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Bank Capital Requirements
May 10, 2019 Bank Capital Requirements Federal Reserve, OCC and FDIC Propose Amendments to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio Requirements for Custodial Banking Organizations SUMMARY Last week, the Federal Reserve, OCC and FDIC published a joint notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register to implement Section 402 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), which would modify the supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”) in their regulatory capital rules to exclude certain funds of custodial banking organizations deposited with certain central banks.1 A banking organization would be considered a custodial banking organization if it is a U.S. top-tier depository institution holding company with a ratio of assets under custody (“AUC”)-to-total assets of at least 30 to 1, or a subsidiary depository institution of any such holding company. Under the proposal, a custodial banking organization would exclude deposits placed at a Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank and certain other central banks from its “total leverage exposure” (the denominator of the SLR), subject to a limit on the amount of deposits that could be excluded calculated as the amount of deposit liabilities of the custodial banking organization that are linked to fiduciary or custody and safekeeping accounts. Comments on the proposal are due by July 1, 2019. BACKGROUND The generally applicable leverage requirements of the agencies’ regulatory capital rules provide that all banking organizations must meet a minimum leverage ratio of 4 percent, measured as the ratio of tier 1 capital to average total consolidated assets. Since January 1, 2018, advanced approaches banking organizations have also been required to maintain an SLR of at least 3 percent.2 The SLR measures tier 1 capital relative to “total leverage exposure,” which includes on-balance-sheet assets (such as deposits New York Washington, D.C. -
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT OF 1913 HISTORY AND DIGEST by V. GILMORE IDEN PUBLISHED BY THE NATIONAL BANK NEWS PHILADELPHIA Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Copyright, 1914 by Ccrtttiois Bator Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis History of Federal Reserve Act History N MONDAY, October 21, 1907, the Na O tional Bank of Commerce of New York City announced its refusal to clear for the Knickerbocker Trust Company of the same city. The trust company had deposits amounting to $62,000,000. The next day, following a run of three hours, the Knickerbocker Trust Company paid out $8,000,000 and then suspended. One immediate result was that banks, acting independently, held on tight to the cash they had in their vaults, and money went to a premium. Ac cording to the experts who investigated the situation, this panic was purely a bankers’ panic and due entirely to our system of banking, which bases the protection of the financial solidity of the country upon the individual reserves of banks. In the case of a stress, such as in 1907, the banks fail to act as a whole, their first consideration being the protec tion of their own reserves. PAGE 5 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis History of Federal Reserve Act The conditions surrounding previous panics were entirely different. -
Observations on Regulation D and the Use of Reserve Requirements
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters October 2016 FEDERAL RESERVE Observations on Regulation D and the Use of Reserve Requirements GAO-17-117 October 2016 FEDERAL RESERVE Observations on Regulation D and the Use of Reserve Requirements Highlights of GAO-17-117, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act The methods by which depository institutions can implement Regulation D requires depository institutions to (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions) include maintaining reserves maintain reserves against a portion of against transaction accounts and enforcing a numeric transfer and withdrawal their transaction accounts solely for the (transaction) limit for savings deposits if they wish to avoid classifying those implementation of monetary policy. accounts as reservable transaction accounts. GAO estimates that 70–78 percent Regulation D implements section 19, of depository institutions limit savings deposit transactions. Other methods and it also requires institutions to limit include automatically transferring balances from transaction (e.g., checking) certain kinds of transfers and accounts to savings deposits in order to reduce reserve requirements. Institutions withdrawals from savings deposits to may choose to maintain transaction account reserves against savings deposits to not more than six per month or eliminate the need to enforce the transaction limit. But some institutions GAO statement cycle if they wish to avoid having to maintain reserves against surveyed indicated that they had operational burdens associated with monitoring these accounts. The transaction limit and enforcing the transaction limit (for example, 63–73 percent cited challenges, allows the Federal Reserve to such as creating forms and converting and closing accounts). -
Letter Agreement for Depository Institutions Eligible to Receive International Cash Services
