The Brookings Institution POLICY BRIEF December 2002 Policy Brief #113 Related Brookings Resources The New National Security Strategy • Protecting the American Homeland and Preemption Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, SUSAN E. RICE, JAMES B. STEINBERG Daalder, I.M. Destler, David L. Gunter, uilding on a concept he articulated in a June 2002 speech at Robert E. Litan, West Point, President George W. Bush has adopted a new James B. Steinberg (2002) Bemphasis on preemption in his administration’s National Security • “The Bush Administration’s Strategy (NSS), issued September 20, 2002. Preemption, defined as the National Security Strategy: An Evaluation” anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long been Policy Brief #109 accepted as legitimate and appropriate Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and under international law. In the new NSS, James B. Steinberg (October 2002) however, the administration is broadening • Defense Policy Choices for the meaning to encompass preventive war the Bush Administration, 2001-2005 as well, in which force may be used even Michael E. O’Hanlon without evidence of an imminent attack to (2002) ensure that a serious threat to the United •Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy President George W. Bush with States does not “gather” or grow over time. Paul R. Pillar National Security Advisor (2001) Condoleezza Rice, who has played The strategy also elevates preemption in • Preventive Defense: a central role in articulating the importance, and visibility, within the tool kit Bush administration’s stance on A New Security Strategy preemption. for America of U.S. foreign policy. Ashton B. Carter and This policy brief examines the implications of this policy shift as William J. Perry (1999) well as under what circumstances preemption, including the possibility • Brookings Project on Homeland Security of preventive action, might actually be applied. http://www.brookings. edu/fp/projects/ homeland/assess.htm The new shift in emphasis on preemptive the terrorists as well as those who harbor and preventive uses of force is a response them. It paved the way for a largely to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, successful military campaign in which brought home the necessity to Afghanistan and sent a clear warning to address potentially catastrophic threats other state sponsors of terrorism. The before the country can be attacked. The Brookings first manifestation of this more forceful The preemption concept was further attitude was the president’s seminal elaborated in the president’s West Point Institution Sept. 20, 2001, speech to a joint session speech and then more formally in the 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. of Congress vowing to hold responsible National Security Strategy. It threatens Washington, DC 20036

All Policy Briefs are available on the Brookings website at www.brookings.edu. POLICY BRIEF

to attack so-called rogue states, which imacy. This can make it more difficult for pose a danger to the United States, the United States to gain international whether or not they are demonstrably support for its use of force, and over the linked to terrorist organizations of global long term, may lead others to resist U.S. reach. The administration argues that the foreign policy goals more broadly, continued spread of weapons of mass including efforts to fight terrorism. destruction (WMD) technology to states Elevating preemption to the level of a with a history of aggression creates an formal doctrine may also increase the unacceptable level of risk, and presents administration’s inclination to reach for “a compelling case for taking anticipatory the military lever quickly, when other actions to defend ourselves, even if uncer- tools still have a good chance of working. tainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” Advocating preemption warns potential enemies to hide the very assets we might Michael E. O’Hanlon However, a broad-based doctrine of wish to take preemptive action against, or is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy preemption carries serious risks. The to otherwise prepare responses and Studies at the Bush administration was right to take a defenses. In this tactical sense, talking too Brookings Institution. strong stand against terrorists and openly about preemption reduces its likely extremist states, but it had already accom- utility, if and when it is employed. Finally, plished this goal with its early words in advocating preemption may well the period after the September 11 attacks embolden other countries that would like and its actions in Afghanistan. It did not to justify attacks on their enemies as need a formal doctrine of preemption to preemptive in nature. drive the point home. Rather than enunciate a formal new doctrine, it would One can argue that a more explicit policy Susan E. Rice is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy have been better to continue to reserve of preemption actually reinforces deter- Studies and Governance the preemptive military tool for a narrow, rence by putting other countries on notice Studies at the Brookings Institution. rare class of situations where inaction about America’s seriousness of purpose in poses a credible risk of large scale, addressing threats such as the possession irreversible harm and where other policy of weapons of mass destruction by rogue tools offer a poor prospect of success. regimes. It also allows the administration Given that the doctrine has now been to argue that its focus on Iraq is part of a promulgated, the Bush administration broader security concept and does not should clarify and limit the conditions represent preoccupation with a specific under which it might be applied. regime. However, linking the real problem James B. Steinberg is vice of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at Elevating the preemptive option to a (WMD) to a broader doctrine of the Brookings Institution. policy doctrine can have serious negative preemption (defined to include preventive consequences. For one, it reinforces the war) complicated the administration’s task image of the United States as too quick to in gaining international support for its use military force and to do so outside the preferred policy, and may do so again if bounds of international law and legit- the administration chooses to use force

