The Ctu Code – the Incident of Grounding Why We Need It of M.V
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C-Ports: a Proposal for a Comprehensive Standardization and Implementation Plan of Digital Services Offered by the “Port of the Future”
C-Ports: a proposal for a comprehensive standardization and implementation plan of digital services offered by the “Port of the Future” Paolo Pagano (*) Abstract—In this paper we address the topic of a possible path to standardize the ICT services expected to be delivered by the so- called “Port of the Future”. A survey of the most relevant technologies and Information Systems used by the Port Communities for their businesses is discussed together with a detailed analysis of the on-going actions carried on by Standard Setting Organizations. Considering the examples given by the C-ITS Platform and the C-Roads programme at EU level, a proposal of contents to be considered in a comprehensive standardization action is proposed. The innovation services are therefore grouped into four bundles: (i) Vessel & Marine Navigation, (ii) e-Freight & (Intermodal) Logistics, (iii) Passenger Transport, (iv) Environmental control. Considering the good practice and the background offered by the Port of Livorno in terms of innovation actions, the prospected final user applications are then labeled as Day 1, Day 1.5, and Day 2 services in consideration of the technical and commercial gaps to be filled. Index Terms — 5G mobile communication, Real-Time Systems, Virtual Reality, Artificial Intelligence, Connected Vessel, e-Freight, IoT-based monitoring, Port Community Systems, Terminal Operating Systems. I. INTRODUCTION eaports are genuine intermodal Points of Interest connecting seaways to inland transport links such as roads and railways. S Seaports are located at the focal point of institutional, industrial, and control activities, in a jungle of interconnected information systems. As seaports operate in freight and passenger businesses, the main vertical applications are in the domain of logistics and digital offer targeted to citizens and tourists. -
MS Estonia with the Visor and Bow Doors Open the MS Estonia Was A
MS Estonia with the visor and bow doors open The MS Estonia was a cruise ferry. The ship sank in 1994 during her journey from Tallinn to Stockholm. It is the deadliest shipwreck disaster to have occurred in the Baltic Sea in peacetime, costing 852 lives. On September 28 at about 01:15, the visor at the bow separated which resulted that the large ship's bow door opened. The ship immediately took on a heavy starboard list to initial 30 to 40 degrees. 15 minutes later, the ship had rolled 90 degrees and sunk within 45 minutes. Of the 989 on board, 138 were rescued alive, but one died later in hospital. Those are the official figures given to the public. Conspiracy theories exist about the cause of the sinking. German journalist Jutta Rabe claims that laboratory tests on debris recovered illegally from Estonia's bow yielded trace evidence of a deliberate explosion. Additionally, she insists that Swedish, British, and Russian governments tried to smuggle military hardware via the civilian ferry. In 2004, a former Swedish customs officer claimed that Estonia had been used to transport military equipment. Carl Övberg, a survivor and frequent passenger, reported that on the day of travel the harbor had been sealed off and that a military convoy had escorted two large trucks to the waiting ferry. Although more than 500 Swedes were among the 852 reported dead, the Swedish government has blocked every effort to recover the bodies from the wreck. Even an early offer by a Norwegian diving company to retrieve the bodies at cost was rejected. -
Presentation | Berlin, 6 February 2020 the ESTABLISHMENT of the PORT NETWORK AUTHORITY
Presentation | Berlin, 6 February 2020 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PORT NETWORK AUTHORITY • Following the Legislative Decree n. 169, 4th August 2016, the North Tyrrhenian Port Network Authority was set up, including the ports of Livorno, Piombino, Portoferraio, Rio Marina, Cavo and Capraia Island • North Tyrrhenian Port Network accounts for over 14% of Italian Port traffic (Ro-Ro, Containers and General Cargo) and holds the national record for ro-ro traffic and number of commercial vehicles handled • Leading node not only for ro-ro traffic but also forest products and new cars • The most important port network in Italy for traffic handled as well as being the natural logistics node for Tuscany PORT NETWORK AUTHORITY OF THE NORTH TYRRHENIAN SEA IN THE ITALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT . North Tyrrhenian Sea Port Network – Livorno, Piombino, Portoferraio, Rio Marina, Cavo and Capraia Island: one of the largest systems of Italian ports for the total traffic handled with over 42 million tonnes of goods and 9 million passengers every year . Port of Livorno and the “A. Vespucci” Freight Village: the network’s most important nodes, well connected with the secondary nodes of the network and are part of the Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor . Port of Piombino, Pisa Airport, Florence Airport and the freight village of Prato: on direct road and rail links, connected to the ScanMed Corridor, with a high capacity for penetration into the markets of Central and North Europe. THE PORT OF LIVORNO AT THE CENTER OF THE NORTH TYRRHENIAN SEA The port boasts high tech systems and equipment, handling over 30 million tonnes of goods and more 3 million passengers (of whom 800 thousand are cruise passengers) every year THE PORT OF LIVORNO . -
