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Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information

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Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information 6&,(17,),&∃1∋7(&+12/2∗,&∃/237,216∃66(660(17 672∃ ∋(9(/230(172)6859(,//∃1&( 7(&+12/2∗<∃1∋5,6.2)∃%86( 2)(&2120,&,1)250∃7,21 9ΡΟ 3ΥΗςΗΘΛΡΘΘΓ∃ΘΟ∴ςΛς 3ΥΗςΗΘΛΡΘΡΙΚΗΙΡΞΥςΞΓΛΗς ∃ΘΟ∴ςΛς∋ΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘΘΓΚΞΠΘΥΛϑΚςΛΘΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΘΓΚΗ ΥΡΟΗΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ ∋ΡΦΞΠΗΘΓΗΥΨΛΟΣΡΞΥΟΗ3ΘΗΟ672∃ /Ξ[ΗΠΕΡΞΥϑ∋ΗΦΗΠΕΗΥ 3(9ΡΟ(1 QA-ST-OA-132-EN-N &ΟΡϑΞΛΘϑΓ 7ΛΟΗ 9ΡΟ3ΥπςΗΘΛΡΘΗΘΟ∴ςΗ 3ΥπςΗΘΛΡΘΓΗςΤΞ∆ΥΗπΞΓΗς ∃ΘΟ∴ςΗΣΥΡΗΦΩΛΡΘΓΗςΓΡΘΘπΗςΗΩ∋ΥΡΛΓΗΟ+ΡΠΠΗΓΘς Ο 8ΘΛΡΘ(ΞΥΡΣπΗΘΘΗΗΥ{ΟΗΓΞ3∆ΥΟΗΠΗΘ(ΞΥΡΣπΗΘ :ΡΥΝΣΟΘ5ΗΙ (3,9%672∃ 3ΞΕΟΛςΚΗΥ (ΞΥΡΣΗΘ 3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ ∋ΛΥΗΦΡΥΗ ∗ΗΘΗΥΟΙΡΥ5ΗςΗΥΦΚ ∋ΛΥΗΦΡΥΗ ∃ 7ΚΗ672∃3ΥΡϑΥ∆ΠΠΗ ∃ΞΚΡΥ 3Ηϑϑ∴%ΗΦΝΗΥΨΛςΛΛΘϑΥΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚΗΥ 8ΘΓΗΥΚΗςΞΣΗΥΨΛςΛΡΘΡΙ∋ΛΦΝ+ΡΟΓςΖΡΥΚ +ΗΓ ΡΙΩΚΗ672∃7ΗΠ (ΓΛΡΥ0Υ ∋ΛΦΝ+2/∋6:257+ +ΗΓΡΙ672∃8ΘΛ ∋Η 2ΦΡΕΥΗ 3(ΘΞΠΕΗΥ 3(9ΡΟ(1 7ΚΛςΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΛςΖΡΥΝΛΘϑ∋ΡΦΞΠΗΘΙΡΥΚΗ672∃3ΘΗΟ,ΩΛςΘΡΘΡΙΙΛΦΛΟΣΞΕΟΛΦΛΡΘΡΙ 672∃ 7ΚΛςΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΓΡΗςΘΡΘΗΦΗςςΥΛΟ∴ΥΗΣΥΗςΗΘΚΗΨΛΗΖςΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ &217(176 3ϑΗ ,ΘΥΡΓΞΦΛΡΘ 3∆Υ2ΘΗ 3ΥΗςΗΘΛΡΘΡΙΚΗΙΡΞΥςΞΓΛΗς 6ΞΓ∴2ΘΗ 7ΚΗςΩΗΡΙΚΗ∆ΥΛΘ&ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΛΡΘς,ΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗ &20,17ΡΙ ∆ΞΡΠΗΓΣΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑΙΡΥΛΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗΣΞΥΣΡςΗςΡΙΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΗΓ ΕΥΡΓΕΘΓΠΞΟΛΟΘϑΞϑΗΟΗ∆ςΗΓΡΥΦΡΠΠΡΘΦ∆ΥΥΛΗΥς∴ςΗΠςΘΓΛς ΣΣΟΛΦΕΛΟΛ∴Ρ&20,17ΥϑΗΛΘϑΘΓςΗΟΗΦΛΡΘΛΘΦΟΞΓΛΘϑςΣΗΗΦΚ ΥΗΦΡϑΘΛΛΡΘ 6ΞΓ∴7ΖΡ (ΘΦΥ∴ΣΛΡΘΘΓΦΥ∴ΣΡς∴ςΗΠςΛΘΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗ∆ςΞΥΨΗ∴ΡΙ ΚΗΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑ∴ςςΗςςΠΗΘΛςςΞΗς 6ΞΓ∴7ΚΥΗΗ 7ΚΗΟΗϑ∆ΟΛ∴ΡΙΚΗΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΡΙΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΛΡΘς ΦΡΘΦΛςΗςΞΥΨΗ∴ΡΙΚΗΣΥΛΘΦΛΣΟΟΗϑ∆ΟΛςςΞΗςΘΓΛΘςΥΞΠΗΘςΞΘΓΗΥ ΛΘΗΥΘΛΡΘΟ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘΘΓΘΛΡΘΟΟΖ 6ΞΓ∴)ΡΞΥ 7ΚΗΣΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΡΙΗΦΡΘΡΠΛΦΥΛςΝςΥΛςΛΘϑΙΥΡΠΚΗΣΡΗΘΛΟ ΨΞΟΘΗΥΕΛΟΛ∴ΡΙΗΟΗΦΥΡΘΛΦΦΡΠΠΗΥΦΛ∆ΟΠΗΓΛΡΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘ 3∆Υ7ΖΡ ∃ΘΟ∴ςΛς±∋ΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘΘΓΚΞΠΘΥΛϑΚςΛΘΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΘΓΚΗ ΥΡΟΗΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3∆ΥΟΛΠΗΘ +ΞΠΘΥΛϑΚςΘΓ(ΞΥΡΣΗ ∃ +ΞΠΘΥΛϑΚςΘΓΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘ % +ΞΠΘΥΛϑΚςΘΓΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ & 5ΗςΣΗΦΙΡΥΣΥΛΨΦ∴ΛΘΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ&ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΡΘ+ΞΠΘ5ΛϑΚς (ΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗ∆ΘΓΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘ ∃/∆ΖΙΞΟ ΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘς &ΡΠΠΞΘΛ∴ΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘΘΓ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ∂ςΣΡςΛΛΡΘ ∃ΣΣΟΛΦΛΡΘΛΘΚΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6Ης %∗ΟΡΕΟ ΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘς ∋ΗςΦΥΛΣΛΡΘ 3ΡςςΛΕΟΗ ΥΛςΝς 7ΚΗΛΞΓΗΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΘΓΚΗΣΡςΛΛΡΘΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘΩ &Υ∴ΣΡϑΥΣΚ∴ΘΓΗΘΦΥ∴ΣΛΡΘΚΗΝΗ∴ΡΚΗΣΥΡΕΟΗΠ∀ ∃ 3ΥΗςΗΘΛΡΘΘΓΣΥΡΕΟΗΠΥΗς % 7ΚΗΣΡςΛΛΡΘΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘ & ∋ΛΨΗΥϑΗΘΡΣΛΘΛΡΘΡΙΡΘΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6ΗΚΗΦ∆ςΗΡΙ)ΥΘΦΗ &ΡΘΦΟΞςΛΡΘ↔ ∃ΘΘΗ[ΓΗΙΛΘΛΛΡΘςΘΓ5ΗςΡΟΞΛΡΘ% %ΛΕΟΛΡϑΥΣΚ∴ ,1752∋8&7,21 7ΚΗΗΥΠ∝ΣΥΛΨΦ∴∂ΟΚΡΞϑΚΛΘΞςΗΙΡΥΡΘΟ∴ΦΡΠΣΥΛΨΗΟ∴ςΚΡΥΛΠΗΦΞΟΟ∴ΥΗΙΗΥςΡ∆ ςΛΞΛΡΘΖΚΛΦΚΛςςΡΟΓςΚΗΓΗςΛΥΗΡΙΛΘΓΛΨΛΓΞΟςΡΕΗΣΥΡΗΦΗΓΙΥΡΠΛΘΗΥΙΗΥΗΘΦΗΕ∴ΡΚΗΥς 3ΥΛΨΦ∴ΛςΚΗΛΘΓΛΨΛΓΞΟ∂ςΛΘΛΠΗςΣΚΗΥΗΡΙΗ[ΛςΗΘΦΗΖΚΛΦΚΠΞςΚΗΥΗΙΡΥΗΕΗΦΡΘΦΗΟΗΓΙΥΡΠ ΚΗΝΘΡΖΟΗΓϑΗΡΙΡΚΗΥΣΗΡΣΟΗΘΓςΚΛΗΟΓΗΓΙΥΡΠΚΗΛΥΦΞΥΛΡςΛ∴ 7ΚΗΥΛϑΚΩΡΥΗςΣΗΦΙΡΥΣΥΛΨΦ∴ΛςΘΛΘΓΛΨΛΓΞΟΥΛϑΚΦΝΘΡΖΟΗΓϑΗΓΙΛΥΟ∴ΥΗΦΗΘΟ∴∃ΥΛΦΟΗΡΙ ΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ&ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΡΘ+ΞΠΘ5ΛϑΚς (&+5Ο∴ςΓΡΖΘΚ∝(ΨΗΥ∴ΡΘΗΚςΚΗΥΛϑΚΩΡ ΥΗςΣΗΦΙΡΥΚΛςΣΥΛΨΗΘΓΙΠΛΟ∴ΟΛΙΗΚΛςΚΡΠΗΘΓΚΛςΦΡΥΥΗςΣΡΘΓΗΘΦΗ∂7Κ&ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΛςΡΘΗΡΙ ∆ΘΞΠΕΗΥΡΙΛΘΗΥΘΛΡΘΟΘΓΘΛΡΘΟΟΗϑ∆ΟΛΘςΥΞΠΗΘςΖΚΛΦΚΦΝΘΡΖΟΗΓϑΗΚΣΥΛΘΦΛΣΟΗΡΙ ΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘ%Ξ∝ΣΥΛΨΦ∴∂ ΚςΘΗΨΗΥΕΗΗΘΣΥΡΣΗΥΟ∴ΓΗΙΛΘΗΓΛΦΡΨΗΥςΚΗΥΛϑΚΡΣΥΛΨΗΟΛΙΗΚΗ ΥΛϑΚΡςΗΦΥΗΦ∴ΡΙΣΗΥςΡΘ∂ςΦΡΥΥΗςΣΡΘΓΗΘΦΗΛΘΦΟΞΓΛΘϑΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘΕ∴ΗΟΗΣΚΡΘΗΘΓΡΚΗΥ ΗΟΗΦΥΡΘΛΦΠΗΘςΘΓΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘϑΛΘςΚΗΠΛςΞςΗΡΙΛΘΙΡΥΠΛΡΘΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑ∴ΘΓΚΗΣΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑΡΙ ΣΗΥςΡΘΟΓΩ∆7ΚΩΥΛϑΚΖςΛΘΛΛΟΟ∴ΣΥΡΗΦΩΗΓΕ∴ςΣΗΦΛΙΛΦΣΥΡΨΛςΛΡΘς±ΛΘΨΛΡΟΕΛΟΛ∴ΡΙΚΗΚΡΠΗ ΡΙΦΡΥΥΗςΣΡΘΓΗΘΦΗΘΓΡΙΣΥΡΙΗςςΛΡΘΟςΗΦΥΗΦ∴6ΞΕςΗΤΞΗΘΟ∴ΖΛΚΚΗΥΥΛΨΟΡΙΠΡΥΗΠΡΓΗΥΘ ΙΡΥΠςΡΙΦΝςΘΓΨΛΡΟΛΡΘς±ΗΟΗΦΥΡΘΛΦΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΗΟΗΣΚΡΘΗΣΣΛΘϑΥΗΦΡΥΓΛΘϑΗΦΘ ΛΘΓΛΨΛΓΞΟ∂ςΣΥΛΨΗΟΛΙΗΦΠΗΡΕΗΣΥΡΗΦΗΓΕ∴ϑΗΘΗΥΟΣΥΡΨΛςΛΡΘςςΛΘΦΗΓΞΥΛΘϑΚΗς ΛΘΙΥΛΘϑΗΠΗΘςΚΓΛΘΦΥΗςΗΓΕΗ∴ΡΘΓΟΟΠΗςΞΥΗ∃ΦΦΡΥΓΛΘϑΟ∴ΚΗ∋3ΥΡΗΦΛΡΘ&ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΖς ςΛϑΘΗΓΛΘ6ΥςΕΡΞΥϑΡΘ−∆ΘΞΥ∴ΘΓΛΗΘΗΥΗΓΛΘΡΙΡΥΦΗΡΘ2ΦΡΕΗΥ7ΚΗ &ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΓΡΗςΘΡΛΘΦΟΞΓΗΘ∴ΥΞΟΗςΖΚΛΦΚΥΗΓΛΥΗΦΟ∴ΣΣΟΛΦΕΟΗΛΘΚΗΘΛΡΘΟΟΗϑ∆ΟΡΥΓΗΥςΡΙ ΚΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6ΗςΛΠΗΥΗΟ∴ςΗςΡΞΣΥΛΘΦΛΣΟΗςΓΗςΛϑΘΗΓΡϑΡΨΗΥΘΚΗΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘΡΙΣΥΛΨΦ∴ΖΚΛΦΚ ΚΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6ΗςΞΘΓΗΥΝΗΡΛΠΣΟΗΠΗΘΖΛΚΟΟΚΗςΗςΚΨΛΘϑΚΓΡΓΡΣΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘΛΘ ΦΡΘΙΡΥΠΛ∴ΖΛΚΚΗΚΡςΗΣΥΛΘΦΛΣΟΗςΕΗΙΡΥΗΓΗΣΡςΛΛΘϑΚΗΛΥΛΘςΥΞΠΗΘςΡΙΥΛΙΛΦΛΡΘ 7ΚΗΣΥΡΗΦΛΡΘΡΙΣΥΛΨΦ∴ΛςΚΗΥΗΙΡΥΗΣΥΡΣΗΥΟ∴ΗΘςΚΥΛΘΗΓΛΘΘΛΡΘΟΘΓΛΘΗΥΘΛΡΘΟΟΗϑ∆ΟΡΥΓΗΥς ∆ςΖΗΟΟςΛΘ&ΡΠΠΞΘΛ∴ΟΖ6ΗΡΞΛΘΚΡςΗΗΥΠςΡΘΗΠΛϑΚΛΠϑΛΘΗΚΩΚΗΥΛϑΚΩΖς ΛΘΓΗΙΗ∆ςΛΕΟΗΕΞΖΗΠΞςΓΓΚΩΛΚςΡΕΗΥΗΦΡΘΦΛΟΗΓΖΛΚΥΗΤΞΛΥΗΠΗΘςΥΗΟΛΘϑΡςΗΦΞΥΛ∴ ΘΛΡΘΟΓΗΙΗΘΦΗΘΓΘΛΗΥΥΡΥΛςΠΦΠΣΛϑΘς,ΩΛςΖΛΚΨΛΗΖΡΠΗΗΛΘϑΚΡςΗΥΗΤΞΛΥΗΠΗΘςΚ ΦΗΥ∆ΛΘΗ[ΦΗΣΛΡΘςΥΗΞΚΡΥΛςΗΓ)ΡΥΗ[ΠΣΟΗΟ∆ΖΙΞΟΛΘΩΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΡΙΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΛς ∆ΞΚΡΥΛςΗΓΕΞΛΛςςΞΕΜΗΦΩΡΦΡΠΣΟΛΘΦΗΖΛΚςΥΛΘϑΗΘςΥΛΦΩΥΞΟΗςΚΗΕΥΡΓΚΥΞςΡΙΖΚΛΦΚΖς ςΗΡΞΕ∴ΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΘΓςΞΕςΗΤΞΗΘΟ∴ΙΡΟΟΡΖΗΓΕ∴ΚΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6Ης∃ΣΥΙΥΡΠςΞΦΚ ∝ΟΖΙΞΟΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘς∂ΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΖΚΛΦΚΛςΕΡΞΘΓΡΣΣΟ∴ΚΗ(&+5ΘΓΚΗΡΚΗΥ ΥΗΟΗΨΘΦΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘςΖΛΟΟΚΨΗΡΦΡΠΕΘΡΡΘΟ∴ΞΘΟΖΙΞΟΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΕΞΟςΡΟΖΙΞΟ ΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΞςΗΓΙΡΥΣΞΥΣΡςΗςΡΚΗΥΚΘΚΗΣΥΛΠΥ∴ΞΚΡΥΛςΗΓΛΘΗΘΛΡΘ7ΚΗΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΠΗΘΡΙ ΘΗΖΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΗςΚςΠΓΗΛΗς∴ΡΓΡΚ 6ΣΗΦΛΙΛΦΥΛςΝςΥΛςΗΙΥΡΠΚΗΞςΗΡΙΠΡΓΗΥΘΠΗΘςΡΙΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘΙ[ΦΗΟΟΞΟΥΣΚΡΘΗςΚΗ ,ΘΗΥΘΗΗΦΖΛΚΥΗςΣΗΦΡΚΗΦΡΘΙΛΓΗΘΛΟΛ∴ΡΙΠΗςςϑΗςΣΥΛΦΞΟΥΟ∴ΛΘΚΗΗΦΡΘΡΠΛΦςΣΚΗΥΗ ΖΚΗΥΗςΞΦΚΠΗ∆ΘςΥΗΕΗΛΘϑΞςΗΓΠΡΥΗ∆ΘΓΠΡΥΗΙΥΗΤΞΗΘΟ∴ΙΡΥΦΡΠΠΗΥΦΛΟΦΛΨΛΛΗς )ΞΥΚΗΥΠΡΥΗΡΨΗΥΚΗςΠΗΣΗΥΛΡΓΨςΥΘϑΗΡΙςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗΗΦΚΘΛΤΞΗςΚςΕΗΗΘΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΗΓ ςΞΦΚςΣΥΕΡΟΛΦΘΓΟςΗΥΠΛΦΥΡΣΚΡΘΗς7ΚΗ∴Π∴ΕΗΓΗΙΛΘΗΓςΕΗΛΘϑΓΗΨΛΦΗςΡΥς∴ςΗΠςΖΚΛΦΚ ΦΘΠΡΘΛΡΥΥΦΝΘΓςςΗςςΚΗΠΡΨΗΠΗΘςΡΙΛΘΓΛΨΛΓΞΟςΚΗΛΥΣΥΡΣΗΥ∴ΘΓΡΚΗΥςςΗς7ΚΗςΗ ΘΗΖΙΡΥΠςΡΙςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗΚΨΗΟΗΓΡΚΗΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΗΓΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΛΡΘςΕΗΛΘϑΣΥΡΦΗςςΗΓΕ∴ ΦΡΠΣΞΗΥ7ΚΗΦΡΘςΗΤΞΗΘΦΗςΡΙςΞΦΚΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΠ∴ΕΗςΛϑΘΛΙΛΦΘΣΥΛΦΞΟΥΟ∴ΙΥΡΠΚΗ ΗΦΡΘΡΠΛΦΣΡΛΘΡΙΨΛΗΖ7ΚΛςΛςΚΗΥΗΙΡΥΗΘΥΗΡΙΗΦΚΘΛΦΟΣΥΡϑΥΗςςΛΘΖΚΛΦΚΚΗΥΞΟΗςΡΙ∆ Ε∴ϑΡΘΗϑΗΚΨΗΕΗΗΘΥΗΘΓΗΥΗΓΡΕςΡΟΗΗΕ∴ΘΗΖΙΡΥΠςΡΙΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΖΚΛΦΚΥΗΦΡΘςΘΟ∴ ΛΘΦΥΗςΛΘϑΛΘΘΞΠΕΗΥΘΓΖΚΛΦΚΠ∴ΘΡ∴ΗΕΗΓΗΗΠΗΓΡΕΗΨΛΡΟΛΡΘς 7ΚΗΓΗΙΛΘΛΛΨΗΗ[ΩΡΙΚΛς&ΡΘΨΗΘΛΡΘΖ∆ςςΛϑΘΗΓΛΘ5ΡΠΗΡΘ1ΡΨΗΠΕΗΥ+ΡΖΗΨΗΥΛςΥΛΙΛΦΛΡΘΕ∴ΚΗ 0ΗΠΕΗΥ6ΗςΡΡΝςΡΠΗΛΠΗ,Ζ∆ςΘΡΞΘΛΟ6ΗΣΗΠΕΗΥΚΟΟΚΗ0ΗΠΕΗΥ6ΗςΚ∆ΓΥΛΙΛΗΓΛ ,ΘΡΥΓΗΥΡΥΗΠΗΓ∴ΚΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΘΓΠΡΥΗςΣΗΦΛΙΛΦΟΟ∴ΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘΚΨΗ ςΗΛΘΠΡΛΡΘΜΡΛΘΦΛΡΘ7ΚΛςΖΚ∴ΚΗ&ΡΠΠΛΗΗΡΘ&ΛΨΛΟ/ΛΕΗΥΛΗςΘΓ,ΘΗΥΘΟ∃ΙΙΛΥς