Südosteuropa 61 (2013), H. 3, S. 432-452
OPEN ISSUES OF DECENTRALISATION IN SERBIA
ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI
New Ecclesiastical (Dis)order: The Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia’s Raška after 2000
Abstract. The contemporary confl icts in the Balkans have brought about a genuine growth of religiosity among the people and increased the importance of spiritual organizations. The Serbian Orthodox Church and its leaders closely cooperated with the political parties and governments of both the left and the right. This article surveys the career of Bishop Filaret who is the head of the Mileševa see. It aims to provide evidence that this cleric was able to retain a powerful position in post–Milošević Serbia even though he had been very close to that regime during the 1990’s. Lastly, the analysis will illustrate the negative consequences of the fusion of politics and religion in this part of South-eastern Europe.
Ale ksander Zdravkovski is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim.
Introduction
The end of the twentieth century was marked by a revitalization of religiosity among the peoples of the Balkans. In Serbia, nationalist ideology became preva- lent and was frequently accompanied by a zealous and aggressive manifestation of new political muscle by certain ecclesiastic hierarchs. The Serbian Orthodox Church1 (SPC) is an organization that is prone to corruption, controversies and perilous political manipulations. The activities of the ecclesiastic representatives have created obstacles to the process of building a civic and inclusive society in Serbia. Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church is presently one of the most trusted institutions in Serbia. As a consequence, this issue is notable and important.2 The topic of the relations between religion and politics in the post-communist Yugoslav successor states has been widely discussed and researched. Most no-
1 Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, henceforth: SPC. 2 Stefano Bianchini, The EU in the Values and Expectations of Serbia, in: Ola Listhaug / Sa- brina P. Ramet / Dragana Dulić (eds.), Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era. Budapest 2011, 77-112. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia’s Raška after 2000 433 tably, the works of Sabrina P. Ramet, Milan Vukomanović and other scholars have examined the activities of the SPC and its ideology in great detail.3 This study is a scholarly att empt to contextualize the activities of the SPC hierarchy in the Southwestern part of Serbia, in the region usually called Raška by Serb historians, authors and intellectuals.4 The local Bosniaks that inhabit the region and form a relative majority there call this part of the country Sandžak. The author would like to underline that he does not claim that the case of Filaret, bishop of the Mileševa diocese, is a paradigmatic one, as this cleric is rather an untypical hierarch of the Church. However, as clerics of the SPC often embody the slogan “where the bishop is, there is the Church”,5 the bishops represent the Church and their conduct represents the policies of the SPC. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the fact that Filaret was a member of the Holy Synod of the SPC from 2006 to 2009. Consequently, it is not a mistake to claim that an analysis of the activities of bishop Filaret is appropriate when surveying the role of the SPC in the Raška region. This study will give additional substance to the claims that the SPC and its bishops have very close relations with Serbian politicians. In addition, the au- thor will give supplementary evidence that the SPC promoted uncivic values in a region that is well-known for its multi-ethnic character. Lastly, this study of the SPC will further the argument that bishops that have close ties to the political establishment are able to make more decisions autonomously and free of interference of the Holy Synod. As a consequence, these clerics could serve as tools for political parties and infl uential groupings. In this context, the author has conducted several semi-structured interviews in Serbia with politicians and experts on the SPC. The author has also relied on newspaper articles and scientifi c studies for additional research. The au- thor also tried to conduct interviews with the relevant hierarchs of the SPC, but unfortunately none of them was willing to participate. Consequently, this
3 See for example: Sabrina P. Ramet, Religija i politika u vremenu promene: Katolička i pravoslavne crkve u centralnoj i jugoistočnoj Evropi. Beograd 2006 (Centar za ženske studije i istraživanja roda); eadem, Nihil obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia. Durham/NC 1998; eadem, The Way We Were – and Should Be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the “Idyllic Past”, in: Timothy A. Byrnes / Peter J. Katzen- stein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge 2006, 148-175; Milan Vukomanović, The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000, Politics and Religion 1 (2008), no. 2, 237-269. 4 See for example: Slavenko Terzić, Raška oblast i sandžačko pitanje, symposium, Beograd, 27.10.2011. A video of his presentation at the symposium is available at
The “Red Bishop”: Filaret’s Reign in the Diocese of Mileševa
The Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and his apparatus tried to wield control over the Serbian media and use them to spread propaganda against their enemies. Indeed, Serbian newspapers and TV stations frequently produced war-mongering reports with the aim of bolstering the “patriotic” feelings of the Serbs.11 Some hierarchs of the Church participated in this orchestrated propaganda. The SPC relationship with the regime of Slobodan Milošević was marked by mutual distrust that evolved from time to time into tactical cooperation.
6 Jovanka Kalić, Raška Kraljevina, Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta 41 (2004), 183-189. 7 Dragica Premović, Sandžak, administrativna jedinica u okupacjonom sistemu u Staroj Raškoj (Paper presented at the symposium Historical and Cultural Processes in Sandžak / Stara Raška, Bosniak Cultural Community, Prijepolje, 03./04.12.2010. 8 Safet BandŽović, Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku. Sarajevo 2006; idem, Balkanski muha- džirski pokreti u historiografskom kaleidoskopu, Almanah 35/36 (2006), 155-192, 182-191. 9 Interview by the author with Vojin “Voja” Vučićević, president of the management board of the humanitarian organization Stara Raška, Belgrade, 13.06.2012. 10 An up-to-date map of the territorial units of the SPC is given in: R. Dragović, U Saboru više vladika, Večernje novosti, 11.10.2010, available at
The president of Serbia and self-declared leader of all Serbs was a former communist apparatchik and an ardent atheist. During the 1990s, he diligently tried to co-opt some of the left-leaning hierarchs of the SPC into his nationalist movement, which aimed to “unify the Serb lands”. He was to a certain extend successful in this regard. One of his closest collaborators in the SPC was Filaret (Jelenko) Mićević. Filaret Mićević was elected bishop of the diocese of Mileševa by the Holy Assembly of the SPC in May 1999. According to one of the most prominent Serbian experts on the SPC, Mirko Djordjević, Filaret did not have the ap- propriate education and background to be enthroned as head of the Mileševa diocese. Djordjević claims that the election was politically motivated and that the conservative faction within the SPC pushed for Filaret’s election to the prestigious post.12 To verify these assertions, it is necessary to detail the activities of the future bishop of Mileševa during fi rst part of the Milošević era. The fi rst reports on Filaret’s activities were published in the late 1980s, when Serbia was engulfed by a nationalist, Kosovo-centered hysteria. The myths re- garding the southern province became the very core of Serbian revisionism and played a pivotal role in the awakening of Serb chauvinism. In 1988, the journal Voice of the Church13 printed an article on the activities of the monk Filaret with the title “The tear of the hieromonk Filaret”. The story portrays the cleric as a noble and virtuous person who was gathering aid for the “aggrieved Serb nuns” in Kosovo. According to the report, the activities of the cleric were widely sup- ported by the Orthodox faithful in all parts of the country.14 This fl amboyant cleric of the Orthodox Church became widely known in 1991. In September of that year, he appeared on TV Novi Sad. The archpriest reported that Croatian forces had been killing Serb children. As proof, he presented a child’s skull and stated that: “The Ustašas have come to one Serb village here, near Kukurizari, and they have caught litt le Ilija and in front of his mother they have slain him and taken him like that. His mother is called Milica. This happened on his birthday on the second of August this year. His mother was running after him so at least she could have the dead child. They did not give [his body] to her. They have burned it.”15
12 Interview by the author with Mirko Djordjević, Šimanovci, 14.06.2012. 13 Glas crkve in Serbian. It was an offi cial journal of the SPC, “blessed” by the episcopate of Šabac. 14 Suza jeromonaha Filareta, Glas crkve, Christmas issue (1988), 69-71. 15 The relevant part of the report of TV Novi Sad is available at
No offi cial investigation or report has ever been conducted on this particular case. However, the explicit circumstances presented in this TV story undoubt- edly had the aim of stirring up nationalist passions among the audience. During the 1990s, Filaret was the custodian of the Monastery of Saint Archan- gel Gabriel in Zemun, Belgrade.16 Here, the fl amboyant priest was organizing manifestations att ended by some of Milošević’s closest associates. One of them was Dragan “Hadži” Antić, who in 1993 became the main editor and director of the daily Politika.17 The Serbian Radical Party18 and its chairman, Vojislav Šešelj, have nurtured good relations with the priest and with many other Serbian clergymen.19 Filaret and his nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric enticed the SRS to cooperate on the spreading of war-mongering propaganda. In addition to his post as the custodian of the monastery in Zemun, Filaret was managing the endowment of the SPC called Philanthropy.20 Most of the activities of this humanitarian organization were related to “fi eld work” in the batt legrounds in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Filaret also provided the Serb militias with active “spiritual support” in many parts of these two countries. For example, in September 1991 he was present on the batt lefi elds in Central Croatia near the monastery of Komogovina. The cleric became very famous due to a picture taken of him in which he is holding a machine gun while standing next to a Serb armored vehicle.21 He kept close ties with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, whom he met in 1994. He was also present at the funeral of Ratko Mladić’s daughter Ana in Belgrade.22 Filaret met Mladić once more in February 1995.23 The diary of the Bosnian Serb general substantiates the claim that at that time the future bishop
16 Tihomir Ilić, Prilozi za biografi ju jednog vladike, Republika (2009), no. 454/455, available at
24 For an extensive analysis of the political activities of the SPC and the power struggle within this institution cf. Milorad Tomanić, Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj. Medijska Knjižara Krug. Beograd 2001. 25 Vlado Mares, Rift in the Serbian Orthodox Church, IWPR. Balkans: Regional Reporting & Sustainable Training, 10.11.2005, available at
29 Patrijarh Pavle: Milosevic nam nije odgovorijo, B92, 25.08.1999, available at www.nytimes.com/1999/07/04/world/crisis-balkans-serbian-orthodox-church-milosevic-s- rise-now-sends-mixed-message.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>. 34 Fr. Rade Merick, The Church’s Role in Serbia’s Peaceful Revolution, Life of the Orthodox Church, 20.10.2000, available at The “Lover of Virtue” in the Post-Milošević Era The change of the political establishment in Belgrade brought new challenges for the bishop of Mileševa. Although the SPS and Slobodan Milošević had lost power, Filaret continued to nurture ties with people connected to the former regime. Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from building camaraderie with the new ruling political establishment. It is important to underline that, after the “bulldozer revolution”, Bishop Filaret tried to support and befriend Serbian politicians with nationalist leanings who have been a part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. He never showed any willingness to cooperate with secular, civic, multi-ethnic political parties such as Zoran Djindjić’s Democratic Party or Čedomir Jovanović’s Liberal Democratic Party. On the contrary, Filaret has always actively supported politicians who have had an ambivalent view on democracy, secularism and liberalism. At the same time, Bishop Filaret’s faithful have begun to rebel against his dictatorial style of governing the diocese of Mileševa. In April 2001, a group of believers sent an offi cial petition to the Holy Assembly of the SPC, demanding the removal of Filaret from his post in Prijepolje. Filaret was accused of political activities and misappropriation of church property.39 The pleas of the faithful fell on deaf ears. The SPC and its institutions did not take any action against the fl amboyant hierarch. In addition to this confl ict with his faithful, the tangible liberalization of the Serbian media after October 2000 led to the Serbian intel- ligentsia taking a more critical stance towards the activities of the “red bishop”. Feeling pressure from the public, Filaret focused on building robust ties with Serbian decision-makers. One such politician who has actively worked on building good relations with the SPC is Velimir “Velja” Ilić, who was a longtime opponent of Slobodan Milošević. In 1998, Ilić formed a political party called New Serbia,40 joined the opposition parties and subsequently played an important role in the toppling of the SPS regime. He was the long-serving mayor of Čačak and became a Minister of Capital Investments in the Koštunica government.41 Velja Ilić is a believer and he has good relations with all of the bishops of the SPC.42 Although the NS platform stipulates that the party “is advocating a secular