Issue No. 1308 30 March 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 //

Feature Report

“Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Clarify Long-Term Uranium Enrichment Mission Needs and Improve Technology Cost Estimates”. Published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office; February 2018 https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690143.pdf The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is taking or plans to take four actions to extend inventories of low- enriched uranium (LEU) that is unobligated, or carries no promises or peaceful use to foreign trade partners until about 2038 to 2041. Two of the actions involve preserving supplies of LEU, and the other two involve diluting highly enriched uranium (HEU) with lower enriched forms of uranium to produce LEU. GAO reviewed these actions and found the actual costs and schedules for those taken to date generally align with estimates. NNSA and GAO have identified risks associated with two of these actions. One of these risks has been resolved; NNSA is taking steps to mitigate another, while others, such as uncertainty of future appropriations, are unresolved. NNSA’s preliminary plan for analyzing options to supply unobligated enriched uranium in the long term is inconsistent with DOE directives for the acquisition of capital assets, which state that the mission need statement should be a clear and concise description of the gap between current capabilities and the mission need. The scope of the mission need statement that NNSA has developed can be interpreted to meet two different mission needs: (1) a need for enriched uranium for multiple national security needs, including tritium, and (2) a specific need for enriched uranium to produce tritium. The DOE directives also state that mission need should be independent of and not defined by a particular solution. However, NNSA is showing preference toward a particular solution—building a new uranium enrichment capability—and the agency has not included other technology options for analysis. Without (1) revising the scope of the mission need statement to clarify the mission need it seeks to achieve and (2) adjusting the range of options it considers in the analysis of alternatives process, NNSA may not consider all options to satisfy its mission need.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS  US Nuclear Stockpile Decreasing in Size, But Not Capability  Perry Sees Plutonium Pit Work Staying at LANL ‘into the Future’  Energy Secretary Rick Perry Promises More Triggers for Nuclear Weapons  Want to Demolish a Uranium Enrichment Facility? Ask a Pipe-crawling Robot First  Navy to Congress: Columbia-class Submarine Program Still on Schedule with Little Margin for Error US COUNTER-WMD  For Special Operations Forces, Fighting WMD Means Getting Deeper Into Enemies’ Leadership and Decision-Making  Raytheon to Begin Modernizing Missile Defense US ARMS CONTROL  How to Spot a Nuclear Bomb Program? Look for Ghostly Particles  It’s No Cold War, but Relations with Russia Turn Volatile  National Security Veterans Urge Trump Not to Scrap Iran Nuclear Deal ASIA/PACIFIC  Japan’s Top Diplomat Taro Kono Mulls Attending Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Meeting  Russia, China Eclipse US in Hypersonic Missiles, Prompting Fears EUROPE/RUSSIA  Poland Officially Signs Deal to Buy Patriot from US  Spying on U.S. Nuclear Submarine Base Factor in Closing of Russia’s Seattle Consulate  Russia to Receive Entire Fleet of Upgraded Supersonic Nuclear-Capable Bombers by 2030  European Powers Press for Iran Sanctions to Buttress Nuclear Deal MIDDLE EAST  Saudi-led Coalition Threatens Retaliation against Iran over Missiles  Netanyahu: Israel Has Consistent Policy – Prevent Enemies from Obtaining Nuclear Weapons INDIA/PAKISTAN  China Sell DANGEROUS Nuclear Weapons to Pakistan as Conflict with India ESCALATES  US Slams Pakistani Firms with Sanctions for Nuclear Trade  WW3: India Will 'DESTROY Pakistan and CRIPPLE China in Two-front Nuclear War' COMMENTARY  A North Korean Gordian Knot: Undoing the Nuclear Link  The Strategic Wisdom of Accommodating North Korea’s Nuclear Status  On Iran and North Korea: Don’t Trust, and Verify, Verify, Verify  Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons

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US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) US Nuclear Stockpile Decreasing in Size, But Not Capability By Daniel Cebul March 27, 2018 WASHINGTON — The number of nuclear warheads kept in U.S. stockpiles decreased by nearly 200 since the end of the Obama administration, according to information released by the Defense Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists. This reduction brings the total number of warheads down to 3,822 as of September 2017. While this downsizing may seem to contradict the Trump administration’s position on U.S. nuclear posture, these reductions reflect “a longer trend of the Pentagon working to reduce excess numbers of warheads while upgrading the remaining weapons,” according to Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at FAS. In October 2017, President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis denied reports claiming the president was calling for an increase in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. “Although defense hawks home and abroad will likely seize upon the reduction and argue that it undermines deterrence and reassurance, the reality is that it does not; the remaining arsenal is more than sufficient to meet the requirements for national security and international obligations,” Kristensen said. “On the contrary, it is a reminder that there still is considerable excess capacity in the current nuclear arsenal beyond what is needed.” The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review introduced two new low-yield nuclear-capable weapons to the U.S. arsenal, a sea-launched cruise missile and a nuclear-tipped D-5 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile. Although the necessity and cost of these systems have been heavily questioned by critics, the capabilities have been defended by those inside the Pentagon as a necessary response to the return to great-power competition and a rapidly evolving 21st century threat environment. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/03/27/us-nuclear-stockpile-decreasing-in-size- but-not-capability/ Return to top

The Los Alamos Monitor Online (Los Alamos, N.M.) Perry Sees Plutonium Pit Work Staying at LANL ‘into the Future’ By Tris DeRoma March 23, 2018 Plutonium pit manufacturing and whether Los Alamos National Laboratory will remain the center of plutonium pit production was the highlight of Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. U.S. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., asked Secretary of Energy Rick Perry how confident he was that Los Alamos would be able to get 80 pits manufactured a year by 2030.

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The National Nuclear Security Administration is expected to release an analysis of alternatives study by May 11 that may favor moving the facility to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. “Now there’s talk of stopping and recalculating and looking at another approach. I just don’t think we have the time to do that,” Reed said. “Sen. Heinrich (D-N.M.) and I have discussed this at length many times. I’ve been to Los Alamos and I’ve visited P-4 (the plutonium manufacturing facility) out there, and it is populated with some very extraordinary men and women,” Perry said. “…Los Alamos is going to be the center for plutonium excellence for as long into the future as there is a future.” Perry further added that manufacturing at least 30 plutonium pits are guaranteed at the Los Alamos plutonium pit manufacturing facility. He also acknowledged however that the Department of Energy is going to take a hard look at the NNSA’s analysis of alternatives document before the May 11 deadline. “I think we know, to get the job done… I think 2026 is for the 30 pits per year to be done… the 31 through 80… I think it’s important for us to be able to send a clear message that we can get it done, that we can get it done in a timely basis in a way that the taxpayers know we are thoughtful about their concerns,” Perry said. Heinrich recited testimony given Tuesday before the committee by USAF Gen. John Hyten, where he emphasized the Department of Defense’s requirement of 80 pits per year by 2030, and having Los Alamos National Laboratory have the first 30 pits done by 2026. Heinrich echoed Reed’s statement in another criticism of the NNSA’s pending analysis of alternatives document, and how there is no time to reconsider another site. The document is allegedly considering the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site as another option for plutonium pit manufacturing. “Spending three years on what I have viewed as a flawed analysis of alternatives does not inspire confidence in regards to the timeline,” Heinrich said. “As you know, I had serious doubts about the NNSA’s analysis of alternatives study to meet the 80 pits per year, and in December, I sent you a letter citing specific concerns with the AOA, in that the modular approach at Los Alamos was not even considered.” Heinrich asked Perry if the modular approach would be fully considered in the analysis of alternatives study the NNSA is considering. Perry said that it would be. Heinrich also asked the secretary if he and Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Dan Brouillette would also do a detailed review of the modular design approach before the analysis of alternatives document came out May 11. Heinrich also wanted assurances that the best available cost estimates are used and that the recommended option will meet U.S. Strategic Command’s demands by 2030. Perry answered in the affirmative to both questions. U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-AR, questioned the Department of Energy’s $200 million plus increase request for upgrading infrastructure throughout the DOE complex, where “a more of a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project.” “Is the budget we passed last month, the spending bill we may be on the verge of passing going to give you the money you need to make real progress on this infrastructure backlog?” Perry said yes.

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Earlier this month, the Department of Energy put in a $30.6 billion budget request to Congress. Congress is scheduled to vote on a $1.3 trillion spending bill by Friday. http://www.lamonitor.com/content/perry-sees-plutonium-pit-work-staying-lanl-%E2%80%98- future%E2%80%99 Return to top

The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) Energy Secretary Rick Perry Promises More Triggers for Nuclear Weapons By Paul Sonne March 22, 2018 The U.S. military is concerned that the government isn’t moving quickly enough to ramp up American production of the plutonium cores that trigger nuclear warheads, as the Trump administration proceeds with a $1 trillion overhaul of the nation’s nuclear force. Energy Secretary Rick Perry, the Cabinet official who oversees the nation’s nuclear labs, promised in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday that he would meet the Pentagon’s demands, even though the only lab capable of producing the triggers hasn’t made one suitable for a nuclear weapon in years. “It is important for us to be able to send a clear message that we can get it done, we can get it done on a timely basis and get it done in a way that taxpayers respect is thoughtful about their concerns,” Perry said in a rare appearance by the nation’s top energy official at the Senate body overseeing the military. Known as “plutonium pits” because they rest inside nuclear bombs like a pit inside a stone fruit, the roughly grapefruit-size spheres are a critical component of nuclear weapons because they trigger nuclear fission when squeezed by explosives. They require replacement as they degrade over time or end up destroyed during regular checks of the nation’s nuclear weapons. At issue is the Pentagon’s demand that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) — overseen by the Energy Department — be able to produce 30 plutonium pits a year by 2026 and 80 a year by 2030 to sustain the military’s plans for its nuclear weapons. The Los Alamos National Laboratory is just coming back on line after suspending pit production years ago because of safety concerns. The lab recently restarted its operation but is still producing only research-and-development pits that are unsuitable for U.S. weapons. The lab would require a sizable expansion to ramp up to 80 pits a year. Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten, who oversees U.S. nuclear forces as the head of Strategic Command, said he was worried about whether the nation’s nuclear establishment will be able to meet the requirement, despite assurances from officials at the Energy Department and NNSA. “I still have concerns,” Hyten said in a Senate testimony earlier this week. He said he was “very nervous” that the requirement might be met only “just in time.” Hyten warned that the nuclear weapons the Pentagon is developing — new bombers, submarines, ICBMs, low-yield submarine-launch ballistic missiles, air-launch and sea-launch cruise missiles — all require reliable warheads. He expressed concern about the age of some plutonium pits being used.

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Nearly all current pits were produced between 1978 and 1989, according to the Pentagon. There is some debate about how long they can last and whether the military in fact needs such high production levels. In 2006, a study by two of the nation’s nuclear labs assessed that majority of plutonium pits for most nuclear weapons have minimum lifetimes of at least 85 years. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has discontinued many of the nuclear weapons capabilities the nation built up during the Cold War. The country began to rely largely on dismantling existing nuclear weapons for plutonium pits and stockpile management, particularly as defense spending priorities diverted to the global war against terrorism. Now the United States is facing a reckoning as Russia and China also race to advance their nuclear arsenals and much of the infrastructure the military relies on to support its nuclear capabilities ages out. The United States no longer operates the full range of facilities capable of producing nuclear weapons and for nearly two decades stopped producing plutonium pits altogether. “Past assumptions that our capability to produce nuclear weapons would not be necessary and that we could permit the required infrastructure to age into obsolescence have proven to be mistaken,” the Trump administration said in the nuclear weapons policy it published in February. “It is now clear that the United States must have sufficient research, design, development, and production capacity to support the sustainment and replacement of its nuclear forces.” Perry highlighted the Trump administration’s decision to budget more funding for the NNSA for that purpose in his testimony Thursday. The 2018 spending bill that the House approved Thursday allocates $10.6 billion to weapons activities within the NNSA — which includes infrastructure updates, maintenance and repairs — an increase from $9.2 billion in 2017 and $8.85 billion in 2016. The administration has requested $11 billion in 2019. But doubts persist about whether the agency charged with stewarding the country’s nuclear weapons can achieve such a complex task, while escaping a past marred by cost overruns and safety incidents. The administration faces billions of backlogged repairs to aging facilities. At one point in recent years, chunks of the ceiling were falling out at the Y-12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., a facility established during the Manhattan Project to enrich uranium for the first atomic bombs. “When I go to Oak Ridge, and I’m in facilities that were built in some cases before I was born, and that’s a spell ago, then it becomes abundantly clear to me,” Perry, who is 68, said Thursday. For the first 13 months of the Trump administration, the NNSA lacked a Senate-confirmed director chosen by President Trump, resulting in lost time on some of the most pressing political decisions to be made on nuclear matters. Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, a former health physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was sworn in to administer the agency on Feb. 22. The Trump administration had kept in place an Obama-era appointee, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, in the meantime. Gordon-Hagerty has promised to prioritize resolving the plutonium-pit issue and escape the past problems at the NNSA, where big projects have resulted in cost overruns and mismanagement. For much of the Cold War, the United States produced plutonium triggers at a facility called Rocky Flats outside Denver. The facility shut down in 1989 months after federal agents raided the premises due to environmental crimes. Nearly two decades later, the United States resumed a limited operation to manufacture plutonium pits in 2007, this time at Los Alamos.

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By then, the NNSA was in the midst of plans to build a bigger plutonium pit production facility at the lab, which would have increased capacity and added protections against earthquakes. But the NNSA canceled the project in 2012 after spending nearly half a billion dollars on designs as cost estimates spiraled out of control. Around the same time, the existing Los Alamos production line was shut down amid safety incidents documented last year in reports by the Center for Public Integrity. The lab only recently restarted the operation. Now the NNSA must decide how to expand production of plutonium pits to meet the Pentagon’s requirements by 2030. Under one option being considered, less ambitious “module” buildings would be constructed at the existing Los Alamos site. An alternative would include repurposing one of the most problematic projects the Department of Energy has ever undertaken, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, to produce pits instead of fulfilling its original purpose of turning weapons-grade plutonium into reactor fuel. The facility is billions of dollars over budget and still only partially built. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have tried to kill the project, but Congress has continued funding it primarily due to political support from the South Carolina delegation. The NNSA is due to deliver its final recommendation to Congress about how to expand plutonium pit production by May 11. The Senate committee members pointed out that the NNSA took three years to analyze where the new production facility should be housed and still failed to issue a decision. The former Texas governor said he would be “greatly concerned” if the new timeline isn’t met. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-military-wants-more- plutonium-triggers-for-nuclear-warheads/2018/03/22/b5d1516c-2d58-11e8-911f- ca7f68bff0fc_story.html?utm_term=.4057149969e7 Return to top

Ars Technica (New York, N.Y.) Want to Demolish a Uranium Enrichment Facility? Ask a Pipe-crawling Robot First By Megan Geuss March 25, 2018 This robot will test radiation levels in 15 of the 75 miles of pipes. A government facility in Piketon, Ohio produced enriched uranium between 1954 and 2001 for both energy and weapons-grade purposes. Several years ago, the Department of Energy (DOE) and a third-party contractor, Fluor-BWXT, began decommissioning the plant. But now a new set of "hands" is being brought in to speed up the work. Well, not hands exactly, but a radiation sensor and a pair of flexible tracks. A small pipe-crawling robot named RadPiper will be unleashed in 15 of the 75 miles of pipes that were once used to make enriched uranium through a gaseous diffusion process. According to a press release from Carnegie Mellon, each one-foot segment of pipe needs to have radiation measurements taken to rule out any potentially hazardous amounts of uranium-235 still left over in the pipes. If RadPiper discovers a hazardous section of pipe, it has to be removed and

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // decontaminated. Clean sections of piping can remain in place and will be demolished with the rest of the building. Fluor-BWXT has already decommissioned one of the three process warehouses on the Ohio site, which contain 75 miles of piping all together. The first process warehouse demolition took the company three years to finish, not least because humans (wearing protective gear) had to measure each foot-long segment of the pipes for elevated levels of uranium-235 from the outside of the pipes. The humans took 1.4 million measurements to thoroughly assess the first process warehouse. RadPiper should expedite the process significantly and cut down on potentially harmful exposure to humans. Another benefit: RadPiper's measurements are more accurate since they will be taken from inside the pipes. The university is seeking a patent for the sensor on top of RadPiper, which uses a sodium iodide sensor to count gamma rays and two disc-shaped blinders that prevent the sensor from measuring radiation beyond the one-foot section of pipe that the bot is measuring. RadPiper was funded by $1.4 million from the DOE, which worked closely with Carnegie Mellon University and Fluor-BWXT to build a prototype and test it on a quick-turnaround schedule. Now, the DOE expects that RadPiper will save labor costs by an eight-to-one ratio. "DOE officials estimate the robots could save tens of millions of dollars in completing the characterization of uranium deposits at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, and save perhaps $50 million at a similar uranium enrichment plant in Paducah, Kentucky," Carnegie Mellon wrote. RadPiper and a second robot of the same name will be able to crawl through 30- and 42-inch- diameter pipes to take its measurements. In some sections of the piping, humans will still be required to take measurements from outside the pipes. But this little robot is equipped with a fisheye lens and a lidar sensor to take corners and identify obstructions in the pipe ahead. "After completing a run of pipe, the robot automatically returns to its launch point," Carnegie Mellon said. https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/03/radpiper-the-pipe-crawling-robot-to-tour-us-uranium- enrichment-facility-pipes/ Return to top

USNI News (Annapolis, Md.) Navy to Congress: Columbia-class Submarine Program Still on Schedule with Little Margin for Error By John Grady March 21, 2018 Overheating problems with a test motor being developed Navy’s next nuclear ballistic missile submarine has not thrown the “no-margin-for-error” program off-schedule, senior service leaders have told Congress. Testifying Tuesday before the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee, Rear Adm. John Tammen Jr. said the problem, discovered before the motor arrived at Philadelphia “consumed considerable flex time” in the program. But “the risk is manageable and well in hand,” Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley, program executive officer for submarines, added. Last week before the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, Navy nuclear programs director Adm. James Caldwell said “it required us to have another motor built” by the

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // subcontractor. The overheating problem was traced to faulty insulation. The new motor has not yet been tested. By overlapping some other testing in the program and other tweaks, the overall Columbia program is on schedule. “We’re managing it very tightly” to meet the 2021 date to begin construction, Caldwell said. James Geurts, the assistant secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition, said at Tuesday’s hearing “early work on missile tubes” for the new submarine also was a factor in keeping to schedule. Also having 83 percent of the ship’s design done at this stage of production, versus 42 percent for Virginia-class at a comparable time helps the program’s on-time prospects. Delivery for the first Columbia boomer is expected in 2031. The no-margin-for-error comes with that date because the first Ohio–class ballistic missile submarine is set to retire. Caldwell termed the development of the life-of-the-ship nuclear core “a pretty big step for us” at the Senate hearing. Instead of coming in for refueling as nuclear-powered carriers do every 25 years, the core for Columbia class is to last the ship’s 40-plus-year service life. This longer core life is central to the Navy’s planning for 12 ballistic missile submarines instead of the 14 in the existing Ohio class. Even with the Navy’s long history in nuclear propulsion, he told the panel that the longer life core “requires new materials,” which can present additional challenges. “We expect to start building the new core next year.” Caldwell added the longer life core would first be installed in future Virginia- class submarines. Tuesday, Jabaley said the combined work on the quad-pack missile tubes and payload with the United Kingdom “is going very well.” The first five tubes have been delivered to the United States — four to Quonset Point, R.I., and one to Cape Canaveral, Florida. He added the congressionally-approved continuous production authorities have been helpful aids in keeping the schedule intact. The Navy is looking to expand authorities into other areas, possibly the electric drive motor. “It allows a more smooth ramp up” in building as repair work for other submarines decline, he said. That also helps Electric Boat maintain a steady skilled workforce over a long period of time. The authorities also “de-risk” the dangers of the early work problems surfacing in new class building, delaying the program and raising costs. At the Senate panel last week, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, recently confirmed as undersecretary for nuclear security at the Department of Energy, said the across-the-board nuclear weapons modernization programs has “everything is on track and on budget.” But she warned the panel that even with her program’s $15.1 billion budget request for Fiscal Year 2019, Congress “needs to sustain predictable funding” to deliver systems such as the replacement vessels for aging ballistic missile submarines. In her opening statement, Gordon-Hagerty noted that $1.8 billion has been put against naval reactors in that request. “That’s a 20 percent increase” over last year’s and in line with Navy shipbuilding plans. David Trimble, from the congressionally-established the General Accountability Office, agreed the longstanding challenge will be sustainability for all the nuclear programs — from ships to weapons. He also raised the affordability issue of bringing all the modernization programs into the services on schedule. He added a further problem may lay in having all this work done at the same time as the Department of Energy is overhauling existing laboratories, reprocessing plants and other facilities such as the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.

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Gordon-Hagery said the facilities are on the average 40 years old. For example, recapitalization of the naval facilities at the Idaho Nuclear Laboratory is closely linked to the Columbia-class construction program. Keeping all that spending in balance makes the task more daunting. “A change in one area [one weapons program] can affect others [infrastructure and other weapons program]” dramatically, he said. Trimble categorized the weapons programs as being on the “high-risk list” because of their demands on the overall budget, the need to keep each synchronized with the other, all requiring infrastructure modernization and many needing a growing, competent workforce with the necessary security clearances even for non-nuclear work. Gordon-Hagerty projected the nuclear weapons modernization program alone would have “a sustained, profound and significant” impact on the Pentagon’s budget. She told the panel the cost would consume about 6.5 percent of the defense budget, up from slightly more than 3 percent in recent years. “We are leaning as far forward as we can” on all these efforts and making sure “that we have priorities correct.” She told the panel she expected to report back by year’s end on infrastructure needs with cost estimates. https://news.usni.org/2018/03/21/navy-congress-columbia-class-submarine-program-still- schedule-little-margin-error Return to top

US COUNTER-WMD

Defense One (Washington, D.C.) For Special Operations Forces, Fighting WMD Means Getting Deeper Into Enemies’ Leadership and Decision-Making By Patrick Tucker March 22, 2018 SOCOM is getting more intel and gear as it settles into its role as the Pentagon’s anti-WMD coordinator. As U.S. Special Operations Command has settled into its role as lead U.S. agency for planning military operations to counter weapons of mass destruction — that is, chemical, biological, and rogue nuclear weapons — it’s getting access to new realms of intelligence. “Differentiating between peaceful scientific research and nefarious intent requires exquisite access into adversary leadership and decision,” said Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, SOCOM’s deputy commander, told the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday. Osterman said that the two-month-old National Defense Strategy, with its focus on Russia and China, had already made it easier for SOCOM to get both the intelligence capabilities and the tactical gear it needs to better plan counter-WMD missions.

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“I do believe that there has been a significant change with an emphasis on those hard problem sets in that peer competitor range,” he said — meaning China and Russia. That change has allowed SOCOM to “open up that planning beyond just that counter [violent extremist] threat from our previous mission sets.” In particular, he said, SOCOM planners have been better able to contemplate whole-of-government approaches. About a year ago, SOCOM became the Defense Department’s lead agency for countering WMDs. “Our primary counter-WMD effort as a coordinating authority is really: how best to orchestrate Department of Defense activity in that pre-crisis phase” just short of open conflict, he said. Also at the hearing, the Defense Department’s top homeland-defense official said it appears quite probable that Russia is behind the recent nerve agent attack that targeted Russian military officer- turned-British informant Sergei Skripal and his daughter in London. “It appears highly likely, with the information at hand, that the Russians are responsible fo the use of an advanced chemical agent against this individual,” said Ken Rapuano, the assistant defense secretary for homeland defense and global security. The United States is “working very closely with the UK as well as other partners and allies” as the government in London completed its forensic investigation, Rapuano said. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2018/03/special-operations-forces-fighting-wmd-means- getting-deeper-enemies-leadership-and-decision-making/146897/ Return to top

UPI (Washington, D.C.) Raytheon to Begin Modernizing Missile Defense By James LaPorta March 27, 2018 March 27 (UPI) -- Raytheon announced this week that the company has begun work on a contract from the U.S. Army to sustain and modernize missile defense for both military commands and government agencies. Raytheon said on Monday it would start work on the three-year service contract for system upgrades valued at $600 million that was first announced in June 2017. The work was held up by a protest bid, the company said. The Army systems set to receive services are the THAAD, the AN/TPY-2 radars, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar and Upgraded Early Warning Radars, according to the company. The Government Accountability Office defines a bid protest as "a challenge to the award or proposed award of a contract for the procurement of goods and services or a challenge to the terms of a solicitation for such a contract." Raytheon said that the bid was withdrawn in February 2018, which paved the way for the agreement between the federal government and Raytheon -- enabling the company to provide software sustainment and system engineering services for U.S. Army systems. Raytheon will receive direction from the U.S. Army to begin work within the 30 to 60 days.

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"We're bringing state-of-the-art, commercial software practices, such as DevOps and Agile, to make sure the systems the Army depends on stay ahead of evolving threats," Todd Probert, vice president of Mission Support and Modernization at Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services, said in a press release. Work on the contract will occur at Systems Simulation, Software and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center at Redstone Arsenal. https://www.upi.com/Raytheon-to-begin-modernizing-missile-defense/8421522167105/ Return to top

US ARMS CONTROL

The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) How to Spot a Nuclear Bomb Program? Look for Ghostly Particles By Kenneth Chang March 27, 2018 What are nations like North Korea and Iran really doing at nuclear reactors that are out of sight? Someday, wispy subatomic particles known as antineutrinos could provide a clear view of what countries with illicit nuclear weapons programs are trying to hide. Antineutrinos are devilishly difficult to detect, but this quality is precisely what makes them potentially ideal for monitoring international nonproliferation agreements aimed at preventing the spread of atomic weapons. A collaboration of American and British scientists announced on Tuesday that they would build a test antineutrino detector called Watchman in a mine on the northeast coast of England. The project is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration, part of the United States Department of Energy. When completed in 2023, the apparatus is to consist of a cylinder about 50 feet in diameter and 50 feet in height, filled with 7.7 million pounds of water and located about 3,600 feet underground in the Boulby Mine, which produces salt and potash, a fertilizer. Sensors lining the inside of the cylinder will observe the occasional flashes generated when an antineutrino resulting from reactions in the Hartlepool nuclear power plant, about 15 miles away, slams into a particle in the detector liquid. The experiment would run for two years. “It’s a demonstration of a capability,” said Adam Bernstein, a physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California who is the principal investigator for the project. “Once we’ve operated, then that would give one confidence that you could use this technology for actual monitoring.” Dr. Bernstein said the United States will contribute $30 million over six years to the project. Neutrinos, particles with no electrical charge and little mass that travel at close to the speed of light, are generated by nuclear fusion, as in the sun, where hydrogen atoms merge into helium, releasing heat and light. Antineutrinos are the antimatter version of neutrinos and are created when atoms fall apart in fission reactions like the decay of uranium. The fission of uranium also produces plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons.

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Antineutrinos rarely interact with anything. That makes them very difficult to detect, but it also means there is no known way to shield a reactor and prevent antineutrinos from flying out. The vast majority of antineutrinos from the Hartlepool reactor would pass unimpeded through the new detector, but calculations by the scientists indicate that two to four a day would collide with a hydrogen nucleus — a proton — in a water molecule. When this collision occurs, the proton transforms into a neutron and ejects a positron, the antimatter version of an electron. Because the positron moves so quickly through the water, it emits the optical equivalent of a sonic boom, called Cherenkov radiation. (Watchman is a shortening of Water Cherenkov Monitor of Antineutrinos.) Mixed in the water will be the element gadolinium, which will absorb the neutron generated in the collision, emitting a second flash of Cherenkov light. The demonstration will scale up previous work that was able to detect antineutrinos at a distance of about 80 feet from a reactor core. Detectors as large as the one at Boulby could be placed near the nuclear infrastructure of a state that had agreed to shut down its nuclear reactors, allowing international authorities to verify compliance. Potentially, much larger detectors could monitor sites hundreds of miles away in hostile nations that do not allow inspections. The same apparatus would also assist astronomers studying supernovas, the explosions of distant stars. In 1987, several large neutrino detectors detected a few handfuls of neutrinos and antineutrinos from the explosion of a star more than 160,000 light-years away. Watchman would similarly detect such cosmic explosions, but with improved acuity. The presence of gadolinium in the new detector would make it possible to differentiate neutrinos, which would generate just one flash of Cherenkov light, from antineutrinos, which would generate two. “We couldn’t do that in 1987,” said Robert Svoboda, a professor of physics at the University of California, Davis and a member of the Watchman team. For neutrino scientists, Watchman will also finance the development of improved technology to record the Cherenkov flashes. These are to be deployed in a second phase of Watchman and then could be used in other neutrino experiments. “There’s this nice duality between basic science research and nonproliferation,” Dr. Bernstein said. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/science/nuclear-bombs-antineutrinos.html Return to top

The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) It’s No Cold War, but Relations with Russia Turn Volatile By Andrew Higgins March 26, 2018 MOSCOW — The expulsion of scores of Russian diplomats from the United States, countries across Europe and beyond has raised, yet again, the question of whether the world is veering back where it was during the Cold War. The alarming answer from some in Russia is: No, but the situation is in some ways even more unpredictable. For all the tension, proxy conflicts and risk of nuclear war that punctuated relations between Moscow and the West for decades, each side knew, particularly toward the end of the Cold War and

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, roughly what to expect. Each had a modicum of trust that the other would act in a reasonably predictable way. The volatile state of Russia’s relations with the outside world today, exacerbated by a nerve agent attack on a former spy living in Britain, however, makes the diplomatic climate of the Cold War look reassuring, said Ivan I. Kurilla, an expert on Russian-American relations, and recalls a period of paralyzing mistrust that followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. “If you look for similarities with what is happening, it is not the Cold War that can explain events but Russia’s first revolutionary regime,” which regularly assassinated opponents abroad, said Mr. Kurilla, a historian at the European University at St. Petersburg. He said that Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, had no interest in spreading a new ideology and fomenting world revolution, unlike the early Bolsheviks, but that Russia under Mr. Putin had “become a revolutionary regime in terms of international relations.” From the Kremlin’s perspective, it is the United States that first upended previous norms, when President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Antiballistic Missile accord, an important Cold War-era treaty, in 2002. Russia, Mr. Kurilla said, does not like the rules of the American-dominated order that have prevailed since then, “and wants to change them.” One rule that Russia has consistently embraced, however, is the principle of reciprocity, and the Kremlin made clear on Monday that it would, after assessing the scale of the damage to its diplomat corps overseas, respond with expulsions of Western diplomats from Russia. The Russian Parliament also weighed in, with the deputy head of its foreign affairs committee, Aleksei Chepa, telling the Interfax news agency that Russia would not bow to the West’s diplomatic “war.” Russia, he said, “will not allow itself to be beaten up, the harder they try to intimidate us, the tougher our response will be.” When Britain expelled 23 Russian diplomats this month in response to the nerve agent attack in Salisbury, England, Moscow not only evicted an equal number of British diplomats, but ordered the closing of the British Council, an organization that promotes British culture and language. While denying any part in the March 4 poisoning of Sergei V. Skripal, a former spy, and his daughter, Yulia, both still critically ill in the hospital, Russia in recent years has built up a long record of flouting international norms, notably with its 2014 annexation of Crimea, the first time since 1945 that European borders have been redrawn by force. The attack on the Skripals was another first, at least according to Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain, who denounced the action as the “first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second World War.” Kadri Liik, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said she was mystified by the nerve agent attack. Ms. Liik said she had expected Mr. Putin, who won a fourth term by a lopsided margin on March 18, to back away from disruption during what, under the Constitution, should be his last six years in power. Mr. Putin, she said, might not be predictable but usually follows what he considers fairly clear logic. “Putin does not do disruption just for fun, but because he is Putin and he can,” she said. Each time Russia has been accused of having a hand in acts like the seizure of Ukrainian government buildings in Crimea or the 2014 shooting down of a Malaysian passenger plane over eastern Ukraine, in which nearly 300 people were killed, Moscow has responded with a mix of self- pity, fierce denials and florid conspiracy theories that put the blame elsewhere.