2 Policy Brief #113 December 2002 POLICY BRIEF against Iraq. Many countries worry that the strategy, by a combination of the Bush administration will take a similar “radicalism and technology.” approach in dealing with other cases such “The National Security as North Korea or Iran or Syria. Further, The administration asserts that Strategy of the United other countries’ frustration with the deterrence of the kind that States of America” was United States’ decision to grant to itself, prevailed during the cold war is issued by President George (though not to others), a right of unlikely to work with respect to W. Bush on September 20, preemption may chill their willingness to rogue states and terrorists—which 2002. This Strategy, the cooperate fully with the United States in the administration claims are not first by the Bush adminis- the war on terrorism. risk-averse—and which view tration, is issued in accor- dance with the Goldwater- weapons of mass destruction not as Nichols Department of weapons of last resort but as THE STRATEGY’S CONCEPT Defense Reorganization Act weapons of choice. OF PREEMPTION of 1986, which mandated President Bush’s cover letter to the an annual report to September 2002 National Security In the Strategy, the administration Congress detailing the Strategy describes the most serious argues that the classic doctrine of National Security Strategy threats facing the United States and the preemption must be enlarged to deal of the United States. A copy means that will be used to address them. effectively with these new threats: of the Strategy is available Notably, he writes, “…as a matter of at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc. “For centuries, international law common sense and self-defense, America recognized that nations need not will act against [such] emerging threats suffer an attack before they can lawfully before they are fully formed.” take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international Although the Strategy also discusses jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of nonproliferation efforts, missile preemption on the existence of an defenses, and other protective measures imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air for thwarting enemies of the United forces preparing to attack. States, it is clear from the cover letter and the text of the Strategy that “We must adapt the concept of imminent preemption is an important element of threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and the administration’s overall approach to terrorists do not seek to attack us using U.S. security in the post-September 11 conventional means…Instead, they rely on environment. The concept is not limited acts of terror and, potentially, the use of to the traditional definition of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered preemption—striking an enemy as it covertly and used without warning. prepares an attack—but also includes prevention—striking an enemy even in “The United States has long maintained the absence of specific evidence of a the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national coming attack. The idea principally security. The greater the threat, the greater appears to be directed at terrorist groups is the risk of inaction—and the more as well as extremist or “rogue” nation compelling the case for taking anticipatory states; the two are linked, according to action to defend ourselves, even if the

Policy Brief #113 December 2002 3 POLICY BRIEF

uncertainty remains as to the time and the Bush administration argues that place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or preemption must be extended to include prevent such hostile acts by our adver- “preventive” attacks even in the absence saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. of an imminent threat. Prevention is a far less accepted concept in international law, “The United States will not use force in all even though the United States has cases to preempt emerging threats, nor threatened or utilized it in previous eras as should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the well, and even though it may be a enemies of civilization openly and actively necessary tool at times. For example, in seek the world’s most destructive 1994, then-Secretary of Defense William technologies, the United States cannot Perry stated publicly that the United remain idle while dangers gather.” States would not allow North Korea to develop a nuclear arsenal (although the Although overlooked by many critics, administration issued no explicit threat to the strategy does not abandon the Elevating the use force). Pyongyang’s awareness that “ notion of deterrence. For example, one the United States might destroy North preemptive option of the four key purposes of U.S. military Korea’s capacity to produce fissile forces is to “deter threats against U.S. to a policy doctrine materials may have contributed to the interests, allies, and friends.” The role of can have subsequent Agreed Framework by which overseas American forces in preserving North Korea capped its large-scale serious negative stability is also emphasized, at least in a nuclear program. But such threats are section that focuses on more conven- consequences. For more problematic in the case of a tional military threats. one, it reinforces concealed “basement bomb” program that U.S. intelligence could not easily locate— the image of the ASSESSMENT OF THE and in fact, it is precisely such a smaller, PREEMPTION CONCEPT United States as yet still dangerous, type of nuclear Despite the National Security Strategy’s too quick to use program that North Korea later initiated. ambiguity on the relative roles of deter- military force and rence and preemption in current U.S. The United States has engaged in security policy, the clear intent of its to do so outside the preventive strategies on a number of authors was to elevate the importance of bounds of occasions in recent history, including the preemption and broaden its scope to 1983 invasion of Grenada and, less international law include preventive action as well. The successfully, the Bay of Pigs invasion of rationale for the shift appears to be and legitimacy. ” Cuba in 1961. U.S. efforts to use covert twofold: to deal with actors who cannot means to unseat foreign leaders, such as be reliably deterred, and to address the Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and enormous threat posed by the spread Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, of WMD. achieved their immediate goals of limiting Soviet influence in those countries but Preemption, narrowly defined, has long with mixed long-term results. been an important and widely accepted policy option for the United States. But Today, the application of a preventive