Form last modified January 2016 Form of Letter Agreement for Depository Institutions eligible to receive International Cash Services [LETTERHEAD OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE BANK] [DATE] [NAME OF DI ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL CASH SERVICES]1 [STREET ADDRESS] [CITY, STATE, ZIP] Attention: [NAME], [TITLE] Ladies and Gentlemen: This letter agreement (this “Agreement”) sets forth the agreement of [NAME OF DI], a depository institution [chartered][organized] under the laws of [U.S. STATE OR COUNTRY] with its principal office located at [ADDRESS] (the “Depository Institution”) [and a U.S. [branch/agency] authorized pursuant to Regulation K (Part 211 of Title 12 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations) located at [ADDRESS] (the “U.S. Branch/Agency”)] to the terms and conditions governing the withdrawal of U.S. dollar banknotes from and the deposit of U.S. dollar banknotes to a Federal Reserve Bank in connection with cross-border currency activity. The Depository Institution acknowledges that the Federal Reserve Bank of [CITY] (the “Reserve Bank”) is the [Depository Institution’s][U.S. Branch/Agency’s] Administrative Reserve Bank. For purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings: “Administrative Reserve Bank” has the meaning specified in the Reserve Bank’s Operating Circular No. 1, as it may be amended from time to time. “Federal Reserve Prohibition” means any prohibition on U.S. dollar banknote trading with a particular individual or entity, or with individuals or entities in a particular jurisdiction, that is communicated by the Reserve Bank in writing upon ten (10) days’ prior written notice to the Depository Institution [and its U.S. -
GAO-14-110, Highlights, U.S. CURRENCY: Coin Inventory
October 2013 U.S. CURRENCY Coin Inventory Management Needs Better Performance Information Highlights of GAO-14-110, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Efficiently managing the circulating In 2009, the Federal Reserve centralized coin management across the 12 coin inventory helps ensure that Reserve Banks, established national inventory targets to track and measure the enough coins are available to meet coin inventory, and in 2011 established a contract with armored carriers that public demand while avoiding store Reserve Bank coins in their facilities. However, according to Federal unnecessary production and storage Reserve data, from 2008 to 2012, total annual Reserve Bank coin management costs. The Federal Reserve fulfills the costs increased by 69 percent and at individual Reserve Banks increased at coin demand of the nation’s depository rates ranging from 36 percent to 116 percent. The Federal Reserve’s current institutions (e.g., commercial banks strategic plan calls for using financial resources efficiently and effectively and and credit unions) by managing monitoring costs to improve cost-effectiveness. However, the agency does not Reserve Bank inventory and ordering monitor coin management costs by each Reserve Bank—instead focusing on new coins from the U.S. Mint. GAO was asked to review this approach. combined national coin and note costs—thus missing potential opportunities to This report examines (1) how the improve the cost-effectiveness of coin-related operations across Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve manages the circulating coin inventory and the In managing the circulating coin inventory, the Federal Reserve followed two of related costs, (2) the extent to which five key practices GAO identified and partially followed three. -
Introduction to Depository Institutions
Introduction to Depository Institutions Advanced Level Millions of people use financial services offered by depository institutions on a daily basis to help them manage their money. Commercial banks, credit unions, and savings banks are all examples of depository institutions. Many types of companies offer financial services to consumers. But, depository institutions are special in that they accept deposits from consumers and the safety of those deposits is often guaranteed by the government. The range of valuable services tied to deposit accounts (online banking, checking accounts and debit cards, bill payment services, automatic savings transfers) makes depository institutions an important component to a financial plan. Types of Depository Institutions Commercial banks and credit unions are the most commonly used depository institutions. Although both types of institutions offer a range of “banking” services, they are actually quite different in terms of their ownership structure and the types of consumers they serve. Commercial banks are for‐profit depository businesses that offer financial services to both consumers and other businesses. Banks are usually the largest depository institutions and offer the widest variety of services to customers. Credit unions are depository institutions that offer many banking services. But, unlike banks, they are owned by their customers, who are usually called members. A credit union has membership qualifications that require its members share a common bond such as the same employer, the geographic area in which they live or membership in an organization. Credit unions are non‐profit organizations exempt from federal income tax. This feature often allows them to pay higher interest rates on deposits, charge lower interest rates on loans and charge lower fees, compared to banks and other depository institutions. -