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In the case of the poisoning in Salisbury, Russia’s denials became so baroque that even the state-run news media had a hard time keeping up. After officials denied any Russian role and insisted that neither Russia nor the Soviet Union had ever developed Novichok, the nerve agent identified by Britain as the substance used against the Skripals, a state-controlled news agency published an interview with a Russian scientist who said he had helped develop a system of chemical weapons called Novichok-5. The agency later amended the article, replacing the scientist’s mention of Novichok with an assertion that the “chemical weapons development program of the U.S.S.R. was not called ‘Novichok.’” The attempted murder of Mr. Skripal on British soil, however, “was the straw that broke the camel’s back,” said Vladislav Inozemtsev, a Russian scholar at the Polish Institute of Advanced Studies in Warsaw. “Western leaders finally decided that enough is enough” because Moscow has played the denial game so many times and showed no real interest in establishing the truth, he said. Unlike Soviet leaders during the Cold War, he added, Mr. Putin follows no fixed ideology or rules but is ready to pursue any “predatory policies,” no matter how taboo, that might help “undermine the existing order in Europe,” while insisting that Russia is the victim, not the aggressor. When the United Nations in 2015 proposed an international tribunal to investigate the MH-17 air disaster a year earlier over territory held by Russian-armed rebels in eastern Ukraine, Moscow used its veto in the United Nations Security Council to block the move, the only member of the Council to oppose the investigation. Ian Bond, a former British diplomat in Moscow who is now director of foreign policy at the Center for European Reform in London, said Russia’s often implausible denials had made it “like the boy who cried wolf.” “If you keep putting forward crazy conspiracy theories, eventually people are going to ask whether what you are saying is just another crazy Russian denial,” he said. Mr. Bond said diplomacy during the Cold War, even when it involved hostile actions, tended to follow a relatively a calm and orderly routine. No longer is that the case, he added, noting that the Russian Embassy in London and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow have issued statements and tweets mocking Britain as an impotent has-been power and scoffing at the Salisbury poisoning as the “so-called Sergei Skripal case.” President Putin, Mr. Bond added, “is not trying to foment international revolution, but he is the great disrupter” and revels in wrong-footing foreign governments by flouting established norms. While Russia may have been surprised by the magnitude of the coordinated expulsions by Britain’s allies on Monday, it was clearly anticipating something. Hours before they were announced, it went on the offensive. Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, posted a message on Facebook sneering at the European Union for showing solidarity with Britain at a time when London is negotiating its exit from the bloc. Britain, she wrote, is “exploiting the solidarity factor to impose on those that are remaining a deterioration in relations with Russia.” While President Trump has expressed a curious affinity with Mr. Putin and raised expectations of improved relations, the Russian leader has always been more measured. The underlying mistrust seemed to be reinforced on Monday by Russia’s ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Antonov, who told the Interfax news agency that “what the United States of America is doing today is destroying whatever little is left in Russian-U.S. relations.”

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Despite the unpredictability under Mr. Putin, the possibility of nuclear conflict between the Russians and the West, the most frightening aspect of the Cold War, does not appear to have increased. Arms control agreements reached since the 1970s are still honored — with the exception of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile accord, known as the ABM Treaty, which Mr. Bush abandoned 30 years later. Mr. Bush’s decision, questioned by even some American allies, opened the way, in Moscow’s view, to a free-for-all in international relations that has left the United States and Russia struggling to recover the trust developed by President Ronald Reagan and the last Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in the 1980s. In a state of the nation address in February, President Putin unveiled what he described as a new generation of “invincible” long-range nuclear missiles but, speaking later in an interview with NBC, he blamed Washington for pushing Moscow into a new arms race by disregarding a Cold War status quo. “If you speak about the arms race, it started when the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty,” he said. Confronted with Moscow’s disruptive actions in the 1920s, Britain and other European countries “did not know how to respond and took 10 years or more to figure out how to deal with Moscow,” said Mr. Kurilla, the St. Petersburg historian. In the case of Britain, the leading power of the day and the first Western country to recognize the Soviet Union, the process had echoes of the present. It recognized the new Bolshevik government in 1924 but then expelled Soviet diplomats and shuttered their embassy three years later after the police uncovered what they said was a Soviet espionage ring bent on spreading mayhem. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/world/europe/russia-expulsions-cold-war.html Return to top

CNN (Atlanta, Ga.) National Security Veterans Urge Trump Not to Scrap Iran Nuclear Deal By Zachary Cohen March 27, 2018 Washington (CNN) — A bipartisan group of more than 100 US national security experts -- including nearly 50 retired military officers and more than 30 former ambassadors -- is urging President Donald Trump to remain in the Iran nuclear deal as sources say it is becoming increasingly likely he will withdraw. The statement titled "Keep the Iran deal -- 10 Good Reasons Why" calls on Trump to "maintain the US commitment to the Iran nuclear deal" as doing so will "strengthen America's hand in dealing with North Korea, as well as Iran, and help maintain the reliability of America's word and influence as a world leader." "Ditching it would serve no national security purpose," the statement said. Penned by a group that calls itself the National Coalition to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon, the coordinated message comes as US officials are taking a two-track approach to the deal -- negotiating with allies to make changes demanded by Trump even as they prepare to walk away from the international agreement.

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Trump set a May 12 deadline -- the next date by which he has to waive sanctions against Iran or leave the deal -- for the US and its European allies to agree on changes to address what he sees as its flaws. The President's thinking, officials say, is that if the US and Europe are united on amending the deal, the other signatories -- Russia and China -- will come along, and Iran will have no choice but to comply. But Trump himself has dismissed the deal as "terrible," and recent changes within the administration giving Iran hawks John Bolton and Mike Pompeo significant influence on the issue, mean many officials in the US and Europe are bracing for Washington to abandon the agreement. Against that backdrop, US officials leading the negotiations with European allies say that at the same time, they are readying contingency plans should Trump decide to pull the US out. By releasing a joint statement on Monday, the group of more than 100 national security veterans join a shrinking contingency within the administration that has advised the President to remain in the deal -- which notably includes Defense Secretary James Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford. Active duty four-star generals Joseph Votel and John Hyten have also advocated for staying in the agreement. The group argues that maintaining a US commitment to the deal will not only enhance US and regional security by implementing unprecedented international monitoring of Iran's nuclear program but will also set a precedent for future dealings with emerging threats like North Korea. "North Korea could not claim that the US abrogates agreements without cause and would be more likely to negotiate an end to its nuclear program," the statement said. Remaining in the accord will also help strengthen US leadership on the world stage and bolster relations with key European allies, the group argues. "US relations with major European allies, who all oppose US withdrawal, would be preserved for advancing US national security interests beyond the nuclear deal," the statement said. "The US will build credibility and retain influence with its negotiating partners to ensure strict implementation with the agreement, be able to lead efforts to strengthen it, or garner strong support for imposing additional sanctions if necessary." https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/politics/experts-trump-iran-nuclear-letter/index.html Return to top

ASIA/PACIFIC

The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan) Japan’s Top Diplomat Taro Kono Mulls Attending Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Meeting Author Not Attributed March 27, 2018 GENEVA – Foreign Minister Taro Kono said Tuesday he is considering attending a meeting this spring of the preparatory committee for the 2020 review conference of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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“If various circumstances allow, I want to properly attend and explain the Japanese government’s position based on the recommendations of our eminent persons’ group,” Kono said after a Cabinet meeting. At the second meeting of the NPT panel, to be held in Geneva starting in late April, Japan is scheduled to offer recommendations on the course of nuclear disarmament that are soon to be compiled by Foreign Ministry-appointees. It is not clear whether Kono will be able to attend in view of the uncertainty over the situation surrounding North Korea, a U.N. diplomatic source said Monday. But if he can, the source said, it would mark the second straight year that a Japanese foreign minister has taken part in the meeting and could further establish the country’s presence in the arena of international nuclear disarmament. Japan sees itself as a bridge builder between nuclear-armed nations and non-nuclear countries at a time when the gulf between the two has been growing, particularly since the adoption last year of a landmark U.N. treaty outlawing nuclear weapons. Then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida attended the first preparatory committee meeting in Vienna last year, and called on the international community to strengthen efforts against nuclear proliferation. The second preparatory committee meeting is one of three to be held ahead of the 2020 NPT review conference. It will take place between April 23 and May 4. Prior to the Vienna meeting, a 2015 review conference fell apart as parties failed to reach agreement and could not adopt a final document, largely due to a rift between the United States and Arab countries over discussions on efforts aimed at denuclearizing Israel. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/27/national/japans-top-diplomat-taro-kono-mulls- attending-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-meeting/ Return to top

The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Russia, China Eclipse US in Hypersonic Missiles, Prompting Fears By Rebecca Kheel March 27, 2018 Russia and China are outpacing the United States in the development of super-fast missile technology, Pentagon officials and key lawmakers are warning. Russia says it successfully tested a so-called hypersonic missile this month, while China tested a similar system last year expected to enter service soon. “Right now, we’re helpless,” Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in advocating for more investment in hypersonics, along with missile defense. Hypersonics are generally defined as missiles that can fly more than five times the speed of sound. Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, last week described a hypersonic as a missile that starts out “like a ballistic missile, but then it depresses the trajectory and then flies

