Talana
Account and Medal Roll
Update 1
By
David Biggins
1 Introduction to Update 1
In compiling the Talana book, more information was researched than could be included and this update is comprised of this information and also some recent discoveries of medals with the Talana clasp that have appeared on the market. The intention is to produce regular updates to this book and the other Boer War titles.
Within this update can be found the dispatches and evidence given to the Royal Commission by General White and the diary of Governor Hely-Hutchinson. Several eyewitness accounts are also included that give perspectives of the battle itself, the view from Pietermaritzburg and life afterwards. Two accounts by the Town Guard are included and also examples of poetry that was written to commemorate the battle. There is a roll of bronze medals earned by Indian recipients and a short section on the postal commemoration of the battle of Talana.
I hope you find the update interesting. For a copy of the book, please contact Token Publishing.
This document can be downloaded from the web site, free of charge. Follow the links to the Talana page.
www.angloboerwar.com
Please use this site to contribute information about Talana, the Boer War or take part in the forum. To provide feedback to the author please use the forum or the email address:
David Biggins March 2012
2 Contents
Introduction to Update 1 ...... 2 British Army organisation ...... 4 Butler’s report of 14th June 1899 ...... 7 Martial Law Proclamation, 23rd October 1899 ...... 9 Hely-Hutchinson’s diary 13th – 26th October ...... 11 White’s despatch of 2nd November 1899 ...... 21 White’s evidence to the Royal Commission ...... 24 Account by Major J F Donegan, RAMC ...... 31 Letter by Captain C Hensley, RDF ...... 36 Account by Major F M Crum, KRRC ...... 42 Account by Lieutenant R Johnstone, KRRC ...... 58 Letter by Sergeant A Harrington, KRRC ...... 60 Account by Major P Marling, 18th Hussars ...... 62 Account by Major H Greville, 18th Hussars ...... 66 Account by Lieutenant Cape, 18th Hussars ...... 71 Account by Corporal Padwick, 18th Hussars ...... 75 Letter from Pte Burrows, Leicester Regiment ...... 78 Reminiscences by Mr S B Jones, DTG ...... 81 Diary of William Chegwidden, DTG ...... 86 Report by Mr P Littlejohn, NGR ...... 93 Account by Michael Davitt ...... 97 Memories of Right Reverend Baynes ...... 110 Pen pictures of the War ...... 121 Bronze medals to Indian recipients ...... 132 Postal commemoration of the battle ...... 143 Poetry ...... 144 Bibliography ...... 151 Index ...... 152
3 QSAs with the Talana clasp
In the short period between the completion of the manuscript for the book and this update, there have been only a few Queen’s South Africa (QSA) medals that have appeared on the market. The details of these men were already captured in the book with one notable exception, the group to Lt O C Du Port, RHA, which was sold by DNW in December 2011.
The group consisted of DSO (GV), QSA (6) (Lt A Bty RHA), 1914-15 Star (Major RFA), BWM and VM with MID (Lt Col).
Osmond Charteris Du Port was born on 9 July 1875. He was educated at Harrow School and the Royal Military Academy. He was commissioned on 2 November 1895.
He served in the Boer War in Natal from 1899, including the actions at Talana and Lombard’s Kop and during the siege of Ladysmith where he was slightly wounded. He next served in operations in Natal, March to June 1900, including the action at Laing’s Nek, operations in Transvaal, east of Pretoria, June to November 1900, including the action at Lydenberg. For his services he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the QSA with 6 clasps.
During the Great War he served in France and Flanders, from 31 May 1915 to 11 November 1918 and was in command of 35th Brigade RFA between 11 March 1916 and 4 February 1917. He was five times mentioned in despatches, awarded the DSO and received the brevet of Lieutenant Colonel on 3 June 1919. At the end of the War he was appointed Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve of Officers on 2 May 1919.
Afterwards he farmed in Southern Rhodesia, was a member of the legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, 1924 to 1928 and a Minister of Agriculture and Lands 1927 to 1928.
He died on 21 June 1929.
4 British Army organisation
This section explains the structure and organisation of the British Army at the time of the Boer War. Terms such as battalion, company, battery and squadron are used throughout the book and these are described in more detail here. The section is divided into infantry, cavalry and artillery as each used their own terms.
Infantry An infantry battalion consisted of around 1,000 men commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. The battalions were numbered 1st and 2nd and each consisted of 29 officers, 2 warrant officers, 25 sergeants, 16 drummers, 40 corporals and 900 privates. Their main armament was the .303 Lee Metford Mark I or Mark II rifle with a bayonet. Each battalion had one machine gun.
The battalion was sub-divided into companies of 100 men commanded by a Major. Companies were identified by letters, A, B, C etc. A company was divided into half companies commanded by a Lieutenant and a half company was divided into sections commanded by a corporal.
Mounted troops from the battalion were referred to as the mounted infantry (MI).
Four battalions were combined into an infantry brigade commanded by a Major General. The total strength of an infantry brigade was nearly 5,000 men, the battalions being augmented by brigade staff, a company of the ASC, company of the RAMC and a field hospital.
The 1st Battalion Leicester Regiment at Ladysmith
Cavalry A cavalry regiment was made up of 531 men and 536 horses. In addition, each regiment had a machine gun and carriage pulled by two horses and 13 transport wagons. The armament of the cavalry was the .303 Lee Metford carbine with 30 rounds for the men and a Webley mark IV .455 calibre revolver and 12 rounds for the officers.
The cavalry regiment was divided into squadrons of around 100 men.
Artillery There were three types of artillery in the Boer War; the Royal Horse Artillery, Royal Field Artillery and Royal Garrison Artillery. Only the RFA was represented at Talana. The role of the RFA was to support infantry and for this purpose was equipped with shrapnel shells only.
The basic unit of artillery was the battery. The RFA battery consisted of six 15 pounder field guns, three transport wagons and a blacksmith. The battery was commanded by a Major and contained 171 men and 131 horses. The battery was divided into a left, middle and right section, each with two guns and two ammunition wagons.
5 A brigade division of artillery consisted of three batteries (18 guns), 409 horses, 32 vehicles and 530 men.
The 69th Battery at Ladysmith
A section of the 67th RFA at Dundee
6 Butler’s report of 14th June 1899
The report by Lieutenant General W F Butler to the Under Secretary of State for War is held by the National Archives in WO32/6369. As the report included plans for the whole of South Africa, the elements relating to the Cape Colony have been removed. The original numbering has been retained which explains why the numbered points are not contiguous.
From Lieut.-General Sir W. F. Butler, K.C.B., Commanding the Troops, South Africa, to the Under Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W. The Castle, Cape Town, 14th June, 1899.
Sir, In reply to your cablegram of the 6th instant, referring to War Office letter No. 266/Cape/30, dated 21st December last, and in continuation of my cipher cablegram of the 9th instant, I have the honour to forward in greater detail certain observations upon the proposed measures for the defence of Natal and the Cape Colony, which, in my opinion, would be necessary as preliminary movements in the unfortunate event of hostilities occurring between our Government and that of the Transvaal, or those of the Transvaal and Orange Free State combined. 2. The consideration of the question is not a little complicated by the uncertainty, which would probably exist up to the last moment, as to the political relations between ourselves and the Orange Free State. Would the Government of that State declare itself neutral, or would it throw in its lot with the sister Republic? It is obvious that the occupation by us of certain points on or near the frontier of the Free State, as preliminary measures towards an invasion of the Transvaal, could scarcely fail in producing the result which probably diplomatic action on our part had been desirous of avoiding or delaying. 3. The consideration of this question of preliminary movements by me has been further involved to a certain degree by the variety of the orders which have been received here in the last year, both on the general question of mobilization of troops in this command in the event of hostilities, as well as upon particular portions of the military problem, such as transport, remounts, supplies, &c., and it has seemed to me that it would be simpler to attempt a solution of the problem by taking the whole defence of the Natal and Cape Colony frontiers as a new subject to be treated after an examination of the respective border lines had been made by me, than to attempt to unravel the somewhat tangled thread of former plans and orders. Part of this examination I have been able to make. When the arrival in Cape Town of Sir A. Milner set me free from the civil duties of Administrator, I visited Natal and had a general view of that portion of the Colony lying to the north of Ladysmith, and a closer examination of the northern angle of ground between Newcastle and Charlestown; but with the exception of a passing look at the railway junctions of De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg, and the bridge over the river at Norval's Pont, I have not been able to see even the general line of frontier lying between Basutoland and Fourteen Streams, although many years ago, in 1875, I visited the town of Kimberley and the Vaal River at Barkly West. The extremely sensitive state of public opinion throughout South Africa during the last few months, and the steady efforts of a portion of the Press to exaggerate anything of a nature tending to excite that opinion, have made even the ordinary movements of troops or Officers liable to create false impressions. 4. In my cipher telegram sent on the 9th instant, I communicated to you the main lines upon which my proposed initial dispositions, in the event of hostilities, would move. That message ran as follows:— N.B.—Words and sentences necessary to elucidate the sense, and which were not cabled, are included in brackets. "Your No. 40. Summary [of] plans as follows:—On receiving instructions I move Ladysmith force, less one squadron, one battery, and half battalion to Glencoe Junction, holding lines of railway to Ingagau bridge on north, and Dundee on east, Cavalry patrolling as far north of Ingagau as possible, towards Buffalo River to east and Drakensberg Passes to west At same time [I] move Maritzburg force, less one battalion to Ladysmith. Upon arrival at Ladysmith, the half battalion, squadron and battery left to hold that point move to Biggarsberg, watching the line through that range, and keeping connection between forces at Ladysmith and Glencoe; The fresh Ladysmith force would then be in a position either to support Glencoe and maintain the line of the Biggarsberg or to operate against Van Reenan's Pass, should circumstances necessitate. A movement against Van Reenan's Pass would, however, depend upon attitude of Free State at moment, and must be governed wholly by the political considerations then existing. Battalion left at Maritzburg would move up to hold line of
7 communications between Ladysmith and Estcourt, with detachments east and west of railway. Entrenched posts would be formed at points between Newcastle and Estcourt. This disposition in Natal would watch about 120 miles of railroad, and as far north, at least, as Ingagau, would permit of easy concentration either on Biggarsberg or north of range between Glencoe and Ingagau, or again south of it towards Ladysmith, while it would avoid committing troops to the exceedingly difficult and strategically weak positions between Newcastle and Charlestown. It would, moreover, threaten a length of frontier [of] more than 200 miles, [and] create uncertainty about future lines of advance. I do not regard immediate possession of Laing's Nek as of such great importance. The railway between Newcastle and Charlestown is of the worst possible description, being commanded on many sides, having exceedingly steep gradients, reversing stations, &c. The possession of the north angle by a strong force [would] always [be] [an] easy operation; by weak [force it will] always remain a dangerous [one]. "[The Natal Volunteers would also act on the line of communications.] The police could scarcely be withdrawn from [their] police duties, except in inconsiderable numbers. "Reply to letter referred to in your telegram follows by mail." 4. You will observe from this general summary of my intentions that the possible attitude of the Orange Free State has to be taken into account as a most important factor in any scheme of initial military movements. On this point the opinion of Sir A. Milner is in accordance with the views here expressed. 5. Again, the conditions of preliminary operations undertaken against the Transvaal have been considerably altered since 1880-81 by the extension of the boundaries of the Republic as far as the junction of the Blood and Buffalo rivers, as much overlapping the frontier of Natal on the east as the Orange Free State does on the west. 6. The possible attitude of the native races in South Africa is another point which must be kept in view in distributing the available forces for defensive purposes. Basutoland is recognized in official publications as likely to neutralize a considerable portion of the Orange Free State forces; it is by no means certain that, in view of events and hostilities there during the last 18 years, it might not be a source of trouble to us. The attitude of the natives in Pondoland and the Transkei would probably require the maintenance in those districts of the police forces now there, if not their increase, and, of the police forces in the west and north of the Colony beyond, 100 to 300 men who might be collected in Kimberley, the greater number would be required for police duties in their respective districts. As far, however, as circumstances admit, I propose to utilize any available men of this force in watching the frontiers, particularly in the neighbourhood of the important crossings of the Orange and Vaal rivers. 8. All troops taking the field will be accompanied by 30 days' rations, and a second 30 days' supply will be sent up as soon as the railway lines are free. 9. The foregoing details explain generally the dispositions I would propose for adoption, in the event of it becoming necessary to protect the frontier line. I would, however, desire to remark that the consideration of this question presents many possibilities which make it different from preliminary operations which would be undertaken in the event of war between two regular military Powers, whose populations were divided by defined frontiers. In the case of South Africa, there dwells on our side of the frontier a preponderating Dutch population, closely connected by family ties and mutual intercourse with the people on the other side. The events of the past few years have served to increase suspicion and racial antagonism, and therefore the possibility that at least the opening stages of war between the Dutch Republics and ourselves might produce active or secret combinations against our communications must be considered. 10. It will be observed that these dispositions and arrangements have taken no account of the contingency of complications with a foreign Power arising at the moment. Should such a state of affairs exist, the plans for the defence of Cape Colony would have to be revised ab initio. 11. In a country such as South Africa it is impossible to lay down forecasts as to the time in which these movements would be completed, but it would be safe to say that the first troops would move within 24 hours of receipt of orders. A time table is being drawn up, and it is assumed that the troops are accompanied by the vehicles of their regimental transport, but not by the animals required to horse them, except to a limited extent in the case of the Cavalry and Artillery at Ladysmith. These animals could only be obtained and forwarded to join their units after the expiration of a period varying from 1 to 3 weeks. I have, &c,, W. F. BUTLER, Lieut.-General, Commanding Troops, South Africa.
8 Martial Law Proclamation, 23rd October 1899
The text and facsimile of the proclamation made by Walter Hely-Hutchinson.
PROCLAMATION
By His Excellency the Honourable Sir Walter Francis Hely-Hutchinson, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and St. George, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of Natal, Vice-Admiral of the same, and Supreme Chief over the Native Population. Whereas by my Proclamation, dated the 15th day of October, 1899, I made known that the Colony of Natal had been invaded by the armed forces of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, and that there was reason to believe that diverse persons within this Colony had joined the forces of the South African Republic and Orange Free State, or had aided them, or given information to them, and otherwise had adhered to Her Majesty's enemies, and had rebelled against Her Majesty and had sought to stir up rebellion and disaffection against Her Majesty, and that it was necessary to take prompt measures for the preservation of good order, and for the suppression of rebellion, and for the protection of Her Majesty's subjects in this Colony, and particularly in the Magisterial Divisions of Newcastle, Dundee, Klip River, Umsinga, and Upper Tugela, and did proclaim that the said Magisterial Divisions were placed, and should be under Martial Law till (such time as) the said Proclamation should be revoked: And whereas by my further Proclamation, dated the said 15th day of October, 1899, I did exhort all persons whomsoever to observe their duty and loyalty towards Her Majesty the Queen and Her Government; and to abstain from all treasonable or seditious acts or words, and from disturbing in any manner the peace and good order of this Colony, or any part thereof, and warned all Her Majesty's subjects not to enlist or engage themselves in the military service of either of the said Republics in the prosecution of hostilities, and not to carry on any trade with or to supply any goods, wares, or merchandize to either of the said Republics or any subject thereof in the said Republics: And whereas I have reason to believe that persons resident in other parts of the Colony, as well as persons resident in the said Magisterial Divisions have failed to observe their duty and loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen, and have been guilty of treasonable and seditious acts and words, and have disturbed the peace and good order of the Colony, and supplied information to Her Majesty's enemies, and have otherwise aided and abetted them, and have endeavoured to intimidate certain of Her Majesty's subjects, and to restrain them from the performance of their duty to Her Majesty, and have carried on, or attempted to carry on, business or correspondence with the said Republics or the subjects thereof: And whereas I have been advised and am of opinion that for the preservation of good order and for the protection of Her Majesty's interests and the interests of Her Majesty's loyal and faithful subjects in Natal, it is necessary that the whole Colony, including the Province of Zululand, should be placed under Martial Law: Now, therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in me as Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of Natal, I do hereby proclaim and make known that the Colony of Natal, including the Province of Zululand, is placed and shall be under Martial Law from the date hereof until this Proclamation shall be revoked or amended. Provided, however, that all cases and legal proceedings, civil, criminal, and mixed, pending at the date hereof in the Supreme Court, Native High Court, Magistrates' Courts, or the Courts of this Colony outside of the Magisterial Divisions of Newcastle, Dundee, Klip River, Umsinga, and Upper Tugela, may be proceeded with and prosecuted to sentence, judgment, and execution in ordinary course, unless the respective Courts shall otherwise order, and in the event of failure or inability of the said Courts to exercise jurisdiction, then the said proceedings shall be suspended till this Proclamation shall be revoked, withdrawn, or amended by me. God Save the Queen! Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the Colony, at Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, this Twenty-third day of October, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-nine. C. J. SMYTHE, Colonial Secretary.
9
10 Hely-Hutchinson’s diary 13th – 26th October
The following document is taken from WO32/7863 in the National Archives and represents a diary of events kept by the Governor Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson. It is fascinating because it covers the time around the battle of Talana. The information is as per the original but the formatting has been changed to improve the readability.
Governor Sir W. F. Hely-Hutchinson to Mr. Chamberlain. (Received November 13, 1899.). (Confidential No. 3.) Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, October 19, 1899.
Sir,
I am keeping a diary of events in Natal bearing on the present South African crisis. The diary commences from the close of the Bloemfontein Conference1, from which date it has been written up, to the 13th October, from the records and notes in my office. It is now kept daily. I send a copy of the diary from 13th October to date, and shall forward a copy of future entries in lieu of my weekly report. 2. I attach copies of telegrams2 which have been received from Sir G. White and Sir Penn Symons during the week, reporting military events.
I have, &c, Walter Hely-Hutchinson.
13th October, 1899
. Sir George White made a reconnaissance in force towards Tintwa. The Boers retreated into the Berg, and the troops returned to camp. . Newcastle abandoned. . Ironclad train wrecked near Maribogo in Bechuanaland3. . Instructions from Secretary of State that ships are not to be searched on the high seas. . "Henzada" arrived, with Ordnance Field Park and Field Hospital. . "India" arrived, with seven companies of the Gloucester Regiment. Sir George White asked for Imperial Light Horse to be sent to the front. I consented. . Declaration issued, under the Natal Volunteer Act, No. 23, of 1895, placing Volunteers under command of General Officer Commanding, and under Army Act so far as Volunteer Act does not provide for discipline. . Message sent into Newcastle by Ben Viljoen to the effect that the Transvaal flag would be hoisted in Newcastle on the following day. . Postal and railway officials withdrawn from Newcastle. . Long train of wagons seen coming down from Moll's Nek towards Doornkop, which is north of Wool's Drift. . Patrol from Picket of 1st King's Royal Rifles fired at on Dundee-Helpmakaar road. Picket returned four shots and enemy withdrew. The men who fired on the picket are believed to be some of our own Dutchmen.
1 The Bloemfontein Conference between Britain and the Boer Republics took place between 31st May and 5th June 1899. 2 These are not included in the information at the National Archives. 3 More commonly known as the train disaster at Kraai Pan.
11 14th October, 1899
. Instructions received from Secretary of State with regard to telegrams sent to and from Consuls, &c. . British Agent arrived at Cape Town. . Sir George White reported that Ladysmith was full of the enemy's spies, and asked if they could not be expelled. He stated that he had given orders to his outposts to stop and arrest all suspicious persons. . Sir George White complained of condition of roads, and asked that they might be repaired. This matter was arranged. . Reported to be the intention of the Boers to concentrate all their columns on Ladysmith. . Sir George White announced his intention of strengthening the General Officer Commanding at Glencoe by another battalion of infantry, and asked for half battalion of King's Royal Rifles to be sent up to Ladysmith. I consented. . Large commando of Free State Boers reported to be at the foot of Botha's Pass, one and a-half miles on the Natal side of the border. . Transvaal flag hoisted at Charlestown, but village not occupied. . Seven Natal Policemen, with their horses, captured by Boers at de Jager's Drift, and taken across the Buffalo. . General Joubert reported to be on Laing's Nek, preparing a position there. . Newcastle occupied by the Boers. . Sir George White asked that martial law might be proclaimed in Newcastle, Klip River, Upper Tugela, Umsinga, and Dundee Divisions as soon as possible. . Only 1,200 Boers and 15 guns at Van Reenen's: latter covered by earthworks at top of Pass. . Commando 1,000 strong in laager on east side of Tintwa Pass. . Patrols of 200 to 300 men each, amounting, in all, to 1,150, believed to be watching the Basutoland border. 15th October, 1899
. Proclamation issued announcing a state of war. . Proclamation issued placing the Magisterial Divisions of Newcastle; Dundee, Klip River, Umsinga, and Upper Tugela under martial law. . Censorship established at Aden. . News of communication with Kimberley being cut off. . Mr. Marwick passed Hattingh Spruit with his 5,000 kaffirs. . Sir George White reported having tapped the telegraph line from Van Reenen's to Harrismith, and asked for three skilled telegraphists, who were accordingly sent. . Boer force reported to be concentrating at Oliver's Hoek. . 1,500 Boers and some artillery reported south of Ingagane.
16th October, 1899
. Telegraph from Dundee to Nqutu cut at Vant's Drift. . Johannesburg Infantry Volunteer Regiment sanctioned. . "Sirdhama" arrived with mules. . Royal Irish Fusiliers arrived at Glencoe. . Natal Volunteers reported by Sir George White to be doing valuable work in a soldierlike manner and spirit. Sir George White states that he greatly appreciates their conduct.
12 . On hearing rumours of Boer raids on Maritzburg and Durban, I asked Admiral to authorise the Senior Naval Officer at Durban to land and send to Pietermaritzburg, if I should ask for it, a naval brigade not exceeding 100 men, with machine guns. . Reported to Admiral that railway reserve of coal had been reduced to three weeks' supply; that coal for shipping at the Point only amounted to 1,837 tons, which was all engaged for steamers, and that labour at the mines was uncertain. Informed him that the Admiralty should not depend on getting coal from Natal for some time, and that we were considering the advisability of cabling to England or Australia for coal for our railway. . Mr. Marwick arrived in Pietermaritzburg. . Imperial Light Horse and half battalion King's Royal Rifles went by train to Ladysmith. . Telegraph communication with Acton Homes, Dewdrop, and Upper Tugela interrupted.
17th October, 1899
. Telegraph communication with Upper Tugela restored. . Boers reported as approaching Helpmakaar. . (Note as to communications with General Officer Commanding re raids on Durban and Maritzburg omitted. See my secret despatch of 19th October, 1899.) . (Note as to £25,000 in "Avondale Castle" omitted. See my despatch, No. 156 of 19th October, 1899.) . "Gaika" reported to have left Southampton on 30th September with one hundred packages of cyanide of potassium for the South African Republic, and thirty-one for Natal; and "Arab" reported to have sailed on 15th September with one hundred cases for Johannesburg. . Reported to High Commissioner that an unconfirmed report had reached me that Bunu4 was fleeing from Swaziland into the Ingwavuma District, and stated that, if he came, he would be allowed to remain. . Information having been received that an attempt was to be made to blow up the railway at Bothas Hill to-night, a patrol of fifty of the Natal Police was sent to guard the threatened spot, and the Inchanga Tunnel. . General Joubert reported by General Symons to have arrived in Newcastle. . Sir George White reported that the Vryheid Column appeared to have moved south and threatened to cross the Buffalo River either by Vant's Drift or Rorke's Drift: and that Joubert's advance post at Ingagane was reported to be 1,100 strong, with 17 guns. He also reported that an advance commenced this morning by a commando one mile long, pushing down the Tintwa Pass, and that he anticipated an advance also from Van Reenan's, and, probably, from Oliver's Hoek. . Our people in Newcastle reported by Magistrate to be well.
18th October, 1899
. Admiral telegraphed that he had directed the "Philomel" to seize the shipment of gold in the "Avondale Castle" outside Delagoa Bay. . "Tintagel Castle" reported by High Commissioner to have contraband of war on board. . Consul at Delagoa Bay asked for a transport to take away refugees to the probable number of 1,000. I communicated with the Senior Naval Officer, and requested the Port Captain to ascertain from steamer agents in Durban what steamers were going to Delagoa Bay. I told the Consul that I did not think it likely that a transport would be available, but that I had communicated with the Senior Naval Officer and the agents: adding that I presumed that any reasonable expenditure incurred by him in relieving, or getting passages for, refugees would be refunded from the High Commissioner's refugee fund.
4 Ngwane V was the main chief in Swaziland and was sometimes known as King Bhunu.
13 . Admiral informed me that Commander of "Tartar" had been authorised to lend a Naval Brigade of 100 men should I so desire. . Asked Admiral whether any of the Admiralty stores of coal at Cape Town or Delagoa Bay could be spared to fill a gap in our supply if required. . Helpmakaar reported: all right at 6 a.m. . Telegram received from Sir George White, stating that on consideration, he had decided to hold onto Estcourt and Colenso as well as to Dundee. So informed Secretary of State by telegraph. . The half battalion of the King's Royal Rifles arrived from Ladysmith. The other reinforcements announced as having started from Ladysmith, and as due here on Monday, October 1st. [sic] . Telegram received from Magistrate at Ladysmith that the Boers had occupied a store at Acton Homes, and were expected to be in force at Blauubank, about 15 miles from Ladysmith, and that the Carbineers were retiring. . Upper Tugela Magistracy abandoned; Magistrate joining Sir George White at Ladysmith, and being attached to the Field Intelligence Department. . Mr. T. K. Murray called, and proposed to form a Corps of Irregulars; the men to find their own horses, arms, &c, not to be drilled but to be ready for service, like the Boers, when called upon. After consultation with General Wolfe-Murray, I approved this idea, and sent Mr. T. K. Murray to the Prime Minister to arrange details. . High Commissioner reported that Boers were in force on both sides of Kimberley, and that they had blown up Modder River Bridge. . Report received that Boers had engaged an armour-clad train near Kimberley, but had been beaten off with some loss. . Remaining refugees from South African Republic warned by Transvaal authorities to go out by Delagoa Bay. . Admiral telegraphed that there was no Admiralty coal to spare. . Magistrate, Nqutu, reported, through Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner at Eshowe, that he was cut off from Dundee both by post and by wire, but that he was quite confident in his position.
19th October, 1899
. Received report from Sir George White that the Boers advanced on the 18th from Bezuidenhout's, Tintwa and Van Reenen's Passes, and that the advance posts of the Natal Volunteers delayed the advance at Acton Homes and Bester's Railway Station with gallantry and stubborness, but were at nightfall ordered to fall back on Ladysmith. Trooper Spencer, Natal Carbineers, slightly wounded, and Lieutenant Gallwey5, Natal Carbineers, missing, only casualties on our side. . Boers stated by natives to have lost several men. . Sir George White reported further that the Northern Column of the enemy had advanced to Dannhauser, wither General Joubert had moved his headquarters, and that there was no movement to the eastward. He added that the security of Ladysmith had been absolutely provided for. . Sir George White telegraphed urgently to say that his movements were restricted for the want of mounted troops, and asked if he might have the Imperial Light Horse. I consented. . Senior Naval Officer telegraphed that he was informed by Captain Sir E. Chichester, R.N., that there were no transports available for despatch to Lourenco Marques to bring away refugees. . Informed by High Commissioner that no closed mails would be made up or accepted for the Transvaal while hostilities lasted. . General Wolfe-Murray informed me that the Commander-in-Chief had decided that, as troops were more urgently required in the Cape Colony than in Natal, both the 3rd battalion of the 60th Rifles and the Borderers Regiment were to go to Cape Town.
5 Lieutenant Gallwey was captured by the Boers and held in Pretoria until June 1900.
14 . The Collector of Customs reported that the "Avondale Castle" had been brought back to Durban in charge of a gunboat, presumably on account of the gold on board. . Report received from Railway Department that a special goods train containing stores for the troops and live stock, with an officer in charge, had been seized by the Boers within sight of Elandslaagte Station, 14 miles from Ladysmith. . The telegraph wires were cut immediately afterwards, but telegraphic communication with Dundee, by way of Greytown and Helpmakaar, still exists. . Telephone communication with Woodcote Police Station, about four miles from Elandslaagte, also reported interrupted. It is believed that the Police Station has been evacuated. . Thirty-five Natal Police, under a sergeant, who were at the Upper Tugela Magistracy, have got safely into Ladysmith, and will be at the General's disposal. Fifty armed Native Constables, under Sub-Inspector Hornby, of the Natal Police, who were also at the Magistracy, have made good their retreat into Ncwadi's Location, near the Tugela source, where they will be useful in helping to defend Ncwadi's cattle from raids. . Glencoe reported all quiet this morning. . An attack from three columns, east, north, and west is expected there to-night or to-morrow morning
Governor Sir W. F. Hely-Hutchinson to Mr. Chamberlain. (Received November 18, 1899.) (Confidential. No. 2.) Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal. October 26, 1899.
Sir,
In continuation of my despatch, confidential, No. 3, of 19th instant, I forward a copy of the Diary of Events to date, and copies of telegrams from the General Officer Commanding, reporting military movements during the week. 2. Since I wrote my despatch, there have been three successful engagements—at Glencoe, on 20th October, under General Penn Symons; at Elandslaagte, on 21st October, under General French; and at Rietfontein Farm, near Modder's Spruit, on 24th October, under Sir George White. These successes have been purchased at the cost of a large number of casualties—14 officers, and 80 non- commissioned officers and men having been killed, besides 61 officers and 409 noncommissioned officers and men wounded, some of whom have since died. They have, however, amply demonstrated the efficiency and bravery of Her Majesty's troops, and have given pause to the enemy, and to the disloyally-minded in Natal. 3. It seems evident that the enemy intends to make a further trial of strength. 4. The death of Sir. William Penn Symons, which is reported to have occurred at Dundee on 23rd instant, has caused universal and deep regret in Natal. Sir Penn Symons had won the confidence, esteem, and regard of all of us: and his death, besides being felt as a serious military loss, is sincerely mourned by all those who enjoyed the privilege of his personal acquaintance.
I have, &c. WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.
20th October, 1899
. Report of capture of train and interruption of communication at Elandslaagte confirmed by Sir George White. . Sir George White telegraphed, at 6.35 a.m., that Glencoe reported "Boers shelling camp with big guns, troops moving out." . Reports received, from time to time, during the day, as to fighting at Glencoe. General effect of reports that Boers are getting the worst of it.
15 . Reported that Sir Penn Symons is wounded. . Report also received that ironclad train, supported by troops, had gone out from Ladysmith to restore communication. . Transports "Upada" and "Johannesburg" arrived at Durban. . Mr. Payn, the Acting Mayor of Pietermaritzburg, called on me and requested me to ask the High Commissioner for a contrition from the Lord Mayor's fund in aid of the Maritzburg Refugee Fund. I complied. . Reported that Sir Penn Symons' wound is serious. . 12.30 p.m. Magistrate, Dundee, reported "Six hours' fighting. Boers getting beans. Thank God." . 2 p.m. Sir Penn Symons' wound reported to be mortal. . Boers surrounded on Dundee Hill—artillery pounding them. . 2.40 p.m. Telegraph officer at Glencoe telegraphs that the Boer position has been captured, and all the guns. He can see our soldiers on the bill. Telegraphed to High Commissioner and Secretary of State. . 4 p.m. Reported that the cavalry and artillery have gone in pursuit. . 6 p.m. Officially confirmed. Sir Penn Symons mortally wounded. Colonel Gunning and four other officers of the King's Royal Rifles killed, and six wounded. Colonel Beckett and Major Hammersley seriously wounded.
21st October, 1899
. Received lists of killed and wounded—39 killed and 173 wounded, including 8 officers killed and 24 wounded. . Ironclad train gone out to Elandslaagte and in action with the Boers. . 14 wounded prisoners of war at Dundee. . Captain Connor and Lieutenant Genge died of their wounds. . 2 p.m. B squadron, 18th Hussars, with Colonel Möller, Major Greville, and Captain Pollok, and Mounted Infantry, with Captain Lonsdale, and Lieutenants Majendie, Grimshaw, and Garvice not yet returned to camp. . Boers reported to be advancing from Hattingh's Spruit. . Fighting going on at Elandslaagte—prisoners reported re-captured. Imperial Light Horse "in it." General Manager of Railways telegraphs "Reinforcements sent — position to be taken at all costs." . Telegraph Clerk at Glencoe camp telegraphs that he has to leave as the Boers are shelling the camp. Troops drawn out to south of camp. . Dundee reports that the Boers are shelling the site of the old camp from the Impati Mountain and that our troops are sitting still. . Later. Dundee evacuated by the civil population, in case of the town being attacked at night. . News from Elandslaagte that the Boers are beaten, and that our troops are among them after a hot engagement. . Magistrate, Dundee, telegraphed that the Boers 'say they lost 20 killed and 73 wounded in the engagement at Dundee; amongst the wounded being Messrs. Uys and Brecher, members of the Second Volksraad. . 9 p.m. Confirmation of good news from Elandslaagte received. Guns, wagons, and camp equipment captured. Cavalry in hot pursuit. . Telegraph to High Commissioner and Secretary of State. . Tried to get news of Elandslaagte affair through to General Yule from Helpmakaar.
16 22nd October, 1899
. Received a telegram from Mr. Escombe6, from Helpmakaar, stating that he left Dundee at 7.15 p.m. on the 21st, that the town had been evacuated, and that the civil population were on the veldt behind the troops, who had been shelled out of the camp and were short of ammunition. . Heard that Mr. Escombe passed through Helpmakaar at 3 a.m. . 7.25 a.m. Umvoti Mounted Rifles report from Helpmakaar that reinforcements are reported by natives to have arrived at Dundee during the night. . 8 a.m. Communication with Dundee re-established. . Reinforcements reported to be coming up from Elandslaagte. . 9 a.m. Telegram from Sir Archibald Hunter stating that Colonel Scott-Chisholme was killed, and that Colonel Dick Cunyngham and Captain Ronald Brooke were wounded at Elandslaagte yesterday. . Reported our troops have moved away from Dundee towards Glencoe, leaving their wounded and stores. . 2.45 p.m. Party of 60 Boers, which had been announced earlier in the day as being on the border at Vermaak's, now reported by Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner from Eshowe as being within one and a half miles of Melmoth at 1.55 p.m. Informed Officer Commanding Line of Communication and telegraphed to High Commissioner and Secretary of State. . Mr. Escombe reports himself at Umsinga, having lost his way. . 2.55 p.m. The telegraph clerk at Dundee wires that he has ridden-through, under escort, at the risk of his life, to find out if there is any news. Things at Dundee unchanged. . 3.50 p.m. The troops at Dundee are taking their ease, out of reach of the big guns, which are still firing. No casualties. . 4.30 p.m. Received an urgent demand from the General Officer Commanding for the 2nd Battalion of the King's Royal Rifles and the Liverpools. Situation at Glencoe stated to be critical. I consented. . Decided to issue Martial Law Proclamation at 2.45 p.m. to-morrow and to overhaul the National Bank at Durban. . 6.30 p.m. Telegram from Colonel Dartnell describing the situation. . A squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards arrived and went through to Ladysmith. . The 2nd Battalion of the King's Royal Rifles and the Liverpools returned to Ladysmith. . Despatch riders were sent from Helpmakaar to General Yule with news of the victory at Elandslaagte and returned safely.
23rd October, 1899
. List of killed and wounded at Elandslaagte received. . Lieutenant Hannah reported killed at Dundee. . Umsinga reports firing Ladysmith way. . List of killed and wounded of the Gordons received. . Major Denne killed. Captain Arthur Buchanan severely wounded in the side.
6 The Honourable Harry Escombe was born in Notting Hill 25 Jul 1838. He arrived in Natal in 1860 and worked as an advocate in Durban. He served in the Royal Durban Rifles, Durban Volunteer Artillery and Victoria Mounted Rifles. Attended the coronation of King Cetshwayo in 1873. Raised and commanded the Natal Naval Volunteers 1885 to 1897. Member of the Legislative Council from 1872 he was Attorney general of Natal 1893 to 1897 and Prime Minister of Natal 1897 to 1899. Escombe was in Dundee during the battle and left by cart soon afterwards. He died in Durban 27 Dec 1899.
17 . Total killed and wounded at Elandslaagte — killed, 4 officers and 37 men; wounded, 31 officers and 175 men. 10 men missing. . Story about attack at Melmoth contradicted. The "commando" turns out to have been Mr. Yonge's patrol7. . The District Superintendent of Railways at Ladysmith telegraphed at 11 a.m. that the special train which left Ladysmith for Elandslaagte this morning was only able to travel about seven miles, when it had to return in consequence of a large patrol of Boers in the neighbourhood, who fired on the train. The Boers were supposed to belong to the Free State contingent. . The Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Eshowe, telegraphed that the natives in Zululand express genuine satisfaction regarding the news of the victory at Dundee. . Martial Law proclaimed throughout the Colony at 2.45 p.m. Lieutenant Bradbury, of the Gordon Highlanders, died of his wounds. Reported that the Dundee Column is retreating on Ladysmith via Beith and Goode Kuis.
24th October, 1899
. Telegraph office reports that General Yule has established communication with Sir George White, and that Sir George White went out with a large force at 4 a.m. to-day. . 9.50 a.m. Heavy firing heard both at Umsinga and Estcourt (? Colenso) in the direction of Ladysmith. . 188 prisoners arrived from Ladysmith at 7 a.m. including De Witt Hamer. . From what Colonel Morgan, who has just returned from Ladysmith, says, it seems probable that the Dundee column is short of artillery ammunition. . Weenen reports firing in the direction of Ladysmith this morning. Umsinga says that firing ceased at about 11 a.m. . Helpmakaar reported abandoned. All papers brought away from telegraph office. . 2 p.m. Telegraph officer at Ladysmith reports that nearly all the troops in the camp, and all the Headquarter Staff, have gone out to meet the Boers near Modder's Spruit, to the west of the Railway. Heavy firing proceeding. . 2.30 p.m. Colonel Dartnell rode into Ladysmith from the Dundee column, which is all well at Waschbank, and, will be at Sunday's River to-night. Column marching rather slowly, as transport animals are poor. . The High Commissioner, to whom I had telegraphed about the prisoners, informed me that the Admiral had hired the "Patiala" to take them to Simon's Bay, where they are to be kept on board the "Penelope." . 4.45. Colonel Schiel arrived, wounded, from Ladysmith, and was taken to the Military Hospital under guard. . 5.30 p.m. Intercepted telegram from Pretoria confirms fears of capture of B squadron, 18th Hussars, and company of mounted infantry. . Determination of Her Majesty's Government to exercise the right of search reported to me by the High Commissioner. . 6.15 p.m. Telegram from General Manager of Railways states that there has been a victory at Modder's Spruit, and that we have captured a gun. . 7.30 p.m. Telegram from Intelligence Department, Ladysmith, reporting that the Dundee column is 35 miles from Ladysmith, and that the Ladysmith troops have cleared the hills to the north of Free Staters, who were threatening to intercept the column. . Colonel of the Gloucester Regiment killed8. Our troops fought bravely.
7 Perhaps Captain Cecil Yonge, Natal Volunteers. 8 At the battle of Rietfontein, the Gloucester Regiment losses were 1 officer wounded, 7 men killed, 57 men wounded and their Colonel, Edmund Percival Wilford, was killed.
18 . 9 p.m. Colonel Royston, the Commandant of Volunteers, telegraphed to Colonel Hime to say that the Natal Volunteers had lost three killed and that 21 had been wounded — two dangerously — but that there were no officers in the list. . Mayor of Durban complained of the floods of refugees from Delagoa Bay, many of whom were, he said, of the criminal classes. Telegraphed to Consul at Delagoa Bay and to High Commissioner saying that Ministers had, provisionally, order the Port Captain not to allow any more refugees from Delagoa Bay, except respectable British subjects, to land. Consul afterwards telegraphed that no more refugees would be sent from Delagoa Bay to Durban, and I so informed the Mayor. . Wrote, privately, to the Chief Staff Officer at Ladysmith asking him to see that I got more prompt information as to operations, as the strain and anxiety amongst people here is great, and, besides, the Secretary of State expects me to give him early authentic news. . National Bank overhauled at Durban. No particulars received. . Ministers formally drew my attention to the defenceless state of Pietermaritzburg to-day. I replied, after consulting General Wolfe-Murray, that he would do his best for Pietermariteburg with the force at his command.
25th October, 1899
. The "Virawa" arrived with the 5th Dragoon Guards9. . Telegram from Sir George White suggesting a consultation with the Naval authorities as to providing long range guns for Ladysmith, I replied, asking whether I was to understand that he intended to keep all the troops at Ladysmith, as, in that case, I should be informed at once, Pietermaritzburg and Durban being, practically, defenceless, and it appearing that part of General Joubert's force would come in via Greytown. I added that I had telegraphed to the High Commissioner and to the Admiral as suggested. . Telegrams from the Railway Department state that the Boers are re-occupying the positions they were driven from yesterday that the Dundee column is expected at 3 p.m., that the infantry are much exhausted and that a detachment has gone out to meet them. . Messrs. William Hosken, Caldecott, and Mackie Niven called on behalf of the Uitlanders Relief Committee. I advised them to agree with the Mayor to appoint a joint Sub-Committee. They agree. They also said that many more men from Johannesburg were willing to join any infantry force that might be raised — men with some experience of drill and arms. They spoke vaguely, first of five hundred, then of a thousand or more. They also offered to assist the Town Guard if possible. I under-took to speak to General Wolfe-Murray about it. . Mr. Arnold Cooper, of Richmond, having asked for assistance for the maintenance of 50 or 60 refugees from Dundee, I asked the High Commissioner to send me £100 for him; and suggested that, to save continual references, he should place, say, £5,000, in my hands to distribute and account for. . Arranged for prisoners to go to the point by a train starting at 11 p.m. to-night. . Received list of killed and wounded in the engagement with the Free State Boers on the 24th. Killed 1 officer and 12 men. Wounded 6 officers and 85 men. Missing 3 men. . Mr. Hignett, Migistrate of the Nqutu District in Zululand, reports himself all safe at the Magistracy up to the 23rd and ready to repel an attack, provided no big guns be brought against him. . 89 wounded prisoners expected from Ladysmith. . Telegram from Sir George White reporting to-day's operations. In touch with column from Dundee. . Telegram from Major Altham reporting yesterday's operations. . The Admiral telegraphed that the "Powerful" would arrive at Durban on Sunday, and that she could land on an emergency, 4 twelve-pounder quick-firing guns and 9 Maxims.
9 The last two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards left Bombay on 8th October. The other squadrons were already in Natal and had taken part on the charge at Elandslaagte.
19 . Telegram from Sir George White earnestly requesting that no pressure may be put upon him to reduce the force at Ladysmith, and giving his reasons. . The High Commissioner telegraphed asking me whether I had issued a Proclamation forbidding refugees from Delagoa Bay to land, and under what law; and stated that Cape ports were very much alarmed at the prospect of their arrival. I replied that no Proclamation had been issued, but that Ministers had given instructions to the Port Captain under the Undesirable Immigrants Act. I added that Ministers claimed that, as Martial Law had been proclaimed in Durban, they could exclude anyone they chose.
26th October, 1899
. Reported that Sir Penn Symons died, and was buried, at Dundee on the 24th. (Turned out to be 23rd) . General Wolfe-Murray, Major Gaisford, and Captain St. Aubyn called, re defence. We discussed the matter. Scheme to be submitted in writing. Mr. Goldfoy's report, re examination of National Bank received. . Telegram from Colonel Dartnell saying he has arrived at Ladysmith, and that the Dundee Column was at Modder Spruit at daylight, having marched all night in the rain. . 11 a.m. Dundee Column reported safe at Ladysmith. . Telegram from Sir George White transmitting a telegram from General Joubert, stating that Sir Penn Symons died on the 24th and was buried at Dundee. . Telegraphed to Sir George White that the object of my yesterday's telegram was to ascertain his intentions, not to put a pressure on him: that his reasoning appealed to my common sense and that I concurred in his decision. I added that, now that I knew his intentions, I should make my own arrangements here, in consultation with General Wolfe-Murray. . The Admiral telegraphed that he was sending in the "Powerful" two extemporised 4.7 quick-firing guns of 41 cwt., which would be ready to land at Durban on Sunday. . Mr. Escombe arrived in Pietermaritzburg from Greytown. . Prisoners reported on board "Patiala," which was hauled out to an anchorage. . "Jelunga" arrived with Rifle Brigade. . Further telegrams from Sir George White, who, General Wolfe-Murray tells me, wishes to take the Rifle Brigade and the Border Regiment to Ladysmith. I replied after consulting with General Wolfe-Murray, proposing to keep the Rifle Brigade. . Telegram from Intelligence Department announcing concentration at Ladysmith and that the Free Staters suffered heavily at Rietfontein. . Sir Alfred Milner sent me £2,000, through the Standard Bank, in aid of the Refugees Fund; to be distributed at my discretion.
20 White’s despatch of 2nd November 1899
The following despatch appeared in the London Gazette on 26th January 1900, pages 497 - 498. Of the full despatch, only the first 14 paragraphs relate to Talana. The other paragraphs have been omitted.
War Office, January, 26, 1900.
The following Despatches, with their enclosures, have been received from General, the Right Honourable Sir Redvers Buller, G.C.B., South Africa:
From the General Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in South Africa To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.
Cape Town, November 9, 1899.
Sir, I have the honour to forward herewith a report from Lieutenant-General Sir George White, V.C., &c, dated 2nd November, on his operations in Natal, which was handed to me yesterday by Lieutenant-General French on his arrival from Durban. It does not seem to call for any remarks from me. I have, &c,
Redvers Buller, General Officer Commanding.
From Lieutenant-General Sir George S. White, VC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, To the Secretary of State, War Office, London, S.W.
Ladysmith, Natal, November 2, 1899.
Sir,
1. Have the honour to forward the following report on the military operations in Natal since the date of my arrival in that colony:— 2. I reached Durban and assumed command of the forces in that colony on 7th October, 1899, proceeding direct to Maritzburg. I found the troops, Imperial and Colonial, then in the colony, distributed as under :— At Pietermaritzburg—1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, and Mounted Infantry Company, 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps. At Estcourt —Detachment Natal Naval Volunteers, Natal Royal Rifles. At Colenso—Durban Light Infantry. At Ladysmith—5th Lancers, Detachment 19th Hussars, Brigade Division, Royal Artillery; 10th Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery; 23rd Company, Royal Engineers; 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment, and Mounted Infantry Company; 26th (two sections) British Field Hospital, and Colonial troops. At Glencoe—18th Hussars; Brigade Division, Royal Artillery; 1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment, and Mounted Infantry Company; 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps, and Mounted Infantry Company; 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and Mounted Infantry Company; 6th Veterinary Field Hospital. With 1 Company, 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps at Eshowe, and a detachment of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles at Helpmakaar. 3. The information available regarding the positions occupied by the armies of the two Dutch Republics showed the great bulk of the forces of the Orange Free State were massed near the passes of the Drakensberg mountains, west of Ladysmith. The troops of the South African Republic were concentrated at various points west, north, and east of the northern angle of Natal. On 10th October
21 His Excellency the Governor informed me that Her Majesty's Government had received an ultimatum from that of the South African Republic, and that the outbreak of war on the evening of 11th October might be regarded as certain. 4. Since my arrival in the colony I had been much impressed by the exposed situation of the garrison of Glencoe, and on the evening of 10th October I had an interview on the subject with his Excellency the Governor, at which I laid before him my reasons for considering it expedient, from a military point of view, to withdraw that garrison, and to concentrate all my available troops at Ladysmith. After full discussion his Excellency recorded his opinion that such a step would involve grave political results and possibilities of so serious a nature that I determined to accept the military risk of holding Dundee as the lesser of two evils. I proceeded in person to Ladysmith on 11th October, sending on Lieutenant- General Sir William Penn Symons to take command at Glencoe. 5. The Boers crossed the frontier both on the north and west on 12th October, and next day the Transvaal flag was hoisted at Charlestown. My great inferiority in numbers necessarily confined me strategically to the defensive, but tactically my intention was and is to strike vigorously whenever opportunity offers. Up to 19th October the enemy from the north were engaged in moving down on the Biggarsberg— Dundee line in three columns. The main column, under General Joubert, occupied Newcastle, and marched south by the road leading thence on Glencoe Junction. A second column, under Viljoen, crossed Botha's Pass, and moved south over the Biggarsberg, cutting the railway from Glencoe Junction to Ladysmith on 19th October at Elands Laagte, where they took up a position. A third column, under Lucas Meyer, crossed the Buffalo River, marching west on Dundee, and arrived within striking distance of that place on the night of 19th October. Meanwhile the Free State forces west of Ladysmith contented themselves with occupying the country at the foot of the Drakensberg Range, without approaching within striking distance of Ladysmith, and, though the mounted patrols of both sides were constantly in touch, up to the evening of 19th October, nothing of importance took place in this direction. 6. On the morning of 20th October, at 3.20 a.m., the Mounted Infantry picquet, east of Dundee at the junction of the roads from Landmann's and Vants Drifts, was fired on and compelled to retire. Two companies, 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, were sent out in support of it by Lieutenant-General Sir Penn Symons, and at 4.30 a.m. a report was received that the enemy had halted and established themselves at Fort Jones. By 5 a.m. all Sir W. Symons' troops were under arms. 7. At 5.50 a.m.,10 the enemy's guns opened fire, from Talana Hill on our camp, at a range of 5,000 yards. Though well directed this fire had but little effect, as the shells, fired with percussion fuzes, buried themselves in the soft earth. Our guns at once returned the fire, but, finding the range too great, the 13th and 69th Field Batteries were moved, at 6 a.m., to a fresh position south of the town of Dundee, with the Mounted Infantry Company of the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles as escort. The 67th Field Battery and the 1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment were detailed to remain in and protect the camp. The 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers were sent through the town to Sand Spruit, the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles taking up a position under cover to the east of the town. These preliminary movements were completed by 6.30 a.m. 8. At 7.30 a.m. the Infantry advanced to a small patch of wood, about 1,000 yards beyond Sand Spruit. They moved, in extended order, over open level grass land, the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers leading, followed in succession by the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles and the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers. Notwithstanding the open nature of the ground this movement was, owing to the accurate fire of our artillery, completed with but slight loss. Sir W. P. Symons' intention was to make a direct attack on the enemy's position under cover of the wood above mentioned, and of some buildings known as Smith's Farm. 9. At 8 a.m. the batteries were brought forward to a range of 2,300 yards, whence the 69th Battery opened fire on Talana Hill, and the 13th Battery on the hill11 (marked 4,700) south of the road which was also held by the enemy, the guns and escort being under fire from both hills. At the same time Sir W. P. Symons moved the Infantry through the wood to its front edge, on which a very accurate direct fire was opened from the top of Talana Hill, and also from a stone wall which extended half way up and along the side of that hill. The Infantry here were also exposed to an enfilading fire from the hill marked 4,700.
10 This is the time that appears in the London Gazette but it is believed to be a mis-print, probably for 5.30 a.m. 11 Lennox Hill.
22 10. At 8.50 a.m. the Infantry Brigade were ordered to advance. The ground was open and intersected by nullahs, which running generally perpendicular to the enemy's position gave very little cover. At 9 a.m. Sir W. P. Symons ordered up his reserves, and advanced with them through the wood at 9.15 a.m. At 9.30 a.m. the Lieutenant-General was, I regret to report, mortally wounded in the stomach, and the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Yule, who directed the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers on the left, and the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps on the right. The latter battalion reached the wall, to which two companies of the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers were also brought up, the other six companies being held in reserve. The 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, however, less favoured by the ground were unable, for some time, to make any progress. 11. About 11.30 a.m., the enemy's guns were silenced, and the Artillery moved into a range of 1,400 yards and opened a very rapid fire on the ridge over the heads of our Infantry. This temporarily brought under the enemy's rifle fire, and enabled our infantry to push on. The ground in places was so steep and difficult that the men had to climb it on hands and knees, but by 1 p.m., the crest was reached, and the enemy, not waiting to come to close quarters, retired in the directions of Landmann's and Vants' drifts. Brigadier-General Yule then ordered the Artillery to the nek on the Dundee—Vants' drift road, on arrival at which point the retreating enemy was seen streaming away in clumps of 50 and 100 men, on which guns could have inflicted great loss. The enemy, however, displayed a white flag, although they do not appear to have had any intention of surrendering, and in consequence the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery refrained from firing. 12. Turning now to our Cavalry, the 18th Hussars received orders at 5.40 a.m. to get round the enemy's right flank and be ready to cut off his retreat. They were accompanied by a portion of the Mounted Infantry and a machine gun. Making a wide turning movement they gained the eastern side of Talana Hill. Here Lieutenant-Colonel Möller halted with one squadron, 18th Hussars, the machine gun and the Mounted Infantry, sending his other two squadrons farther to the east. These two latter squadrons took part in the pursuit of the enemy, who retreated eastward, but Lieutenant-Colonel Möller and the troops with him appear, so far as can be ascertained, to have pursued in a northerly direction, to have come in contact with superior forces not previously engaged, and to have been surrounded and forced to surrender, while endeavouring to return to camp, round the north of the Impati Mountain. 13. The Boer force engaged in this action is computed at 4,000 men, of whom about 500 were killed or wounded12. Three of their guns were left dismounted on Talana Hill, but there was no opportunity of bringing them away. 14. Our own losses were severe, amounting to 10 Officers and 31 Non-commissioned officers and men killed, 20 Officers and 165 Non-commissioned officers and men wounded, and 9 Officers and 211 Non-commissioned officers and men missing. The Divisional Staff suffered severely, Lieutenant- General Sir W. P. Symons, K.C.B., being mortally wounded, and both Colonel C. E. Beckett, C.B., A.A.G., and Major Hammersley, D.A.A.G., being severely wounded. Of the Brigade Staff, Lieutenant- Colonel John Sherston, D.S.O., Brigade Major, was killed, and Captain F. L. Adam, Scots Guards, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Yule, was severely wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Gunning, commanding 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps, was killed within a few yards of the crest of the position.
12 Being written on 2nd November, White can be forgiven for using these initial estimates of the Boer losses. These were the same figures he had given to Hely-Hutchinson on 29th October.
23 White’s evidence to the Royal Commission
The Royal Commission into the war called many of the leading participants to give evidence and explain their conduct and decisions during the conflict. General White appeared before the Commission on 16th February 1903 and his evidence was recorded and printed in the Minutes of Evidence in the same year.
Some of the evidence given by White is presented here but sections that do not relate to Talana have been omitted. Each question was sequentially numbered. There is usually one question per paragraph and each paragraph starts with the questioner’s identity, the question and, separated by a hyphen, the answer.
White very strongly defended his decision to concentrate his forces on Ladysmith and explains that he tried to ensure that Penn Symons took adequate precautions to defend his position in Dundee. He made a convincing case for why he allowed his force to be split between Ladysmith and Dundee. The Commission do not take a view either way but the reader will probably be inclined to sympathise with White’s predicament so soon after his arrival in Natal. White certainly viewed the engagement as being beneficial because of the time it bought him.
Two other points are of note. First, White’s view that the threat of a Zulu uprising was a very serious one. He used his experience of the Indian Mutiny nearly half a century before the Boer War to form this view but it was a powerful factor when he considered the defence of Natal. Second, the intimation from the Commission that White may have been able to better use the forces under his command had he concentrated all of them in Ladysmith and conducted surprise attacks from a single base as was his policy to do. In the early days of the war it is possible that his mounted forces might have been able to operate with success in the area around Ladysmith, however, the predominance of infantry within his troops constrained the degree to which this was possible other than in close proximity to Ladysmith.
This is his evidence:
14707. You have been good enough to give us a statement, and, if you have no objection, we should propose to treat it, as we have other statements, as a part of the evidence? —That will quite meet my views.
The statement is as follows :—
In accordance with the permission conveyed to me in a letter from the Secretary of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, dated 7th January, 1903, I have the honour to submit the following summarised account of the military operations directed by me during the period I exercised an independent command in Natal, in the course of this statement I will endeavour to dwell on those events and decisions which have hitherto been looked upon as of the highest public importance, with a view of laying before the Commissioners the circumstances and conditions which surrounded the questions at the time I had to decide them; and the reasons that led me to issue the orders in each case. I embarked at Southampton for South Africa on the 16th September, 1899.
I may here mention, as the point has been referred to in the evidence I have been allowed to see, that, previous to starting, I had received no orders, except that I was to assume command of the forces in Natal; and that the General Officer commanding at Cape Town was to exercise his command independently of me. I was not informed of any plan of campaign against the Boers, or asked to operate on any given lines. I therefore considered myself unfettered in meeting the emergencies which I had to face immediately on landing, as I thought best for the preservation of Natal. I arrived at Cape Town on the 3rd October, and had a short interview with Sir Alfred Milner. From what he told me I was convinced that Natal would be the main objective of the Boers, and the war was imminent. I accordingly changed my plan of going by sea to Durban from Cape Town, and proceeded the same evening overland to East London, where the Durban mail steamer had been detained for me. I landed at Durban on the 7th October. Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons met me there.
I may, perhaps, here say that at Durban I met Captain Holland of the Indian Marine, who was helping in the transport service, and who had served with me when I was commanding the Field Force during the war in Upper Burma. I asked him about the coal supply, and urged him to get as much as possible from outside sources, as even then I had grave doubts as to my ability to cover the Dundee coalfields in the north of Natal. From Major-General Symons I learned the distribution of the Imperial and Colonial troops then in the Colony. This is given in the second paragraph of my despatch, dated
24 Ladysmith, 2nd November, 1899, which, with my other despatches, is, I presume, before the Commissioners.
The troops were distributed between Pietermaritzburg, Estcourt, Colenso, Ladysmith, Glencoe, Eshowe, and Helpmakaar. The information available to me regarding the disposition of the Boer forces is given in paragraph 3 of my despatch above referred to. The Governor of Natal, Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, informed me on the 10th October that the outbreak of the war on the 11th October was certain. On learning the disposition of the troops, I had been much impressed by the exposed position of the force at Glencoe and had discussed it with Sir W. Penn Symons. He had given the subject great thought, had consulted the Colonial officers and local civil authorities, and was most confident that he had sufficient troops there to hold his own against the Boers. He also dwelt to me on the advantages that the ground round Glencoe offered for the tactics of his trained troops against burgher levies. Notwithstanding his opinion, I considered the Glencoe force should be withdrawn. Ladysmith appeared to me the most advanced post that could practically be held against the two main divisions of the Boer Army. We knew that both Transvaalers and Freestaters were making every preparation to take the initiative and to assume at once an active offensive. The screen of mountains which separates both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State from Northern Natal gave the enemy exceptional opportunities of manoeuvring behind it. He could start from many bases, and yet his forces, acting in combination and aided by the extraordinary mobility of their organisation, could mass suddenly at a selected point of vantage in Natal. If too heavily threatened on any point by the slower- moving British forces, they could fall back to the inaccessible fastnesses of the border land, where, it was apparent to me from the first, it would have been folly to follow them with any force I could hope to attack them with, at so great a distance from the base at Ladysmith. But in addition to the considerations given above, my transport only allowed me two or three days' march from a railway. The facility with which the enemy could cut communications behind me if I had given them a long line to strike at, would have involved me in probable disaster.
Feeling that Ladysmith was the most advanced post that I could hold is force to use as a shield to cover the vitals of Natal, I sought an interview with the Governor, Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, to tell him of my intentions to concentrate there. He has himself given an account of that interview, which took place at Pietermaritzburg on the 9th October, 1899. His account was laid before Parliament in January, 1900, and is no doubt before the Commissioners. It will be seen that Sir W. Hely Hutchinson gave a most decided opinion that a withdrawal from Glencoe would be disastrous, involving the probability of the Dutch, not only in Natal, but also in the Cape Colony, throwing in their lot openly with the Boers. He further said that the effect on the natives, of whom there are some 750,000 in Natal and Zululand, might be disastrous, and that loyalists would be disgusted and discouraged. He also informed me that the opinions he had expressed were not his only, but were shared by the Prime Minister and by every member of the Natal Government. The dangers described above have since been referred to as mere political considerations, which, should not have been allowed to over-ride military principles; but I submit that to dismiss them thus, after the danger is passed, is to deprive them of the weight that was due to them when I had to decide.
The issue that appealed to me with greatest force was the rising of 750.000 of perhaps the most warlike and bloodthirsty natives in our Empire. Had it taken place, it would have been as great a disaster in a military sense as in a political. With reference to the probability of these results, I was bound to give the greatest possible weight to the opinions of the Governor and the Ministers. They had all the threads of information, both as regards Dutch and native feeling, coming direct to them, and they had had experience of these races for years. If I had ordered withdrawal, and their anticipations had turned out true, it would have been said, with reason, that after a few hours' experience of a country in which I had never been before, I had acted in direct opposition to the opinions of all my responsible advisers on such a point, who for years had had their fingers on the pulse of native opinion, and that I had thus brought about a most terrible disaster. On the other hand, there was a chance of success, and Sir W. Penn Symons was most sanguine, as were the whole of the local Government. Failing a success, there was the chance of being able to effect a withdrawal from Glencoe later, as was actually accomplished, after the Glencoe force had inflicted a very stopping blow, the after effects of which had far-reaching results. It turned the over-weening confidence with which the Transvaalers crossed the frontier into a hesitancy which not only aided the Glencoe column in getting away, but was of immense value to me in affording me more time to get up reinforcements, which were arriving daily.