U.S. Policy in the Bretton Woods Era I
54 I Allan H. Meltzer Allan H. Meltzer is a professor of political economy and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University and is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. This paper; the fifth annual Homer Jones Memorial Lecture, was delivered at Washington University in St. Louis on April 8, 1991. Jeffrey Liang provided assistance in preparing this paper The views expressed in this paper are those of Mr Meltzer and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. U.S. Policy in the Bretton Woods Era I T IS A SPECIAL PLEASURE for me to give world now rely on when they want to know the Homer Jones lecture before this distinguish- what has happened to monetary growth and ed audience, many of them Homer’s friends. the growth of other non-monetary aggregates. 1 am persuaded that the publication and wide I I first met Homer in 1964 when he invited me dissemination of these facts in the 1960s and to give a seminar at the Bank. At the time, I was 1970s did much more to get the monetarist case a visiting professor at the University of Chicago, accepted than we usually recognize. 1 don’t think I on leave from Carnegie-Mellon. Karl Brunner Homer was surprised at that outcome. He be- and I had just completed a study of the Federal lieved in the power of ideas, but he believed Reserve’s monetary policy operations for Con- that ideas were made powerful by their cor- gressman Patman’s House Banking Committee. -
Regulation CC
Consumer Affairs Laws and Regulations Regulation CC Introduction The Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFA) was enacted in August 1987 and became effective in Septem- ber 1988. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21) was enacted October 28, 2003 with an effective date of October 28, 2004. Regulation CC (12 C.F.R. Part 229) issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System implements the EFA act in Subparts A through C and Check 21 in Subpart D. Regulation CC sets forth the requirements that depository institutions make funds deposited into transaction accounts available according to specified time schedules and that they disclose their funds availability poli- cies to their customers. The regulation also establishes rules designed to speed the collection and return of unpaid checks. The Check 21 section of the regulation describes requirements that affect banks that create or receive substitute checks, including consumer disclosures and expedited recredit procedures. Regulation CC contains four subparts: • Subpart A – Defines terms and provides for administrative enforcement. • Subpart B – Specifies availability schedules or time frames within which banks must make funds avail- able for withdrawal. It also includes rules regarding exceptions to the schedules, disclosure of funds availability policies, and payment of interest. • Subpart C – Sets forth rules concerning the expeditious return of checks, the responsibilities of paying and returning banks, authorization of direct returns, notification of nonpayment of large-dollar returns by the paying bank, check-indorsement standards, and other related changes to the check collection system. • Subpart D – Contains provisions concerning requirements a substitute check must meet to be the legal equivalent of an original check; bank duties, warranties, and indemnities associated with substitute checks; expedited recredit procedures for consumers and banks; and consumer disclosures regarding sub- stitute checks. -
Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 12 CFR Part 204 Docket No. R-1737; RIN 7100-AG07 Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking, request for public comment. SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) proposes to amend its Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 CFR Part 204) to eliminate references to an “interest on required reserves” rate and to an “interest on excess reserves” rate and replace them with a reference to a single “interest on reserve balances” rate. The Board also proposes to simplify the formula used to calculate the amount of interest paid on balances maintained by or on behalf of eligible institutions in master accounts at Federal Reserve Banks, and to make other conforming changes. DATES: Comments must be received on or before [INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket Number R-1737; RIN 7100-AG07, by any of the following methods: • Agency Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm. 1 • E-mail: [email protected]. Include the docket number and RIN in the subject line of the message. • Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102. • Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20551. All public comments are available from the Board’s website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, unless modified for technical reasons or to remove personally identifiable information at the commenter’s request. -
The Evolution of Fed Independence