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // more like a cruise missile or an airplane. So it goes up into the low reaches of space, and then turns immediately back down and then levels out and flies at a very high level of speed.” In November, China reportedly conducted two tests of a ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle that U.S. assessments expect to reach initial operating capability around 2020. The country had already conducted at least seven tests of experimental systems from 2014 to 2016. Meanwhile, earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a flashy state of the nation address to tout a slate of new weapons, including a hypersonic missile he claimed was “invincible” against U.S. missile defenses. About a week later, Russia claimed it successfully tested a hypersonic. At the time of Putin’s announcement, the Pentagon said it was “not surprised” by the report and assured the public that it is “fully prepared” to respond to such a threat. But in congressional testimony last week, Hyten conceded U.S. missile defense cannot stop hypersonics. He said that the U.S. is instead relying on nuclear deterrence, or the threat of a retaliatory U.S. strike, as its defense against such missiles. “We don't have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us, so our response would be our deterrent force, which would be the triad and the nuclear capabilities that we have to respond to such a threat,” Hyten told the Senate Armed Services Committee. To bolster missile defenses against hypersonics, Hyten advocated space-based sensors. “I believe we need to pursue improved sensor capabilities to be able to track, characterize and attribute the threats, wherever they come from,” he said. “And, right now, we have a challenge with that, with our current on-orbit space architecture and the limited number of radars that we have around the world. In order to see those threats, I believe we need a new space sensor architecture.” Asked if the U.S. is really falling behind Russia and China on hypersonics, Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said flatly: “Yes.” “And the reason is the U.S. hasn’t been doing anything near the same pace both in terms of developing our own capabilities but also failing to develop sensors and shooters necessary to shoot down theirs,” he continued. Terrestrial sensors are limited in their ability because of the curvature of the earth, Karako said, but “you can’t hide from a robust constellation of space-based sensors.” Yet while the last five administrations have identified space-based sensors as a critical need on paper, nothing has come to fruition, he said. “One of the reasons that we haven’t prioritized the hypersonic threat is we were slow to kind of appreciate not merely the Russia and China problem, but the Russia and China missile problem,” Karako said. In that regard, he credited the National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review, both of which were unveiled by the Trump administration earlier this year, for their renewed focus on a "great power competition" with Russia and China. Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), chairwoman of the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, likewise cited them as helping the U.S. get back on track in the area of hypersonics. “I think we are aware of the capabilities that our adversaries have, and … whether it’s the Nuclear Posture Review, National Defense Strategy, these are all laid out because of the identification of the threats we have,” she said.

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Fischer added that there “probably will be” something about hypersonics in her subcommittee’s portion of this year’s annual defense policy bill. But the Nuclear Posture Review, in particular, has been controversial for its call to develop a sea- launched nuclear cruise missile and a "low yield" warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Those new capabilities are part of the deterrence that Hyten cited, but critics say the document is poised to fuel an arms race. “Calling for the addition of new weapons and weapons capabilities to our arsenal and expanding the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy imposes significant economic burdens and undermines decades of United States leadership to prevent the use and spread of nuclear weapons,” more than 40 House Democrats, led by Reps. Earl Blumenauer (Ore.), Barbara Lee (Calif.) and Mike Quigley (Ill.), wrote Monday in a letter to President Trump. “We oppose this approach and will continue to support maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent without wasting taxpayer dollars, inciting a new arms race or risking nuclear conflict,” they said. In addition to the nuclear review, Pentagon officials have been touting budget proposals that would put more money toward hypersonics and missile defense that they say will help close the gap with Russia and China. Hyten told the Senate Armed Services Committee that there's $42 million in the fiscal year 2019 budget for the Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency to work on a prototype for space-based sensors. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee last week her fiscal 2019 budget includes $258 million for hypersonics. And Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Director Steven Walker touted his $256.7 million fiscal 2019 budget for hypersonic missile development the same day as Putin’s press conference. Still, he said, DARPA needs more money for infrastructure to test the missiles, as most of the agency’s testing is done out of one facility. “The dollars that were allocated in this budget were great, but they were really focused on adding more flight tests and getting some of our offensive capability further down the line into operational prototypes,” he told the Defense Writers Group. “We do need an infusion of dollars in our infrastructure to do hypersonics.” Inhofe, the senator from Oklahoma, said he’s most worried about the missile defense issue, adding there “appears to be no defense” against hypersonics. To him, the answer is reversing defense budget cuts, which Congress has taken steps to do in a two-year budget deal and a recently passed appropriations bill for fiscal 2018. “We need to make up the losses that we had during the Obama administration by putting a priority, which we are doing now, on the military,” he said. http://thehill.com/policy/defense/380364-china-russia-eclipse-us-in-hypersonic-missiles- prompting-fears Return to top

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EUROPE/RUSSIA

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Poland Officially Signs Deal to Buy Patriot from US By Jen Judson March 28, 2018 HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — After years of laboring over details of a complex air and missile defense procurement deal, Poland signed a letter of offer and acceptance on March 28 with the U.S. government to buy Raytheon’s medium-range Patriot system currently in use by the U.S. Army. According to a source with knowledge of the deal, Poland will buy — for what it’s calling its Wisla program — two Patriot Configuration 3+ batteries, the latest version of the system. There are two fire units per battery, so Raytheon will deliver four fire units total. The first systems will also have Northrop Grumman’s still-in-development Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, or IBCS, and the Lockheed Martin-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement missiles. The source said delivery is expected in 2022. At a time of dramatic change in leadership in Poland’s Ministry of Defence, the new guard — having just recently come aboard following the ousting of former Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz and many of those under him — has brought the complex deal across the finish line. There were many times where those following the possible procurement thought it would fall through. Poland first selected Patriot in 2014, but with a change in government, the new president wanted to take another look at the options available for a medium-range system. The government ultimately settled on Patriot, but caught industry off guard when it said it wanted to incorporate Northrop’s IBCS that is in development to be the command-and-control system for the U.S. Army’s future integrated air and missile defense system. IBCS’ initial operational capability is delayed, but Northrop has a way to offer a version of the system for Poland’s Patriots sooner. And a Yockey waiver was granted for Poland to procure the system ahead of the U.S. Army. The Poles also wanted 360-degree detection capability, which the current Patriot lacks. Poland plans to procure 360-degree radars for the Wisla program later. The U.S. Army is also working toward a 360-degree capability. Poland ultimately wants to procure eight batteries, so some of these capabilities will be worked into later phases that will require further agreement between the U.S. and Poland. The country also slowed the procurement process to go through painstaking offset negotiations to ensure those met legal requirements as well as goals the government had set for the program. The country wanted at least 50 percent domestic industrial participation. Because of those complicated aspects to the sale, paired by sky-high U.S. State Department cost estimates that were not affordable for Poland, it seemed like an uphill climb to get to the point where both sides were prepared to sign a deal. Poland closed in on cementing the letter of offer and acceptance last week when it signed an offset agreement. The details were not disclosed and much is classified. According to Polish reports, the offset totaled just less than 1 billion zlotys (U.S. $295 million) and consisted of 46 offset areas, of which 31 are Northrop- and Raytheon-related and 15 are Lockheed-

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // related. The entire deal, when all phases of the deal are executed, is expected to cost approximately 20 billion zlotys. “Signing the offset agreement with the Polish MoD sets the stage for the creation of new jobs in the U.S. and Poland and strengthens the trans-Atlantic partnership by fostering the exchange of information and ideas between U.S. and Polish industry,” Pete Bata, Raytheon’s vice president of Poland integrated air and missile defense programs, said at the time of its signing. Now that the letter is signed, the U.S. government and Poland can begin contract negotiations with Raytheon, Northrop and Lockheed. “Poland joins the now 15 nation-strong group of countries which trust Patriot to defend their citizens, military and sovereignty,” Wes Kremer, president of Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, said in a March 28 statement. “Poland’s procurement of Patriot strengthens Trans-Atlantic partnership and security by enabling a common approach to Integrated Air and Missile Defense, and creating jobs in the U.S. and Poland.” Of NATO members, the U.S., Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain have Patriot, and Romania has signed a letter of offer and agreement for the system. The U.S. State Department has also cleared a possible sale of Patriot to Sweden, which is awaiting congressional approval. According to Raytheon, the subsequent phase beyond the first two batteries would include the acquisition of additional Patriot fire units, gallium nitride-based 360-degree active electronically scanned array radar and a low-cost interceptor missile called SkyCeptor. On the Missile Segment Enhancement side, Poland becomes the fifth international customer to sign an agreement to buy the missile. The U.S., Qatar, Japan, Romania and the United Arab Emirates have signed agreements to buy the Missile Segment Enhancement weapon. “We’re honored to partner with Poland in support of the Wisla Air and Missile Defense system to protect and defend their armed forces, citizens and infrastructure. We also look forward to working with the Polish Armaments Group consortium of companies in support of the agreed to Wisla technology transfer,” Tim Cahill, vice president of Integrated Air and Missile Defense at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, said in a March 28 statement. “Today’s global security environment demands reliable Hit-to-Kill technology and innovative solutions. We expect PAC-3 MSE interceptors to continue serving as an integral layer of defense,” he added. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/28/poland-officially-signs-deal-to-buy-patriot- from-us/ Return to top

Miami Herald (Miami, Fla.) Spying on U.S. Nuclear Submarine Base Factor in Closing of Russia’s Seattle Consulate By Franco Ordonez and Kevin G. Hall March 26, 2018 WASHINGTON — The Trump administration expelled 60 Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle — the latter to help block Moscow from spying on U.S. Naval Base Kitsap, the home port of U.S. Navy nuclear submarines in Washington State.

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The White House took the dramatic step in conjunction with more than a dozen European allies retaliating against Moscow’s alleged role in poisoning a former Russian spy living in the United Kingdom. It is said to be the largest, global one-time expulsion of a country’s intelligence officials ever. The aggressive actions run counter to President Donald Trump’s efforts to improve ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and instead reflect the U.S. intelligence apparatus’ growing concerns of an increased Russian surveillance on Washington and critical military bases. “It’s not just any naval base,” said Brian McKeon, who served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President Barack Obama. “It’s one of the two bases where we have submarines that have nuclear weapons.” Dozens of European and NATO allies joined the United States and expelled Russian intelligence officials from their countries. European Union nations on Monday expelled 30 people, Ukraine ordered 13 to leave and Canada expelled seven. British Prime Minister Theresa May called it “the largest collective expulsion of Russian intelligence officers in history.” Mike Carpenter, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense with responsibility for the Russia portfolio until January 2017, called the expulsions an important step, but more symbolic if not followed up with more consequential actions. One option for a next step, he suggested, includes financial sanctions similar to those imposed on Iran that would prohibit transactions with Russian financial institutions and Russian defense companies. “Such steps would have a strong impact on Moscow's calculus,” Carpenter said. “The expulsion of Russian diplomats alone, however, is unlikely to deter Russia from its aggressive behavior.” Moscow quickly vowed retaliation. “There will be a mirror-like response,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. “We consider this step as unfriendly and not serving the tasks and interests of establishing the causes and finding the perpetrators of the incident that took place on March 4 in Salisbury.” Russia has repeatedly denied being behind the nerve agent attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury on March 4. Skripal, 66, and his 33-year-old daughter Yulia were found unconscious on a public bench in a shopping center and remain critically ill in a hospital. Trump has yet to speak publicly about the expulsion. Nor did Trump raise the accusations of poisoning of the ex-spy in a phone call with Putin last week. He instead went against the advice of national security advisors by congratulating the Russian leader on his March 18 reelection victory. The White House said it continues to want to build a better relationship with Russia, but that’s only possible if Russia changes its behavior and recognizes that its actions have consequences. A senior administration official warned of an "unacceptably high" number of spies at the Russian consulate in Seattle. "It sends a very clear signal, particularly since on the West Coast, the Russians will now have a degraded capability with regards to spying on our citizens," a senior administration official said Monday. The number of ousted Russian officials — including a dozen at the United nations — is almost double the amount expelled by President Barack Obama in December 2016 in retaliation for Moscow’s interference in the U.S. presidential election. And it is nearly three times larger than the expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats by Great Britain earlier this month. It even surpasses the 51 Russian diplomats expelled by President George W. Bush in 2001.