Memorandum on Measures Taken Following the Sinking of Car Ferry Ms Estonia and Plan for Joint Action in the Nordic Countries
MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES TAKEN FOLLOWING THE SINKING OF CAR FERRY MS ESTONIA AND PLAN FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES Working group on bow doors Maritime Department Helsinki 1994 MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES TAKEN FOLLOWING THE SINKING OF CAR FERRY MS ESTONIA AND PLAN FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES On 28 September 1994 an ad-hoc meeting led by minister of transportation Ole convened to discuss immediate measures to be taken following the sinking Norrback of car ferry Estonia. It was pointed out at the meeting that all passenger vessels regularly calling at Finnish ports are subjected to safety inspections. These inspections also include foreign vessels. The inspections are based on both international conventions and national legislation. As a response to the Estonia disaster, the parties decided on the following additional measures to be taken: 1. Inspection of bow doors in Finnish car and rail ferries The National Board of Navigation was to inspect urgently the bow and stern doors of all car and rail ferries that fly the Finnish flag and call at Finnish ports. The inspection was to include both condition and functioning of the doors as well as their alarm and monitoring systems and was to be completed within a week. The National Board of Navigation was also to verify that the passenger vessels, car and rail ferries maintain such routines that the closing of all cargo doors is secured before departure. These inspections were completed by October 8th, as follows: Vessel Year of Build Type of bow door Date Cinderella -89 butterfly type 29.09. -
The MS Estonia Sinking Was Planned
return to updates The MS Estonia Sinking was Planned by Miles Mathis First published March 12, 2021 As usual, this is just my opinion, based on personal research. This paper is by request. Just a cursory glance at the facts is enough to peg this sinking as another purposeful scuttling by the ship's owners, to get rid of an old, damaged ship and collect insurance money. Which of course means the deaths were faked. For the MO here, consult my papers on the Titanic, the Lusitania , and the Hindenburg, where we saw their demises were also faked or planned. Unlike in the other stories, Wikipedia doesn't give us much to work with here, but the biggest clues there are the signs of a coverup. As with the Lusitania, the wreckage of the Estonia was immediately hidden by the governments of Sweden, Finland, and Estonia, proving they were in on the fake. The Estonia Agreement 1995, a treaty among Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Denmark, Russia and the United Kingdom, declared sanctity over the site, prohibiting their citizens from even approaching the wreck. That is enough by itself to peg this as a conjob. If there was nothing to hide, that fake “sanctity” would not be necessary. We always see the same phony appeals to the sanctity of the dead in these cons, possibly the worst of them in the aftermath of 911, where we were told asking any questions or expecting any investigations was an insult to the dead. Just the opposite of the truth, of course, since if these people were really dead, both their ghosts and their families would want a full investigation. -
ESPO Code of Good Practices for Cruise and Ferry Ports
EESSPP OO CCOODDEE OOFF GGOOOODD PPRRAACCTTIICCEESS FFOORR CCRRUUIISSEE AANNDD FFEERRRRYY PPOORRTTSS GGoooodd PPrraaccttiicceess PORT-CITY RELATIONSHIP ............................................................................................................................. 2 Enhance the mutual understanding between Port and City ............................................................... 2 Bring the City into the Port and the Port into the City ........................................................................ 3 Educate Stakeholders and Passengers ................................................................................................ 6 Work on the Sustainability of the Cruise and Ferry Port Activity ....................................................... 7 Manage the Congestion and Pressure on Infrastructure and Services ............................................... 8 INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................................................................................................... 10 Match the long-term Nature of planning Port Infrastructure with the quickly changing Market Needs ................................................................................................................................................. 10 Good Hinterland Connections are a major Success Factor for the Cruise and Ferry Port ................ 10 Greening the Infrastructure as to mitigate the environmental Impact of Cruise and Ferry Port Business ............................................................................................................................................ -