4 Policy Brief #113 December 2002 POLICY BRIEF strategy to known terrorist groups is focus from overthrowing Saddam Hussein relatively uncontroversial. Given the to disarming Iraq has substantially stealthy nature of the actors, it is increased international support for U.S. unlikely that specific attacks can be policy, and may well lead in the end to identified in advance. So these groups’ support for regime change if he does not past practices and explicit statements clearly comply with the relevant Security provide an adequate substitute for the Council Resolutions. traditional doctrine’s requirement for imminent threat. There are two other important concerns raised by the adoption of a formal Less clear is the need for an expanded doctrine of preemption. First, it under- approach with respect to rogue states. values the still important role of deter- One problem is that the Strategy fails to rence, even against so-called rogue distinguish between eliminating states such as Iraq and North Korea. dangerous capabilities and overthrowing Second, it legitimates a wider scope for dangerous regimes. Even the unilateral the use of force—preemption without a “The Bush use of force to eliminate dangerous WMD clear, imminent, and widely accepted administration argues is controversial, as can be seen from the threat—that in general the United broad international condemnation of States should discourage. that preemption must Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Osirek nuclear be extended to reactor in 1981. Pursuing regime change Deterring Rogue States include ‘preventive’ has broad consequences for the overall Deterrence appears to have a considerable stability of the international system and is effect even against rogue states. As the attacks even in the thus even less accepted as a legitimate State Department’s annual report on absence of an objective than eliminating weapons of terrorism makes clear, for example, most imminent threat.” mass destruction. And a preventive regime rogue states are actually diminishing their change strategy may trigger the very use active support for terrorism, perhaps of WMD that the strategy seeks to partly in response to President Bush’s preclude. But going after capabilities recent threats. That is not because they under many circumstances is likely to have all reformed their ways, but because achieve limited results at best, as can be deterrence tends to work against even seen in the Clinton administration’s brutal autocrats, who tend to value highly “Desert Fox” attack on Iraq’s WMD infra- their hold on power and their lives—as structure in 1998 after weapons inspec- National Security Advisor Condoleezza tions were impeded by Saddam Hussein. Rice herself wrote in the On balance, policy should not rule out January/February 2000 issue of Foreign regime change in extreme cases, but it Affairs: “These [rogue] regimes are living should only be considered when there are on borrowed time, so there need be no no alternative means of eliminating sense of panic about them. Rather, the unusually dangerous capabilities. first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they In this regard, the administration’s shift of do acquire WMD, their weapons will be

Policy Brief #113 December 2002 5 POLICY BRIEF

unusable because any attempt to use credibility is needed to accomplish that— them will bring national obliteration.” but not that he is undeterrable. In 1990, the United States was unclear about its North Korea illustrates both the potential commitment to Kuwait prior to Iraq’s and the limits of deterrence in dealing decision to invade; since Desert Storm, with rogue states. It clearly has shown a the United States has been clear, and willingness to flout international norms Saddam has not again attacked a U.S. ally and agreements, as underscored by its in the region. recent admission of a secret nuclear weapons program. But that program The administration argues that Saddam “The weight of the probably reflects an effort either to extort Hussein might support a terrorist group evidence concerning money from the outside world or to deter such as al Qaeda and not be caught doing attack. It does not appear to be designed so. But he also knows, particularly since Saddam Hussein’s to help North Korea undertake September 11, that there is enough of a past behavior aggression, as further suggested by the risk he will be found out that he is not suggests that he fact that North Korea may have had one likely to gamble his survival to benefit a or two nuclear weapons for a decade terrorist group he cannot control and is difficult to without going on the offensive. Indeed, whose agenda he does not share. While it deter...but not on the whole, its external behavior has cannot be dismissed categorically, such that he is improved substantially in recent years. Its an action seems highly unlikely. support for terrorism is virtually non- undeterrable. ” existent, according to U.S. government The strongest argument for making sure sources; its missile testing moratorium that Saddam Hussein never acquires continues, and its arms exports have nuclear weapons is that, if he possessed declined substantially; it is coming clean them, he would be less constrained and on its history of kidnapping Japanese therefore would become much more citizens decades ago. It is also engaging dangerous in the region. He might, for with South Korea, Japan, the United example, attack the Kurds or seize oil States, and the outside world in general, fields on his disputed border with Kuwait, albeit fitfully and slowly. Certainly it is believing that his weapons of mass not attacking the United States or its destruction protected him from a U.S. allies. North Korea also signifies that, at response (or at least from a U.S. invasion least to date, Bush does not reach for the to overthrow him). He might still be preventive option indiscriminately. deterrable even with the bomb, but certainly the risks of deterrence failure The case of Iraq is particularly significant, could be expected to increase. since it lies at the heart of the adminis- tration’s argument for adopting a broad For that reason in particular, there is a approach to preemption. The weight of good case that Saddam Hussein is too the evidence concerning Saddam dangerous to be allowed to develop WMD, Hussein’s past behavior suggests that he is particularly nuclear weapons. The case is difficult to deter, and that strong U.S. buttressed by virtue of 1991 UN Security