I may, perhaps, here be allowed to notice the evidence given by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, as follows: "The question, then, is, did Sir George White make the best of the situation as he found it?
25 This is a most difficult point to decide, but it has always seemed to me that it was still possible for Sir George White to give effect to the great military principle of meeting the enemy with massed forces while they were still separated. I think the various actions and movements of Sir George White's troops must be regarded from that point of view, and that if so regarded they cannot be considered as altogether satisfactory. It seems certain that Talana might have been fought with a much stronger force, although I admit that Ladysmith would have been in some danger of attack by the Orange Free State troops for the space of a few days." In the earlier part of the evidence Earl Roberts gives the strength of the force available in Natal when the crisis came as 13,630 men, including militia, volunteers, and police. His Lordship further says that the task set before these 13,630 men was to hold their own against 50,000 or 60,000 Boers for a period of two months at the least. The method he has now advocated was to meet the enemy with massed forces. He also indicates Talana as an instance in which this massing ought to have been applied. Coming from so high an authority, I feel the conclusion he has arrived at deeply. I, however, beg, with the deference due to his Lordship's great ability and well-merited success, to ask consideration for the following views.
To be quite impartial towards my own contention, I must begin by stating that I consider 50,000 to 60,000 Boers too high an estimate of the numbers I had to fight against. In order to argue within my own convictions of the odds against me, I will divide Lord Roberts's estimate by two, and work on the basis of 30,000 Boers. It would perhaps be a fair division to give the Transvaalers 18,000 and the Orange Free State 12,000. As a matter of fact, in a report dated 12th October, 1899, laid before me by my Intelligence Staff officer, it was estimated that on the 10th October the total force of Boers assembled on the northern and western frontiers of Natal amounted to 27,000 men. The enterprise of massing in strength against the enemy while they were still separated divides itself, naturally, into a choice between two objectives:
(1) the Transvaalers, generally speaking, to the north; (2) the Orange Free Staters to the west.
It must not be taken for granted that I could have advanced the force from Ladysmith, either north or west, without every move being known to the enemy. Ladysmith itself was full of Dutch partisans. It is therefore unreasonable to suppose that I could have taken any of the principal detachments of the advancing enemy by surprise. They would have had certain information of my movements. In case their numerical strength, or the still greater strength they know so well how to take advantage of in the selection of strong positions, had not given them the better of the chances, they would have fallen back on the fastnesses, which everywhere presented themselves in the mountain ranges which screened the advance of both Transvaalers and Free Staters. In any such manoeuvring the superior mobility of the Boers would have given them the very greatest advantage. I had positive evidence from an eye-witness that most of the Free Staters had three ponies. A force so equipped could have manoeuvred round me. They could cover 30, or even 40, miles with less fatigue than our infantry could march 12 miles. In an advance of any length towards the enemy it would have been necessary to provide for the safety of the base at Ladysmith and the line of communication with it. After making these provisions, the numbers that I could have brought up into fighting line would have been wholly inadequate to meet the Boers in any position in which they were likely to make a stand. It will be readily understood that out of 13,630 men in Natal, or even many more, but a small number could be brought to the fighting front. The Boers had the advantage of being strategically on the offensive, but, tactically, they could at any time assume the defensive. Besides, I should have had to make a long advance under the disadvantage of not being able to move more than two or three days from a railway, as my transport was not adapted for more.
The positions the Free Staters could have taken up to the west have been aptly described as a succession of precipices. These are specially adapted for Boer defensive tactics, and all the experiences of the war show the impossibility of defeating Boers so placed without greatly superior numbers. In my case the British would have been actually fewer than the defending force. With special reference to the propriety of massing my troops against the Transvaalers in the north, the arguments I have used above are generally applicable. The nearest point at which I could have hoped to strike at any force would have been more distant from Ladysmith than in a similar operation to the west; they would consequently have had longer notice of my approach, and I do not believe I could have brought 8,000 men into action. According to the data or strength I have taken, the Boers could have massed some 18,000. The initiative resting with them, they could have awaited my attack without loss or inconvenience in selected positions. Every hour so occupied would have made my position worse. The Free Staters would have been drawing nearer and nearer to Ladysmith, to find it depleted of its garrison, an easy prey and a prize of immense value. I may here state definitely that
26 my ultimate hopes of saving Natal from being overrun by the Boers were centred in holding Ladysmith. Personally, I never underrated the enemy's fighting power. I knew they were fighting for what they knew was national existence, and according to their national instincts. I had had letters from officers and men of my own regiment who were engaged at Majuba, and who had fought under me all through the Afghan War, 1879-80, and I knew that the Boers who had forced Ian Hamilton, Hector Macdonald, and others to surrender were no despicable enemies. With special reference to Talana, if the Boers had known—and they would have known—I had massed there it is not likely that Meyer would have made his isolated attack without waiting for the co-operation of Erasmus and the support of Joubert. But I could not foresee the date of Talana.
It took General Yule's column, marching for their existence, the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th October to reach Ladysmith. I could not depend upon moving a large body of cavalry, artillery, and transport by rail on a single line with very steep gradients. To be present then, and fit to fight on the 20th at Talana, I would have had to quit Ladysmith on the 14th, when many of the troops had not yet arrived there. But it will be remembered that General Koch, occupied Elandslaagte on the 19th, and cut the railway communication with Glencoe. The position of the British force massed at Talana would then have been as follows: A superior force with six-inch guns in front of them, an intercepting force at Elandslaagte, and the whole of the Free State Army either at or close to Ladysmith, which would have been unentrenched, and without a garrison capable of defending it. It may fairly be said that under such conditions capitulation would have been a question of days, if not of hours. Let us now consider what was really accomplished under the system of strategy I adopted and of which the ruling factor was: "Take care of Ladysmith, and use it to cover the capital and south of Natal."
I have already shown why, contrary to my strategical instincts, I was induced to leave the force at Glencoe. I was confident that that fine soldier, Sir William Penn Symons would strike with the greatest energy. This he did at Talana, taking immediate advantage of the defective co-operation of the Boers. These latter, from the individuality and independence of their organisation, were incapable of recovering their energy rapidly after such a shock. I therefore think that it was to this bold stroke of Major-General Symons that we owe the facility with which General Yule managed to withdraw his force. But General Koch's force would have barred Yule's line of retreat had there not been a sufficient force at Ladysmith to make a more decisively victorious attack on it than was made at Talana I may perhaps be pardoned if I here quote from that great strategist and writer, Admiral A T Mahan, who reviews this part of the campaign without any personal or political bias, and who expresses my convictions in language more lucid than I can use: "Duly to appreciate the merits and results of these two successful days of fighting at Talana and Elandslaagte, it must be remembered that the British, in a general sense, and at Dundee locally as well, were upon the defensive, and that the Boer movements were each a part of one general plan directed, and most properly, to overwhelm and destroy the detachments—Dundee and Ladysmith—In detail; they together being considered one fraction of the enemy's force present, or hurrying over sea. So regarded, the vigour with which the British took the initiative, assumed the offensive, themselves in turn attacking in detail and severely punishing the separate factors of the enemy's combinations, is worthy of great praise. Sir Penn Symons is perhaps entitled to the greater meed13, because to him fell, with the greater burden, the greater opportunity to which he proved not unequal. Such men are worthy of the steady forward gallantry shown by officers and men. Both leaders and led easily carried off the palm from the more phlegmatic opponents, who failed to sweep them away. The result was to save Ladysmith, or rather— what was more really important—the organised force that was there shut in. The brilliant antecedent campaign, the offensive right and left strokes, the prompt and timely resolve of Yule to retreat just as he did, and the consequent concentration utterly frustrated the Boers' combinations, and shattered antecedently their expectation of subduing the British by the cheaper method of exhaustion."
I will turn now to the opinion expressed in Earl Roberts's evidence, that within 48 hours of Brigadier- General Yule's return to Ladysmith, it would have been possible for me to strike a blow with my whole force either against the Free State troops or those of the Transvaal. With reference to this, I submit the following consideration: The Brigadier-General's force marched into Ladysmith on the 26th October, and the Orange Free State and Transvaal troops joined hands on that very day at Modder Spruit. Even on the 27th and 28th the troops that had returned from Dundee were not fit for work in the field, and needed more rest. I had not lost sight of the importance of massing for an offensive effort. On the contrary, it was a prominent feature in my general plan. There were, however, limitations to the scale on which I could carry this out. The fighting power, the numerical superiority and greater mobility of the enemy working against me from divergent bases, precluded me from assuming the
13 A meed is a fitting recompense.
27 strategical offensive. I could only concentrate and wait till he gave me a chance of acting tactically on the offensive. In the great successes that were obtained later in the war the British had a very great numerical superiority. Lord Roberts must have had four or five times the number of troops that surrendered with Cronje. Towards the end of the war the Boers were estimated at about 20,000; the British had 250.000. In the latter phases of the war, also, the mobility of the British force was greatly increased. When Natal was invaded the relative numbers were all the other way, and the mobility also.
In reading over Lord Wolseley’s evidence, I find he entirely condemns the holding of Glencoe and Ladysmith, and says that it should not have been even contemplated. I find in my file of telegrams one from Lord Wolseley, dated War Office, 17th October, No. 370: "Is Glencoe rationed for 60 days, as ordered? If not, for how many? Comply with orders, and report action." This conveyed to me the meaning that at that time Lord Wolseley contemplated Glencoe being held, and that he was also anxious that there should be the means of holding it for 60 days after the enemy had cut its line of supply. I received a second telegram from Lord Wolseley, No. 419, dated 23rd October, from which the following is an extract: "I do not wish in any way to hamper your discretion, but, personally, I am anxious about the safety of Colenso Bridge." On the date on which this telegram was despatched, viz., 23rd October, there does not appear to me to have been any suggestion from his Lordship of withdrawal from Ladysmith. I interpreted it as calling my attention to the importance of the bridge as on my line of communication from Ladysmith, and on the 31st October, in attention to Lord Wolseley’s telegram, I despatched out of my already too small force in Ladysmith, the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Natal Field Battery by rail to Colenso to assist in the defence of the bridges over the Tugela. In reply to Question 8875, Lord Wolseley says: “No one ever thought that the troops would occupy Ladysmith. The district in front of Ladysmith is called Biggarsberg, a very strong position. Ladysmith is in a hollow. It is no position at all." To this I can only reply that when I arrived in Natal, and I believe before, there was a general opinion that Ladysmith was a point to be held. Its selection as the principal station for troops in Natal received the very high sanction of Lord Wolseley himself. Everything that has since come to light shows that the Boers were confident that it would he held, and laid their plans to concentrate on it accordingly. It was their chief objective, and its fall was to be the guarantee to waverers that the Boers were too strong for the British in the field, and that, therefore, the time had come when it was safe for them to join the Dutch standards.
At this point the Commission evaluated the choice of Ladysmith by White but they do come back to Talana a little later:
14724. Then was your objection to holding Dundee mainly because you wished to keep your forces massed? —Certainly; and I also looked upon Dundee as a long way out.
14725. Had the nature of the position anything to do with it?—No, not at the time.
14726. The position was not a good one for defence, was it?—I have not seen it. Perhaps in reply I may say that when I sent Sir William Penn Symons to take command at Glencoe I directed him to get a defensible position, to entrench it, and I gave him definite directions to be certain that he had an assured water supply inside it. I had better tell the story out. I sent, I think, Sir Henry Rawlinson up there on some staff mission, and when he came back I asked him about the position, and on getting some facts from him which made me doubt its strength and completeness, I communicated with Sir William Penn Symons that if he had not got an entrenched position, with an assured water supply inside it, he must vacate Glencoe at once.
14727. And there was a difficulty about the water supply, I gather?—His reply to me (I think I have it amongst my telegrams) was: "I cannot give you the assurances you ask for; and, therefore, I must obey your orders." He then went into the details of retiring; he said that he would make a feint towards the front, and that I must send him rolling stock to take away everything that could be taken away. I think women and children were amongst them. I forget the exact date, but it must have been within a couple of days of the action at Talana. I wired in reply : "It is too late to do that," and I asked him whether he personally thought that under the circumstances, and knowing what he had to remove, he had better stand. He said: "I am certain we must remain here" I then wired back to him : "I accept it, and I will support you."
14728. Is it not rather singular that there had not been an examination into the water supply before?— I think it was part of the grand confidence of the man. He had enlarged to me on the advantages of Glencoe as a field in which he could work his trained soldiers (and I may say they were splendidly
28 trained; he was about the finest tactician I have known); he wanted to work them in the open against the advancing enemy, and I think he was carried away more by his own convictions upon that point than upon the precautions I directed him to take. This is the telegram: "Sent at 1.30 a.m., 18th October, to General Symons. I have been in communication with the Governor, and he thinks the political importance of your force remaining at Dundee has already greatly decreased. Maritzburg is now threatened, and I have to reinforce it heavily. If, therefore, you are not absolutely confident of being able to entrench yourself strongly with assured water supply within your position, fall back on Ladysmith. Send reply as quickly as possible." On the same date I sent, a couple of hours afterwards, the following telegram: “From Chief, Natal, to General Symons. With regard to water, are you confident you can supply your camp for an indefinite period? The difficulties and risk of withdrawing civil population and military stores are great. The railway may be cut any day. Do you yourself, after considering these difficulties, think it better to remain at Dundee and prefer it?" General Symons’ reply to me is dated 18th October: "Clear the line. We can and must stay here. I have no doubt whatever that this is the proper course. I have cancelled all orders for moving.” Then on the 18th October I rejoined to that: "Your 1.34 to 'clear the line.' I fully support you. Make particulars referred to by me as safe as possible. Difficulties and disadvantages of other course have decided me to support your views."
14729. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) Might I ask what influenced your sending a second telegram two hours after the other in a different sense?—It is not in a different sense, is it? It never struck me that I had contradicted, myself. You mean the difficulties and risk of withdrawing?
14730. Yes?—I think the telegram has been lost from the file, but he had asked me for carriage for the women and children; and when he came to work out what he would require his demands on me were what I could not possibly have given him; it would have risked the whole of the rolling stock. I must think out that point on the spot now. The line between Ladysmith and Glencoe was cut (this was the 18th October) by General Koch on the 19th at Elandslaagte. Have I answered your question? Was that what you wanted? (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) Yes, I think generally.
14731. (Chairman.) When I asked the question about preparations for a water supply I did not so much mean to refer to General Symons, but to the whole of the schemes of defence of the colony. When Dundee was suggested I should have thought the question of water supply would have been one of the first that was attended to?—I agree.
14732. But apparently it had not been thought out? —Apparently it had not been thought out even by the officer who was in presence of the situation.
14733. Then another consideration which I understand weighed very much with you in acceding to the views of the Governor was the presence of the natives on the frontier?—Yes.
14734. That you considered a serious danger, which you were obliged to take into account?—I thought it a most serious danger. I was probably the only one in South Africa at the time who had been all through the Indian Mutiny, and I felt a very heavy responsibility in acting against the advice of my responsible, I might say, my constitutional advisers on what the effect of a given order of mine might be upon 750.000 natives. I pressed the Governor with regard to it. I said: "You have put before me terrible risks with regard to the result of my proposed action that I think I would not be justified in facing." He adhered to his view most firmly, and also, as I think I have said in the statement which I have submitted, he told me that it was not only his opinion, but that it was the strongly-held opinion of every member of his local government. I think it is only fair that people judging on that decision of mine should put themselves absolutely in the position that I was in at the time when I had to decide.
14735. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) Do you think the Governor was aware of the fact that there was a possibility, if our troops did not withdraw from Glencoe, that they might have been beaten at Glencoe?—I think he had overwhelming confidence in their standing.
14736. Because, of course, it is palpable that their being beaten out of Glencoe would have had a worse effect upon the natives than their withdrawing?—Yes; but, of course, there was always the element of hope that they would not be beaten, and there was a chance of getting them back if fighting an enemy on equal terms.
29 14737. (Sir John Edge.) But is that quite so? The Governor may have been aware of the fact that there was a risk of our being defeated, but would not a good fight, even if we had to retreat afterwards, have impressed the natives more with our power than if we had retreated without fighting? The natives might not understand concentration at all; they might think that we were running away but if we had had a good fight, as we had, and then retreated, and then concentrated, the natives might have looked upon it from a different point of view?—I am not a native, and I cannot say. I may, however, say apropos of what Sir John Edge has suggested, that I attach the greatest importance to the blow struck from Glencoe, and I have brought that out in my statement.
14738. (Chairman.) That is to say, that although we had to retreat afterwards, still the fight at Glencoe had its effect?—If I am not wasting time I would like to say exactly how it was put to me by a man who knew both the Boers and the Zulus. I was told that the Boers had come over the passes, declaring that one Hollander was worth four Englishmen; that the fool Englishman would be in a red coat and white hat, and stand at the top of the hill, and the wily Boer would shoot him, not over a rock, but from round the side of a rock. That over-confidence was knocked out of them at Talana.
14739. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) On the whole you think that the holding of Glencoe had a beneficial effect? —I think it had a very beneficial effect, not only as regards the general question of the relative fighting value, man to man, of Briton and Boer, but it gave us so much more time, and it certainly paralysed the readiness with which the Boers were prepared to advance and fight, and I believe it had a very strong influence in enabling General Yule to get away as he did.
14740. (Chairman.) You are speaking there of the effect that it had upon the Boers?—Yes.
14741. Do you think it also had an effect upon the natives—the Zulus?—I really cannot enter into that I do not know what effect it would have upon the Zulus. I would rather not commit myself to any opinion on that.
14742. (Viscount Esher.) Do I rightly understand that in the first instance you say that your military instinct was in favour of retiring from Glencoe?—Concentrating.
14743. But that on retrospect you think it was fortunate that that position was maintained; is that what we are to understand?—No, I will not go so far as that, but I will say that the incident at Talana, which, of course, was contingent on the force being there, and their being attacked, had a very strong stopping effect on the advance of the Boers.
14744. You do not go so far then as to say that you are glad on the whole that we remained at Glencoe and fought at Talana?—I never thought of it in that way.
14745. (Chairman.) What has been represented to us is that if you had been concentrated you might have made attacks upon the Boers as they came over the border, and therefore you could have fought the fight at Talana under perhaps more favourable circumstances? —I have tried to argue that point in my statement. I wrote it deliberately. I might perhaps read it.
14746. If you will just refer me to the particular point?—That is in regard to what the Commander-in- Chief said about Talana: " With special reference to the propriety of massing my troops against the Transvaalers in the north, the arguments I have used above are generally applicable. The nearest point at which I could have hoped to strike at any force would have been more distant from Ladysmith than in a similar operation to the West; they would consequently have had longer notice of my approach, and I do not believe I could have brought 8,000 men into action." I may here add that I could not have brought nearly so many into action. With regard to Talana, that engagement was fought on the 20th October; by that date troops were massed at the Drakensberg to the west of Ladysmith.
14747. The Boer troops you mean?—Yes, and they, who, according to the data which I take in my statement in reply to Lord Roberts, were at all events some 10,000 or 12,000 in number, could with their extra mobility have ridden into Ladysmith in a day. Therefore if I had fought with greater strength at Talana I should have opened Ladysmith to an attack from the west.
30 Account by Major J F Donegan, RAMC
This account by Major Donegan is taken from a hand-written document relating to the battle and a short period afterwards. The account is difficult to read in several places and best guesses have had to be used in the transcription. The document is from the archives of the Talana Museum.
Donegan mentioned the work of the two Field Hospitals at Talana, the 18th and 26th. Both came from India with the 18th being mobilised in Bangalore in early September. Donegan himself was in charge of the 18th which was attached to the Cavalry Brigade, with Donegan as Senior Medical Officer. Major Kerin14 was the Senior Medical Officer of the Brigade Division Field Artillery.
Friday 20th October 1899 Camp shelled at 6am. Three shells smashed into hospital. Troops received orders and marched out but no orders whatever were given to the medical officers. In consultation with Major Kerin we agreed to march down the Bearer Companies to the town. Major Kerin formed a dressing station near a store15 and ordered me to go to the firing line and tell the medical officers in charge of [the] corps where the dressing station was.
The infantry advanced towards the position about nine 30 under heavy fire.
As the regimental stretcher bearers of the RIF under their medical officer16 showed signs of remaining at the dressing station I march A and B sections of the 18th up to the fighting line under very heavy fire. While advancing one man was shot but with the assistance of the NCOs and Warrant Officers I got the Kahars17 to advance to a bit of cover near a river where we found three wounded men. These were dressed and returned to [the] dressing station.
I then ordered the dhoolies to advance and relieve the regimental bearers as near the fighting line as possible and I must say that they worked splendidly. I then returned to [the] dressing station and fetched out two more sections and gave orders to Captain McDermott18 to continue while I returned to get more field dressings. He also worked the men under heavy fire assisted by assistant surgeon Green19 and Duckworth20, Sgt Turner21, Pte Alexander22, Pte Willcocks23, and Atkins24, 4th Hussars.
Having visited the dressing station I galloped to [the] Field Hospital to see if it was ready to receive the wounded.
I found that Capt Erskine25 assisted by Mr Moore26 and Tocher27 had made the most perfect arrangement and had every thing in readiness. I again returned to the fighting line and saw all was correct and that the wounded were being relieved and removed. In my second advance I was accompanied by Capt Milner28 who extended to the left and worked his men to the far ends of the farm in rear of the attacking infantry. As the doolies were not advancing quickly, I again returned to dressing station and found that General Symonds (sic) had been wounded. I galloped to the Hospital to get his tent ready and on arrival of General I remained there relieving Capt Erskine who wished to see the fight and render assistance in the field. As each case
14 Major William Kerin, RAMC. 15 The store in the town belonged to Oldacre. 16 Major Francis Daly, RAMC. 17 The Kahars people of India were once palanguin bearers, that is they used to transport covered sedan chairs or litters supported by poles and carried on the shoulders. Kahar comes from the words meaning ‘shoulder’ and ‘burden’. Donegan uses the term to refer to the Indians who carried the wounded from the battlefield. Dhooly is another name for the litter used to transport the wounded and Donegan uses Dhoolies to refer to the men or bearers who carried the dhooly. 18 Captain Thomas McDermott, RAMC. 19 Assistant Surgeon Cecil Green, ISMD. 20 Assistant Surgeon P Duckworth, ISMD. 21 2674 Sergeant S Turner, 4th Hussars. 22 3985 Private R Alexander, 4th Hussars. 23 There are 9 men of the 4th Hussars on the medal roll but no one of the name Willcocks. 24 3507 Private J Atkins, 4th Hussars. 25 Captain William Erskine, RAMC. 26 Assistant Surgeon John Moore, ISMD. 27 Sub Conductor J Tocher, Supply and Transport Corps. 28 Captain Arthur Milner, RAMC.
31 arrived I had it put in a tent and issued warm tea and stimulants. I redressed all cases put up with temporary dressings and I consider that the dressing of the dressing station and in the field was absolutely splendid. By 3 pm my Hospital was full and I then loaded up No 26. I noticed that assistant surgeons [blank - author removed the names] 2 of were drunk and absolutely useless requiring the work to be done by my staff. By night time every wounded man was succoured and attended to. All Bearers did not finish till after 11 pm. In many cases these Bearers brought the wounded from the fighting line all the way to Hospital.
Major Kerin who was at the dressing station speaks highly of the civilian assistance rendered. I have to report most favourably on No 792 M Daniel an ex Madras Sepoy of 4th Madras, right wing dhoolie bearers.
Before the engagement he drilled the Kahars and in action his courage and cool headedness was marvellous. He helped the officers with maintaining strict discipline and urging the Bearers on. He worked in the most exposed positions and set a most magnificent example to the other Kahars and ward servants. I attribute the success of the work done by the 18th FH to having each doolie accompanied by an assistant surgeon, NCO or man of the Regt attached. Captain Erskine told me that later on in the day when I was not present and this system suffered with that the Bearers were inclined to take cover in nullas and remain there. I consider that every Officer, Warrant Officer, NCO and man of the Hospital under my command did excellent service and all officers of other corps were loud in the praises of the Kahars. These men were an undisciplined mob at Bangalore, were sent anyhow in different ships to Durban, were moved about Ladysmith and ordered to do garrison fatigues. They arrived at Dundee on 13th and since that date have been drilled and trained company and support drill. On Thursday morning for the first time they practiced bearer company drill and the next day they were doing it in reality in action under fire without any transport.29
Saturday 21st October Wounded doing well.
5 am. All officers and staff up all night assisting wounded.
8 am. Hearing an officer had been left in farm house near position I rode out to see if it were true. There were no wounded officers but I saw 7 officers and 28 men lying dead near the farm house. Hearing that a wounded Boer was on top of hill I went to see him in the interests of humanity. I found him under charge of a Boer sentry who said he had orders to remove him to the Boer Hospital. I arranged his dressings. I, with the assistance of Capt Sanders30 and Major Wickham31 ISC, got supplies for the wounded in town. I offer these officers my hearty thanks for the assistance they rendered me both on Saturday and Friday. Without their help the work would not have been as successful as it was. I got back to camp at 9 am when I heard the troops were going out again. I ordered two sections under Capt Erskine and Capt Milner to march out with troops. About 1.30 shelling commenced from the hill, many shells bursting in the vicinity of Hospital. The troops, horse, foot and artillery stampeded and ran out of camp. I ran to try and get transport to remove wounded as the Hospital was so much fired on with cannon shells bursting between tents but fortunately doing no harm. I found it impossible to bring back the Bearers so returned to camp where I found that nearly all the Hospital staff with the following exceptions had joined in the stampede.
Assistant Surgeon Moore, Mr Tocher, Capt McDermott, De Santos32, Hart33, Thomas34, the other assistant surgeons and now being on duty 503 2nd Grade Ward Servant Anthony, 861 3rd Grade Ward Servant Samuel, 301 2nd Grade Ward Servant Anthony, 211 First Grade Ward Sweeper Ragoo Nath. All others except those on duty with Bearer Company joined in general stampede and ran for shelter to Dundee and elsewhere. Also many of the slightly wounded and sick.
Sunday 22nd October Staff up all night attending wounded. About 8.30 some guns returned to camp when shelling commenced again which was subsequently directed towards Dundee. I regret to have to say that guns and troops persistently passed in front of Hospital and attracted fire on it. The Kahars and ward servants who returned on this occasion remained on camp having been paraded by sections. At 2 pm received orders to tend to
29 Donegan reported that about 241 wounded were removed by the dhoolie bearers from the field of action to the field and temporary hospitals. 30 Captain G Sanders, Supply and Transport Corps. 31 Lieutenant Colonel W Wickham was serving on the staff at Dundee. 32 Assistant Surgeon Francis De Santos, ISMD. 33 Assistant Surgeon A Freud-Hart, ISMD. 34 Assistant Surgeon A Thomas, ISMD.
32 sections with the troops who were going to occupy the position taken on Friday. The orders were to parade at 11 pm. Detained Capt McDermott in relieving of Capt Erskine. About 10.30 Major Kerin called me out to speak to Capt Valancey35, a staff officer. He delivered to me the following message from General Yule. Tell General Symonds [sic] that General Yule is sorry he could not see him before he left, that he was returning to Ladysmith and that he had been promoted Major General. Capt Valancey said that Sir George White had ordered that the sick and wounded were to be deserted as they could not be taken. Major Kerin and I explained that we had no rations or means of getting water for the wounded as we were not even supplied with a water cart.
Capt Valancey said I can’t help it, get what you can from the stores before the Boers come and they probably won’t take Hospital stores. Major Kerin and I had a consultation with the officers and they unanimously decided to stay with the wounded and take their chances. At midnight I summoned Mr Tocher and told him my position. He volunteered to come over to camp with me and get stores. I fell in A Section and Major Kerin came also. We worked all night at removing stores for each Hospital. For all Mr Tocher knew this camp was infested with Boers and I consider the way he worked and volunteered for this duty is worthy of special mention.
None of the other staff were told that the force had marched off and left the Hospital.
Monday 23rd October Two Privates of Lincoln Regt turned up in camp.
From day break was an anxious time and at 10.30 as natives were seen about the Hospital it was shelled again. Bhistie Mohamed Khan was wounded by shell in left foot. As the Red Cross flag appeared to be of no use I saw Major Kerin and we agreed to hoist the white flag. Capt Milner rode alone to the Boer Camp with the flag of truce and my orderly Daniel volunteered to go also. Capt Milner was of special service to the town and wounded as the Boers explained that they did not see the white flag and would have continued firing till they saw the flag of truce. On returning Capt Milner proceeded unarmed to the town and compelled the magistrate to deliver it over to the Transvaal Free State. The British magistrate at first refused and said he would not do so but Capt Milner in the interest of the wounded compelled him to do so. Capt Milner related his experiences in the Boer camp which were as follows. They stated that they could not see the Red Cross flag verified by Major Kerin who went to breakfast with the General next morning and told me that he particularly looked but could not see the flag. When the shelling commenced some natives and patients again left Camp but they returned to their tents when I ordered them to do so and stated that I would myself shoot the first man who moved a yard from his tent.
Statement of Capt Milner RAMC on arrival in the Boer camp. I was met by two officers and told to write to General Commanding as follows:
Sir. We surrender our Hospital and ask for your protection as we are likely to run short of dressing if we remain here long. We ask you to facilitate the wounded being removed by a Hospital train. We are not an armed corps but we have arms of patients who were involved in the field in Hospital. We wish to carry out the conditions of Convention and we do not wish to give up arms unless compelled to do so. In camp there are men of different regts attached to Hospital but they are non combatant. Signed A E Milner, Capt RAMC and J Schorder.
The reply was as follows:
To Capt Milner – Sir – If you lay down the arms which are at present in your possession I will be willing to discuss the other points brought forward by you. I remain your obedient servant. Erasmus, Ast Gen 23.10.99 12.15pm
There was a delay of nearly two hours from the time of Capt Milner’s departure to this return during which time all in Hospital were very anxious as to the development of affairs.
About 12.30 two Boer officers rode into camp and the letters on the previous page were had over. Major Kerin and I agreed to hand over arms. We were then asked to answer the following question in writing. Is it a fact that the Boer wounded on Friday were tied to your gun carriages and dragged round the field. We answered in the negative to this question. One of the officers then produced a Mark 4 Bullet and asked us
35 Captain Henry Vallancey, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
33 why we used dum dum bullets36. I explained the difference and brought him to a Regt officer who verified my statement.
Neither of these officers appeared to understand the general conversation and told us that everything of value we had would be taken except our clothes. They immediately took my two charges with two saddles and regt harness complete also the charges of Capt Milner, Eskine and MacDermott with saddles complete. They took my field glasses, sword and belts with pocketcase attached. Also the swords and small arms of all officers, WO & NCO’s and men in camp. Also minor articles of personal property which were lying about. They were civil in the demeanour towards the men and except in the case of those drunk all were well behaved. It was trying to have two drunken Boers trying to shoot each other at each side of a tent full of helpless wounded. I discovered afterwards that the person representing himself to be an officer by name Schoder was a fraud but as none of the Boers wore uniform it was impossible to tell who was who.
At 3.30 PM General Symonds expired and before dying told Capt Milner to write to Sir George White speaking favourably of the work done by myself and Capt Milner. As Capt Milner did not like to write recommending himself for consideration the letter was not written by him. General Symonds then sent for Major Kerin to dictate a letter but on the arrival of this officer the poor General was too bad to dictate. General Symons’ case will be found in the case book of officers. About 4pm Doctor Holt of the Boer army arrived in camp and did all he could to help myself and staff in attending to the want of the wounded. He ordered Boers to keep out of camp and stop looting and we were thankful in the extreme for his kind assistances He took the names of those who had looted us and said he would try to have our property returned.
I, acting on the advice of Col Beckett37 AAG went over the papers of the General and destroyed anything prejudicial to British interests. This was at the time that I expected all articles of value to be taken way from us. In the evening I flogged three Kahars and sentenced one to death for leaving Hospital and looting in camp of Boers. The sentence of death was afterwards commuted. The moral effect of the public flogging of these Kahars was excellent.
Tuesday 24th October Moved camp.
Arranged for the funeral of General Symonds and had a rough tombstone made in Camp. The body was sewn in union jack carried to the Church of England burial ground by the NCO and men of Hospital staff. All officers who could attended and as the body was taken out of camp every man who could stood to attention. Mr Bailey the Church of England clergyman performed the Burial Service in the orthodox manner partly in church and at the grave side. The funeral was most imposing and all Boers raised their hats of the procession passed to Burial Ground where many of them attended the service being most respectful in their manner. At 4pm a Sergt died in Hospital and I was ordered to bury the 28 NCO and men and 7 officers killed on Friday.
Wednesday 25th October At 7am A Section under Capts Erskine and Milner fell in and proceeded to the farm house to bury the dead. The scene was too frightful for description and I myself was an eye witness of the excellent work done by these officers, also by the Kahars and sweepers and ward boys and Sergt Robinson38 West Riding Regt. Suffice is it to say that all the dead in an advanced stage of decomposition were buried in five large graves, the officers separate. All were identified by marks on their clothes and slight mementoes of all officers were taken from the bodies. The sweepers carried the bodies on stretchers to grave and as there were only six sweepers they had to make 36 journeys from farm house to grave. This was the most disagreeable duty that officers, NCO and men of this British Service were ever asked to perform and I consider from my own personal experience having been present for some hours that Capt Erskine, Capt Milner, Sergt Robinson
36 Expanding bullets were given the name Dum-Dum or dumdum after an example produced in the Dum Dum Arsenal near Calcutta, India. The Mark IV bullet was produced in 1897. Dum Dum bullets were made of a soft material which would often flatten on impact and thus produce a larger wound that the original diameter of the bullet. The Hague Convention of 1899 prohibited the use in warfare of bullets that flattened or expanded in the body. 37 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Beckett served as Assistant Adjutant General for General Penn Symons. 38 2770 Sergeant T Robinson had served with the 18th Field Hospital before joining the West Riding Regiment.
34 and the men of AHC39 noted also the Kahars of A Section did splendid work which is well worthy of notice. The party returned to camp at 6.20 having been occupied on this duty referred to from 7am without food or anything to drink. In the interests of the wounded I was unwilling to detail attendants on sick for this duty but I was compelled to do so and the credit of the nation had to be considered at all cost. Clergymen of each denomination read their Burial Services. It was impossible to bury them NCO’s and men by Corps.
Thursday 26th October Mr Tocher with permission went foraging for the Hospital with excellent results. Wired as follows to the Sec of State Pretorius
Sir,
On behalf of all British officers, NCO and men I wish to offer you my sincere thanks for the kindness showed to the patients in my Hospital by the Boer officers and men. Would you kindly notify to the British authorities the death of General Symonds on the 23rd and also that the wounded are doing splendidly and that no officer under treatment is likely to die.
Handed this form to an officer of artillery who appeared fully pleased.
No 26 Hospital moved into town. Frightfully wet afternoon and night. Took in and treated two wounded Boers. Mr Duckworth who went out with a section to find one of our wounded some distance away returned to camp. There was no hesitation on his part or on the part of the Kahars to march out into a foreign country. He was out all night but found his man Pte of Hussars suffering from a wound of right lung and soon brought him to camp.
Friday 27th October Moved wounded and stores by hand from Camp to town. Put all wounded officers and serious cases in houses and made them as comfortable as possible. It was an arduous task and all worked well from 6.30am to 7pm. We had one ambulance cart.
Made prisoner of [blank] for being in the town without leave.
Bedded down all the wounded and attended to professional treatment of same.
Received the following telegram in Dutch from Secretary of State Pretorius.
Your wire of 26th received the facts therein. Will be contributed [sic] to the British Authorities.
Made prisoner of three men for breaking out of Hospital and being found in town without permission.
39 Army Hospital Corps.
35 Letter by Captain C Hensley, RDF
Captain Charles Albert Hensley was a Canadian by birth and served with the RDF at the battle of Talana. This section is based on a letter he wrote to his father that was published in the Illustrated London News.
The letter was dated 21st November 1899 and was written in Estcourt. Captain Hensley was killed at Venter’s Spruit in the relief of Ladysmith on 20th January 1900.
My dear Dad: Although I have not written since we have been out, A40 has, nearly every mail day. The truth is that we have had a rather bad time, with little time for writing. What with picquets, etc., up all night for sometimes several nights at a time, one does not feel like writing. I have sent A. a note or wire nearly every day, except while we were cut off at Dundee. It does seem a ridiculous thing that a column of 3,500 strength, with transport, in all making a mass some 3.5 to 4 miles long, could have absolutely disappeared Captain Hensley as we did for 3 whole days41.
However, to begin at the time we left Maritzburg, on the 19th September. We arrived at Ladysmith early the next day and marched out 2.5 miles to camp. We only stayed there 3 days and were ordered off to Dundee with the Leicesters. The order came at 6 p.m. and we were in the train with everything packed at 1.00 a.m. Got up to Dundee early in the morning and had to bivouac that night. Early the next morning - 3.00 a.m. - we were turned out but it proved a false alarm. The following day the 3 batteries arrived with the 18th Hussars and, two days after, 1st K.R.R42. We had a nice camp and comfortable mess tent and, with the exception of a tremendous lot of picquets, an easy time of it. On 9th October we heard of the Z.A.R. ultimatum, and on the 11th war was declared, but for some days before that our patrols, near the Buffalo river (the border) which is 12 miles from Dundee, could see armed Boer patrols moving about and guns had been placed at Volksrust just over the border. The 87th Irish Fusiliers43 arrived at Dundee at about this time and General Symons cleared all the women and children out of the town. Dundee, of course, is the centre of the Natal coal fields and we were sent there to protect them. It seemed a foolish move except that nobody seemed to realise that the Boers would invade Natal. No, I won't say that, because many of the colonials said they would; but our intelligence reports - which by the way were absolutely rotten - said no. Well, at about 1.00 a.m. on the 14th or 15th our C.O. 44, Bird, was wakened in his tent by the General who said: 'Bird, I have just received a wire from General White saying, send your best battalion at once to Ladysmith as the Free Staters are over the border.' General Symons added, 'I have chosen you, trains will be ready at 3.30 a.m.' We arrived at Ladysmith between 8 and 9 o'clock and the people at the station said, 'hurry up the fight has begun, we have heard their big guns for sometime.' (Such is imagination). We chucked off everything except equipment and legged it out at 4 miles per hour but the farther we got the more peaceful things looked and, when we were 6 miles out, at Dewetsdorp Spruit, we got orders to remain where we were until the General arrived. It was then 2.00 p.m. and we had had nothing to eat; however, we saw a transport cart with bully beef and hard biscuits which we commandeered (a great word now) and served out, a ration per man. General White turned up at about 3.00 o'clock and said, 'I have just had a wire from Gen Symons saying, send back my battalion at once as we expect attack.'
So off we went and arrived at Dundee at 1.30 a.m. Found our camp under water as it had been raining all day. Every-body was pretty well done up, having been two nights out of bed to say nothing of only a little bully beef to eat. In spite of no blankets we slept the sleep of the just.
Nothing of any importance happened until the 19th when the General sent over and said we were to supply 3 companies under a field officer to go by train to a coal field 10 miles away and bring in 1,000 bags of mealies which had been abandoned there when the mine shut down. The train had to pass through Hatting Spruit
40 Agnes his wife who was in Pietermaritzburg at the time. 41 During the retreat from Dundee between 23rd and 25th October 1899. 42 The arrival of units at Dundee was not exactly as Hensley reported them. 43 Hensley here uses the pre-1881 regimental designation for the RIF, the 87th Regiment of Foot. Later he used the 60th to refer to the KRRC. 44 This occurred on 13th October 1899.
36 where a commando of 600 Boers had been seen the day before. It was a bit exciting. English45 went as the field officer, and my company with two others. On arriving at Glencoe, the main line junction from Dundee by branch line, we found the mail train in and all the passengers very much excited, saying the train had been fired on at Elandslaagte and that they had had to leave half the train on a steep grade just the other side of Wasbank, the station just outside Glencoe, as the Boers rode firing from their ponies at the engine driver. We saw where glass had been broken by their bullets. The place we had to get to was up the other way and the Staff Officer at Glencoe did not want us to go up, but English said to me, 'I think we ought to go, don't you.' I, of course, agreed with him. We turned the engine round the wrong way so that the coal at the end would lead. (No tenders on these Natal engines.) Two Sergeants who are crack shots and I, all with rifles, got into the engine with English, who kept a lookout with glasses. We saw no one. Hatting Spruit had been looted and the store burnt. We got down to the coal field and I went out with a covering party on the hills whilst English supervised the loading of the mealies. The men worked like bucks and in 25 minutes we had loaded 1,100 bags and were off again to Dundee where we arrived all right and the General was very pleased.
The next morning, 20th October we paraded as usual at 4.30a.m. and, whilst on parade, heard musketry firing. A message had come in from the M.I. that a large party of Boers were coming up on Talana Hill overlooking the town and that 20 M.I. could not check them. So companies who were for picquet that day (B & E) were sent out to reinforce. At 5.00 o'clock we were dismissed but told to stand by and wait what might befall. Renny46, one of our youngsters, who was looking through a glass, spotted a lot of men on top of Talana, 4,100 yards from our camps. We argued about their being Boers and I said to Bird, our C.O., the first thing we shall hear will be the sing of a shell into camp: I had hardly got the words out of my mouth when a puff of smoke came from the side of the hill and a shell hit the road about 1,000 yards short. Bang! came another, right into camp, but hurt no one. I think we all ducked to it and it must have been funny. I know I ducked because I rammed my head against the muzzle of the rifle of a man who was near, and nearly knocked my ear off. The men had fallen in by this time and I gave my company the order to double out and lie down on the ground away from the tents which served as targets for the enemy and drew the fire. The shells were coming in pretty thick then. No sooner had I done that than every company in the Batt'n followed me and formed quarter column, which of course was worse than being near the tents - so I moved again. I have come to the conclusion that men are just like sheep; where one goes - especially in time of fright - the rest will follow; However, the order came to double into a nullah some 300 yards to the front and under shelter, and there to await orders. Old Father Murray, R.C. came rushing out of his tent not knowing what was going on and the plucky old chap came along with us until a lot of wounded were brought back, when he helped to look after them.
Our guns answered back in 15 minutes whilst we the infantry, that is the 87th, 60th, and ourselves, and the Leicesters were kept back to protect the camp from flank attack with 1 Battery47. We advanced through the town and got into a river bed parallel to the Boer position and about 1,200 yards from it. Our guns then moved up closer and engaged the enemy. The shooting was magnificent and at the end of half an hour a shell from one of our guns burst just under a cursed gun the Boers had, a Maxim-Nordenfelt (the men call it the barking gun as it sounds just like a dog). Our shell burst just under it and I happened to be looking through my glasses at the time. It seemed to rear up on its tail and turn over backwards. The Boers had 8 guns on the top!48 Talana is from 800 to 1,000 feet high with another hill49 about 1,000 yards off flanking the whole front of it, and the devils enfiladed us with a couple of Maxims from it.
At 7.25 a.m. the order came for the infantry to advance; the Dublins to form the firing line and to cover the front with a cloud of skirmishers. It was then, as afterwards, that the training of our men told and showed that we had not been dinning into the men's ears for 2.5 years50 in vain that they must advance in open order formation, take advantage of all cover, and fire independently when they could see anything to fire at. You may have seen in some of the home papers very flattering accounts of the behaviour of the regiment and others that rather cry it down, saying, why, if we did it all, were our casualties so much less in both officers and men than the other regiments. I can only put it down to the different training, and several times during the day it was most noticeable. Our men would, one at a time, get up and rush across the open, never two together, get over behind a stone or in a nullah, the officer, of course, going first. It was different in the 87th and the 60th. I, several times, saw them advance a whole section at a time, à la drill book. It does not do
45 Major Frederick English, RDF. 46 Lieutenant Lewis Renny, RDF. 47 The 67th RFA. 48 A slight exaggeration of the actual number of Boer guns. 49 Lennox Hill. 50 The RDF had arrived in South Africa in 1897.
37 against good shots like the Boers. It may answer in Egypt. I tell you this by way of making some of those Egyptian heroes sit up. Our officers, for instance, left swords in camp and carried rifles and fired with the men. I fired some 40 or 50 rounds during the day and plugged several I think - one I know of. He was right on the sky line and on my third shot he came down, 600 yards. I marked a stone near a bush and, after we had cleared them off the hill, I had a look for him and found him dead all right. I took a brand new Mauser and bandolier off him and it is now safe in Maritzburg with A. It is only one of 40 or 50 saved in the regiment but I had to carry it myself for three days, besides my own kit, in that awful retreat from Dundee. But, as the novel says, I have wandered from my subject.
We left the river bed at 7.25 a.m. as I said, 4 paces between files, in quick time. I was one of the 3 leading companies. As soon as we came out of the riverbed the bullets began to buzz. We had a green field 400 yards across, as open and flat as a cricket pitch, to march over before we could get any cover. Halfway across was a barbed wire fence and they had got the range of that and made things pretty hot. We had to cut the wire. I had a small pair of pliers and was stooping cutting, or trying to cut the wire, my Colour-Serg't standing just behind me, holding the wire I think. A bullet went over my back and killed him, poor chap, and at the same time another bullet hit the toe of my boot. Another man dropped close by. So I made them all climb over the top and then we went at a steady double to the edge of the wood - 200 yards - where there was a second wire fence with a small stone wall on the far side. We lay under the wall for five minutes. The man on my right was shot in the neck and the bullets were whizzing all around us when we found it was the beastly hill on our right which was enfilading us51. We made a rush through the wood and it was weird hearing bullets zipping through the leaves of the trees. On the far side of the wood was another low stone wall and we lined that and opened fire for the first time at 600 to 700 yards. We remained there for some time and then the word came to advance. I was the left company and the two lines of advance were on the left by a nullah, and on the right a stone wall which protected them from the Maxim on the right hill. Most of the ground was dead from the top of the hill. Those who went up along the wall formed up under cover of it. It was about three feet high, running parallel to the Boer position, about 100 yards from it. We who had the luck to get into that cursed nullah had a bad time of it as it proved a regular death trap. The Boers evidently suspected it would form one of the points of our attack and consequently told off their crack shots - the Middleburg Burghers - to watch it. If anyone showed himself for a minute the bullets sang about him. The cover was very bad and effective only when we lay flat on our stomachs. We made rushes, one at a time, from one little side nullah to another I had made a run forward and a minute after Perreau52 said, 'we are giving them Majuba today.' Our guns were giving them beans on the top. Then a bullet whizzed past my head over my right shoulder and I thought I was hit and put my hand up. I heard a thud and Perreau staggered back saying, 'by God, they've got me.' He had got it clean through the left shoulder but afterwards it proved to be a clean wound and not very serious. He was very plucky about it and said he wished they had left him alone until he had got to the top. I had to go on at once to make room for more men. However; in time [I] got to the end of the nullah and there was nothing for it but to wait until the guns hammered them a bit as it was suicide to attempt to cross the open in that hail of bullets. I got up once to see if there was another nullah in front so that we could rush for it and though I was up only 15 seconds bullets buzzed around like bees. One hit just in front and knocked mud into my face. Just to show what the fire was like I made a man put his helmet in the grass which was 2 or 3 inches high on the nullah edge and almost at once there was a hole in it. Toward noon it began to drizzle. We had nothing but our thin khaki on and soon were completely wet. We had had nothing to eat that day and there were a lot of wounded and a few dead lying about. We could neither advance nor move back and we could see the others behind getting ready for something. I can't well imagine anything more miserable.
Then, at the wall, we saw a lot of men led by Dibley, one of our captains, make a mad rush over the wall for the hill. This was the so-called bayonet charge. It was a very plucky thing to do but mad and absolutely useless as it was impossible to charge up a perpendicular hill, as we found it afterwards. They had to come back. Some of the 60th and 87th joined in the charge. Lowndes, our Adjutant, who followed Dibley, was shot in the leg and had it broken. He has had to have it off, I'm afraid53. Dibley was shot under the eye and the bullet came out behind his ear. It looked a ghastly wound but he was doing well when we left Dundee. Just as our fellows came back our guns began salvos on the top. I ought to tell you of one magnificent bit of pluck on the part of the Boers - the only time I have seen them show any. As I told you, our men were under cover behind the wall but when they climbed over they had to cross a space of about 15 yards before they got under cover of the cliff.
51 Lennox Hill. 52 Captain Charles Perreau, RDF. 53 Captain Maurice Lowndes continues to serve with the RDF after Talana earning the QSA and KSA. No other source suggests his wounded leg was amputated.
38 A picture from September 2009 showing the steepness of the final incline to the summit
39 As they came over the wall, 8 Boers in their waterproofs which blew about like flags stood up on the skyline regardless, or perhaps, in contempt, of our rifle fire, remembering 1881, and fired down at our chaps like one would at a rabbit bolting down hill. Five of them went down almost at once; of course we had to be careful for fear of hitting our own men, but three seemed to bear a charmed life until they too went down in time.
As I said, the guns began salvos and all I can say is that I hope to heaven I shall never be under fire such as they poured into the top of the hill. The fire was incessant for 5 or 10 minutes and the top must have been a perfect hell. I seized the opportunity to get up and run across to the next nullah, 50 yards on, followed by 40 or 50 men. There were no shots fired from the top but they had a good old plug at us from the right hill. As far as I know this did no damage. It was while this awful fire was going on that, either by some mistake or accident, a lot of the 60th and 87th either had got over the wall to try Dibley's charge again or were those who followed him and had had no time to get back. Anyway, one of our shells burst amongst them and killed the lot. This partly accounts for their casualty list being so much bigger than ours. While the salvos were still on I made another rush and worked up along the wall and joined the rest. The guns stopped and Col Carleton of the 87th called out: ‘Who's for the top?' Murray, the General's A.D.C. came along and said to me 'I am the only one left of the four who dined together last night.' Then he told me that the General had been hit in the stomach, Sherston (Brigade Major) shot dead, and Col Beckett, Chief of Staff, lying wounded over the wall. He also said, 'let's see if we can get to the top'. We scrambled over; followed by 60 or 70 men, and then they began blazing at us from the right hill but could not see us from the top. Thank the Lord the Maxim was out of action. Just as we got under the cliff there was a cry: 'Come back! The guns are going to shell the position again.' You bet we ran for the wall as we had already seen the result of the first shell amongst our own men. In one place I saw 8 men and one officer of the 87th all of whom looked as if they had taken a dive into the earth, all, of course, dead. Two officers of the 60th Rifles were blown to bits - one, poor young Hambro, I knew rather well. Of course there were a lot of wounded lying outside the wall. We tried to get them under cover. I found Connor, Adjt of the 87th, hit in three places54. It took four of us to carry him down to a place of safety as he weighed 14 stone. Poor chap, he died the next day. It proved to be a false alarm as the guns opened on the left and right of us, so away we went, all mixed up; Dublins, 60th and 87th, and arrived at the top which proved to be absolutely forsaken, except by dead and wounded Boers.
They were still firing from the right hill, however, but a few volleys soon stopped that. There were not many dead left on the top but the ground was strewn with kit, rifles and ammunition and the rocks were splashed with blood, showing that their loss must have been very heavy. We advanced to the edge of the hill at the back, and there below us, on the run, was one solid block of men and horses 1,500 yards away. There were at least 5,000 of them I think though people who saw them at the back, and could judge, said that there were 7,000, but I doubt it. We all expected the guns, which had galloped up to the nek between the hills to open fire. If they had, they must have killed 1,000 to 1,500 Boers, put that commando out of existence, prevented that retreat from Dundee and most likely stopped all raiding into Natal. But no, the old fool commanding officer; Col. Pickwoad, would not let them fire as he said the Boers had hoisted a white flag. When, O when, will we learn about the Boer tricks? When a white flag goes up, troops halt and lay down their arms. It was too much for me though the cease fire had gone. I got 15 to 20 men together for long range volleys at 1,600 yards and got in two before the Staff Officer could get up on his flat feet and wanted to know what I meant by firing after the cease fire had sounded. I said I thought it was a mistake and he grinned but said it was the General's (Yule's) orders. He is an old woman too. I wish he could have heard the men's remarks.
It was 2.45 when firing stopped and we reached the top of the hill, so that we had been 9.5 hours under fire, and as I heard one Tommy say, 'we have been 9 ______hours getting to the top of the _____ hill and when we can get a good shot at the _____ we won't be let fire. What fools work it is, at all, at all.'
I had a plug at a Boer going off on a white pony with the Mauser I had captured and made him skip. We watched them for a long while and I have never been so sick at anything in my life. To think that what our real general had worked for; i.e. to drive them off the hill in a mass on to our guns and cavalry, and then after we had done it to have an old woman, or rather; two old women, spoil everything. Our cavalry and M.I. were taken prisoner as they were hanging on the flank waiting for the guns to throw them [the Boers] into disorder and so let them in.
It began to pour with rain about 4.00 o'clock and at 5.00 o'clock, at the edge of the town, we found a cart with bully beef and biscuits waiting for us. What people were left in the place came out with brandy and whisky etc. We marched into camp in the rain, wet to the skin, tired, hungry, and I personally, as were most of us, sadder than I have ever been in my life before. All those good chaps gone with whom we had been chaffing and laughing only that morning. Poor Weldon, with whom I shared a tent, was killed. Ginger Long of '21
54 Captain Frederick Connor, 1st RIF.
40 died that evening. Three others were hit. Sherston, my old Garrison instructor, was shot dead. Fifteen Rifles dead. Two Irish Fusiliers, to say nothing of all the men killed or wounded. And the General dying. I tell you, the romance of a big battle against modern arms is very small and one can only wonder how anyone escapes the terrific fire. But with it all, one cannot help feeling a bit proud of the fact that 2 500 of ours drove 7,000, or call it 5,000 if you like, out of an almost impregnable position and showed the Boer that we are better than he is any day, and can shoot as well.
As for the rot that the honour belongs to us - the Dublins; in my opinion all were alike and everybody did his best, as they must have done, or we could never have succeeded as we did.
As I have said, it is a wonder that anyone escaped. Our losses for the day, in the Regiment alone, were; killed, wounded and missing, 9 officers and 105 N.C.O.s and men. As far as we could make out we killed over 200 Boers and wounded another 300, but, as they take away their dead, it is very hard to say. The 60th lost; killed, wounded and missing, 12 officers and 111 men; the 87th, 5 officers and 41 men.
I must honestly say I don't like big battles and everybody's nerves after 9.5 hours constant fighting were all in pieces. If a knife dropped in mess it was a volley and a plate was a salvo. But that night in spite of wet blankets, nerves and all, I slept - O, how I did sleep.
I hope you got my cable from Ladysmith. Cory and I shared as his father has a cable address. He was out on the flank with the M.I. and was not actually in the fight. I will write soon again and tell of our doings after leaving Dundee.
The grave of Captain Hensley
41 Account by Major F M Crum, KRRC
In 1903 Major Crum published a book about his time in South Africa under the title ‘With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa’. This was based on his personal diary and letters written home.
Part I contains a fascinating chapter on the fight at Talana. Crum was wounded at Talana and captured by the Boers. Part II of his book relates the story of his time as a prisoner in Dundee and Pretoria. His experiences will have been mirrored by others who were captured at Talana albeit that his arrival at Pretoria was delayed while his wound was taken care of.
Both parts I and II are reproduced.
Footnotes have been added to explain and elucidate some parts of the diary, otherwise the text is as published.
Part I – Talana and Dundee Hospital The detachment of the 1st Batt King's Royal Rifles to which I belonged had been stationed in South Africa since January, 1896, so that when the war did come, in 1899, was no surprise to us. Indeed, on our departure from India, many men were heard to express their intention of “pulling Mr. Kruger's whiskers," and very soon after our arrival at the Cape we started field days and training in South African warfare. General Sir Wm. Goodenough fully realised the possibility of war with the Boers, and trained the troops under him particularly in stalking and shooting, which he foresaw would be so important; yet, being anxious to do nothing in the way of hurrying matters, he used the term "South African" warfare, and forbad the words "Boer" warfare.
General Goodenough was succeeded by Colonel Morgan-Crofton, and later by Sir William Butler, and they too kept the troops employed, laying particular stress on the necessity for intelligence in individuals and on good shooting and stalking. So convinced were all ranks that they were training for the real thing, that we listened keenly, and profited greatly from serving under these commanders.
On May 5th, 1899, great excitement and a feeling of a coming ultimatum were caused by the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Reitz. On Sunday, May 7th, we sailed from Cape Town, and joined the other four companies of the battalion at Maritzburg under Lieut.-Col. Gunning, arriving there on the night of May 11th. At Maritzburg we were kept busy soldiering, and all ranks showed a keenness which could only be inspired by the conviction that war was coming. It took a long time coming. For about four months we were in a continual state of suspense. We rushed at the morning papers every day — when the news looked like peace we were greatly depressed; when war seemed certain we were in tremendous spirits. We congratulated ourselves on being one of the regiments on the spot, and our only regret was lest someone should have to be left behind.
In June Sir William Penn Symonds, from India, took over the command in Natal. He kept us busy with constant field days, taking a special interest in the Mounted Infantry, to which I belonged. He was a keen and capable soldier, and though some of us thought that his tactics were more suited for Afridis55 than for Boers, yet we all felt that he was a leader of men, and all were ready to go anywhere with him.
In June and July I made expeditions to the neighbourhood of Laing's Nek, for a fight there was looked upon in those days as a certainty, and it would be a great advantage to know the ground. The historical interest of the ride along the Nek from Majuba to the Buffalo was greatly added to by the feeling that we might some day soon be either attacking the south side or resisting an attack from the north. The feeling on the border was already strained, and there was considerable uneasiness at Charlestown, where, I remember, there was a meeting of the residents to discuss what they should do in the event of war, should Charlestown not be held by our troops. A retirement on Newcastle was decided on by all the residents except one, an old soldier, who voted for forming a laager and resisting to the end.
55 The Afridi is the name of the Pashtun tribe of India.
42 On the night of Sunday, Sept 24th, General Symonds came in to us while we were all at mess. We all stopped talking, and felt that something was up. The General said that we were to move up next day to Ladysmith, while the Ladysmith garrison was being moved on to Dundee. This looked like business at last. The battalion went up by train, while the Mounted Infantry Company marched up the road with the 5th Lancers. The enthusiasm was tremendous, and I shall never forget the exchanges of cheering which took place when we, marching north by road, met the crowded trains of refugees coming south by rail from Johannesburg.
A fine serviceable looking lot were these troops, and, looking back on them now, I feel sure that better never started for the front than the highly-trained troops which found themselves in the country at the beginning of the war. In those days there were a few, but very few, who would shake their heads and say that the Boer was a very good fighting man, that he was well armed, and that there was room for anxiety about the result. But we felt full of confidence; we expected to have one hard fight, perhaps two; and we realised that with modern quick-firing rifles there must be many casualties. But we were not going to make the blunders of 188056; we were dressed in khaki now, and well practiced in skirmishing. We would be in Johannesburg by Christmas.
On October 1st we reached Colenso. While we encamped there, detachments of the Natal Carabineers, Durban Light Infantry, and the Natal Naval Volunteers, with two guns, arrived to do garrison duty. All were keen for a fight, and regretting that they should be thus employed on lines of communication. It makes one smile now to think of the two old 40-pounder muzzle-loading guns, which had been solemnly brought up from Durban to Colenso to be pitted against the Boer Long Toms.
In peace time Ladysmith as a military station had always had a bad name. Officers had been known to resign their commissions rather than serve there, and when we arrived there, as we did on a typical afternoon, on October 2nd, we were well able to realise why Ladysmith was unpopular. Wherever one went the dust was ankle deep, a black, grimy dust, which was blown by strong hot winds for the first half of the day in one direction, and then, at half time, the wind would change and blow the whole lot back again. The flies were so thick that one could not eat without swallowing them, and the heat was most oppressive. Very glad we were when on October 4th orders came for us to march to Dundee next day. Colonel Gunning had been asked how long it would take him to start for Dundee, and he had answered like a good rifleman, "I am ready now, Sir," with the result that we were chosen to go instead of another regiment which had been intended for Dundee. Our last night at Ladysmith was a real bad one. All tents had been struck and packed on the waggons, and we were sleeping in the open, when a storm and whirlwind of dust came along our way, carrying off boots, helmets, and kits into the darkness. As we started before daylight we were unable to retrieve everything, and some who had taken great care to provide themselves with complete campaigning kits started at the very outset with incomplete ones.
The Leicester Regiment, two Batteries R.F.A., and the 18th Hussars, under Colonel Möller, had already reached Dundee, and had reported being fired on in the Glencoe Pass; and there were rumours of a concentration of 16,000 Boers on the Border. Our party consisted of the 1st Batt K.R.R., Major Wing's Battery R.F.A., and our Company of M.I. (96 men under Captain Northey), the whole under Colonel Gunning. Full military precautions were taken, our Company doing the scouting, and we arrived at Dundee without adventure on the afternoon of Saturday, October 7th.
Dundee, with its beautiful climate and scenery, was much appreciated after Ladysmith. Though we knew that there were large numbers of armed Boers collected near the borders, still there was a feeling that war was by no means certain, even up to October 11th, when the Boers celebrated Kruger's birthday by firing in their ultimatum, and thus removed all doubt. In those days, with the Dundee shops all open, and the civilians carrying on their ordinary pursuits, while our bands played regularly each afternoon, it was difficult to realise that fighting was so imminent.
