means a small set of a certain type of SPAD can have a very large effect on the underlying SPAD risk metric. The SPADs with the greatest effect on the underlying risk metric are those that pass a signal at danger and reach a location where an accident involving a passenger train is possible.

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2.1.2.3 Trends in SPAD risk Figure 5 Trends in SPAD risk explained

Figure 5 shows the underlying SPAD risk alongside the annual moving total number of SPADs where a train reached a location with potential for a collision involving a passenger train. The patterns of the two series are closely aligned, illustrating that the underlying risk estimate has been driven by a small subset of the total number of SPADs.3 On 23 March 2020, the UK government issued a nationwide lockdown in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This led to steep reduction in rail travel and the number of train journeys. The reduction in rail traffic has coincided with reduced SPAD numbers and risk. From the end of 2019/20 to the end of May 2020, the SPAD annual moving total reduced from 362 to 330 and the underlying SPAD risk reduced from 71% to 58%. A ‘deep dive’ is being conducted to better understand the safety impact of Covid-19. As part of this, RSSB will be looking at the relationship between trains run, red aspects approached and numbers of SPADs during the lockdown period.

3 One such SPAD occurred on 25 May 2019, when an empty coaching formation passed ground position light signal EK5145 by 632 metres, stopping in Ramsgate’s Platform 4. At the time, a route had been set into the same platform for a passenger train. The passenger train was brought to a stand by a TPWS intervention when the signal it was approaching reverted.

7 2.1.3 Overspeeding Figure 6 TPWS activations at speed restrictions by fiscal year

Figure 6 shows the number of Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS)—activations at fitments protecting speed restrictions—where the TPWS equipment was reported as activating correctly. This shows a noticeable downward trend in the number of reported events. The last fatal train accident caused by overspeeding on the GB mainline rail network occurred at Appledore on 14 March 1980. However, incidents continue to occur. On 19 October 2018, for example, passenger train traversed a 20-mph emergency speed restriction at Sandy South Junction at approximately 121 mph. RAIB noted that the incident had been caused by distraction, but added that it raised questions about how speed restriction information is conveyed to drivers. LHSBR recognises that ‘[t]he risk from overspeeding and the effectiveness of controls and mitigations are not fully understood’. As a result, the industry is creating a ‘task and finish’ group to evaluate current hazards and identify knowledge gaps, evaluate interim measures, conduct research to understand the underlying causes of overspeeds and research and evaluate technological solutions.

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2.1.4 Potentially higher risk train accidents Figure 7 Trend in PHRTA types

30 26 25 25 25 24

20 19

15

10 Number of PHRTAs 5

0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Collisions between trains (excluding roll Buffer stop collisions backs) 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 Number of PHRTAs

Number of PHRTAs 0 0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Derailments (excluding collisions with Collisions with RVs not at level crossings RVs on level crossings) (without derailment) 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5

Number of PHRTAs 0 0 Number of PHRTAs 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Collisions with RVs at level crossings 20 15 10 5

Number of PHRTAs 0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Overall there were similar numbers of PHRTAs to last year, although, after rises in recent years, collisions with road vehicles (RVs) at level crossings and derailments have fallen this year. The drop in the latter is pleasing and may reflect the industry’s increased effort to reduce freight-related incidents like this. That said, freight train derailments do

9 still occur. On 11 June 2019, for example, an empty wagon derailed while being hauled at COLLISIONS around 15 mph through Carpenters Road RAIB is currently investigating two collisions: North Junction. RAIB released a digest on On 13 November 2019, an empty coaching this incident, which noted that the wagon stock formation struck the rear of another derailed because it ran over a substantial near Neville Hill Depot. The investigation will consider both the staff and train acceptance part of its own brake equipment, which had aspect of the incident. fallen onto the track beneath it. The On 23 March 2020, a passenger train struck a standard of wagon maintenance has arisen locomotive which had struck the stops and in a number of previous RAIB investigations. derailed foul of the main line at Bromsgrove. RAIB will consider how the risk of overrun However, freight derailments can also result within the siding was assessed (inter alia). from deficiencies around the track as well as the train. On 28 January 2020, indeed, a freight came off on a set of points just south of Eastleigh station. There were no reported injuries, but there was extensive disruption to services on the South Western Main Line for the following six days. RAIB’s preliminary examination found that a series of rail fastenings, intended to maintain the correct distance between the rails, had broken. Initial evidence suggests that some of these were already broken before the derailment. Consequently, as the freight train passed over the points, the rails moved apart and the train wheels dropped into the space between the rails.