ςΝΗΓ672∃6ΦΛΗΘΛΙΛΦΘΓ7ΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΦΟ2ΣΛΡΘς∃ςςΗςςΠΗΘΡΓΥΖΞΣςΞΓ∴ΡΘΚΛςΡΣΛΦ 7ΚΗ∆ΛΠΡΙΚΛς%ΥΛΗΙΛΘϑ1ΡΗΛςΡΣΥΗςΗΘΚΩςΞΓ∴ΖΚΛΦΚΦΡΘςΛςςΡΙΙΡΞΥΥΗΣΡΥςςΗΛΘϑΡΞ∆ΟΛς ΡΙΚΗΘΗΖΗΟΗΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΗςΚΗΥΛςΝςΛΘΚΗΥΗΘΚΗΥΗΛΘΘΓΚΗΠΗΚΡΓςΡΕΗ ΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΗΓΖΛΚΨΛΗΖΡΗΟΛΠΛΘΛΘϑΚΡςΗΥΛςΝς ,Θ∆ΘΗΙΙΡΥΩΡΣΥΡΨΛΓΗ∆ΘΡΨΗΥΨΛΗΖΡΙΚΗΗΘΛΥΗΛςςΞΗΚΛς%ΥΛΗΙΛΘϑ1ΡΗΕΗϑΛΘςΕ∴ςΞΠΠΥΛςΛΘϑΚΗ ΙΡΞΥςΞΓΛΗςΕΗΙΡΥΗΞΘΓΗΥΝΛΘϑΘΘΟ∴ςΛςΖΚΛΦΚΦΡΨΗΥςΟΖΙΞΟΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΘΓΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘ ΦΞΥΥΗΘΟ∴ΛΘΙΡΥΦΗςΖΗΟΟςϑΟΡΕΟΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΡΙΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΘΓΦΥ∴ΣΡϑΥΣΚ∴ΖΚΛΦΚΠΛϑΚ ΣΥΡΨΛΓΗ∆ςΡΟΞΛΡΘΡΚΗΛςςΞΗΡΙΦΡΘΙΛΓΗΘΛΟΛ∴ ,Θ−ΞΟ∴ΚΗΘ∆ΠΗΡΙΚΗΦΡΠΠΛΗΗΖ∆ςΦΚΘϑΗΓΡΚΗ&ΡΠΠΛΗΗΡΘ&ΛΛ]ΗΘς )ΥΗΗΓΡΠςΘΓ5ΛϑΚΩς−ΞςΛΦΗΘΓ +ΡΠΗ∃ΙΙ∆ΛΥςΝΘΡΖΘΕ∴ΚΗΦΥΡΘ∴Π/,%( 3∆Υ2ΘΗ 35(6(17∃7,212)7+()285678∋,(6 ,1752∋8&7,21 ,ΘΥΗςΣΡΘςΗΡ∆ΥΗΤΞΗςΙΥΡΠΚΗ&ΡΠΠΛΗΗΡΘ&ΛΨΛΟ/ΛΕΗΥΛΗςΘΓ,ΘΗΥΘΟ∃ΙΙΛΥς 672∃ ΦΡΠΠΛςςΛΡΘΗΓςΞΓ∴ΗΘΛΟΗΓ∝∋(9(/230(172)6859(,//∃1&(7(&+12/2∗<∃1∋ 5,6.2)∃%86(2)(&2120,&,1)250∃7,21∂7ΚςΞΓ∴ΛςΚΗΟΡϑΛΦΟΦΡΘΛΘΞΛΡΘΡΙΚΗ ςΞΓ∴ΣΞΕΟΛςΚΗΓΕ∴672∃ΛΘ6ΗΣΗΠΕΗΥΗΘΛΟΗΓ∝∃1∃335∃,6∃/2)7(&+12/2∗,(6 2)32/,7,&∃/&21752/∂ΓΥΖΘΞΣΕ∴ΚΗ0ΘΦΚΗςΗΥΕςΗΓ20(∗∃)ΡΞΘΓΛΡΘ7Κ ΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΓΗΟςΖΛΚΚΗςΣΗΦΛΙΛΦΛςςΞΗΡΙΗΟΗΦΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗΘΓΚΗΘΦΗΥΗΙΗΥςΡΥΗΦΗΘ ΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΠΗΘςΛΘΚΩ∆ΥΗ∆ςΞΠΠΥΛςΛΘϑΥΗΘΓςΛΘΦΞΥΥΗΘΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘΛΘ(ΞΥΡΣΗ∆ΘΓΛΘΚΛΥΓ ΦΡΞΘΥΛΗς,ΩΟςΡΡΞΟΛΘΗςςΗΥΛΗςΡΙΡΣΛΡΘςςΞΦΚςΚΗΦΡΠΠΛςςΛΡΘΛΘϑΡΙΠΡΥΗΓΗΛΟΗΓςΞΓ∴ ΛΘΡΚΗςΡΦΛ∆ΟΣΡΟΛΛΦ∆ΟΦΡΠΠΗΥΦΛΟΘΓΦΡΘςΛΞΛΡΘΟΛΠΣΟΛΦ∆ΛΡΘςΡΙΚΗϑΟΡΕΟΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦ ςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗΘΗΖΡΥΝςΡΖΚΛΦΚΛΥΗΙΗΥςΖΛΚΨΛΗΖΡΚΗΡΥϑ∆ΘΛςΛΡΘΡΙ∆ΚΗ∆ΥΛΘϑΡΙΗ[ΣΗΥΩς ΓΗςΛϑΘΗΓΡΞΘΓΗΥΣΛΘΚΗΙΞΞΥΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΣΡΟΛΦ∴ΡΘΦΛΨΛΟΟΛΕΗΥΛΗς 7ΚΗΙΡΞΥςΞΓΛΗςΣΥΗςΗΘΗΓΚΗΥΗΙΞΟΟ∴ΦΡΠΣΟ∴ΖΛΚΚΥΗΤΞΗς7ΚΛςΛς∆ςΞΓ∴ΦΡΘΦΗΥΘΛΘϑΚΗ ΛΠΣΦΡΙΗΟΗΦΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗΛΘΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ8ΘΛΡΘΖΚΛΦΚΖΛΟΟΗΘΕΟΗΚΗΛΘςΛΞΛΡΘςΘΓΛΘ ΣΥΛΦΞΟΥ0ΗΠΕΗΥςΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘΡΞΘΓΗΥςΘΓΘΓΦΡΠΣΥΗΚΗΘΓΚΗΦΞΥΥΗΘςΗΡΙ ΚΗΗΤΞΛΣΠΗΘΞςΗΓΛΘΘΓΚΗΞςΗΠΓΗΡΙΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗςΡΚΩΚΗ∴ΖΛΟΟΚΨΗ∆ΟΟΚΗ ΛΘΙΡΥΠΛΡΘΚΗ∴ΘΗΗΓΡΣΞΛΘΣΟΦΗΟΗϑΛςΟΛΡΘΖΚΛΦΚΖΛΟΟΣΥΡΨΛΓΗΗΘΚΘΦΗΓΥΗςΣΗΦΙΡΥΚΗ ΦΡΘΙΛΓΗΘΛΟΛ∴ΡΙΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΘΓΟςΡΗΟΛΠΛΘΗςΙΥςΣΡςςΛΕΟΗΚΗΗΦΡΘΡΠΛΦΥΛςΝςΖΚΛΦΚ Π∴ΥΛςΗΙΥΡΠςΞΦΚΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘςΘΓΙΥΡΠΙΥΗΗΦΡΠΣΗΛΛΡΘ 6ΞΓ∴2ΘΗ7ΚΗς∆ΩΗΡΙΩΚΗΥΩΛΘ&ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘς,ΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗ &20,17ΡΙ ΞΡΠ∆ΩΗΓΣΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑΙΡΥΛΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗΣΞΥΣΡςΗςΡΙΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΩΗΓΕΥΡΓΕΘΓ ΠΞΟΛΟΘϑΞϑΗΟΗςΗΓΡΥΦΡΠΠΡΘΦ∆ΥΥΛΗΥς∴ςΗΠςΘΓΛςΣΣΟΛΦΕΛΟΛ∴Ρ&20,17 ΥϑΗΛΘϑΘΓςΗΟΗΦΛΡΘΛΘΦΟΞΓΛΘϑςΣΗΗΦΚΥΗΦΡϑΘΛΩΛΡΘ 7ΚΛςςΞΓ∴ΓΥΖΘΞΣΕ∴∋ΞΘΦΘ&ΠΣΕΗΟΟ ΙΡΥΩΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3∆ΥΟΛ∆ΠΗΘ∝ς∋ΛΥΗΦΡΥΗ∗ΗΘΗΥΟΙΡΥ 5ΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ ΠΡΥΗςΣΗΦΛΙΛΦ∆ΟΟ∴ΙΡΥ672∃ςΞΠΠΥΛςΗςΚΗΦΞΥΥΗΘςΩΗΡΙΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟ ΘΦΗΨΛ &ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΛΡΘς,ΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗ &20,17ΛΗΚΗ∆ΞΡΠΗΓςΗ∆ΥΦΚΙΡΥΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΛΡΘς ΖΚΛΦΚΠΝΗςΚΗϑΟΡΕΟΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘΡΙςΞΦΚΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΣΡςςΛΕΟΗ,ΩΛςΓΗΙΛΘΗΓΕ∴ΚΗ16∃ς ΘΛΘΓΞςΥΛΟΦΛΨΛ∴ΖΚΛΦΚΠΝΗςΛΣΡςςΛΕΟΗΙΡΥΟΟΙΡΥΗΛϑΘΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘςΡΕΗΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΗΓ 7ΚΗΞΚΡΥΥΗΙΗΥςΡΚΗΘΗΖΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΗςΞςΗΓΘΓΗ[ΣΟΛΘςΚΡΖΚΗ∴ΡΣΗΥΗ,ΘΡΥΓΗΥΡΗΘΚΘΦΗ ΡΞΥΞΘΓΗΥςΘΓΛΘϑΡΙΚΡςΗς∴ςΗΠςΚΗΓΥΖςΚΗΥΗΓΗΥ∂ςΗΘΛΡΘΡΚΗΥϑΗςΡΙϑΟΡΕΟ 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ΣΥΡΨΛΓΗςΖΡΥΟΓΖΛΓΗςΞΥΨΗΛΟΟΘΦΗ8ΘΟΛΝΗΠΘ∴ΡΚΗΥς∴ςΗΠςΛΛςΓΗςΛϑΘΗΓΣΥΛΠΥΛΟ∴ΙΡΥΞςΗ ϑΛΘςΘΡΘΠΛΟΛΥ∴ΥϑΗς,ΩΡΣΗΥΗςΕ∴ΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΘϑΨΗΥ∴ΟΥϑΗΤΞΘΛΛΗςΡΙΛΘΙΡΥΠΛΡΘΘΓΚΗΘ ς∴ΣΚΡΘΛΘϑΡΞΖΚΛςΨΟΞΕΟΗΞςΛΘϑΥΛΙΛΦΛΟΛΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗΛΓς 2ΘΦΗΚΗςΗΡΥϑ∆ΘΛςΛΡΘςΚΓΕΗΗΘςΗΞΣΚΗΨΥΛΡΞςΦΡΞΘΥΛΗςΛΘΨΡΟΨΗΓΛΘΚΗΠΘΗΗΓΗΓΡΝΗ ΦΗΥΛΘςΗΣςΡΥΗϑΞΟΗΘΓΠΡΘΛΡΥΚΗΠ7ΚΛςςΞΓ∴ςΞΠΠΥΛςΗςΚΗΕΦΝϑΥΡΞΘΓΡΚΗΨΥΛΡΞς ΟΖςΓΡΣΗΓΘΓΓΗΠΡΘςΥΗςΦΟΗΥΟ∴ΚΗΣΥΗΓΡΠΛΘΘΦΗΡΙΚΗ8ΘΛΗΓ6ΗςΖΚΛΦΚΗΥΟ∴ΡΘ ΞΘΓΗΥΣΥΗςςΞΥΗΙΥΡΠΚΗ)%,ΦΡΘΨΗΘΗΓΠΗΗΛΘϑΡΙςΗς ΡΓΛςΦΞςςΡϑΗΚΗΥΚΗΨΥΛΡΞςΖ∴ςΛΘ ΖΚΛΦΚ∆ΦΛΨΛΛΗςΠΛϑΚΕΗΥΗϑΞΟΗΓ7ΚΗςΞΓ∴ςΗςΡΞΚΗΣΡςΛΛΡΘΝΗΘΕ∴ΚΗ8ΘΛΗΓ6ΩΗς7ΚΗ ΞΚΡΥΙΗΗΟςΚΚΣΡςΛΛΡΘΓΡΗςΘΡΣΥΡΠΡΗΦΡΘΙΛΓΗΘΛΟΛ∴ΘΓΚΗΘΦΗΣΥΛΨΦ∴,ΘΓΗΗΓΚΗ ΣΡΟΛΦ∴ΣΞΥςΞΗΓΕ∴ΚΗ 16∃ 1ΛΡΘΟ6ΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴∃ϑΗΘΦ∴ςΗΗΠςΥΚΗΥΛΘΦΟΛΘΗΓΩΡΥΗΤΞΛΥΗΘ∴ΩΚΛΘϑ ΖΚΛΦΚΠΛϑΚΙΦΛΟΛΗΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΛΡΘς7ΚΗ∃ϑΗΘΦ∴ΜΞςΛΙΛΗςΛςςΘΦΗΕ∴ΤΞΡΛΘϑΛΠςςΞΦΚς ΦΡΠΕΛΘϑΦΥΛΠΗΘΓΗΥΥΡΥΛςΠΘΓΛΣΞςΛςΨΛΗΖςΦΥΡςςΡΚΗΡΚΗΥΦΡΞΘΥΛΗςΛΘΨΡΟΨΗΓΛΘΘ
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