About October 10th General Symonds arrived and took over the command; later Colonel Yule arrived, and soon all the women and children were sent down country. Rumours grew more and more serious, till at last, on October 12th (my birthday), we heard that the Boers had declared war. Shots had been fired near Van Reenen's Pass, and large numbers of Boers were advancing from all directions. At the time I heard the news, I was writing a letter home. Though so long expected, it came as a shock. I sat up with a start and thought, "Well, now we are in for a 'big thing.” On October 13th we woke to find that the whole battalion of Dublin Fusiliers had been sent down to Ladysmith. The Free State Boers were expected in the direction of Van Reenen's Pass. As they had already 8000 troops at Ladysmith, and we had only 3000 at Dundee, and
56 A reference to the events on Majuba Hill in the Transvaal War.
43 as they had not so many Boers to deal with as we had, we grudged losing our old friends the Dublin Fusiliers. However, they soon came back; so when, on the 16th the Royal Irish Fusiliers under Colonel Carleton also joined us, we felt ready for all comers.
From the 12th to the 19th the scouting by day and the picquets by night kept the mounted troops hard at work. These parties were sent out to considerable distances, far further than would have been considered advisable later in the war however, they never came to any harm, and even the night picquet of twelve men under Lieutenant Grimshaw, Dublin Fusiliers, three miles east of camp, which was rushed at 3 a.m. the morning of Talana, had only one man wounded; the rest succeeded in falling back and warning General Symonds of the attack.
On October 18th I had been out from 4 a.m. to 6 p.m., doing a hard day's reconnoitring with four picked men of the M.I., one Natal Carabineer, a man called Spencer57, with a good head and local knowledge, and one police trooper, who also knew the district. We had been sent to watch the Landsman and Laffine's drifts over the Buffalo, about twelve miles from camp. To do this we had stalked up by Fort Pine to the top of Moma Mountain, and then worked our way along the Malmgave Range, fully expecting to see something of a party of thirty Boers who were daily in those parts. There were none, however, that day, so after waiting till 3 p.m. at a place where we could see several of the drifts over the Buffalo, we left for camp, calling at the Wade's Farm on the way.
On arrival in camp I reported to General Symonds, who had trustworthy news that the Boers were all round us and intended to attack next day. He seemed relieved to hear it was all clear in the direction I had come from.
We were joined this day by Stuart Wortley, Jelf, and Johnson, who had come in a cruiser from Cape Town just in time.
The long day's reconnoitring upset me, and I spent a bad night. I had to remain in bed with fever the following day, and very glad I was that the expected battle did not come off just then.
On Friday, October 20th, the troops fell in at 5 a.m. awaiting an attack. I lay awake on my valise listening, and praying that the Boers would give me yet another day to get fit in. Dr. Julian58 passed my tent and told me on no account to get up. I told him the blister he had put on me had made me so sore, and the fever had left me so weak, that I didn't think I should do the Boers much harm, but that if they did come, I should certainly have a try. At 5.15 a.m. all our fellows came back much disappointed, saying the battle was "off" again. The troops had been dismissed, and it looked like another day of “armed peace." Presently I heard a rumour that Grimshaw and his picquet of twelve men of M.I. had been rushed. Next I heard the mess servants outside my tent say, "What's them 'ere bloaks on that bloomin' hill?" and some discussion as to whether they were Boers or Dublin Fusiliers. Going out of my tent I saw them looking at the hill above Piet Smith's Farm, which is about two miles east of the town. I saw crowds of men on the sky-line, and something very like guns. The whole camp had turned out to look at them.
I felt that they were Boers at once, rushed into my tent, and forgetting my fever and blister and everything else, bundled on my clothes as fast as ever I could. I had got one puttee on and was just putting on the other, when there was a loud, sharp report from the hill, a noise like a rocket travelling through the air, then a thud, and an explosion, which sounded at the next tent. Never did I spend less time dressing than that morning, and yet I forgot none of the things which I should need for a long day's fighting—my difficulty was to find them. Every coat but the right one seemed to come to hand. Another shell, close to, nearly made me put on Northey's coat, but just in time I saw mine bang at the bottom of everything. “Where are my field glasses, my watch, my knife, my whistle and helmet?" More shells tell me I must not waste time; luckily there is my haversack full of necessary articles, and my sword-belt, but of course, that is buckled up and wants a lot of undoing. “Shall I take my sword? No, it won't be much use against Mausers. Spurs, too, can go to the devil. Well, here goes!" and I bolt across to the Mounted Infantry lines. The camp has been surprised; there is great confusion, but all are doing their best to get right. Shells are landing all over the camp—there goes one into a span of mules, but they don't seem to be killed. My men are saddling up quick as they can, some calm, some excited. “Can I help you there? Your horse don't seem to like shells, but that's no reason for putting in the bit upside down, and that strap first—there—that's all right, up you get” What a lot of loose horses!—hope mine are not loose. “Faulkner! Oh, there you are." The good Faulkner59
57 202 Trooper R Spencer, Natal Carbineers. 58 Major Richard Julian, RAMC, in medical charge of Crum’s regiment. 59 7212 Private C Faulkner, KRRC.
44 with 'Rounie' and 'Fiddlehead' nearly ready—as cool as when saddling up in the paddock for a race; just a soupcon of excitement as he tells me my rein is twisted. “The 'Mounted' are going in that direction, Sir, I don't know what their orders are." "All right, come on!" and away we go.
As I rode through the tents of our battalion I saw men huddled in twenties behind the tents, and just as I passed Colour-Sergeant Davies60 and B Company, one shell seemed to land right in the middle of some men, and yet no great harm was done. The fire is very straight; how awful it would be if they fired shrapnel shells! I felt so sorry for our men having to sit still and do nothing, and I rather felt riding away from them into comparative safety. At first, I am told, there was just the least tendency to panic, but the regiment which had faced death quietly on the Warren Hastings was soon steadied. "Now then, D Company!" from Jack Pechell, and "Steady, men!" from Johnny Campbell, and every man was sitting tight, hoping for luck and waiting for orders. The Mounted Infantry, with the 18th Hussars and all the pack and transport animals, had orders to get under cover under the rocky slope to the north side of the camp. It must have been about 6.15 a.m. when all were present and formed up. With our Company there were Northey, Jelf, Majendie, myself and about eighty men. We went round and saw that each man had his ammunition, his magazine charged with ten rounds, and food in his haversack. All the men were ready and keen. I told my lot that all I wanted of them was to keep cool and shoot straight. As we had no orders, I got leave from Northey to ask the General what our orders were. The artillery duel had begun. Our guns had got a bad start; all their horses were away watering, so that they could not choose their positions, and had to fire from where they were61. But they were three grand batteries; every shot they fired was a good shot, and gave confidence to our side, while it told on the enemy.
General Symonds62 and his staff were standing at his tent near the guns when I galloped up. Shells seemed to be visiting this neighbourhood too. The General signed to me not to gallop, and asked, "Well, what is it?" I told him the Dublin and Rifles M.I. had no orders. He said, "You are to go with the 18th Hussars. Go and tell Colonel Möller that he is to wait under cover—it may be for one or two hours—and I will send him word to advance, but he may advance if he sees a good opportunity. “Go quietly, don't gallop." I repeated the order clearly to the General to make sure I had it correctly. I trotted away to where the horses were, told Lonsdale and Northey, and then told Colonel Möller. The whole lot then dismounted.
Knowing that much larger forces were to be expected from the direction of Impati than from the Buffalo, I felt very uneasy about what was now our left flank. The early morning mists had not yet cleared from the ridge, and the top of Impati was in a cloud. I got leave to ride out, while we were waiting, to have a look in that direction.
I took one man (Swaine63) with me and galloped about two miles to the top of the ridge above Seager's Farm, on the road to Hatting Spruit. Finding all clear, we turned round and headed across country towards Indumeni, and made for some mounted men a mile or two from camp, towards Glencoe. As we crossed the Sand Spruit, we watered our horses, and I took a drink, as I was feeling very dry. We found it was the Leicester M.I. we had seen. We talked to some gunners who were there with the R.A. transport, and then rode back to the Company. Perhaps this bit of scouting was rather officious, but I was young, and was just as well employed thus perhaps as doing nothing. It was from the same ridge, on the Hatting Spruit road, that Erasmus's guns and Joubert's commando attacked the next day.
It must have been nearly 8 a.m. when I got back to Colonel Möller and the 18th Hussars. He told me our M.I. had gone on with the 18th's maxim gun, so I galloped on after them. I soon came in sight of them working down the Sand Spruit valley, and getting round the Boer's right. There was also one squadron of cavalry. The enemy's guns on Smith's Kop, or Talana Hill, had spotted this move, and opened fire on the moving target. As Swaine and I drew nearer the maxim, we got nearer the shell fire. I said to him, “Don't ride beside me; there is no reason why we should both get shot". He said he could not hold his bally horse, so I took a pull at mine and let him shoot about ten yards ahead. Immediately afterwards a shell whistled past between us and struck the bank of the stream close to us. I had hardly time to say “By Jove!" when another, and then a third fell, all so close that one felt it was a question of inches. This was their quick-firing gun, afterwards known as the pom-pom, which had evidently got the range, if not the direction, of our maxim gun. I got up to our maxim, and found that my section of M.I. were not there, only twenty-two men, under Majendie, as escort. The men of this escort were far too close together, but we got them to open out after a lot of shouting. The 18th squadron had gone on in front. There were a lot of wire fences, which we cut in several
60 3480 Colour Sergeant A Davies, KRRC. 61 Only the horses for the 67th were being watered at the time. 62 General Sir William Penn Symons. 63 8222 Pte T Swaine, KRRC. He was made a prisoner at Talana.
45 places. Crossing the Sand Spruit, we halted a few minutes in the river bed, and here I got Majendie to give me half his men, so we advanced in two small sections, each under an officer. When men are excited or under fire, I should say from the experience of this day that twelve men is as many as one man can supervise.
Once round the Boer flank, the firing on us ceased, and one had more time to look to one's front and left. The front was clear enough, but the hills covered with mist on our left might have held an Army Corps. We pushed on down the left bank of the Sand Spruit, through two farms and a kraal and more barbed wire fences, then, turning sharp to the right, we re-crossed the spruit at a bad place, and came right up under cover of a ridge of stones and boulders on the Meyer's Drift road, where it looks down on Schultz's Farm. Here we found the advanced squadron of the 18th Hussars. Soon afterwards we were joined by the remainder of the 18th and the whole Company of Dublin Fusiliers M.I., who had also been heavily fired at from Talana on their way. There was cover here for all, so we dismounted and waited. I crept up to where Colonel Möller was, and asked leave to have a look over the ridge. It was grand—here we were on the Boers' right rear, at about 1500 to 2000 yards range, with a maxim gun, 120 rifles, and a whole regiment of cavalry. The hill the Boers were on commanded us by about 500 feet, but we were out of sight and under cover from them. Their pom-pom was quiet now, and the other Boer guns did not seem so busy. Peeping up I could see fully 500 ponies, and a lot of Boers. What was the range? Major Greville put it at 1200 yards, but I put it at 2000. We asked for a range-finder, but there was none, we had all come out in such a hurry. But we should soon get the range when we began firing. We had a grand chance if we only waited and kept out of sight The only question to my mind was whether we ought to leave our horses and go slap bang at them, or fire from where we were when the proper time came.
The ground all round our ridge was bare and open, and by shifting a few rocks and boulders, we very soon had a strong position against an attack. It must have been about 11 a.m. Our guns seemed to have nearly silenced theirs, and the time to fire must have been about ripe, when the Colonel sent out a squadron towards Dr. Schultz's Farm, and soon afterwards took the maxim gun and the whole of the rest of his force in that direction—what his reason was I can't say—it was a very great disappointment to me. We went on, cutting fences as we went, about two miles, till we came on the Landsman Drift road. There the M.I. were ordered to dismount, and extend along at right angles to the road, facing the Boers' rear. We were behind the centre of the Boer position, and about two-and-a-half miles from it The country here is open and undulating, covered with thousands of ant-heaps. We lined out across the road, every man behind his ant- heap, our whole line being about half-a-mile long. Our horses were in a slight hollow, about 400 yards in rear.
Here we lay for about an hour, doing nothing. What our object in coming was, I don't know. Hidden on a flank this small force might have been of some use when the Boers retreated, but what was the use of planting 120 men across the line of retreat of 4000? While waiting, I had a good opportunity of watching the Boer position and movements. They occupied three distinct hills. Their right was on Talana Hill, an isolated hill about 600 feet high; their centre on a similar hill about 700 feet high, being a spur of the Lennox Hill. Both these were steep and bare, and almost impregnable. Through the pass they form, runs the road from Dundee to all the drifts over the Buffalo River. The third hill, to the Boer left and drawn back, was the Lennox Hill itself. The Lennox Hill was occupied by about 2000 Boers; it afforded the Boers a good line of retreat, and closed our line of retreat by the Helpmakaar Road.
Looking at Talana Hill from my position in the rear, I could see a farm-house with a huge ambulance flag; this was the Boer Hospital, to which I was taken later. There were still hundreds of Boers and ponies moving about near the farm. These were probably skulking under the protection of the red-cross flag. At the same time I saw one or two of our shells burst over the top of the hill; I could not make out what had happened. On the centre hill I could see crowds of horses and men, about 2000; the horses looked like flocks of sheep or goats on, the side of the hill. I longed to see some of our shells planted among them, and all but sent a messenger round to tell the Colonel of the Artillery about them. On Lennox Hill, a large force was collecting, another 2000 I thought. The whole force I put down at about 5000, and from conversations I have had since with various Boers, I think that estimate is about right.
After about an hour a rumour came of an attack on our rear. We were ordered back to our horses, and mounted, but it turned out to be a false alarm. After this we changed our position, still more to the Boer left, and lined out as before, but facing Lennox Hill I saw a move of some kind going on on Lennox Hill. The Boers were leaving Talana and making for Lennox Hill. I can't say what time this was, but should think it was nearly 2 p.m. A party of about 200 was moving from Lennox Hill in our direction. I went along our line till I came to Lonsdale, and pointed out this move to him. He and I, with his collie dog, walked out some way to the front to look at the ground, and choose a better position to meet this advance. This open ground,
46 covered with ant-heaps, is very deceptive—one keeps on seeing just in front of one what looks like a good position, but when you get there you find it does not command the clear view it seemed to, and that lying down you can only see a short distance ahead.
The ground we were on sloped towards a water-course or donga, about a mile distant. The Boers were advancing down to this watercourse in a straight line for us. Later the whole of the 2000 on Lennox Hill also took this line. I think now this was the beginning of the Boer retirement, but at the time I sent Faulkner to tell Colonel Möller they were going to attack us. I remember that we called for a range-finder again, but could only get one box, and that the wrong one. We moved the line up a bit, bringing the right forward. The maxim under Cape, 18th Hussars, was on the left behind two large ant-heaps, the Dublin M.I. in the centre, and we on the right I felt that we were now in for our first experience of Mauser bullets. Walking down our line, I cautioned each man not to fire unless he could see something to fire at; not to waste a single round, and to keep his magazine for an emergency. I was sorry I had not got my own men, though I knew these men pretty well. Someone called to me, “They are firing on the left, Sir," and, looking towards Lennox Hill, I could see the whole Boer force coming towards us. The Dublins had opened fire on them. They were firing very quickly on the left, "independent". The range was over a mile, which in those days was considered almost out of range. However, it was a large target and a good opportunity, so I fired a couple of volleys before they were lost sight of in the donga.
But the other Boers, whom we had first seen advancing towards us, were considerably nearer now. Bullets began to whistle past us, and the men were taking every advantage of the ant-heaps. "Shoot whenever you can see anything to shoot at!—no Hythe words of command"—I yelled. The maxim was blazing away, the Dublins were having a great fusillade, and the Boer bullets were more and more plentiful; but I could see nothing to fire at, and even standing up I could only occasionally catch sight of a Boer creeping towards an ant-heap. I could see several horses, and there were a good many galloping about loose. Our men were very cool and steady. The fire was getting very warm, very straight; this really was business. I was not the least afraid of them in front, but they were certain to work round us before long, and our horses, about 250 yards in the rear, were quite exposed enough already. I found one of our men lying behind an ant-heap, thinking more of cover than of shooting. I took his rifle. "You must shoot, man!" I said, and with his rifle I had about five shots and left him, saying, "Why can't you do that yourself?" Another man seemed much excited, and I had a shot or two out of his rifle to steady him. I knew the Boer, once ensconced behind his ant-heap, would not come nearer than a hundred yards so long as we kept up the fire, but I felt most anxious all the time about my right flank. "The Dublins have retired, sir." "All right," I answered, "hang on a bit longer; keep up the fire,"—then, after a short space to cover their retirement—"Now!" I shouted, "one volley along the ground, and then join the horses. Volleys! Ready! Along the ground! Present! Fire! Retire!" There was a lull in the Boers' fire, and then a perfect hail of bullets followed us as we ran back to our horses and mounted. Wonderful that we don't seem to be getting hit, I thought, when poor Greenfield's horse carried him past me64; he was hit in the middle of the back, and done for. I think it was here that Williams65 and Cullam66 were hit too. The Dublins and the maxim were well away; so, telling my men to follow them, I made for the Colonel to ask him for orders. I told him the Boers were getting round me and I had had to retire. I asked for orders. “Go and hold that ridge, and cover my retirement" he said, pointing towards Schultz's Farm. The cavalry had been doing nothing all this time, and I was hoping they would have charged.
It was at this stage that Cape got cut off with his maxim gun. It was a most unfortunate thing, the only redeeming feature being the plucky way in which Cape and his six men stuck to their gun, when they might well have got away. Four of the men were killed, while Cape and the other two men were all three wounded and taken. I saw the dead bodies lying in the dry bed of the Sand Spruit, as I was brought back in the moonlight that night. I hope that a stone may some day be put up to mark the site of this plucky stand.
I galloped back, and passing Lonsdale, shouted my orders to him. When we got to the ridge we dismounted and held it, but only for a short time. There was a strong party of Boers heading to cut us off, and we were under a heavy fire from the Boers following us up. My chief thought was to get before the Boers to the ridge we had first left early that morning, and ought never to have left. I felt that once there we could stop any number of Boers, while if they got there first we were quite cut off, and the left flank of our main attack exposed. But the Colonel, who now led the retirement, kept bearing off to the right, making straight for the north end of Impati Mountain. The retirement had a bad effect upon the men. We must have galloped a mile without a stop, and it was only with very great difficulty that Majendie and I could keep our men together and
64 7232 Private S Greenfield, KRRC, was killed at Talana. 65 7987 Private M Williams, KRRC, died of wounds at Talana. 66 9470 Private W Cullan, KRRC, was taken prisoner at Talana.
47 stop them going too fast. They were beginning to think they were being chased, whereas the shots were getting fewer and fewer, and there was every minute less reason for retiring.
Here it was that I took my knock. We halted behind a ridge, about one mile from Jordaan's Farm, dismounted, faced about and advanced in extended order, the Dublin Company on our right. At the top of the ridge we came under fire. I suppose there were some thirty firing at us now, but the Boers are so clever behind ant-heaps that there might have only been two or three. I took the two men on the left, and with them crept round the flank of the only two Boers I could see. We got well round them. I took a rifle from one of the men, and was standing up to take a steady aim at a Boer behind a heap not fifty yards away, when from another heap still closer a man fired and got me plump in the right shoulder. The rifle dropped with a thud, "Take the bally gun and shoot” I said, and turning back made straight for Faulkner, who held my pony three hundred yards in rear. As I went the pain was very great; I thought my arm had been shot clear off, and was only hanging by a few threads of my khaki jacket.
I seemed to be carrying in my left arm an enormous heavy bolster. The fingers were twitching and dancing, and seemed to be far away. I caught at them, and said goodbye to them affectionately. I realised that in this steeplechase of war I had come down at the first fence. When I reached Faulkner, he got his field-dressing at once, and tied it up as tight as he could pull at the shoulder joint. I was feeling very giddy. A doctor turned up almost immediately, a jolly good doctor too. He put me under the cover of an ant-heap, and disregarding all cover himself, cut off my jacket and shirt and dressed my wound. Just after this the order was given to retire, and they retired, leaving Dr. Hardy67, his orderly (Private Jose68, 18th Hussars), and me.
There were still occasional shots coming over us, and if we stayed where we were, the chances were that we should get between two fires. It was quite likely, too, that some Boer coming up might in his excitement have a shot at us. It was a job shifting out of our unsafe position, but once out of the fire and in Hardy's hands I felt much better. In the meantime the Boer advance seemed to have stopped—they never came beyond the point where I was hit. Why then were our people still retiring? I could see them disappearing over the ridge to the north of Impati, right into the arms of General Joubert's commandos which were known to be in that direction. About 220 strong they went on past the Impati, and lost their way in the direction of Hatting Spruit. They were attacked by the Ermelo and Pretoria commandos, and after a stand of two hours at a farm, against heavy guns and mausers, the white flag was put up. No men could have behaved better than our twenty-two M.I. men did that day, eight of their number being hit; they deserved a better fate.
When Hardy had patched me up, he went back in the direction we had come from to look for more wounded, and I was left with Jose to try and reach the nearest farm. All that day and the following night Hardy was working hard with the wounded, and whether it was a British soldier or a Boer Burgher, he treated all with the same care and kindness. Many of our men and many of the Boers, among them Drs. Van der Merve and Molloy of the Dutch Ambulance, have spoken to me since of Dr. Hardy and the good work he did.
With some difficulty Jose and I managed to reach the farm-house. We were met by a most unsympathetic looking Dutchman, who at first seemed to have no intention of taking me in, but as I had neither the ability to go a yard further nor the intention of doing so, and as Jose ordered him to go and fetch some rugs for me, I was soon lying on the floor of his kitchen. It turned out to be Jordaan's Farm. He and his wife, a grown-up daughter, and two small children were the occupants. They could not speak English. Later a trooper of the 18th Hussars (Masters69) was brought in. He had a broken arm too, and a bullet in his inside somewhere, and seemed very bad. Under Jose's instructions he too was put on the floor next to me, and so close that I was always afraid of his touching my wounded arm.
The Boer family did nothing but stare at us, but there was one little chap called Hans, about six years old, who was very good in fetching water for the trooper and me, and we spent our time in drinking water and vomiting most of the afternoon. My arm began to bleed again; there was no one to stop it for me. I began to feel very weak, and felt that I did not mind if I bled to death, more especially as I had quite settled that my arm was lost. It was dark and raining when Dr. Hardy turned up. He had commandeered a spider with six mules and a Boer driver. He had also brought with him Reade70, Colour-Sergeant Davies and some men. The first question I asked was as to how the day had gone, and it was a great joy to hear that we had turned them out of that hill, and that they had retired across the Buffalo. But what terrible losses! Colonel Gunning,
67 Captain William Hardy, RAMC. 68 4449 Private S Josey, 18th Hussars. 69 4203 Private E Masters, 18th Hussars, severely wounded during the battle. 70 Lieutenant Robert Reade, KRRC. This is the only source of information that Reade was wounded at Talana.
48 Jack Pechell, Barnett, Taylor, and Hambro all killed, and many wounded, including Oliver Nugent, Boultbee, Johnson, Martin, General Symonds, and all his staff.
I will not attempt to describe what happened on the other side of the hill; how the General went straight at the hill with three battalions, and after a short but wonderfully accurate fire from our guns, carried it with frightful loss (over 250 killed and wounded); how our guns shelled our own troops by mistake, and killed many of our bravest and foremost men; and how we lost more than the other two regiments together71, including five officers killed and seven wounded. All the details are well known.
If only this victory had been followed up, these terrible losses might have been less hard to bear, for a day which seems to me to have only been drawn in our favour would then have been one of the most decisive and important victories in the history of South Africa. But as it was, after the brilliant assault of Talana, the infantry soldier was deprived of his turn with rifle and sword-bayonet; the artillery, who were brought into position on the captured heights, were forbidden to fire at the mass of Boers, guns, and waggons, which were retiring in the open in great confusion within their range, while the cavalry and M.I. were being led in the opposite direction, to be made prisoners by 7000 Boers under General Joubert.
Trooper Masters and I were got into the cart somehow. Hardy put his coat on me, and a rug on the trooper. It was raining hard and very cold, and it was a five-mile drive to the farm on Talana, which the Boers had made into an ambulance hospital. The driver walked himself and drove the mules at a walk; he drove well, and did all he could to save us, but the road was bad, and we both felt it a great deal, groaning and vomiting at every bump of the cart. Crossing the spruit, where we saw the bodies of the poor maxim gun detachment, the cart nearly upset, and we cannoned into each other. Hardy rode just in front, picking out the best road. It must have been about 10 p.m. when we got in, and a place was found on the floor for the two of us, side by side, in an outhouse.
There were three men also sleeping in the place, Irishmen of a low type, who had been commandeered, and who wore red cross badges, for they were by way of being hospital assistants. Their Doctor told them to look after us. My feet were very cold; one of the men took off my boots and rubbed them, for which I was most grateful. The only other attendance we got was brandy and water, of which I was very glad too. There was a liberal supply of brandy, and I thought the "hospital assistants" did themselves pretty well. The night dragged on; it seemed to have no end. The hospital assistants turned in and had a snoring match. Poor Masters seemed to be dying, and kept asking for water, but I couldn't help him.
At last day came, and they said our ambulance carts would come for us soon, but no carts appeared to be coming. The place was full of men with red crosses on their arms, all loafers, who knew nothing of ambulance work, and who were there for their own safety. They ate all the food intended for the wounded. There were about sixty wounded Boers, and a few English, among these Cape, of the 18th Hussars. Many of the slightly wounded Boers came in and looked at us. They shook their heads gravely, as if it was all up with us. Some came and talked to me; all were kind and sympathetic. Our shrapnel seemed to have done terrible work among them, and we quite agreed that modern warfare was "not ghut." They kept leaving in large numbers with rifles, ponies, and waggons; and all seemed agreed that they did not intend to fight any more. The force we had met came from Vreiheid, Utrecht, and Krugersdorp, and were under Lucas Meyer, "the Lion of Vreiheid," about 4500 strong. They had crossed the Buffalo at de Jaeger's Drift, and occupied the Talana position after a long and quick night march.
Still the time dragged on, and we at the farm seemed to have been forgotten. The thought of being deserted, and the feeling that my arm wanted dressing, made me fretful and feverish. About 12 noon some of the Dundee Town Guard came up and found us, I told them how we stood, and one of them rode back for the ambulance. The Boers had nearly all cleared now except the badly wounded.
About one o'clock the ambulance turned up, and at last we got away. Hardy, who had turned up again, put Cape and me into the same waggon. The jolting was very bad, and I don't know how I should have stood it but for Cape holding my shoulder for me. We got into camp about 2 p.m. Cape and I were put into a hospital tent together; there were no beds or mattresses available, so many had been wounded. General Symonds was lying next to us, hit in the stomach. The ground was wet and muddy. Someone, however, got my valise and a rug for me, and I lay on that. The troops were out somewhere, and we could hear firing in the direction of Glencoe.
71 The number of officer and men killed was 28 for the KRRC. The combined total for the RDF and RIF was 29.
49 About 3 p.m. we had just got fairly settled, when from Impati ridge, about 4000 yards away, there was a bang, and we heard a shell whizzing over in our direction. It exploded near the stores in Camp, about two hundred yards away. Another and another! They were shelling the camp. One struck the ground seventy yards from us, and sent the mud splashing all round our tent. It was the most unpleasant experience I had yet gone through. This bombardment came to an end after about twenty shells, but it left a very uneasy feeling. Why did our guns not answer?
The next day guns were heard again towards Glencoe; we got the rumours of the victory at Elandslaagte, and we heard that Sir George White was coming up, and with us was going to go for Joubert and that beastly Long Tom on the ridge. But soon the truth came out. General Yule was going to retire from Dundee, and was off via Helpmakaar, leaving us to our fate.
I lay in the Camp for forty-eight hours in the tent with Cape. I had fever and a lot of pain, so I fear I must have been a nuisance to him. The army doctors were very busy; they never dressed my wound, or looked at it; the attendance was very bad, and we had to call for hours before we could get anyone to answer.72
Under these circumstances I was very anxious to get to the civilian hospital in the Swedish Mission buildings in the town, where many of the worst cases were. I managed to work this, and at 2 p.m. on Sunday, October 22nd, was, with very great pain, transferred in a dhoolie. Now it seemed to me that the Boers had a special grudge against me, for only one shell was fired from the Impati ridge this day, and that landed within a hundred yards of my dhoolie while I was being carried half-way between the Camp and the town.
It was an anxious moment as I heard the report and then the shell whirring over in my direction. The dhoolie bearers stopped short, and I expected they would drop the dhoolie and bolt. I caught hold of the top pole with my left hand, ready to break the fall. I shouted to them “Chelo!" (go on) and said the shells would never hit Hospital “log" (people), but I was expecting another shell every moment, though none came.
The Hospital I was taken to was originally intended for the wounded of the Town Guard, and was under Dr. Galbraith73; after the battle, however, it became so full with wounded soldiers and Boers that it was put under an Army doctor.
On reaching the Hospital I was moved very scientifically into a most comfortable bed in the Swedish Mission buildings. This being the first time I had been under a roof or in a bed for a month, the luxury was the more appreciated. So what with this, and the kind attention of the Doctor and his staff, I soon felt quite well again.
Soon after my arrival, the door opened and in walked a most attractive young lady—a nurse as I thought at the time. “By Jove," I said to myself, "you will have to watch it when you are getting better." However, to my relief, this turned out to be a married lady, none other than Mrs. Galbraith, who proved herself a heroine indeed that afternoon, and whose subsequent nursing and cheerfulness were such a help to all.
Soon after we had got settled down I heard yells and hooting, and the sound of a lot of horses coming down the street towards the hospital. "Ce sont les Hollandais," I heard the Italian lady say, as she rushed to the door. I could not move myself to look, but I knew she was right, and that the Boers had come into the town. “Well," I thought, “these are the chaps who have been threatening to shoot the first 'rooibatchi' they see, or indeed any 'rooinek.' These are the people who shell our hospital when the Red Cross flag is flying. How are these ignorant Boers going to deal with me?" I must confess I felt a bit uneasy, and had visions of Boers coming and pointing rifles at my head. It was not till afterwards, when they used to come in and sit on my bed filling my pipe for me, and showing me other attentions, that I learned that the Boers are as civilised as we are. [And I take this opportunity of saying that all the Boers I have met up till now, December 1900, have been kindness itself, and that their dealings with our wounded have been everything one could desire.]
Elated by their success, excited with drink, and under the impression that there were still some troops in Dundee, the Boers rode into the town, each with his rifle cocked, and ready to shoot the first British soldier he saw. Anyone will realise the risk of meeting men in such a mood—it was Mrs. Galbraith, while others hung back, who went out to meet them. She told them the English had left the town, that this was a hospital, and that it would be bad for the wounded to be disturbed.
72 This contrasts with the account given by Major Donegan, RAMC. See page 31 73 Doctor Hugh Tender Galbraith was born in 1864 in Ireland. He and his wife stayed in Dundee during the Boer occupation. He was Acting Magistrate in Dundee in June 1900. He died in Durban 4 May 1941.
50 It was a great relief to me when, after examining my arm, Dr. Galbraith, with his more up-to-date knowledge, told me that the amputation of my arm, which had been threatened, was not likely to be necessary.
After three weeks of comparatively good health—during which in spite of my arm I was able to write my diary—my temperature on November 13th went up to 105˚, remaining there or thereabouts until November 20th. During this time I developed erysipelas, and could neither sleep nor breathe freely, being only half conscious. On the 30th some bone came out of the wound, I suddenly felt well again, and had a normal temperature. All through this crisis I was saved by Dr. and Mrs. Galbraith, of Dundee, who fought for me without resting.
There were at the Swedish Mission Hospital besides myself, Major Nugent, D.S.O., Lieut. Carbery, Sergeant-Major Burke, R.D.F., and about thirty men who had been wounded too badly to be moved with the remainder to Ladysmith—and I am sure there is not one of them who will ever forget the good work done by the Galbraiths.
Towards the middle of December I was coming to life again, and beginning to take an interest in what was going on; but what a time it was to come back to life! The siege of Ladysmith and the invasion of Natal had been shocks, but the worst time of all for us, was when we heard of Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso. We only got the Boer versions, and only half credited them, still we knew we had been badly beaten all along the line; we could not hear what they were doing at home, or what the response of the nation would be. I for one, even in my weak state, swore to become a Frenchman, a Russian, anything but a Briton, if we did not see the war out, and I shall not easily forget the feeling of great relief when I did hear how the nation joined by the Colonies, the United Empire, was rising to the occasion. Gradually we all began to get better, I shared a house with Nugent, and we used to listen to the guns, which we could hear distinctly at Ladysmith and Colenso. Some days the sound seemed to come from the east, and some days from the west, and on some it seemed to grow nearer and nearer. This change in the sound would cheer us up, leading us to picture successful flanking movements and general advances on Dundee. But the days dragged on and no good news ever reached us. At last, on Christmas Day, just as I was beginning to feel well enough to think about escaping to Greytown, the order came that the whole hospital was to be moved to Pretoria.
It was a sad day, December 31st, when the time came to part with the Galbraiths and Pastor Nauranius of the Swedish Mission, for, cut off as we had been from all friends and from all correspondence with our people at home, we had become great friends, and even situated as we had been, had had a happy time together.
Part II – Departure from Dundee Hospital – Prison – Release – Pretoria On December 31st we started in the Boer ambulance train, a most perfect thing of its kind. The feeling of getting out after a long illness is always a great pleasure, and I remember feeling in high spirits as we steamed along through Glencoe towards Newcastle, with the country at its best. The line was guarded all the way to Pretoria, and at each culvert or bridge there was a small garrison, the defenders, as a rule, being housed in our bell tents, captured, no doubt, at Dundee.
Crowds came to look at us at each station; they were always friendly, and wanted to talk to us. But as we got nearer Pretoria my spirits went lower and lower, and New Year's Day found them very low indeed. How I hated the man on the train who on that morning said, "A happy New Year to you.” How could we look forward to a happy new year when we were just entering on a period of captivity, the end of which seemed so far away? We arrived at Pretoria at 10 a.m. on New Year's Day. There was a large crowd at the station. Here the army doctor74 who had been in charge at Dundee, and all the orderlies, soldiers, and civilians were packed off to Delagoa Bay, and I said goodbye to Mr. Annis and Mr. Arnot, of Dundee, who had been so good to me.
We were now entirely in Dutch hands. The thirty men were taken to one hospital, while Nugent, Carbery, and I were taken to Burke's hospital. This hospital, for which the Boer officials took to themselves great credit, was run entirely by Mr. Burke, an Englishman and a resident of Pretoria. He was an extremely kind man; he saw that we had everything we required, and bore the whole expense himself.
There were in the hospital, when we arrived, Major Adye75 and Lieutenant Kentish76, recovering from enteric, and twenty-three wounded Boers. Miss Lowry, the matron, was a trained English nurse; the others were
74 Major F A B Daly, RAMC. 75 Major Walter Adye, Royal Irish Rifles, captured at Nicholson’s Nek, 30th October 1899.
51 Pretoria ladies, among them being daughters of Lucas Meyer and of the late President Burgers. Though amateurs they were good nurses, and they fully carried out Lucas Meyer's injunction to his daughter, when he told her she was to treat the British just the same as the Boers. In fact I think some of them, possibly owing to the novelty of the thing, possibly owing to his more civilised ways, had a preference for nursing the British officer. Anyway, we were very good friends. Dr. Veale was our doctor.
The day after my arrival I had my arm X-rayed, and curiously enough in the dark-room I recognised the photographer as Tom Woolley-Dod77, who had been an old friend and neighbour in Cheshire.
The Boer officials were most suspicious, and allowed no communication at first with the outside world. Instead of putting us on parole, and giving us a chance of convalescing, we were shut up all day in one room, not allowed to see the papers or any friends. Even when I had a tooth out the operation was performed by a dentist armed to his teeth with forceps and revolver, while the Commandant and a Zarp (policeman) armed with rifle and bandolier, were also present to see that I, no giant when in health, and at that time scarcely able to walk, did not try to escape.
I never had anything to say against the fighting Boer or his Commandant, but the officials at Pretoria were mean and petty in the extreme, and it was only their great desire to appear civilised in the eyes of Europeans which made them treat us as well as they did. The meaning of “the word of honour of a gentleman " was quite unknown to them, so that they would not hear of my taking convalescent exercise on parole.
From January 12th we were allowed to see friends, i.e. one at a time from the officers, prisoners in the Model School. But the interview only lasted five minutes, with the Boer Commandant listening to hear that no plans of escape were made and no news exchanged. The Boer Commandant, who was a beast, might occasionally be detained by the offer of fruit or a cigar, and Dr. Gunning, the other warder, who was a good fellow, might be delayed by a discussion on philately, but at most these interviews never lasted a quarter-of- an-hour. The time went very slowly—day after day, nothing to do, no letters from home, and no news but bad news; so, after over six weeks without leaving my bedroom, I longed for a change of any kind, and as my wound had nearly stopped running, I, against the advice of those who knew the life, got transferred, on February 8th, to the Model School, where there were over ninety officers as prisoners.
On the whole, at first, I much preferred the life in the Model School. In hospital the food was better, but with only one window to look out of, and no chance of exercise, one had got very much bored. Here there was far more room, and there were lots of people to talk to. The building was a large oblong one with a path all round it. In front it had a verandah, and an iron railing between the path and the main road. At the back were a small playground, two baths, and a cookhouse. There were twelve Zarps on guard all round the building. The bedrooms had nine of us in each, which was rather crowded; there were no shelves, nor anywhere to put one's belongings. Only one soldier servant was allowed to twenty officers. A bed, a mattress, one blanket, and a pillow were supplied.
At about 5.30 a.m., while all were in bed, the head-gaoler used to come round and count heads, to see that nobody had escaped in the night. About 6.15 I used to turn out to have my bath. The early mornings were lovely, so that even if one had to wait some time for one's bath, with a cup of coffee and a cigarette in the verandah, it was no hardship. When dressed I used to take about a mile walk before breakfast at 8.30. The meals were the worst part of the life. The room crowded and hot, overworked servants, a hundred of us at small tables, no table-cloth, unclean kitchen knives and forks, noise, bustle, dirty plates, indifferent food, and only water to drink. After breakfast one would smoke, talk and lounge in a deck chair in the verandah, and read books which could be got from the town library.
By noon it was quite hot. At 1.30 we had another meal to face, after which I used to play patience, or lie on my bed reading, not infrequently allowing a siesta to pass away an hour. About four one would take a stroll round the estate, about one-ninth of a mile round. Tea at 4.30, a good square meal, after which some used to play rounders or quoits in the small playground at the back, while the majority took exercise, walking round and round the crowded court. At 7.30 p.m. dinner, a dirty piggery sort of meal, after which we were not allowed outside, and used to play cards, or talk or read, until about ten, when we turned in.
The hundred officers presented a weird sight, and it was no wonder that people passing on the opposite side of the road used to stop and have a good stare at us. One could imagine, when they stopped and talked to
76 Lieutenant R J Kentish, Royal Irish Fusiliers, captured at Nicholson’s Nek. 77 T C Wolley-Dod, an electrical engineer. He was the manager of the Pretoria Municipal Electrical Department.
52 the Zarps, that they were asking if we really were officers. Colonels, majors, subalterns, and magistrates, some no doubt, in better times, very particular as to their personal appearance, were to be seen with long hair and shaggy beards, dressed in all sorts of ready-made, badly-fitting, cheap Pretoria suitings. A scarf or muffler was more fashionable than a collar and tie, and a helmet usually gave a finishing touch to the get-up, for the authorities would not allow any hat which might help towards an escape.
Almost every regiment was represented. There were also a few civilians, magistrates and police, and a parson, the Rev. Adrian Hofmeyer. Some of them had sad stories to tell of the mistakes made at Stormberg, Colenso, Magersfontein, Tugela and Colesberg—some had been taken rescuing wounded men, and many had been wounded; some seemed quite happy and contented, whilst others showed signs of melancholia. It was indeed a despairing, hopeless kind of feeling, to know that this existence might go on for months, perhaps for years, and every keen soldier must have felt being out of the running.
I was joined here by my servant Faulkner, who when I was hit had been told to leave me, and had shared the fate of Colonel Möller's party. There had been much difficulty in getting hold of him, and it was only after a Cabinet Council meeting in the Volksraad that permission was given for him to be brought from the men's camp at Waterfall.
On my first Sunday I was much impressed with the service conducted by Adrian Hofmeyer; his extempore prayers and sermon were delivered with great feeling and eloquence. He had a robust voice, and used to play the organ and sing the first verse of the hymn to give us the tune, and then, having given us a start, he branched off into tunes of his own, so that with the farmers' bass of the majority, the part-singing of the few musical ones, and the fancy part-singing of old Hofmeyer, we kicked up a noise worthy of any cathedral. We used to finish up with the hymn for absent friends, as sung in Westminster Abbey, which left more than one damp eye, and a lump in many a throat.
The inhabitants seemed very anxious to have photographs of us, but when any kodak or other photographing fiend turned up, the alarm was given and everyone turned his back on the camera. One day a closed cab, with the window-blinds down, drove up, and came to a halt close to where a lot of fellows were standing leaning over the railings. Suddenly a peep-hole opened in the window of the carriage, and it was seen that there was a camera inside. Everyone turned round, and stones were thrown at the cab, which galloped off, having, I hoped, failed in its object.
One afternoon after lunch, about the end of February, I was lying on my bed reading a novel. The heat was excessive and the book very dull; sleep was upon me, and I was just dozing off, when I heard the rush which always took place when letters arrived, but having been so often disappointed at not getting letters, I did not bother. I was half asleep, and seemed to hear my name being called. It went on in a monotonous way, getting louder and louder, till at last I was awake, and it dawned on me that there were letters for me and my name really was being called. Over fifty letters came for me altogether, dating from Sept. 1899. I was indeed glad to have at last established communication with my people and many friends, and near as I had often been to them in my thoughts I was brought still nearer by this mail. We were sentimental in those days, and I was very much so that afternoon.
Our numbers increased as time went on. On February 25th there was a rush to the back door. More letters? No, it was six new prisoners. The prison door opened, and in walked Dr. Gunning, leading the way, with his pipe in his month, followed by six men, all of different regiments, bearded and burnt, in dirty torn khaki; evidently they had had a rough time of it. They all looked smart, workmanlike fellows. How was it, one wondered, that smart fellows like these kept on being taken, while we never heard of any corresponding captures on the other side?
These new arrivals looked puzzled at first at the sight of this wonderful collection of officers in odd clothes, and with beards and whiskers; but gradually friends recognised each other, and each of the new arrivals had a crowd round him, firing questions at him. What about Cronje? Kimberley? Ladysmith? and a hundred other queries. Most of these fellows seemed to know very little, for it is not the way in our army for subordinates to know too much. They are not like the wounded Boers who used to come into the hospital. Each of those Boers was a bit of a general himself; he knew what was going on all over South Africa, and would give intelligent accounts of many battles, with his own comments on the strategy and tactics of each side. Thus our numbers were constantly increased, and thus we used to gather news of how things were going.
But we had another source of information which was the greatest godsend to us. How Patterson, of the telegraph department, used to come over daily with the latest confidential wires to Kruger, and how the Miss
53 Cullingworths78, who had learned to signal with a flag, used to signal the news from the back of their house to our signalling officer, the worthy Captain Burrowes79, is a story too well known for me to go into fully. From this source, from about February 22nd, good news began to come. The relief of Kimberley, the surrounding of Cronje, the successful advance at Peter's, the chaos at Boer head-quarters,—all these were known to us and to Kruger alone, in Pretoria. Our spirits went up and the days seemed shorter.
Majuba Day was suitably celebrated at Paardeberg and on the Natal side, and it was also celebrated in Pretoria by the escape of Haldane, Le Mesurier, and Brockie, for it was on that day that they were found to be missing. Many a time had I sat wondering how I could escape, and I was often so desperate that I would have attempted anything with a shade of a chance of success, but it had always seemed quite impossible. I could not conceive how these three had managed it. I envied them and admired them, and no one could have been more astonished than I was when I heard what they had done.
On March 14th we saw Cullingworth and Patterson marching off to the front with rifle and bandolier80. The Boers knew that we were getting the news, and suspecting these two, without being able to prove anything against them, sent them off on commando. We were getting too large a party for the Model School, and the authorities feared more escapes, so on March 16th we were moved to the place now known as the “Birdcage," which had been built to receive the Ladysmith garrison.
It was only at this time that we heard how Haldane and his party were still living under the floor at the Model School. The fact came out when others, proposing to escape in the same way (remaining underground when the rest were moved) magnanimously decided to forego their attempt in order that Haldane might have a better chance.
We were moved, beds, bag and baggage and all, through the town to our new abode, which was situated a mile outside to the north of the town. We drove up in cabs, escorted by all that were left in Pretoria in the shape of Burghers—the Boer “land-wehr," consisting of boys too young to manage their ponies and rifles together, and of very old men. The building was a long low draughty corrugated iron barn, with only one partition. It had a few small windows high up, and only a mud floor. It was a place more suitable for cattle than men. There was no shade to be had, and the sanitary arrangements were disgraceful. There was a dense wire entanglement all round, at some distance from the barn.
Our first step on arrival was to draw up a strongly-worded protest, which was signed by every officer, and forwarded at once to the authorities. Shutting 130 of us up in such a barn was quite bad enough for my taste, but how had they intended to get the whole Ladysmith garrison into the same place!
Our Government had refused to consider any exchange of prisoners, a decision which, though one regretted it, one felt to be very sound. At this time we were very sanguine, the Boers seemed to be collapsing, and we did not expect to be shut up more than another month.
78 Mr C Cullingworth owned the house on Skinner Street, Pretoria, that was opposite the exercise yard of the State Model School. Cullingworth was a telegraphist and used his flags to signal news to the prisoners. The daughters’ role was reported in the New Zealand Poverty Bay Herald, September 1900, and said “One day there appeared on the kopje behind the gaol two ladies. They looked innocent creatures taking the air, and they seemed to be troubled with colds in their heads, for their white handkerchiefs were in continuous use. Could it be possible? Yes, there was no doubt about it. These were the inmates of the house whence Mr Paterson had signalled his news, and they were signalling too - not blowing their noses. Dot and dash, dot and dash, flashed the white bits of cambric, and the message was read, "Mafeking relieved, Giving the Boers fits at Kroonstad." Daily the colds grew worse, until, alas! these heroines, whose names shall go down to posterity in the romance of war, were forbidden to take air on the kopjes. Brave Misses Cullingworth.” 79 Captain Arnold R Burrowes, Royal Irish Fusiliers. He had been at Talana with Crum and was captured at Lombard’s Kop, 30 Oct 1899. 80 Reverend Batts, pastor of the Baptist community in Pretoria, in his book 'Pretoria from within during the war' reported on the punishment received by the two men: "Two officials - Messrs Cullingworth and Patterson - who had been forced to go to the front against their will, had been arrested trying to get over to the British lines and brought into Pretoria gaol. It was a bitter thing for these two men, forced to take up arms against their own nation; and it was because it was known that it would be a dreadful things for them to do, and that they were suspected of giving information in some way to the prisoners, that they were made to go."
54 After a day or two in the Bird-cage one began, to see some advantages in it. Here we were high up, had grand air, and a fine view with beautiful sunsets. I bought a large Japanese umbrella tent under which we used to sit and read. Here naturalists had leisure to study the ways of snakes, salamanders, bugs, locusts and butterflies, and the botanist also had a limited field of research. There was a lot of rain about this time, making it damp muddy and uncomfortable inside the barn, with the result that there was a chorus of coughing and sneezing all day long, I, for one, owing to the draughts, never getting rid of my cold till I was released. It was a miserable place to feel seedy in; one could get no privacy, and one could not escape the whistling draughts that came through the badly-built building.
About March 25th the guard of Zarps was exchanged for one of Hollanders, most inoffensive looking foreigners, clerks, shopkeepers and the like, whose larger numbers made up by quantity that which was lacking in quality. Opperman and Dr. Gunning were dismissed for having let three prisoners escape, and their place was taken by a Hollander grocer, who was a sensible sort of fellow and civil enough. He found Opperman's office full of back letters for us, which he delivered, and of unposted letters, which he posted.
Having read in one of our letters disparaging remarks on the martial appearance of his commando, and on the improbability of his men being able to hit a haystack, the new Commandant started to drill his men, and sent them off to do a bit of musketry training with their old Martinis. They chose as a target a kopje at the back of our building, and all day long bullets came buzzing like locusts, flying harmlessly over our heads in the direction of Pretoria. Whether they learned to hit the kopje, or whether the people in the town protested, I do not know, but the musketry course came to an end after two days.
Their marksmanship was put to the test on April 5th when five of our number made a bid for freedom. At about 9.45 p.m., some clever electrician was to extinguish all the electric lights, inside and out. The lights did go out, and as they went out so did the desperadoes, each from a different door, and made straight for the wire entanglement. Unfortunately, however, just as they started, something went wrong, and the electric lights flared up again, giving the whole thing away. Two or three shots were fired and the attempt failed. In the meantime the officers inside were in some anxiety. Some lay flat on the ground, and some put up hasty defences. I was in bed myself, so that this was my second experience during the war of being under fire in bed. Kentish, who was playing chess, said that one of the bullets came in and took the head off his queen!
April came to an end, and still the end of our captivity seemed no nearer. Perhaps we had been too sanguine. The advance seemed so slow to us, and the continued arrival of prisoners was not reassuring. A description of these latter days of April and the beginning of May, would be as depressing as the account of poor Dreyfus on his “Île du Diable."81 The "hope deferred," the absence of news, the discomfort and the depression, the disappointed ambitions and the want of health, all made the time drag very heavily.
In May, however, we began to get better news. The advance on Bloemfontein seemed to be going well, the Boers seemed to be wavering, but still we had this anxiety—should we be besieged in Pretoria, or carried off into the mountains of Zoutpansberg or Leydenburg? On the 13th Hofmeyer was released, and we all turned out to see him off. As he drove away we gave him quite an ovation, for we should miss him, especially his Sunday services, and his translations each evening of the "Volkstein," a local paper which we were now allowed to take in.
On the Queen's birthday we had, after some discussion, got leave to send a telegram from ourselves and from the men at Waterfall to Her Majesty—and to celebrate the occasion we were for the first time allowed port wine! It was bad fiery port wine. I only took one glass (in a mug) and had a mouth like blotting paper next morning—one would do a great deal for the Queen! After drinking "the Queen" came "God save the Queen" which had been forbidden so long. We thundered it—every word, every letter, was sung with an emphasis and an impetus I had never heard before. A pent-up, stirring volume of loyalty, coming from 150 men. The room was barely big enough for 150 men, and it is a marvel to me how the roof stood such an explosion.
The Union Jack floated over Pretoria that day, for Haserick let loose a tame hawk with a Union Jack tied to its neck, and sent it hovering over the town.
On the 29th we had been hearing guns all day in the direction of Johannesburg. Rumours of our being moved kept us on tenterhooks all day.
81 A reference to Devil’s Island (French: Île du Diable), a small island 6 miles off the coast of French Guinea. The island was used as part of a French penal colony between 1852 and 1946. Captain Alfred Dreyfus had been sent there on 5 Jan 1895.
55 The 6000 men at Waterfall, ten miles away, of whom we had never been able to get news, had, as we now heard, got out of hand on hearing the guns. The Boer authorities had tried to move them, but they had refused to move. Kruger had fled to Middelburg. Colonel Hunt warned the Boer authorities that if any men were shot the Boers would have to take serious consequences, and he offered to send officers to keep order, on condition they were not moved. It would have been a serious matter if 6000 men had broken loose and celebrated, perhaps with alcohol, this great occasion, in a town already in a state of chaos.
About 8.45 p.m. Hay, the American Consul, and Lee Wood came in while we were at dinner. Hay received an ovation as he came in. They sat down and had a glass of port and a smoke. It very soon transpired that the British were expected in the town next morning. The town was upside down. Irish, Americans and foreigners who had fought for the Boers, were looting and drinking and taking their payment in kind. Oom Paul had fled for Holland, and Hay was practically Governor of Pretoria. Then the Hollander Commandant entered, and amid cheers said that he expected the British in the town next day. He appealed to us as soldiers, not to make it difficult for him to do his duty until the time came for us to change places with him. Colonel Hunt said we all thanked him for what he had done to improve our circumstances as far as he could. We gave him three cheers—very hearty ones—for we were all ready to cheer anyone or anything. Then Colonel Hunt thanked Hay and Wood for all they had done for us, and we cheered them for all we were worth, singing “For he's a jolly good fellow." They each thanked us and were visibly pleased. Then came "God save the Queen." It was a record on the Queen's Birthday, but I think we just beat the record this time. We were sober enough, but drunk with joy and enthusiasm. I wish the good Queen could have heard us. It was a great night. I shall never forget it. Twenty-five officers left for Waterfall that night to join the men.
Friday, June 1st.—Two days ago we were on the point of being free. The Boers were in a panic; if only they had been followed up we should be free. But something seems to have gone wrong; rumours of a reverse, French killed, and all sorts of such-like inventions; everyone walking about very despondent to-day. If Bobs does not hurry up they will move us all up country, which would break my heart. But he will be here soon.
Sunday, June 3rd.—This is a terrible long wait. Botha, who is about the best man they have, has stayed the stampede, and collected 15000 Boers to face us. They are said to have taken up a position seven miles from here, and have sworn to die or win. They are cornered, or should be after this long wait, so they may make a stand; but the shells may alter their decision, which I think more likely. In any case it will probably be a lively time for us when the defeated rabble come our way.
Monday, June 4th.—This morning, at about 9 a.m., guns were heard quite close. We knew the Boers, 15000 strong, had taken up a position about six miles out, and it was said they had solemnly sworn to die or win. At 10 a.m. we saw a shell burst over the hill to the south, close to one of the forts. Then shrapnel after shrapnel was landed just over the fort and all along the crest line, about four miles away from us. Then some larger gun placed a lyddite close to the big fort, sending up an enormous column of red dust, and making a huge report. It was a grand sight. It went on all day, and we sat there in deck chairs watching. We could see very few Boers about. About 3 p.m. we saw the balloon some fifteen miles off, I should think. Later in the afternoon the railway was shelled near the suburbs, and just before dark, away to the west, we saw clouds of dust, and what we took to be fleeing commandos. After such a day we all went to bed in excellent spirits. Our long depressing wait was very near its end, and we should now escape the terrible fate of being moved away to the east.
About 1 a.m. we were awakened by the commandant, who turned on the electric light and walked along the line of beds, saying, “Pack up, gentlemen; you have got to start at 3 p.m. and march six miles” “Why?" “I don't know why; those are my orders." “Which direction?" “To the railway, to the east."
Well, I knew what that meant at once, for I had expected the move for the last month, and many a very depressed hour had I spent thinking of the possibility of being carted about for six months in the cold—no food, no news, and every chance of being shot down. I lay in bed thinking what I should do; what we ought all to do. Some got up at once, and dressed quite ready to move, saying they were only going to move us out of range of the firing. But Colonel Hunt luckily was not of that opinion, and nearly everyone felt what it meant. We knew nothing for certain, but we thought our people were only six miles off. Outside the Hollander guard had been trebled—about two hundred—and there were about twenty armed and mounted Boers. It was soon agreed that no one should move unless a rifle was pointed at his head. The Hollanders are only half-hearted, and the Boers don't act without leaders. So the commandant and sub-commandant, who were alone inside, and only armed with revolvers, were made prisoners. They were told that we refused to move, that they would have to shoot, and that if they did shoot, everyone of them would be hung by Bobs, who, we knew, was only seven miles off.
56 Well, the Hollander commandant was talked round, and fairly bluffed. He undertook not to move us, and to become a prisoner of the Boers if they insisted. He went out and had a talk with the Boer commandant; they had words, and the Boers galloped off to the town, calling him “a-Hollander," and saying they would have to get a maxim. We had delayed the thing, anyway for a time, and the railway might be cut any time by French.
It was frightfully cold; I did not turn in again. Many went and hid in the roof, in ditches, and all sorts of places, where they were bound to be found. I got a bread knife and cut a hole in the rabbit wire, which was only a small part of the obstacle, and asked the Hollander sentry to look the other way if I tried to get out when the commando came. But there were so many of them that one was afraid of the other. He only hesitated and said he would see. We waited on till daylight, and no one came. We looked anxiously at the hills all round in hopes of seeing our troops on the hills, but could see nothing. We waited and watched anxiously, and thought we should have a day of suspense.
Tuesday, June 5th. —About 8 a.m. large bodies of men were visible to the west, about seven miles off, but it was impossible to say whether they were our men or Boers. Even if they were our men it was possible that we should be hustled off under their noses. About 9 a.m., two men in felt hats and khaki with a civilian galloped up. Even till they were a hundred yards off I feared they might be Boers. Then they took off their hats and waved them. There was a yell, and we all rushed through the gate. They were Marlborough and Winston Churchill, and we were free! We jolly soon had the Boer flag down, and the soldier servants, armed, on sentry over the Hollanders inside as prisoners. A Union Jack, made by one of our fellows for the great moment, was hoisted. Majendie and I tore down the hill into the town, running and yelling. It was a grand feeling being free again. When we got into the town we found British sentries over all the Government buildings, Kruger's house, and all the banks, &c.
It would have been rather a shock to anyone accustomed to seeing the smart guardsman on sentry in Pall Mall to have seen him in the square at Pretoria, with his beard, dirty clothes, worn khaki, and battered helmet, with a toothbrush, spoon, or some such useful article taking the place in his helmet of the ornamental plume in his busby, a loaf of bread, a cooking-pot, and many other necessaries not laid down in the regulations as part of his equipment.
It was about 10.30 when we got into the town, and Bobs was not timed to arrive before two. So we looked round the place till then, watching the various troops coming in and posting sentries over the public-houses, banks, hotels, &c. They all looked most business-like and fit, sunburnt and covered with dirt and dust I lunched with Nugent, Colonel Hunt, and others, the first decent lunch for ages—clean table-cloths, glasses, plates, &c, all very much appreciated. We were waited on by one of our late guards, a German waiter!
By 2 p.m. all the prisoners of war were drawn up in the square, where we got a good view of the proceedings. I will not go into them, as the papers at home have no doubt given full details. It was a grand moment when the Union Jack went up, with Lord Roberts and Kitchener sitting on their horses at the salute. The troops marched past, not all of them, but quite enough to make an impression. They looked most serviceable, though some of them must have been very nearly done - up. Though these fellows have had no fighting compared to the Natal troops, they have had very hard work, and the cold nights and short rations must have found out the invalids long ago. I was jealous of the Mounted Infantry when I saw them, and I felt that the entry into Pretoria was quite incomplete without a Rifle regiment being there. But still the sense of being free again drowned all other feelings. The Woolley-Dods found me out, and have been putting me up since then. I have not time to go into raptures over their hospitality and kindness, and the joys of having a room to one's self and a hot bath, and lots of other comforts. They have been kindness itself.
On June 6th Lord Roberts saw all the released officers. We formed up in a long line in front of his house. Having lost all my uniform, I had to appear in flannels, with a muffler and a slouch hat. Lord Roberts had a word for everyone, and especially for those who had been captured on his side of the country, seeming to remember all the circumstances.
57 Account by Lieutenant R Johnstone, KRRC
This section comprises an account of the battle that appeared in the Annals of the KRRC. The account was anonymous but has been attributed to Lieutenant Richard Johnstone because of the thigh wound he received during the battle and the fact that he and two other officers arrived in Dundee after the rest of the battalion. In the original text the officers’ surnames were displayed with only the first letter of their surname and all except one of these has been replaced with their full name.
“On the 18th October, 1899, Wortley82, Jelf83, and self, arrived in camp at Dundee about 10 a.m. We were all put in a tent together, and were very glad to see the Battalion again. In the afternoon we went for a ride and looked round the country, and were shown the position of the picquets, etc. As we passed near Talana Hill we little thought that in so short a time we should be storming the place. The next day, during the afternoon, we heard that a train had been fired at and some cattle looted. Soon afterwards Colonel Sherston came to our camp, and said he wanted an officer and fifty men to go down the line. My company was detailed for this, and my orders were that I was not to involve myself in any serious engagement, but was given full power to use my discretion.
We went slowly down the line in the train, carefully watching the rails, as we were afraid they might have been cut. Long before we got to Waschbank it had got quite dark, but on arriving there we found the points over the wrong way and locked. We smashed a lock and picked up the cattle trucks, not a vestige of a Boer, and the cattle all in the trucks. I questioned several natives whom I found on the station, but could get no clue as to the whereabouts of the enemy, so I got the men into the train and went on the engine. The brakes on the train all went wrong so had to disconnect them. The engine raced dreadfully as we went up the hill over the wet rails (it was pouring hard), and we arrived at Dundee at 11.30 p.m. wet through.