2.1.5 Operating incidents

2.1.5.1 Signaller errors The daily logs have long shown incidents of trains being wrongly authorised or signalled into a possession or blockage for some time. Outside possessions, a number of incidents have occurred in which trains have been wrongly routed on non-platform roads, and pedestrians have been trapped at CCTV-controlled level crossings. The are many causes behind these signalling errors. Together, they have led RAIB to launch a class investigation into the factors affecting safety-critical human performance in signalling operations, which was published in May 2020. It identified several common factors influencing the actions of signallers across these scenarios, associated with: • signaller workload • user-centred design • competence management • experiential knowledge • organisational structure. The common causal factors include the fact that Network Rail’s management of signaller workload does not fully reflect the complex cognitive demands of modern signalling

10 centres. Furthermore, signallers are not consistently involved in making decisions about the design or installation of equipment, or the processes they are required to use. In light of the above, it is pleasing to note that Figure 8 shows there to have been 277 fewer recorded signaller errors in 2019/20 than 2018/19. It also shows that most of the errors involved wrong-routing, but not into station platforms, of which fewer were evident in Q1-Q2 2019/20 than in Q1-Q2 2018/19.

Figure 8 Signaller errors

11 2.1.5.2 Other operating incidents and TPWS activations Figure 9 All operational incidents and TPWS activations

Figure 9 shows 2019/20 to have seen 236 fewer operational incidents and TPWS activations than 2018/19, the largest year-on-year falls being evident in quarters 3 and 4. Note that the third quarter of 2018/19 did have an unusually high number of station overrun incidents.

2.2 What’s being done? The data in this document shows a number of areas where performance improvements have been made. It also shows where we need to concentrate more effort in the future. To help drive this improvement, this section presents some of the industry initiatives that are under way to help improve the safe performance of train operations. • Regarding SPADs, RSSB has updated and improved its online resources, including an online good practice guide for SPAD management. This contains information and advice to assist the industry with understanding and improving SPAD performance. • A ‘deep dive’ is under way to investigate the recent increase in SPAD numbers and the associated risk. The work will consider factors such as signal characteristics, organisational factors and causes.

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• TARG has recommended companies to record and classify their causes from SPAD investigations for 2019 and 2020 using the causes report form in SMIS, which has been developed using the Human Performance Factors and 10 Incident Factors, to understand better the underlying causes of SPADs. RSSB will support this. • The Red Aspect Approaches to Signals (RAATS) Toolkit was launched in October 2019. RSSB is in the process of setting up a RAATS user group to share best practice and drive further development. • The industry recognises the need to CIRAS improve safety critical communications. A concern was raised that incorrect signage TARG supports the development of a had been used to warn drivers about a speed national strategy and will be discussing restriction. According to the reporter, there with TOM-SC the best way of achieving were no warning boards or AWS magnets. As this. a result, a review of the works was carried out, which revealed a misunderstanding of the • A Rail Industry Standard (RIS-3704-TOM) rules regarding signage. has been published to help facilitate a