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The closure of the Seattle consulate is a significant blow to Russian espionage, according to one former high-level U.S. official who handled Russian intelligence. The former official said Russia is not only interested in the military base, but also the aircraft manufacturer Boeing and the shopping website Amazon, whose reach and products extends into homes across America. "Seattle is an important tech center" of interest to Russian intelligence, said the official, pointing to the 2010 U.S. arrests of 10 members of a Russian sleeper cell. The cell, with some members in Seattle, became notorious for its attractive spy Anna Chapman. Chapman was part of what the Justice Department called the Illegals Program, which became the inspiration for the popular TV series The Americans. In real life, the cell members lived normal suburban lives, had U.S.-born children and assimilated. Two other alleged cell members were implicated, including 23-year-old Alexey Karetnikov, who worked as an entry level software tester for Microsoft in Seattle. He was deported for immigration violations. "A consulate is a clandestine signals-collection site … and is a base of operations," said the official, noting Russian collection abilities have been dealt other recent setbacks with the closure last year of the Russian consulate in San Francisco and Russia’s traditional "vacation" compounds in Maryland and New York State due to alleged espionage activities. http://www.miamiherald.com/article206898199.html Return to top

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) Russia to Receive Entire Fleet of Upgraded Supersonic Nuclear-Capable Bombers by 2030 By Franz-Stefan Gady March 21, 2018 Russia’s entire new fleet of Tu-160M2 bombers will be upgraded by 2030, the deputy Russian defense minister says. The Russian Aerospace Force’s entire fleet of new Tupolev Tu-160M2 long-range supersonic strategic bombers are expected to be put into service by 2030, according to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov. “We are going to purchase the entire fleet of our strategic Tu-160 bombers in their new version and carry out heavy upgrade[s] of operational aircraft where only the fuselage will remain while all the onboard radio-electronic equipment and engines will be replaced,” Borisov said on March 21, TASS news agency reports. “That is why, we will get the renewed fleet of strategic aircraft somewhere by 2030.” It is unclear whether Borisov in his comments was referring to the existing stockpile of 16 Tu-160s or the 50 Tu-160M2s purportedly to be manufactured at a rate of three aircraft per year beginning in 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced in January, that it had placed an order for the first batch of 10 Tupolev Tu-160M2s with the bomber’s manufacturer, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). The day the order for the 10 aircraft, estimated to be worth around $2.7 billion, was placed coincided with the maiden flight of the first partially upgraded Tu-160M2. (The Tu-160M2 flew with an old engine.) The aircraft was first rolled out at the S.P. Grobunov assembly facility in Kazan

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // in southwest Russia in November 2017. The new Tu-160M2 will be an upgraded variant of the Cold War-era Soviet Tu-160, first introduced into service in 1987 and the last strategic bomber to enter service prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Next to upgraded avionics and a new engine, the aircraft will also feature “special coatings,” according to Borisov, to reduce the plane’s radar signature. The new bomber will be be armed with long-range standoff cruise missiles, including the Kh-101/Kh-102 (nuclear variant) air-launched cruise missile and the Kh-55 subsonic air-launched cruise missile, among others. As with other aircraft programs such as the Su-57 stealth fighter, the Russian military aircraft industry has been struggling to develop a next-generation engine for the bomber, as I reported in January: [The] Russian military aircraft industry still is having trouble with the bomber’s new engine. (…) The Tu-160M2 is expected to be fitted with the new Kuznetsov NK-32-2 turbofan engine, providing increased maneuverability and range. (…) The Russian aircraft industry began testing a non-afterburning variant of the Kuznetsov NK-32 engine, purportedly the largest and most powerful turbofan jet engine ever fitted on a bomber, in October [2017]. The new engine will reportedly increase the new bomber’s operational range by up to 1,000 kilometers. Borisov, on March 21, noted that the new engine will increase fuel efficiency by 10 percent: “In its upgraded version, it [the engine] will be 10 percent more efficient, which will make it possible to increase the flight range of the strategic bomber by about 1,000 kilometers.” As of now, it is unclear when the new engine will be ready for serial production. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/russia-to-receive-entire-fleet-of-upgraded-supersonic-nuclear- capable-bombers-by-2030/ Return to top

U.S. News & World Report (Washington, D.C.) European Powers Press for Iran Sanctions to Buttress Nuclear Deal By Robin Emmott and John Irish March 28, 2018 BRUSSELS/PARIS (Reuters) - France, Britain and Germany sought on Wednesday to persuade their EU partners to back new sanctions on Iran to preserve a nuclear deal with Tehran that U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to pull out of in May, diplomats said. The new measures proposed by London, Paris and Berlin were discussed by the EU's 28 ambassadors and could include members of Iran's most powerful security force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), diplomats said. Trump has given the European signatories a May 12 deadline to "fix the terrible flaws" of the 2015 nuclear deal, which was agreed under his predecessor Barack Obama, or he will refuse to extend U.S. sanctions relief on Iran. The European Union rejects those criticisms. But Britain, France and Germany hope their steps could encourage Trump to issue new waivers preventing U.S. sanctions lifted under the deal from being reimposed next month.

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In Brussels at the closed-door meeting, the three pushed for agreement on possible travel bans and asset freezes before a foreign ministers' meeting next month, four diplomats told Reuters. Some EU capitals said they need more time, and discussions are expected to continue next week. A total of 15 Iranian individuals and companies are on a list circulated to EU governments, but there was no direct discussion of names at Wednesday's meeting, one diplomat said. Britain, France and Germany have proposed the extra EU sanctions over Iran's ballistic missile programmes and its role in the war in Syria, according to a document seen by Reuters. Diplomats pointed to the next EU foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg on April 16, the last formal gathering on the EU agenda before Trump's May deadline, although governments can always convene other sessions. "The idea is to have a final decision on Iran sanctions by or at the April Foreign Affairs Council," the diplomat said. But another diplomat said: "It will be complicated because this will need time to convince the member states." The sanctions would not involve measures that were lifted under the nuclear deal but would instead target individual Iranians that the EU believes are behind Iran's ballistic weapons and its support for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which is also subject to sanctions. Any Iranians targeted would be subject to asset freezes and bans on travelling to the EU or doing business with companies based in the bloc. SOME EU NATIONS WARY EU envoys discussed possible sanctions on the basis of last week's meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels, who agreed that Iran needed to be held to account for its role in Syria's seven-year war, even while upholding the Iran nuclear accord. At that meeting, France also urged the EU to consider new sanctions on Iran, citing publicly the "proliferation of ballistic missiles and (Tehran's) very questionable role in the near- and Middle East." But countries ranging from Sweden and Ireland to Iran's closest European allies Italy and Greece still need to be convinced. Austria is also wary, one diplomat said. Given strong EU support for the nuclear deal, signed by the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, the European Union and Iran, many governments are wary of doing anything that might jeopardise it. Any EU-wide measures would be the first significant punitive steps since the bloc lifted broad economic sanctions on Iran last year following the accord to curb Tehran's nuclear ambitions for at least a decade. Ballistic missiles fired by Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi militia killed a man in Riyadh on Sunday. Iran says its missiles are purely defensive weapons. It has given no indication that it would walk away from the nuclear deal due to the proposed new sanctions, which are minor compared with the broad sanctions lifted as part of the deal. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-03-28/eu-envoys-discuss-new-iran- sanctions-possible-adoption-in-april-diplomats Return to top

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MIDDLE EAST

Arab News (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)

Saudi-led Coalition Threatens Retaliation against Iran over Missiles Author Not Attributed March 26, 2018 RIYADH: The Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Houthi movement said on Monday that ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia were a serious escalation and threat to regional and international security. Coalition spokesman Col. Turki Al-Malki told a news conference in Riyadh that Sunday’s missile attacks on the Saudi capital were a clear violation of international law and accused the Houthis of smuggling weapons from Iran. The coalition threatened retaliation against Tehran, accusing it of being behind the multiple attacks on the Kingdom. We “reserve the right to respond against Iran at the right time and right place,” coalition spokesman Turki Al-Malki told a news conference, calling the development a “dangerous escalation.” Saudi forces said they intercepted seven missiles on Sunday, including over the capital Riyadh, in a deadly escalation that coincided with the third anniversary of the coalition’s intervention in Yemen. Displaying wreckage at a news conference in Riyadh of what it said were fragments of those ballistic missiles, the coalition claimed forensic analysis showed they were supplied to Houthi rebels by their ally Iran. “The missiles launched against Saudi territory were smuggled from Iran,” coalition spokesman Turki Al-Malki told reporters. "Iran has become like an appendix in the body of the international community. Either they correct their evil path or the international community will correct it for them," he said. Al-Maliki added Houthi rebels have fired 104 ballistic missiles towards Saudi Arabia and Iran exploits the Al-Hudaydah Port in Yemen to smuggle ballistic weapons to the Houthis. He also stated that Houthis are using Sanaa airport as a platform to train their militias and as a base to launch their Iranian-made "Sayyad" ballistic missiles. Presenting the remnants of alleged Iranian-made missiles, Al-Maliki described the possession of ballistic missiles by Houthi militants as a "serious developmnet". "Yemen has suffered from Iranian intervention and support for Houthi militants to force a coup," he added. The missile strikes resulted in the first reported fatality from Houthi fire in the Saudi capital. Egyptian national Abdul-Moteleb Ahmed, 38, died instantly in his bed when what appeared to be burning shrapnel struck his ramshackle room in Riyadh’s Um Al-Hammam district, leaving a gaping hole in the roof, witnesses said. Three other Egyptian laborers in the same room were wounded and hospitalized, they said.