20th October.—Paraded at 5 a.m. and dismissed. Went to tent and left sword, etc. Saw some Boers on hill; watched them through my glass and saw two guns. I then went to report to the General last night's operations. General was very pleased to hear that the cattle had arrived. One battery was at that time going out to water; on the General hearing that the Boers were on the hill, he immediately ordered out two batteries, and sent Sherston84 to stop them watering. I then went straight back to my tent. About two minutes afterwards the first shell came into camp and burst about fifty yards from us. Men at first a bit frightened, but were soon collected and well in hand, laid down among the tents. I went to see the Colonel, who gave us our orders. He was to command D, E, F, and H Companies, while Campbell85 was to command A, B, and C. We were to advance in line extended at five paces, left of F directing. I had to prolong the line to the left, and D Company, Pechell86 in command, was on my left. We were to advance in support of the Dublin Fusiliers. When we got to the bottom of the nullah below our camp we saw the Dublins halting. Soon after we advanced over the hill on the other side of the nullah, and came for the first time under infantry fire of a very desultory description; we advanced through several fields, cutting wire as we went. When we got near some farm buildings to the right of the cemetery, we halted again. I saw some staff officers, went up to them and had a chat; got out my telescope and looked at the enemy. Bullets at this time were coming very straight considering the distance (about 1800 yards), but had men well under cover so had no casualties; I was quite surprised at the accuracy of the fire. We watched our shells bursting, which they did well. We stayed there about fifteen minutes, and then advanced into another nullah, where we formed up by companies. I heard no more of the enemy's shells after this, but could hear their bullets whistling over our heads. Pechell and I looked through my telescope and could see them beautifully, and could distinguish several heads above the rocks.
For the first time I realised the strength of their position; it would be difficult to conceive a stronger one. The ridge ran north-west to south-east fairly level, with huge boulders giving any amount of cover both from view and fire, the approaches from the front and flank were all commanded. The ground in front of the position for about 100 yards was precipitous, for the next 100 yards, absolutely open; then came a stone wall running vertically up and down the hill; 500 yards further on there was a wood surrounded by a hedge and a small mud wall. There was a nullah running through the wood up to the enemy's position commanded by their fire. This wood extended for about 700 yards from front to rear; between the wood and the nullah we were in was a level piece of open ground about 600 yards across. The nullah we were in ran east and west for about a
82 Captain A Stuart Wortley, KRRC. 83 Captain R Jelf, KRRC. 84 Lieutenant Colonel John Sherston, Rifle Brigade. 85 Major William Campbell, KRRC. 86 Captain Mark Pechell, KRRC.
58 mile, then turned to the north round the mountain, and gave plenty of cover. I could not understand why we did not make more use of this nullah, as we might have made a flank attack in this way. We waited in the nullah for about half an hour, and the Colonel87 called us up and explained to us how we were to advance across the 600 yards of open country that was before us. This was to be done in column of half companies extended at ten paces. Immediately afterwards we were given the order to advance. We got over the sides of the nullah extended, and moved across in quick time. Here it was that the first casualties occurred. None occurred in my half-company, and the others were too far off for me to see who they were. When I saw other people advancing, I advanced my half-company and moved through the wood to the right across the nullah. We could see as we crossed the nullah how our shells were bursting on the whole very well. The fire was here most decidedly heavy, but we had a certain amount of cover. While we were in the wood we were under cover from view, but the enemy fired into the wood, of course not very straight.
We crossed the fire swept zone with the utmost rapidity, so lost no one. We came out on the other side of the wood, and laid down behind the small mud wall, and for the first time we opened fire on the enemy. Poor Hambrough88 was almost immediately hit in the jaw, and several men in Wortley's company were wounded close to me. Sergeant George89 had his fingers badly smashed by a bullet. General Yule came shortly after and watched us, and after we had been there about forty minutes, we were ordered to advance. The men had behaved splendidly, adjusting their sights and so on. I took a few shots myself, but could not see the effect. However, I think I got the sighting all right; made the distance 700 yards; could see shots striking through telescope, but Boers were very well hidden behind rocks. Had I had my field glasses I might have lent them to someone to spot my shots. We got the order to advance, and I rushed up the hill about fifty yards to the right of the wall which ran up and down the hill, followed by my half-company. After we had gone about 100 yards we found we were being enfiladed from the right, so we laid down for about five minutes well under cover. Taylor90 got hit here, the wound was a very nasty one. We then moved our men to the left under the shelter of the wall. Nugent91 and Wortley went to the brow to look out, and then signalled to us to advance, and up we went, lining the wall which ran parallel to the crest about 200 yards from the enemy. We fired occasionally by volleys, but more often kept up a fire whenever anyone showed himself; we took great care over the sighting of the rifles, there was no excited firing whatever, everyone was very cool. We stayed here for about two hours, and for the first hour were entirely by ourselves. I felt very hungry and rather faint, not having had anything to eat since lunch the day before. The fire was very hot, and we lost several men, including Colour Sergeant Edwards92 and Sergeant Abrames93 in my company, and a great many wounded.
At last we got the order to advance, firing one volley previously. Taylor came on, and I shall never forget him sword in one hand and revolver in the other urging his men on. On we went up the hill, and I had just drawn my revolver, as I was getting within revolver range, when I felt a most tremendous blow on my left hip. At first I thought my thigh was broken, but finding that I could move my leg, knew that this was not the case. I then looked down and saw Martin94, and slid down as far as him; he was also wounded. The firing was still going on, but then we found ourselves under our own shrapnel fire. Just before this I saw the Colonel gallantly leading on his men; he passed about five yards to my right — this was the last I saw of him. I then looked back and saw five flashes from our guns in quick succession, followed by the reports, and then the most awful shower I have ever heard all round us, a bit of the shell falling about six feet below us; the dust was thrown up all round us. Martin then helped me across the open to the wall which we had left a quarter of an hour before; on the way there I saw Nugent being helped down too. B_____ soon afterwards bound me up. Yule passed by and said "your men have done most awfully well." Soon after this the guns stopped firing, and Wortley said to me "our men are on top of the hill." I do not think anything could have been more cheering than this news.
I have given a most egotistical description, but it is not because I thought of my own actions, but I saw so little of what was going on elsewhere. All behaved splendidly. The way Hambrough went on after his jaw was broken was a thing to be remembered. Of the seventeen officers who went into the fight, five were killed and eight wounded.”
87 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gunning, KRRC. 88 Lieutenant Norman Hambro, KRRC. 89 6704 Sergeant W George, KRRC. 90 Lieutenant John Taylor, KRRC, was killed. 91 Major Oliver Nugent, KRRC. 92 3406 Colour Sergeant C Edwards, KRRC. 93 4484 Sergeant S Abrames, KRRC. 94 Lieutenant Gerald Martin, KRRC.
59 Letter by Sergeant A Harrington, KRRC
This letter to his father was published in the Annals of the KRRC.
“Well, as to the fight: For a few days prior to 20th October the cavalry and mounted infantry patrols had reported that large bodies of the enemy were within a few miles of us, and at 3 a.m. on that day news was brought to General Penn-Symons that the Boers were in force taking up a position on Talana Hill, about one and a half miles to the west of Dundee and two miles from our camp. We had been standing to arms at daybreak, and on being dismissed that morning we heard some rifle shots in the distance, and on turning to the hill discovered that it was lined along its whole crest length by men. Still nothing was done. At twenty minutes to six a loud report, followed by a shell dropping among the tents, dispelled all dreams, and we were ordered to lie down, the shells in the meantime dropping all around us. Many men had narrow escapes, one in my company actually having the top of his helmet carried away without being injured.
We were now doubled out to take cover amongst the rocks in front of our tents, on the side farthest from the enemy, and lay watching their artillery practice for a few minutes.
By this time the General had made up his mind what to do. We (the 1st Battalion K.R.R.) paraded by companies in our lines, and, moving through the rear of the camp, deployed into line, when we found ourselves in the rear of the Irish Fusiliers. There was a lot of rock-strewn ground in our front, after passing which we were much delayed at various points by fences, gardens, cultivation, barbed wire, and so on. At about half-way between the camp and the hill was a dry river bed, behind the bank of which nearest to the enemy the Brigade, consisting of ourselves, Irish Fusiliers, and Dublin Fusiliers, were formed up preparatory to crossing a plain about 700 yards wide.
Just before reaching the river bed the Boers opened on us with a five barrel Hotchkiss quick-firing gun, and dropped five shells (weighing about three pounds each, I should guess) not four paces in front of my company, just as quickly as you would fire five revolver shots. Fortunately no one was hit, although the mud flew over us on their striking the sodden ground. We were now about 1600 yards from the hill, which in shape strongly resembled a piano, if you imagine a steep slope from keyboard to ground, and found that a copje95 or rounded hill to our right was also crowded with Boers. When all was ready the order came, "The Dublin Fusiliers will advance, supported by the Rifles." Clambering the bank, the Fusiliers extended and rushed across the open plain, making for a wood about 700 yards to our front and lying immediately at the base of the hill. We followed at about a distance of 150 yards.
Never shall I forget the dreadful storm of bullets that smote us during these few awful minutes. Exposed to a cross-fire from thousands of rifles, men commenced to fall rapidly, whist the air and ground all round us were torn by the fearful hail. For my part, I never hoped to reach the wood, notwithstanding which I got so winded that the last 100 yards or so had to be walked. To my joy, however, the edge of the wood was at length reached, and by great good luck I struck it just where there was a little bit of wall, behind which I dropped and had barely done so when two bullets struck the uppermost stones. After a breather the company (B), with the others of the Battalion, moved as best considered through the wood, the missiles all the time screeching and tearing through the trunks and leaves, more than one man being struck whilst in fancied security. We were, I suppose, about a couple of hours getting through the plantation, which was about 500 yards in width. At its farther edge we lay down behind a bank while the hill was surveyed by the responsible officers. On emerging we had to cross another open space of about 150 yards, when we met another hail of bullets. We then got to a low wall running up the boulder strewn slope, and gradually mounted under its partial cover, the bullets continually striking the rocks. Half-way up the hill we reached a wall running parallel with the crest. Two of our batteries had been firing over our heads ever since the start, and were making grand practice. Further progress was for the present stopped, and all we could do was to try to keep the Boers' fire down by firing at them whenever they showed up from behind their cover. Many of our men were struck in the act of aiming over the wall, which was distant about 250 yards from the crest. I fired about fifty rounds over the wall.
After lying there about two hours, it became evident that some companies of our own force (of the Irish Fusiliers) lying in a nullah on our left were endangering ourselves with their fire. Colonel Gunning asked if anyone would go down and stop them. Of course it was extremely risky. I jumped up at once, ran down the hill under a shower of lead, and delivered the message. Resting for a couple of minutes, a staff captain asked me to take a message to the artillery, who had not noticed that some of our men had gone higher up.
95 Kopje.
60 Passing through the wood at the edge farthest from the enemy, I again crossed the plain, the distance to the guns being about 600 yards, and gave the message to the officer commanding the Brigade Division, Colonel Pickwoad. A veritable hail poured about me going and returning, so much so that half way back I was obliged to lie down in a depression of the ground for many minutes. You will, I am sure, be delighted to know that both incidents came under notice, and that Major Campbell, a splendid officer, who brought us out of the action, has mentioned me in his despatch in (I am told) highly favourable terms. Colonel Pickwoad told me a couple of days ago that he had mentioned it to the General.96
About two o'clock the order was given by Colonel Gunning to jump the wall, cross the keyboard, and take the remaining portion at the point of the bayonet. A fire, the intensity of which can scarcely be imagined, smote our front as the wall was clambered over, the bit of flat space crossed, and the last terrible 150 ft of the precipitous slope climbed. The Boers then fled, and the 18th Hussars, getting round the hill, cut them up as they retired, but prevented our artillery from firing on the retreating masses.
We were now able to look round and reckon up our losses, and see the awful effects of our artillery fire. The ground from the wall to the crest was strewn with our stricken men, whilst dead bodies and pools of blood showed how the enemy had suffered on top, though as usual most of the dead and wounded had been removed. The sights were terrible.
After removing our dead and wounded, we were formed up and marched back to camp. I got hold of a Mauser rifle and bandolier, and a satchel full of Mauser ammunition. Others got ponies, money boxes of shell, and so on.”
96 Sergeant Harrington was mentioned in despatches by Lord Roberts’ on 4th September 1901. He went on to be awarded the DCM for his service in South Africa.
61 Account by Major P Marling, 18th Hussars
Major Percival Scrope Marling had already gained a broad military experience by the time he reached the Boer War. He had participated in the Transvaal War of 1880-81 and gained the VC for gallantry at Tamai in 1884.
He published his autobiography in a book called ‘Rifleman and Hussar’ in 1931 and the following extract relates to his time at Talana.
Friday, October 20th Stood to our horses at 4.30 a.m. At 5.10 a staff officer came and said we could go to water, as it was all clear. We however did not water, but kept the saddles on. At 5.25 without warning the Boers began to shell the camp heavily. We were ordered to get out of camp at once, and form up on the north side of it. One battery's horses were actually at water ¾ mile away. Möller sent my squadron on. We went along a nullah about 2 miles, and then turned half right, and got to a first-rate position on the enemy's right flank. I sent back a message at once to Möller asking him to bring up the rest of the regiment and M.I. In about twenty minutes B Squadron came up with Knox. We had an A1 position, and could see a lot of their led horses about 1,200 yards off behind the north-east shoulder of Talana Hill. Then Knox sent another message to Möller asking him to bring up the rest of the regiment and the M.I. at once, and finally in another forty minutes Möller appeared with the rear squadron and the M.I. I begged him to let us open fire on the Boer led horses with the machine gun, and our men dismounted, and the M.I., but he wouldn't hear of it, and told me when he wanted my advice he would ask for it.
When I first brought my squadron up a few shells had been fired at us on the move, but had all passed over our heads. Möller then took the regiment, the M.I., and our machine gun right away from the enemy in a northerly direction, leaving a perfect position, under cover, and completely commanding the enemy's rear and their led horses. Then we came on a Boer ambulance and about 20 armed Boers. Two troops B squadron charged these men, killed 2, wounded 3, and captured the others. These prisoners were handed over to the M.I. Knox again begged Möller to let us go back towards the enemy, but he wouldn't. At last, Möller sent my squadron, supported by Laming's97, and told Knox to go with us while he himself stayed behind with two troops B Squadron, the machine gun and 1 section K.R.R.C. M.I. and 1 Com. Royal Dublin Fusiliers M.I.
Knox took us at once towards the enemy, who had now taken up a second position on another hill in rear of Talana. We crossed Sand's Spruit . . . but the ground was cut with deep nullahs, and nearly impossible for cavalry. We saw a Boer holding up a white flag behind a wall and took him. He seemed very glad to surrender. Then we went on towards Vant's Drift, and were quite behind the line of retreat of the Boers, my squadron leading, with Laming's in support. All the hills and kopjes from Talana Hill for 6 or 7 miles towards Vant's Drift were held by Boers.
Knox told me to dismount my men and occupy a hill overlooking the road along which the Boers would have to retreat. I dismounted the squadron and went up it on foot with the men. When a quarter-way up we were fired on from the top, and Wood, who had been round the hill with two men to patrol, reported that about 120 Boers had galloped up the nullah the far side of the hill to reinforce the small party of Boers already on the hill. I seized a kopje half-way up, and began firing at the Boers, but they kept very close.
After about eighteen to twenty minutes of this the order came to mount. We went across a farm and into a nullah, but could not see our led horses anywhere. All the time the Boers were firing at us hard at from 300 to 600 yards. I got all the men under cover in a nullah, and went out to find the led horses. I only had No. 2 troop with me. After a quarter of an hour Corporal Hamilton98 came within 400 yards of the nullah with my horse. He said my trumpeter's99 horse had been shot through the nose and upset the trumpeter so that he had let my horse go. In about fifteen minutes more I saw the two squadrons about 1,400 yards off coming over a ridge. I sent Corporal Hamilton for the led horses, and got the troop out of the nullah and mounted. We had 2 men hit and 3 horses. The Boers fired till we were 2,000 yards off.
I reported what had happened to Knox. Knox said I had done very well to get the men off so cheaply. I know I was very glad to get my horse again, as I hate walking, and running even more.
97 Major Henry T Laming, 18th Hussars 98 4144 L Cpl E Hamilton, 18th Hussars. 99 Either 4008 T Denny or 3896 D Seppings, both trumpeters in A Squadron, 18th Hussars.
62
We took up a position now on some high ground and drove off the Boers, who tried to attack us. Suddenly they opened on us with a gun about 3,000 yards off, and put a shell right into my squadron, which fortunately did not burst, or else it must have knocked over a whole troop. The other shells went short as we moved off to Wade's Farm. It now came on to rain with a lot of mist, and about 4.30 p.m. we decided to return to Dundee. We had received no orders from the General or Möller since early morning, though we had sent in several messengers, none of whom had returned. The Boers had, I should think, 6,000 men engaged, but it was impossible to make a proper estimate, as they moved so quickly and were scattered over a lot of hills, all of which they held.
As we got near Talana Hill about 5.30 p.m. we met three Boer doctors and heard guns firing near Impati. As we passed Talana we saw the Irish Fusiliers, who told me that General Symons was hit, Gunning, Colonel of the 60th Rifles, killed, and a lot more. Our casualties very heavy. Got into camp about dark. We were wet through to the skin. Nothing heard of Möller, Greville, Pollok, or the vet., Shore, and two troops of ours and the machine gun and 130 M.I. Cape badly wounded in the neck; Charlie Maclachan in thigh; Bayford slightly in wrist. Pollok and Greville both had their horses shot.
The Infantry stormed Talana Hill with the greatest gallantry, and if Pickwoad100, CO., R.A., had brought up his batteries, as he should have done and opened fire at once on the retreating Boers instead of coming up at a walk, as they say, after a long delay, we should have killed heaps more Boers. But I still think that if Möller had opened fire on the Boers behind Talana Hill from the first position Knox and I took up, about 1,000 yards distance, where we were under good cover and could see 700 or 800 of their led horses and Boers passing ammunition up by hand, the Boers would have retired at once. They were always very nervous of losing their horses.
We learned from some of the prisoners that 5,000 Boers had crossed Landsman's Drift with four field guns and two Maxims, and the guns were served by the Staats Artillery. These Boers mostly came from Middleburg, Wakkerstroom, Utrecht, and Vryheid, and were commanded by Lucas Meyer, and Cris Botha, and were to seize Talana Hill at daybreak, and a joint attack was to be made on the camp at Dundee by a large column which was marching from Newcastle. This latter force was commanded by Erasmus. Mercifully for us Erasmus was a day late and didn't get to Impati till noon on the 21st 101. Another Boer force had gone to Elands Laagte to cut off our retreat from Ladysmith.
October 20th My servant stupidly left my scatter-gun behind in camp at Dundee when, we retired, and 2½ years afterwards I got a letter from the Provost-Marshal, Radclyffe, as follows :
" Dear Marling,
" Your gun has been dug up at Heidelberg. I had tried to find it several times, and when I left I told my successor as A.P.M. to try when the prisoners returned. He says it's somewhat damaged, but anyhow, it will be a trophy. Warren, A.P.M., says he is sending it to you c/o me, but perhaps it hasn't started. A.P.M. Heidelberg might fetch it yet. I hope Mrs. Marling is well. She must be glad the strain is over.
" Yours sincerely, "C. Radclyffe."
Saturday, October 21st Started at 5 a.m. with my squadron to reconnoitre towards Hatten's Spruit station102, 9 miles on the Newcastle road. At 4.30 a.m. Knox went with one and a half squadrons to Glencoe Junction. We were fighting all day from 6 a.m. till dark. At 11 a.m. a message came from General Yule, "Advance with great caution, and don't let your patrols get too far in front of you." At 12.30: "Do not advance any farther, and be most careful not to get cut off." At 2 p.m. a message was brought by an excited orderly, no time, no date, no anything, on a piece of dirty paper: "Retire at once on the camp." When we got near our old camp we found our troops had been shelled clean out of it. I met General Yule, who succeeded poor General Symons, who
100 Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Pickwoad. 101 Probably a supposition based on the fact that Erasmus’s force had not engaged on the 20th. This suggests the account was written soon after the battle and not subsequently revised, despite the fact that the book was not published until 1931. 102 Hatting Spruit Station.
63 had been mortally wounded at Talana. I went back to the old camp to get the men's kits, but the shell fire was very hot, so I went off to where the new camp was to be. Even there it was pretty hot. The Boers had got two of those beastly long French guns, 6-inch Creusot, which carry 9,000 yards. [These guns came from the forts at Johannesburg, and our Intelligence Department had reported they were absolutely immobile], so we shifted behind a ridge farther on.
It was now getting dark, and there was the most awful confusion: regiments without their commanding officers, and commanding officers without their regiments. No one knew where the General was, and all the Staff but two had been knocked over. The Headquarters telegraph clerk came and asked me where the General was, as he had been hunting for him with a most important message for an hour. It was to this effect: "From G.O.C. Ladysmith. Fear quite impossible to reinforce you. You must do your best. Will however do what we can." Cheery under the circumstances. I couldn't find General Yule, so gave it to old Pickwoad in the R.A., the next senior officer, who nearly fell off his horse when he read it. It had been drizzling since 5 p.m., and now rained in a steady downpour. We had no tents or covering, and held on to our horses all night. We got no orders at all, and none of us had any idea what we were to do in the morning.
Sunday, October 22nd Started at 5 a.m. and took up the best position we could to resist an attack. A message came in from Ladysmith saying the Boers had been beaten the day before at Elands Laagte, and were retreating up Glencoe Pass, and we all bucked up wonderfully. So we (18th Hussars) and one battery started off for the pass, only however to find two Boors [One of them was wounded, and the other said he was on our side]. We had a fight of sorts all day with a fresh lot of Boers who had arrived from Newcastle. At 5 p.m. it was decided to withdraw the whole force either to Helpmakaar or Ladysmith. Our wagons, under Wickham, A.S.C., went to the old camp at dusk to load up all the forage and rations they could carry, and we started in the pitch-dark, with no road for 1½ miles. Wickham did good work under very difficult conditions, getting all the stuff away. We went stumbling along in the night and got through Dundee all right. No smoking, or talking, or lights allowed. Got to Beith103 at 1 p.m., at least the advance guard did; the rear-guard and baggage got in at 5 p.m. We finally decided to go by the old Dutch road down Waschbank Pass. This is an unfrequented track now seldom used. I commanded the rear-guard. It was pitch-dark at starting, but presently the moon rose. We got down the pass, 5 miles long, and out on to the Waschbank Plain. The rear-guard and baggage reached the banks of the Waschbank River, and so across by 9 a.m. Thackwell104 did jolly good work in going down the pass, with a sergeant and 6 men, to see if it was held by the Boers or not.
Tuesday, October 24th Very tired and short of sleep. We led our horses most of the night, and next morning, about 10 a.m., heard firing, so one battery and one and a half squadrons of ours started off as hard as tired horses could go, hoping to cut in at the Boer forces, which were engaging our people from Ladysmith. We went about 9 miles, but saw nothing, and the firing died away. Desperately hot day and not a tree for miles. At 4.30 p.m. it began to pour, and the Waschbank River, which had been only about 3 inches deep in the morning, when we crossed, rose 12 feet in two hours, and was 30 to 40 yards wide, the current running very strong. I never saw such a sudden change. An infantry picket and one of my subalterns with a patrol of 6 men were cut off. The ground all along the river was converted into a swamp, so about 7 p.m. we moved to higher ground, though even there the water was 2 to 3 inches deep. A beastly night, no tents or shelter of any kind, so we just squatted down by our horses.
Wednesday, October 25th Started again, wet through, at 4 a.m. I commanded the advance guard. Went through some very rough country and down a short pass 1½ miles long, reaching Sunday River. Got eight fresh eggs and two fowls out of a Kaffir kraal. Knox and I ate the eggs raw with some whisky. 5th Lancers from Ladysmith turned up about 3.30 p.m. The water of this place was too beastly for words, and very little of it. Started again at 6 p.m. I was in command of the rear-guard, one and half squadrons. It had begun to rain, and poured all night. By 11.30 we had only done 2½ miles. It was so dark that I had dismounted all the men at the start and walked myself, holding on to the handle at the back of the Irish Fusiliers' water-cart so as not to lose touch. We halted every minute, as the wagons got stuck, and the track was up to the horses' hocks with slush and mud, and a few huge boulders thrown in just to break the monotony. About 9 p.m. half the wagons got stuck, and although we had sixteen mules to each wagon, they could hardly move. At 10 p.m. I went up
103 Beith. 104 Lt Charles Thackwell was awarded the DSO later in the war.
64 with the General (Yule) and the A.D.C. (Murray) to see what could be done, and presently we started them on the right track, which a lot of them had lost. Into Ladysmith by 11 a.m. The infantry had not a kick left in them, everyone soaked to the skin, and more or less covered with black slush. Distance from Glencoe to Ladysmith the way we came, 64 miles. Our horses ate their last forage Thursday morning.
Sir George White came out to meet us, and complimented the regiment on its appearance and the horses, which had stuck it out awfully well. They had only had their saddles off for two hours in three and a half days. We left all our wounded, tents, and a lot of stores at Dundee, as, now the railway is cut, we had no transport to carry it away. Also band instruments of four infantry regiments, so that old Kruger is now probably playing the soft trombone to his old Dutch at Pretoria. "B." came out to meet us. I did not take my boots off from 4 a.m. Sunday till 1 p.m. Thursday. However I am very fit, except for shortness of sleep. I could not keep awake even standing up.
Friday, October 27th Had to write an account of the Battle of Talana for Sir George White. No fresh horses or saddlery to be got.
Saturday, October 28th Sir George White said he would give us three days to rest to get straight, but we were up at 4 a.m. this morning and on patrol till dark.
65 Account by Major H Greville, 18th Hussars
This account is not attributed to an author and appears in the book on the 18th Hussars by Burnett. However, from reading the account, it is likely to have been written by Major Greville who was taken prisoner but not wounded during the battle.
"In accordance with the orders issued the previous night, all the troops in camp stood to their arms at 4.30 a.m. on Friday morning, October 20th, 1899. It was one of those cold misty mornings which are occasionally experienced in Natal at that time of the year. All night it had rained incessantly, and the prospect outside was so very uninviting, that I was very loth to get up when my servant called me at a quarter to four in the morning. After struggling into my clothes I ran over to the mess tent to procure myself a cup of cocoa and a few biscuits, a very wise precaution as it turned out later.
I was one of a group of officers standing outside the tent when Colonel Beckett, staff officer to General Symons, rode past, calling out to us we could dismiss. I heard afterwards he was on his way to a piquet of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which had just sent in word that Boers were advancing and firing on them, and that they were in need of support.
Whilst conversing at the end of my squadron lines, numbers of men were pointed out to me collecting on the two hills which lay to the east and overlooked our camp. I ran to my tent and got my field glasses, and through them could see swarms of men, mostly on ponies, on Talana Hill. They were plainly visible against the sky line, and undoubtedly Boers. I could just distinguish some dark-looking objects, round which small clusters of men were gathered, and, whilst speculating whether they were guns, there suddenly came a flash from the hill top, and a shell crashed in the direction of the town. This was quickly followed by another, and soon plenty came pounding into our camp. I think the guns were being principally aimed at the General's tent, which, with the Union Jack floating from the flagstaff close by, was a conspicuous mark for the Boers. As I was in my tent, buckling on revolver and sword, whilst my horse was being brought me, a shell burst, but did no damage, a few yards off. Most of the shells were not bursting properly, no doubt due to the long range (5,000 yards) at which they were fired from; anyhow very few caused any damage. Still this unexpected bombardment on a practically empty stomach was not over pleasant, and it had the effect of hastening us out of camp pretty smartly. Whilst Colonel Möller, accompanied by his adjutant, rode off to the Headquarters Camp to get the orders, our men quickly mounted their horses, which fortunately had remained saddled up, and hurried out of camp, to form up under cover of some rocky ground, which was below the lie of the camp, and to the west of it. There was no confusion, and the officers were able to collect the squadrons and tell them off. Our guns had opened fire from the camp itself, but the range was too long a one to reach Talana Hill. Soon we caught sight of the horses of one of the batteries being led back at a gallop from the watering troughs beyond. The battery to which these horses belonged remained in camp with the Leicestershire Regiment, whilst the other two batteries were quickly on the move, making for a spot east of the town, where they came into action at a much closer range.
And now Colonel Möller and Captain Pollok returned from the General. They had found him calmly smoking a cigarette while issuing orders, and whilst shells fell all around. He was much incensed at the impudence of the enemy daring to attack us like this.
It was about 5.15 a.m. when the Boers began their bombardment, and barely half an hour later 'A' squadron, of the 18th Hussars, under Major Marling, V.C, received the order to move off along the Sand spruit nullah and take up a position just below a stony ridge east of Dundee, and almost right behind Talana Hill. About five minutes afterwards I was ordered to follow, with my squadron 'B,' the direction ‘A' squadron had taken and join it. Two only of my officers were with me, Captain Burnett and Lieut. Bayford, as my two other subalterns, Lieutenants Thackwell and Maclachlan, had left camp the previous night, and were still out with their patrols. Before starting to join Major Marling, Colonel Möller rode up to my squadron and ordered Captain Burnett away with a patrol to reconnoitre our left flank and the southern slopes of Impati Mountain, whose summit lay hidden in mist. Thus early in the day I lost the services of my second-in-command, for I never saw Captain Burnett again. As I trotted off towards the Sandspruit nullah the enemy's guns opened fire on me. On my way I met Lieut. Maclachlan with his patrol, and they joined me. From him I learnt that he had seen nothing of the enemy near the Navigation Collieries or on the Newcastle road. Major Laming, with 'C' Squadron, now followed me, and, in turn, the Mounted Infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers, under Captain Lonsdale, and a section of the 60th Rifles Mounted Infantry, under Lieut. Crum, together with our Maxim gun under Lieut. Cape, and this completed our little force. From the ridge top behind which we were assembled we could watch the progress of the battle, admire the precision of our Artillery fire, and, later on, the dash with which the Infantry attacked. Our shrapnel was
66 doing great execution on Talana Hill; the shells were bursting beautifully just over the summit. From the position we had taken up, and which was about 2,000 yards from the hill, we could see thousands of Boers. A great many were coming down the hill and making for a farm house at the foot of it, and from which the red cross was flying, a building the Boers had temporarily turned into a hospital for their wounded. A great number of ponies, waiting for their masters, were scattered about below Talana. Had we but had a horse battery with us, what deadly execution it could have inflicted! Our position completely enfiladed the Boers, but the range was too great for rifle fire. Our plan should have been to remain in this position until the enemy were in full retreat, but, unfortunately, we committed the error of issuing out into the plain far too soon. We thus disclosed to the enemy our intention, and instead of sweeping down into them when they were a routed foe, they saw us in time to tell off a portion of their force to make a strong counter attack and so cover their retirement. The plain, east of Dundee, stretches away to the Buffalo River, and over it lay the enemy's line of retreat. This impatient eagerness of ours to intercept and cut off the Boers was the primary cause of our ultimate discomfiture. My squadron was to act as advance guard, and Major Knox accompanied it. It was still drizzling slightly, and the fog had not lifted as we descended into the plain, followed at some distance by the remainder of the regiment and the Mounted Infantry. I picked my way through the fog, moving in a north- easterly direction, with scouts thrown out well to the front and flanks. No enemy was visible, and but for the rattle of musketry fire, which could be distinctly heard, there was no sign a fierce battle was raging close by. After advancing some little way Knox ordered me to halt whilst he galloped back to see what the Colonel proposed doing. My advanced parties were under the command of Second Lieutenant Bayford, while Maclachlan was galloping for the commanding officer. Presently one of my scouts returned to report that a small party of Boers were gathering in a spruit about three-quarters of a mile away, and to my right flank. I sent him back, telling him to keep a sharp look out and report any further developments. It was about this time that I noticed some Boers advancing towards a Boers' ambulance waggon, which, with its staff of doctors, had halted in the open veldt. Owing to the fog these latter Boers were unaware of the presence of my squadron, and it came quite as a surprise to them when they caught sight of me advancing on them at a gallop, for I quickly made up my mind to charge. It was all over in a few seconds, and out of the thirty Boers one was killed, about eight wounded, and the remainder taken prisoners. Had I not shouted to my men to give quarter few would have escaped death. The men's blood was up, and it was their first introduction to the Boers, and their desire to lay about them was only natural. Besides, these very Boers had previously fired at us from off their ponies as we were advancing towards them. But once we got amongst them they were a wretched, miserable, cringing lot, pleading for mercy. Some took off their bandoliers and held them up to us, others threw their rifles to the ground and prayed for their lives. These we made prisoners. I then saw a young Boer, a mere lad, deliberately fire at one of my men, who had purposely spared him on his begging for mercy. He shot him through the body, but this was my only casualty. I then retired with my prisoners towards the Boer ambulance, and despatched their doctors off to attend to the wounded. Dr. Hardy, our own doctor, also assisted. The prisoners were handed over to a guard of mounted infantrymen, who, with the remainder of the 18th, had come on the scene. These Boers were a funny crew. Their shaggy beards, slouch hats, and unkempt appearance reminded me forcibly of the brigands portrayed in burlesque.
Colonel Möller now ordered me to halt and dismount; my squadron was to remain with him and the Mounted Infantry, whilst 'A' and 'C' squadrons, under Major Knox, moved away in a south-easterly direction. Lieut. Bayford was still out with his troop scouting, and he, with his men, eventually joined Knox.
I was next ordered to mount my men and accompany the commanding officer, but after proceeding a short distance we returned to the Mounted Infantry, whom we found dismounted close to a road, and lying down ready to fire to cover our retirement had it been necessary. It was then a message from Major Knox was brought me, bidding me rejoin him with my squadron. However, it was not to be, for the Colonel, thinking Knox was advancing too far towards the Buffalo, ordered me to remain with him; but he sent Veterinary- Lieutenant Shore, who was acting as galloper, to ask why Knox required my squadron. Unfortunately Shore was unable to deliver the message owing to large parties of Boers now blocking the way and separating us from Knox. The Boers were now advancing on us in numbers. My scouts had warned me of their approach. They had collected in batches in the spruit before alluded to until they were sufficiently strong to attack us. The Mounted Infantry fired a few volleys and the Maxim gun also opened fire, but the range was still a long one, and many ant hills gave the Boers good cover; besides the heavy fog assisted in keeping them concealed.
The Boers steadily increased in numbers, and the flanks of our small force were threatened, so the Colonel ordered a retirement. I am inclined to think my squadron might then have been advantageously employed; a charge into the flank of the enemy at this period, though costly no doubt, might have checked the enemy, and even caused them to fly. I was not, however, in a position to dictate orders, and I had to obey those I received.
67 After retiring nearly a mile we were again halted, and besides the Mounted Infantry, one troop of my squadron was ordered to dismount and take up a position to check the enemy's advance. It was difficult to tell exactly how many Boers were attacking us, but there is no doubt we were greatly outnumbered. The position taken up on the open veld, with only a few ant hills to give cover, was really no position at all, and when the Boers began to work round our flank we were forced once more to fall back. We now had to cross a deep spruit, and here my horse stumbled and rolled over with me, but I managed to keep hold of him, and, being none the worse for my spill, I was quickly up again in the saddle and with my squadron. A good deal of wire fencing had now to be cut through, but sending on a few men with wire cutters to clear a way for us, we were not much retarded. It was at this spruit our casualties began. Our Maxim gun got stuck in the muddy bottom. This I heard afterwards, and also how pluckily Lieut. Cape and the gun detachment had behaved. But in their endeavour to extricate the gun from its perilous position, all the detachment were either killed or wounded. Lieut. Cape was himself severely wounded, shot through the throat, and the Boers quickly closing in captured the gun. All this was related to me afterwards. A portion of the Mounted Infantry had been told off as escort to the maxim, but, for some unaccountable reason, had been removed, by order of the commanding officer, before the gun got into difficulties. Being the only officer with my squadron I had not left it, and so the sad gun episode, which had occurred on the right flank whilst I was on the left, had not attracted my notice. My trumpeter, a smart lad, had been wounded before we got to the spruit, but now the poor lad was hit again and killed.105
Men were beginning to drop, several riderless horses were careering about, and Boers were firing from closer quarters. Lieutenants Crum and Maclachlan were wounded. Both the latter managed to get back to camp without further mishap. Bullets were whistling past us and the fire was getting hotter, but, considering the excellent target we must have presented while riding through the narrow openings made in the wire fence, the Boer's marksmanship was very erratic.
Once more we dismounted, and this time the whole of my squadron, besides the Mounted Infantry, were dismounted and sent into the firing line. An ant hill here and there offered cover, but many men had to lie down and fire fully exposed. The Boers have a wonderful knack of keeping concealed, and it was only very occasionally during the whole of our retirement I actually caught sight of one. Captain Pollok and myself had imprudently ridden up into the firing line, with the result we almost simultaneously had our horses shot under us. Remaining mounted, we had drawn the enemy's fire on to us. Whilst in the act of dismounting from my wounded horse, who was bleeding profusely, a bullet passed through the end of my right boot, but it avoided my toes most miraculously, and another took a small snick out of the heel of the same boot. I soon captured another mount, a Boer pony, which was trotting about riderless. Meantime the order to mount and retire was again shouted out, as Boers were beginning to outflank us and render our present position no longer tenable. I had not even the time to unstrap my cloak from off my dead horse or even empty the contents of the wallets, in which, amongst other things, lay my flask. I had barely time to draw my sword and secure my field glasses.
The Boer pony I had managed to catch seemed a willing enough beast, but I found having to ride in a saddle with only one stirrup, and that one quite four holes too short, a not altogether comfortable predicament to be in. I soon caught up the squadron and Mounted Infantry, who now retired through a narrow defile, and struck west round Impati Mountain, with the intention of regaining the camp via the Newcastle road. We could hear no more firing from the direction of Dundee, and fighting was evidently over. By this time we had shaken off the enemy. The Colonel trusted in getting safely back round by the Navigation Collieries, which neighbourhood Maclachlan had reconnoitred early in the morning, and reported clear of Boers at 6 a.m. Our luck was, however, dead out, for we had not proceeded far when my advanced scout reported the presence of Boers in the vicinity, and I soon myself observed parties of them descending the slopes of Impati. It was now clear to push on further in the direction we were taking was but to court disaster. We were heading for a new Boer commando, which had taken no part in the battle of Dundee. Thereupon the Colonel decided in taking up as strong a position as could be found handy and holding out until nightfall in the hope of slipping away in the dark. I considered this a most injudicious plan, and was all in favour of retracing our footsteps the way we had retired, now the Boers, who had harassed us all the morning, had sheared off and given up the pursuit. Had we done so and returned to camp via the Sand-spruit nullah we should have escaped the sad fate which awaited us. By taking up a position then our mobility no longer stood us in good stead; we became Infantry and isolated Infantry, caught like a rat in a hole. There seemed little chance of deliverance, and it was with a feeling we were all doomed men I entered Adelaide Farm, for I never expected to leave it alive. It was about 1.15 p.m. when the Colonel settled on this farm as our last stand. Hills which were spurs of Impati Mountain lay at the back; on them the Mounted Infantry were posted. Scarcely had we dismounted and got into our places when the Boers, with their customary alacrity, collected from all sides and opened fire
105 4373 Trumpeter Charles Salmon, 18th Hussars.
68 upon us. The position we had taken up was the best we could select, and which the country we were in afforded us. It gave the men good cover and a clear field of fire, but it had the drawback of giving an insufficiency of cover for the horses, and the presence of a nullah, stretching along the front and flanks, only about 750 yards away, which was quickly occupied by Boers, and from which they fired unceasingly for over two hours, was a great disadvantage.
The Defence of Adelaide Farm The position we had selected to defend was a small farm, the front of which was faced by a stone wall 3ft. 6in. high, and about 80 yards long. This wall was about twenty yards from the house. The house itself was quite a small brick building, with a tin roof, on which bullets were heard to rattle unceasingly. It contained but three small rooms and a front and a back door. A small stable, also of brick, stood about thirty yards to the right, and an ox waggon lay halfway between the two buildings. A wire fencing, which completed the enclosure behind, we cut down on entering the farm. My men were posted behind the wall, whilst our horses were placed behind the house and stable, which latter was able to accommodate a couple only. The Mounted Infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers occupied some rocky ground on a hill to the right, which commanded the approach to the farm. The section of the 60th Rifles Mounted Infantry, took up a position on a small hill overlooking the place. Behind us rose Impati Mountain, on whose stony slopes lay the Mounted Infantry as well. 106
From behind the wall we could see no Boers, but the continual whizzing of bullets over our heads made us aware of their presence. The Mounted Infantry, being on higher ground, could occasionally catch a glimpse of a Boer moving about, and they would seize those opportunities to fire a volley, and, as their shooting was good, they accounted for several of the enemy. The Boers' fire never showed signs of slackening; the expenditure of ammunition to them did not matter, besides they were plentifully provided, whereas we had to carefully nurse ours. I could see nothing of the enemy, and my men had to content themselves in remaining crouching behind the wall, wet through and shivering from cold. But they behaved splendidly, as they did all through that trying day. Not the slightest symptom of fear or wavering was ever shown, all orders were cheerfully and bravely carried out. The men were on their mettle, and seemed to realise their case was a desperate one, but a firm desire to do their duty to the last filled the mind of each defender. Once we experienced a bitter disappointment. We had observed a body of men approaching, and in the distance had mistaken them for British troops; our hopes of being rescued were, however, quickly dispelled on finding them to be Boer reinforcements. At about 1.45 p.m., and after we had been about half an hour in the farm, a gun opened fire on us, but the shell dropped short of the wall. Only one shot was fired, and at the time I could not understand why no more followed. Meanwhile the Boers were actively employed firing off their Mausers. Though none of us had yet been hit behind the wall, the rain of bullets which poured into the farm enclosure made it very unsafe to move out, even but a few yards away from the wall. Bullets were pattering into the roof of the house and stable, and occasionally a horse was hit. The house was too small to completely hide the horses from view, and unfortunately a good number had to stand unprotected from the enemy's fire. It was a sad sight to see the poor brutes shot down one after another, and exasperating to feel we could do nothing to prevent this massacre. We tried shifting some of the more exposed ones from behind the house to the back of the stable, but whilst moving them across the bit of open ground which separated the buildings several were struck, the Boers firing with increased energy when they came into view. A corporal of my squadron, who was leading a horse, was knocked over, and at first I thought he was killed. He was picked up and carried into the house through the back entrance. He had been badly wounded, the bullet having entered the right side of his body, struck a pocket book, which saved his life, for it caused the bullet to glance off a vital spot.
The owner of the farm was discovered, with his wife, lying under the bed, too terrified to render any assistance to the wounded man. The latter was put to bed and the best done for him, and a man told off to remain by his side. From time to time I looked over the wall to try and catch sight of the enemy, but not a single Boer could I see. It was necessary, however, to keep a sharp look out, as the Boers might at any moment emerge from the spruit and try to rush us. Their firing never relaxed a moment, but as far as we were concerned it did us no harm. The Mounted Infantry fared less well, and a few of their men were struck. Our horses, too, were frequently knocked over. A few turkeys and chicken were pecking away in the farm quite unconcerned. A bullet would often strike the ground with a thud right in their midst and cause a little skipping, but they would soon resume their grubbing, regardless of the consequences. The Mounted Infantry were now beginning to run short of ammunition, and matters were getting serious. The fire was now not only directed at our front, but our flanks were also beginning to catch it hot. The Boers had crept along
106 This should read Inyati Mountain. Adelaide Farm faced Impati.
69 the spruit, which formed nearly a complete semicircle round our position. When we eventually capitulated we found the enemy had worked right round and gained the heights of Impati to our rear.
But if matters had previously looked bad for our small force, they looked doubly more so when, at 3.45 p.m., a couple of Krupp guns opened fire on us at a range of only 1,500 to 2,000 yards. The first shell struck the rocks above the ground where the Mounted Infantry were lying, but the second fell amongst them, killing one of the Dublin Fusiliers and wounding several others. The third, I believe, did no harm, but the following one fell amongst the horses, killing several and causing the remainder to stampede. The guns were making excellent practice. Every second I expected a shell to come ploughing into us, and it was hardly a pleasant sensation to experience. One hit the stable plump, killing a horse inside, another carried away part of the wall, behind which we were, smothering the men with earth and stones, but hurting no one.
Our casualties increased. I saw one poor fellow struck by a shell which caught him below the shoulder blades, and which also killed the horse he was holding. Another man, though riddled by splinters of a shell, was still conscious and groaning piteously. We were having a bad time of it, and I had resigned myself to the fate which awaited us, and from which there seemed no escape. It was then the Colonel decided to surrender.
Seventeen of our horses had been shot down and the others had stampeded. The Mounted Infantry had fired their last round. To continue a hopeless resistance entailed a mere useless sacrifice of life. For over two hours we had held out against heavy odds. If those guns had not appeared on the scene we might, perhaps, have lasted out until dark. We were told by the Boers afterwards that the first time they had fired a gun at us was from their laager, but that on finding the range was too long a one, they had brought their guns up much closer.107 Whilst the guns were being fetched, and until their arrival, the Boers had, by their incessant rifle fire, kept us boxed up in the farm.
Out of a total of 187 men, the following is a correct return of our casualties on October 20th:
Officers Killed Wounded Wounded. 18th Hussars 3 8 2 Dublin Fusiliers M.I 3 6 - 60th Rifles M.I 2 3 1
Total 8 17 3
A sheet, which someone had fetched from the house, was attached to a pole and raised over the wall. Above, on the hill, the bugler was sounding the 'cease fire ' . . . . we had given in!
There was a short pause and a few seconds for bitter reflection, and then, as if by magic, Boers sprang up from everywhere. From all sides they galloped up to us, waving their arms and yelling to us to lay down our arms. There were quite 500 of them, and as their laager lay not far off, it would have been easy for them to summon up more men had they required assistance. I don't mind confessing that when I saw this howling cavalcade approaching, I was foolish enough to imagine we should all be shot down."
107 This is interesting because it suggests the Boers on the top of Impati had visibility down to the valley below. Perhaps this was a temporary clearing in the mist.
70 Account by Lieutenant Cape, 18th Hussars
Following on from the last section, Herbert Cape wrote a longer account of his time from the day of the battle to the 4th November when he and the other more seriously wounded were send into Ladysmith by the Boers.
This text is taken from a copy held by the Talana Museum. At the end of the section is an extraordinary request made by Cape in 1963 by which time he was in his 80s.
20th October As usual we stood to at 4.30 a.m. and were all up and ready at that time. At 5.30 we got an order to turn out and water our horses but just as we were complying with this order a second order arrived telling us to remain as we were. At the same time we saw in the hills to the East of Dundee above the old Dundee farm and lining both hills on the other side of the main road to the drifts, an enormous number of Boers on the top of the hills. At about five minutes past six they opened fire by firing a shell into the town and almost immediately another fell into the camp. We all rushed to our tents, put on our kit and ran to our squadrons which, in the meantime, had been clearing out of the camp as quickly as possible. We formed up under cover of a kopje between the camp and Impati mountain and awaited orders. After about fifteen minutes, during which shells were dropping all around us, our Artillery answered with their 15 pounders and thus the battle began. The range to the hill was, however, too far so the firing had little effect until an advance was made. After about a quarter of an hour we got orders to go round on our left flank with the Mounted Infantry of the Dublins and K.R.R. all under command of Col. Möller, 18th Hussars. I went with the machine gun in rear. Eventually we all worked round to this flank but were shelled the whole time, luckily without much harm. We reached a point under cover, to the enemy's right rear where we could have peppered their led horses beautifully. However, Col. Möller decided not to do so and sent "A" Squadron under Major Knox still further to the rear. Major Knox himself came back and reported about 200 of the enemy to be advancing against us, upon which we all left our positions but could not see anything of them. The whole regiment and M.I. worked round still more to the rear position and after some time ‘A’ and ‘C’ Squadrons were detached and sent right round to the rear of the enemy’s position. Meantime the M.I. and myself took up a position on the open plain against a party of Boers I saw advancing from our left. I was ordered NOT to open fire but remained in position some time. I then got an order to retire, the M.I. doing likewise and I again took up another position but was at once ordered to retire, the M.I. having done so already. I was the last to leave and saw the M.I. on my left and "B" Squadron, with Col Möller fast disappearing over the hill. I then saw Pollok on my left helping Trumpeter Salmon108 on to his horse, he evidently having lost his. Almost immediately the trumpeter fell off again, so I stopped the gun and took him up and on we went again, bullets flying around like hailstones and the Squadron going farther and farther away. I then saw a deep spruit in front and I knew it was all up. I turned round and cheered on the gun and emptied my revolver at the fast advancing Boers, which had the effect of checking them somewhat for an instant. Waterson109, one of the gun team, tells me I knocked one man over and I heard Trumpeter Salmon sing out, "Well done, Mr. Cape". Down into the spruit we plunged and then the Boers were all round us, so I shouted out "Save yourselves, lads." but I knew it to be too late. I slipped up the other side but was immediately knocked out of my saddle with a bullet through my neck, which, by God's mercy, just escaped my spine and came out in front of my neck. I lost consciousness for some time and when I came to I saw a Boer pointing a rifle at me but another came up and told him not to shoot. They then took me and Corporal Sexton110, wounded, and Wolf111 back and put us on to the gun carriage. Waterson, another of the gun team, was shot three times but was not hurt. He took Sergt. Batten's112 revolver and shot one man's horse and then knocked him on the head. He also told me that Lock113, the driver, was all right but when I passed them he and Sergt. Batten were lying together, as I thought, dead, also Salmon the trumpeter. This left Corporal Saxton, Waterson, Lock and myself.
They took Corporal Sexton, Wolf whose horse was shot, myself, and another man of the K.R.R. who had his leg broken and who was picked up out of a farm house, into the middle of the Boer party who had attacked us but who, in the meantime, had retired. They then sent us back to the Boer hospital which had been established at the base of Talana Hill, where we passed the night but Wolf was taken prisoner, as he was un-wounded.
108 4374 Trumpeter Charles Salmon, 18th Hussars. 109 4181 Private William Waterson, 18th Hussars. 110 4395 Sergeant A Sexton, 18th Hussars. 111 4649 Private Alfred Wolfe, 18th Hussars. 112 3441 Sergeant Albert Batten, 18th Hussars. 113 4030 Private William Lock, 18th Hussars.
71
Whilst we were in amongst the Boers, I saw our Batteries come over the neck on the main road by which the whole commando of Boers was retiring, after having been driven off Talana Hill by our Infantry. Of course I thought they would open fire on the retreating mass, as they should have done; however they did not do so and we got back to the Boer hospital in safety. There I was put into a room with about 20 wounded Boers and spent a terrible night. We lay on the floor and during the night several died. However, the Boers were more or less kind to me so I did not do so badly. Hardy114 (the Regimental Doctor) came and saw me, also Stirling115 of the 60th. They told me that during the day the Infantry had made a splendid attack on the hill, the 60th and the Dublins bearing the brunt. The 60th lost heavily, especially in Officers, Col. Gunning, Capt. Peachel116, Taylor, Barnett and Hambro all being killed, whilst Crum who was with me, Nugent, Major Boultbee, for certain, and possibly some others were wounded. The Dublins lost Weldon and I do not know who else. I did not hear the casualties in the Leicesters. It was a magnificent attack and beat Dargai117. The Staff lost heavily, Jack Sherston, killed. Col. Beckett, Major Hammersley, Captain Adam all wounded, but worst of all General Symons himself mortally wounded.
That evening I heard ‘B’ Squadron had not been heard of but had gone right on, with Pollok (Adjt.) too.
The Boers guns did practically no damage at all but the men were marvellous behind ant hills. They were a very rough looking lot but humane. Their Artillery were the only ones who wore any uniform at all, the others wore just ordinary clothes with bandoliers and Mausers. Had our Colonel kept his head we might have made a brilliant victory of it, instead of which it was a fearful sacrifice. Whether Gen. Symons was justified in ordering a frontal attack when he did instead of waiting until the Artillery had shelled the place more, is an open question.
21st October After a night, which I do not wish repeated, we woke with hopes of coolies coming for us from our hospital, but it was about 1 p.m. before they came with Hardy, and very thankful we were to see them. During the morning I had seen Crum and looked round the wounded and dead and some terrible sights I saw. One poor chap of the 60th M.I., I tried to comfort as I saw he was dying, but my own wound prevented my doing much. At last we got away in tongas and were taken to the British hospital and put into wringing wet tents to lie on the ground, a thunderstorm coming on just as we arrived. A bad journey, but it might have been worse. As we arrived, to our dismay, the camp was again fired on from Imparti mountain and it was kept up for some time. Our feelings can better be imagined than described. There were many rumours of reinforcements coming from Ladysmith and good news of a successful engagement at Ellands Laagte118.
Our hopes, though, were all doomed to disappointment as no reinforcements arrived and we were practically left to our fate. Occasional shells came over but did no damage. The whole force moved into bivouac and remained there. Our camp was practically looted and I expect to see no more of my kit. Today I heard of the severe losses we had suffered. My wound did not trouble me much but I kept quiet. Crum was very bad and having only the ground on which to sleep was not very comforting. In all I hear we lost between 200 and 300 killed and wounded. Their losses were, I should think, about double; of course, one will never know.
22nd October Today we were again shelled but no damage was done to anyone. I fancy they saw some of the troop's baggage and aimed at that. However, it was unpleasantly near the hospital. More reports came in of reinforcements but to no purpose, and we were left helpless. That night the force came in and took some rations, and at midnight moved away towards Helpmakaar leaving us. General Yule sent in a message to Gen. Symons to say he was sorry he could not say ‘Goodbye’ to him, and left. I did not find this out until the morning. Passed a goodish night but Crum was very bad and wanted some attention. My wound went on well.
114 Captain William Hardy, RAMC. 115 Lieutenant Reginald Stirling, 1st KRRC. 116 Captain Mark Pechell, 1st KRRC. 117 The battle of Dargai was fought on 20th October 1897 during the Tirah campaign and involved the British troops storming the heights of Dargai that were held by the Afridis tribesmen. Piper George Findlater, Gordon Highlanders, was famously awarded the VC for his actions that day and three other VCs were awarded. 118 Elandslaagte.
72 23rd October A memorable day and one I thought I should never see and hope never to see again. Only one shell came over camp today and I trust this is the end but we are safe, but how different to one's anticipations. Early this morning, as I say, we found we - the wounded - were left, so it was decided to send out a flag of truce and treat with the enemy. As I expected, they were quite friendly and treated us well but of course we are now prisoners of war. They came down the hill and practically took possession of the camp and hospital. Helped themselves to what they wanted, stores, etc. and went through the hospital tents taking arms, etc. Their demeanour, however, was very good indeed, no boasting, no swaggering, in fact they behaved like gentlemen to us. Of course nothing was decided as to our ultimate fate but I have no fear now and expect we shall be well looked after. Possibly we shall be sent back or taken to Pretoria. Wound going on well. Heard Boers acknowledged defeat at Ladysmith and also at Mafeking. Believe our losses at Ladysmith were very heavy. About 6.30 p.m. Just been told of the death of Gen. Symons. Another to add to the list of good ones sacrificed. A man in whom everyone had confidence and respected and loved and a difficult man to replace. Crum sent message to say he was much better and happier.
24th October Camp overrun with Boers who behaved well. A loud explosion about 10 a.m. which I thought was a gun but discovered only Boers blowing up a bridge on the railway line. Shifted over to Adam's119 tent, very comfortable, awaiting orders as to our fate from Gen. Joubert I hear. Bad thunderstorm in afternoon. Boers cleared away during the afternoon as firing was heard over beyond Glencoe. In afternoon very few Boers left. Can't find out whether their guns have returned or not. Milner120 told me his experiences when he went up to the Boers with the white flag. They said they did not recognise our hospital flag and also that their orders were to shell the town unless it capitulated by 2 p.m. He galloped back and found the Magistrate saying he would not give it up. However, Milner told him he must and took the responsibility on himself. Magistrate did so. Good news in evening, Joubert’s ADC dined with the Doctors and also P.M.O. to Boer army who said he would see us righted. In good spirits at this news.
25th October Fine morning. Boers still over-running camp and looting. Wound better but had awful shooting pains during the night and could not get to sleep for a long time. Clegg121 was brought in in the afternoon. He says that last Sunday the Regiment and half a battery tried to get through Glencoe but were headed back. No.4 troop was part of the advance guard and he was one of them but they all got split up into twos and threes, some he thinks have got through. He and Corporal Padwick122 waited until about 4 a.m., and tried to get through but ran up against a Boer outpost on the pass. They tried to get through but he was shot as he galloped away and he thinks Corporal Padwick may have got through. Me also thinks he may have been sent up to Pretoria.
26th October Still in camp. No news. Bad night with pains in head. About 11.30 train arrives. Dutch engine and 3 or 4 goods trucks.
27th October Good night practically no pain. Moved in morning into Town. Still no news as to our fate. House we moved into nice and clean and comfortable so we shall be quite happy here. Telegram received in afternoon from Secretary of State, Pretoria, saying that our telegram thanking the Dutch Government for their kindness to us, etc. had been received and would be transmitted to the British Authorities. Good dinner and much more comfortable.
28th October No news this morning at present. An ambulance train arrived here from Pretoria, I think. Have not heard yet who or what it is for. Donegan123 gave us a description of the ambulance train which sounds far above anything the British Government could produce. Wire received from Pretoria telling the Major Doctor to send up a Doctor to look after our wounded there, so have hopes of getting a wire and letter through.
119 Captain Frederick Adam, Scots Guards. 120 Captain Arthur Milner, RAMC. 121 4219 Private F Clegg, 18th Hussars. 122 4549 Corporal Henry Padwick, 18th Hussars. 123 Major James Donegan, RAMC.
73 29th October Walked down to the other house, saw Boultbee, Lowndes, Crum, Martin, Johnstone all doing well. Lovely day. No news. Wound better but sharp pains in afternoon.
30th October Much pain during the night. Heard firing of big guns in distance, Ladysmith way, but no news of result yet. Mrs Galbraith came up.
31st October No news of firing yesterday. Wired home through Lorenzo Marques, hope it will reach. Pain pretty bad.
1st November Very bad night, took tabloid of morphia, slept well but awful head in the morning. Very sick so stopped quiet all day. Better in evening.
2nd November All right again, goodish night, no pain practically. Got orders to send slightly wounded to Pretoria, severely wounded to Elands Laagte and those who cannot be moved to be left behind. Pretoria lot paraded at 2 p.m. and left by train. Male inhabitants also warned to leave for Pretoria tomorrow.
3rd November Got ready to leave for Ladysmith early but finally got off about 4.30 p.m. Got to Glencoe junction where we passed the night. Awful in small carriage, fearfully hot and beastly and dirty. Got off about 10 a.m. the next day.
4th November Got away in train towards Ellands Laagte and arrived there after fearful journey about midday. Waited there hours until baggage came in another train. Went on about three miles and were met by Boers transport and taken to Pepworth farm where they had a hospital. Journeyed on eventually arriving at the Orange Free State Junction where we met a picket of the Liverpool Regiment throwing up breastworks. Sent in for transport and eventually was taken to Church behind the Ladysmith Town Hall where there were lots of chaps and Sisters and everything very comfortable. We were told, however, we were to move out to camp the next day.
In the February 1963 issue of Kommando, the magazine of the South Africa Defence Forces, a letter from Cape was published. It contained his appreciation for the clemency shown to him at the battle of Talana, over 63 years previously.
The Adjutant General recently received the following letter from Colonel H. A. Cape, a retired British officer of the 18th Hussars:
"Sir, I should be grateful if the following incident in my life could be included in your records. At the Battle of Talana Hill on the 20th October, 1899, I was wounded in the neck, the shot taking me over my horse's head and rendering me unconscious for a short while. When I came to and sat up, I saw a Boer taking aim at me at about twenty yards distance, in order to finish me off. At that moment another Boer came up and, seeing that I was wounded and bleeding profusely, told his comrade to put down his rifle and not to shoot. By this means, of course, my life was saved. I am now 80 and, though I am perfectly fit, I cannot hope to live very much longer. I am anxious, therefore, that this act of chivalry on the part of one who at the time was my enemy, should be recorded and that through him I have enjoyed many years of happiness. If by any chance he who performed this act of mercy is still alive and should see this notice, I do hope he will realize that his action was one of profound clemency seldom met with on the field of battle.”
Sadly, the magazine did not record if anyone responded to his letter.
74 Account by Corporal Padwick, 18th Hussars
On 22nd October, Yule pushed a patrol towards Glencoe to look for any Boers who were retreating north from the battle of Elandslaagte the day before.
Corporal Padwick was part of C Squadron, the 18th Hussars, and gave this account:
“On Sunday, the 22nd October, we (that is No. 4 Troop, C Squadron), under Sergeant Baldry124, moved from our camp at Dundee in the direction of Elandslaagte. I don't think any of us knew where we were going to; the extent of our knowledge was that we were the advance troop of the squadron, and had to reconnoitre towards Glencoe. It was raining heavily as we entered Glencoe Pass, and we halted when we had got about three miles down it. Sergeant Baldry then sent me with two men to keep a look out on the right, with orders to rejoin him as soon as the main body came abreast of my post. I waited about twenty minutes, and saw no signs of connecting files or main body, but I did see what I was sure were parties of Boers on the opposite side of the pass, on the very ground I had seen our left flank scouts on a few minutes before. I was about to send the information to Sergeant Baldry, when the latter came back up the road, and I rejoined him, and we proceeded up the pass to join touch with the main body. On nearing the summit of the pass we heard guns firing, and soon found our road blocked, and that we were cut off from our squadron. The only course left us was to make back again down the pass in the hope of reaching Elandslaagte and joining up with any of our troops there, who might have stayed behind after the fight of the day before.