consistent approach to the management of train accident risk by the Operational Risk and Mitigation (OPSRAM) groups. • Work to understand the hazard of ‘going too fast’ is under way. Following the RAIB report into the overspeed at Sandy South Junction, the ORR asked RSSB to create an industry group to undertake a structured review of research, recent experience and practices associated with overspeeding. The goal is to develop an approach for industry to manage the risk associated with speed restrictions more effectively. TARG has taken up this suggestion and will develop a group to investigate this area and create a work plan. The first phase involves a workshop and industry collaboration to create an overspeeding risk bowtie, among other initiatives. The bowtie will be used to identify overspeeding threats, controls, barriers and their effectiveness. This will assess the current management of overspeeding, aid the identification of areas of most concern, and define further work for the overspeed group and potential R&D project. • Network Rail has also undertaken extensive work to identify and assess interim train protection system enhancements that could be deployed as part of a migration strategy supporting the implementation of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS). A European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 Limited Supervision solution is currently under development and—if implemented following a successful verification and validation process—will provide safety improvements. It will be compatible with a migration to full ETCS with the potential for earlier installation than currently planned. The Train Protection Strategy Group has started to work on a migration strategy, which will also strengthen its link with TARG, thereby aiding collaboration in this area.

13 3 On-train injuries to passengers and public

3.1 Safety overview The following analysis focuses on injuries that occur to passengers and public on-board trains. Unlike the previous section, this does not include injuries resulting from train accidents, but the day-to-day hazards people come across while travelling.

Figure 10 Risk in context

Passengers and public on trains (9.2 FWI; 9%)

Other passengers and public on trains accidental risk (96.5 FWI; 91%)

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Figure 11 Risk to people on trains

On-board injuries 5.5

Assault and abuse 3.3

Manual handling/awkward movement 0.2 Passengers

Fatalities Lean or fall from train in running 0.3 Major injuries

Minor injuries

Other < 0.1 Shock and trauma

0 2 4 6 SRM modelled risk (FWI per year) The largest risk to passengers emerges from the general on-board injuries category. This includes, but is not limited to, slips, trips and falls, injuries from contact with objects or animals on trains, and loss of consciousness due to hot or crowded trains.

15 Figure 12 Passenger and public on-train injuries

13.6

10 8.6 8.4 7.9 6.9 FWPI 5

0 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 2018/2019 2019/2020 Fatali�es Major injuries Minor injuries

8 8 8

6 6 6 FWPI FWPI FWPI 4 4 4

2 2 2

0 0 0

There were no fatalities on board trains in 2019/20. Two of the fatalities last year were assaults. Many of the major injuries seen in 2018/19 were due to disrupted travel and a hot summer, which led to more overcrowded conditions and frequent fainting. The absence of this as a factor in 2019/20 resulted in the reduction in harm now evident. It is likely that the Covid-19 lockdown will see a further reduction, although assault incidents continue to be reported in the daily control logs at the time of writing.

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Figure 13 Passenger and public on-train major injuries

89 75 69 59 53 55 50

25 Major injuries

0 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 2018/2019 2019/2020

Assault and abuse Slips, trips and falls 40 40

20 20 Major injuries Major injuries

0 0

Contact with object or person / awkward body movement Other 40 40

20 20 Major injuries Major injuries

0 0

In 2018/19, there was a large increase in the number of major injuries, again almost entirely due to losses of consciousness, again mainly due to crowding on short-formed trains during a heatwave.4 This year, the recorded number of major injuries to passengers on trains has fallen, but is still higher than the preceding years. As well as the on-train conditions seen before, analysis has found cases where sudden braking has caused people to fall and fracture bones or be knocked out (this particularly affects the frail and vulnerable, and the intoxicated).

4 A person fainting due to conditions brought about by the operation of the railway is categorised as a major injury.

17 Figure 14 Assaults and abuse to passengers and the public on-board trains5

4000 3407 3500 3272 2986 3000

2500 2156 1933 2000 1500

Violent offences1000 500 0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

GBH and more serious violence Actual bodily harm 1500 1500

1000 1000

500 500 Violent offences Violent offences 0 0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Common assault Harassment 1500 1500

1000 1000

500 500 Violent offences Violent offences 0 0 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

Figure 14 shows that the rising trend of assaults and abuse to members of the public seems to be slowing. Indeed, cases of grievous bodily harm and more serious violence have remained relatively steady for the entire 5-year window. We also note that the number of assault and abuse incidents being reported on board trains in the last year rose more slowly than the overall number of violent offences reported by police forces across England and Wales (for the year ending December 2019, according to the Office for National Statistics). However, this is attributable to improvements in reporting rather than an increase in incidents, as the actual amount of violence being carried out is thought to have decreased for the year ending December 2019, with the overall number of violent offences changing little in recent years, nationally.