state”, it also advocates for the state cooperating with the SPC and 39 Željka Jevtić, Vladika koji je voleo Slobu, Glas Javnosti, 13.05.2001, available at 43 Program, Nova Srbija, 26.11.2005, available at 49 Dragoljub Gagričić, Vladika Filaret: Nisam jatak, Večernje novosti, 25.09.2007, available at 54 The full text of the bill is available at 58 Vladika Filaret na sudu zbog freski, Kurir, 24.11.2005, available at 62 Naumov posetio Filareta, B92, 29.08.2007, available at Following the meeting with Filaret, Ilić stated that if “a Serbian bishop cannot go to Montenegro, a Serbian minister doesn’t have to go there either”. Ilić also announced that he would ask the Serbian government to discuss the “Filaret case” during the next session and make an eff ort to fi nd a joint solution with the Montenegrin authorities.69 Lastly, he stated, the whole case was politicized by the authorities in Podgorica and that it was an att ack on the SPC and its clergy.70 In the context of Filaret’s hunger strike, Serbian and Montenegrin politicians began to trade accusations. As the bishop’s health began to deteriorate,71 the SPC asked Filaret to end his protest.72 The Bishop of Vranje-Pahomije was the only hierarch of the SPC to visit Filaret. He gave explicit support to his colleague.73 During the hunger strike, Filaret stated that he received a phone call from the leader of the SRS, Vojislav Šešelj, who gave him advice on how to deal with the situation. Filaret blamed Serbia’s former minister of foreign aff airs, Goran Svilanović, at that time the chairman of the Civic Alliance of Serbia,74 for his denial of entrance into Montenegro. It is important to point out that during 2007 relations between the Koštunica government and the left-wing opposition parties were marred by tensions and confl icts. Velja Ilić continued to support the “red bishop” and declared that his political party would donate 10,000 € for the erection of a church at the place where Filaret was protesting. Further assistance came from some minor pro-Serb political parties in Montenegro, which organized rallies in support of the cleric. Some of the participants of these gatherings were carry- ing signs with the slogan “Montenegro and Serbia: together again”.75 Velja Ilić spoke at one of these gatherings and enthusiastically defended the “red bishop”: “See how many people are gathered today! What do you think, how many would have come if they did not grant entrance to the bishop? Thank God that he sent us 69 Tražiću danas da vlada Srbije reaguje, Nova Srbija, 07.09.2007, available at Bishop Filaret in this place so he can gather us and show us how to fi ght for faith and nation.”76 Under pressure from the public, the Serbian parliament also discussed the “Filaret case”. During a session in September 2007, the liberals accused the cleric of political activities, while the MPs from the SRS defended his undertaking. SRS MP Nataša Jovanović stated that the “separatist Montenegrin government has att acked Serbia”.77 In the end, the whole issue was solved due to the good relationship between Serbian president Boris Tadić and Montenegrin president Filip Vujanović. The authorities in Podgorica decided to grant entrance to the bishop of Mileševa under the condition that he would be “supervised” by the appropriate institutions.78 On 4 May 2008, exactly one week before the parlia- mentary elections in Serbia, the church on the border crossing was consecrated by bishop Filaret.79 Presidential elections took place in Serbia in January and February 2008. The NS party nominated its chairman, Velja Ilić, for president of the country. He chose a rather unusual place to start his campaign – the Mileševa monastery. The opening ceremony at the shrine was att ended by Bishop Filaret, who “blessed” the candidate. Subsequently, Ilić organized a meeting with the citizens of Pri- jepolje, where Filaret was present to endorse Ilić.80 However, during the same presidential elections, Filaret also gave his support to the candidate of the SPS, Milutin Mrkonjić.81 The campaign continued through many other Serbian cities and fi nished in Belgrade, where the concluding rally took place on 17 January 2008. Among the many distinguished guests and speakers at the rally, Bishop Filaret was the most vocal in his endorsement of the NS candidate. He was the fi