All went well till we reached Wessels Nek, where I and two men, who had been sent on with me as advanced scouts, found a Boer fugitive in the police hut, and we took him prisoner, and I kept his pony with the intention of riding it to save my own horse, which had hardly been unsaddled for three days, but it proved to be so dreadfully done up that I could hardly get it out of a slow walk. I little thought that the slowness of this same pony would eventually land me in Pretoria for over six months as a prisoner of war. I went on nearly to Elandslaagte, where I could see nothing of our own troops; the red cross flag was flying from some buildings, and what appeared to be a burial party was moving about on the battlefield. I learnt from a Kaffir that our men had withdrawn to Ladysmith the previous day, and then I withdrew to rejoin my troop. I met Corporal Randall125 on the way, and he told me that Sergeant Baldry had determined to try and get up the pass again, and that I was to bring the prisoner along. As the troop was trotting it was impossible for me and the prisoner on his tired pony to keep up, and I soon got left a long way behind. As we neared the centre of the pass, Sergeant Birkett126 came back to me and said Sergeant Baldry would wait for me at a spruit there was ahead, and I soon came in sight of the troop halted about 1½ miles in front. Almost at the same moment I saw a mass of men and what appeared to be guns on the summit of the pass, and they very quickly opened fire on our troop beneath them. I waited, fully expecting the troop to retire back towards me, but they turned straight to the west, through the opening I had been posted on earlier in the day, and with great difficulty, as I heard later, reached Ladysmith on the following day. This left me and another man, Private Clegg127, with the prisoner alone in the pass. There was only one thing to do, namely, to let the prisoner go and retire again. The Boers were already between me and the troop, and in a few minutes would have been in the road behind me if I hadn't galloped pretty sharp. We reached the Elandslaagte Collieries at dusk and found the manager there. The latter gave us food and shelter, and we put our horses up for the night. At daybreak we moved off again, intending, if possible, to get to Ladysmith. All went well till we got just past Modder Spruit, where we almost ran into a Boer patrol. We also saw several other parties of Boers across our front. We tried in several places to get through, but the Boers seemed to be in front of us everywhere, so at last we gave it up and decided to wait till dark and try and get through Glencoe Pass somehow, hoping, if we were detected, to be able to gallop through in the darkness. We little thought that by this time the Dundee column had left and was then on its way to Ladysmith, and that by going back to Dundee we were going practically into a Boer laager.
We got within sight of the pass at dusk, and we were passing a Kaffir kraal when two men came out from it. They were dressed in khaki with slouch hats, and had no arms. They struck me at first as being Natal Carbiniers, but on coming up closer to them we found that only one of them could speak English, and that they both had Transvaal crests in their hats. We were just drawing our carbines, but before we could do so two shots came from the kraal, but they missed us, though I can't think why, as the range could not have been more than thirty yards. I saw one of these decoy men later on when I was a prisoner, and I asked him
124 3278 Squadron Sergeant Major R Baldry, 18th Hussars. 125 4306 Lance Corporal W Randall, 18th Hussars. 126 3706 Sergeant J Birkett, 18th Hussars. 127 4219 Private F Clegg, 18th Hussars.
75 how he accounted for the bad shooting. He said that one of the men who fired first had been wounded at Elandslaagte in the arm, and so was unsteady, and that they were also afraid of hitting their own men who were close to us. However, we got clear away, and they did not attempt to follow us. I should think there were ten or twelve of them in the kraal. After we were out of range we came across an old shed, and as it was now dark and raining heavily we decided to rest ourselves and the horses for an hour or two before making our fourth and last attempt to get through. This was the most miserable night I spent during the whole campaign. We had nothing to eat since the morning, and one of us had to hold the horses and look out whilst the other tried to get a little sleep.
At last, about 11 p.m., we started again for the pass; we made a wide detour of the kraal from which we had been fired upon, and shortly commenced entering the pass. We made the horses walk very slowly, and as the road was muddy we made no noise at all, and except for the moon showing through the clouds occasionally, it was quite dark. We went along very well for about two miles, when we evidently disturbed something a little to our right, and although it might only have been cattle grazing, we decided to halt where we were till the moon came out, so that we could see among the bushes and make sure. Presently there was enough light to see a group of ponies grazing, and here and there a saddle with men lying about, evidently all asleep. We decided to move off very slowly as we had come, in the hope of leaving them undisturbed. This we managed to do, and it was a great relief to get away from them without being discovered. The suspense was, however, dreadful, as we did not know at what moment we might run into another post and perhaps be discovered by them first. Soon afterwards we crossed a spruit in about the middle of the pass, and could not avoid making a certain amount of noise doing so, but we got over it all right and moved on, but had not gone more than forty yards before someone shouted in my ear, in Dutch, ”Who goes there.” All suspense was now at an end, and there was only one thing to do, so I shouted to Private Clegg to gallop, and at our first stride they opened fire. I could hardly say which of us was hit first, for at the same moment that I felt as if someone had smacked my ear, Clegg fell across my horse's croup, shot through the chest. I could do nothing but go on, as they kept firing up the road. Clegg's horse followed behind mine, which was lucky, for my horse seemed to be going very lame, and I dismounted a little further on, and found that he had been shot in the near fore, and that I had two scratches, one in the thigh and another in the ear, so I mounted Clegg's horse and pushed on at a gallop, which was now necessary, as any other piquets in the pass would certainly be on the alert. However, nothing happened till I reached the top of the pass, when I was fired on from the right. I heard afterwards this was from a post with a gun in position. After passing this post I saw nothing till I arrived at the colliery near Dundee, and as it was breaking day, but still dark, I thought I would wait till it was lighter, and then have a look round to see where our troops were. As it gradually got lighter I could see mounted men moving about our camp, and on closer inspection I saw they were Boers, and no matter which way I looked it was the same. Above Glencoe Station I could see their laager. They were coming down the Newcastle road. They were all over the town of Dundee; in fact they were everywhere. Although no doubt they could see me, they probably took me for one of their own men in the uncertain light, so I turned round with the intention of hiding in the colliery until I could find some way of getting away from them. When about fifty yards from the colliery a party of Boers came from behind it, and although I attempted to get away, they, with their fresh ponies, soon overtook me, formed a circle right round me, and so I was taken prisoner.
I had always thought that falling into the hands of Boers meant very harsh treatment, and I was very much surprised when they offered me, first of all, a bottle of whisky and then food, which they had evidently just looted from the town. I was very thankful for the food, having had nothing since the morning before, and after the fatigue and excitement of that last day and night, I appreciated it all the more. Many of these Boers could speak English, and they informed me that our troops had evacuated Dundee, leaving all their guns behind, and that it was only a matter of hours before Lucas Meyer overtook them and captured the lot. They took my horse and put me on a little white Basuto pony, and took me to their laager above Glencoe Station. There I was brought before the commandant, a very big dark man in a velvet jacket, who, when I arrived, was at breakfast on the end of a very comfortable waggon. He offered me some of the beef he was eating and some coffee, and as I sat at the end of the waggon a crowd very soon collected round me, and I appeared to be an object of great curiosity to them. As they began to get a nuisance asking all manner of silly questions, the commandant sent them away, and had me taken over to the ambulance to get my wounds dressed. There I learned that Clegg was very seriously wounded, and the doctor said he did not think he would get over it, but luckily he eventually did. When I got back to the laager, which, by the way, looked very much like an old-fashioned country horse fair at home, I found out that there were a good many men who had fought at Elandslaagte attached to it. One man showed me his rifle, which was cut through the wood and partly into the barrel. He said a lancer had made a cut at him with his sword, and he had saved his life by holding his rifle with both hands above his head. About mid-day I was driven in a Cape cart to Hatting Spruit Station. We passed several laagers on the way, and at each of them we stopped, and I was exhibited for a few minutes. At one they told me that a lot of our men, pointing to the colours in my helmet,
76 had been captured a few days before, and had been sent to Pretoria. When we arrived at Hatting Spruit we found several commandos round the station, and a lot of the Staats Artillery with their guns, awaiting transport to Ladysmith. They then put me into the pantry of the stationmaster's house with a sentry on the door, and later in the day another prisoner, a corporal of the Royal Irish Fusiliers128, was put in with me. He had been left behind when our troops evacuated Dundee. We were left till about nine o'clock the next morning, when a Boer, who I afterwards learnt was General Botha, came in to see us, and with him an old gentleman, rather stout, with a long square beard almost white. He was introduced by General Botha as follows:—This is Commandant General Joubert, and he wishes to ask you a few questions, which, as prisoners of war, you are not obliged to answer. Then, turning to me, he asked, “Do you know if there is any ammunition buried in Dundee?” I replied “I don't know.” Again he asked: “There are two wires running from a tent in Dundee camp; do you know if they are connected with a mine?” I replied “I don't know, but they might be.” I knew quite well the wires he meant; they were telegraph wires running from the Brigade Office. After these questions General Joubert said: “I am sending you to Pretoria, and as long as you give no trouble you will be treated with respect and no one will interfere with you.” After this interview we were marched out to the platform. We had been standing there a few moments, when a train came into the station, and exactly opposite us was a truck with a very large gun on board, which one of our guards informed us was. 'Long Tom.' On the other trucks there was a searchlight and several other guns. Next to the engine of the train was a closed truck, and into this they put us, and as three-parts of it was full of Long Tom shells, we sat on these whilst they conveyed us back to Glencoe again.
We got out of this train at Glencoe and were put into an old room in the stationmaster's house. During the day a civilian was put in with us; he had been taken as a spy because he was riding through Dundee town on a bicycle. As night came on it got very cold and wet, and we found some old dresses in a cupboard, and with these we covered ourselves up, and had just got to sleep when we were awakened by a dreadful noise. We found out it was the stationmaster's piano, supplemented by captured drums and brass instruments, in the hands of not very competent Boer musicians. The next morning a train was made up for Pretoria, and we were put into this in a closed cattle truck with two Boer sentries. Our first stop was Newcastle, and as soon as the truck was opened we had a crowd of burghers round it. They treated us with civility, and were most anxious that we should have the latest news, and, as it was the same thing always between here and Pretoria, I will relate what the latest news was:—“Ladysmith had been taken that morning. They had cut off the water supply at Kimberley, and expected it to fall at any moment, whilst Mafeking would succumb to the first attack.” One of our guards, an old man, was present at Majuba in 1881, and as we passed it he pointed it out, and tried to give us his version of the fight, but his knowledge of English was so slight that we did not understand him very much. About 6 p.m. we arrived at Volksrust and were now in the Transvaal, a country I did not again quit till the end of the war. As the train went no further that night we were marched to the jail to be housed till morning. Arriving there we were put into a large room, in which there were already two civilian prisoners. One of them, a bank clerk, had been arrested as a spy whilst leaving the Transvaal a few days earlier. His bag had been searched at Volksrust, and a photograph of a man in the uniform of the 17th Lancers had been found in it. It was the photograph of a friend of his, but the Boer official said that it was his (the clerk's) photo, and with this he was arrested on suspicion. The other prisoner was a French Jew; he told me that he had for some time been employed in the Transvaal secret service, but lately he had been employed by the English, and that he had been arrested near the border just before war was declared. He said he had been taken out to be shot two days earlier, but they had brought him back again to the jail. He seemed quite confident that though they had threatened to shoot him they were afraid to do so. I was surprised to read in a Standard and Diggers newspaper, a week or two later, a graphic account of the shooting of this very man. It was the 25th of October when I met him, and the paper was dated October 22nd! We were awakened the next morning at 3 a.m. and taken to the station at six o'clock by six men of the Johannesburg police, who were staying in Volksrust on their way down to Ladysmith. We left Volksrust at 6 a.m. and reached Pretoria at about nine at night, having been exhibited on the way to very inquisitive crowds of Boers at all the roadside stations. Their chief questions were the date of General Buller's arrival and the effects of lyddite shells. The corporal of the Fusiliers gave them a most exaggerated description of the effects of the latter, which seemed to amuse the more enlightened amongst them, but evidently impressed the majority, judging by the way they translated it to their friends who did not understand English. We were escorted solemnly through the town of Pretoria by a dozen mounted police to the jail, and lodged that night in a room the Reform prisoners129 were in in 1896.”
128 5382 Corporal J Walker, 1st RIF. 129 From the Jameson Raid.
77 Letter from Pte Burrows, Leicester Regiment
Private Alf Burrows served in the Leicester Regiment and was present at Talana. During his time in South Africa he wrote letters home containing details of his experiences in the Boer War. This letter was addressed to his uncle, was not dated, and arrived in England in early February 1902. It recounts his memories of the battle of Talana and is a strikingly vivid account of the fighting that day.
Dear Uncle,
I proposed to give you a detailed account of the battle of Dundee …, but I fear that will be a task I am incapable of. Most certainly I can review the whole scene as if it were but yesterday, but, though it is indelibly impressed on my memory, yet as I have remarked previously, there are things which a man may see and yet not set down in black and white. Therefore, any description I may give must of a necessity be rather disjointed, an incident here and there; a view of that memorable day as seen through the eyes of one of the human atoms who formed part of that rather unfortunate army, and one who can better describe it by speech and action than by the medium of a letter. These few remarks will lead you to excuse the omission of details and the narrowness of the description as I do not pretend to do justice to a subject where so many have failed to do so. Remember it was my first battle130 and I was swayed by the varying emotions which the others were swayed by, and for that reason I am rather hazy about the details, and indeed, looking back now with passionless eyes after a lapse of two years. … However, we shall see, for what it is worth you are more than welcome to it, so without further comments I will proceed with my story, or rather, “jumble”.
To begin. On Sunday, 24th Sept, 1899 at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, a sudden order came for our Regt. to leave Ladysmith for Dundee. We left at midnight, and, detraining at Glencoe, marched to Dundee, a distance of about 4 or 5 miles, to which a branch line runs from the main to the collieries. I need not describe the incidents which led up to the declaration of war, as they are familiar to you all. Our camp, for some inexplicable reason, was situated near the railway line, but in a valley completely surrounded by hills and mountains, with no defensive position near us! Day after day passed, and news of the Boer advance reached us, but yet our camp remained (nearly 5000 troops) bunched up together “en masse”. It is true we had mounted scouts on the surrounding hills, but once they were driven in, the camp was at the mercy of an opposing force, and this the Boer knew, and so framed his enveloping movement for the capture or destruction of the entire force. On the evening of 19th Oct, the Boers were in touch with our outposts, and, we learned afterwards, some of those outposts (18th Hussars) were captured, and during the night, while the camp was sleeping, all unconscious of danger, the Boers were strengthening their positions and developing their movements. Lucas Meyer took up a strong position on Talana Hill beyond the town and dragged guns up to its summit during the night.
The morning of the 20th dawned, and a heavy mist hung between us and the hills. The camp was astir and set about its usual routine, suspecting nothing. The sun had quite cleared the mist by 5.30 a.m. and revealed our camp to the Boers. At the same instant a mounted scout was seen galloping towards us, frantically waving his arms. But, even as we see him and stand wondering, a dull heavy boom comes from Talana, a rush and a scream, and a shell pitches the earth on high just to our right. What can it mean? Everyone seemed paralysed. Another and another boom and a trumpeter, who has been riding along, drops from his horse with his head blown completely off. The spell on the troops breaks, and we rush pell mell for our rifles and get in some sort of order and make for cover. The horses of the Artillery are at water, but willing hands man the guns. Round they swing, and the gunners, waiting to see the flash of the enemies hidden guns so that they may locate them, stand perfectly calm amid the shells which are hissing and screaming overhead. Suddenly the officer drops his glasses, and points out a spot on the hill where the edge is serrated by black moving figures, looking for all the world like so many ants. A careful sight, a roar, and the first shell from our side is on its way. Again, and yet again, and at the third one the men throw up their helmets, and cheer wildly, for straight and true the shell lands fairly upon one of the Boer guns and renders it useless.131 In the meantime, the infantry have moved forward through the town with the intention of storming the hill. The cavalry go round to take them in the flank, but most of these get captured, and so the battle is one for the infantry. Horses are put in the guns and they move nearer the position and open a terrible hail of shrapnel upon the rocky crown. And now the rifle fire blazes and crackles from both sides,
130 The last time the Leicester Regiment had been in combat was during the Crimean War nearly half a century before. 131 This occurred slightly later in the morning once the batteries had left the camp and moved closer to the Boer position.
78 and the bullets swish about one’s head vindictively. It is our first time under fire, and our feelings are difficult to analyse as we lie there under the scorching sun, facing grim death.
To an ordinary spectator there is nothing to show him the nature of the men’s feelings. Outwardly they are calm, but inwardly, what a raging torrent of emotions are sweeping through their brains. The power of fixed thought seems completely gone. Now it is a scene of other lands revisited which rises before them; again it is a picture of some leafy lanes or pleasant fields in England, or perhaps a misty vision of some of the home people, which holds his fancy. He dimly wonders what they are doing? He can see, perhaps, a favourite spot he often used to visit, or maybe he lives again, in memory, some little incident which happened years ago. How he longs for the cool breezes of dear old England, and the sweet freshness of the fields! So he dreams, yet mechanically loading and firing his rifle the while. He tumbles back to earth with the consciousness that something is happening. He shudders as he sees the bare stony plain; the edges of the rugged kopjes waving with the heat of the sun; the streak of railway line curling like a hideous snake across the scorched up veldt, and the hill in front frowning down on him. He must get to that hill, which is just now belching out its message of death. He laughs grimly and softly to himself as he creeps up a few more yards. It seems comical and ludricious (sic) to him, this creeping and crawling like some wild animal. Why not walk properly? He half rises to his feet and sinks down again with a little shudder and white lips as his glimpse rests for a moment on a couple of figures carrying something horrible in their arms and covered with blood. Surely that awful object cannot be a man? And – what if his fate were the same? Now the overwhelming fear of death seizes on him, and at every crash of the guns he crouches like a wild animal at bay.
“Advance”. The line dashes forward, and wonderingly, he dashes with them. Now, as the fire comes hotter and hotter, he gets a glimpse of slouch hats and rifle barrels, and with demon possessing his soul, he itches to come to close quarters. Every shot he fires is sent with the fervent hope of seeing one of those slouch hatted figures reel backward. No thoughts now of green fields. One burning desire fills him, to let himself go, to fight, to kill, anything but this eternal waiting! He has lost all sense of fatigue, hunger, and thirst; he cares for nothing. The man is merged for the time being into a mad unreasonable being, swayed by his emotions, and yet, curiously enough, swayed also by his discipline. And now they are beginning the ascent of the steep ground at the base of the hill, driving the Boer skirmishers in front like chaff. On they go with dogged persistence, in spite of the iron hail which meets them. Slowly but surely they gain ground, until they are approaching a wall of rocks running across their entire front. The leading files have almost reached it, when, from the concealed Boer marksmen, comes a perfect torrent of bullets, and the front line seems to wither away like chaff before a wind. The men coming up behind grasp the situation in a twinkling – there can be no stopping, for that is certain death. “Charge!” shouts an officer, and falls with a bullet in the brain even as he utters the word, but the men understand. A wild yell; a rush; a sharp splutter of fire, and our men have gained the further side. From this point a wall runs at right angles over the crest of the hill, and a terrible fire is being poured down it. Our men have lost their officers for most part, and the battle becomes in every sense a soldiers’ battle, as much as Inkerman ever was132. Again comes the forward movement, until at last our men are so close to the position that the shells from our guns are killing our own men, and it becomes necessary to stop their firing. A man springs recklessly upon the wall to signal the order to the guns, and is immediately knocked over. Another takes his place, and for a full five minutes, though the Boers are using every endeavour to kill him, he daringly stands there at his full height and calmly waves his flag! This done, he as calmly gets down and resumes his place in the line (This man was not mentioned).
Now the final act of this drama is being played. The Boers stubbornly hold their ground, in the hope that the other commandoes (who had got lost in the mist of the previous night) would turn up and throw the scales against us. The men creep up until the stage has arrived for the delivery of the assault; the cavalry closes in to the flank to cut off the retreat, and the guns take up position, from whence to turn the retreat into a rout. Everything is ready. The bayonets are out in a flash, and with an impetuous cheer they dash forward. Crash! A volley meets them, and several fall never to rise again. Yet again that blasting fire meets them, but fails to stop them panting and breathless, yelling, cursing, and maddened by the stinging bullets, they fling themselves upon the Boer position. There is a hand to hand struggle for the mastery for a few moments, a veritable Pandemonium, but that magnificent charge has broken the resistance of the Boers, and they break away, streaming in long lines across the nek of the hill, and our men remain in possession, leaving the guns and cavalry to do their work.
The minutes pass and the fugitives grow mere specks in the distance. Still no sign of the guns. The chance has gone! We had the Boers completely at our mercy, and yet not one single shot was fired at them, and
132 The battle of Inkerman was fought during the Crimean War, on 5th November 1854. The battle was called the ‘Soldiers’ Battle’ because of the ferocity of the fighting and because the poor weather conditions meant the soldiers fought much of the battle on their own initiative.
79 they were all allowed to escape! Presently there came an ugly rumour that the officer in charge of the guns, had ordered the guns not to fire because “you know, poor devils, they’d had enough, and it would be rather rough to shell them when they were going by Jove”. His humane principals were highly commendable, no doubt, but they were decidedly misapplied on this occasion. To this hour I firmly believe that if the troops had got hold of that man they would have killed him in their anger. To fight like they had done, inch by inch, for 9 ½ hours, and at such cost in human life and blood, and then to be robbed of the fruits of victory because one man had put his own feelings before his duty! Oh, it was too hard, and men bit their lips till the blood came, to restrain their overwhelming anger. But it was useless caring. The Boers had gone, and there was an end to it. They cheered themselves up with the thoughts that it had been the first time since the Majuba disaster133 in which Briton and Boer had pitted their strength and courage against each other, and it pleased them to think that the people at home would know they had upheld the flag with honour, and gained a victory in the first battle as a help to wipe out the dark page of 1881, and that the Boer would henceforward have a greater respect for the “Verdomde Rooinek”134. We marched back to camp with our prisoners and laid down thoroughly tired out. So ended the battle of Dundee or Talana, but it was only the first move in the great tragedy which is still being enacted. Could we have seen what the next few days would bring we should not have probably slept so sound, but it is mercifully denied us to lift the veil of the future. This I will speak of some other time as I have no room now. I have had to cut this description very short, but it will give you a little idea, and I hope it will prove interesting to you, although it is rather disconnected, and a very poor attempt indeed, but as I have said before, I never can write a good description if I sit down to give you any special subject. So please excuse. Must close now, with fond love to all at home.
I remain Your Ever Loving Nephew Alf Burrows
A picture from September 2009 showing the view of Impati from the top of Talana Hill
133 The defeat of the British at Majuba Hill on 27th February 1881 had been the last conflict between Briton and Boer. 134 ‘Damned Redneck’, a term of contempt used by the Boers against the British soldiers unaccustomed to the South African sun.
80 Reminiscences by Mr S B Jones, DTG
Samuel Jones served as a Sub Leader in the DTG at Talana but his military experience went back to the Zulu Wars and First Boer War. His Reminiscences are an account of his military career and his experiences before and after the battle of Talana. He says he wrote them down “at the urgent request of some of my friends” but they are not dated. It is possible that they were committed to paper some time after the battle itself as the details, in some instances where they can be checked against other sources, would seem to be slightly incorrect. Such occurrences are detailed in the footnotes.
Introductory Months before the war broke out the feeling in the up-country districts of the Colony among the Dutch was bitter, and opinions were freely expressed with regard to war with England. Consequently, as this feeling became more acute, it was felt by all true Britishers, with the many preparations going on just over our borders, and few troops in the Colony, that we should be up and doing something to ensure the protection of our homes. Consequently on August 28th a meeting of Dundee residents was called, and the matter discussed. At this meeting it was decided to act forthwith; first, by approaching the Government, and getting its consent; and, secondly, by having trenches dug and redoubts built round the town. A strong committee was formed, and a deputation was selected to interview Col. Royston, the Commandant of Volunteers, those selected being Mr. H. Ryley, chairman of the Local Board; Mr. S. B. Jones, also member of the Board; and Mr. J. W. Holding, vice-president of the Rifle Association. We met Col. Royston, and he urged on us the necessity of having every able-bodied man armed at once. He promised to supply the necessary arms and ammunition, and these were sent forward on our return to Dundee. The feeling had then grown so strong that a public meeting was called on the Sunday afternoon, at which hundreds of the male population attended; leaders were appointed and men enrolled under the oath of allegiance, and, in the course of a few days, each leader had his men out for parade and target practice. As matters became more serious many from country districts came into Dundee and joined the Town Guard. Consequently at the time of the battle of Talani135 our Guard numbered over 300 strong.
Slighted advice About six weeks previous to the battle of Talani, Capt. Molineux, being in Dundee, and hearing that I had information re the Boer plan of attack on that place, was desirous of knowing what it was. Capt. Willson, of the Natal Carbineers, accordingly arranged a meeting, and, under a promise from the former that no names would be divulged, I told him what I knew (the information was from a resident of Vryheid). Both these gentlemen treated this news very lightly, and both remarked that it was not likely to take place. I am unable to say whether the intelligence was given to the authorities or not; but I have this satisfaction to know that it all came to pass, with one exception136, viz. that instead of being attacked by two commandoes on the 20th, we only had one on Talani, the other not coming up to time from Newcastle, owing to wet weather and heavy roads; and my opinion is that it was very fortunate for us that things happened as they did,
The first night's excitement During the intervening weeks the general talk and excitement of the town was made up with Town Guard parades, building of redoubts, and the usual rumours and reports from over the border. On Thursday, the 19th of October, matters began to look serious, and a meeting of the Town Guard leaders was called; and it was felt that, owing to so many natives and coolies being in the town, in the event of an attack, we should have a guard on and patrol the town. I, consequently, volunteered to take the first night with No. 1 Company, and at 9 o'clock every man was present, notwithstanding the fact that it was raining and only very short notice given. I divided the night into watches of three hours each, with ten men to a watch, one man remaining on the Guard Room (the Local Board Office). The first excitement of the night was the disarming of one of the Town Guard, who was suspected of being disloyal, and it is satisfactory to know that the suspicion was well-founded, for this man immediately joined the Boer forces upon the evacuation of Dundee by the British residents, and was appointed to the acting position of gaoler by the Boers; his name is F. Sandlen, and he was formerly employed by the Dundee Local Board. The next event was at 2 a.m., when shots were heard in the direction of Talani. The Guard reporting this at once at the Guard Room. At 2.30 a.m. more shots were fired, followed by one of the outlying military vedettes arriving at our Guard Room in an exhausted condition, minus his hat and coat, and covered with mud. He said that his horse had stampeded,
135 Throughout his Reminiscences, Jones refers to Talana as Talani. 136 Jones suggests that he knew in mid September of the details of the Boer attack on Dundee. It seems very unlikely that the Boer would have had this level of planning so early before the War started. It is more probable that the Boer plans for the attack was put together in Newcastle on 16th October.
81 and in the darkness he had lost the others. While talking to him one of the mounted men of the same picket passed, galloping to the camp; immediately following this one of the same party was carried to the Guard Room, having been shot through the groin. I had a stretcher brought out from the police quarters, and sent the poor fellow on to the camp, in charge of two men with native police. Time dragged on very heavily until the first streaks of dawn, when the "Dubs" came marching down the main street, to take up their position at the foot of the town; the K.R.R. marching in the same direction, but to our left, to take up another position. Everything remaining quiet, at 5.30 I dismissed the men for an hour in order to go home for a change of clothes and coffee. Going home, in company with my brothers and several others, we noticed that the hill "Talani" was swarming with men from end to end, and we were speculating as to who they were, hoping that our own troops had reached the top. As we were partaking of our coffee, we were startled with the boom of a cannon, followed by the screeching of a shell, which, to our intense surprise, burst and came rattling through the roof. We rushed out to the verandah, overlooking the camp, when shell after shell came shrieking just overhead, and, pitching into the camp, it dawned on us then that the first one had been a sighting shot, and that it was the camp the enemy intended the first shell for. With the boom of the first shot the rifle fire began, and, to describe this, I can only liken it to one of our up-country hailstorms rattling on the iron roofs. However, after we had refreshed ourselves, we went back to the centre of the town.
Silencing the Boer guns In a very short time our guns, the "Royal Field Artillery," got into action, the two batteries being about a mile apart, and then we had the intense satisfaction of witnessing what our artillerymen could do. It was a sight I shall never forget. Within twenty-five minutes the Boer guns were silenced; one gun, which was hit, could be seen to turn over. The excitement of the townspeople was intense, as the whole line of attack, and the effect of each shell, could be seen from almost any point of the town. The enemy had, however, managed to keep their Maxim-Nerdenfeldt going for some considerable time later, but even this was silenced by the splendid fire of the Artillery. They placed their shrapnel just where they liked, and again and again, as the enemy rushed from one point to another to take cover, they were scattered by a shell beautifully placed amongst them. During this our brave General Penn-Symons was seen riding calmly along the firing line, as though on parade, giving instructions, and people on every hand asked; "Why does the General expose himself like that?" The bullets from the enemy were falling like hail around him. Colonel Dartnell was with the General most of the time, and also several staff officers.
General Symons wounded About 10.30 the report spread through the town that the General had been wounded; and several went as near as we were allowed to the fighting line to make enquiries. We were met by some of the ambulance men bringing Sir William in, and one of the officers standing near by told us that, at the General was being brought past, be called out to some of the men who looked anxious for his safety: “I am all right, boys, It's not serious; I'll be with you in the morning."
Rushing the position The battle raged on in all its fury till 1 o'clock, when our big guns ceased for a short time, but the terrible rattle of musketry continued. The "Dubs" and King's Royal Rifles, moving up from one position to another, when within about a hundred yards of the hill top, both batteries opened fire, which was the signal for the final rush, and I am quite sure in saying that a smarter bit of work has never been accomplished, for it must be remembered that this part of the hill is almost perpendicular and covered with rough boulders, and very rugged, while the enemy in thousands, from well sheltered positions behind rocks, poured a hail of bullets into our advancing brave fellows; but there was no stopping them, though they had to scramble on hands and knees to gain the top. At this juncture, I am afraid that one of our shells dropped very near our own men, doing some damage amongst them, but they rushed the position in splendid style. By the ringing cheer which followed we knew the fight was won. I must mention here that just as our brave fellows were about to break cover, for the last rush, one of tile R.F.A. batteries moved down into the main road and up to the nek, just behind Mr. P. Smith's house, and to the right of the Boer position. For half a mile, as they climbed the hill, they were exposed to a fearful crossfire from the enemy, but they gained the position without loss. Just as the "Dubs" and K. R. Rifles rushed the enemy's position, they smartly brought the guns into action, training them on to the enemy, who were by this time rushing in full retreat, at a distance of not more than 500 yards from our Artillery. At this time the "Cease fire" was sounded. The men were naturally very much disappointed at this order, and wondered why they were not allowed to open fire, especially after the terrible risk encountered in gaining the position. The enemy was in their power, but they found, to their disgust, that the wily Boer, finding the game was all up, had hoisted a white flag on the end of a whip-stick, and stuck it in the centre of the battle-field. This was, of course, one of the first things the officer in charge saw as they gained the hilltop; but why the enemy were allowed to retire without our men firing a shot is hard to understand. Either the enemy should have surrendered, or our men should have opened fire on them. But
82 neither of these courses were followed, and only one lot of 30 prisoners, and other lots of twos and threes, were taken at different points of the hill. The Boers in their hasty retreat, however, left many horses, saddles, bridles, harness, and other things on the field, and it was very amusing to see Tommy during the afternoon, riding through the streets back to camp on a Boer's horse, with a highly coloured rug, found on the saddle, over him, worn in the same way as a Spanish "poncho," a ring cut in the middle, above which one could only see a head and a helmet. Being a cold, wet afternoon, Tommy had devised this means of keeping himself warm and dry.
After the battle—the Boer loss Soon after the position had been carried, I, with several others of the Town Guard, galloped out to see the battlefield, and, though I had not time to go the whole length I saw enough to convince me of the terrible havoc our shells had wrought. I counted 37 lying about in small lots, and there was evidence on every side to show that bodies had been removed and carried to the rear as they fell. At these places the grass was trodden down and covered with blood. In the first lot of prisoners I met, I knew one of them intimately. This man was looking very sad, and I asked him what he thought of things now. His answer was: "As long as I live I shall never have a word to say against the English soldiers; the way they climbed that hill was brave. We never thought it was possible for foot soldiers to drive us off," and he added "but those shells were simply awful.” I then asked: "What is your loss?" He replied: "I can't possibly say; but it must be hundreds; we have lost an awful lot.” With this I passed on. As there was plenty to do, with many poor fellows lying out in the cold, damp grass, needing help, most of our Town Guard volunteered their services, and they did good work. From mid-day, while the fight was going on, until late into the night, they helped to bring in the wounded, and give other assistance. During the day Messrs. Oldacre's store was used as a half-way hospital. In it were the bodies of several officers and men, who died as they were being brought in from the battle-field. The other store was used for the wounded. Everybody worked hard. I was struck by the cheerful look on the faces of the wounded. One stalwart Dublin Fusilier, who had walked in, had no less than three wounds, one in the head, the blood from which covered his face and clothing, giving him an awful appearance. When asked by the surgeon in charge, "What is wrong with you?”, he replied, "It's nothing much, sir; do give me a smoke; I can wait a bit while you attend to them other chaps.” At this there was a general laugh all round, and Tommy went on smoking. It did one's heart good to see the poor fellows so jolly notwithstanding their pain. This memorable day, the 20th of October, like all other days, came to a close, and all who had the privilege of going home enjoyed their rest. One company of the Town Guard remained on duty.
The enemy's slain On Saturday morning, at 9 o'clock, the alarm was sounded, when within half-an-hour almost every man was at the Local Board Office, where a cavalry officer informed us that the General wanted the whole of the Town Guard to march out and occupy the Talani battle-field. The reason given for this order was that the enemy would see it was occupied. In a short time the Guard marched out, in extended order. These were then many men on the hill, and we were not sure as to who they were — friends or foes. On reaching the summit we found several civilians from the town, and Boers who were left behind to bury their dead. I met two of the Boer Red Cross men who were trying to identify the dead, and, in conversation with them, I learned that out of about 30, they only recognised two. Some of the Boer dead looked like Germans, and several, well- dressed, looked like Englishmen. It is very evident that many of their killed were not known, and consequently not reckoned in their losses. Many of their dead were thrown down a shaft, near Mr. P. Smith jun.'s farm, and during the day the Boers had natives digging trenches for the dead. They had four mule ambulances running all that day from Talani to beyond Sand Spruit, removing their wounded from Mr. Smith's house. I visited this house and found every room full of wounded, and one contained dead bodies. About 11 o'clock137
Heavy firing beyond Impati was heard in the direction of Hatting Spruit, and this continued until about 2 o'clock, when it suddenly ceased, in the direction of Martiez Farm (Aletta). It was not known at the time what this firing was, but it transpired afterwards that the 18th Hussars, under Col. Möller had surrendered to the Boers138. At about 5 o'clock that afternoon we were surprised to hear the boom of a big gun to our right. This we very soon found was from Impati, as shell after shell fell well into the military camp below, and the rapid evacuation by the soldiers proved to us that this was as much a surprise to the camp as to us. We could see the troops making for the hills towards the Indumane Mountains. We were then experiencing a severe thunder storm, the rain continuing through the night.
137 Here Jones created a section title in the middle of the sentence. 138 Möller’s surrender had taken places the day before.
83 Rough on the Town Guard I drew the attention of the young officer mentioned to the seriousness of our position—the troops were gone, and the town was being shelled occasionally. I asked: "What are we to do; it is impossible for us to remain here. The men are wet and hungry, and practically cut off?” His reply was: “Fall the men in and follow me, and I will ride on and endeavour to get in touch with the General." Accordingly, about 5.30, we marched off the hill towards the town. Our march back was very trying, owing to the heavy roads, and the swollen spruit through which we had to wade, waist deep. When we arrived at the Local Board Office, the officer remarked: "The only thing for you to do is to make for the hills behind the column; I will ride on and get instructions and meet you." He rode off up the street, and a little later we were informed that he had been killed by one of the Long Tom shells139. About this time, Mr. H. Riley, chairman of the Local Board, in company with the late Hon. Harry Escombe, drove out to see the General, and to hear from him what was to be done with the Town Guard. The reply was: "Hoist the white flag and surrender to the Boors." As he would not undertake the responsibility, the idea of this was never for one moment entertained. About midnight Messrs. Riley, H. Greenough, and A. A. Smith happened to come across the General and staff, lying down on the branch line embankment, near the S. A. coal mine, and again the question was asked as to what was to be done with the Town Guard. The General, who seemed at this time more reasonable and collected, said that if the men could get through to Ladysmith, he would advise them to do away with their arms and go. Darkness came on and many did not know what was to be done, consequently men in small companies wandered all over the country in search of the troops. I, with about 78 men, wandered about from one hill to another. On one occasion, falling in with some mounted men, I asked the officer in charge if he could assist us in finding the General. His reply was: "I don't know where he is." Later on we found some of the commissariat wagons and several officers. I explained our position, and said, "If you show us where to find the column, the men are willing to fall in the ranks and do their share of whatever may be required.” Pointing to the hills in the darkness, he said: "Well, go up in that direction, and most likely you will find them." I told him we had been doing this for hours, and were done up. He replied: "Well, go to the devil - anywhere out of this; I don't want you here." After having done our duty, it was cruel to feel that we were to all intents and purposes abandoned. However we made for a farm house, the home of a Dutchman, by name Dekker. Some of us had already been there, to rest out of the rain for a short time, but most deemed it would be unwise to remain there until morning. Consequently we moved off, and it can be easily imagined that in the darkness, with a very rough country, and plenty of barbed wire fences, we soon got separated into small lots. When daylight broke on Sunday morning we were scattered all over the country. The few remaining with me made for a kaffir kraal to get warmed and something to eat. We had not been there long before the Long Tom from Impati began shelling the troops, and, as they moved further back, the shells were put into the town. As I watched this from the hill side, and noticed that the shells were falling nearer to where we were standing, I felt that, notwithstanding our worn-out condition, we should at once make for Ladysmith. Accordingly we started off for the thorn country and hills. The country being well known to most of our party, there was not much difficulty in working our way round, well out of the enemy's lines. Fortunately for us, the battle of Elandslaagte on the Saturday (20th October) had completely demoralised the Boers for a time, and we learned from the natives on our march that at almost every farm house, and many of the kraals, wounded and tired out Boers were finding shelter. We gathered much information from these natives. One boy in particular, who has lived on a certain farm for many years, gave the names of local Dutchmen who had been killed and wounded in the battle of Elandslaagte.
Ladysmith reached On Monday, at noon, we reached the Sunday River, and there we found four more of our Town Guard, resting at a road party's tents. From the overseer we got a cart and four oxen, and all were very thankful for this kindly help on to Ladysmith, as we were famished for want of food. At this spot we found a horse, and one man was sent on ahead to inform my brother, Mr. C. J. Jones140, of the Royal Hotel, Ladysmith, of our condition. He, on hearing this news, immediately drove out in a drag, with four horses, meeting us on the Umbulwana Nek about 6.30 p.m. A smart drive soon brought us into town, and, after being refreshed with something to eat and drink, we left by the 7.45 p.m. down train that same evening for Durban, arriving there on Tuesday morning, just in the same condition, as regards our outward appearance, as when we got into Ladysmith, covered in mud from head to foot, and one member bootless. Thus ended a very exciting, trying, and miserable experience, the saddest part of which was to realise that all we possessed, and which had
139 Lieutenant William M Hannah, Leicester Regiment, was killed on the 21st October. 140 Charles James Jones (1851 – 1910) was the eldest brother of Samuel. He served in the Newcastle Mounted Rifles and saw his first service on 1873. He married on 1876 and had 12 children. Like Samuel he served in the Zulu War and also in the First Boer War. He was Alderman and Deputy Mayor of Ladysmith when the Boer War commenced and served in the Town Guard during the siege. He had purchased the Royal Hotel in Ladysmith in 1898.
84 cost many a life-time to build up, was to fall into the hands of the Boers. So sudden was our departure, that most of us never even returned to our homes, after leaving them on the Saturday morning; consequently there was in many cases a good deal in cash left behind, the writer leaving the cash of business takings of a fortnight in the house. However, we feel sure that the Imperial Government will compensate us, but it is nevertheless very hard for many of us who had comfortable homes and paying businesses, to find ourselves bereft of everything, and compelled to ask for relief. Let those who read this, and who have not suffered the loss of their all, try to realise what it must mean; but sure I am of this, that the day is not far distant when we shall have the satisfaction of seeing these plundering marauders meeting with their just deserts.
A tribute to Symons In conclusion, I would like to pay a tribute to the late brave General, Sir William Penn-Symons. Words fail me to express all I feel, but I am certain that all who ever had the pleasure of meeting him, will join me in saying that a more noble specimen of a British officer and gentleman would be hard to find. I had the privilege, with the other leaders of the Town Guard, of meeting the General on several occasions in connection with the defences of the town. The first meeting was on a Sunday morning, soon after his arrival in Dundee. He met us by appointment, to hear what we had done, and also to give us the benefit of his advice. Leaving the Board Office we rode round inspecting the redoubts, and before we parted that morning he said that we had carried out the work of defence splendidly; "In fact," he added, "I don't see how it could be improved on, and I shall have great pleasure in writing to the Governor to this effect," which he did. We always found him cheerful, jolly, and full of life — one of these men who inspired with a zeal to fit one for anything. The loss of such a brave leader under the circumstances already mentioned, was a blow to everybody, and I feel confident that had he not been laid low most of the foregoing sad and trying events would never have happened. A stout heart and a clear head was taken from us just when we needed it most. Much that has taken place will be forgotten, but Dundee people will never forget the late General Sir W. Penn-Symons, and that spot which marks his last resting place, inside the English Church grounds will be held sacred by us all.
85 Diary of William Chegwidden, DTG
William Arthur Chegwidden served in the Dundee Town Guard and wrote a diary of his experiences. Only the first part of the diary has survived but this covers the period from 15th October 1899. The diary ends abruptly on the 27th, just before Ladysmith was reached.
The diary was written in note form using very long sentences. Some changes have therefore been made to aid readability.
The Dundee Town Guard 15 October. The Home Guard were called out of the Church about 7 o'clock and assembled at the Town Offices, and formed into four companies to parade and search the town for all undesirables. We formed up under the Town and Mounted Police, who marched us to different parts. We were out searching for about 3 hours and there were about 14 men taken to the Town Offices and questioned, and those that could not give a satisfactory answer were taken to the Railway Station, where a train was waiting to take them down the country, for they were a lot of loafers that did not belong to the town. And the people of the town did not know which side they would take, as the Boers had crossed the borders of Natal a few days ago, and we were expecting them around Dundee soon, as our troops were at Dundee so there was no telling how soon that there would be a battle. So about 1 o'clock in the morning we went home and went to get [with] our guns and ammunition all ready, for we did not know how soon we should be called out.
16 October. A lot of women and children who were going to leave by the 9 o'clock train for Durban and Pietermaritzburg and other places, and there was a general holiday no-one after seemed to care to work, so I should say that all the people in town were at the station to see them off and a lot of women that did not intend going were there joking and laughing at them for going away. But before the train left there was an order issued by the late General Penn Symons saying that all women and children must leave the town that day. So there was quite a bustle, for we thought then that that it must be getting rather serious as the orders came from the general. So after that train left everyone went to their homes and started to prepare and to pack a few things just to last them for a few weeks, in about an hour after the first train left the town, police came around to the houses saying that all must be in readiness by 12 o'clock as the train would be waiting at that time to take them away, so there was a lively time all that morning with luggage and things going to the station and at 12 o'clock not all the people were there, and started to join the train, but it took a long time to get them all away. The train could not take all of them, so some had to wait for another train. There were a lot that went by that train and had to go in open trucks for there were not enough carriages to take them, and then there were [some] left in Dundee. About a dozen women with their families [they] would not leave.
17 October. There were [sic] not anyone working on this day for everyone was waiting and waiting for the Boers, for reports were coming that there was a large commando 16 miles away. About 9 o'clock there was a report spreading around [because] that all the men had to clear out, but no one seems to know where it came from, so the Chairman of the local board went out to the military camp and saw the general and asked him if the men had to leave. He sent in a notice and posted it at the Town Offices and Post Office saying that he did not want any able bodied men to leave the town, so that settled the men and none of them ever left.
18 October. Everything seemed to be all quiet on this day, but when the mail train arrived and some of our town people came up from Durban and Pietermaritzburg saying that the train was fired on at Elandslaagte and that some of the carriages with cattle and other provisions for our troops at Dundee had been left behind, for there was no time to couple them to the train, because the Boers came up in large numbers and fired on the train as it was leaving. It was reported that the guard was shot and the engine driver and the stoker had to get on their knees to keep the bullets from striking them.141 In the afternoon a company of the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers volunteered to go down and try to bring up the cattle trucks, so the same engine driver volunteered to take the engine142. About 10 o'clock that night the train came in to Dundee station with all the cattle. There was great cheering for the soldiers and the engine driver for their work143.
That night No 1 Company of the Town Guard was told to go on picket duty to patrol the different parts of the town, and report all that they saw and heard.
141 This incident with the train took place on 19th October. 142 On the 19th, three companies of the RDF went to the Navigation Collieries to collect mealies. It was men of the KRRC who travelled to Waschbank to collect the trucks from Elandslaagte. 143 The driver of the train under fire at Elandslaagte was H Cutbush.
86 The Battle of Talana 20 October. About 1 o'clock on the 20 October we were called up by some of the Town Guard that were on duty and the different bells in the town started ringing so all the men in town assembled with their guns at the Town Office and when we got there we could hear the report of rifle firing, so just after that a horseman of one of the troops that had been out of duty said that they had been fired upon just outside of the town, so he rode off to camp, and just after another soldier came in running saying that the Boers were just outside in a large force and he said had wounded one of the pickets. Just after a soldier came up the street with a wheelbarrow with one of his comrades in it. He was wounded in the head and could not walk, so as soon as he got to the Town Offices he was taken out of the barrow and put on a stretcher and taken by the Town Guard Red Cross staff to the Norwegian Hospital144.
We could hear all the time a few shots firing now and again, it was the pickets firing at each other, so by this time it was getting a little more light and at last we saw the soldiers marching down the street.145 When they came near the Town Offices they halted and an officer came forth to know who we were, for they did not know if it was Boers or Town Guard, so after they found out they marched on to their positions.
About 6 o'clock we could see a lot of men moving about on the top of the ridge of Talana Hill, so in a few minutes we heard a shell passing over the town, we could hardly tell which way it was going for the first time, but just after we could see the Boers firing their artillery at our camp, and then we saw one shot from our artillery from the camp, drop on the hill and then one or two. But that was all they fired from the camp, so they changed their position very quickly and got on the flat just a little coal field side of the town and just in line with the redoubt of No 5 Company of the Town Guard, so they started to exchange shots with their artillery.
It was a grand sight to see the shells bursting on the hills, but in about 35 minutes they had silenced the Boers artillery, and then they changed their position and got down to the bottom of the hill. There was only one poor fellow killed by the Boers artillery, he was a bugler, the shell struck him in the back of his head and took his skull right out just leaving the face146.
No 5 Company Town Guard were ordered to go to their redoubt and on our way we met the artillery changing their position, as we lined up by the side of the street for them to pass and gave them cheers for it was a grand sight to see them going, they were going as hard as the horses could go. So after they had passed us we went off to our redoubt and took our position. We were in a grand place for we were in full view of the hills that the Boers were on and we could see the shells from our artillery exploding all along the top of the ridge from one end to the other. The Boers had only their Pom-Pom left then, that they could use on our artillery, so our artillery turned their attention to this and silenced it very quick, so then they shelled the hills for all they were worth and our infantry advanced to the bottom of the hill under cover of their fire where we were waiting [for] them all the time and at last the artillery ceased fire, and then it was awful to hear the rifle fire. I never heard anything like it. I can only compared it to hail on an iron roof, for it was one continues racket for nearly two hours. We could see our men steadily advancing up the hill. At last we could see that our infantry had taken the top ridge of the hill with the point of the bayonet, the Boers cleared for their lives and in a short time we could see that the fight was over and knew that our troops were victorious. So then some of us took a walk around where our artillery took up their first stand to see if we could pick up some pieces of shell that the Boers fired, we found a good many and we saw the poor fellow that was killed but there was a stretcher brought and his body was taken away by some of the Town Guard. So then we were ordered back to town. We marched to the Town Offices and were dismissed, and then we went to see the artillery return, and the wounded were brought into town and rested and had their wounds attended to at Messrs Oldacre’s Stores. It was a sad sight to see the poor fellows brought in one after another and laid out in rows, but there was not a murmur [from] one of them. Some of the men of the town went to their homes made cocoa and coffee and brought it to them, for the poor soldiers had had a hard day fighting. After the wounded had been brought in we could see the infantry coming over the hill and coming back to camp. All the people assembled on the side walks of the streets had gave them ringing cheers as they marched by. Then there were some Boer prisoners brought in and put in the gaol. Then all the Town Guard went to their homes to get something to eat for they had been out ever since 3 o'clock in the morning.
Just after tea the Captain of No 5 Company of the Town Guard had orders to get some of his men at the gaol to guard the magazine and the Boer prisoners, so about 6 o'clock arrived there about a dozen of us. Then
144 Swedish Hospital. 145 The two companies of the RDF. 146 Trumpeter W B T Horn, 69th RFA.
87 three of us were told to go in the gaol to guard the prisoners and the others were told off to keep guard over the magazine. It was an awful night raining very hard, but I was one of the three that was in the gaol, so we did not get it so badly, and we got some blankets and laid down in one of the empty cells. It was the first time that I ever was in a cell, and I hope that it will be the last. Well we were just getting ready for two to lie down and get some sleep, when we heard a loud knocking at the yard door, so we went out and challenged them and when we opened and it was some of the Natal Mounted Police, with eleven more prisoners so we put them in the cell with the others and that made it seventeen prisoners in all.
Then the gaoler came and we went in the cell with him and searched the prisoners, we took away all they had and put it in the Office, so then after they had a drink they were locked up. We then had two more of our company sent in to help us. Then three went to lie down and two kept guard, so we took it on in that way.
21 October. So every thing went all right and at 6 o'clock in the morning the prisoners were left out in the yard for a smoke and just to stretch their legs, we were then relieved by some more of the guards and then we went home to get something to eat and after breakfast there was an order given that all the Town Guard had to assemble at the Town Offices, so when we arrived there we were told that we had to go on the hill that the fight was on the day before, just to show that it was occupied. There was an Imperial officer there to take us and command us. We could see a lot of men moving on the hill and we could not tell if they were Boers or towns people, anyhow we started off marching in companies, there were some men in the town that would not go for they never took up arms but the officer that was commanding said that every man had to go and then some of the Town Guard were sent off to these and see if they would not come. They had to be brought by force so then I think that they all went.
When we got to the bottom of the town and were taking the flat just before we came to the foot of the hill, we met a lot more of the towns men coming down from the hill and going towards the town, they had not had any arms with them but they had to return to the hill with us. They did not seem to like it but all the same they had to go.
The officer told us to go up in searching order so we all spread out about a yard apart and then started to climb the hill we had as much as we could manage to get up there. I can tell you we had to stop and rest two or three times for it was very steep and nothing but large stones, big enough for two or three to lie down behind. Then there were two stone walls all around the hill, so that the Boers had plenty of shelter, and how our soldiers fought their way up their and drove the Boers before them, it is a marvel, but of course we all know what the British soldier is like when he means to take a position. I think that if our soldiers had this position instead of the Boers, that [then] it would have taken all the Boers Army to shift them with a frontal attack like our soldiers did to take the position. After we had got to the top of the hill we were formed up into our companies, and sent to different parts of the hill, and told to spread out as much as possible so that if any of the Boers should be about they could see that the hill was occupied.
Then we started to look about the hill to pick up shell and cartridges just to keep as a memento of the battle, we came across 25 or 26 dead Boers lying behind rocks and most of them were shot in the forehead. There were some of the Boer Red Cross men there looking for their dead, but it seems that they had not anyone to help to take them away, so some of our Guard got some kaffirs that were on the hill and made them help to carry the bodies down to a farm house just the other side of the hill.147 The house was nearly full of dead bodies, our men said they took one of their Red Cross men prisoner, for he was well known to some of the Town Guard, he was a deserter from the Natal Carbineers, there were two of the Town Guard sent to take him to the gaol.
After a little while it came on to a very heavy thunderstorm and rain, we had to make the best shelter we could behind the rocks but they did not shelter us much. After it cleared off we heard a big gun firing and we looked towards the camp and we could see the Boers were shelling with the Long Tom from the Impati mountain, and at last we could see that our troops were leaving the camp and getting out of range. We saw our artillery fire a few shots from close by the South African Coal mine, so we were coming to think that things were getting rather serious for we were afraid that they would send a few shots at us on Talana hill. Anyway we sat down and watched the shots exchanged, it must have been about 5 o'clock then. Our commander asked the officer that was with us what we had better do. He said he did not know as he had not had any orders from General Yule that was in command in General Symon's place.
So the officer said that he thinks that we had better make for the town and he would see where we had to go. So all marched off the hill. We came away in small bodies for fear that if we marched all together that the
147 Thornley Farm.
88 Boers would put a shell amongst us. When we got halfway down the hill, we fell in with a company of soldiers that had buried their dead comrades that were killed the day before. When we got down to the river it was swollen so much by the rain that we had received, that it was a hard job to cross, we had to wade through it took us up past our knees.
Then the officer rode past and told us all to go to the Board Offices, and we should be told what to do. So we made for it and when we got there we were told that we only had ten minutes to clear out of the town and that we must make for the military, they said they think it was at the back of the race course.
So we made for our homes as quick as possible and changed some of our wet clothes. There was no time to have anything to eat so we went out and fell in with a lot more making their way for the military.
It was raining and dark as a pit. We could not see where we were going and no one seemed to know where to find the soldiers. At last we got amongst a lot of military horses. They stopped us and wanted to know who we were, and where were we going. We told them that we were the Town Guard and that we had orders to get out with the soldiers, but that we could not find them, so they led us to a farm house and when we got there we found a lot already there, so we all laid down our guns and went to lie down on the floor, as many as could, for we were pretty well done up some of us.
22 October. We awoke on the Sunday morning by hearing our troops passing, so we went out and all the artillery were passing by the house going out to Glencoe. The soldiers were cheering and it was reported that Sir George White was coming up with reinforcements. We thought then that we should be all right for we thought that if there were a few thousand more soldiers coming, that we had nothing to fear from the Boers.
We heard the artillery fire a few shots and after that we saw them returning with more troops as we thought, but we were disappointed for none came. The troops took up their position on the koppie just behind the house we were in and then some of the mounted men tried to go to the camp and a lot of us left as well for the town to try and get something to eat. But, just as we got on the flat about half way the Boers started to shell us. We could hear shells whistle over our heads so we thought that it was time to try and get out of range. So we all made off back again but we were afraid to go back the same way for fear of the shells for it wasn't then Long Tom that was firing, and our artillery could not get within range of it but their shells did not burst and I am glad to say that they did not strike anyone. So we got right behind the soldiers and there we found another lot of the Town Guard in another farm house belonging to a Dutch man called Decker but he had left, so they occupied it for its shelter. So we got over to our own place again. The Boers had stopped firing for they could not reach us there and I don't think that they much cared to attack our troops for they would have had to come across open ground and that they did not seen to care for.
After dinner General Yule and some other officer came to the house where we were all staying and he occupied a small room by the side of the one we were in. Some of the Town Guard tried the town again in the afternoon and they got in all right and brought out some food for us. On the Saturday night someone came to the house about 9 o'clock and said that we must all make for Ladysmith but did not know who gave the order. Some started and then some more of us thought we would go as well but it was raining and dark and no one seemed to know the road, we turned back again and just after that the Dundee armies came and said that they were making for Ladysmith or the Boers would surrounded us all before morning. So off they cleared but we thought that we would keep with the military and we decided to stay where we were until we got proper orders, for there were none of the Town Guard leaders to be found, so we were left to do for ourselves. Our commandant of the Town Guard was the only one of the leaders that was to be found and he kept with the men. He did not know what to do as he had no orders. The soldiers were still behind us on the hill when we went to lie down on the Sunday night, and the general in the little room and another room floor of men. I think that all of us in that room must have slept sound for when we woke up in the morning there was not a soldier to be seen nor the General, so we thought that they were gone out for to have an engagement, but someone rode out behind the hill to see if the transports were still there, but there was nothing to be seen and most all the town men in the other room had left as well.
Abandon Dundee, make for Ladysmith October 23. So our commander went into the town to see if things were more right and to send out something for us to eat. Some of us asked him if we might go in to the town and he said that he thinks so. Just then there came two soldiers into the house where we were, they had been out on night duty somewhere. They did not know where the troops had gone. So then some of us started for the town and just as we got out side of the farm we saw three kaffirs on horse back and one of us asked what they were
89 looking for and told them they were Boers spies, but they said no that they were looking for the soldiers. So on we went to town, and when we got in the town we could see everyone in a great bustle. They said that the Boers were coming in to the town from all directions. So we saw our commander and he was getting his horses put in his brake, he said that he had sent word out to the two farm houses to tell them all to make for Ladysmith.
We went and got some bread and went home and let go the horse and cow and took some jams and other things to eat. And then we fell in with three more of the Townsmen and they asked us where we were thinking to go. We said that we did not know. They said that they were thinking of going to the Indumini148 and that we had better go as well, so we agreed to go together. Then five more came on after us and as we were crossing the veldt we saw ten more coming away from the farm house where we had been staying, so they followed us to the mountain so then we were twenty of us. We got up first and took the cave. We were six of us in the cave. We had no sooner got up there when we saw the Boers coming up just behind the farm house where we had all been, and after a while we saw them making for the town. We judged them at about six or seven hundred that went that way. We were on a keen look out for we were expecting to see another battle, for some said that our troops were just outside so we fully thought that we should see a charge, but we were disappointed for we did not hear a shot fired or see any of our soldiers.
We came to think then that our troops had left, and we did not know what was the best to do. Anyhow we decided to stay there for a day or two and we kept watching the Boers going and we saw them all coming back again about 6 o'clock in the evening for we were not more than about a mile away from them so we had a good view of them with the two glasses that we had with us. We could see them knocking around about the hill and then they made towards Glencoe, to their main camp.
Someone on top of the hill started to roll down stones, we could hear them rolling down but they could not hurt us as the cave stands in about ten or twelve feet, but some of the party got nervous that they might come to us and said that one was close on us. But we did not hear anyone for I think that the six of us in the cave slept, but I don't think that any one came up for we had a dog with us and he lay by my side all night and did not make a sound. Anyhow these others came to us about twelve mid-night and said that they think we had better make off for Ladysmith. We told them that we were not going but if they liked to go they could, so they started off.
October 24. We awoke in the morning and could not hear nor see any Boers, so we cooked the kettle and made tea and had something to eat. But about 7 o’clock we saw the Boers marching about the same as that they did the day before, and then start off for the town again, and some of them started the looting business. We saw six or seven start around the place to take the horses they could lay their hands on. We were expecting them up by us any time, for we were quite close to them that were looting, but they went around to a different farm. We kept as quiet as possible but about 3 o'clock we saw about twelve of them making our way, so we felt sure that we would be caught and started to bury all our money and everything that we had, and lay as quiet as mice for a long time. At last we heard them coming our way, so we just peeped and we saw that they were coming right up the little flat just about 30 yards below us, and when they got up to the little path that we came up by, one of them said to the others that there was some one up there as he could see the foot marks and wanted to come up, but the others said no, not now and they rode away and when they had gone about a quarter of a mile they off-saddled. We got out of the cave and one of the men that was with us told us what they had said, for he could talk Dutch well. Then we said that we would eat the bread that we had and decide what to do and we would go by the majority, but before we had tea one of our party came and said that two of the Boers had been back looking.
It came on to a terrible storm and I suppose that they went back for shelter. Anyhow that decided us for we picked up our rugs and started at once. We said that we would make for the Waschbank Mission Station that night, so just after we got on the other side of the Indumini we fell in with two kaffirs and we asked if they had seen any Boers about. They told us that the Boers had been about all the day, so we asked one of them to guide us to the mission station and we would give him ten shillings. He told us he would. So off we started. We had not gone far before we had to cross a sluit and there was a lot of water, the Kaffir said that he wanted to clear a farm, for there were some Boers there, so we kept under cover as much as possible. We had crossed the same sluit about a dozen times when the kaffirs said that we could make straight for the mission station, but we just looked on ahead and saw about 20 horses tied to a fence. So then we had to turn and recross the sluit. It was raining hard and by the time we had crossed it was getting dark and we were tired and thirsty and hungry, but we knew that we had to keep on so at last we got to a kaffir kraal and we had a drink of water. Some of the kaffirs went on with us. They took our rugs and carried them for us.
148 Indumeni Mountain.
90 And about half past nine we arrived at the Mission Station. When we got there we were much surprised to find a Mr and Mrs Lane and family there from Glencoe. We were very glad to see someone that we knew so they went and got some tea and something for us to eat. And I can tell you that we were pleased to get it for we were very cold and wet. So after we had our food we asked him if there was any chance for us to sleep there for the night. He said that there were plenty of rooms and mattresses in the house but that the minister was not at home, he had left before he got there himself and that he and his family came there with their cattle for safety. When he found that the minister had left he fitted up a place on the back verandah for himself and family.
But we were all wet to the skin so one of us got in through a window and unlocked the door, and then we laid the mattresses on the floors of the empty rooms and we gave all our clothes to the kaffirs to dry for us against the morning. Then we all lay down and slept and I think that we did that all right as we were fairly tired out.
