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TR-069 CPE WAN Management Protocol V1.1 TECHNICAL REPORT TR-069 CPE WAN Management Protocol v1.1 Version: Issue 1 Amendment 2 Version Date: December 2007 © 2007 The Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. CPE WAN Management Protocol v1.1 TR-069 Issue 1 Amendment 2 Notice The Broadband Forum is a non-profit corporation organized to create guidelines for broadband network system development and deployment. This Technical Report has been approved by members of the Forum. This document is not binding on the Broadband Forum, any of its members, or any developer or service provider. This document is subject to change, but only with approval of members of the Forum. This document is provided "as is," with all faults. Any person holding a copyright in this document, or any portion thereof, disclaims to the fullest extent permitted by law any representation or warranty, express or implied, including, but not limited to, (a) any warranty of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, or title; (b) any warranty that the contents of the document are suitable for any purpose, even if that purpose is known to the copyright holder; (c) any warranty that the implementation of the contents of the documentation will not infringe any third party patents, copyrights, trademarks or other rights. This publication may incorporate intellectual property. The Broadband Forum encourages but does not require declaration of such intellectual property. For a list of declarations made by Broadband Forum member companies, please see www.broadband-forum.org. December 2007 © The Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 2 CPE WAN Management Protocol v1.1 TR-069 Issue 1 Amendment 2 Version History Version Version Date Version Editor Changes Number Issue 1 May 2004 Jeff Bernstein, 2Wire Issue 1 Tim Spets, Westell Issue 1 November 2006 Jeff Bernstein, 2Wire Clarification of original document Amendment 1 John Blackford, 2Wire Mike Digdon, SupportSoft Heather Kirksey, Motive William Lupton, 2Wire Anton Okmianski, Cisco Issue 1 November 2007 William Lupton, 2Wire CWMP v1.1: Multicast Download Amendment 2 Davide Moreo, Telecom Italia support, 10 AUTONOMOUS TRANSFER COMPLETE event, AutonomousTransferComplete method, additional Download fault codes, interoperability clarifications, minor editorial changes. Technical comments or questions about this document should be directed to: Editors William Lupton 2Wire [email protected] John Blackford 2Wire [email protected] Mike Digdon SupportSoft [email protected] Tim Spets Westell [email protected] BroadbandHome™ Greg Bathrick PMC-Sierra [email protected] Technical Working Heather Kirksey Motive [email protected] Group Chairs December 2007 © The Broadband Forum. All rights reserved. 3 CPE WAN Management Protocol v1.1 TR-069 Issue 1 Amendment 2 Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 8 1.1 Functional Components .............................................................................................................. 8 1.1.1 Auto-Configuration and Dynamic Service Provisioning................................................. 8 1.1.2 Software/Firmware Image Management ....................................................................... 8 1.1.3 Status and Performance Monitoring.............................................................................. 9 1.1.4 Diagnostics ................................................................................................................... 9 1.1.5 Identity Management for Web Applications................................................................... 9 1.2 Positioning in the End-to-End Architecture.................................................................................. 9 1.3 Security Goals ........................................................................................................................... 10 1.4 Architectural Goals .................................................................................................................... 10 1.5 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................. 11 1.6 Terminology............................................................................................................................... 11 1.7 Document Conventions ............................................................................................................. 12 2 Architecture........................................................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Protocol Components................................................................................................................ 12 2.2 Security Mechanisms ................................................................................................................ 13 2.3 Architectural Components ......................................................................................................... 13 2.3.1 Parameters ................................................................................................................. 13 2.3.2 File Transfers .............................................................................................................. 14 2.3.3 CPE Initiated Sessions................................................................................................ 14 2.3.4 Asynchronous ACS Initiated Sessions ........................................................................ 15 3 Procedures and Requirements ............................................................................................................. 15 3.1 ACS Discovery .......................................................................................................................... 15 3.2 Connection Establishment......................................................................................................... 17 3.2.1 CPE Connection Initiation ........................................................................................... 17 3.2.2 ACS Connection Initiation ........................................................................................... 18 3.3 Use of SSL/TLS and TCP..........................................................................................................20 3.4 Use of HTTP.............................................................................................................................. 21 3.4.1 Encoding SOAP over HTTP........................................................................................ 21 3.4.2 Transaction Sessions.................................................................................................. 22 3.4.3 File Transfers .............................................................................................................. 23 3.4.4 Authentication ............................................................................................................. 24 3.4.5 Digest Authentication .................................................................................................. 24 3.4.6 Additional HTTP Requirements................................................................................... 25 3.5 Use of SOAP............................................................................................................................. 25 3.6 RPC Support Requirements...................................................................................................... 30 3.7 Transaction Session Procedures............................................................................................... 30 3.7.1 CPE Operation............................................................................................................ 31 3.7.2 ACS Operation............................................................................................................ 37 3.7.3 Transaction Examples................................................................................................. 40 Normative References .................................................................................................................................. 42 Annex A. RPC Methods ......................................................................................................................... 44 A.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 44 A.2 RPC Method Usage .............................................................................................................................. 44 A.2.1 Data Types................................................................................................................................ 44 A.2.2 Other Requirements .................................................................................................................. 45 A.3 Baseline RPC Messages ...................................................................................................................... 45 A.3.1 Generic Methods ....................................................................................................................... 45 A.3.1.1 GetRPCMethods......................................................................................................... 45 A.3.2 CPE Methods ...........................................................................................................................
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