rst speaker and used the opportunity to “bless” the gathering. He further stated: “Velimir Ilić has all the virtues that beautify an Orthodox believer and follower of Saint Sava. Our future president has entered the election campaign with belief in God and with the blessing of Saint Sava and he is not a pumpkin without roots but he is rather a person from a noble family. The time has come that a person from 76 Vladika Filaret je primer kako se treba žrtvovati za crkvu i svoj narod, Nova Srbija, 10.09.2007, available at Šumadija governs Serbia and leads the country on the way that it was led by our ancestors. That man who fears God and shies from people, and to whom the Church is not alien, he will, God willing, lead Serbia.”82 Bishop Filaret additionally stated that Velja Ilić would continue building the infrastructure in all regions of the country and create bridges between various ethnicities. He said that the Church would be content with the new president be- cause a good believer can do good things. According to the bishop, “the Church and the state are one tissue, one being”, and Ilić would “reconcile” those two entities. Furthermore, he thanked Prime Minister Koštunica for his endorsement of the NS candidate. He emphasized that Koštunica and Ilić would keep Kosovo part of Serbia. Last but not least, he asked the att endees to pray for Ilić and the prime minister. Bishop Filaret followed his speech with the Lord’s Prayer.83 On the same day, the information service of the SPC released an offi cial state- ment titled “What Is of God, to God, What Is of the King, to the King”. In this declaration, the SPC declared its disapproval of political engagement of “the deacons, the priests and the bishops”.84 The statement did not explicitly mention Bishop Filaret and his political agitation for the NS candidate. Interestingly, Ilić also obtained the endorsement of Vojislav Koštunica and his party. The presidential candidate of the SRS, Tomislav Nikolić, expressed his content with Koštunica’s decision not to endorse the DS candidate, Boris Tadić, who was his main rival in the elections. Nikolić stated that he agreed with Ilić “on many topics regarding his statements on Boris Tadić”.85 The NS candidate placed third in the fi rst round of the elections, with 7.43 % of the votes cast.86 Ilić’s lack of success in the elections and the SPC’s timid pressure on its hier- archs regarding political engagement did not break the bishop of Mileševa’s ties to political parties. However, the controversies forced the cleric to tone down his political engagement. In December 2008, Bishop Grigorije of Zahumlje and Herzegovina sent an emotional lett er to all of the territorial units of the SPC in which he pinpointed all the diffi culties in the SPC that demanded att ention. The lett er stated that one of the problems within this organization is the “very educated Bishop Filaret”. 82 Završna konvencija predsedničkog kandidata Nove Srbije Velimira Ilića na Trgu republike u Beogradu, Nova Srbija, 17.01.2008, available at According to Grigorije, Filaret’s protest in 2007 was used for “daily-political purposes”.87 In September 2010, Filaret caused an additional hullabaloo. In the village of Štitkovo near Nova Varoš, a monument to the senior Chetnik offi cer Vuk Kalaitović was built. This commander of the quisling guerrillas had committ ed appalling atrocities during World War II. The bishop of Mileševa was present at the opening ceremony. He and his assistants “blessed” the memorial on the “Feast of the Nativity of Mary” holiday that is widely celebrated in Serbia88. Yet again, the offi cial organs of the SPC did not comment on this event. In October 2011, a brand-new, nine-ton church bell was consecrated in the monastery of Mileševa. As one would expect, the diocese organized an att ention- grabbing ceremony that was headed by Irinej, the new patriarch of the SPC. It is interesting to note that clerics from the Russian Orthodox Church and the ambassador of Russia were also present at the ceremony. The chairman of the SPS and then-minister of interior, Ivica Dačić, was given the “White Angel”89 award by the “red bishop”. During the ceremony, the Serbian patriarch de- livered a speech in which he expressed his gratitude to “Mother Russia” and stated that the biggest friends of the Serbs were the “Russian