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The Iran-aligned Houthis said on their Al-Masirah television that Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport was among the targets. Al-Maliki alleged the rebels in Sanaa were using the airport there to launch missiles on Saudi territory, adding the coalition had seized a number of smuggled weapons. Iran has repeatedly denied arming the Houthis in Yemen, despite claims by the United States and Saudi Arabia that the evidence of an arms connection is irrefutable. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1274016/saudi-arabia Return to top

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel) Netanyahu: Israel Has Consistent Policy – Prevent Enemies from Obtaining Nuclear Weapons By Herb Keinon March 21, 2018 Netanyahu was the head of the opposition at the time of the attack, and was interviewed soon after it on what was then Channel 1. Israel has a consistent policy of preventing its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Wednesday, 12 hours after the IDF Censor allowed publication of details of the 2007 attack on a nuclear reactor that was being built in northeastern Syria. “The Israeli government, IDF and Mossad prevented Syria from developing nuclear capabilities,” Netanyahu said in a statement. “For this they are deserving of all praise. Israel’s policy has been and remains consistent – to prevent our enemies from arming themselves with nuclear weapons.” Damascus, meanwhile, remained silent Wednesday on the matter. Israel’s admission has placed President Bashar Assad in a tricky position, since he never admitted that Syria – contrary to its international obligations – was building a nuclear reactor. Netanyahu was the head of the opposition at the time of the attack, and was interviewed soon after it on what was then Channel 1. When the interviewer, Haim Yavin, said to Netanyahu that he had not yet heard him praise then-prime minister Ehud Olmert for the operation, which at the time was shrouded in mystery, Netanyahu replied, “When the prime minister does things that in my eyes are important for Israel’s security, I give my backing. Here, too, I was involved in this matter from the very beginning and gave my backing, but it is too early to discuss this issue, and there will be plenty of time to give out all the congratulations.” Asked if he called Olmert to congratulate him, Netanyahu replied: “Yes.” Netanyahu was taken to task after that interview for discussing the operation, seeming to confirm it, even though at the time Israel had not admitted to it and it was under a blackout from the censor. His critics charged he was somehow trying to elbow in and take some of the credit for the action. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-Israel-has-consistent-policy-prevent-enemies- from-obtaining-nuclear-weapons-546712 Return to top

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INDIA/PAKISTAN

Express (London, United Kingdom) China Sell DANGEROUS Nuclear Weapons to Pakistan as Conflict with India ESCALATES By Dan Falvey March 27, 2018 CHINA is selling dangerous military technology to Pakistan, aimed at helping boost the nation’s ballistic missile programme, it has been reported. The revelations come as tensions between India and Pakistan are rising, risking a full blown conflict between the two neighbours. Pakistan’s decision to invest in its nuclear capabilities during such a volatile moment in its diplomatic relations with India has caused concern. China declassified the information regarding the sales this week, but it is uncertain when the transfer took place. However, it is already known Pakistan has been testing its nuclear capabilities for over a year. Last March, the head of the Defence Intelligence Agency stated Islamabad had “conducted the first test launch of its nuclear-capable ‘Ababeel' ballistic missile, demonstrating South Asia's first multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload.” According to the Arms Control Association Pakistan is pro-actively looking to increase its nuclear stock. They said the nation is “pursuing new ballistic missile, cruise missile and sea-based nuclear delivery systems”. The group estimated the Asian country has a nuclear warhead stockpile of approximately 130 to 140. They also admitted the increase in nuclear stock was a direct consequence of rising tensions with New Delhi. The Arms Control Association said: “Pakistan has lowered the threshold for nuclear weapon use by developing tactical nuclear weapon capabilities to counter perceived Indian conventional military threats.” Heavy exchanges of shelling on the contested border, known as the Line of Control (LoC), have increased over the past 12 months. The Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947 and 1965 both revolved around competing claims for the area. Both countries have accused the other of being responsible. There are fears the tensions could cause a rift across the whole region with countries in Asia picking sides in the conflict. The United Nations have encouraged the pair to engage in talks as part of a desperate plea for the violence on the border to be de-escalated. https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/937468/india-pakistan-conflict-china-nuclear-weapons- pakistan-world-war-3 Return to top

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VOA (Washington, D.C.) US Slams Pakistani Firms with Sanctions for Nuclear Trade Author Not Attributed March 26, 2018 The United States is imposing sanctions on seven Pakistani companies for alleged links to the nuclear trade. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIC) placed 23 companies —15 from Sudan and one from Singapore, in addition to the seven from Pakistan — on its Entity List. The Entity List contains companies the U.S. determines are "acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States," according to BIC's website. Companies placed on the list need special licenses to do business in the United States. A U.S. State Department spokesperson told VOA that the U.S. regularly adds entities to the list. "It is not country-specific. Entities are looked at on a case-by-case basis, irrespective of national affiliation, and are added based on whether they operate counter to U.S. national security interests," the spokesperson said. VOA tried to talk to some of the companies on the list, but they would not comment on their designation. Pakistan said it would "seek more information" from the U.S. and these companies to better understand the circumstances which led to its listing. A statement released by Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "Pakistan believes that there should be no undue restrictions on the access to dual-use items and technologies for peaceful and legitimate purposes. Pakistan has always been transparent and willing to engage with the suppliers of the dual-use items." Dual-use technologies have both civilian and possible military uses. The sanctions could potentially hurt Pakistan's chances to join the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Pakistan wants to join the 48 countries who are members of the NSG, but the United States and some of its European allies oppose the move. The NSG is dedicated to curbing nuclear arms proliferation by controlling the export and re- transfer of materials that could foster nuclear weapons development. Nuclear-armed Pakistan applied to join the NSG in 2016, but has made little progress. The U.S. has been concerned about Pakistan's development of new nuclear weapons systems, including small tactical nuclear weapons, and has been trying to persuade Islamabad to make a unilateral declaration of "restraint." Pakistani denials Pakistani officials have been accused of handing over nuclear secrets to North Korea. The government has denied the accusations, though Pakistan has a poor record on nuclear proliferation. Pakistan's Foreign Office said the nation's "efforts in the area of export controls and nonproliferation, as well as nuclear safety and security, are well known. Pakistan and the U.S. have a history of cooperation in these areas."

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The announcement of sanctions has come as relations between Pakistan and the United States are at a low point. The United States accuses Pakistan of helping militant groups that attack the U.S. and its allied forces across the border in Afghanistan — a claim Pakistan denies. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-slams-pakistan-companies-sanctions-nuclear- trade/4317189.html Return to top

The Daily Star (London, United Kingdom) WW3: India will 'DESTROY Pakistan and CRIPPLE China in two-front nuclear war' By Joy Basu March 25, 2018 THE world could witness a devastating nuclear conflict if tensions between three global giants escalate, a retired army general has warned. Retired Indian army lieutenant BS Jaswal, former commander of Northern Command, said India would reduce nuclear giants China and Pakistan into crumbling ruins if it is faced with a "two-front war". The devastating conflict would destroy all of Pakistan and throw it back to the "Stone Age", he said. And China's massive economic strides would take a massive hit and isolate Beijing from the world, he added confidently. Speaking to Daily Star Online, Mr Jaswal said India is ready to take on its mighty neighbours simultaneously but both enemy countries would likely face a devastating fallout. He said: "India's policy is no first use [nuclear weapons] but massive retaliation. "We can face a two-front war. And if we retaliate, Pakistan will be thrown back to the Stone Age. We will destroy all of Pakistan." He added: "And for China to wage a war would mean risking international isolation and facing massive setbacks to its economic ambitions." Fears of war were raised over a new moot point – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – plummeting existing tensions between India and its neighbours to a new low. The new trade route is being built between fast friends Pakistan and China at a cost of £33bn in the northern Gilgit Baltistan; a territory India claims as its own. The news comes as China's president Xi Jinping flexes his military muscles in the area of Doklam, and heavy artillery is exchanged with Pakistan across the contentious Line of Control in Kashmir. Tensions remain equally strained in the Indian Ocean. India is building a massive military facility in Seychelles, north of Madagascar, in a major attempt to counter arch-enemy China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean. Last year, Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat expressed his deep concern for a war on two fronts with China and Pakistan. He stated China had started to “flex its muscles” and had begun “taking over territory in a very gradual manner”.

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He said: “In sum, China and Pakistan are one entity threatening India on multiple fronts.” The former lieutenant discussed China’s “adept” skill for taking territory without resorting to “direct conflict”. He added: “China is adept at nibbling territory, and going by the experience of the Doklam crisis, it never seeks direct conflict. “It calls an area 'disputed,' and then occupies it by proclaiming it as Chinese territory. Lieutenant general from the Indian Army’s Special Forces Prakash Katoch said earlier that Pakistan’s “foreign and defence policies” could be influenced by China following reports Xi Jinping could be planning to add to the tension in the region of Jammu and Kashmir. He went on: “20 rounds of talks on the India-China boundary have yielded little and there is a need to address questions of an escalation by Pakistan at China’s behest. “This also raises questions about whether Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies are influenced by China. “Has Pakistan become a de facto Chinese province with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Belt and Road Initiative? “Dispassionate analyses would conclude that this is a real possibility." https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/691188/war-news-india-china-pakistan-nuclear- nuke-doklam-kashmir-loc Return to top

COMMENTARY

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) A North Korean Gordian Knot: Undoing the Nuclear Link By Mercy A. Kuo March 27, 2018 Insights from Soo Kim. Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Soo Kim – former intelligence officer at the Central Intelligence Agency, specializing in leadership intentions, nuclear proliferation, and propaganda analysis – is the 133rd in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” Explain “Gordian knot” in the context of the North Korea imbroglio. The expression describes an extremely difficult problem solved easily through creative thinking or bold, decisive action. Seoul’s Blue House officials have recently used this metaphor to draw a parallel to the current standoff with North Korea. An apt comparison, as it conveys the complexity of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the formal name for North Korea] dilemma and reflects our cautious, reined-in optimism in finding that one-fell-swoop solution to undo the decades-long tension with Pyongyang.

