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Avalanche Handbook AGRICULTURE HANDBOOK 489 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE July 1976 USDA, National Agricultural Library NALBIdg ^ 10301 Baltimore Bivd Beltsville, MD 20705-2351 Avalanche Handbook RONALD I. PERLA and M. MARTINELLI, Jr. Alpine Snow and Avalanche Research Project Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station USDA Forest Service Fort Collins, Colorado (Dr. Perla is now with the Glacioiogy Division, Environment Canada, Calgary, Alberta) Agriculture Handbook 489 Acknowledgments We wish to thank André Roch and Hans Frutiger of Switzerland and many persons in the United States who furnished photographs. Special mention is due the instructors at the 1972 and 1973 National Avalanche Schools, who used and improved early versions of much of the material presented here, and Alexis Keiner, who did the art and graphic work. Substantial help was also received from numerous reviewers in the Forest Service and from: WILLIAM HOTCHKISS National Ski Patrol and U.S. Geological Survey Helena, Montana DR. E. R. LACHAPELLE University of Washington Seattle, Washington DR. JOHN MONTAGNE Montana State University Bozeman, Montana PETER SCHAERER National Research Council of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia. Cover photos: Wingle (front), Keiner (back), Standley (inside). Perla, Ronald I., and M. Martinelli, Jr. 1975. Avalanche Handbook. U.S. Dep. Agrie, Agrie. Handb. 489, 238 p. Avalanches seldom touch man or his works, but when they do they can be disas- trous. This illustrated handbook sets forth procedures for avoiding such disasters in ski areas, near roads and settlements, and in the back country. New snowfall and old snow redeposited by winds are the major causes of ava- lanches. Melting and freezing or the presence or absence of a temperature gradient in the snow are difficult to observe directly but can make the snowpack either more or less susceptible to avalanching. Such variations often can be identified by digging pits in the snow. When a snow slope fails, the impact of the avalanche depends on such variables as the length, shape, and roughness of the avalanche path. If disaster strikes, buried vic- tims must be rescued quickly, since the chance of survival decreases sharply with time. Methods of avalanche control include artificial release by explosives, defense struc- tures, public warnings, and land-use legislation. Oxford: 111.0+111.784+384.1 Keywords: avalanche, avalanche classification, avalanche control, avalanche report- ing, avalanche rescue, meteorology, snow, snow-cover stability, snow mechanics, snowfall, snowpack, weather, weather observations, zoning. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-600061 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $3.95. Stock No. 001-000-03466-9/Catalog No. A 1.76:489. Preface This book is for ski patrolers, snow rangers, mountaineers, rescue teams, and others who encounter avalanches in work or recreation. It is suitable also for persons generally interested in mountain weather, snow, avalanches, and avalanche control. Although avalanches are treated mainly as a problem of physical science, this is not an engineering text. Those interested in engineering design will find references to more technical material in the "Further Reading" lists at the end of each chapter and in the "Literature Cited" section at the end of the book. In the few places where equations or numerical values are given, the international system of metric units is used, in view of the trend toward the metric system. Moreover, quantities such as snow density, atmospheric pressure, snowpack stress, and avalanche impact pressures are easily expressed in metric units. Tables and arithmetic methods for converting to English units are in Appendix A. For brevity, avalanche is used to mean a mass of snow that sometimes contains rocks, soil, and ice moving rapidly downslope. This book is meant to supplement, not substitute for, field experience. Hopefully, the reader will gather his field experience painlessly under competent leadership. ni Abbreviated units of measure The commonly accepted abbreviations for units of measure used in this book are hsted below, along with the words for which they stand. Appendix A discusses the metric system at some length and gives methods and tables of equivalents for converting from metric to English units and vice versa. b bar °C degree Celsius cm centimeter cm- square centimeter cm^ cubic centimeter cm/h centimeters per hour ft foot g gram g/cms grams per cubic centimeter h hour Hz hertz (cycles per second) in inch kg kilogram kg/m3 kilograms per cubic meter km kilometer m meter m2 square meter m3 cubic meter m/s meters per second mb millibar mi mile mi/h miles per hour mm millimeter mm^ square millimeter mm^ cubic millimeter mm/h millimeters per hour s second t metric ton t/m2 metric tons per square mete The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience of the reader. It does not constitute an official