people” and the “Russian Orthodox Church”. Furthermore, the head of the SPC called for the preservation of Kosovo as part of Serbia. The patriarch said that “there is no land more hallowed than Kosovo”. Irinej said that he had hopes for “the ones that represent Russia, and thank God, the best sons of Russia represent that nation”. Lastly, he said that they would do “what God and the Serb people expect them to do”.90 It is interesting to note that one of the reasons Dačić was given the award was the fact that he had decided to ban a gay pride-parade that had been scheduled in Belgrade the previous week. In this regard, Bishop Filaret delivered a speech in which he stated: “Minister, brother Ivica, thank you for everything that you have done for your party, thank you for the fact that these days you were brightening the honor of 87 Pismo Vladike Grigorija Arhijerejima SPC, Glas Srpske, 09.12.2008, available at Serbia, when some democrats tried […] to fasten Serbia to the wall of shame, when they tried to have Serb blood spilt in Belgrade and maybe beyond, you had the masculinity and courage to say ‘enough’.”91 Some Serbian journalists believe that the gay pride-parade was cancelled not for security reasons but rather for political ones. Namely, the ruling coalition wanted to appeal to the more conservative electorate in the upcoming elections.92 The controversy regarding this event did not stop there. The bishop of Mileševa additionally gave the “White Angel” award to Bishop Pahomije of Vranje, who was tried for the alleged sexual molestation of teenagers in his diocese. The SPC patriarch declined to comment on this issue.93 This award caused uproar among the left-wing political parties in Serbia. Most notably, the commissar for human rights of the Liberal Democratic Party, Marko Karadžić, called Filaret a “pillar of shame”.94 In early 2012, more than 4,000 orthodox faithful from the diocese of Mileševa signed a petition for the removal of Bishop Filaret from his post. Some media outlets speculated that Filaret would be retired by the Holy Assembly scheduled for May of that year. According to one report, the younger bishops of the SPC wanted to remove some of the old and incompetent hierarchs, one of whom was the bishop of Mileševa.95 Additional pressure on Filaret came from the clergy in his own diocese. According to some of the local priests, Filaret had been governing the eparchy in an authoritarian manner. The besieged bishop immediately reacted to these accusations and sought assistance from the SPS chairman, Ivica Dačić, whom he had decorated the year before.96 Two days after this news aired, the spokesman of the SPC, Bishop Irinej, gave an interview in which he said that there is no legal way to force a hierarch of the SPC to retire. Only when a “canonical violation” is established 91 Uručen orden Beli Anđeo Pahomiju, B92, 07.10.2011, available at Conclusion This study has shed light on the relations between the centers of political and spiritual power in Serbia. The Serbian government and the political elite have diligently tried to wield as much infl uence on the SPC as possible. It is important to note that, generally, it is the right-wing parties that have advocated this approach. Nevertheless, the SPS and the JUL are proof that there are also parties on the left that have worked to the detriment of the secular character of the country. Secondly, the SPC was and still is struggling with phyletist currents. This study has also suggested that some SPC hierarchs have repeatedly and consciously encroached on political terrain. The canonization of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, the ideological architect of modern Serb clerico-nationalism, is further proof that the Serbian Church has no capacity or willingness to turn a new page and embrace secular ideology and values. 97 J. Čalija, Nema penzionisanja arhijereja, Politika, 24.02.2012, available at Lastly, this analysis of the SPC has provided further evidence for the argu- ment that the infl uence of political actors can have a detrimental impact on the Church’s internal stability. Bishops who have the support of politicians are often engaged in activities that further blur the border between politics and religion. This predicament could have a deleterious impact on the Church and the faithful.