FEDERALRESERVE The Evolution of Fed Independence BY STEPHEN SLIVINSKI oday there is a consensus Wars, Depression, and How monetary policy that a central bank can best Dependence T contribute to good economic When the United States entered and central bank performance by pursuing price stabil- World War I in April 1917, the Federal ity — and that it should remain inde- Reserve almost instantly became the autonomy came pendent from political forces. In the primary vehicle for financing the war case of price stability, this understand- effort. The main function of the Fed of age ing evolved over decades of experi- during those war years was to lend ence. The notion of independence of money to banks to purchase “Liberty the central bank was more difficult to Loans” bonds from the U.S. Treasury. fulfill. They loaned the money at a discount- The original conception of the ed rate — not coincidentally lower Federal Reserve System when it was than the interest rate on the war bonds created in 1913 was meant to continue — to entice bond purchasers. After the spirit of the “independent treasury the war, the Federal Reserve Bank of system” that existed in the pre-Fed New York remained the official era. That system assumed that the U.S. fiscal agent of the U.S. Treasury Treasury would store its gold and Department. assets in its own vaults lest it unduly In the post-war years, the Fed influence the markets for credit and busied itself with maintaining the money. Ideally, Treasury meddling in newly reconstructed gold standard. what passed for monetary policy at the Its missteps in the wake of the stock time was to be avoided. -
Warehouse Banking∗
WAREHOUSE BANKING∗ Jason Roderick Donaldson Giorgia Piacentino Anjan Thakor Washington University in St. Louis September 21, 2016 Abstract We develop a theory of banking that explains why banks started out as commodities warehouses. We show that warehouses become banks because their superior storage technology allows them to enforce the repayment of loans most effectively. Further, interbank markets emerge endogenously to support this enforcement mechanism. Even though warehouses store deposits of real goods, they make loans by writing new “fake” warehouse receipts, rather than by taking deposits out of storage. Our theory helps to explain how modern banks create funding liquidity and why they combine warehousing (custody and deposit-taking), lending, and private money creation within the same institutions. It also casts light on a number of contemporary regulatory policies. ∗For their helpful comments, we thank Franklin Allen, Vladimir Asriyan, Ulf Axelson, Juliane Begenau, Philip Bond, Liam Brunt, Mike Burkart, Doug Diamond, Leo Ferraris, Colm Friel, Nicolae Gârleanu, Anand Goel, Itay Goldstein, Charles Goodhart, Denis Gromb, Chao Gu, Charles Kahn, Bill Keaton, Peter Koudijs, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Yaron Leitner, Ben Lester, Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko, Ernst Maug, Martin Oehmke, Clemens Otto, George Pennacchi, Uday Rajan, Adriano Rampini, Daniel Sanches, Tano Santos, Joel Shapiro, Carolyn Sissoko, Janis Skrastins, Javier Suarez, Neng Wang, Lucy White, Andrew Winton, Randy Wright, Tanju Yorulmazer and seminar participants at the 6th Bank of Portugal Conference on Financial Intermediation, the 2015 Colorado Finance Summit, the 2015 Summer Symposium at Gerzensee, the 2015 European Winter Finance Conference, the 2015 IDC Summer Finance Conference, the IMF, the 10th Jackson Hole Finance Conference, the 2016 LBS Financial Intermediation Conference, the 7th Conference on Money, Banking, and Asset Markets at UW-Madison, the 2016 Mitsui Finance Symposium at the University of Michigan, the 2015 Summer Money Workshop at the St. -
Remittance Transfer Rule Interviews: Questions for Depository Institutions, Credit Unions, Broker Dealers
1700 G Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20552 REMITTANCE TRANSFER RULE INTERVIEWS: QUESTIONS FOR DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, CREDIT UNIONS, BROKER DEALERS This document is an overview of the type of questions that we would like to ask regarding the temporary exception in the Remittance Transfer Rule. First, there is an overview of the temporary exception. Below that overview are the questions that we will use in our discussions with you. We may not cover every question; however, we hope this list will serve as a useful guide for the types of topics that we would like to cover. OVERVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY EXCEPTION The Remittance Transfer Rule requires regulated institutions to provide disclosures to remittance senders containing information about the price of the transfer, including fees and exchange rates. Generally, all disclosed amounts must be exact. However, the rule contains several exceptions that allow providers to estimate the applicable exchange rate, back-end fees and taxes, and total funds to be received. Some of these exceptions are permanent. The focus of this interview is a temporary exception for insured depository institutions and credit unions.1 The exception is described in section 1005.32(a) of Regulation E. It is currently set to expire on July 21, 2015. For the temporary exception to apply, the provider must meet the following criteria. • Insured institution. The provider must be an insured depository institution or credit union, or an uninsured U.S. branch or agency of a foreign depository institution. • Account-based transfers. The remittance transfer must be sent from the sender’s account with the provider.