6 Policy Brief #113 December 2002 POLICY BRIEF

Council resolutions, which reflected a Potential examples abound, ranging collective judgment that as a price for from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and staying in power under the post-Desert Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps Storm ceasefire, he must disarm—a the clearest case is the India-Pakistan judgment reinforced by Resolution 1441, crisis. Last spring, India was poised to adopted unanimously by the Security attack Pakistan, given Pakistan’s Council on November 8, 2002. But the suspected complicity in assisting Islamic presence of these resolutions obviates extremist terrorists who went from the need for a more expansive doctrine Pakistan into the disputed territory of of preemption. Kashmir. A combination of U.S. pressure on both countries, with some The Dangers of last-minute caution by the leaders of Legitimating Preemption Pakistan and India, narrowly averted a A final concern relates to the impact of war that had the potential to escalate to the precedent set by the United States the nuclear level once it began. legitimating action that others might Although India might have intended to emulate, at the same time reducing its limit its action to eliminating terrorist leverage to convince such countries not bases in Pakistan-held Kashmir and to use force. This concern is theoretical perhaps some bases inside Pakistan, at one level, since it relates to stated nuclear-armed Pakistan might well have doctrine as opposed to actual U.S. believed that India’s intentions were to actions. But it is very real at another overthrow the regime in Islamabad or to level. Today’s international system is eliminate its nuclear weapons capability. characterized by a relative infrequency of That situation would have further interstate war. Developing doctrines that exacerbated the risks of escalation. lower the threshold for preemptive action Unfortunately, the terrorist infiltrations could put that accomplishment at risk, from Pakistan to Kashmir that did much and exacerbate regional crises already on to spark the earlier crisis appear to be the brink of open conflict. resuming. Kashmir’s status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of Of course, no country will embark conflict remains. suddenly on a war of aggression simply because the United States provides it with Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy a quasi-legal justification to do so. But of preemption may provide hawks in countries already on the brink of war, and India the added ammunition they need Brookings gratefully leaning strongly towards war, might use to justify a strike against Pakistan in the acknowledges the the doctrine to justify an action they eyes of their fellow Indian decision- generosity of the already wished to take, and the effect of makers. Recently, India Finance Virginia Wellington the U.S. posture may make it harder for Minister (and former Foreign Minister) the international community in general, Jaswant Singh welcomed the adminis- Cabot Foundation and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay tration’s new emphasis on the legitimacy for its support of the and diplomacy. of preemption. Policy Brief series.

Policy Brief #113 December 2002 7 POLICY BRIEF Russia’s recent threats against the Now that the administration has sovereign state of Georgia, which it included its expanded concept of accuses of harboring or at least failing to preemption in the National Security pursue Islamic extremists tied to the Strategy, the guidelines offered by Chechen war, also illustrate the dangers Condoleezza Rice in an Oct. 1, 2002, of legitimating an easy and early recourse Manhattan Institute speech are helpful to preemption. steps in the right direction. She empha- Recent Policy Briefs sized that pre-emption should be used

•“The Telecommunications To the extent that raising the possibility only after other remedies have been Crash: What To Do of preemption can intimidate countries exhausted and principally in cases where Now?” Robert E. Litan into avoiding hostile actions they might a grave threat could arise. She also (December 2002) otherwise consider, President Bush’s less indicated that “the risks of waiting must •“The IMF’s Dilemma in formal comments—in his September 20, far outweigh the risks of action.” Argentina: Time for a New Approach to 2001, address to Congress and in the Lending?” June 2002 West Point speech—probably These principles should be reinforced by Carol Graham and Paul Robert Masson achieved the desired effect. At this point, President Bush when opportunities arise (November 2002) formal codification of the concept may in the coming months and should guide • “Kashmir: Redefining do little more than give some countries the administration in any application of the U.S. Role” Navnita Chadha Behera warning to hide their most valued assets the doctrine in the future. (October 2002) from the United States, and give other • “The Bush National Security Strategy: countries an excuse for undertaking their An Evaluation” own preemptive actions. Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg (October 2002)

Editor Elana Mintz Production/Layout Tell us what you think of this Policy Brief. Mary Liberty E-mail your comments to [email protected]. Vice President of Communications Ron Nessen The Brookings Institution NONPROFIT ORG. U.S. POSTAGE Senior Director 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. of Communications Washington, D.C. 20036 PAID Robert Dabrowski FREDERICK, MD The Brookings Office PERMIT NO. 225 of Communications 202/797-6105 [email protected]

The views expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the trustees, officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.

Copyright © 2002 The Brookings Institution

Cover Photo by AP/Wide World Photos

8 Policy Brief #113 December 2002