endorsement or approval by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of any product or service to the exclusion of others that may be suitable. IV Contents Chapter ^^Se Chapter Page 1. Effects of avalanches 1 6. Protection of ski areas Ill Disasters of the past 3 Control by restrictions 113 Further reading 5 Control by compaction 115 Control by explosives 117 2. Avalanche meteorology 7 Choice of explosives 119 Use of explosives 121 Flow of large airmasses 9 Assembly of explosives 123 Precipitation 13 Explosive safety 127 Snow crystals 18 Cornice control 130 Windflow over mountain terrain 23 Use of artillery 136 Wind redistribution of snow 25 Artillery techniques 139 Wind analysis 29 Planning the control program 143 Heat exchange at the snow surface 31 Further reading 147 Storm analysis 35 Further reading 37 7. Protection of highways and villages 149 3. The mountain snowpack 39 Defense structures 150 Structure of the snowpack 40 Reforestation 157 Types of metamorphism 42 Control by explosives 158 Equitemperature metamorphism 43 Planning the protection of highways .... 160 Temperature-gradient metamorphism ... 45 Protection of the Trans-Canada Highway 163 Melt-freeze metamorphism 49 Land-use regulation 167 Fracture mechanics of snow 52 Avalanche zoning 171 The inclined snowpack 55 Public information and warnings 173 Snowpack analysis 57 Further reading 175 Further reading 63 8. Safety and rescue 177 4. Avalanche phenomena 65 Avalanche accidents 178 Decisionmaking and route selection .... 181 Failure of snow slopes 66 Precautions for back-country travel .... 186 Slab analysis 69 Mechanics of slab failure 74 Probing for the victim 190 Search by electronic transceiver 194 The avalanche path 76 Identification of avalanche paths 81 Avalanche dogs 196 Revival and evacuation of the victim . 200 Avalanche movement 85 Organized rescue in ski areas 203 Further reading 90 Special rescue problems 206 5. Stability evaluation 93 Further reading 209 The general problem 94 Appendix Snow-cover distribution and avalanche A. Converting units of measure 211 activity 96 B. Snowpit data 217 Snowpack structure 98 C. International avalanche classification . 223 Local meteorological data 100 D. Avalanche reporting in the United States 225 National Weather Service data 103 E. Literature cited 231 Ski and explosive tests 104 Further reading 109 Index 235 Effects of avalanches Avalanches are common on steep, snow-covered mountains everywhere. Although most are remote from man and his improvements and damage little except timber, some do considerable damage to man and his works. This chapter describes briefly a few of the most devastating North and South American avalanches of recent times. Figure 1.—Bingham Canyon, Utah, February 17, 1926: searching for victims amidst wreckage and avalanche debris (death toll 40). Figure 2.—Recovering victims at Ophir, Utah, February 26, 1939. Figures.—The mining lownof Alt;i, Utah, was nearly destroyed by an avahmche on Iclniiai) 13. 1885. Photo July 3, 1885. Figure 4.—Avalanche damage to a ski lift terminal at Sun Valley. Idaho, February 11, 1959. EFFECTS OF AVALANCHES Disasters of the past Snow avalanches are powerful forces of nature. A large one may transport not only ice and snow but also rock, soil, and vegetation. Avalanches thus play a significant role in carving and weathering the world's most spectacular peaks. Most of this action occurs in places remote from civilization, but when man and avalanche interact the results can be terrifying, as this description by Benjamin Morales (1966) makes clear; In the Santa Valley, Peru, on January 10th, 1962, a great ice avalanche occurred, the first one known in the country, which fell from one of its highest and most beautiful peaks. The avalanche was caused by the breaking oflF of the west front of the Figure 5.—Bent steel beams on bridge near Teton Pass, Wyo., hanging glacier on the summit of North Huascaran testify to avalanche force, February 27, 1970. (Photo by at the approximate altitude of 6,300 m. The quan- Martinelli) tity of ice involved is estimated at 2.5 to 3 million m-', dragging along a great volume of granodiorite and controlled by modern technology. Other natural blocks from the cliff. disasters such as earthquakes, floods, volcanic erup- This avalanche traveled 16 km, descended 4,000 m tions, and tornadoes are much harder to anticipate in elevation, and destroyed and demolished every- and often impossible to control. thing in its path. The average speed of the ava- lanche was 60 km/h. More than 4,000 human lives Small, isolated avalanche disasters have occurred were lost and 9 small towns were destroyed. Cul- since the early settlement of the West. Reports of tivated fields were devastated, thousands of animals avalanche deaths before the Civil War appear in were killed, and great destruction was caused in an Mormon church records at Salt Lake City. Vivid area which had been famous for its fertility and accounts of later avalanche disasters in the nearby beauty.
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