October 25. On the next morning we arose about 7 o'clock meaning to start off for Ladysmith but the farmer said that he thinks we had better send a kaffir on to Elandslaagte to see if there were any Boers about. So after a little while we got one of the kaffirs to go. He said that he would be back again that night, so we looked around the place but very soon we saw a lot of Boers about a mile away. So we kept as much as we possibly could out of sight and watched them through our glasses and at last we saw a bridge blown up so then we made sure that they were retreating back from Elandslaagte. So we thought that we should be all right for a straight cut for Ladysmith in the morning, but after a while we saw about 12 armed Boers coming towards the mission station, so we went inside out of sight and we hid all our money again. We thought that we should be taken prisoners, but they passed the house and never came in. After they went past we came out again and watched them go away across the veldt. We saw them take away a horse from the kaffir boy that was out herding the cattle. They gave him the saddle and told him to take it home to his master. We spent the day as well as we could, looking around and watching the Boers moving about.
October 26. So early next morning we were out looking for the kaffir. He turned up about 8 am and told us that the way was clear to Ladysmith. So off we started with the kaffir for a guide and we told him that we would give him one pound a day to take us to Ladysmith. We had not been walking for more than about an hour before we came to a kaffir kraal and they asked us where we were going and when we told them, they said that we could not go that way for the Boers were all around so we turned again and made for the Helpmakaar road. We were walking like the kaffirs walk one behind the other so that we should not be conspicuous, for we thought that if the Boers should see us from a distance that they would think that we were natives with our bundles on our backs. So on we went and after another three or four hours we came to another kraal, and we got some eggs to eat and the kaffirs told us that the Boers had been to their place that morning, and took away some cattle for to eat. They said that the Boers were just over the rise having their meal, that it was General Joubert's column. So we lay down in the donga and our guide said that he would go over the rise and watch, so we had a little to eat and lay as low as possible, and it came on to a very heavy rain. We were pretty wet. After lying there for two or three hours we heard rifle shots on each side. We did not know what was up but we kept very low. So at last we saw our guide coming back. He had been gone about four hours and he said that it was all right that the Boers had started, some going on each side of us. So then off we started again but some of us were getting to feel very tired and foot-sore with hardly anything to eat for the week but the ones that felt alright done everything to cheer us up and make us follow on as quick as possible.
After we had walked a few miles we came across a farm house that was smouldering. The Kaffirs said that the Boers had burnt it down because the farmer would not join them. Well about 6 o'clock we came to another kraal and the natives brought us out some boiled mealies but we could not eat them very well, we could not get any milk. But the kaffirs were very kind to us and did all they could for us. So we had a little rest and our kaffir asked them the nearest way to Ladysmith. They said they would not advise us to take that way as the hills were full of Boers, so they directed us to another way and one of the natives that was there said that his kraal was a little further on. So he went on with us and when we were close to his kraal it came on to a very heavy thunderstorm and he told us to come up to his kraal. So we went up with him and he had a new kraal swept out and blankets laid on the floor for us to lie on and told us we had better stay for the night as it was going to be a very wet night and it would be too dark for us to go on.
So we all crawled in as best we could but after we got in we had plenty of room, and the kaffirs made us some tea and boiled some mealies. The chief said that he was sorry that he could not give us anything better, so after we had the tea the kaffirs left us and we closed the door and rolled ourselves in our rugs and I don't think that we were long any of us before we were fast asleep, for we were pretty well tired out.
91 October 27. About 6 o'clock the next morning we crawled out of the kraal and had a wash, and the kaffirs brought a looking glass for us to look in. I suppose that they thought we would like to look at ourselves. We were nice looking objects I can tell you with not shaving and washing. Well after we washed we started off again. Some of the kaffirs from the kraal went with us for a little way and carried the rugs of us that were the worst. I felt myself as I would as soon stay behind and let the Boers take me for my feet were terrible I could not suffer to put them to the ground. I told the others to go on and leave me for I should never reach Ladysmith. But they said no, that we would all go together.
I tried my best to get a horse to ride but there was no chance and as I found out after we had gone a little way that it was almost impossible to put a horse over the road that we went and I was glad after that that I did not have a horse. We kept on walking under cover as much as possible, after a while we saw the Umbulwana mountain149 but some of us were getting very bad. Our feet were awful. I could not suffer to put my feet to the ground. I had to get one of the other men's sticks and use them as crutches for the bottom of my feet were full of bladders [blisters]. I could not keep anyway near the others and I think that I was the worst of the party, but later in the day some of the others began to …. [Here the narrative ends].
149 4 miles (7 km) from Ladysmith.
92 Report by Mr P Littlejohn, NGR
The Natal Government Railways controlled the Natal railways lines. With staff working at the station and on the trains, they were greatly affected by the advance of the Boers into Natal. Peter Littlejohn150 was the District Superintendent, based at Newcastle. He wrote a report on the effects of the invasion and his staff, sending this to the General Manager of the NGR in Durban. The report was dated December 1899 and was written from the neutral camp at Intombi, Ladysmith.
Littlejohn is quite critical of Yule and his staff for the way they were treated in the days after the battle of Talana.
To the General Manager of Railways, Durban.
Sir,
Under existing conditions, I think it right to place on record, for your information the circumstances under which a portion of the Railway Staff at Dundee were left behind there, subsequently sent to Pretoria, then unfortunately, landed in the Neutral Camp at Intombi Spruit, near Ladysmith.
On Saturday 21st October 1899, the day following the Battle of Talana Hill, I asked the General Officer Commanding whether I might arrange for an engine to run to Glencoe Junction to bring into Dundee, a number of empty wagons left there on the evening of October 19th, and having received a reply in the affirmative, the necessary movement was made, and Glencoe Junction cleared of all vehicles.
Late in the afternoon of the same day, the Military Camp and Town were shelled from the Impati Hill by the Boors; the troops then moved out of Camp and between 6 and 7 p.m. an order was given for all residents to clear out of Dundee, and to muster at Decker's Farm House. I got this information on my way to dinner at the Hotel, and immediately returned to the Station to warn the men there, but found the information had preceded me, and that a number of men had already left. The night was dark and wet, and those who knew the locality were at a loss to determine their whereabouts, so that strangers were at a disadvantage, consequently a number of men lost their way on the veldt, and quartered themselves variously, some at Rowan’s and Decker’s Farm houses, others at the South African Collieries buildings, while some spent the night in Native or Indian huts.
Along with Mr Biddington, Station Master, Dundee, Mr Binnie, Foreman of Works, Ladysmith, and others, I went to Rowan’s Farm house thence to Decker’s, from which a party of about 150 persons started for Ladysmith a little after midnight. Amongst these were a number of Railway men, and while I did not discourage any from going, I did not feel at liberty to leave myself as there were so many men unaccounted for and besides, I had no direct order from the general Officer Commanding or Railway Staff Officer, and assumed that there was some uncertainty as to requirement for Railway Staff. In the circumstances, I decided to remain, and with me, there were Sim, Station Master Newcastle, Kellock Station Master Glencoe Junction, and Guard Robertson, Glencoe Junction. The Ladysmith trek having started, I set about to find some of the Staff Officers in the Military Lines to got authoritative instructions. I was fortunate enough to find Brigadier General Yule, and on enquiry as to whether there would be any further need for the Railway Staff at Dundee, he, after some hesitation, said he thought it would be as well for us to remain. On hearing this, we, four in number, returned to Dundee and slept in the carriages at the station
On Sunday morning, October 22nd, an order came from the General Officer Commanding for an engine to be got in readiness and to proceed to Glencoe Junction, but before the Officer left the platform, a shell into the partially deserted camp put a different aspect on affairs, and I suggested waiting fresh instructions before anything further was done in the way of making a movement towards Glencoe Junction, and this was agreed to.
During Sunday afternoon I sent a message to the General Officer Commanding, asking whether he had any instructions for the Railway Staff. No direct answer was received to this, but a message which seemed to have crossed mine was received, asking that four or five wagons of livestock should be moved from the
150 Peter Littlejohn was born in Murthly, Perthshire in May 1858 and educated at the local parish school. He moved to Natal in 1881 when he started working with the NGR. He rose to District Superintendent in Newcastle by 1890. He died in 1938.
93 South African Collieries Siding to Coalfields, and that this was to be done after it was dark. An engine was got in readiness for this movement, but finding the road to the South African Collieries was blocked by a disabled ox wagon, no movements was made.
On Monday morning October. 23rd the Troops had disappeared but no information was left for the Railway Branch of the service - notwithstanding a direct enquiry for instructions - and not until the Boers came into town between 1 and 2 p.m. without opposition from any quarter, was it certain that the Troops had finally vacated Dundee.
During Sunday and Monday, Railway men came back to Dundee in parties of twos and threes, having had various experiences since leaving Dundee on Saturday night. On Monday 30th October the Coalfields Staff and other Railway men who had taken refuge at the Mines, reported themselves at Dundee, bringing, the number up to 32 men, as per list submitted. Apart from the General's advice and the two separate orders received on Sunday, I need not say I was gratified that I had not left with the trek on Saturday night, when so many of the Railway staff under my supervision had found it impossible to get away.
On Monday forenoon, I went to confer with the Resident Magistrate as to the situation, and while I was at the Residency the Boers came in and took possession of the Town. Two or three days after this, Dr Holtz, Chief of the Transvaal Ambulance, came into Town, and on my making enquiry as to passport for self and Railway Staff, he said he was to return the following day with Commandant General Joubert, and, as I was known to the General, he had no doubt the matter could be arranged. Developments prevented either the General or Dr. Holtz coming to Dundee. At this time nothing was known of what had happened at Ladysmith and it was hoped that the Column which had left Dundee might join issue with a relief column and return. It was with expectations of this sort that the time passed until November 2nd when a notice was issued by the Representative of the Transvaal Government as follows:-
Notice is hereby given that all male inhabitants resident within a radius of three miles from the Office of the Resident Justice of the Peace at Dundee must be present at the Railway Station at Dundee to leave for Pretoria at 2:30 p.m. tomorrow afternoon 3rd inst.
November 2nd 1899. (signed) J. Wolfaardt, Vrederechter151.
This Notice was posted at the Town Office and in addition was sent round the town 'Bellman' fashion, a translation in English as above being appended to the original Dutch notice. I represented to the Resident Justice of the Peace that amongst the Railway men there was only one Dundee resident, all the rest being from other centres, and merely cut off at Dundee by the fortunes of the War. He promised to wire to General Joubert for instructions on this point. All however was of no avail, and we had to prepare for a trip to Pretoria.
Although the order was for [the] train to leave at 2:30 p.m. it did not leave until about 9 p.m. The vehicles provided for our accommodation were Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij152 close vans or Box trucks with no sitting accommodation, no light, and little ventilation, the sliding doors being fastened close up, although in the construction of these trucks provision is made for the doors being left partially open and fixed, without affecting the security. A suggestion to allow ventilation of this means was only met by our armed Guard of Burghers with a jeering refusal, so that we were treated as if we were dangerous customers, no consideration being given for requirements of nature. I may say that the Acting Traffic Manager at Dundee promised that a carriage would be provided. Nothing of the sort however was forthcoming at Dundee, and it was then promised at Glencoe Junction. On arrival at the latter Station it was said provision of carriage would be possible at Newcastle but here again the promise was not implemented and the journey was continued in the same uncomfortable and unsuitable conveyance. Before leaving Dundee, I wired to Mr W. H. Mackay, Pretoria, and to the District Traffic Manager Standerton, who in turn wired to the Director General of Railways at Pretoria, this with the view of securing their assistance in getting passport via Delagoa Bay.
151 Justice of the Peace. 152 The Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij (NZASM) translates from the Dutch as the Dutch-South African Railway Company. The company was formed in 1894 in the Transvaal with a licence conditionally issued on the construction of the line between Pretoria and Delagoa Bay which would offer the Boer Republics a trade route that did not cross British territory.
94 Mr Schadd met the train at Volksrust and was the essence of kindness and consideration, doing all that he could to afford a little more comfort in travelling, but in working in with the Burghers in charge of the train, he had the utmost difficulty in effecting any change, although he ultimately succeeded in getting a Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij Brake Vanattached, in which there was sitting accommodation, ventilation, and a good outlook, and by this means the remainder of the journey to Pretoria was accomplished in comparative comfort, and I take the opportunity of placing on record my appreciation of Mr Schadd's kindness in this and other directions open to him.
The train arrived at Pretoria between 5 and 6 a.m. on Sunday November 6th and notwithstanding the early hour, Mr Van Kretchmar with Mr Van Hassalt were kind enough to meet the train, the former arranging so that I might be taken to the Transvaal Hotel instead of to the Park. Mr Von Kretchmar also arranged that the Railway Staff generally should receive consideration at the camping ground in the Park, and for these acts of courtesy from the Director General of Railways, Pretoria, and his Staff, I suggest that your acknowledgement on our behalf are due at the first convenient season.
Mr Mackay called at the Hotel on Sunday morning in company with the Commandant General's Principal Secretary and having, after receipt of my wire, interested himself on our behalf, was then hopeful of our being sent to Durban via Delagoa Bay. During the afternoon Mr Reitz, State Secretary, called at the Hotel and took occasion to thank me for the attention given to his wife and family at Newcastle etc on the occasion of their recent visit to Natal, and I understood him to be solicitous for the termination of our discomforts consequent on our being sent from Dundee to Pretoria, which he admitted, was a blunder on the part of the official at Dundee.
On Monday November the 6th contrary to all expectations we were informed we would be sent back to General Joubert who would arrange for our disposal and we left Pretoria at 2 p.m. that day in the hope that we were to be passed through the Boer Lines and thence of course, to Durban. Mr Van Hassalt was at the Station to say good-bye on behalf of Mr Von Kretchmar and desired to be kindly remembered to the General Manager, Natal Railways and principal officers.
We arrived at Modder Spruit on Wednesday morning 8th November and were taken forward from there by Boer transport wagons to the outskirts of Ladysmith whore we were taken over on behalf of the British General to whom a letter of which the Resident Magistrate Dundee was bearer - was sent by the Boer Commandant General.
From the point of exchange near Free State Junction where we were detained from 9 a.m. till 3 p.m. we had to walk to Intombi Spruit, Neutral Camp, which we reached about 6p.m. Here we were accommodated in Patrol tents. No opportunity was given for obtaining refreshments from the time we arrived at Free State Junction until Intombi Spruit Camp was reached, and here we were dependent upon the courtesy of friends for the night.
Not until we got settled down at this Neutral Camp did we fully realise how effectually Ladysmith was out off, and then it was apparent that instead of being passed through the Boer Lines we had actually been placed in a besieged town, and this, I should hope, was not the intention when the State Secretary of the Transvaal gave expression to his good wishes.
It will be seen from the foregoing that the Military after the requirement for the Railway employés ceased, took no further interest in them, notwithstanding that it was known that the Railway Staff did not, from a sense of duty, identify themselves with the inhabitants of the town who were warned to leave, deeming that they would be considered specially, having special duties to perform for the Military.
The journey to Pretoria was not pleasant and while the treatment received in Pretoria itself at the hands of the Transvaal Government left nothing to be desired, whatever the intention, it resulted in deception seeing the ultimate end was to land us on a town under siege, whereas it was an easy matter to pass us to Durban via Delagoa Bay, or arrange to put us through the Boer Lines below Ladysmith.
While the discomforts and anxiety attendant upon being shut off from communication with relatives etc in this Camp have not been few, I may say I do not regret having taken the course I did at Dundee, because any other course would in the circumstances have been contrary to the approved policy pursued from the commencement of trouble, the evacuation of Charlestown and succeeding events that of not being carried away by what the public generally did, recognising all through that the Officers of the Railway Department had other considerations to bear in mind.
95 I think it right to place on record here, that the fruits of this attitude and policy are exemplified in the behaviours of the Staff from the Newcastle District who were employed at Ladysmith when panic set in there, and sub-joined I give a list of such Staff who remained for duty at Ladysmith at a time when others left for down country etc.
I may say, in conclusion, that I was not without the opportunity of getting safe escort for myself on several occasions after the Boers entered Dundee, but of course, I could not think of availing myself of any opportunity which did not lend itself to the Railway Staff as a whole, and I have not been without subsequent satisfaction because of the waving of personal considerations of safety and comfort.
Names of staff referred to in foregoing153:
Campbell, M Station Master Charlestown Porter, F Clerk Charlestown Mills, J Guard Charlestown Miller, W G Guard Charlestown Hilder, J E J Guard Charlestown Mason, M Guard Newcastle. Killed by a shell in Ladysmith Station yard Mason, A Guard Joined the Natal Carbineers at Ladysmith Mason, W Checker Joined the Natal Carbineers at Ladysmith Moody Locomotive Department Charlestown. Joined the Natal Carbineers at Ladysmith Creswell, H T Checker Newcastle Gardiner, R Engine Driver Charlestown Strachan, J Engine Driver Charlestown Jackson, W Engine Driver Charlestown Hibberd, C Engine Driver Charlestown Axtelius, A F Passed Fireman Charlestown Fletcher, J C Passed Fireman Charlestown Richards, S Passed Fireman Charlestown Jackson, C Passed Fireman Charlestown Hay, C Fitter Charlestown Grieveson, W A Fitter Charlestown Parker, A Fireman Charlestown Neil, R A Fireman Charlestown Massey, W H Fireman Charlestown Whitley, T E Cleaner Charlestown Abbott, E Cleaner Charlestown Emond, F J Cleaner Newcastle Michaelson, C Cleaner Charlestown Waublad, A A Examiner Charlestown Hodgkinson, F Examiner Charlestown Rayner, H Examiner Charlestown Ritson, J H Engine Driver Newcastle Angus, M Fireman Newcastle
153 It is interesting to note that there is no one from the Glencoe siding listed amongst the men of the NGR in Ladysmith. It is not clear whether Kellock and Robertson from Glencoe remained.
96 Account by Michael Davitt
Michael Davitt (25th March 1846 – 30th May 1906) was an Irish republican and campaigner for land reform in Ireland. Born during the Great Famine, his family moved to England to seek a better life. At the age of 11, working in a cotton mill, his right arm had to be amputated after becoming caught in machinery. In 1865 he joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood and worked for Irish rights. He was imprisoned for treason in 1870 and failed to take up his seat as a Member of Parliament for County Meath due to the disqualification of having been imprisoned again in 1881. He campaigned for agrarian reforms in Ireland and travelled extensively to lecture on humanitarian issues. Still an MP in 1899, he resigned his seat in protest at the Boer War and travelled to South Africa to support the Boer cause. His trip led to the publication in 1904 of the Boer Fight for Freedom, from which these three chapters are taken.
Chapter X - The advance on Dundee While events were taking place, as related, on the Western border, the main burgher forces, under the immediate command of Joubert, had moved southward into Natal, across the pass known as Laing's Nek. Not expecting any serious attempt on the part of the enemy to defend Charlestown, the Commandant- General had Newcastle as his objective; a small town distant about twenty-five miles from Laing's Nek, and where a body of Colonial troops had been for some time watching for movements from the Transvaal. Charlestown had also been occupied by the British, but they fell back on Newcastle on learning of the advance of General Jan Kock through Botha's Pass with the Johannesburg and Rand commandoes. The village was found by the Boers to have been looted by Kaffirs and Coolies after the departure of the English forces.
The country through which the burghers were to force their way to meet the enemy is remarkable for its superb mountain scenery and for its historic associations. The road from Standerton through Volksrust crosses the Drakensberg range and goes on to Newcastle and Ladysmith by the pass of Laing's Nek. The Nek is over 4,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is an opening in the range seven miles long, which ends on the west in an imposing mountain with precipitous sides and some wooded ravines. This hill is Majuba. The summit is more or less table-shaped, and the view from it embraces the magnificent alpine prospect of the towering Drakensbergs to the west and south, and a country of diversified picturesqueness to the east, with defiles and valleys through which the Buffalo River winds its way southward to the Tugela; separating in its course the Utrecht and Vryheid (Transvaal) districts from the northeastern frontier of Natal— a country of mountains and ridges, of kopjes, valleys, and grassy plateaus, with its bracing altitudes and inspiring natural panorama. Down from these heights, and past Majuba, Joubert and his burghers rode resolutely on the 12th and 13th of October to encounter the forces of the British Empire and to decide again, and perhaps forever, whether Boer or Briton shall rule the Transvaal.
While the Commandant-General was advancing upon the English positions from the north by the direct road from Volksrust, a small force under Field Cornet Botha, forming part of the Vryheid commando, had crossed the Natal border at De Jager's Drift, on the Buffalo River, on a reconnaissance. Six frontier police were taken without any resistance by Botha's men on touching Natal soil, and he thus shared with De la Rey the credit of making the first haul of British prisoners.
On the 15th of October scouts brought tidings to Newcastle of the British positions to the south as far as Glencoe Junction and Dundee. The enemy's outposts at Dannhauser, on the railway line twelve miles south of Newcastle, had fallen back on Glencoe on learning that Jan Kock and Viljoen's column of Johannesburgers had swept southward over the Biggarsberg to the west of Glencoe, and were believed to be intent on forming a junction with Prinsloo's Free Staters, who had entered Natal through Van Reenan's Pass. The main British camp was located on the road from Glencoe Junction to Dundee, where General Penn Symons was in command of a combined infantry and cavalry force estimated at 6,000 men, and four batteries of field artillery154.
It was decided by the Boer generals to make an attack upon Penn Symons on the morning of Friday, the 20th, from two hills, one to the east and one to the northwest of Dundee, which the English had left unguarded on the flanks of their position. General Lukas Meyer, with 2,500 burghers and four guns, was to advance on the Transvaal side of Buffalo River as far as Doornberg, east of Dundee, and in a night march from thence to reach Craigside, or Talana Hill, on the early morning of the appointed day.
154 This was a high estimate of the British troops involved and should have been corrected by the time the book was published.
97 Commandant Erasmus, with 3,000 men and Trichardt's artillery, was to proceed south from Dannhauser along the railway, and, striking eastward from the line a few miles north of Glencoe, make (also under cover of a night march) for the heights of Impati, which overlooked the British position to the west; the plan being to deliver a simultaneous blow at Penn Symons from the hills to his right and left.
From telegrams left behind at Dundee after the battle about to be described, and which fell into Boer hands, the English general appeared to be in complete ignorance of Joubert's movements up to the 18th. He was also uncertain as to his ability to hold the place if attacked by the Boers. The following messages were sent by him to General White and to the Chief of Staff at Ladysmith:
Glencoe Camp, October 18th. From G.O.C. to Chief of Staff, Ladysmith. 1.35.—Large body of Boers reported by our patrols to be at Dannhauser. Our Basuto scouts say that they have seven guns with them, and that they are coming straight here to attack us. Our patrols are watching them now, and I have sent out a squadron of cavalry in support. Dannhauser is 14 miles from this camp. Dundee was cleared last night of undesirable men. 9.45.—Last patrol from the north has come in. There were no Boers at Dannhauser at 6 p.m. The officer in charge was told that many of the enemy at Ingagane had gone back to Newcastle. As a result of further inquiries I am convinced that, unless more rain falls, from want of water Dundee could not be invested by a large force for any length of time.
It will be seen from this official message of the English general that armed Kaffirs (all scouts are necessarily armed) were used by the English from the very outbreak of the war.
It appears from the following telegram that General White had contemplated the withdrawal of Penn Symons and his force from Dundee, on learning of the advance of Kock and Viljoen southward of Glencoe. The rapid advance of Joubert's column from Newcastle on the 19th frustrated this intention.
The telegram reads :
Glencoe Camp, 18th October, 3.26 a.m. From General Symons to Sir George White, Ladysmith. 1.33.—Urgent. Clear the line. I cannot fulfil the conditions you impose, namely, to strongly entrench myself here with an assured water supply within my position. I must therefore comply with your order to retire. Please to send trains to remove civilians that will remain in Dundee, our stores, and sick. I must give out that I am moving stores and camp to Glencoe Junction in view of attacking Newcastle at once. W. P. Symons, L.G.
The egregious Moneypenny, of the Johannesburg ‘Star,’ was likewise at fault in his journalistic scouting for the London ‘Times’ at Dundee, but from the concluding words in the following message it would appear that if he knew nothing about the movements of the Boers he still knew how to libel them:
From Moneypenny, to 'Times,' London. Glencoe Camp, October 18th.—Attack this position, which thought possible last few days, seems not likely take place. No evidence enemy in force this side Newcastle, and patrols report small party which advanced Ingagane retiring. Vryheid commando believed near Landman's Drift. Reports state general drunkenness, laxity discipline, Boer camp Newcastle.
The British Military Censor was also already at work in his task of limiting the information which the British public was to be permitted to receive from English war correspondents, where they did not speak exclusively of British achievements. The following censored message fell into Boer hands at Glencoe :
From Cumming, to 'Advertiser,' London. Report reached camp that Boers had been sighted seven miles out. Squadron 18th Hussars, under command Major Laming, rode out. The advanced officers' patrol under Lieutenant Cape, on reaching brow of hill beyond Hattingh Spruit Station, discovered strong advance party of enemy. (Censored:
98 'The Hussars patrol fell back, and Boers advancing swiftly poured in a scattering fire without dismounting at 400 yards.')
Dundee is a pretty little town with about a hundred and fifty dwellings, three or four churches, and two or three small hotels. It is situated at the northeastern extremity of a semicircular area, almost surrounded by hills. The railway from Glencoe Junction cuts across this stretch of rugged veldt, which is also intersected by a spruit, a branch tributary of a small river that falls into the Buffalo a few miles east of the town. The distance across the plain from Glencoe to Dundee—that is, from southwest to east—is about seven miles; while the north to south distance is some five or six miles.
To the east of Dundee, at a distance of about three thousand yards, rises a square-topped hill to a height General Meyer of twelve or fifteen hundred feet above the level of the town. To reach this hill from the town, you descend a Lukas Johannes Meyer, who was to fight the sloping road for about a mile, and, crossing a small first pitched battle of the war with the English as spruit and wire fence, you begin to ascend the grassy Commandant of the Southeastern Transvaal slopes of Talana Hill. On the side of the hill facing burghers, was born in 1851 in the Orange Free Dundee there is a plantation, some two hundred yards State. He removed in early life to Natal, and square, of closely-planted trees. The plantation does ultimately settled in the Vryheid district, near the not reach to the top of the hill. To the right and left of Zulu border. He commanded a small force these trees pathways lead to the summit of Talana, under Joubert in the War of Freedom in 1881, while an irregular fence of loose stones stretches and was seriously wounded at Ingogo, in one of across the face of the hill, starting from the wood and the encounters with General Colley's troops. A going round to the crest of the northern extremity. few years subsequently he volunteered along with some other adventurous spirits to fight for Talana slopes down on the right (still looking at the hill the Zulu chief, Dinizulu, in the latter's campaign from Dundee) over a nek to another kopje, at the foot against a rival claimant for Cetewayo's kingship of which there are some coal mines, about three miles of the warrior race of Dingaan and Chaka, and south of the town. Beyond these mines the ground the victorious son of Cetewayo rewarded Meyer rises again to the Biggarsberg range in the direction of for his services by presenting him with the Helpmaakar and Ladysmith. Between the coal mines section of Zululand which was wedged in and Talana Hill, a roadway passes over the nek from between the south of Swaziland and the Dundee, under the base of the hill, leading on to De northeast of Natal. Jager's Drift, across the Buffalo River and into the Transvaal. Meyer, being of an ambitious and romantic disposition, formed his territory into a small To the left of Talana Hill (looking from Dundee) there State, which he called "The New Republic." A rises Impati Hill; a valley three or four miles wide large number of Boers from the Transvaal and running in between the two hills towards Doornberg. Africanders from Cape Colony migrated to the Impati, like Talana, commands the town of Dundee new Boer country. Meyer, however, soon completely, being about 6,000 yards away to the relinquished the idea of ruling a State by northwest. Impati at its highest point rises 1,000 feet himself, and obtained the consent of his fellow- above the level of the town, but a spur on its southern burghers to join their territory to that of the slope, in the direction of Glencoe, stands no higher Transvaal. He was elected to represent the than 400 or 500 feet over the ground on which the Vryheid district, the locality of the "New English camp was pitched. The camp was located on Republic," in the Volksraad at Pretoria, and had a spot gradually rising from the town, and on its graduated by ability and popularity to the western side, distant about 2,000 yards, in the position of Chairman of the First Raad a few direction of Glencoe. years before war was declared. He went to the front as Speaker of the Boer House of Why a position was chosen on which to meet the Commons. advancing Boers that was dominated by two hills in the immediate direction of their march, has not been Lukas Meyer has a striking appearance, being explained in any English account of the two battles of six feet four in height, and built in proportion, Talana Hill and Dundee. It was possibly done in with a strong, handsome face, markedly ignorance of the fact of the Boers possessing artillery German in features and expression. He is a with a range equal to the distance from Impati to man of good education, with cultured tastes, General Penn Symons' location. In any case, there and was immensely popular among the Boers was no natural advantage in the English position of his district, with whom he was known as "the which could not have been found anywhere behind, Lion of Vryheid." nearer to Glencoe. Two miles further away from Impati would have taken the British army beyond the
99 reach of artillery on either hill, while it would have given the English general's mounted troops better ground on which to act if the Boer column should venture an attack on the town of Dundee from the Doornberg direction.
Another unexplained fact is even stranger still: no scouts had been placed on either of the commanding hills to the right and left of the British camp! Two very unpleasant surprises, therefore, awaited the enemy, when, at five in the morning of the 20th of October, Captain Pretorius, of the Transvaal Artillery, sent a Creusot shell from the top of Talana Hill across the town of Dundee, clean into General Penn Symons' tents. The Boers were on the hill, and they possessed guns which could easily search the British position.
Daniel Erasmus, who at the head of the Pretoria and other commandoes, was to have cooperated with General Meyer in the attack on Dundee, had no record or qualification for his election to the position of Commandant other than his wealth. He is a tall, heavy-looking, dark man, aged about fifty, and unsoldierly in appearance.
Chapter XI - Battle of Talana Hill The selection of Dundee as a base for a large British force operating in the north of Natal was most unwise from a military standpoint. It was easily open to attack by a force from the east, through the Utrecht and Vryheid districts of the Transvaal, while the railway line on the west, from Newcastle to Glencoe, offered a very favorable means for the march of a cooperating column. In fact, the whole plan of defending Natal north of the Tugela with less than an army of 50,000 troops, against an invading force of 10,000 burghers, was wanting in the most elementary generalship.
The country between Laing's Nek and the Tugela River has the Free State on the immediate west, with the Drakensberg mountains acting as boundary; and the Transvaal on the immediate east, having the Buffalo River and hilly country as dividing line. This section of Natal resembles in formation a triangle, with the base at the Tugela and the apex at Laing's Nek; having a depth of ninety or a hundred miles, and a width at the base of fifty or sixty. For forty miles of the east depth, the Transvaal border is crossed by drifts over the Buffalo River, which offer little difficulty to a Boer army; while Van Reenan's Pass, on the west side of the triangle, gave the Free Staters a safe way for a cooperating force to march, with flanks secured by impassable mountains, to the aid of a column moving south along the opposite side of the triangle.
The section of Natal included in this triangle is an ideal country for Boer methods of warfare. It abounds in strong positions, in kopjes and kloofs, with its western boundary made unassailable by the towering walls of the Drakensberg range.
The resolve to defend Dundee was, therefore, most unwise in itself, while the attempted defense, which was made on the 20th and 21st of October, was foredoomed to utter failure. Reasons other than strategic must have determined the selection of this town for a stand-up fight with the advancing Boers. These reasons might have had their inspiration in the existence of coal mines needing protection, or in the fact that the little town had been made a depot for an enormous amount of military stores. Political considerations were probably the essential factor in determining the unwise proceeding. The position of the farmers, traders, and others in this portion of "the Garden Colony" had to be thought of in Pietermaritzburg. The public promise made some months previously by the Governor, on the inspiration of the Colonial Office, "that Natal, if attacked, will be defended by all the forces of the Empire," was, doubtless, the real cause of cooping up General Penn Symons and his men in the position in which, but for the failure of Commandant Erasmus to carry out his part of the Boer plan of attack on the 20th, the entire British force would have been captured or destroyed.
General Joubert remained at Dannhauser on the 19th and 20th.
Lukas Meyer, with burghers from eight commandoes, namely, Utrecht, Vryheid, Ermelo, Wakkerstroom, Piet Retief, Krugersdorp, Middelburg, and Bethel, numbering 2,500 men, marched from Doornberg during the night of Thursday, the 19th. The weather was wet and cold, but the long night's ride of twenty miles was successfully performed. The march was continued in silence, and the north side of Talana Hill was reached about two in the morning of Friday. Dividing his force into three divisions, Meyer disposed them as follows: The right was to hold the northern end of the valley running in between Impati and Talana. The center was to occupy the hilltop, and the left was extended to a circular kopje behind the coal mines to the south, and was to prevent an outflanking movement by way of the neck where the railway line crossed from the coal mines in the direction of Landman's Drift on the Buffalo River. The four guns were hauled up the side of Talana by willing hands, and were placed near the crest immediately overlooking Dundee, Captain Pretorius
100 being in charge of the small battery, which consisted of one Krupp quick-firer, two fifteen-pound Creusots, and one pom-pom.
Anxious eyes looked to the west across the valley to Impati heights as the sun began to roll up the morning mists from hill and plain. Nothing, however, was visible except the bold outline, of the unoccupied hill against the dark gray sky. There was no sign of Erasmus! Away right in front lay Dundee, a tempting target on the plain right under the hill, while the white tents of Penn Symons' army dotted the veldt about a mile beyond the town; whether reachable by the yet untested French fifteen-pounder remained an unsolved problem for the dark, flashing eye of Pretorius.
The light was growing, five o'clock arrived, but still no sight of the Pretoria column. Suddenly the sharp crack of a Mauser was heard on the right, and some British outposts were seen hurriedly retiring in the direction of Dundee. The enemy had discovered the Boers who were holding the valley, and the battle could no longer be delayed.
Pretorius trained his Creusots on the British camp, and sent his first pair of shells over the town, right into the center of the enemy's position, some three miles away. The response to this "top of the morning" salute from Talana Hill was instant. The English guns belched forth their reply, and soon the side of the hill was being pounded by the British artillery.
It was found, after nearly two hours' firing, that Penn Symons' guns failed to reach the Boer center on Talana. His batteries were, therefore, moved into new positions, nearer to the hill; a change of plan on the part of the English general which would have been all but impossible had Erasmus, with Trichardt's battery, occupied the Impati heights, to the British left, as arranged.
It was a daring move, but the overwhelming force by which the guns were protected on the one hand, and the fewness of General Meyer's guns on the other, encouraged the operation. The fire of the enemy's batteries from their new and nearer position began to tell upon the Boer lines on the head of the hill, and necessitated a withdrawal of their artillery further back from the crest of the mountain. The British fire was, however, generally ineffective; a great number of the shells going fifty feet above the heads of the burghers. Captain Pretorius handled his little battery with admirable coolness, and developed a much greater accuracy of aim than did his British adversaries below.
It was soon seen from the hilltop what General Penn Symons' plan of operations was to be. Under cover of his numerous guns, be sent out three attacking columns; two composed of cavalry and mounted infantry, with guns, to turn the flanks of the Boers to the right and left of Meyer's position on Talana; one to sweep in south of the circular kopje, near the coal mine; the other to rush the valley, to Meyer's right, between Talana and Impati; while the third, composed of the Dublin Fusiliers, Royal Rifles, and Royal Irish Fusiliers, was to work up the slope of Talana, facing Dundee, under the shelter of Smith's plantation and a loose stone wall which crossed diagonally the face of the hill from the east to the north. This main attack on Meyer's center was to be covered by the play of the enemy's guns from the new position in front of Dundee.
There was practically a simultaneous move forward by the three attacking columns, and, as they cleared from the shelter of their camp and the town, and came out on the open to the south, east, and north of Dundee, the Boer guns played upon them with deadly effect, while several hundred of the Utrecht and Middelburg commandoes on the west of Talana moved down the hill, under cover of the wall and plantation, and poured a searching rifle fire into the center attacking column. This body of troops suffered severely by this counter attack, and already the grass on Smith's fields, over which the Irish Fusiliers were moving, was being dyed with blood. The British raced for the shelter of the trees, into which cover Pretorius now sent his pom-pom shells with unerring aim.
It was at this critical stage in the combat that the English general entered the zone of fire, and ultimately received his death wound. He had marked the advance of the Fusiliers and Royals across the spruit and into the plantation, where they remained. He saw also the steady fire from Talana into the trees, and it looked as if the column were about to be hurled back, despite the incessant play of his batteries upon the Boer position. He then rode rapidly across the open space at the base of the hill, and entered the plantation. He left his horse, and, addressing the Fusiliers and Royals, urged them to charge the hill. Encouraged by this example and appeal, the men went forward again and gained the shelter of the upper wall of loose stones which, starting from the top end of the plantation, went round slantingly towards the north, or right, of the Boer center on Talana. To make this advance in face of a galling fire, I have been assured by Boer officers that the British officers, revolver in hand, had frequently to threaten their men unless they moved upward. Officers in every instance had to lead the way, and this accounts for the extraordinary proportion of
101 men of rank who fell in the fight. Boers who fought in the commandoes which defended Meyer's center have related that several British officers were shot down from behind while pointing their weapons towards their own men in order to induce them to advance.
The Boers contested every yard of the ground, firing from behind any cover which presented itself, and making gaps in the ranks of the climbing Fusiliers. At one point, a little to the north of the end of the plantation, where the stone wall approached a hollow in the side of the hill, a body of burghers lay waiting. On the British approaching within a hundred yards of the place a deadly volley was poured into them, which sent those of them who survived down the hill again towards the shelter of the wood. It was at this juncture in the fortunes of the advancing British column that the English gunners missed their mark most disastrously, as has happened with the British artillery at almost every subsequent big engagement. They were signaled to from below the plantation to fire on the cleft in the face of the hill, where the Boers lay concealed. At that very moment the fire from these burghers was compelling the advancing Tommies to race back for the protection of the trees, and, just as they were doubling down the side of the hill, shells from their own batteries fell among them, killing eight men and wounding more.155
It was a few minutes before this British artillery blunder that General Penn Symons received a mortal wound in the stomach from a rifle bullet. He was returning from the cover of Smith's wood to the foot of the hill to rejoin his staff when he was shot, and had to be taken into Smith's farmhouse156. The injury to their general was unknown to most of the troops in front or to those of the right and left columns, until after the fight had finished.
In the meantime Penn Symons' right column went round by the coal mine and engaged a small Boer force which had been placed on the round kopje to protect the left flank of Meyer's central position. A body of these Boers came down from the hill and engaged the British troops. They were soon outflanked, and had to retire on the neck connecting the kopje with Talana, leaving seventeen prisoners in the hands of the English and suffering the loss of six killed. They had checked, however, the movement which was intended to turn Meyer's left flank.
The column which had been sent forward to turn the Boer right met with a repulse. The Wakkerstroom commando was guarding this position vigilantly as a fog commenced to descend upon the battle-field. They awaited the approach of the Hussars and Fusiliers, fired into them at 500 yards, and then charged them at the east extremity of the valley, capturing a Maxim, and compelling them to retreat. The men who charged numbered only twenty-five, but the fog concealed the smallness of the force from the British, while the volleys of supporting Mauser fire from the higher ground behind completed the discomfiture of the English column and drove them into the fog.
It was this column, thus driven back, that did not return to Dundee. They wandered in the mist, which now commenced to fall rapidly on the field of battle, and found themselves on the north side of Impati Hill that evening, where they fell in with some men of Trichardt's commando and of Blake's Irish Brigade, who were in search of the battle-field, and were driven by them into a cattle kraal, fought, and captured.
The artillery ammunition failing, and the non-arrival of Erasmus, caused General Meyer to give orders to retire to his base. The 900 men of his center, who had borne the brunt of the fight for seven hours, fell back, with guns and equipment intact, without confusion, before a single British soldier had reached the crest of Talana, a thick fog had fallen over the battle-field, which shut completely out from view the enemy's movements below the hill.
It was for these three reasons that the Boer general retired behind the Buffalo River. He was to learn on the morrow that he had, in reality, won a victory without knowing it.
Captain Nugent, with two bullets in his body, was the first Britisher to gain the top of the hill. There was not a single Boer in sight when the Fusiliers had worked their way round to the crest by the shelter of the loose stone wall. No Englishman had reached the hilltop while a single Boer remained upon it. There was, therefore, no "brilliant charge" such as has been described in the British press; no performance like that which the imagination of the English war correspondents had alone witnessed; no vaunted application of "cold steel" to which the spirit of boastful invention had given the credit of finally deciding the bloody issue of the day on the summit of the mountain.
155 Most accounts place this event slightly later in the battle. 156 No other account said that Penn Symons was taken to Smith’s farm.
102
Officers of the Irish Brigade outside Ladysmith
The fortunes of the fight are to be determined, not by the statements of correspondents, but by the results of the battle. Captain Nugent was a prisoner in the hands of the Boers within forty-eight hours, as were 250 more of his wounded companions; including the general who had inspired the attack on the hill by his courage and exhortation.
Down from the top to the bottom of the mountain British dead and wounded lay, almost at every yard, showing how dearly the Fusiliers and Royal Rifles had paid for their fruitless climbing of the fiercely- contested hillside. In and around Piet Smith's farmstead, over fifty British killed were found, and in a quiet corner of the small plantation, under the shade of the rocking trees, in the branches of which the doves were telling their tales of love, I have seen the graves of these men, side by side with some of the Boers who had killed them in battle—in a battle fought by the unfortunate "Tommies" for the capitalists and schemers of London and Johannesburg.
The number of Boer killed and wounded was accurately accounted for when Erasmus entered Dundee on the Monday following the battle of Talana. The list, according to each commando engaged, was compiled and published as follows:
Commando Wounded Killed Utrecht 32 13 Middelburg 15 9 Wakkerstroom 12 9 Piet Retief 12 5 Staats Artillery 11 - Bethel 3 4 Krugersdorp 3 2 Vryheid 2 1 Outside 1 1 91 44
Adding to these numbers the 17 burghers who were taken prisoner in the encounter near the coal mine, but were subsequently abandoned on the retreat from Dundee, the total Boer casualties in the fight on the 20th amounted to 152 men.
103
A view from the top of Talana Hill looking towards where the British camp was located. Picture taken September 2009
104 On the British side there was a total loss of 60 killed—including General Penn Symons—and 253 wounded. To this list of casualties must be added the 243 Dublin Fusiliers and Hussars who surrendered to Colonel Trichardt after having retreated from the fight with the Wakkerstroom burghers on the extreme right of the Boer central position. Altogether the British casualties reached the total of 556; or more than three times the number on the Boer side.
The forces engaged on both sides, with their relative equipment of artillery, are also a most material factor in deciding to which army the real fruits of victory belonged. The Boer general had a total of 2,500 men under his command, tho’ it is claimed by Meyer that only 1,700 of these came into action. This claim, however, ignores the services rendered by the commandoes which watched over the right and left wings of his fighting line, protected the horses at the back of Talana, and otherwise rendered indirect and essential aid.
Lukas Meyer had only four guns, but admittedly his fifteen-pounder Creusots and the pom-pom were far more effective in their fire than the whole of Penn Symons' batteries.
On the English side, there were 6,000 men, with 18 guns. The advantages for the British, therefore, were: in men, two to one; and in guns, over four to one.
Against this superiority in strength and equipment, there was the apparent advantage of the Boer position on Talana Hill. This position, however, ought to have been easily turnable by a numerically stronger force from the two vulnerable points to Meyer's left and right, as there were no entrenchments to defend the hill on either its top or sides. Talana was occupied by Lukas Meyer as part of a plan of attack which, if it had been carried out as arranged, would have completely safeguarded his right while menacing with a counter envelopment the left of Penn Symons' camp and position, and the barring of the enemy's only way of retreat to Ladysmith. The failure of Erasmus to appear on Impati exposed Meyer to a defeat which was only averted by the splendid fighting qualities which his small force displayed in a first encounter with an antagonist greatly superior in men and artillery.
The one convincing and conclusive fact, however, which determines the question of which side really won the battle of Talana, is the retreat of the British army from Dundee within thirty hours after the fight; leaving the dead unburied, their wounded general, and 240 wounded officers and men, 240 prisoners, with the entire camp, an enormous quantity of ammunition, and immense stores of provision, in the hands of the Boers.
The fierceness of the Boer attack upon a British army, and the deadly hail of infantry fire by which it was sustained, were a revelation to the English general and his officers. They had not reckoned upon any such development of Boer fighting qualities from a Republic which Dr. Jameson and a handful of raiders believed five years ago could be overturned in a dash upon Johannesburg or Pretoria. The dead and the wounded on the sides of Talana Hill, the Maxim fire which had never before rained its showers of lead upon British troops, were a rude awakening to those who planned Dundee as a garrison from which North Natal could be defended against the Transvaal until overwhelming numbers should arrive and clear a way to Pretoria. And this was not all which the battle of Talana Hill made clear to English officers. It taught the British a more alarming lesson still; namely, the great inferiority of the drilled English soldiers as compared, man for man, with the undisciplined burghers. They found on the morrow of the encounter on Talana that Tommy Atkins, Kiplingized into an invincible warrior for his exploits against savage foes armed with spears, was no match for the first white foeman he has met in combat in this generation. They saw him retreating from a field on which 6,000 of England's best men had been attacked by a force of 2,500 untrained farmers; leaving his dead unburied, his wounded to the mercies of his foe, his provisions and ammunition to the adverse fortune of a pronounced defeat. It was a disastrous experience for British arms, that refusal to fight again on the day after the alleged "brilliant victory" at Dundee, that three days and three nights' continuous flight through the passes of the Biggarsberg, in drenching rain and benumbing cold, in preference to holding a selected British battle-field against the Mausers and Maxims of the despised Boers. It was the Boer, and not the Briton, who remained the actual victor at the battle of Talana Hill.
There are many stories of Boer bravery related of this battle. General Meyer has honorably mentioned one which is to the credit of the Wakkerstroom burghers: 25 of these charged the 250 of the Dublin Fusiliers and Hussars, who fled from the encounter, leaving a Maxim gun behind them, and ultimately surrendered at Marais' Farm to 300 of their foes.
A lad named Scheepers, 18 years old, fought with his father, who was mortally wounded in the attack on the Boer right by this English column. The lad was guarding his dying father when the English rode up and made him prisoner. He asked to be allowed to remain, but was refused. Soon after, however, the
105 Wakkerstroomers swept down upon the English, drove them into the fog, and released the boy, who hastened back to where his father lay, now dead. Several boys under 16 took part in this battle.
Lieutenant Mike Du Toit, of the Staats Artillery, was severely wounded early in the fight. He was unable to stand, but refused to be removed from the field. He remained alongside of his pompom, and continued to give orders to the gunners, on receiving from them the results of their observations of the enemy's batteries and doings.
I heard a pathetic incident of the battle related when visiting the scene of the conflict in May, 1900. Three days after the fight, a number of British were found dead in Piet Smith's cow shed. They had either crept in there severely wounded, or had been carried there as dead, and left by their comrades. On the place being entered by Boers on the Monday after the battle, a collie dog was found faithfully watching the lifeless body of its owner. It had evidently been there for the three days, giving in its beautiful loyalty a sad instance of how much nobler some instincts of dumb animals are to the vaunted superior virtues of their masters.
Chapter XII - Capture of Dundee The movements of Commandant Erasmus' column form part of the story of the battle of Talana Hill, and of the British retreat from Dundee. They explain the failure of the Boer plan to completely crush or capture Penn Symons' army, and account for the first big battle-blunder on the Federal side.
The Pretoria, Heidelberg, Standerton, Boxburg, and Ermelo commandoes, under Erasmus' orders, crossed the Buffalo River on the 14th at Newcastle Drift, in all about 3,000 men. They had negotiated the Drakensberg by the Wakkerstroom road in a continuous downpour of rain as a "saddle commando"; that is, with tents and baggage left behind, carrying only rifles and bandoliers, and such food as each man could handle for himself, in a hurried order to march forward; and were suffering from fatigue and exposure on reaching Newcastle. The column started south again on the 17th, with its wagons and tents, accompanied by a battery of artillery, which included a "Long Tom."
The country south of Newcastle drops downward towards Glencoe, having broken ridges to the east and spurs of the Drakensberg to the west, with the picturesque Biggarsberg range of hills crossing from west to east between Glencoe and Ladysmith. A strong patrol was sent ahead to discover the enemy's position, and it was found that Dannhauser, midway between Newcastle and Glencoe, had been evacuated by the English two days previously; the enemy falling back upon their base at Dundee.
Dannhauser was reached and occupied on the 18th, and the burghers were ordered to sleep in their clothes, with horses saddled and everything in readiness for a movement forward in search of the foe, at a moment's notice.
Early on the 19th, amid a heavy rainstorm, the commandoes received orders to reach Impati heights before daylight the following morning, for the concerted joint attack upon the British at Dundee.157
The day continued stormy, and, as night approached, a wet fog added to the difficulties of the march. The column wandered about in search of the appointed hill, and off-saddled for a few hours in the evening at the foot of a kopje which was supposed to be a spur of Impati heights. During the night the column climbed the hill, and awaited the morning, which it was hoped would reveal the British camp, with Lukas Meyer and his burghers on Talana Hill opposite.
When the morning of the 20th came, the fog still shrouded everything in obscurity. To add to the disappointment felt by all the burghers, the sound of cannon was heard to the east, indicating the progress of a conflict not many miles away.158 The fog continued during the whole day. The force descended in the evening, and took up a position for the night on a lower terrace of the hill. The Fusiliers and Hussars who had had an encounter with the Wakkerstroom burghers in the morning, and had retreated into the fog, were met by two bodies of the Pretoria and Ermelo burghers, numbering 300 men, under Trichardt, who were trying to find the locality of the fighting which had been heard away east. The British column numbered 250, and on finding themselves in face of the Boers they retired to an enclosure near by, where they took up
157 Davitt said the plan to attack Dundee was only communicated to Erasmus’s men on the 19th whereas most accounts suggested a much earlier date. 158 Davitt failed to explain why Erasmus did not engage. In addition, his excuse of ‘not many miles away’ is hardly an accurate one.
106 position. Trichardt's men surrounded the kraal, and, on sending a couple of shells into the enclosure, the white flag was raised, and the English surrendered after some twelve of them had been killed and wounded.
An interesting incident occurred at the capture of the roaming British by Colonel Trichardt's men. Among the latter were some thirty men of Blake's Irish Brigade, who, contrary to strict orders, had left the main body of their corps at the base, and had followed the Erasmus commando on learning that fighting was about to take place to the south of Newcastle. These Irishmen, who carried a green flag at their head, manifested a special interest in the Dublin Fusiliers, who formed the bulk of the captured British. Nor were the prisoners less interested in the flag and nationality of some of their captors. A little recrimination occurred between the divided Irish, but did not go beyond a few words of reproach addressed by some of Blake's men to fellow- countrymen who could fight against a small and a republican nation for the power which deprived their common country of self-governing liberties. The Fusiliers, on finding that nothing more unpleasant than a political lecture was "to be inflicted upon them for the present, fraternized with the pro-Boers, to whom they related details of the morning's attack upon the Dundee camp.
On Saturday morning, the 21st, Erasmus found himself between Glencoe and Impati, in the very neighborhood where the encounter between Meyer and Penn Symons had taken place on the previous day. He moved forward at once to the heights he had failed to occupy twenty-four hours earlier, and on reaching the hill overlooking the town of Dundee discovered the whole British camp in great disorder. Trichardt's guns, including his "Long Tom," were trained without delay upon the enemy's position.
Here again Erasmus exhibited his blundering incapacity as a general. He had failed already to cooperate with Meyer in what would have been a crushing defeat of Penn Symons' forces, wedged as they would have been between 6,000 burghers and a dozen guns. The prevalence of fog has been given as the explanation of this failure. The same fog hung over the march of the Meyer commandoes, but did not prevent their reaching Talana Hill in time. This reason is put forward by Erasmus' apologists as an excuse for the first military blunder of the war on the Boer side, but the feeling among officers and men, with whom I discussed this question while on the scene of the battle in May, was that Erasmus could have easily reached the appointed rendezvous on the morning of the 20th, after having heard the guns to the east, had he been spurred by any very strong or very earnest desire to get there. His ignorance of the topography can be pleaded for all it is worth, and the fog adduced as an exculpation of his apparent remissness; but he will be blamed notwithstanding in the Boer mind while the memory of this war lives in Afrikander recollection for having been instrumental in permitting the English to escape destruction or capture at Dundee.
On arriving at Impati heights and observing the demoralized condition of the enemy's forces, a general capable of forming an elementary plan of battle would have thought only of the delivery of a crushing blow at the half-beaten foe. He would have established immediate communications with General Meyer, who had inflicted the damage from which the enemy was suffering, and who was no more than two or three hours' ride from Talana, and would have concerted a renewed attack for the following morning under conditions which would have insured a brilliant triumph for the Republican army. Or, he would have asked Joubert for reinforcements from the rear. No such thought of planning a crushing blow found place in the mind of Erasmus. He ordered an artillery fire upon Dundee from his safe position on the hill, and contented himself with looking on while General Yule transferred his menaced camp from its exposed position southward of the railway line, beyond the reach of Trichardt's powerful Creusot gun. The English guns were unable to return the artillery fire with any effect. Their shells fell short of the Boer guns by a couple of thousand yards.
General Yule made no attempt to storm Impati, tho it was far more accessible for the purposes of such an assault than Talana Hill. He had still over 5,000 disciplined men at his command, with three batteries of artillery, but there was no attempt made to grapple at close quarters with Erasmus and his 3,000 undisciplined Boers. Here was a chance for "cold steel," and frontal attack, and a display of British pluck, and all the rest; but the chance was allowed to pass by. The order was not to charge Impati. It was to clear for Ladysmith.
During these hours, when the fate of Penn Symons' army would have been determined by a competent Boer officer, the British Empire was ringing with the news of "the great victory of Dundee"! Majuba was avenged, and another glorious chapter had been added to the annals of England's military glory. These were the tidings of great Jingo joy which London was flashing on its wires to Montreal, to Melbourne, to India. But on that very day, on Saturday, October 21, it was only due to the accident that a man with no military judgment had the command of 3,000 brave and capable burghers; a man who had already failed to carry out the simplest of movements on a momentous occasion—it was owing to this stroke of British good luck that the most damaging blow of the whole war was not struck at 5,000 of the Queen's best troops, at the very spot
107 where the imaginary triumph of the previous day had been won—by the war correspondents and the London editors.
General Yule retreated on Ladysmith after the battle of Talana. He naturally anticipated a junction between Erasmus and Meyer, or the coming up from Dannhauser of the Commandant-General with the reserves from the base of the Boer army, and wisely determined to get away. Further blundering on the part of his foes enabled him to do so. All Saturday was wasted by Erasmus in gazing down from the hill upon the enemy. Joubert was away at Dannhauser, a few miles north of Erasmus, doing nothing in particular with the reserve burghers. Lukas Meyer was a dozen miles away on the Buffalo River, seemingly indifferent to what was taking place at Dundee, while General Kock was actually engaged in fighting 4,000 of the Ladysmith garrison at Elandslaagte with his Johannesburg commando. In a word, 8,000 Boers, within a radius of thirty miles, with a beaten army of 6,000 in between, had no plan, no intercommunication in concerted effort to prevent Yule from carrying his defeated and dispirited troops to the shelter of Ladysmith.
It was the first great opportunity which the war had offered to Joubert for the exercise of his generalship in the field, and he was found wofully wanting in the qualities which the occasion demanded. The result of the fight on Friday, which ended at two in the afternoon, must have been known to the Commandant-General that night. The discovery of Impati Hill by Erasmus, and the consequent break-up of the British camp at Dundee on Saturday, could not be concealed from him, even were it attempted, as he was immediately in the rear of Erasmus' column. He was in touch with Lukas Meyer's men, east of his own position, with no enemy in between, and yet not a single move was ordered by him, either to direct a continued and crushing attack on Yule, or to prevent this all but encircled officer from escaping by the Helpmakaar road to Ladysmith—the only way left for him to retreat by. Nothing, in fact, was done that should have been the obvious and imperative work of the moment in face of the enemy's desperate difficulties, and he was, therefore, allowed to steal away on Sunday night from under Erasmus' guns, practically unmolested.
General Yule's escape through the Biggarsberg passes was one of the most notable performances of the war, and must rank high in the military achievements of the British in the campaign. It was the one and only way in which to save his force from capture. The success of the desperate enterprise of carrying a straggling beaten force of 5,000 men and three batteries of artillery through tortuous gorges and across a range of mountains in a continuous march of three days and nights of wet and frightful weather, where 1,000 Boers could have successfully barred the way, was due, next to his own sagacity and resource, to the lack of cohesive purpose and want of intelligent military direction in his opponent's plans.
Erasmus took possession of Dundee on Monday, October 23. The town was not much injured by Boer shells, owing to the English camp having been placed a mile away towards Glencoe, and to the activity of the Boer guns, both from Talana and Impati, these being directed towards the changed positions of the English artillery. Enormous military stores were found, and among them huge quantities of Mark IV. ammunition— the ammunition which it was declared, in Parliament, in July and October, was not to be used by British soldiers in the event of war breaking out in South Africa!
Two incidents connected-with the capture of Dundee were related to me while standing, a few months subsequently, in the little graveyard in the town where General Penn Symons sleeps oblivious of further battles and bloodshed.
A Dublin Fusilier and a young burgher were lying side by side in one of the extemporized hospitals, awaiting the arrival of the doctors to dress their wounds. Said the Boer:
"Tell me, my friend, do you know why you have been sent out to fight against the people of the Transvaal?"
Dublin Fusilier—"Well, I'll be hanged if I do!"
Boer—"Then I will tell you. It is because Mr. Chamberlain wanted our Government to give the franchise to the Englishmen on the Rand after five years' residence in the country, instead of seven, as President Kruger proposed."
Dublin Fusilier—"Do you tell me so! Why, we have been fighting for a full franchise in Ireland for 700 years, and we haven't got it yet!"
A nephew of General Joubert's who had reached Dundee with the advanced portion of Erasmus' force entered a shed from whence sounds of pain came from a party of wounded British. On pushing open a door which gave admission to the place, he overheard one of the wounded say in tones of fear, "May God have
108 mercy on us, here they come! They will cut our throats!" "Oh, no, we won't," instantly responded Mr. Joubert. "We are Christians like yourselves, and you will be treated just as kindly as our own wounded!"
"Good Lord, Mike," exclaimed the agreeably astonished Fusilier, turning to his companion, "the Boers speak better English than we do in Dublin."
In further conversation with the wounded Tommies, Mr. Joubert found that their minds had been crammed with the usual English lies about the character of the Boers. They were believed to be a compound of uneducated Dutchmen and of savage Kaffir; a treacherous, inhuman foeman, dead to all the better feelings of civilized soldiers; unkempt, cruel, and rapacious. Great and agreeable, therefore, was the astonishment of the British prisoners and wounded at this first encounter with the maligned Boer. They found him the very reverse of the picture which the Rhodesian slanderers in the Cape and London press had drawn of the people whose country was to be ruthlessly despoiled by Imperial forces.
109 Memories of Right Reverend Baynes
The information in this section is taken from the book My Diocese During the War by the Right Reverend Arthur Hamilton Baynes159, who at the time was the Bishop of Natal. The extracts cover the period from 29th September to 4th November 1899 and come from chapters I (On the brink), II (First days of war), III (The first fights) and IV (Reverses). Baynes expresses the anxiety felt in Pietermaritzburg at the time but also demonstrates that, amid the rumour, there was very up to date and accurate information circulating about the military situation further north.
Chapter I. Bishop's House, Maritzburg, Friday, September 29, 1899 None of us here can think or write of anything but one subject - the prospect of war - and that will have been settled one way or the other before you get this. Nearly all our friends in the regiments here have already left to be nearer the border. It has been a very touching sight last week and this to see the departure of the men amidst immense enthusiasm on the part of the crowds, but very different feelings Arthur Baynes on the part of wives and children, who cannot tell when or whether they will see them again. On Monday last I went to the station to see the 60th Rifles and part of the 5th Lancers entrained. The men were carried in open trucks, which had been fitted up with benches and a sort of scaffolding round the sides, with a beam for a back to the seats - not a very comfortable method of spending the night in the train, but fortunately the weather was fine. These troops were going to take the place at Ladysmith of those who, the night before, had been quietly and swiftly moved from Ladysmith to Glencoe. The order for this move was only given at 8 on Sunday night, and the troops were in the train by 2 a.m., and in their new camp by 6 on Monday morning. These consist of battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment, the Dublin Fusiliers, and the 18th Hussars, besides one or two batteries of artillery, and some engineers.160 I am hoping to go up on Saturday night with the General to pay them a visit and hold a church parade on Sunday, if things are then still as they are now; but we cannot tell, from day to day, what may happen. We have all sorts of rumours as to Boer raids into Natal, as to native risings, etc., but the recollection of many colonists of similar rumours and alarms at the time of the former wars here serves to reassure us a little.