5 Source: British Transport Police (BTP)

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3.2 What’s being done? This section presents some of the industry initiatives that are under way to help improve the safety of stranded passengers, passengers suffering overcrowding and those who need first aid. • Network Rail has started work to manage the risk of passengers stranded on trains more effectively. The aim is to minimise the number and duration of events where passengers are stranded, improve safety and performance, improve customer service, and reduce reputational damage. It will also aim to provide consistency across the industry. • Following the lessons learned during the bad weather of February–March 20186, RDG reviewed and updated guidance on Meeting the Needs of Passengers Stranded on Trains. RSSB also undertook a knowledge search (S341) to identify information that may influence passengers to self-evacuate in the event of a stranded train. • Research project T1147, which investigated the effects of crowding on trains and in stations, has been completed. The project offered a good practice guide on the management of crowds. This has been created for operational roles who influence the management of passengers at stations and on trains. • A knowledge search (S348) to examine first aid provision is under way. This will share best practice and improve the understanding of obligations and conventions across the industry.

66 Including the self-detrainment of passengers onto open and electrically live lines at Lewisham on 2 March, an incident investigated by RAIB.

19 4 Key safety statistics

4.1 PHRTAs

PHRTAs 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 Involving passenger trains 15 16 12 12 8 Collisions between trains 6 3 3 2 2 Derailments 3 2 2 1 0 Collisions with RVs not at LC 2 3 0 0 2 Collisions with RVs at LC (not 3 5 5 8 4 derailed) Collisions with RVs at LC 0 0 0 0 0 (derailed) Striking buffer stops 1 3 2 1 0 Struck by large falling object 0 0 0 0 0 Not involving passenger 10 8 7 14 17 trains Collisions between trains 0 1 0 2 3 Derailments 8 4 5 11 10 Collisions with RVs not at LC 1 0 0 0 1 Collisions with RVs at LC (not 1 1 2 1 1 derailed) Collisions with RVs at LC 0 0 0 0 0 (derailed) Striking buffer stops 0 2 0 0 2 Struck by large falling object 0 0 0 0 0

Total PHRTAs 25 24 19 26 25

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4.2 Non-PHRTAs

Non-PHRTAs 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 Involving passenger trains 332 279 256 302 344 Open door collisions 0 1 0 0 2 Roll back collisions 3 0 0 0 0 Striking animals 96 105 91 98 131 Striking level crossing 3 1 4 1 3 gates/barriers Striking other objects 142 87 92 117 121 Struck by missiles 51 42 20 31 35 Train fires 37 43 49 55 52 Not involving passenger 58 45 44 37 39 trains Open door collisions 0 0 1 0 0 Striking animals 11 9 9 11 10 Striking level crossing 0 1 2 1 0 gates/barriers Striking other objects 32 26 24 14 19 Struck by missiles 8 5 5 3 4 Train fires 7 4 3 8 6

21 4.3 Train accident harm

Train operations 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 Fatalities 0 2 2 0 0 Passenger 0 0 0 0 0 Workforce 0 0 0 0 0 Public 0 2 2 0 0 Major injuries 2 3 3 2 1 Passenger 1 2 0 1 0 Workforce 1 0 1 1 1 Public 0 1 2 0 0 Minor injuries 41 95 30 25 13 Passenger 28 77 4 5 4 Workforce 11 17 16 18 7 Public 2 1 10 2 2 Incidents of shock 17 27 20 21 20 Passenger 3 5 2 0 0 Workforce 14 22 17 21 20 Public 0 0 1 0 0 Fatalities and weighted 0.28 2.50 2.36 0.24 0.12 physical injuries Passenger 0.148 0.353 0.012 0.109 0.008 Workforce 0.127 0.041 0.124 0.13 0.107 Public 0.002 2.105 2.222 0.002 0.006