Finnish Studies
JOURNAL OF FINNISH STUDIES Volume 16 Number 1 August 2012 Journal of Finnish Studies JOURNAL OF FINNISH STUDIES EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICE Journal of Finnish Studies, Department of English, 1901 University Avenue, Evans 458 (P.O. Box 2146), Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TEXAS 77341-2146, USA Tel. 1.936.294.1402; Fax 1.936.294.1408 SUBSCRIPTIONS, ADVERTISING, AND INQUIRIES Contact Business Office (see above & below). EDITORIAL STAFF Helena Halmari, Editor-in-Chief, Sam Houston State University; [email protected] Hanna Snellman, Co-Editor, University of Helsinki; [email protected] Scott Kaukonen, Associate Editor, Sam Houston State University; [email protected] Hilary Joy Virtanen, Assistant Editor, University of Wisconsin; [email protected] Sheila Embleton, Book Review Editor, York University; [email protected] EDITORIAL BOARD Varpu Lindström, University Professor, York University, Toronto, Chair Börje Vähämäki, Founding Editor, JoFS, Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto Raimo Anttila, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles Michael Branch, Professor Emeritus, University of London Thomas DuBois, Professor, University of Wisconsin Sheila Embleton, Distinguished Research Professor, York University, Toronto Aili Flint, Emerita Senior Lecturer, Associate Research Scholar, Columbia University, New York Anselm Hollo, Professor, Naropa Institute, Boulder, Colorado Richard Impola, Professor Emeritus, New Paltz, New York Daniel Karvonen, Senior Lecturer, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Andrew Nestingen, -
A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies: Policy Lessons from Sweden for South Korea*
A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of the MV Sewol and MS Estonia Tragedies: Policy Lessons from Sweden for South Korea* Jörg Michael Dostal**, Hyun-jin Kim***, and Albin Ringstad**** Abstract: On April 16, 2014, the South Korean ship MV Sewol sank, claiming the lives of 304 passengers. The accident appeared to observers to be a man- made disaster, since all the passengers could have been rescued if adequate safety measures and disaster management procedures had been in place. The Sewol sinking has subsequently turned into a focusing event in terms of safety policy debates in South Korea. On September 28, 1994, the Swedish ship MS Estonia sank, claiming the lives of 852 people. This earlier tragedy was also a focusing event in the context of Swedish debates about safety policies. In this article, South Korean and Swedish safety policies are analyzed from a historical-institutionalist perspective. While Swedish disaster prevention systems have generally performed well in a virtuous cycle, those of South Korea have performed poorly in a vicious cycle. The article highlights how South Korean policy makers might use Swedish policies, developed in response to the 1994 MS Estonia accident, to improve their safety policies. In addition, we suggest that long-term policies focusing on comprehensive social welfare and the pooling of risks are required to restore citizens’ trust in government and to transform South Korea from a low safety into a high safety society. Keywords: historical institutionalism, Korea, MS Estonia, MV Sewol, safety policy, Sweden **** Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Korean Association for Policy Studies and Korean Association for Public Administration conferences in Seoul on December 5 and December 12, 2014, respectively. -
The Sinking of MS Estonia: Still Doubts Over Official Story 24 Years After the Biggest Maritime Disaster in Europe Since World War II
The Sinking of MS Estonia: Still Doubts Over Official Story 24 Years After the Biggest Maritime Disaster in Europe Since World War II By Terje Maloy Region: Europe Global Research, September 18, 2018 Theme: History, Law and Justice, Media Disinformation Just after midnight, in the first hour of September 28th, 1994, the passenger ferry MS Estonia sank in the Baltic Sea. It was sailing its regular route, from Tallinn in Estonia to the Swedish capital Stockholm. The vessel capsized and sank in less than an hour, in the end settling sideways on the ocean floor at 80 meters deep. The weather was rough, but nothing extraordinary for the time of year, with winds of 25 meters/second and waves of 4 to 6 meters. Of the 989 passengers and crew, 852 died, making it the biggest European maritime disaster since WW2. 501 of the dead were Swedes. Just hours after the sinking, Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt was quick to try to control the narrative of what had happened. In a statement to the public, he announced that the sinking happened because the bow visor (the front part protecting the bow of the ship, which can be lifted up to allow the car ramp to be extended), had fallen off due to being pounded by the waves. The same afternoon Bildt called the Swedish minister responsible for maritime affairs, saying the same thing, ‘There are no other explanations’. And he called Hans Laidwa from the Estline shipping agency, the owner of MS Estonia, telling him ‘The accident must have been caused by a construction error’. -