As to the ethics of the question, which after all is the matter that supremely concerns us, my own tendency has always been to distrust anything like Jingoism, and I felt and spoke strongly at the time of the Jameson Raid, both as to the method and the motive. I could not feel sure that that was a genuine uprising of the people, or, at all events, that it was not being exploited for the purposes of capitalists. But I am thankful to feel free from such suspicions this time. My recent visit to Cape Town, and my immense confidence in Sir Alfred Milner, from long acquaintance, have satisfied me that the case for firm and effective interference is now overwhelmingly strong. We cannot be the paramount power, and decline the responsibilities of the position. The time has really come now for us to decide between two possible lines of policy: either to leave South Africa to settle its own affairs, and allow it to become, as it then probably would, an Africander Federation, or else to accept the responsibility of our present position, and say plainly that that position is inconsistent with the existence of oppression practised on Englishmen. There is no third course open to us.
The expedient which the second line of policy seems likely to entail is indeed a terrible one. No one can face war without a sense of its awfulness; no one but must feel that it is the clumsiest and most barbarous method of arbitration. But if through weakness and shrinking from the horrors of war we allowed things to slip into a state of anarchy, having let the possible moment for effective interference pass away, the sufferings, the bitterness, the protracted conflicts which might be the consequence would in all probability be far worse than such a war as now seems to be at hand. Indeed, we cling to the hope that the home Government has profited by the experience of the past enough to be preparing to carry out this campaign on a scale which shall insure, so far as human preparations can do so, that it shall be short and conclusive. God give us all grace to keep our heads, to sternly repress the unworthy feelings of race hatred, of vain longing for revenge or retaliation, and so overrule even the evils of war for our good that it may in the end lead to a truer
159 He was born 23 March 1854 and died 30 June 1942. Having been ordained in 1882, he served as Vicar of St James, Nottingham, 1884 to 1888, Domestic Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury 1888 to 1892, Vicar of Christ Church, Greenwich, 1892 to 1893, Bishop of Natal 1893 to 1901, Vicar of St Mary’s, Nottingham, February 1901 to 1913, Canon of Southwell Minster 1905 to 1913, Canon of Birmingham Cathedral 1913 to 1937 and Provost of Birmingham Cathedral 1931 to 1937. For his services in the Boer War he was awarded QSA (1) RoL (WO100/235p47). 160 The 13th and 67th Batteries arrived on Wednesday 27th September.
110 brotherhood and a firm and righteous rule, and to the extension of His Kingdom among both white and black South Africans.
On this very day I travelled up through the night to Glencoe and Dundee. Our much-loved and lamented General, Sir William Penn Symons, had very kindly suggested that we should travel up and down together; but as he could not start till Saturday night, I preferred to go on a day sooner so as to get a little longer with the troops and not have to preach immediately after a night journey in the train, so I went on on the Friday and he followed on the Saturday. It was a very little force which we then had at Glencoe - only two infantry battalions - the Dublin Fusiliers and the Leicestershire - and one cavalry regiment, the 18th Hussars, and a single battery of artillery. As the Boers had a dashing commander, one could not but feel that then was their chance. They were said to be in considerable numbers just across the Buffalo, not more than sixteen miles away. Indeed, a farmer rode in through the night to say that we were certainly going to be attacked next morning. However, war had not then been declared, and the idea of their attacking us was not seriously entertained. On the Saturday I was able to see something of some of the men in camp as well as of some of the Dundee people. And on the Sunday morning we had a church parade. The weather was threatening; but it did not get beyond a slight mist. I felt at the time that I was speaking to some who would be very soon facing for themselves the mysteries of death, and that which lies beyond it. And it proved to be so. The text was "Stand fast in the Lord, My dearly beloved."
In the afternoon I returned to the camp, and with the General made a tour of the different regiments. He had an eye for everything, and above all was continually considering all possible ways of promoting the comfort of the men and saving them from any unnecessary labour. He would not have them stand to attention as he moved about the tamp. He evidently foresaw what was the work they would soon have to do, for he said to Major Bird, who was commanding the Dublin Fusiliers, "I want you to practise your men in trying to get to the top of that hill (pointing to the slopes of Imparti161) without exposing themselves, taking advantage of every bit of cover, so that if possible they shall get to the top without being seen from it." In the evening I preached in the church to a full congregation, consisting largely of men, for already a certain number of the ladies had left.
Next morning the General and I left again for Maritzburg. I looked out on all the surrounding hills with a special interest, wondering which would become famous as a battlefield. I asked him if our position would not become untenable if there were an enemy with guns on the Imparti Mountain. He said we might surround the whole hill and take their guns, and so perhaps we might have done if we had had the necessary number of troops. As it was, the victory of Talana was only gained because of the fortunate coincidence that the top of Imparti was veiled in mist all that day. I am told that General Symons was very eager to get the fight of Talana over, lest that most fortunate mist should lift and so unveil the enemy's big guns which they were known to have mounted there. On that Monday morning, as the train steamed away from the siding near the camp, Colonel Möller, who was then in command of the little force, waved an adieu to General Symons, "Come back soon and come to stay," words which were pathetically prophetic.
The journey down had a special interest. First we joined at Glencoe one of the crowded refugee trains from Johannesburg. The poor people had been nearly three days on the journey, though, as it turned out two days later, they were fortunate to get carriages at all, and not dirty coal trucks as others had. Then, too, we were joined by Major Henderson of the Intelligence Department, and he had interesting news to tell us of the movements of the enemy, of which he knew much from his own observations in a ride all down the border. And then again the Volunteers had just been called out, and all the way down we passed them as they were taking up their quarters in the various positions to which they were assigned. We looked at many points that have since become famous. We watched the crowded platform at Ladysmith, where Volunteers of various regiments were getting their things into order, and we saw their camp quite near. We hardly realized then that in a few weeks that very platform was to be shattered by shells and to be inaccessible to any of us in Maritzburg.
At Colenso we watched the first beginnings of the erection of what has since been called Fort Wylie, just above the Tugela railway bridge, on the north side of it. We little thought then that this was being erected as a stronghold for the Boers which an English army of 15,000 men would be unable to take. We saw the Naval Volunteers dragging their guns into position. I think we regarded all this as a rather amusing and harmless diversion, calculated to reassure people's minds while keeping the Volunteers usefully employed until they were wanted for real work at the front. I do not think that anyone in Natal then realized that this, and not Glencoe or Laing's Nek was to be the "front." That day in the train is one that will long live in my memory. The General and I had the carriage to ourselves (Major Henderson having left us at Ladysmith), and all the
161 Baynes repeatedly used the word Imparti rather than Impati.
111 way down we had long and interesting discussions on the position, both political and military. The Indian contingent was just about to arrive, and I, at least, with all an Englishman's complacent optimism, felt that when once it had arrived our position was assured, even if it were not so already. I did not, indeed, suppose that we could take the offensive till the Army Corps from England arrived, but I took it for granted that the papers were right in assuming that the Indian reinforcements were ample to check any hostile movement into Natal on the part of the Boers. It is rather sad, but at the same time instructive reading, now to look back to the papers of that time. They all assured us that the force we had would be ample to prevent any little raiding that the Boers might attempt.
From this point the interest in the situation quickened rapidly. A few days later we had the arrival of Generals Sir George White and Sir Archibald Hunter and General Yule and General Wolfe Murray. It was a very interesting evening I spent at Government House on the day of their arrival, sitting next to General Hunter, and having long and interesting talks with him about both the Sudan and Natal. On October 9th came the astounding "Ultimatum," and the very next day the starting of this illustrious group of officers for the front. As I said "Good-bye" to General White on the station platform, I knew from both his manner and his words, more than I had realized before, how grave was the task which lay before him, though even then I think we should have smiled incredulously at any prophet who had told us that for three months at least we should have no chance of seeing any of these again.
Then followed days of anxious waiting as we felt the opposing forces gradually creeping near to each other, and watched for the first flash of the first cannon. There were rumours of the Free State Boers threatening Ladysmith from the west, and moves and counter-moves of the Ladysmith force and its outposts to get at them. Then came the brush with the Carbineers, in which Lieut. Gallwey, the son of our Chief Justice, was taken prisoner162. And then in quick succession the exciting telegrams about Talana, Elandslaagte, and Rietfontein, and we hoped that another fight or two would break the back of the Boer attack. Even then we had little idea of what lay before us. The first awakening to the actual position was probably the retirement from Dundee. It was a magnificently executed manoeuvre, thanks, I fancy, chiefly to Colonel Dartnell, of the Natal Mounted Police, but it showed us what the enemy we were facing was like, that we had thus to retire and concentrate. Then came the doubtful day of Lombard's Kop and the news of the surrender of the two half battalions of the Gloucesters and the Irish Fusiliers, and about the same time the official confirmation of what we had practically known for certain some time before - the loss of the squadron of the 18th Hussars and the mounted infantry under Colonel Möller after the battle of Talana Hill.
From this point things got steadily worse, though with occasional gleams of sunshine. There was the investment of Ladysmith, the retirement from Colenso, the raiding in the neighbourhood of Estcourt, the gradual influx of the Boers on each side till Estcourt, too, was cut off, the attack (a faint one, it is true) on Mooi River, and the possibility, coming more and more within the horizon of practical politics, of the invasion of Maritzburg. And then, too, there was the disaster of the armoured train. Its redeeming feature was the heroic bravery of Mr. Winston Churchill, which impressed every single man who was present; but it rubbed in the obvious fact that the blunders were always on our side, and never on that of the Boers. The chief gleam of sunshine during this rather gloomy time was the night attack on Willow Grange by General Hildyard. Though much complicated by the terrible hailstorm of that night and other difficulties, it had evidently a very considerable moral effect on the Boers, and from that moment the ebb of their flowing tide began. Very soon they were back again beyond the Tugela, and the line was free for us to repair and use right up to Frere.
Chapter II. Saturday, October 14, 1899 We still wait for startling developments. Yesterday there was a telegram to say that large numbers of Free State Boers had crossed the border from Harrismith by Tintwa's Pass, and were advancing towards Ladysmith or Colenso. Our troops went out from Ladysmith to try and get at them, but they seem to have thought better of it and slipped away back again to the Berg. I am afraid this is what will happen: they will not face a general engagement, but will try and raid and cut off transports and cut the railway line, of course, if they can, though I hope they will not be able to get at it. Our troops will try their best to be there first if they are heard of as approaching the line. In one way perhaps it is the best thing that can happen, for if they play that game for another month, we shall have troops enough to begin the advance into their country. To-day there is sad news of the loss of an armoured train between Vryburg and Mafeking.
I met Mr. Edwards (Vicar of Newcastle) this morning. He has been obliged after all to leave Newcastle, though he waited till the very-last. It has been entirely deserted, Mr. Jackson, the magistrate, alone remaining, though Mr. Edwards thinks he may have since left on horseback. Our General felt that we should
162 This occurred 18th October 1899, the so-called ‘Carbineer incident’.
112 be running a too serious risk in trying to hold Newcastle. We have not forces enough to divide up between so many places. It is a particularly unfortunate border-line for us, as Natal runs up between the Transvaal and Free State in a very narrow point: we have the border close to us everywhere, and may be attacked all down the line. So we have had to tell the Newcastle people that we cannot defend them, and the result is that all of them have thought it safer to clear. They have left their houses just as they are, so either Boers or Kaffirs are having a good time.
I met Mr. Crawford, at whose house I have often stayed. He has left all his goods, and it is a very well- furnished, comfortable house. Mr. Edwards must have been a sight to see when he left. All his boys (natives) had already cleared for fear of the Boers, so he had to wheel his goods to the station himself on a wheelbarrow. On the way he found two old coloured women toiling under the burden of two big bundles which they could hardly carry, so he took their bundles on board too. A funny sight, but a pleasant one as far as that last episode goes, in this country, where as a rule the coloured people receive so little consideration. If all the stories I hear are true, or even half of them, about the Boers' treatment of the natives, they deserve to lose their power. Mr. Edwards was telling me some bad stories. Living so near the border in the midst of the Dutch, he hears a good many such.
Inhabitants of Newcastle trying to leave the town
Sunday, October 15 As no one had asked me to preach to-day, I thought I might have a day off, especially as I know there are plenty of clergy about from the Transvaal and Newcastle. However, when I went to the early service at the Garrison Church, Twemlow asked me if I would preach to the men at 11, as he was asked to preach to the Imperial Light Horse at a special parade at St. Saviour's at 9.30. I felt rather guilty in doing nothing, so I said "Yes," though it was rather short notice. The Rifles were there - the 2nd Battalion, which has just come out. I preached to them from the words in the second lesson, "With singleness of heart, fearing the Lord." Things are very quiet today. I suppose the Boers would not choose Sunday for operations unless they were obliged. After luncheon I went in for a little chat with the Governor.
We live in a state of feverish excitement, waiting for each scrap of news and surrounded by startling rumours which turn out as a rule to be pure inventions. We rush for the morning paper and hail everyone we meet for news. There are rumours to-day of various kinds, but all untrue as it turns out. We cannot tell, and probably shall not know for some days, what is happening on the western border, about Mafeking and Kimberley. There are rumours of fighting, and we know that they are more or less isolated.
113 It seems as if the next five weeks would be a very serious risk. If we can hold out, it will take us all our time; and the Boers know that it is their only chance, so they will strain every nerve to overcome us before the Army Corps arrives.
In the afternoon I went to a meeting of the committee about the sick and wounded. We had a telegram from Dundee to say that the military authorities had given orders for all the women and children to leave to-day in consequence of the probability of attack. There may be as many as six hundred coming down, and probably many of them having nowhere to go to. The Mayor and Dr. Scott went straight off to the shops to see how many mattresses Maritzburg could produce. I heard afterwards that they got about fifty, but a great many more blankets and sheets. It is likely to be a very hot night, and if there is a crush I daresay they can manage one night sleeping in blankets.
In the evening I went to the station to see the first of the trains come in from Dundee, thinking that, if there was any lady I knew who was in difficulty about a house, we might offer a bed for the night. I went to the station at 7.15 and was there till 9.30 before the train came in! I should not have stayed all that time, but there was a good deal going on. Some squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse had just gone off amid great cheering. The half battalion of the 60th Rifles were to start. And all the men were sitting on the ground outside the station and the officers pacing about the platform. It was a lovely hot moonlight night - so bright that one could distinctly see the red houses, red a thing which I have always thought impossible in England. It always seemed to me that one did not see colour by moonlight, but only light and shade. But there was no doubt about it last night. I got one of the subalterns to introduce me to Major Gore-Browne163, one of the senior officers of the regiment. I found he was a nephew of the late Bishop of Winchester, Harold Browne164. I noticed him at the celebration yesterday morning. Then also there was a train full of mules and Indian followers just disembarked and on the way to the front. So the station was a lively place. When at last the train came in, I found one or two whom I knew, but none who needed hospitality.
Tuesday, October 17 Still the same intense excitement and nothing to appease it. There is still no fighting. We thought that the removal of the women from Dundee meant that the Boers were very near and that an engagement was imminent. I heard from the General (Sir George White) this morning in answer to a letter from me about a chaplain for the camp at Dundee. As the military chaplains still do not arrive, I feel I ought to send a chaplain to be with the men, not merely to preach on Sunday, which Mr. Bailey can still do. He replies that they will appreciate a visit from me. But that is not quite what I mean. I want some one to live in camp with them. The Romans165 have got a priest166 with the Dublin Fusiliers, and much more ought we to have one with our men, who are a far larger number. So I have written to General Penn Symons, who is commanding at Dundee, to say that either I or Twemlow will be glad to come if we can have accommodation in camp. This only means a third of a small bell-tent. That is all the officers have.
In the afternoon our committee for the sick and wounded met again at 3. It meets every day. There was not much to do; but we sent off to the camp a few things which the medical officer had mentioned as needed.
Wednesday, October 18 The tension remains-still there is no decisive action. But this morning we had a new excitement. We were told that Boers had been seen not very far from Maritzburg, and that the authorities at least thought sufficiently gravely of it to send down a regiment from Ladysmith, and we heard that the 60th Rifles had actually arrived. This was startling. However, in conversation with Mr. Shepstone167 I found that it is quite possible that the Boers in question are a party of our own Natal (Umvoti County) Boers, and that their gathering had something to do with a new church. Still, even so, it may possibly have some connection with the movements of the enemy. Without committing themselves to any hostile action, this might have been a prearranged thing on purpose to accomplish that which it has accomplished, viz., the drawing away of a part of the Ladysmith force, and so preparing the way for an attack on the force there. Anyhow, we have gone on quite comfortably as usual here, and have seen and heard nothing of any enemy.
In the afternoon I again attended the committee for the sick and wounded.
163 Major H Gore-Browne was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the KRRC on 21st October 1899. 164 Edward Harold Browne died 18 December 1891. 165 Roman Catholics. 166 Father Murray. 167 Probably Mr A J Shepstone, one of the sons of the famous Theophilus Shepstone.
114 Thursday, October 19 The war news gets more and more exciting and ominous. The Carbineers seem to have been more or less seriously engaged with the enemy at Bester's yesterday. This is to the west of Ladysmith, between it and the Berg. They say that Taunton (who is the agent for this house and for the Union Co.) was off his horse with young Rodwell, when big volleys were suddenly fired on them. They mounted and galloped and got away, but young Gallwey, the lawyer, son of the Chief Justice, is missing. His horse turned up, but not himself.
They tell me that there is a flying column of about half the troops at Ladysmith under orders to come down here by road, with a view to protecting Maritzburg. But why it comes by road instead of train I cannot understand. I also heard later on that there is a Boer commando marching for Maritzburg by the middle drift over the Tugela, that is, Greytown way. So I am beginning to think we may see more of the fighting here than at the front-so called.
What with Natal Dutchmen possibly joining the enemy, or even if they do not do so openly, helping them by cutting the railway or the telegraph, we don't know where we are. Later on news came to me privately that the enemy have got hold of one of our trains at Elandslaagte. That is the station north of Ladysmith, and between it and Glencoe. They say they have attacked the train and taken it, and in it one of the officers of the Hussars. The worst of this seems to me, too, to be that they may intrench themselves in a strong position on the line, and so stop our communications and compel us to come out and attack them; and then with inferior numbers and in a place of their choosing, where they had the advantage of the ground, we might have a very tough job, like the taking of Laing's Nek in the last war.
However, we can but wait. Then the next piece of news which came was that Gallwey's body had been found with seven bullets in it. This I am specially sceptical about, as he was said to have been attacked at an outlying place, where it is very unlikely we could go to get his body. Indeed, a report was published that an attempt had been made, but the Boers fired on the Red Cross.168
We are all in such a state of excitement that we cannot sit still long, and all day long everyone repeats the same question to everybody else - "Any news?"
Friday, October 20 A pouring wet day - the poor chaps on the veldt must have a bad time. I don't know which are most likely to suffer from it, their men or ours. As they are advancing they cannot have their tents with them, and so far our men are better off. The first news after breakfast (there was little fresh in the paper) was that a battle had begun at Dundee, and is now proceeding. If it is true I think it is good news, as what we wanted was that they should attack us rather than go on cutting our communications and running away again and such like. By a curious coincidence Miss W. had shopping to do directly after breakfast, and came in with a special edition of the paper with this news. Then I found that I too had business down the town, though I ought to be preparing sermons (not an easy thing to do in these times). When I went down there was a later telegram to say that after fifteen minutes our artillery had silenced theirs, and that the infantry under cover of the guns were advancing.
But I believe nothing until it is officially confirmed. So I have to try and possess my soul in patience for a few more hours. ... No details yet, but we seem to have had a great victory - taken their guns and killed many. But my dear General (Sir W. Penn Symons) is wounded, some say slightly, but some mortally - God forbid. This victory relieves our tension here, as I don't think Maritzburg will be in danger of attack now.
Chapter III. Maritsburg, Saturday, October 21 Though yesterday's victory (Dundee or Talana) has a little relieved the tension of anxiety, so far at least as our actual safety is concerned, the excitement is still intense and it is very difficult to settle to anything in the way of sermonizing or quiet reading, except of the newspapers. And all to-day we are hearing at how dear a price the victory has been bought. Poor General Symons! We were told at first that the wound was in the thigh and was slight, but we hear now that it is in the stomach and that it is feared that it is fatal. Still he lives, and they say is brighter this morning. But we hardly dare to hope. Then there has been a very large percentage of officers killed. The Boers seem to aim at them. It is true there is not much to distinguish them in khaki; but I suppose the fact that they carry swords and wear a cross-belt is enough. A lot of the officers
168 Lieutenant W J Gallwey was taken prisoner by the Boers and survived the war.
115 of the 60th are killed.169 Poor Barnet, my partner at golf! When I went to see them off for the front I said, "We must play our return match when you come back," - for he and I had won one and lost one match against the Governor and Blore. Then there are many others whom we knew. And there is one of the staff officers (Colonel Sherston) killed. Murray, the Governor's A.D.C., who has gone up as A.D.C. to General Symons, had a very narrow escape, having his horse shot under him. The ladies here are of course in terrible anxiety. Mrs. Bird had a telegram to say that her husband, the major who commanded the Dublins, was all right, but we hear that even he has a slight wound in the foot. Then there are other causes for grave anxiety. First, the squadron of cavalry (18th Hussars) and a company of mounted infantry which went in pursuit of the Boers after the battle have not returned, and it is very much feared they have been caught in a trap. The only thing which gives us hope is that if that were the case it would be almost certain that at least one or two stragglers would have come in. It is hardly possible they could have killed every one. Then again it is true about the train that was captured on Thursday at Elandslaagte. And the Boers hold the line between Dundee and Ladysmith. They will plainly have to be turned out of that or else supplies will be cut off for the Dundee camp. They have cut the wires also. But very fortunately there is a second wire via Greytown. I almost wonder that has not been cut too, for the neighbourhood of Greytown is the stronghold of the Dutch in Natal, and even if the disloyal Dutch did not do it, there are many parts of the line that must be within striking distance of the enemy. However, so far they have not, so we still have news from Dundee.
I went into the Brigade Office to ask General Wolfe Murray for news of General Symons. All he could say was that the doctors did not feel able to give any further opinion. In the evening I went into Government House, and there I saw the Governor and had a cup of coffee with him, and heard more exciting news. It seems that all to-day there has been another big fight. We have heard nothing definite yet. It has been at Elandslaagte, and the Ladysmith force under General White have been the combatants this time. H. E. tells me they have a complete victory; but we wait for all particulars. We seem to have taken more guns and stores, and to be pursuing the enemy. This is a great blessing, as it would have been very serious if they had been able to hold their own on the line between our two forces and so cut our communications. I have no idea yet what loss this has involved, nor whether the Carbineers were engaged. But this is not all the news. There is still terrible anxiety, for another commando has appeared at Dundee, and there is to be another big fight to-morrow (Sunday).
Joubert has come down. (Why he did not attack at the same time as Lucas Meyer on Friday I cannot think.) This time the battle will be on the Imparti. I find I was mistaken in thinking that Friday's battle was on that hill. It was on a lower hill called Dundee Hill to the east of the town, between it and the Buffalo. But this time the enemy has got on to that big hill to the north, which I was referring to when I asked General Symons whether it would not be a danger to our camp. And His Excellency tells me they have brought down those two 40- pounders which we heard they had put on the Pogwani Mountain. This afternoon they have been firing on us with them. But our men have quietly withdrawn from the camp to the other side of the railway, and have sat watching them bang away at the deserted camp. How they have done this without being seen from the hill-top I do not know. But as it has been a very wet day they may have done it under cover of the mist. Very likely at times the top of the hill has been almost hidden in mist. We have not replied as yet, as it was too late to do anything effective to-day before dark; but the Governor tells me the battle will begin at daylight. It is hard on our poor chaps after a big fight on Friday to have to tackle a new enemy that comes to the scratch fresh.
Sunday, October 22 Another very anxious and trying day. I have been to Government House three times, till I am quite afraid of exhausting the Governor's patience. So I must try to be more patient. But at such times the thirst for news is like that of a dipsomaniac. Following on the last part of yesterday's diary, the news is small and mysterious, which makes one all the more anxious. We were told by Colonel Hime (the Premier) not to believe anything we heard, as there was no through communication since 7 this morning. But that alone makes us anxious. Why is it cut off? And why these rumours that things have gone wrong? However, after evening service, when I went for the last time to Government House, the Governor showed me a telegram from Dundee saying that the force there had moved out some miles nearer Glencoe and were intrenched on the side of the hill out of range of the Boer guns, and that they were trying to lay on a telephone in order to save the risk of journeys to and from the Dundee post-office. Now what can this mean? It may mean simply that the Boers have not begun the battle as we expected they would yesterday, and that meanwhile our men wish to be out of range of their guns. It may be that they do not like fighting on Sunday. On the other hand, why is it dangerous to send telegrams or messengers from the new camp to Dundee Post Office, unless either they
169 With 5 officers killed of the total of 12, the KRRC suffered twice as many officer casualties as any other unit.
116 (the enemy) have pickets down in the valley or they are still firing their big guns. Then another fear haunts us that the force at Dundee may be short of ammunition. Having had to fight all Friday, it is a very possible thing, and there was ammunition in that train the Boers took at Elandslaagte. It is true that has been recovered, but we have reason to believe the rails have been taken up for some distance, and it may not have been possible to get the ammunition through. And indeed we do not know that, in spite of Elandslaagte, the Boers have been quite cleared off the country between that place and Glencoe, which is, I suppose, more than thirty miles. However, the fact that our force is intrenched in a safe place is a comfort, and we cannot but hope that before further fighting begins they will have got some reinforcements and ammunition from Ladysmith.
But now to resume the account of to-day. I went to early celebration at the Garrison Church. There were very few there, but among them there was one poor young woman who was made a widow by Friday's fight - a sergeant's wife. On my way there I got a letter from H. E. asking me to come round before church and he would confide the latest news. So after breakfast, and on my way to church, I called. He gave me further news about yesterday's fight at Elandslaagte. Poor Colonel Chisholme has been killed at the head of his new Imperial Light Horse. He was a very smart officer who had just laid down the command of the 5th Lancers. H. E. tells me there are fifty Boer prisoners on their way down here. Then I was introduced to Mr. Acland Hood, a clergyman from Kimberley, and his wife, who is a sister of the Duke of Hamilton. They are refugees and could find no place in Durban. Then I went to church, as did they also (St. Peter's), where I preached on Belshazzar's Feast - as bearing on the situation - the danger of national pride, the need for humility and magnanimity. It was rather trying work with so many things to stir one's feelings - the thought of all those good fellows gone. After service I went again to Government House, and H. E. showed me a long telegram which had come meanwhile from Sir George White, giving a full account of yesterday's battle. The total of killed and wounded is 160, but as it was dark before the battle was over that is only a rough guess.170 The Boers seem to have fought most bravely; again and again coming up to the scratch. It is terrible work.
Even now we do not know whether the Boers have been shelling the town of Dundee all day to-day or not. It seems to be quite at their mercy, and I tremble for poor Bailey. A single defeat might be enough to bring the Boers down on Maritzburg. Indeed they would have been here before this but for the successes of Friday and Saturday. And I fancy both were near things - might easily have been defeats. Even now we do not know that the Boers are not going to overwhelm the Dundee force; and if they do I expect the Ladysmith column would have to fall back on Maritzburg, and we should have the war in the midst of us here.
What would happen then is hard to say. One can hardly trust the Boers to act on the methods of civilized warfare. Their leaders might, but some of them are half civilized. And apart from that, the danger of shells, if they bombarded the town, would be very serious. I think I should have to try and get the women and children of this establishment off to the sea. In the afternoon I went with Colonel and Mrs. Johnston down to see the Legislative Building and to reckon out how many beds it would hold, and what rooms can be made into offices, dispensaries, surgeries, nurse rooms, etc. It is a splendid building and nothing could be better for the purpose. It is lofty and cool, and has abundant small rooms and lavatories for all sorts of purposes.
The news of General Symons is a shade better, and seems to point to a chance of recovery. But it must be a small one, I fear. They say that as he was being carried off the field he spoke to the men, and said they were brave fellows, and told them that General Yule would take them through. I preached at St. Luke's at 7, a part of their dedication festival.
Monday, October 23 Still the same intense anxiety - all the more acute because we have no news whatever from the Dundee force. I fancy the reason is that they have had to fall back to a position out of range of the big guns on the Imparti, and that now there are Boer patrols actually down in the valley between them and Dundee, and so it is a difficult thing to get messages through to the Dundee post-office. They have intrenched themselves, we are told, so we hope for the best. But you can imagine the state of mind of the poor wives of the officers up there. There is a full description of the Elandslaagte fight in this morning's paper. It seems to have been a very toughly contested fight. The Gordons say that Dargai was child's play compared with it. And the list of our killed and wounded is much heavier than the first guess. There seem to be some forty killed and over 200 wounded. We have taken some of their leading men prisoners, among them Schiel, the German.171
170 The total for killed and wounded was 263. 171 Colonel Adolf Schiel. He joined the army in Germany and received training in infantry, artillery and cavalry. In 1878 he travelled to South Africa later joining the Staatsartillerie and received promotions to the duty of Administrator of the Corps in 1892. His next role was a head of the Prison Services during
117 It is very hard to settle one's mind to any regular, quiet work. The whole place is seething. There is a perpetual crowd round "The Times" office, where the latest telegrams are posted up. In the evening, when we got the third edition of "The Times" (there are editions coming out at all hours of the day now), we found one piece of news which gave us a slender amount of comfort with regard to the force at Glencoe. It said that the troops there heard of the news of Elandslaagte on Sunday morning, and they sent out a troop of cavalry to try and cut off fugitives. Now they could not have done this if they had been very hard pressed themselves. Part of this troop (some thirty men) got cut off themselves by the Boers and could not get back to the camp at Glencoe, and had to fight their way all the way from Biggarsberg to Ladysmith, some forty miles. An ambulance train, with sick and wounded, was to come down to-night.
Tuesday, October 24 Early this morning Miss W. called out that the Boer prisoners were arriving. The jail is at the top of the street, not a hundred and fifty yards from us, and the railway runs just beyond it. So they had stopped the train at the crossing, and were marching them straight into the prison. I had a distant view of them from our gate. I hear they were a very seedy-looking lot. One has to make allowance for their having been caught in the middle of a fight, and never having got a chance of change of clothes, and having on top of this had a night journey. I don't suppose any of us would look very much like Bond Street after that. But, on the other hand, the commandeered riff-raff would be the ones who would be most likely to let themselves be taken, as being less risky than flight, especially with Lancers charging.
The news this morning is very little with regard to Dundee. There are no telegrams direct from there. So we still have this agony of suspense, not knowing whether they have been cut up, nor whether they are retreating, or whether they are holding on to their intrenched position till they can be reinforced. Last night the Governor issued a proclamation of martial law throughout the whole colony.172 Before, it had been proclaimed only for the northern parts. This may mean that they have some news of a reverse, and that they consider Maritzburg in danger, and therefore want power to call out every able-bodied man to serve. But meanwhile the paper this morning has a very graphic account of the flight of the civil population of Dundee on Sunday and Saturday night. And this is a little reassuring, for they say that General Yule sent word to the town that the force might have to fall back on Ladysmith in consequence of Joubert's commando being in exceptional strength, and therefore the troops were retiring from their previous camp and intrenching themselves. Now this relieves us from the fear we had entertained that the retirement from the camp was a hasty flight after a defeat. It seems to show that it was a deliberate strategic movement, calmly planned and executed. So there is no special reason to be alarmed by it.
One wonders what they did with poor General Symons and the other wounded. They could not surely attempt to take them with them from one camp to another, and yet to leave them either in camp or town would be to leave them exposed to shells. The Boers seem to have been shelling the town, though what damage they have done we shall not know yet. It will be very sad if they have destroyed the new church and parsonage which we have so lately built at considerable expense. And I don't quite see where the war indemnity is to come from if we are victorious. It was only the Uitlanders who could do anything in the way of taxes. I am waiting anxiously to know whether Bailey was among those poor refugees who had to walk some thirty miles all through the night across the wet veldt, in momentary fear of falling into the hands of the Boers.
Since writing the above I have been out and met a man from Dundee, a correspondent who has a long account of their flight in to-day's paper. I find from him that Mr. Bailey has remained at the hospital in charge of the wounded men. It is plucky of him, and I am very glad he has. They don't seem to have fired more than four or five shells at the town. And I suppose they were justified in doing this, inasmuch as the town guard were called out and were at their posts, and so far Dundee was a fortified town and had to put up with the consequences. But as soon as they knew that there were no fighting men there, I think they stopped firing. This man tells me that poor General Symons was not at the hospital but at the camp, and that he believed they moved him with the troops. And he tells me that it is believed he has already passed away. In spite of our fight of Saturday it is reported that the Boers are in stronger possession of Elandslaagte than before, many having come down with Joubert's column. So either General Yule will have to fight his way through them to Ladysmith, or General White will have to fight his way through to relieve General Yule. I
which time he was responsible for designing the system of forts for Johannesburg and Pretoria. As the threat of war approached, his ambition was to form a German Corps to fight on the side of the Boers. He was also responsible for generating interest and support for the Boer cause in his native Germany. He became the Officer Commanding the German Corps and was captured at Elandslaagte. 172 See the proclamation on page 9.
118 presume the former will be the plan. I trust a simultaneous movement will be made from both sides, and so the Boers may be caught between the two. I was glad to have the chance of asking him exactly where the troops are now. They seem, from his description, to be nearer Dundee than I thought. It is anxious work waiting for news. Meanwhile we are told that they are continually on the look-out around here, as if they thought that at any moment we might have a descent of Boers upon us.
About 6 General Wolfe Murray came to call. He told me there had been another engagement to-day, a smaller one than the other two, and fairly successful. It seems to have been in the same direction as that of Saturday, only a little nearer Ladysmith than Elandslaagte.173 He also tells me that the Dundee force has been heard of as far on their way to Ladysmith as Waschbank. This clears up the obscure question of their movements, and it is a great relief, as when there is no news coming through people imagine all sorts of disasters. I asked for permission to visit the 188 Boer prisoners. I should like them to feel they are well treated, and that we look after them. They have certainly fought most pluckily. I must also go and see our wounded, as Twemlow will have his hands more than full. I went in to see Colonel Johnston for a minute after dinner, but found him trying to get a nap on the sofa, as he was up till 3 this morning, and may be again to-morrow, meeting the wounded and seeing them conveyed to the hospital.
Wednesday, October 25 The news this morning is that there was a considerable fight yesterday, at which again a good many men were killed. It would appear as if it had not been a very decisive affair; but as I suppose our object was to do no more than was necessary to keep the Boers engaged, so that they might neither attack Ladysmith nor the Dundee column on its march, I suppose one may take it as satisfactory.
In the middle of the morning came the splendid news, if it is true, that General Symons has been brought into Ladysmith, that the bullet has been extracted by means of the Rontgen rays, and that he is doing well. It seemed hardly possible after what we had heard before, and a few hours later I went to the Governor and found that it is not true. He could not have got to Ladysmith, seeing the Dundee column is not there yet, and from a letter which has got through from Murray (A.D.C.) to the Governor there seems to be very little hope. The Governor told me that he had had a telegram from General White to say that he was already in touch with General Yule and his Dundee force. This is so far good news. But it is a bad business having had to retire from Dundee. I am a good deal afraid of what the effect may be on the natives all over South Africa. They will certainly say: "It is no good your talking of victories. Who is master of the country? Have not the Boers actually got half Natal?" And then all those poor wounded fellows - about 170, I believe - will be prisoners; as they get better, I suppose they will be carried off to Pretoria, or else have to be exchanged for those that we have taken.
Thursday, October 26 A pouring wet day. We are having much more rain than is usual at this time of year. Many of our poor fellows, and the Boers too, must be suffering from it, I fear. I should think there would be a good deal of rheumatism and colds. The day was without much excitement. There was little that was new. The Governor sent for me in the morning and told me he had news that poor General Symons had passed away. He died last night, and news seems to have been sent to Sir George White by General Joubert. It is a great grief to me, especially after the false hopes that had been aroused by the news that the bullet had been extracted. I shall hear from Bailey some day whether it was the operation that killed him, or whether the case was hopeless from the beginning, as I imagine. A more courteous, kindly, bright and genial man you could not find. I liked him very much and he inspired one with confidence. I had many long talks with him before he left Maritzburg. He was so high-minded about the war, deprecating strongly the mere vulgar desire to avenge Majuba, yet feeling intensely that England's prestige must not be allowed to suffer. Then the Governor asked if I would serve on a small committee to consider the claims of other places besides Durban and Maritzburg for a share of the fund for the relief of refugees which has been raised by the Lord Mayor - a part of which we are to have here. I also called on General Wolfe Murray to ask him if he would come to the memorial service to-morrow night for those who have fallen. We hear that the Dundee column has safely reached Ladysmith and joined General White; but we are afraid that the missing squadron of Hussars and the company of mounted infantry who went in pursuit after the battle of Talana Hill are either killed or prisoners. Nothing seems to have been heard of them. I hope they may be prisoners. In the evening I went in to Colonel Johnston, where we again discussed the whole position. I never remember a time when we talked so much! Everyone is eager to review all the possible issues.
173 The battle at Rietfontein.
119 Chapter IV. Saturday, November 4 I went to Government House, and Murray gave me a very definite and detailed account of the battle of Talana Hill, and of General Penn Symons's wound, and of the subsequent retreat from Dundee to Ladysmith. He himself had a marvellous escape, as he was again and again under hot fire as he rode about taking the General's messages. Let me see if I can make it plain to you.174 First of all picture the position of Dundee.
There is a wide flat strath175, though that name hardly applies strictly, as the surrounding hills are not continuous ranges, but more or less isolated hills. On the north is the Imparti, a steep hill about 1,200 feet high, with the usual flat top. It slopes away to the west to let the Newcastle Road and the railway pass north. On the south of the strath and about four miles away is a bigger mountain, called Indumeni, about 2,500 feet above the plain. To the east lies a hill called Dundee Hill or Talana, on which is Mr. Smith's farm, called Dundee, from which the town has taken its name. The road to the Transvaal on the east of the Buffalo lies more or less over this hill, though it finds its way through a dip or nek between this hill and a kopje (smaller conical hill) to the south of it. It was on this hill and kopje that the battle took place. At daybreak the Boer guns from the top of it opened fire on our camp. In a few moments our guns were got into position to reply, and before long had for the time at least silenced the enemy's guns. Immediately the infantry regiments were got out. First the Dublin Fusiliers, then the 60th Rifles, and then the Irish Fusiliers were to cross the flat between the town and the hill in extended order. This flat is a slight decline to a donga with a little stream in it, and then a slight rise to the foot of the hill. A little way up the hill is the plantation of gum-trees belonging to Smith's farm. This wood and a wall at the top of it gave a certain amount of cover to our infantry. But all the way the fire from the enemy's rifles was hot. There was a certain delay in getting through the wood, and the General, who was a little anxious lest a flank attack from the Imparti should begin (he knew that the enemy had been dragging guns up it), sent Murray across the flat and up to the wood to see why they did not get on. Murray found that the fire on the upper side of the wall was so hot that he galloped back to the General, and said he thought the artillery must continue to pound the Boers on the top a bit more before the infantry could charge up the last and steepest part of the hill above the wall bounding the wood. Then the General sent him away to the left to find out where the cavalry were. When Murray came back he found that the General had ridden forward right up to the wood, had dismounted, and had actually crossed the wall at the top with a view to encouraging the men to make the attack, hot as the fire was, so that at this moment the General of the whole army must have been actually leading it.176 This was too brave, and immediately he got over the wall he was shot. Murray got to him in time to help him back. He had managed to mount his horse in spite of the wound and its pain. They got him to Oldacre's store in the town, where he was seen to.
Meanwhile the Dublins had made one advance and found the fire too hot for them, and had to fall back. Directly they crossed that wall they were exposed to a cross fire from the kopje as well as from the top. Another place where they suffered badly was a little more to our left, where there was a sort of donga running up the hill, which seemed to give a certain amount of cover, and so our men had got into rather closer formation in it. But unfortunately it was commanded from the top, where the enemy had made a sort of sangar. So the artillery went on at the Boers on the top and cleared this sangar. Then a second assault over the last and steepest part was begun, and a second time our men had to fall back a bit as a shout was raised that our own artillery was about to reopen fire, and so our men would have been in danger from it.177 However, finally the position was rushed, and the Boers fled behind the hill. It was after the battle that our misfortune took place. The 18th Hussars had sent out some squadrons under their Colonel (Möller) to get behind the mountain and so cut off the Boers. They seem to have pursued several parties of fleeing Boers, though we cannot be exactly sure of their movements. But at one or two places they seem to have got into difficulties, such as having their Maxim stuck in a donga within fire from the enemy. And ultimately they seem to have pursued the enemy too far to the north, till they could not get back again to the south of Imparti, but had to try and make their way round it. It was here, I suppose, that they fell into the trap, and probably rode right into General Joubert's commando178, a larger force than that which had been engaged and quite fresh. So they had no chance at all and had to surrender. The party included the mounted infantry company of the Dublins and a few of the 60th Rifles. In the Dublins was my young friend Le Mesurier, our next-door neighbour here. However, report says they are being very well treated in Pretoria. I think you know that Murray himself had a very narrow escape at Talana: he had his horse shot under him, I think, in the wood. It was so badly hit that he had to finish it with his pistol.
174 Baynes’ account is, for the most part, highly accurate. 175 A strath is a large valley, typically a river valley that is wide and shallow. 176 This is the only account that has Penn Symons on the outside of the wall and therefore seems unlikely. 177 Baynes did not mention that some troops were hit by their own shells. 178 General Erasmus’s men.
120 Pen pictures of the War
In 1900 a book was published called ‘Pen pictures of the War’. This book told the events of the early months of the war from the letter, accounts, articles and despatches from people who were there at the time. Chapter II was devoted to the battle of Talana and Chapter IV the retreat from Dundee. These two chapters make fascinating reading and sections of them have been reproduced in this section.
Chapter II – The battle of Talana On October 2nd a private in the B Squadron of the 18th Hussars wrote home to his mother in Blakeney:
"Dear Mother,—After getting your letter, which I received quite safe, I can't stop to say much, as I am at last up to the front facing Kruger. I can tell you it is an awful hard life; I never thought it was like this. I can't say whether I shall come home again, but, if not, you can say your son died a soldier, with his face to the foe, revenging Majuba Hill. But, dear mother, I hope to come home safe and sound, because there is not a Boer living to shoot me, your son. I write in haste. Don't get down-hearted, mother dear. Tell dear little C_____ his brother is fighting for home, sweet home. Good-bye, and God bless you. From the base of operations, with Boers all round. Where duty calls I must obey, I stand between love and duty.”
There was "no Boer to shoot him," nor were there any Boers at that time in Natal. There were Boers, however, in plenty a fortnight later. He was captured in the first fight and conveyed to Pretoria.
General Joubert, advancing from the north by Laing's Nek, occupied the deserted town of Newcastle on October 14th, Lucas Meyer marched directly upon Dundee, where General Penn Symons held the extreme British outpost at a distance of 70 miles from his base at Ladysmith, where General White commanded a force of 8,000 men.
Reinforcements had been hurried up from the coast, arriving none too soon. When the men on the Avoca disembarked at Durban179, they heard, on starting, the news that war had broken out. An officer in the last train up says:
"We passed through the town, which was in a state of wild enthusiasm, and our men returned the cheers; indeed, although they were packed sixty in an open truck without any protection, and it poured with rain nearly the whole night, they never stopped cheering. At one small station some ladies had come miles to get tea ready for us, which was very acceptable, as it was cold. We stopped at Pietermaritzburg for the men to get something to eat, and the officers had dinner.
We got to Ladysmith early on the morning of the 13th, and had a very cold reception, nearly all the troops having gone to meet the Boers, and the camp, which was some distance from the town, expected to be attacked. We marched up to camp very disappointed at having missed a chance of meeting the enemy. We were broken up and sent away on picket duty at once, H Company being sent to hold the ration post, where we stopped till the regiment left for Dundee on the night of the 15th, again in open trucks. We got to Dundee very early on the 16th, but kept in the train till daylight, when we marched up to the camp."
On October 16th the son of a well-known Norfolk squire in the Glencoe field force wrote home:
"Just a few lines to let you know how we are getting on. Hitherto there has been no fighting at all, but our patrols are in touch with the enemy. I was out on my first patrol the day before yesterday, since the declaration of war. My orders were to start at 6 a.m., and push on about twelve miles along the Newcastle road, and stay out till about 6 p.m. I went out to a small hill about four miles from the camp and reconnoitred, and then went on to a place called Hadding Spruit180, where I found a few people at the station, and the station-master. This is at present the terminus of the line, all the rolling stock north of this having been sent south, and all the wires cut and instruments removed by the railway people. There is a large coal mine here, and the people are in a deadly funk of being blown up. I pushed on to a large kopje a few miles this side, and just as I looked over the top of the hill I saw two men on ponies, with guns, talking to a Kaffir. I at once put them down as Boers, and thought of firing at them, but I decided not to disclose my position, and watch them, which was lucky for them, as I caught them
179 The Avoca docked in Durban on 12th October and carried the Royal Irish Fusiliers. 180 Hatting Spruit.
121 later and found them to be refugees flying from the Boers, who I discovered were in occupation of Ingagne and Newcastle, and had their patrols out nearly to Dannhauser.
I then went on to the latter place, but discovered that the Boers were not expected to come down as far as that till next day. I then made my way slowly back by the main road, and reached camp about 5 p.m., when I found that the other patrol (six men and an officer is the strength of them), which had proceeded to De Jagers' Drift, had not returned, but that a telephonic communication from the police station at De Jagers' Drift had said: 'A large force of forty Boers have crossed Buffalo to cut off your patrol, am trying . . . .' and then ended abruptly, as it eventually transpired, because the Boers then rushed the police station. Thackwell, who was in command of the patrol, pursued twelve Boers up to the river, and then thirty-four crossed back and twelve lower down, the latter trying to cut him off behind. However, he retired on a nek behind, and as they did not come on, he retired in about half an hour by another road, which was lucky for him, as he saw the thirteen men who had crossed by Landsman's Drift disconsolately coming down from a lot of rocks, where they had been lying in wait for him on the road he had come by.
There seems to have been something going on at Kimberley. I wish they would buck up here and do something. I am on picket to-night, which means no sleep and a lot of bother, as the picket is about seven miles from camp, at the junction of Vants' Drift and De Jagers' Drift roads, where there is a chance of being plugged at. The picket on the Helpmakaar road (the next one that is on the right) was shot at the other night.
I do not think there is much more to say. The, or rather one of the armoured trains came up here yesterday, an ugly-looking beast, with an engine in the middle all covered with iron, which only just shows the top of the funnel. I do not believe in them. It appears to me you put a dynamite cartridge under a rail, and pop! up goes the armoured train.
I think this will be a very interesting war, as the railway will play such an important part in the tactics; thus the other day we sent the Dublin Fusiliers down to Ladysmith to repel an expected attack at half an hour's notice, and brought them back the same night.
Nothing fresh at present. If any of the original Black and White sketches of the show are for sale in the Black and White Gallery, for instance, I should love to have one or two as souvenirs after the ball, if we all come out on the top and there are no more Majubas.
We are under an awfully nice general, one Penn Symons, a real good chap."
He had not long to wait. The Boers "bucked up and did something."
The private letters enable us to fill in the official outline with many picturesque details.
On Thursday, October 19th, a train arriving from Maritzburg reported that it had been fired upon by the Boers. An armoured train was sent down the line with fifty men to look for them, but could find no trace of the enemy.
Early next morning a patrol rode bare-headed into the town. The Boers were approaching. No one had expected them so soon. Lieutenant R. G. Stirling, of the 1st King's Royal Rifles, wrote after the battle:
"We paraded as usual in the morning, 4.30. We had dismissed the men, and went back for a cup of tea, when one of our fellows said, 'There they are!' Of course, we all laughed, went and got our glasses, and saw them all on two hills, two or three miles away. We were so amazed we must have stood there for nearly a quarter of an hour, when suddenly a shell brought us to our senses."
The rest of the narrative is supplied by a noncommissioned officer from Rochdale, who, like Lieutenant Stirling, is in the King's Royal Rifles. He had just come from the Zulu frontier. He wrote:
"I cannot better describe it than by saying the Boers were on a hill or plateau, as it were, at the top of Church Stile, corner of Milkstone Road (Rochdale), with our camp in the Newgate, and the hill as steep all round as the slopes at their steepest. It has been so awful a time I cannot tell you the day even now. I seem to have lived years.
122 At about 3 a.m.181 on Monday we were surprised to hear a shell come whistling over the camp — our first intimation of their possession of guns. The town was between us and the hill of Talana. The camp, composed of Rifles, Dublin, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 5th Royal Lancers182, and Artillery, was soon astir. (None of us have shaved for weeks, and look horrible.)
The Artillery at once answered, and shell after shell struck in the camp, not exploding. Then the Cavalry trotted away through the town, and took up a position on the right. Then our Mounted Infantry left us with our cheers, laughing and singing as they went, anxious to get a smack at the Boers.
A shell struck a commissariat wagon near me, and a piece of the wheel flew past me about a foot off. You should have seen me duck — yes, I am not ashamed to say it — I ducked pretty fast too.
The singing and splashing of these shells was more than horrible. Within ten yards of where my company stood was the mounted orderly to our Colonel on a grey mare. A shell hit her in the breast. The horse disappeared; the man was uninjured, but we were all splashed with more or less of the poor thing's blood. The waiting for the charge was awful.
Presently up dashed some Cavalry scouts. Then came the order: Dublins first line, Rifles second, Fusiliers third. And our Colonel, poor old Bobby Gunning, said, as he called together the non- commissioned officers, 'Now quietly, lads. Remember Majuba, God, and our country.' He died like a soldier, standing in front of his men.
I cried like a kid as I walked quietly to my company and passed word on to the men. You do not half realize at home what war is.
When we got the order and extra ammunition, we marched through the town. Some were blustering and joking, some were smiling, and others trembling; and the civilians, both men and women, caught us by the hand.
One woman whom I never saw before or since caught me by the neck and kissed me as I marched along by the Company, and said, 'God bless you, lad.' Do you know I've laughed since at it; but at the time I only saw the pathetic side, and I did some more choking and swallowing.
All the time a rain of shells between our artillery and theirs was flying over our heads. We were all in the valley, and the Boers were entrenched on the hills in front. We got an order to lie down, as they were firing at long range. We did so. And our Colonel rode quietly along, behind us, and dismounted. He sent his horse back by an orderly.
The Dublins began to advance, and rushed up the hill, and suddenly stopped. For a couple of minutes they seemed to hesitate, as the guns were doing fearful havoc, and the General suddenly gave the order for us to become the first line instead of the Dublins.
We gave a terrific shout, which was continued the whole way up the hill. When we reached the 'Dubs' we got command from Colonel Gunning to charge, and we went mad, without any thought of being winded or done up about it, and in its place a very horrible longing to kill somebody.
Of course, the Boers were mounted, and a number of them charged us183. I know I jabbed at a fellow who was going to kill me with his rifle butt. He was shot by some one beside me, and I jabbed my bayonet into the horse instead of him. If he had not been shot I should have had my brains scattered. It was awful. I did not get a scratch; the nearest approach to it was that my right shoulder-knot was shot away.
Our casualties were horrible. When the war commenced our regiment was 800 strong; it is not 500 now.
It is not so much the actual fighting as the horrible duty after. Three times it has been my lot to be detailed with fifty men to dig trenches and to help to bury the dead."
181 There is a note to the effect that this time is incorrect, it being too early. 182 This should have read 18th Hussars. 183 This is the only source for information that the British infantry was charged by mounted Boers and seems very unlikely.
123 Lieutenant Stirling, whose long and interesting letter appeared in the Times of December 8th, gives a much more detailed account of the fight:
"It was rather funny seeing every one dodge them as they whistled through the air. Luckily, the shells were badly managed and refused to burst, or half of us would have been killed. I was talking to Nugent when one shell came straight for us, the wind it made knocking the cigarette out of his mouth; it must have come between us, as it fell two yards from us.
We had been standing there ten minutes, which seemed like so many hours, when our guns began. I think they began at a quarter-past five, and by seven o'clock they were silenced. We started to attack the hill about a quarter to six o'clock. We marched in extended order nearly 1½ mile, when we came to nearly a dry river. Just as I got there they began their quick-firing guns, five or six at a time. I had just jumped into the river when one of the beastly things hit the ground at my feet and covered me with sand. We stayed under the bank about half an hour and collected our men. We were about one mile from the summit. Beyond the river was a bit of open ground, about a quarter of a mile, then came a wood, then a bit more open. When we got the order to advance my heart was rather in my mouth, as I knew then we were under fire, and in a minute or two I might be a corpse, or rather cold. However, up I had to get and give my men a lead. They all behaved splendidly. Bullets came whizzing past rather unpleasantly. I was dying to run to get to the wood. However, I got so excited I forgot everything.
In the wood there were plenty of ditches, and at the end of the wood was a wall. We lay there to get breath. Poor Hambro was shot through the jaw, but would take no notice. Then came the bad part. There was a bramble hedge on the top of the wall, so one could not get over, but there was a gateway, and through this we all had to go, and it was a hot time. When we got under the wall some heavy firing took place, lasting nearly two hours. Then we crossed the road to take the hill; that was the worst place. When I got half-way up the hill I found myself next to Hambro, who had been wounded twice; we lay down under the rocks, as the firing was very heavy. Hambro and I had to retire. I had my helmet knocked off with a piece of rock the shell hit. When I went up the hill a second time, Hambro was lying almost dead, with his legs reduced to pulp. Too terrible! I suppose a shell must have hit him behind. We must have been there for an hour, bullets whizzing over us. Colonel Sherston was dying, his groans were awful.
Then an awful part happened — our artillery, mistaking us for Boers, began firing on us. (One shell, says another soldier, killed eight or nine of the Irish Fusiliers and the Rifles.) Colonel Gunning, who was just below me, stood up and yelled out, 'Stop that firing!' These were the last words I heard him speak, but I believe his last words were, ‘Remember you are Riflemen.' Of course, we could not stand our men firing on us, so retired over the wall safely. I saw Nugent had been badly wounded and being helped over by some men, so I took him over — he had been shot in the knee and back. When we got over the wall the scene was terrible. Three of our officers shot within five yards of one another, Pechell and Taylor dead, Boultbee wounded in the groin.
By this time our artillery had stopped. We again ascended the hill, and got to the top to see the veldt black with retiring Boers — a good many Boers were dead on the top. The hospital, a six-roomed cottage, was filled with wounded. It was pelting rain, and the poor wounded on the hill must have had an awful time. They were all kindness at the Boers' hospital. They even offered me something to eat; I refused, although I had a cup of tea at five, just twelve hours ago. Got in about seven, and though I had eaten nothing all day, did not feel hungry, but dolloped the brandy down. It had been a terrible day, and we were down in the mouth; dead tired, I was soon asleep."
The death of Colonel Gunning was described more particularly by Private Down184:
Half-way up there was a breastwork of rocks to climb over, and then we were picked off one by one; but, worse than that, we had a flat piece of ground to go over right in the open. Our men were dropping down wounded, and our Colonel thought they were retiring. He turned round, revolver in hand, and said that any man retiring under the Boer fire he would shoot, and he immediately received a bullet in his heart, and fell to get up no more. He was in charge of my company at the time."
General Symons received his fatal wound early in the day. Sergeant J. Freeman185, also of the Rifles, says:
184 9079 Pte A Down, 1st KRRC. 185 7173 Sergeant J M Freemen, 1st KRRC.
124 When the foot of the hill was reached, the enemy poured in on us a terrific fire from rifles and those terrible Nordenfeldt quick-firing guns. The latter were going plunk, plunk, plunk, as fast as the very devil can run. We were what you may call playing hop-scotch — literally hopping and skipping over them as best we could.....The order was given by General Symons to storm the hill. He called out, ‘Forward, the Rifles, the gallant 60th, and take that hill.' Well, our Colonel (Colonel Gunning) then called out, 'Advance,' and threatened that he would shoot any man he saw hanging back. He turned and led the way, and in a minute or so he was shot dead.”
An officer who was one of General Symons' aides-de-camp says:
“He was shot while leading the men to the assault. Though badly wounded, he got on to his horse and rode quietly to his old position, in order that the men should not lose confidence. We took him to a store in Dundee which was being used as a dressing station, and the doctors did what they could to make him as comfortable as possible. His pluck and endurance were wonderful. When I got back to camp after the fight I found him drowsy and under the influence of narcotics, but he was much cheered by the news of the victory."
Mr. H. H. Paris, the postmaster of Dundee, says:
"I saw General Penn Symons brought in mortally wounded in the stomach. He was suffering intense agony, and said, 'Oh, tell me, have they taken the hill yet?' That was at 10.20 a.m., and the hill was not taken for hours later. After the doctors had injected morphia his pain was easier, and he said he would be with the column on the following day."
There has been some confusion as to whether the final charge was made by the Dublins or the Royal Irish. Private Francis Burns186, of the Royal Irish, says:
"The papers say the Dublins were first on the hill, but it was the Royal Irish. It does not matter anyhow, for we were all Irish. Tell my mother England's first battle was won by the Irish Brigade. We have had five days and nights of misery. The world will never know what Irishmen did those fearful nights."
Another Irishman, who hails from Newry, apparently in the Dublins, writes to his mother:
"The war is one of the greatest ever fought. I needn't start praising my regiment, for every one in Ireland has heard of their deeds of daring — both my regiment and the Royal Irish Fusiliers. You can tell any one in Newry who has a son in the Royal Irish Fusiliers that the hills which we took with our splendid charge are going to be called the Irish Mountains. I was reading in the papers where the Irish people were subscribing for a green flag for the Boers, and are backing them up187; but the Irish people will want to be careful of themselves, or we will do the same with them as we are doing with the Boers."
Much dissatisfaction was expressed by some of the private soldiers at what they regarded as the unreasonable humanity of their officers. A Welsh Hussar complained bitterly of this at Talana. He says:
"As they were crossing the open, we could have cut them to pieces, but the officers in command would not give the order, saying this is a poor way of retaliating. So you see we are too tender- hearted in our treatment of them. It is sad to see our men being butchered by them, and when we have a few prisoners we have to take tea with them. Our officers sympathize with them in a marked degree, begging us not to cut them down, but to disarm them and take them prisoners."
Private L. Thompson188, who is in the Royal Rifles, sent home a letter which is probably more characteristic than exact:
"One man next to me was hit by a shell, and I was almost blinded by his blood. It was awful. Our advance had now lasted five and a half hours, and we were about one hundred yards from the top when came that order which put new life into us—' Fix bayonets.' As he gave this order our Colonel
186 4355 Private Francis Burns, 1st RIF. 187 A reference to the Irish men who joined up and fought for the Boers in the Irish Brigade and some of the commandos. 188 There are three Thompsons on the KRRC roll but no one with the initial ‘L’.
125 fell, shot dead. We then closed in, and with levelled bayonets went at them for all we were worth. With a wild cheer we were amongst them. The bayonets went to work, and heads were smashed like pumpkins. Then with another cheer that could be heard above the roar of artillery the second line of the King's burst upon them, but that cheer frightened the Boers. They were speechless with terror when they saw that line of cold steel coming at them. They threw down their arms and fled in confusion, only to be cut up into travellers' samples when they reached the bottom by our cavalry." (Which did not happen, as they were allowed to depart without pursuit.) "You will be cut up to hear that poor Ford189 is among the killed, but he sent four Boers to ‘kingdom come' with a bayonet before he fell dead in my arms. I shall never forget it as long as I live, because as he fell he gave a groan, and said, ‘Mother,' and that word has been ringing in my ears ever since. But he died like a British soldier, and I hope he has gone to a better world.
I think the Boers will soon 'cheese’ it, as they are no match for our fellows. Their shooting is worse than the blind man's rifle club. If every shot had told there would not have been a man alive when we stormed the hill. There are some good shots among the old stagers, but they are very few. The others could not hit the parish they were born in. They find Thomas Atkins a hard nut to crack this time, and he can shoot a lot better than he did in 1881, and well they know it. The enemy are four to one to us, but I am not boasting when I say we can slog them any morning before breakfast. They are a mean, crafty, treacherous lot. One of our fellows gave a wounded Boer a drink of water after the battle, and when he left him the Boer shot at him, but it was a miss. Even that is nothing to other scenes of brutality by the Boers that I have seen. One of them said to me that when we got at the top of the hill he knew they would never win, so he bolted. We were, he said, not men, but devils. The way we put them to rout surprised them, and they say our men are the bravest in the world. There are a lot of foreigners fighting for the enemy, and they are more cowardly than the Boers, who are brave fellows — at long range. I ain't had a good sleep or rest since we have been here. We could not get a wash or a shave, and we looked pictures, believe me, old chum. But with all our hardships we are all gay."
The Hussars believing that the Boers were retreating on Helpmakaar, rode out to cut off their retreat in that direction. The A and C Squadrons did not get nearer than three miles of the main road and then returned. It was otherwise with the B Squadron.