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4.4 On board injuries

On board injuries 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 Fatalities 0 1 1 3 0 Assault and abuse 0 0 0 2 0 Lean or fall from train in running 0 1 0 1 0 Slips, trips and falls 0 0 1 0 0 Major injuries 53 59 55 89 69 Assault and abuse 5 4 2 6 1 Slips, trips and falls 12 15 15 27 29 Contact with object / person / 12 13 18 13 11 awkward body movement Other 24 27 20 43 29 Minor injuries 1157 1161 1017 1128 1132 Class 1 101 89 98 139 124 Class 2 1056 1072 920 990 1007

Fatalities and weighted 6.9 8.4 7.9 13.6 8.6 physical injuries

Passenger and public assaults

on trains Total (BTP data) 1933 2156 2986 3272 3407 GBH and more serious cases 66 67 75 66 43 of violence Actual bodily harm 294 317 409 457 508 Common assaults 830 893 1228 1332 1454 Harassment 715 857 1240 1360 1325 Other violence 28 22 34 57 77

23 Appendix A Train describer areas

Table 1: List of train describer areas included in analysis presented in Figure 4 ID Name ID Name A2 Ashford IECC B MH Machynlleth AD Ashford IECC A MP Manchester Piccadilly PSB TD AN Allington Junction NE EMCC North Erewash Area WestCAD AW Acton Wells NK Ashford North Kent MCS BE NM EMCC Nottingham WestCAD BM Barnham DTD NX BX Basingstoke (WoE) Q1 ROROC Stratford IECC C1 SWCC Newport Corridor WestCAD Q2 ROROC Shenfield IECC C2 SWCC Cardiff Area MCS R1 Rugby SCC (Watford - Bletchley ITD) C3 SWCC Shrewsbury North WestCAD R2 Rugby SCC (Northampton - Rugby ITD) CA Cambridge PSB R3 RYROC Stafford Area WestCAD CC Colchester RW Rochdale West CE Crewe PSB SJ WMSC Stourbridge WestCAD CV WMSC Cherwell Valley WestCAD SK Stoke On Trent CY WMSC Coventry WestCAD SS Merseyrail IECC D1 TVSC Reading IECC A SX Saxmundham (East Suffolk) MCS D2 TVSC Reading IECC B T1 Tyneside 1 IECC D3 TVSC Paddington IECC T2 Tyneside 2 IECC D4 TVSC Hayes IECC TB Three Bridges ASC ITD D5 TVSC Didcot IECC TD WMSC Telford D6 TVSC Maidenhead IECC TE Tonbridge D7 TVSC Swindon IECC TH Thrumpton D9 TVSC Stoke Gifford IECC TN EMCC Chesterfield Area WestCAD EA Edinburgh IECC A TY Tees Yard (Ryhope) EB Edinburgh IECC B U2 Upminster "B" IECC EC Edinburgh IECC C U3 Upminster 3 IECC ED Edinburgh IECC D UR Upminster "A" IECC EH Eastleigh VC London Victoria EK East Kent MCS ITD W2 () EN Cambridge IECC (Ely - Norwich) WA Warrington PSB FE Ferrybridge WE Worksop G2 WSSC Paisley ITD WH West Hampstead PSB HG Harrogate IECC WI Wimbledon NCP IH Inverness Highlands WestCAD WJ Wembley Mainline (Watford) WestCAD KN WMSC Kings Norton WestCAD WL WMSC Walsall WestCAD L2 Lincoln East WN WMSC Water Orton WestCAD LC WMSC Leamington Corridor X0 TBROC Thameslink Core WestCAD LN Lincoln X6 TBROC Streatham Area WestCAD LS Liverpool Street IECC "A" Y0 YKROC North Lincs WestCAD M1 MRROC Liverpool Area WestCAD Y4 YKROC Sheffield WestCAD M2 MRROC Manchester North WestCAD YO Yoker SCC MCS M3 MRROC Manchester Central WestCAD ZB TDC MD EMCC Mansfield ZG TDC ME Marylebone Chilterns IECC ZY Yeovil TDC

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