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TECHNICAL REPORT TR-069 CPE WAN Management Protocol Issue: Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 Issue Date: June 2020 CWMP Version: 1.4 © Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. CPE WAN Management Protocol TR-069 Issue Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 Notice The Broadband Forum is a non-profit corporation organized to create guidelines for broadband network system development and deployment. This Technical Report has been approved by members of the Forum. This Technical Report is subject to change. This Technical Report is owned and copyrighted by the Broadband Forum, and all rights are reserved. Portions of this Technical Report may be owned and/or copyrighted by Broadband Forum members. Intellectual Property Recipients of this Technical Report are requested to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent claims or other intellectual property rights of which they may be aware that might be infringed by any implementation of this Technical Report, or use of any software code normatively referenced in this Technical Report, and to provide supporting documentation. Terms of Use 1. License Broadband Forum hereby grants you the right, without charge, on a perpetual, non- exclusive and worldwide basis, to utilize the Technical Report for the purpose of developing, making, having made, using, marketing, importing, offering to sell or license, and selling or licensing, and to otherwise distribute, products complying with the Technical Report, in all cases subject to the conditions set forth in this notice and any relevant patent and other intellectual property rights of third parties (which may include members of Broadband Forum). This license grant does not include the right to sublicense, modify or create derivative works based upon the Technical Report except to the extent this Technical Report includes text implementable in computer code, in which case your right under this License to create and modify derivative works is limited to modifying and creating derivative works of such code. For the avoidance of doubt, except as qualified by the preceding sentence, products implementing this Technical Report are not deemed to be derivative works of the Technical Report. 2. NO WARRANTIES THIS TECHNICAL REPORT IS BEING OFFERED WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY WHATSOEVER, AND IN PARTICULAR, ANY WARRANTY OF NONINFRINGEMENT AND ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED. ANY USE OF THIS TECHNICAL REPORT SHALL BE MADE ENTIRELY AT THE USER’S OR IMPLEMENTER'S OWN RISK, AND NEITHER THE BROADBAND FORUM, NOR ANY OF ITS MEMBERS OR SUBMITTERS, SHALL HAVE ANY LIABILITY WHATSOEVER TO ANY USER, IMPLEMENTER, OR THIRD PARTY FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ARISING FROM THE USE OF THIS TECHNICAL REPORT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, INCIDENTAL, AND INDIRECT DAMAGES. June 2020 © Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 2 of 276 CPE WAN Management Protocol TR-069 Issue Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 3. THIRD PARTY RIGHTS Without limiting the generality of Section 2 above, BROADBAND FORUM ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY TO COMPILE, CONFIRM, UPDATE OR MAKE PUBLIC ANY THIRD PARTY ASSERTIONS OF PATENT OR OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THAT MIGHT NOW OR IN THE FUTURE BE INFRINGED BY AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL REPORT IN ITS CURRENT, OR IN ANY FUTURE FORM. IF ANY SUCH RIGHTS ARE DESCRIBED ON THE TECHNICAL REPORT, BROADBAND FORUM TAKES NO POSITION AS TO THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF SUCH ASSERTIONS, OR THAT ALL SUCH ASSERTIONS THAT HAVE OR MAY BE MADE ARE SO LISTED. All copies of this Technical Report (or any portion hereof) must include the notices, legends, and other provisions set forth on this page. June 2020 © Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 3 of 276 CPE WAN Management Protocol TR-069 Issue Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 Issue History Issue Number Approval Publication Issue Editor Changes Date Date Issue 1 May 2004 Jeff Bernstein, 2Wire Issue 1 Tim Spets, Westell Issue 1 November Jeff Bernstein, 2Wire Clarification of original document Amendment 1 2006 John Blackford, 2Wire Mike Digdon, SupportSoft Heather Kirksey, Motive William Lupton, 2Wire Anton Okmianski, Cisco Issue 1 November William Lupton, 2Wire CWMP Version 1.1: Multicast Amendment 2 2007 Davide Moreo, Telecom Download support, 10 Italia AUTONOMOUS TRANSFER COMPLETE event, AutonomousTransferComplete method, additional Download fault codes, interoperability clarifications, minor editorial changes. Issue 1 November John Blackford, Pace CWMP Version 1.2: Small updates Amendment 3 2010 Heather Kirksey, Alcatel- for IPv6 related to DHCP, Additions Lucent for Software Module Management William Lupton, Pace support (including new RPCs, Inform Event Codes, fault codes, and an Annex on UUIDs), ScheduleDownload RPC, and CancelTransfer RPC. Issue 1 July 2011 Sarah Banks, Cisco CWMP Version 1.3: Added Proxy Amendment 4 Andrea Colmegna, management support and added FASTWEB Tim Spets, Annex J and Appendix I. Table 4 Motorola Mobility Session timeout updated. Removed xsd Section A.6. Added Alias-Based Addressing additions, Section 3.6.1, Appendix II, and RPC Definition updates. Issue 1 11 8 January John Blackford, Pace CWMP Version 1.4: Added XMPP Amendment 5 November 2014 Mike Digdon, Aptean Connection Request support (Annex 2013 K and Appendix III), CPE standby- related behaviors (Annex L), UDP Lightweight Notification support (Annex M), and several other small clarifications/enhancements. Issue 1 16 March 20 April 2018 KlausWich, Huawei CWMP Version 1.4: Added security Amendment 6 2018 John Blackford, Arris enhancements, XMPP clarifications, Instance wildcards, Hearbeat event handling, Firmware Image support, XMPP over WebSockets for Connection Requests, HTTP Bulk Data Collection (from TR-157), Software Module Management (from TR-157) and several other clarifications / enhancements June 2020 © Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 4 of 276 CPE WAN Management Protocol TR-069 Issue Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 Issue 1 25 June 25 June 2020 Klaus Wich, Huawei CWMP Version 1.4: Clarifications Amendment 6 2020 John Blackford, around RequestDownload RPC Corrigendum 1 CommScope arguments, clarification around the definition of printable ASCII characters, updates to Digest Auth requirements related to the Connection Request and the new HTTP RFCs. Comments or questions about this Broadband Forum Technical Report should be directed to [email protected]. Editor: John Blackford, CommScope Klaus Wich, Huawei Work Area Director(s): John Blackford, CommScope Jason Walls, QACafe Project Stream Leader(s): John Blackford, CommScope June 2020 © Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 5 of 276 CPE WAN Management Protocol TR-069 Issue Amendment 6 Corrigendum 1 Table of Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 18 1.1 Functional Components ............................................................................... 18 1.1.1 Auto-Configuration and Dynamic Service Provisioning ..................... 18 1.1.2 Software/Firmware Image Management............................................. 19 1.1.3 Software Module Management .......................................................... 19 1.1.4 Status and Performance Monitoring ................................................... 19 1.1.5 Diagnostics ........................................................................................ 19 1.2 Positioning in the End-to-End Architecture ................................................. 19 1.3 Security Goals ............................................................................................. 20 1.4 Architectural Goals ..................................................................................... 20 1.5 Assumptions ............................................................................................... 21 1.6 Terminology ............................................................................................... 22 1.7 Abbreviations .............................................................................................. 25 1.8 Document Conventions ............................................................................... 27 2 Architecture ............................................................................................................ 28 2.1 Protocol Components .................................................................................. 28 2.2 Security Mechanisms .................................................................................. 29 2.3 Architectural Components ........................................................................... 29 2.3.1 Parameters ......................................................................................... 29 2.3.2 File Transfers ..................................................................................... 30 2.3.3 CPE Initiated Sessions ....................................................................... 30 2.3.4 Asynchronous ACS Initiated Sessions ............................................... 31 3 Procedures and Requirements ................................................................................. 32 3.1 ACS Discovery ........................................................................................... 32 3.2 Connection Establishment ........................................................................... 35 3.2.1 CPE Connection Initiation ................................................................. 35 3.2.2 ACS Connection Initiation ................................................................
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