Second Quarter, FY2011
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SIGTARP: Quarterly Report to Congress | April 28, 2011 Congress to Quarterly Report SIGTARP: SIGTARP: Quarterly Report to Congress | April 28, 2011 Congress to Quarterly Report SIGTARP: NSPECTOR L I GE IA NE C R E A P L S T R M O A U R B G L O ED R A F P SSET RELIE Office of the Special Inspector General Q2 for the Troubled Asset Relief Program SIGTARPSIGTARP 2011 SIGTARPSIGTARP Advancing Economic Stability Through Transparency, Coordinated Oversight and Robust Enforcement SIG-QR-11-02 202.622.1419 Hotline: 877.SIG.2009 Quarterly Report to Congress [email protected] April 28, 2011 www.SIGTARP.gov MISSION SIGTARP’s mission is to advance economic stability by promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of TARP management, through transparency, through coordinated oversight, and through robust enforcement against those, whether inside or outside of Government, who waste, steal or abuse TARP funds. STATUTORY AUTHORITY SIGTARP was established by Section 121 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) and amended by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009 (“SIGTARP Act”). Under EESA and the SIGTARP Act, the Special Inspector General has the duty, among other things, to conduct, supervise and coordinate audits and investigations of any actions taken under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) or as deemed appropriate by the Special Inspector General. In carrying out those duties, SIGTARP has the authority set forth in Section 6 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, including the power to issue subpoenas. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program General Telephone: 202.622.1419 Hotline: 877.SIG.2009 [email protected] www.SIGTARP.gov CONTENTS Executive Summary 3 Program Updates and Financial Overview 11 Oversight Activities of SIGTARP 12 SIGTARP Recommendations on the Operation of TARP 13 Report Organization 13 Section 1 THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 15 SIGTARP Creation and Statutory Authority 17 SIGTARP Oversight Activities Since the January 2011 Quarterly Report 18 The SIGTARP Organization 30 Section 2 TARP OVERVIEW 33 TARP Funds Update 35 Financial Overview of TARP 38 Homeowner Support Programs 57 Financial Institution Support Programs 102 Asset Support Programs 140 Automotive Industry Support Programs 156 Executive Compensation 166 Section 3 TARP OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION 169 TARP Administrative and Program Expenditures 171 Current Contractors and Financial Agents 172 Section 4 SIGTARP RECOMMENDATIONS 179 Update on SIGTARP’s Recommendations Regarding Capital Purchase Program Restructurings and Recapitalizations and Small Business Lending Fund Refinancings 181 Recommendations Regarding Treasury’s Process for Contracting for Professional Services Under TARP 182 Endnotes 196 APPENDICES A. Glossary 219 B. Acronyms and Abbreviations 224 C. Reporting Requirements 226 D. Transaction Detail 230 E. Cross-Reference of Report to the Inspector General Act of 1978 306 F. Public Announcements of Audits 307 G. Key Oversight Reports and Testimonies 308 H. Correspondence 313 I. Organizational Chart 320 EXINVESTIGATIONSECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS I APRIL 28, 2011 5 The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”) is committed to vigorous oversight of the Troubled Asset Relief Program’s (“TARP”) unprecedented commitment of billions of taxpayer dollars. Recent events, including the expiration of Treasury’s authority to initiate new TARP investments, the continued repayment of TARP funds by larger banks, and the issuance by the Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) of its final TARP report, have contributed to the perception that TARP is drawing to a close. This is simply not the case. TARP may have entered a new phase, but it is far from over. As of March 31, 2011, approximately $146.8 billion in TARP funds was still outstanding, and there is close to $60 billion obligated and available to be spent. TARP programs, extraordinary in their scope, scale and complexity, were designed to last years. For example, TARP’s almost $30 billion Public Private Investment Program is scheduled to last at least seven more years. Congress understood that TARP might last for many years, and that oversight would be essential throughout TARP’s existence. In the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”), Congress created SIGTARP to provide vital oversight and law enforcement for as long as Treasury holds an asset under TARP. In other words, SIGTARP will remain “on watch” as long as TARP assets remain outstanding. With the closure this month