St. John's Law Review Volume 79 Number 2 Volume 79, Spring 2005, Number 2 Article 3 Some Exceptions to the Suretyship Statute of Frauds: A Tale of Two Courts Bernard E. Gegan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE SURETYSHIP STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A TALE OF TWO COURTS BERNARD E. GEGANt INTRODUCTION Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:...(2) Is a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.' So reads the suretyship part of the New York Statute of Frauds, in language not substantively different from that enacted in England in 1677.2 Its purpose was never better stated Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw3 of Massachusetts in Nelson than by 4 v. Boynton: The object of the statute manifestly was, to secure the highest and most satisfactory species of evidence, in a case, where a party, without apparent benefit to himself, enters into stipulations of suretyship, and where there would be great temptation, on the part of a creditor, in danger of losing his debt by the insolvency of his debtor, to support a suit against the friends or relatives of a debtor, a father, son, or brother, by means of false evidence; by exaggerating words of recommendation, encouragement to forbearance,5 and requests for indulgence, into positive contracts.