Port of the Future
Port of the Future IoT and 5G to enhance Port Community System capabilities: the experience in Livorno Paolo Pagano (CNIT/AdSP) [email protected] Short presentation of CNIT and Livorno joint lab 2 9/10/2019 (C) Paolo Pagano - Joint Lab CNIT – Port Network Authority of the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea CNIT: a snapshot • 43 research units (37 universities+ 6 institutes of CNR) • 5 National Laboratories + Joint Lab with Port Network Authority of Northern Tyrrhenian Sea • 1300 people from partner universities • 100 own employees • Funding from private companies and competitive programs: • H2020: 41 projects, 10 of them coordinated by CNIT • Active projects 2018: 121 3 9/10/2019 (C) Paolo Pagano - Joint Lab CNIT – Port Network Authority of the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea Port of Livorno View • Mid-size historical port: • passengers and freight; • multipurpose(containers, break/dry/liquid bulk); • freight village, car stocking (25,000 cars capacity); • along TEN-T SCANMED corridor (core node); • door of Tuscany; • minor ports (Piombino, Elba) under the same organization. 4 9/10/2019 (C) Paolo Pagano - Joint Lab CNIT – Port Network Authority of the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea About us July 2016 June 2017 June 2018 Most innovative Public Body Port and 5G November 2016 July 2017 EU Connected Vehicle Port of the Future September 2018 October 2018 March 2019 First C-ITS Port in EU Autonomous Driving October 2019 October 2019 5G and IoT for the Port of the Future 5 9/10/2019 (C) Paolo Pagano - Joint Lab CNIT – Port Network Authority of the Northern Tyrrhenian -
An Analysis of Short Sea Shipping Container Routes in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea
Marino Lupi, Antonio Pratelli, WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on ENVIRONMENT and DEVELOPMENT Martina Falleni, Alessandro Farina An Analysis of Short Sea Shipping Container Routes in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea MARINO LUPI, ANTONIO PRATELLI, MARTINA FALLENI, ALESSANDRO FARINA DICI , Department of Civil & Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering University of Pisa Largo Lucio Lazzarino 2, 56126 PISA ITALY [email protected] http://www.dici.unipi.it/ Abstract: In this paper, an analysis of SSS container routes in the Mediterranean and Black Sea region, with a focus on those routes calling at Italian ports, is performed. Italian container ports are classified in four groupings: Ligurian, north Adriatic and Campanian multi-port gateway clusters, and Italian hub port system. Firstly, the Italian maritime foreign trade is analyzed and it is compared to the total Italian foreign trade carried out by all means of transport. This survey has been accomplished in order to study the effects of the economic and financial crisis in Italy (which began in 2008 and is currently in force) on maritime transport. Then, the container throughput at all Italian ports is studied. From this study, it emerges that the most important Italian port cluster is the Ligurian one: its throughput has shown a positive trend; but the greatest growth rate is shown by the north Adriatic gateway cluster. Italian hub ports register instead a negative trend. Afterwards, SSS container routes of the year 2018 are analyzed. The detected routes are extensively reported in the Appendix of the paper. SSS container routes calling at Italian ports in the year 2018 are compared with those of 2010. -
ESTONIA: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in Crisis Management and Disaster Response
ESTONIA: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in crisis management and disaster response Philip Spassov ÅÑÒÎÍÈß: Ñïîñîáíîñòè, îðãàíèçàöèÿ, ïîëèòèêè è çàêîíîäàòåëñòâî çà óïðàâëåíèå íà êðèçè è ðåàãèðàíå ïðè áåäñòâèÿ IT4Sec Reports 124 http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/it4sec.0124 ESTONIA: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in crisis management and disaster response Philip Spassov Institute of Information and Communication Technologies CSDM | Centre for Security and Defence Management www.IT4Sec.org Sofia, March 2015 Philip Spassov, ESTONIA: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in crisis management and disaster response, IT4Sec Reports 124 (March 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/it4sec.0124 IT4SecReports 124 „ESTONIA: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in crisis management and disaster response“ This report looks into the Estonian crisis management system, built around the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for policy formulation and its execution in the area of civil security. The author further presents the various levels of the system – regional, county and local. The report draws particular attention to the Estonian Rescue Board that is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and has a key role in representing Estonia in various international forums such as the UN, EU and NATO and other relevant civil security organisations, and to the Emergency Response Centre. Philip Spassov offers a thorough examination of the legislative base of the Estonian crisis