"That B Squadron, finding themselves rather cut off, as the enemy were supposed to be retreating on Helpmakaar190, and not towards Vrekgeid191, they decided to try and work round Impati, and, by all accounts, they did so and banged into two commandoes under Joubert. These shot all their horses and all their officers bar the Colonel, and apparently lots of the men, so then they took them prisoners, and the Colonel is now in Pretoria Gaol."192
It was not until several months had elapsed that any authentic news reached England as to this capture of the first batch of British soldiers by the Boers. The Figaro of February 22nd published two letters from an English officer, captive in Pretoria, to his wife, which give a vivid picture of the scene — the precursor of many such. He writes:
"I once charged with my squadron, taking several prisoners and inflicting losses on the enemy. Our adversaries fight well and are opponents not to be despised. They greatly outnumbered us. Unfortunately our line of retreat was intercepted by the enemy. All we could do was to take up as strong a position as possible and resist, on the chance of relief coming or of being able to escape during the night. It was terrible weather. It had rained pouring rain the whole day, the ground was soft, a heavy mist was hanging upon it, and it was bitterly cold. Our horses were dropping down from exhaustion, having been neither fed nor watered. Our position, selected by the Colonel, was a farm with a wall in front, behind which we took shelter. We took this position at about 12.15, and for three hours we resisted overwhelming forces, but although we had good shelter and the mounted infantry were under cover of the rocks, we suffered heavily. We replied to the enemy's fire, but at length our ammunition began to run short, and the enemy began to surround us. A poor fellow beside me was hit with a bullet in the eye. Several were killed and wounded. Our position seemed hopeless, and when heavy guns were brought into position against us I thought our last hour had come. The shells killed
189 73 Private T Ford, 1st KRRC. 190 As Helpmekaar is south east of Dundee, a movement there by the Boers would have been an advance rather than a retreat. 191 Vryheid. 192 Other than the part about Colonel Moller being captured, there are few facts in this sentence.
126 many horses and several men; nearly all the remaining horses stampeded. The enemy promptly found the range, and they handled their guns admirably. I remember taking out my cigarette case and putting it in a breast-pocket to cover the heart.
When the Colonel ordered the white flag to be hoisted a man ran into the farm, brought out half a sheet, and, tying it to a stick, waved it over the wall. Instantly the firing ceased on both sides. The Boers galloped up and we surrendered. The Colonel said it was useless resisting any longer. Our ammunition was well-nigh gone, we had no horses left, and three guns were pointed on us. Still, it was very humiliating, and not one of us surrendered willingly. Our swords, pistols, glasses were taken from us. We were very well treated, and were allowed to visit the wounded. We had eight wounded and two killed, and the mounted infantry with us the same number. We were altogether nine officers, thirty-two men of the 18th Hussars, eighty men of the Dublin Fusiliers, and fourteen of the 60th Rifles. The men behaved splendidly. Every one was ready to die. They all felt, like myself, that our last moment had come, and were surprised when the order was given to hoist the white flag."
There is another narrative of the same episode supplied by Mr. Dunn, an Irish-American who is fighting under the Transvaal flag. His version is at least more in accord with the admitted facts as to the comparative bloodlessness of the fight. Mr. Dunn says:
“The Irish Fusiliers we captured at Dundee didn't seem to be very sorry they were taken, and were sort of tickled when they saw our brigade had them. They retreated into a cattle pen — they call them kraals here — on the side of a hill, and were going to put up a fight when they saw our flag. Colonel Blakef193 sent out Major O'Hara and Captain Pollard (I think he is a Buffalo man) in with a flag of truce and demanded their surrender, and they came out and laid down their arms. They are a good-looking lot of chaps, but they ought to be on our side."
Chapter IV - The retirement from Dundee. Talana Hill was fought on Friday, October 19th, and on Saturday, Elandslaagte194. It was on Saturday, also, that our troops at Dundee discovered that, despite their victory of Friday, their position was untenable. The demonstration was afforded by two 40-pounder guns which the Boers brought up from the north. As their range was greater than that of our guns, they shelled us with impunity. They fired at 6,000 yards range. Our shots fell short. On Sunday, Colonel Yule marched to Glencoe to intercept the Boers who were supposed to be flying from Elandslaagte. There, also, he was shelled by the long-ranging 40-pounders, which fired both on Glencoe and on Dundee without our being able to get near them.
General White thus reports the evacuation of Dundee and the retirement on Ladysmith:
“On the morning of October 21st it was ascertained that the enemy had cleared off from the east of that place, but very large bodies were reported to be advancing from the north and north-west. General Yule moved his camp on this day to a more defensible position to the south of the previous camp, but the enemy, bringing up heavy artillery to the shoulder of the Impati mountain, rendered the site untenable, and another move was made to a site still further south. On October 22nd General Yule decided to effect a junction with the troops at Ladysmith. A reconnaissance in force showed that the Glencoe pass was very strongly held, and that to force it would entail heavy loss. The troops therefore moved off at 9 p.m. by the Helpmakaar Road, reaching Beith on 23rd, and Waschbank Spruit on October 24th, at 9.30 a.m. Knowing of General Yule's approach, I moved out this day to Rietfontein, to cover his flank from attack, and there fought an action, which will be described later. Meanwhile, General Yule, hearing my guns in action, halted his Infantry at Waschbank Spruit, and moved west with his Artillery and mounted troops, in hope of being able to participate in the action. The distance, however, was found to be too great, and he rejoined his Infantry at Waschbank Spruit, halting there for the night. On the morning of October 25th General Yule's force marched to Sunday's River, whence it reached Ladysmith on October 25th, being joined en route by a force detached by me to meet it. The casualties at Dundee after October 20th were very slight, and none whatever were incurred on the march to Ladysmith, where the troops arrived fit and well.”
Corporal Hallahan195, of the 2nd Battalion Irish Fusiliers, gives a very clear account of the sequel of the battle of Talana:
193 Colonel John Y F Blake who commanded the Irish Brigade. 194 Both these dates are off by one day. 195 Probably 5114 Sergeant Hallahan. 2nd RDF.
127 "We got back to camp and slept in peace that night, but the next day we paraded in the evening with blankets, oil-sheets, and great-coats, and just a short distance from the camp, when the Boer guns opened on us from Impati Hill, but they did not do much damage, three being killed on our side. The worst of it was that our guns could not reach them, and even if they could it would have been a waste of shell, for there was a thick haze on the hill which prevented us from seeing anything. So we lay there under their fire over two hours, when we retired to a different camp and slept as best we could, although the rain was coming down in torrents, and half the men had thrown away their oil-sheets and blankets. We left the camp, tents, musical instruments, kits, &c, to the Boers if they liked to take them.
On Sunday we were ready before daybreak for the Boer attack, but they did not seem inclined. So we went out, and later on managed to get our guns within range and gave them a few shells, which fell among some Boers who were coming from Glencoe and laid a good few of them out. The remainder ran for shelter to a neighbouring wood. Of course their guns replied, but they did no damage, as we were under cover. We returned to our position in the evening and started off that night at two o'clock for Ladysmith.
We marched all that night and the following day, only resting for meals, and an occasional halt for three minutes. We encamped at 4 p.m. outside Van Thunller's Pass196. At 11.30 p.m. same day (Monday) we entered the pass and just got through before daybreak. We were anxious to get through as quick as possible, as it would have been sure death to the whole column if we happened to be attacked in it by the Boers.
Tuesday evening we encamped by the side of a river about 11 p.m., and were out all day expecting an attack from the Boers who were defeated at Elandslaagte, but some natives informed them of our whereabouts, so they gave us a wide berth. When we came back to camp the rain came down again, and we had nothing only our great-coats to shelter us. You may guess how the rain came down when the river, which we were able to cross that evening without wetting our feet, was overflowing its banks in half-an-hour's time, and the banks were very steep, too.
We laid down and slept as best we could until 3.30 a.m. on Wednesday, although we had to get up several times to walk about to warm our feet, and lay down again. We arrived at Sunday's River about midday and had dinner. We went on again until near sunset, when we had tea, and were settling down for the night when an order came in from Sir George White that we were to get to Ladysmith as quickly as possible. So we packed up again, this time putting our great-coats on the transport, and we were ordered to form the rear guard. It started raining again, and the night being pitch dark the column moved at a snail's pace, often having to halt to find the road. We were wet through, in fact, the water was pouring down our backs, and after some time the roads got torn up by the transport, so that we were hardly able to keep our footing. When we would halt some of the men would fall asleep on their feet in the mud. There was a young officer standing beside me when we halted once, and he was asleep on his feet, with his hands out groping for my rifle. I had to rouse him. He told me afterwards that he was going mad that night. We arrived at Ladysmith about 11 a.m. on Thursday."
The postmaster, Mr. H. H. Paris, of Dundee, who stuck to his post for a day after the camp field telegraph staff had bolted, gives a very interest account of the last days at Dundee. General Yule, on the 21st, had taken up his headquarters at Rowan's Farmhouse, about four miles from Dundee, where several hundred civilians were huddled together starving and shivering. Mr. Paris says:
Major-General Yule sent for me, asking me to go to the office with a message stating that the Boers had surrounded us. He required reinforcements from Ladysmith, and expected they were near at hand; in fact, he was going to Glencoe Junction to meet them.
I rode in under the whizzing 40-pounder shells. I ascertained that no reliefs were being sent, which surprised General Yule very much. At 7 p.m. the General asked me to go in with another telegram, adding that he wished us to destroy all military messages that had been sent.
As we could not get horses we walked into the town, and we did as requested. At 11.30 p.m. a friend, who is a guide to the military, rode up very excitedly, saying he had come to inform us that the troops had gone, and that their last waggon was then moving down the street. The General had forgotten all about us!
196 Van Tonder’s Pass.
128 Needless to say, we soon had our lights out, and after cramming the registered letters into the safe, and carrying away what office cash and stamps we could, amounting to £200, we soon caught up the last waggon, and walked throughout the night, toiling through slush, mud, and rain, over a very bad, hilly road. We caught up the camp a mile and a half past Beith, where the artillery had drawn up into position to cover us. We had little ammunition, and towards the end of the journey the men were put on half rations."
Private Allen197, of the Leicestershire Regiment, in a letter to some friends at Spalding, describes the march from Dundee to Ladysmith:
“General Yule sent men down to the camp to light candles in tents to make believe that they had retired into camp, and while this was going on we were on the move. The Boers woke up next morning, and shelled the camp and town, only to find that the troops had gone; so they gave chase, but went the wrong way."
Of the miseries of that terrible march there are many descriptions. A manager of a colliery who marched with the column says:
"We were under the impression we were going to take up a fresh position ready for the morning. We marched for hours and hours, passed quietly through Dundee under the Boer guns, and found ourselves on the road out of Dundee. We were dead tired, hungry, and footsore, but on we went until four o'clock in the morning, and then we knew that we were retreating on Ladysmith. I cannot go into the awful hardships we encountered, walking seventy miles in horrible storms of rain and thunder. Suffice it to say, we walked for five days with not a dry thread on us, and nothing to eat except hard biscuits and bully-beef. The last mile I walked without boots; they had fallen off my feet."
Another correspondent in the ranks says:
"We went through water and mud sometimes up to our knees. We were wet through to the skin. Every time we halted for a rest men would fall down asleep. It was hard to wake them up. Every now and then you would hear a splash, which was some one falling over asleep. They slept on their horses, and kept falling off. We got into Ladysmith at nine the next morning, after sixteen hours' hard march."
Mr. J. G. Dunn, of the Irish Brigade, says:
"Had the Boer contingent had more experience in military matters we could have got the whole of Yule's bunch, horse, foot, and waggons, for I never saw a worse beaten, demoralized crowd than that same British army."
During the Sunday after the evacuation of Dundee — General Yule had withdrawn to Glencoe on the Saturday198 — the Boers shelled the hospital and the ambulance until the white flag was hoisted, when their firing ceased. Captain Milner199 rode, with one orderly, into the Boer camp with a flag of truce, and was told that the Boers could not see the Red Cross flag. This statement he verified by personal observation.
On arrival at the Boer camp, Captain Milner was met by two officers, who told him to write to General Erasmus. This he did as follows:
"We surrender the hospital and ask for your protection. As we are likely to run short of dressing if we remain here, we ask you to facilitate the removal of our wounded by ambulance train. We are not an armed corps, but have the arms of patients who were wounded in the field. We wish to carry out the conditions of the Convention, and do not wish to give up these arms unless compelled to do so."
General Erasmus replied:
"If you lay down the arms at present in your possession, I will discuss the other points brought forward."
197 There are four Private Allens on the Leicesters roll. 198 Yule did not venture near Glencoe as it was too close to the Boer positions. 199 Captain Arthur Milner, RAMC.
129 About 12.30 on October 23rd two Boer officers rode into the camp and asked whether it was true that Boer wounded were tied to gun-carriages and dragged round the field of battle. A negative reply was given.
General Symons, who was mortally wounded on October 19th in the battle of Talana Hill, died at half-past three on Sunday afternoon200. The Boers occupied the town, and seized all the provisions, forage, tents, and railway stores left behind by General Yule. According to the captors, their estimated value was £350,000. The provisions were said to be ample to supply rations for 10,000 men for two months.
General Symons was buried on the 24th. His body was sewn in a Union Jack and was carried to the Church of England burial ground by the noncommissioned officers and the men of the Hospital Staff. All the officers who could do so attended, and as the body was taken out of the camp, every man who was able stood at attention. The funeral was most impressive. All the Boers raised their hats as the procession passed to the burial ground, where many of them attended the service, behaving most respectfully. General Joubert wrote the following letter to General White, expressive of his sympathy with Lady Symons:
"Must express my sympathy. Symons, unfortunately badly wounded, died, buried yesterday. I trust great God will speedily bring to close this unfortunate state of affairs, brought about by unscrupulous speculators and capitalists, who went to Transvaal to obtain wealth, and, in order to further their own interests, misled others and brought about this shameful state of warfare all over South Africa, in which so many valuable lives have been and are being sacrificed, as, for instance, Symons and others. I express my sympathy to Lady Symons at loss of her husband."
At Dundee the Boers seized something much more valuable to them than tents and tins of preserved beef. The special correspondent of Reuter with the Boers telegraphed from Glencoe on October 28th as follows:
"The papers captured at Dundee camp from the British unveil a thoroughly worked out scheme to attack the independence of both Republics as far back as 1896, notwithstanding constant assurances of amity towards the Free State. Among these papers there are portfolios of military sketches of various routes of invasion from Natal into the Transvaal and Free State, prepared by Major Grant, Captain Melvill, and Captain Gale immediately after the Jameson Raid.
A further portfolio marked secret, styled ‘Reconnaissance Reports of Lines of Advance through the Free State,' was prepared by Captain Wolley, on the Intelligence Division of the War Office, in 1897, and is accompanied by a special memorandum, signed by Sir Redvers Buller, to keep it secret. Besides these, there are specially executed maps of the Transvaal and Free State, showing all the natural features, also a further secret Report of Communications in Natal north of Ladysmith, including a memorandum of the road controlling Laing's Nek position. Further, there is a short military report on the Transvaal, printed in India in August last, which was found most interesting. The white population is given as 288,000, of whom the Outlanders number 80,000, and of the Outlanders 30,000 are given as of British descent, which figures the authorities regard as much nearer the truth than Mr. Chamberlain's statements made in the House of Commons.
One report estimates that 4,000 Cape and Natal Colonists would side with the Republics in case of war, and that the small armament of the Transvaal consists of 62,950 rifles, and that the Boers would prove not so mobile or such good marksmen as in the War of Independence. Further, the British did not think much of the Johannesburg and Pretoria forts.
A further secret report styled 'Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa,' and numbers of other papers, not yet examined, were also found, and are to be forwarded to Pretoria.
The Free State burghers are now more than ever convinced that it was the right policy for them to fight along with the Transvaal, and they say, since they have seen the reports, that they will fight with, if possible, more determination than ever."
Mr. C. Easton, the special war correspondent of the New York Journal with the Boer army, says:
"Regiment after regiment at Dundee fled through the fog before the merest handful of Boer farmers. The disorder was indescribable. The British there deserted two trainloads of provisions and one of ammunition. The officers left even their secret documents and plan of campaign. These I have seen, and they show that the English had been preparing for the war ever since the Jameson Raid. I have
200 The battle took place on the Friday and Penn Symons dies on the Monday.
130 in my possession photographs, documents, and affidavits found in the officers' camps at Dundee, after the precipitate flight, which disclose the whole plan of campaign through Natal into the Free State. These documents begin in 1896; they mention every kopje, every spruit, railway, and pass in the mountains. Everything is carefully outlined; details of the forts at Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Bloemfontein are given, with the places where foodstuffs are stored, and where fresh water is to be had."
With this in their hand, it is not surprising that on the 31st the Boers should have posted up in Dundee the following proclamation:
"Praise the Lord and ask His protection and assistance, as our troops have had heavy losses, as also have the enemy. Pray the Lord, all ye Burghers, for our success and victory, which, with the Lord's assistance, we shall gain, ever praising and blessing the Lord and a just cause."
Mr. F. C. Snaith, a cyclist who set out for Johannesburg with a cycle laden back and front with a prospector's tent, fly, and hammock, two pairs of blankets, several changes of clothing, a change of boots, tinned meats, biscuits and bread, fruit, salt, and a map of South Africa, passed Yule's column on the march, and brought the news of the retreat to General White.
Arriving at Ladysmith, he was advised to go to see General White, to inform him with regard to the retreating army. He therefore went to the headquarters. On an Indian attendant indicating General White's room, the cyclist knocked at the door, and a voice said, "Come in." He entered, and saw the General writing at a dressing-table. The apparition of the stranger had a disconcerting effect. The General cried, "Who are you? Who are you? What do you want? What are you doing here?
Then both asked questions rapidly. The guilty man answered meekly that he had very properly knocked at the door, and had been told to come in, that he had come in, and he only wanted to give them some information. Then Sir George and the other officers cooled down, and, after hearing the information, cordially thanked him for his news.
131 Bronze medals to Indian recipients
The British troops at Dundee were supported by men from Indian regiments whose duties covered transportation, the provision of medical assistance and other responsibilities. Bronze medal were issued to non-enlisted men who were involved in hospital work, cleaning, food preparation, clothing and wood work.
At the time the medal rolls were compiled, it was not clear whether the Indian troops would be issued with clasps for the medals. As a result, the entitlement was duly recorded on the roll so that it is possible to see where the men who received Bronze medals had served.
This is a breakdown of bronze medals by rank:
Rank Medals Notes 1st Grade Ward Sweeper 1 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper 5 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper 9 Bhisti 2 Water carrier Bhisti Pakhali 1 Water carrier Carpenter 1 Dhobi 6 Dhooly Bearer 190 Head Dhobi 1 Washerman Kneader 2 Mate 3 Mehtar 1 Sweeper Ord Washerman 1 Sirdar 1 Valet or body servant Sweeper 1 Tailor 2 Tati 1 Washerman 2 The reverse of a bronze Weighman 1 QSA Follower 4 Total 235
A group of Indian stretcher bearers
132 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Abdool, 29 Washerman, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Bombay District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p120 Abdul Latief, 2 Bhisti, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p198 Abdul Rahim, 5 Carpenter, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p198 Adar Sooray Mally, 391 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Alikany Yenkiah, 586 Sirdar, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Annarapoo Ramasawmy, 17 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Annasawmy, 6 Tailor, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p198 Anthony, 805 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p36 Anthony, 859 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p36 Arson, 794 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p36 Bada Punchum, 6097 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Badal Debi, 37 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (4) Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Badal Dookai, 14 Ord Washerman, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Mhow District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p144 Badal Teeka, 68 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Badoo Paupiah, 830 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Badra Jaitha, 28 Mate, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Banala Sarathy, 166 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Banda Bhooma, 3 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Banda Padmanabadoo, 95 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO 100/298p161 Bandy Koopoosawmy, 293 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Barkoontha Kalka, 409 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Basevi Narsunloo, 159 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Batchoo Nunumanthoo, 757 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Beggam Audiah, 706 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Bhaggoo Debi, 223 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154
133 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Bhagoo Bahriyar, 49 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (2) Tal OFS | WO100/298p141 Bhagoo Gunga, 28 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (3) Tal OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Binda , 6040 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Bisoasoar , 6068 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Boototty Ramasawmy, 39 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Buldev, 784 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Bundari Vencatasawmy, 224 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Bunder Peddaloo, 36 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p161 Bunsi Kunwa, 147 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Bombay Command | QSA (3) Tal RoL Tr | WO100/298p30 Cawnpore Ragavaloo, 43 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Chatla Moonisawmy, 371 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Chilmal Rajanna, 410 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Chotay, 777 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Chotoo Sirdar Khan, 12 Bhisti Pakhali, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Mhow District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p144 Chotta Punchum, 6090 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Chotta Ramtall, 6071 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Chowti Harpal, 300 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Chuinacointhay, 838 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p36 Coombala China Munisawmy, 686 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Coongal Appojee, 650 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Daniel, 792 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Darala Venctasawmy, 205 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Darsoonala Narasimulu, 930 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Datadin Sookhai, 46 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (4) Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Dhoolah , 805 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163
134 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Dookhi Seetal, 30 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (3) Tal OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Doorga Jaithoo, 224 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Doorjan, 6086 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Enthoor Kristnama, 178 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Fakir Debi, 33 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (4) Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Francis, 856 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p36 Furnand, 525 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p36 G Govindrajee, 294 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 G Venkatasawmy, 297 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p167 Gabriel, 793 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p37 Gallamoody Rajavaloo, 76 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Garika Lutchmiah, 381 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Garika Ramoodoo, 165 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Gejjoo Kauta, 66 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Ghiravoo Khiwan, 31 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (3) Tal OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Gollapalli Vencatasawmi, 55 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Googunty Vencatasawmy, 217 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Goordeen, 797 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Guja Moola, 42 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Gundapericola, 906 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | QSA (0). DNW Sep 07 £140 | WO 100/298p163 Gungadin Bodi, 34 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (5) CC Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Gungasala Narrainsawmy, 194 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Gunput Anjeer, 27 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (5) CC Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Gunta Yelliah, 262 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Gunti Narasiah, 363 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166
135 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Gurraphah, 15 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO100/297p198 Gymari Doorga, 372 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Hankoo Binda, 67 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO 100/298p155 Hanooman Bhowani, 36 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (2) Tal OFS | WO100/298p141 Hansraj Chhotoo, 307 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Hariduar, 819 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Harkoo, Private followers | QSA (0) - Clasps not listed | Servant to Major Pope RAMC | WO100/297p332 Haryan, 3 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Heera Suja, 33 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Hema Bhugwan, 46 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Ismail, Private followers | QSA (0) - Clasps not listed | Servant to Col Wickham, S&T Corps | WO100/297p332 Isyasami, 13 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/297p198 Itbaree, 21 Mehtar, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Bombay District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p120 Jakkam Penchaloo, 171 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Janaky Ramiah, 828 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Jaswant Jaithoo, 233 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Jerry, 6100 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Jirasay, 808 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Jodha, 778 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Jookhan, 802 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Joorain, 798 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Jothy, 6084 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p161 Kachee Venkatswamy, 10 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Kalaty Gungooloo, 162 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Kalidin, 809 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164
136 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Kaliyan Chellamiah, 192 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Kaloopally Ramiah, 256 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Kaly, 6082 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Kanny Pillai, 12 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p162 Karansing , 1 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p162 Karappan Chetty, 96 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Karati Paupiah, 142 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p162 Karaty Dooroogiah, 199 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Kasoda Yenkiah, 11 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO 100/298p162 Katta Kattiah, 6 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Kattimandi Koopoosawmy, 5 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Kesra Jewa, 29 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Khayoo, 769 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Khimai, 786 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p163 Khuba Sudayan, 108 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Bombay Command | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p30 Kokira Nagooloo, 176 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Koon Koon Bence, 309 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Kulloo Zalem, 144 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Bombay Command | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p30 Kunchi Siddah, 918 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Kunnoe, 806 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Laljee Rawa, 143 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Bombay Command | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p31 Lanka Veerasawmy, 21 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Lekha , 779 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Lukha Kulloo, 40 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Mahabeer Binda, 376 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO100/298p154
137 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Mahabeer, 795 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Mahabir, 374 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Mahadeo Binda, 318 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Mahagoo Kalloo, 38 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (2) Tal OFS | WO100/298p141 Mahomed Karim, 32 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Mahomed Khan, 1 Bhisti, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/297p199 Makala Lutchmoodoo, 598 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Mana Roopa, 30 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Mannoo , 24 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Mannoo Mohari, 39 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p154 Mata Badal, 6077 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Matabadal Ramdeen, 394 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Megha Dia, 45 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Megha Malla, 43 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Milary Scobbiah, 13 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Mohan Matabadal, 387 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p154 Moolakottalam Moonoosawmy, 9 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Moonegadoo, 538 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO100/298p37 Moonoosawmy Chetty, 26 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Moorkpoody Venketsawmy, 829 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Mooroogan, 292 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Moreapoody Lingadoo, 923 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS LN | WO 100/298p164 Motharapoo Vencannah, 661 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Mount Mooroogasan, 287 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Mount Rungasawmy, 15 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162
138 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Mungal Ghisawan, 32 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (4) Tal RoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p141 Munisami, 11 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO100/297p199 Nagappa , 341 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Nagasar , 793 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Naly Rungiah, 926 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nandy, 6083 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Narasinga Row, 9 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p199 Natharam Marsimulu, 695 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nathoo Dangal, 44 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Nazirool Huck, 13 Weighman, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Bombay District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p120 Nucca Gooroomoorthy, 591 Mate, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nucca Munivengata, 903 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nucca Narayadoo, 183 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Nucca Rajagopal, 909 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nucca Rungiah, 370 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Nucca Venkatasawmy, 133 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Nunkoo, 807 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Nuthoo, 780 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Okha Suja, 34 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Oosoorie, 6064 Mate, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p162 Oothageree Venkata, 741 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 P Yelliah, 373 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | Deceased | WO100/298p167 Pagadala Dooroogadu, 296 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p167 Pagoda Pally Melloo, 406 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Paitha Paraga, 36 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139
139 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Palati Bungaroo, 928 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | QSA (0) | WO 100/298p164 Pamala Bogiah, 380 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p166 Parapathy Ramiah, 258 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Pason Ganga, 228 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Patha Hurju, 39 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Poonoosami, 8 Head Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p199 Poovan, 2 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Pothula Narayadoo, 237 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Pudma Megha, 41 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Punna Chutra, 31 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Purbha Nimba, 35 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Purkha Jaitha, 37 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO100/298p139 Ragavaloo Naidoo, 16 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Raghoobeer Gooradhan, 291 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Ragoo Nath, 211 1st Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p37 Raj Akha, 8 Kneader, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Bombay District | QSA (4) Tal DoL CC OFS | WO100/297p120 Ram Autar, 388 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p155 Ramasami, 12 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p200 Ramasur, 929 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p164 Ramdeen Binda, 301 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Rampershad Raghubeer, 375 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Ramzan Peerbux, 39 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Bombay Command | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p32 Rasoor Vencataswamy, 56 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO 100/298p160 Rutna Waga, 35 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (3) Tal RoL Tr | WO100/298p141 Salla Ragavaloo, 274 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p160
140 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Sara Rama, 42 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Ahmedabad District | QSA (3) Tal RoL Tr | WO100/298p141 Sathiaty Thathiah, 182 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p167 Seatal Matabux, 70 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | QSA (0). DNW Jul 03 £160 | WO 100/298p155 Seelam Kondiah, 286 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Seerapoo Yelliah, 682 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p165 Shai Nimbru, 17 Washerman, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Mhow District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p146 Shaik Mustan, 21 Sweeper, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/297p200 Shankrampeth Senoo, 175 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155 Sona Gangloo, 401 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (4) Tal DoL OFS Tr | WO 100/298p155 Sookhoo , 6074 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Subhan, Private followers | QSA (0) - Clasps not listed | Servant to the 18th Hussars officers' mess | WO100/297p333 Subramanian, 7 Tailor, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/297p200 Suda Muthiyaloo, 917 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p165 Thadala Baboo, 10 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (3) Tal DoL LN | WO 100/298p160 Thadala Kattiah, 18 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Thanai , 6042 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Thelenvran, Private followers | QSA (0) - Clasps not listed | Servant to Col Wickham, S&T Corps | WO100/297p334 Tholasi , 6072 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Tikai, 6047 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Tota Ram, 760 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p165 Veeraragavulu, 14 Tati, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/297p200 Vellore Krishnasawmy, 38 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Venkat Rao, 10 Dhobi, S&T Corps, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/297p200 Voori Lutchumudoo, 171 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p167 Vosapally Gundadoo, 927 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p165
141 Recipient | Entitlement | Notes | WO Reference Vurusawmy, 819 3rd Grade Ward Sweeper, Army Hospital Corps, Madras Command | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO100/298p38 Walla Kisna, 38 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Deesa District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/298p139 Wazir, 17 Kneader, S&T Corps, Bombay Command, Bombay District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO100/297p121 Wody Munusawmy, 667 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bangalore District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO 100/298p165 Yamala Krishnamah, 173 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Yatoor Kondiah, 242 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (4) Tal DoL LN Belf | WO 100/298p160 Yedla Vencatasawmy, 45 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Madras District | QSA (2) Tal DoL | WO 100/298p160 Yedoola Yeedanah, 283 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Madras Command, Bellary District | QSA (5) Tal DoL OFS LN Belf | WO100/298p167 Yelmel Jaga, 27 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (5) CC Tal DoL OFS Tr | QSA (0). | WO 100/298p155 Yenjal Mootaiya, 28 Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, Dhooly Bearers, Bombay Command, Kamptee District | QSA (3) Tal DoL OFS | WO 100/298p155
142 Postal commemoration of the battle
Below are two envelopes that commemorate the battle. The first is dated 20th October 1971 on the 72nd anniversary and the second from the Talana Museum was issued on 21st October 1991, the anniversary of the battle of Elandslaagte. The Talana Museum postcard is plain on the reverse whereas the National Army Museum commemoration consists of an envelope containing a printed card giving brief details of the light cavalry uniform of 1900.
143 Poetry
Thissection is composed of several poems that were written in the aftermath of the battle.
Talana Hill from a collection called Godley’s Second Strings, 1902 Peace to the empty rhetorical prater, Peace to your patriot chatter and brag! What! did you deem that the Celt was a traitor, Dream that the soldier was false to his flag? Hurl, if it please you, your windy defiance, Talk of the deeds that you never will do, Eloquent Dillons and frothy O'Briens— Slander not men that are better than you!
Waiting the word that would call them to action, Sternly determined to conquer or fall, Little they recked of the babble of faction— Soldiers of Ireland afar in Natal: Only they knew that the guns were before them, Only they knew there was honour to gain, — Charged on the foe for the island that bore them, Routed and chased him o'er mountain and plain!
'Tis not in speech is a country's salvation: Lads that can fall with their face to the foe— These are the men to make Ireland a nation: Slainte, O Irish who fought at Glencoe! Saxon and Celt they may strive to dissever, Faction may part us and seas are between; Soldiers are links to unite us for ever, Soldiers of Erin who died for their Queen!
The Battle of Talana Hill (of Dundee) by John Elbrough, 1900 Oorlog! Oorlog! resounds the Transvaal o'er; To arms, to arms, rushed every grizzled Boer; South, from Newcastle, Joubert led his men, From Botha's Pass there issued Joelven, Whilst Lucas Meyer from the East emerged: Thus columns, three, the Boers converged 'Gainst Glencoe, all their strength and might To hurl from vantage of Talana's height. Cheerless and cold awoke the early dawn, And wept the heavens with drizzling rain forlorn When breathless horsemen, urging deep their spurs, ("The driven in pickets"), soon the camp bestirs, And on the skyline of the hill were seen The valiant Boers behind their stony screen; Twas then the British and their steeds of war Sniffed the grim scent of battle from afar. Forthwith the guns of the hidden Boer Hurled shot and shell with deafening roar, The lifeblood of one British gunner ebbed Away in the dust, and his spirit fled From this world of woe to a better life, Where the soldier rests from war and strife. Ah! If death had been stamped on every shell, How many had fallen, 'twere hard to tell; Great Jove those missiles had banned and cursed, And the shells of the Boer forgot to burst To silence the enemy's thunderous tongues
144 The Britishers had to relimber their guns: With range well found and muzzles re-trained, On the unseen foe like hell! they rained, For two fateful hours, a withering fire And forced the Boer gunners to retire. Then hoarse commands, and stern, smote the chill air, The bugle's blast was sounded here and there, And men and horses marshal for the fray And heavy guns go on their lumb'ring way; Some gallant bands told off to guard the camp, And infantry adown the donga tramp, There for attack to form and wait their chance When the shrill bugle's voice sounds the advance. The gallant Symons onward urged his men, To drive the foe from out their aerial den, Then at the double, like advancing waves, Order extended swept the British braves! While from the heights the foe upon them rained Death-dealing bullets, cruel, unrestrained. Whizzing and Whirring, fell the leaden shower Now well within the range of Mauser power. Thus far the ruddy orb had on us smiled, Shielding our men from harm of bullets wild. But cruel fate! how undeserved the blow That laid the gallant General Symons low! Who, with the courage of a Lion's heart, Bared his bold breast to bullet, spear or dart— That breast ablaze with many honours bright, Fair won on fields of hard and stubborn fight For Queen and country (waged on foreign strand)— For ever live his fame in old England! Sacred the grave shall be, nor flowers lack Where he lies shrouded in the Union Jack. Onward the force of Britain's sons advance, Bayonet, and spear, and quivering lance Glancing and glittering under Afric's sun, Panting, arrive at where the stone walls run With the hills lofty summit parallel, And there a storm of deadly bullets fell So thick and fast, that for brief space of time We quailed before the deadly firing line.
Sudden, were silent the guns of the foe, Nor longer wrought confusion, death, and woe: Then came at last the long awaited chance! On the Boers' mountain stronghold to advance! And show the world that neither death nor hell Rolls back the work of Britain's son who fell. In every soldier's brain there seemed to roar Symon's bass voice: " My lads, Excelsior!" And panther-like they crept the rocky steep, And lion-like o'er walls of stone they leap! Great was the loss of many gallant lives; Orphans were made and many tearful wives. Panic—the wildest—seized the Boers—they fled, Leaving their wounded men and many dead; Whilst from the summit, seen, miles o'er the plain, The rabble horde of Boers, horse, ox and wain, Their safety gained by treacherous flag of truce, The ensanguined Transvaal rag! That foul abuse!
Whilst chanting victory of Talana's height,
145 Fain would our minds forget the sorry plight Of eager "Möller " and his dogs of war In hot pursuit of the retreating Boer: Himself and gallant men run down to earth, Surrender sad! through ammunition's dearth, O'erwhelming odds, and many a levelled gun. Twas thus the sands of Möller 's fate outrun.
A message to the Queen by Allan Park Paton, 1st November 1899 Symons, farewell! To thy resistless Sword Victory came, and thou had'st thy reward: A Soldier's Death, following an Army's cheers; That sank to sobs,—sobs changing into tears. Britons! carve deep upon his Burial Stone, "Here, seed of The New Africa was sown."
Soon as the wounded Hero ceased to stir, "A Message from the Queen," was held by her Who nevermore on earth should see his face, And the two Widows wept in their embrace. That Message never fails: it still departs To shed its faith-fed light on mourning hearts.
Wise thoughtfulness for all, her diadem; The Tear of sympathy, her purest gem; Her royallest of robes, the Widow's dress: Her ear awatch for tidings of distress; Long Life and Reign are hers, yet if God will, Her subjects pray these may be longer still.
Yet Sovereign Beloved, Time will not stay, And ever nearer comes the solemn day, When thou wilt, from the hallowed Throne come down, Resign the Robes, the Sceptre, and the Crown, And take thy couch, the Cross upon thy breast, To wait the change that brings eternal rest.
Marbling thy Visage with its silver rim; Earth's sounds and objects growing faint and dim; Till thou art Dead. Then with the spirit ear, There music-woven words thou mayest hear, "Victoria, Servant! an Angel brings To thee, A Message from the King of Kings."
Anonymous poem, entitled Dundee Hill, 20th October 1899 The blow is struck; and—praised be Heaven!—our arms Are still untarnished, shining as before. No odds appalled our soldiers: called to show That Britons still have courage, on they rushed, Thro' bullets hailing, up the deadly hill, And scaled the height nigh inaccessible. Our foes were gallant, else scant boast were ours; We need not stint their worth, to swell our fame. But Boers scarce cope with Britons; and their vaunts Return unto them void and impotent. We thank the Highest: yet perforce we sigh, We weep o'er many fallen; and we weep With many more, whose tears must rain for them; And, with the rest, we mourn o'er one whose skill, Whose voice, whose valour, roused and led them on, Struck down in triumph's hour, alas! perchance
146 To lead no more. Britons! arise as one, And prove that ye are brethren. Rise, uphold, As one, your Home, your Country, and your Queen. Let factions all be hushed; and, just yet firm, Fulfil your mission, true to God and man.
In Memoriam, 23rd October 1899 by Charles Archer "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
Sleep, noble warrior! for thy work is done; Sleep! for thy course hath reached its eventide: Thy Country's hearts are with thee, every one, In whose true service thou has toiled and died.
Within the forefront, facing Britain's foes. Thy little army counted numbers nought, But up the mountain fearlessly they rose, And foot by foot their way to victory fought.
And thou didst lead them, falling in the van, Yet well content in such a cause to fall; For wert thou not a Briton, soldier; man? To such their Fatherland is all in all.
Beside thy dying couch watched friend and foe, And sought to save thee, or thy pangs assuage:— Sleep! for thy name is sacred here below, Thy memory is enshrined in History's page.
The Lord of all knew best; and He hath stilled Thy breath on earth, to live for evermore; For thee that one great sacrifice He willed; Henceforth thy toils and sufferings all are o'er.
We mourn thee; yet the hearts thou leavest here Are few compared with those who greet thee now; Drake, Blake, and mighty Nelson hold thee dear, And Wolfe and peerless Gordon wreathe thy brow
And all who fell hard struggling by thy side, True to their Queen, their Country, and their Lord, Not vainly, Duty's martyrs, have they died; They reap a rich, exceeding great reward.
The battle of Glencoe by Alfred Morton, 1899 Oh! free men of Britain, who honour her name, Oh! list' to a deed thrills our hearts with the fame Of our soldiers who fought with the wily Boer foe, And drove them, defeated, front the hills of Glencoe.
Oh! that dark Friday morning, the Boers took the field, To repeat a Majuba, and force us to yield; But, the blood of the Briton, aroused by its flow, Washed the stain of Majuba, from our Flag at Glencoe:
From day-dawn 'till sunset the fight raged so keen, While the eye of bold Symons ranged over the scene; Till the sons of Britannia he ordered to show The gleam of our steel to the Boers of Glencoe.
147 Then soon our Royal Rifles so steady were seen, With the sons of Old Erin, whose bayonets bright sheen Flashed o'er the hill-side, and transfixed the foe, Who fell in that charge, o'er the heights of Glencoe.
At last noble Symons spurred forward his steed, To welcome his comrades from their gallant deed, When a shot, from a cannon, in death laid him low, But covered with glory his name at Glencoe.
Then here's to Britannia I and long may she reign! The Home of the Free, and the Queen of the Main! And, if duty calls us, let's face every foe! And honour her name, like the men of Glencoe.
In Memorian by Alfred Morton, 1899 Respectfully and reverently Dedicated to the memory of General Penn Symons, who fell mortally wounded at the close of the Battle of Glencoe, fought October 20, 1899, in South Africa.
Left with the Foe Oh! left with the foe, was the Chieftain who fell, In the hour of his success and glory; Struck down from his horse, by a piece of a shell, That left him death stricken and gory.
When stern duty called him, undaunted he sped, To the field, where he ably contended With forces he vanquished, as bravely he led, In the charge where his noble life ended.
But, soon o'er the scene of his triumph appeared. Fresh foemen, whose hosts far outnumbered The victors, who watched o'er the wounded they cheered, And guarded the dead where they slumbered.
Now forced to retreat, was the gallant array, Lest o'erwhelming woe should betide them; Leaving God to protect helpless comrades who lay At the mercies of those who decried them.
No word of regret by the hero was made, As the fortunes of war changed around him; No word of reproach for the sad hearts who bade Him adieu, ere death's fetters had bound him.
Thus' nobly he died for his country's weal, Unsoothed or caressed by his loved ones; Rewarded with death for his courage and zeal, But mourned for by all Britain's true sons.
Yet the glow of his name it still lives to inspire Our regard for the freedom we cherish; Then let not the flame of his valor expire, Lest our altars of liberty perish.
Oh! left with the foe was the chieftain who died, A captive, disabled and gory; The fame of whose deeds fills our nation with pride, And whose death but enshrouds him with glory.
148 Our Fallen Braves by Mary Elizabeth Southwell, Trinity Lodge, Knaresborough, 1st November 1899 They were the heroes of some noble heart, They were the darlings [of] some family band— Loved ones with whom 'twas anguish sore to part- To die for Empire in a distant land.
Tenderly raise them from the blood-soaked sod, From pain-racked pallet and from soldier's cot, Those silent forms whose souls have gone to God— Whose names on memory's roll call fadeth not.
Wrapped in their soldier garb lay them to rest, They need no trappings and proud show of woe, They were in life our bravest and our best, And now, 'neath Union Jack, we lay them low.
And softly breathe a tender prayer for all, To the great Captain of the Hosts, who hears The prisoners sighings, knows when soldiers fall, Weeps with bereaved ones, dries the mourners' tears.
Lay them to rest without a fear or doubt, They bravely faced death's cold dark valley, Last post has sounded and their lights are out, Angels will guard them till the great reveille.
The First Fight – the Battle of Dundee (At Talana Hill), Composed by Percy Langton, aged 11½, Hayes, Middlesex 'Twas early and the sun rose Over the Natal veldt, And here at sad Talana Hill The first hard blows were dealt.
For on Talana's Rocky height Four thousand Boers were camped; And at the back of that high hill Four thousand horses stamped.
Commandant Lucas Meyer On that hill was entrenched, And there the soldiers from Dundee His warlike spirit quenched.
Up, up, right up Talana Hill Our Infantry did go, And here and there the men did fall From bullets of the foe.
Fix bayonets and charge!—the sound Along the ranks did run, And from the hill it did resound, And soldiers' footsteps rung.
And then a bullet cleft the air, And gallant Symons fell, It made the soldiers' vengeance swear, They used their rifles well.
For Symons was a man beloved By all those soldiers bold,
149 And many a man to tears was moved, When this sad thing was told.
Now, all the time a dozen guns, And twice two hundred men, Shelled those four thousand burgher's sons And quickly scattered them.
Our Tommies very soon did come To Meyer's strong entrenchment. But now the Boers were quite done, Away on horseback they went.
Two hundred of the hussars Did after them pursue, But in a Kaffir farmhouse fixed, Were taken by the foe.
A certain sergeant, Baldrey201, With thirty hussars, then Picked their way through the enemy, And Baldrey saved his men.
But still, it was a victory, And any man will tell How the first blows in this great war Were struck at Talana Hill.
201 3278 Squadron Sergeant Major R Baldry, 18th Hussars.
150 Bibliography
Books Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Wyman and Sons Ltd, London, 1903 Baynes, Rt Rev A H, My diocese during the War, George Bell & Sons, London, 1900 Burnett, C, The 18th Hussars in South Africa: The records of a cavalry regiment during the Boer War, 1899- 1902, Warren & Son, Winchester, 1905 Crum, F M, With the mounted infantry in South Africa, Macmillan and Bowes, Cambridge, 1903 Davitt, M, The Boer fight for freedom, Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1902 Godley, A D, Second strings, Methuen & Co, London, 1902 Hare, S, The annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, Volume IV, J Murray, London, 1929 Marling, P, Rifleman and Hussar, John Murray, London, 1931 Pen Pictures of the Way – By men at the front, Volume I, the Campaign in Natal to the Battle of Colenso, Horace Marshall & Son, London, 1900 Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, volume II, Wyman and Sons, London, 1903
Manuscripts and Journals Donegan, Major J F, The Action at Talana Hill, Dundee, The British Medical Journal, 1 Jun 1900, pages 1372-3
151 Index
Churchill, Winston, 57, 112 Abbott, E, NGR, 96 Clegg, Private F, 18th Hussars, 73, 75, 76 Abrames, Sergeant S, KRRC, 59 Colenso, 14, 18, 21, 25, 28, 43, 51, 53, 111, 112, Acton Homes, 13, 14 151 Adam, Captain Frederick, Scots Guards, 23, 72, Commando 73 Bethel, 100, 103 Adelaide Farm, 68, 69 Ermelo, 48, 100, 106 Adye, Major Walter, Royal Irish Rifles, 51 Heidelberg, 106 Alexander, Private R, 4th Hussars, 31 Irish Volunteers, 102, 107, 127, 129 Angus, M, NGR, 96 Krugersdorp, 49, 100, 103 Anthony, 301 2nd Grade Ward Servant, AHC, 32 Middelburg, 100, 101, 103 Anthony, 503 2nd Grade Ward Servant, AHC, 32 Piet Retief, 100, 103 Arnot, C, 51 Pretoria, 48, 100, 106 Atkins, Private J, 4th Hussars, 31 Standerton, 106 Axtelius, A, NGR, 96 Utrecht, 49, 63, 100, 101, 103 Vryheid, 63, 97, 98, 100, 103 Bailey, Reverend Gerard, 34, 114, 117, 118, 119 Wakkerstroom, 63, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106 Baldry, SSM R, 18th Hussars, 75, 150 Connor, Captain Frederick, RIF, 16, 40 Barnett, Lieutenant Richard, KRRC, 49, 72 Cory, Lieutenant George, RDF, 41 Batten, Sergeant Albert, 18th Hussars, 71 Creswell, H, NGR, 96 Batts, Reverend, 54 Crum, Lieutenant Frederick, KRRC, 42, 66, 68, Bayford, Lieutenant Edmund, 18th Hussars, 63, 72, 73, 74 66, 67 Cullam, Private W, KRRC, 47 Baynes, Right Reverend Arthur, 110 Cullingworth, Miss, 54 Beckett, Lieutenant Colonel Charles, 16, 23, 34, Cullingworth, Mr C, 54 40, 66, 72 Beith, 18, 64, 127, 129 Daniel, Dhooly Bearer, S&T Corps, 32 Bezuidenhout Pass, 14 Dannhauser, 14, 97, 98, 100, 106, 108, 122 Biddington, Mr S, 93 Dartnell, General John, 17, 18, 82, 112 Biggarsberg, 7, 22, 28, 99, 105, 106, 108, 118 Davies, Colour Sergeant A, KRRC, 45, 48 Binnie, Mr F, 93 De Jager’s Drift, 122 Bird, Major Spencer, RDF, 36, 37, 111 De Santos, Assistant Surgeon Francis, ISMD, 32 Birkett, Sergeant J, 18th Hussars, 75 Delagoa Bay, 13, 14, 19, 20, 51, 94, 95 Blake, Colonel Y F, 102, 107, 127 Dibley, Captain Athelstan, RDF, 38, 40 Bloemfontein, 55, 131 Donegan, Major James, RAMC, 31, 73 Bloemfontein Conference, 11 Doornberg, 97, 99, 100 Blore, Captain Herbert, KRRC, 116 Down, Private A, KRRC, 124 Botha, General Louis, 56, 77 Drakensberg, 7, 21, 22, 30, 97, 100, 106 Boultbee, Major Charles, KRRC, 49, 72, 74, 124 Du Port, Lieutenant O C, RHA, 4 Buffalo River, 7, 8, 12, 13, 22, 36, 42, 44, 45, 46, Du Toit, Lieutenant M, Staats Artillery, 106 48, 67, 97, 99, 100, 102, 106, 108, 111, 116, Duckworth, Assistant Surgeon P, ISMD, 31 120, 122 Dundee, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, Buller, General Redvers, 21, 77, 130 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, Burnett, Captain Charles, 18th Hussars, 66 42, 43, 50, 51, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 71, Burns, Private F, RIF, 125 76, 77, 78, 81, 85, 86, 89, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, Burrowes, Captain Arnold, RIF, 54 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, Burrows, Private A, Leicester Regiment, 78 111, 112, 114, 115, 116,117, 118, 119, 120, Butler, General William, 7, 42 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 144 Durban, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 32, 43, 84, Campbell, M, NGR, 96 86, 93, 95, 117, 119, 121 Campbell, Major William, KRRC, 58, 61 Cape Town, 7, 12, 14, 21, 24, 42, 44, 110 Edwards, Colour Sergeant C, KRRC, 59 Cape, Lieutenant Herbert, 18th Hussars, 47, 49, Elandslaagte, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 29, 37, 50, 63, 66, 68, 71, 98 72, 75, 76, 84, 86, 91, 108, 112, 115, 116, 117, Carbery, Lieutenant Miles, RIF, 51 118, 119, 127, 128, 143 Carleton, Lieutenant Colonel Frank, RIF, 40, 44 Emond, F, NGR, 96 Chamberlain, Joseph, 11, 15, 42, 108, 130 English, Major Frederick, RDF, 37 Charlestown, 7, 8, 12, 22, 42, 95, 96, 97 Erasmus, General Daniel, 27, 33, 45, 63, 98, 101, Chegwidden, William, 86 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 129
152 Erskine, Captain William, RAMC, 31, 32, 33, 34 Escombe, Harry, 17, 20, 84 Impati, 16, 23, 45, 47, 48, 50, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, Eshowe, 14, 17, 18, 21, 25 71, 83, 84, 88, 93, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, Estcourt, 8, 14, 18, 21, 25 106, 107, 108, 111, 126, 127, 128 Ingagane, 12, 13, 98 Faulkner, Private C, KRRC, 44, 47, 48, 53 Fletcher, J, NGR, 96 Jackson, C, NGR, 96 Ford, Private T, KRRC, 126 Jackson, W, NGR, 96 Freemen, Sergeant J, KRRC, 124 Jameson Raid, 77, 110, 130 Freud-Hart, Assistant Surgeon A, ISMD, 32 Jelf, Captain Rudolf, KRRC, 44, 45, 58 Johannesburg, 12, 13, 16, 19, 43, 55, 64, 77, 97, Galbraith, Doctor Hugh, 50, 51 103, 105, 108, 111, 118, 130, 131 Gallwey, Lieutenant W, Natal Carbineers, 14, 112, Johnstone, Lieutenant Richard, KRRC, 58, 74 115 Jones, Mr Charles, 84 Gardiner, R, NGR, 96 Josey, Private S, 18th Hussars, 48 Garvice, Lieutenant Chudleigh, RDF, 16 Joubert, General Pietus, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, Genge, Lieutenant Charles, RDF, 16 27, 45, 48, 49, 50, 73, 77, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, George, Sergeant W, KRRC, 59 100, 107, 108, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 126, Glencoe, 7, 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 130, 144 29, 30, 37, 43, 45, 49, 50, 51, 63, 64, 65, 73, Julian, Major Oliver, RAMC, 44 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 115, 116, Kentish, Lieutenant Reginald, RIF, 51, 55 118, 121, 127, 128, 129, 130, 144, 147, 148 Kerin, Major Michael, RAMC, 31, 32, 33, 34 Goodenough, General William, 42 Kimberley, 12, 14, 53, 54, 77, 113, 122 Gore-Browne, Major H, KRRC, 114 Klip River, 9, 12 Green, Assistant Surgeon Cecil, ISMD, 31 Knox, Major Eustace, 18th Hussars, 62, 63, 64, Greenfield, Private S, KRRC, 47 67, 71 Greville, Major Henry, 18th Hussars, 16, 46, 63, 66 Kock, General Johannes, 97, 98, 108 Greytown, 15, 19, 20, 51, 115, 116 Kroonstad, 54 Grieveson, W, NGR, 96 Kruger, S J Paulus, 42, 43, 53, 56, 57, 65, 108, Grimshaw, Lieutenant Cecil, RDF, 16, 44 121 Gunning, Dr, 52, 53, 55 Gunning, Lieutenant Colonel Robert, KRRC, 16, Ladysmith, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 42, 43, 48, 60, 63, 72, 123, 124, 125 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 41, 43, 51, 53, 54, 63, 64, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, Haldane, Captain Aylmer, Gordon Highlanders, 54 77, 78, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, Hallahan, Sergeant H, RDF, 127 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, Hambro, Lieutenant Norman, KRRC, 40, 49, 59, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 72, 124 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 Hamilton, Lance Corporal E, 18th Hussars, 62 Laing's Nek, 8, 12, 42, 97, 100, 111, 115, 121, Hammersley, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick, 16, 130 23, 72 Laming, Major Henry, 18th Hussars, 62, 66, 98 Hannah, Lieutenant William, Leicester Regiment, Landman’s Drift, 22, 23, 98, 100 17, 84 Le Mesurier, Captain Frederick, RDF, 54, 120 Hardy, Captain William, RAMC, 48, 49, 67, 72 Littlejohn, Peter, NGR, 93 Harrington, Sergeant A, KRRC, 60 Lock, Private William, 18th Hussars, 71 Harrismith, 12, 112 Lonsdale, Captain Malcolm, RDF, 16, 45, 46, 47, Hatting Spruit, 12, 16, 36, 45, 48, 63, 76, 77, 83, 66 98 Lowndes, Captain Maurice, RDF, 38, 74 Hay, C, NGR, 96 Heidelberg, 63 Mafeking, 73, 77, 112, 113 Helpmakaar, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 25, Magersfontein, 51, 53 46, 50, 64, 72, 91, 108, 122, 126, 127 Majendie, Lieutenant Bernard, KRRC, 16, 45, 47, Hely-Hutchinson, Walter, 9, 11, 15, 25 57 Hensley, Captain Charles, RDF, 36 Majuba, 27, 38, 42, 43, 54, 77, 80, 97, 107, 119, Hibberd, C, NGR, 96 121, 123, 147 Hilder, J, NGR, 96 Marling, Major Percival, 18th Hussars, 62, 66 Hodgkinson, F, NGR, 96 Martin, Lieutenant Gerald, KRRC, 49, 59, 74 Holtz, Doctor, 94 Mason, A, NGR, 96 Horn, Trumpeter W, RFA, 87 Mason, M, NGR, 96 Hunter, General Archibald, 17, 112 Mason, W, NGR, 96 Massey, W, NGR, 96
153 Masters, Private E, 18th Hussars, 48, 49 Rayner, H, NGR, 96 McDermott, Captain Thomas, RAMC, 31, 32, 33 Reade, Lieutenant Robert, KRRC, 48 McLachlan, Lieutenant Albert, 18th Hussars, 66, Reitz, State Secretary Francis, 42, 95 67, 68 Renny, Lieutenant Lewis, RDF, 37 Melmoth, 17, 18 Richards, S, NGR, 96 Meyer, General Lucas, 22, 27, 46, 49, 52, 63, 76, Rietfontein, 15, 112, 127 78, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, Riley, H, 84 116, 121, 144, 149, 150 Ritson, J, NGR, 96 Michaelson, C, NGR, 96 Robinson, Sergeant T, West Riding Regiment, 34 Middelburg, 56 Rorke's Drift, 13 Miller, W, NGR, 96 Ryley, Harry, 81 Mills, J, NGR, 96 Milner, Alfred, 7, 8, 20, 24, 110 Salmon, Trumpeter Charles, 18th Hussars, 68, 71 Milner, Captain Arthur, RAMC, 31, 32, 33, 34, 73, Samuel, 3rd Grade Ward Servant, AHC, 32 129 Sanders, Captain Gerhardt, S&T Corps, 32 Möller, Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard, 18th Schiel, Colonel A, 18, 117 Hussars, 16, 23, 43, 45, 46, 47, 53, 62, 63, 66, Schultz, Doctor Julius, 46, 47 67, 71, 83, 111, 112, 120 Sexton, Sergeant A, 18th Hussars, 71 Moore, Assistant Surgeon John, ISMD, 31 Sherston, Lieutenant Colonel John, Rifle Brigade, Murray, Father W, 37 23, 40, 41, 58, 72, 116, 124 Murray, Major Frederick, Royal Highlanders, 40, Shore, Veterinary Lieutenant Frederick, AVD, 63, 65, 116, 119, 120 67 Murray, Mr T, 14 Smith’s farm, 103, 106 Smith's farm, 22, 44, 120 Neil, R, NGR, 96 Spencer, Trooper R, NC, 44 Newcastle, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 22, 42, 51, 63, 64, Standerton, 94, 97 66, 68, 76, 77, 81, 84, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, Stirling, Lieutenant Reginald, KRRC, 72, 122, 124 100, 106, 107, 113, 120, 121, 144 Stormberg, 7, 51, 53 Northey, Captain Edward, KRRC, 43, 44, 45 Strachan, J, NGR, 96 Nqutu, 12, 14, 19 Stuart Wortley, Captain Alan, KRRC, 44, 58, 59 Nugent, Major Oliver, KRRC, 49, 51, 57, 59, 72, Swaine, Private T, KRRC, 45 102, 103, 124 Taylor, Lieutenant John, KRRC, 49, 59, 72, 124 Oldacre, Walter, 83, 87, 120 Thackwell, Lieutenant Charles, 18th Hussars, 64, Oliver’s Hoek Pass, 12, 13 66, 122 Thomas, Assistant Surgeon A, ISMD, 32 Padwick, Lance Corporal Henry, 18th Hussars, 73, Thornley Farm, 88 75 Tintwa Pass, 11, 12, 13, 14, 112 Paris, Mr H, 125, 128 Tocher, Sub Conductor J, S&T Corps, 31, 32 Parker, A, NGR, 96 Trichardt, Commandant S, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, Patterson, Mr, 54 107 Pechell, Captain Mark, KRRC, 45, 49, 58, 72, 124 Turner, Sergeant S, 4th Hussars, 31 Penn Symons, General William, 11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 42, 60, 72, 82, 85, 86, 97, Uitlander, 19 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 114, Umsinga, 9, 12, 17, 18 115, 120, 121, 122, 125, 148 Units Perreau, Captain Charles, RDF, 38 18th Hussars, 16, 18, 23, 35, 36, 43, 45, 46, 47, Pickwoad, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin, RFA, 40, 48, 49, 61, 64, 66, 71, 74, 75, 78, 83, 98, 102, 61, 63, 64 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 119, 120, Pietermaritzburg, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 121, 126, 127, 150 25, 29, 36, 38, 42, 86, 100, 110, 111, 112, 114, Casualties, 70 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122 19th Hussars, 21 Pollok, Captain Willaim, 18th Hussars, 16, 63, 66, 5th Dragoon Guards, 17, 19 68, 71, 72 5th Lancers, 21, 43, 64, 110, 117 Porter, F, NGR, 96 Devonshire Regiment, 21 Pretoria, 18, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 65, 73, 74, 75, Dundee Rifle Association, 81 77, 93, 94, 95, 105, 119, 120, 121, 126, 130, Dundee Town Guard, 49, 81, 86, 87, 88 131 Durban Light Infantry, 43 Gloucester Regiment, 11, 18, 112 Ragoo Nath, 1st Grade Ward Sweeper, AHC, 32 Gordon Highlanders, 17, 18, 117 Randall, Lance Corporal W, 18th Hussars, 75 Imperial Light Horse, 11, 13, 14, 16, 113, 114, Rawlinson, Major Henry, 28 117
154 King's Own Scottish Borderers, 14 Vant's Drift, 12, 13, 22, 23, 62 King's Royal Rifle Corps, 14, 21, 23, 37, 38, 40, Volksrust, 36, 77, 95, 97 41, 58, 60, 63, 66, 69, 82, 101, 110, 114, 116, Vryburg, 112 120, 125, 127 Vryheid, 81, 97, 100 Casualties, 70 Leicester Regiment, 21, 22, 36, 37, 43, 45, 66, Walker, Corporal J, RIF, 77 72, 78, 110, 111, 129 Waschbank, 18, 58, 64, 86, 90, 119, 127 Liverpool Regiment, 17, 21, 74 Waterson, Private William, 18th Hussars, 71 Manchester Regiment, 21 Waublad, A, NGR, 96 Natal Carbineers, 81, 88, 96 Weldon, Captain George, RDF, 40, 72 Natal Naval Volunteers, 21, 43, 111 White, General George, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, Natal Police, 12, 13, 15 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 33, 34, 36, 50, 65, 89, 98, Natal Royal Rifles, 21 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 127, 130, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 21, 22, 23, 28, 36, 37, 131 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 58, 60, 62, 66, Whitley, T, NGR, 96 69, 70, 71, 72, 82, 83, 86, 101, 105, 107, 108, Wickham, Major William, 32, 64 110, 111, 114, 116, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127 Williams, Private M, KRRC, 47 Casualties, 70 Willson, Captain Charles, Natal Carbineers, 81 Royal Engineers, 21 Wing, Major Frederick, RFA, 43 Royal Field Artillery, 13th Battery, 22 Wolfaardt, J, 94 Royal Field Artillery, 67th Battery, 22 Wolfe, Private Alfred, 18th Hussars, 71 Royal Field Artillery, 69th Battery, 22 Wolfe-Murray, General Sir James, 14, 19, 20, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 12, 22, 23, 31, 36, 37, 38, 112, 116, 119 40, 41, 44, 54, 60, 63, 64, 77, 101, 112, 120, Woodcote, 15 121, 123, 124, 125, 127 Woolley-Dod, Tom, 52 Umvoti Mounted Rifles, 17, 21 Upper Tugela, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 Yule, Brigadier General James, 16, 17, 18, 23, 27, Utrecht, 97, 100 30, 33, 40, 43, 50, 59, 63, 64, 65, 72, 75, 88, 89, 93, 107, 108, 112, 117, 118, 119, 127, 128, Vallancey, Captain Henry, ASH, 33 129, 130, 131 Van Hassalt, Mr, 95 Van Kretchmar, Mr, 95 Zululand, 9, 18, 19, 25 Van Reenan's Pass, 7, 12, 13, 14, 43, 97, 100 Van Tonder’s Pass, 128
155