of COP — a key TARP oversight body — and the public perception that TARP is ending, it is now more critical than ever that SIGTARP remain vigilant in protecting taxpayers. TARP’s financial outlook is improving, with more institutions repaying TARP and cost estimates continuing to decline. Nevertheless, it bears repeating that Treasury’s ultimate return on its TARP investments depends on many variables that are largely unknowable at this time, including the ability to sell certain securities in the market (such as American International Group, Inc. and General Motors Company), the ability of many banks to repay (over 550 banks have yet to repay TARP’s Capital Purchase Program investment), and the extent to which Treasury will spend funds allocated to its housing programs. TARP’s costs, of course, involve more than just dollars and cents. It will take many years to assess the full extent of all costs associated with TARP. As SIGTARP and others have documented, the non-financial costs include TARP’s contribution to the moral hazard associated with massive infusions of Government funds into some of the very institutions that engaged in risky behavior that contributed to the financial crisis. Many of those institutions remain “too big to fail.” Today, the biggest banks are bigger than ever. These banks continue to enjoy unwarranted advantages over their smaller competitors such as better access to capital and cheaper credit. These advantages exist just by virtue of the pervasive belief — shared by their executives, counterparties, creditors, and the credit rating agencies — that the Government will bail them out if necessary. While the underlying problem may have pre-dated TARP, it is now more severe than ever. And in terms of market perception, it has not yet been solved by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). As regulators work to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms, continued oversight will be critical in determining the extent to which the Act ultimately meets its promise of ending the concept of “too big to fail.” The integrity of our financial system is still at risk. Indeed, the stakes could not be higher. Further evidence that TARP’s end remains distant lies in recent activity related to TARP housing programs. Unfortunately, Treasury’s signature program — the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) — has been beset by problems from the outset. Many of these problems relate to the structure of the program, which puts the ultimate decision to modify a mortgage in the hands of mortgage servicers, whose performance has been extraordinarily poor. SIGTARP, through its Hotline, continues to receive a substantial number of complaints from the public regarding HAMP servicer performance. These complaints include loss of paper- work by the servicer, a lack of servicer communication or contradictory informa- tion, trial modification periods that extend six months or more, and negative credit reporting for homeowners enrolled in a trial modification. SIGTARP, along with TARP’s other oversight bodies, has long urged Treasury to get tougher on servicers. Treasury noted recently that it will start requiring all HAMP servicers to assign a single point of contact for homeowners, that it will start grading the largest HAMP servicers on “key performance metrics,” and will begin withholding financial incen- tives for servicers receiving an unsatisfactory grade. These may be encouraging first steps. However, it is too early to tell whether these steps will have a meaningful impact. Treasury’s other housing programs and subprograms are in earlier stages of development. These include, for example, the Hardest-Hit Fund, the 2MP Second Lien Modification program, and the FHA Short Refinance program, all of which have yet to produce substantial results. As these programs develop, SIGTARP will continue to conduct strong oversight and make recommendations for improvement where appropriate. SIGTARP is the only agency whose primary law enforcement mission is the swift and robust detection and investigation of those who seek to profit crimi- nally from TARP. When Congress created SIGTARP, it understood that TARP’s extraordinary expenditure of taxpayer funds would inevitably attract criminal and other unlawful conduct. In 2009, FBI Director Robert Mueller predicted that fraud related to bailout money would be the “next wave of financial fraud cases.” Congress assigned SIGTARP with primary responsibility for policing TARP to minimize losses to fraud and to bring to justice those who attempt to profit from TARP unlawfully. SIGTARP takes this mandate seriously, working hard to deliver the accountability the American people demand and deserve. SIGTARP’s inves- tigative