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With simmering tensions punctuated by two upcoming high-level dialogues – the inter-Korean summit in April followed by the Trump-Kim face-to-face in May – expectations for a fruitful outcome from these meetings are in suspense. The flurry of diplomatic activity in the lead-up to these meetings, including the recent announcement that representatives from the DPRK, South Korea, and the U.S. will be meeting in Finland for Track 1.5 talks, reflects the anticipatory mood of stakeholders. Yet, the odds of arriving at a clean fix to undo the Gordian knot à la North Korea seem just as uncertain. Identify the critical link in this knot. The key, as expressed by South Korean officials, is in “cutting the biggest link,” which would then set free the remaining entangled knots. Indisputably, the biggest, most critical link is Pyongyang’s nuclear program – the regime’s all-powerful bargaining chip and reason for existence. The threat of a nuclear attack has been the Kim regime’s single most effective coercive and negotiating tool; it can be used any time, at any occasion. Bluster or credible, nuclear weapons capabilities have unfailingly served in extracting concessions from the international community, attracting media attention, and providing the DPRK with a sense of legitimacy. Considering the versatility and potency of nuclear threat capabilities, it comes as no surprise that Pyongyang has held out on giving up this arsenal for over a half century. Most recently, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha portrayed North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization as merely a part of the grand vision of a lasting, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. Kang’s comments, while taken in good faith, shifts our long-focused lens away from the nuclear issue, and in effect downplays the seriousness and imminence of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat capabilities. To restate, the purpose of the inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK summits is to hammer out steps for the Kim regime to follow through on its “willingness” to denuclearize. Should this shifted framework be applied to the upcoming talks, we could be setting ourselves up for some unintended consequences. Our greatest apprehension: the U.S. and South Korea relent to concessions prior to the North taking any credible and verifiable steps toward denuclearization, and North Korea walks away with a generous, undeserved aid package – plus an added bonus of its nuclear program remaining intact. Describe a scenario in which North Korea pursues denuclearization. The indispensability of nuclear capabilities to North Korea’s existence and survivability can be re- emphasized when we consider a scenario in which the Kim regime takes constructive steps to follow through on denuclearization. If the North renounces its nuclear and missile programs, there would be no confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul and Tokyo’s perception of Pyongyang as a national security threat would be reduced; Seoul’s dependence on U.S. troops to back up its military and defense readiness in the event of an outbreak along the demilitarized zone would be much more relaxed; the Kim dynasty would not be able to barter the lives and rights of its citizens for international economic concessions for regime survivability. If the North renounces its nuclear and missile programs, it will only be a matter of time [until] we settle the remaining tangential issues pertaining to the Kim regime – its atrocious human rights record, illicit trade and financial transactions, complicity in acts of terrorism by hostile states, and cybercrimes. How should Washington and Seoul handle this Gordian knot? Evidently, the toughest link in the Gordian knot will not come undone so easily, as it defeats the purpose of the riddle – the North has much to lose by giving up its nuclear arsenal. Denuclearization is akin to jettisoning Kim Jong-un’s lifeline and forever bargaining token. As tempting as it may be to pursue bold, decisive measures to slay this persistent, tenacious knot – particularly under this time crunch — Washington, Seoul, and other parties should cautiously

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // proceed in the months ahead, discerning North Korea’s olive branch extension and intent to denuclearize with a grain of skepticism. Surmise Pyongyang’s current calculation/miscalculation. Interestingly, the DPRK has yet to issue a public statement in response to President Trump’s acceptance of Kim’s summit invitation; we’ve also yet to see North Korea’s response to the recent announcement of the resumption of the joint U.S.-South Korea military drills. Laying low and keeping mum are, as we know, a tactic Pyongyang employs to hold us in suspense. In addition, even for Kim, two summits back-to-back – including one with his archrival – is a pretty big deal. Kim’s probably using this time to re-center himself, calculate and mentally play out possible moves in the lead-up to and during the negotiations. If the U.S. and South Korea are intent on concluding the summit meetings with more than just Pyongyang’s conditional, qualified, and noncommittal agreement on denuclearization – which would be no different from the previous summits – we need to once again remind ourselves that the DPRK will not easily give up its nuclear card, for its inherent and existential value to the survival of the Kim regime. Complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization will come with a heavy price. All sides have been made aware of this; Washington and Seoul should thus deflate any unrealistic hopes and anticipate a condition-laden, tentative guarantee of rehabilitated steps from their North Korean counterparts before reaching the threshold for a pledge to denuclearize. After all, it wouldn’t be called a Gordian knot if it’s easily undoable. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/a-north-korean-gordian-knot-undoing-the-nuclear-link/ Return to top

The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) The Strategic Wisdom of Accommodating North Korea’s Nuclear Status By Graham W. Jenkins March 28, 2018 What if Washington came to terms with a nuclear North Korea but remained on the peninsula? As the North Korean “crisis” continues to unfold, any negotiations, including the possible (albeit unlikely) Trump-Kim summit, represent a significant strategic opportunity for coming decades — even if today’s official policy goals are never achieved. Pyongyang and Washington must come to terms with two realities: North Korea will not surrender its nuclear arsenal; the United States will not withdraw its support for South Korea. But once the U.S. policymaking apparatus accepts this, the aperture of the possible widens. By tacitly acquiescing to North Korea’s nuclear status — and in the process, securing concessions on advance warning and notifications, among other subjects — the United States could partially supplant China as a patron (in a limited sense), simultaneously shoring up peninsular stability and presenting China with a new security challenge on its own border, requiring the diversion of forces and materiel. A North Korea no longer beholden to Beijing would dilute Chinese strategic attention, with the Yalu River joining the Western Pacific Ocean, Indo-Chinese flashpoints, Belt and Road, and mounting internal unrest as key security foci for the Central Military Commission. None of this requires in any way weakening the U.S. commitment to South Korea. Continued joint exercises and a military presence are key both for the United States’ overall Indo-Pacific posture as well as its readiness to defend Seoul if North Korea should renege or a more revanchist leader emerge. Nor does it mean

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // abandoning U.S. nonproliferation obligations. This is the geopolitical jujitsu of nuclear recognition: rather than allow China to use North Korea as a wedge between Washington and Seoul, by dislodging North Korea from its current firmament it would be positioned as a potential threat to China as well, tying up forces and resources in the Northern Theater Command that might otherwise be deployed elsewhere. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo would have the freedom to turn their attention to the larger looming strategic issue: China itself. If there’s a dividing line in the U.S. foreign policy community, it probably lies between those who think there is any prospect of the Kim Jong-un regime’s voluntary denuclearization and those who think such a thing impossible. Much of the debate around pursuing an ill-considered military option depends on this framing – the interventionists think North Korea will only denuclearize at gunpoint, whereas those opposed to intervention mostly agree but see such a goal as incommensurate with the cost. Of course, North Korea – despite indicating some newfound willingness – will almost certainly never, ever dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Such weapons guarantee its existence as an independent state, and even if scholars like B.R. Myers are correct, and the regime’s sole raison d’état remains the promise of reunification, whether or not we like North Korea’s nuclear status doesn’t matter. North Korea will not surrender its nuclear arsenal without U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula, and that is a nonstarter both for moral reasons (abandoning South Korea) and geostrategic ones (conceding the peninsula to a Chinese sphere of influence). But where the anti-interventionists (who are otherwise correct in their opposition to a pointless squandering of lives, resources, and goodwill) fall short is in depicting what form a non- disarmament U.S. policy toward North Korea should take. Tacit recognition of Pyongyang as a nuclear power at first seems, more or less, a nonstarter for a host of reasons, not least of which is the blow it might deal to nonproliferation efforts around the world. But North Korea is not as much of an outlier as it might otherwise seem. The United States has certainly not taken any action to halt the development of nuclear weapons in India or Pakistan, despite their nonadherence to global norms of nonproliferation. Perhaps their possession is defensible given that neither country signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but then so too would be North Korea’s, given their invocation of Article X and observation of the legal NPT withdrawal process. There are significant drawbacks to outright recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state. Even though by withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea did not violate international law per se, openly admitting that any country can a) exercise Article X and withdraw from the NPT and then b) develop and test a nuclear arsenal, without suffering consequences for it, sets a troubling precedent, to put it mildly. But it is still possible to pursue a policy of splitting the needle: quietly accepting (not officially, but through nonofficial or track II diplomatic efforts) North Korea’s nuclear status while refusing to officially condone it. Such a tacit form of acceptance would also allow the United States to potentially extract concessions from Pyongyang and allow it to maintain its nuclear arsenal, all of which would serve to reduce its reliance on China as a client state, and instead allow it to chart a more independent path, but one in which the United States, China, and South Korea would still be able to deter any major crises. Indeed, the United States’ own actions and policies since 9/11 have done little to prove to anyone that disarmament is in their favor; the power of example is a compelling one for Pyongyang. Even in Libya, the one successful case of convincing a state to surrender its nuclear program, Gaddafi’s own fate in the Arab Spring suggests that any other nation ought to think twice before trusting the United States with the preservation of their regime in the wake of disarmament. Even the South China Morning Post, which has been toeing a Beijing line as of late, felt compelled to publish an opinion piece explaining “How North Korea’s nuclear weapons are helping to prevent war.” Current

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // efforts by the Trump administration to gut the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and insist that Iran renegotiate “the Deal” imply that future U.S. governments will feel no compulsion to honor the diplomatic agreements made by their predecessors. As Phil Gordon points out, attempting to rewrite the JCPOA in order to dictate a similar arrangement to North Korea is more likely to end in zero effective nuclear agreements than two. In short: what deal could the United States possibly offer that would be worth them surrendering their guarantor of independence? The concept of reunification is losing salience in South Korea. Their rising generation, which never witnessed a unified peninsula torn asunder and has grown up in the shadow of the demilitarized zone, cherishes its peace and prosperity, and sees little value in a destructive conflict to reunify the peninsula. Overall support for reunification has dropped more than 10 percent in the past four years, to only 57 percent of South Koreans of all ages in favor, and less than 30 percent of those in their 20s. South Korea has learned to live with a bellicose North Korea and a fortified DMZ. It shows little sign of revisionism or revanchism. While confederation remains a possibility, it seems some distance off (though as all observers of international affairs have come to know, the unexpected can unfold with startling rapidity). China is not dissatisfied with the present scenario, in which North Korea drives the South and the United States further apart, torn by simultaneous needs for security assurances and action alike. As Stimson’s Yun Sun was quoted in the New York Times: “The Chinese enjoy the wedge North Korea is driving between South Korea and the U.S… and it will create a further rift between the allies.” The continued U.S. insistence on denuclearization and the North Korean refusal to contemplate it have left the two at an impasse, despite a promise of talks brokered by South Korea itself. Here is where I part ways with John Mearsheimer. While he believes, rightfully, that North Korea will never denuclearize, both for reasons of their own national security and the relative untrustworthiness of the United States on this issue, he also thinks that preserving a separate North Korea as a “buffer state” remains a paramount interest of China’s. In fact, if Beijing had its druthers, the Korean Peninsula – denuclearized, unified, and with the U.S. presence removed for good – would be a fixture in China’s own sphere of influence. The continuing presence of an increasingly unpredictable Pyongyang is cause for alarm, rather than any sort of reliable ally. Oriana Skylar Mastro did an excellent job of debunking some of these myths earlier this year in Foreign Affairs, outlining the new Chinese calculus in Korean affairs: Beijing may have previously been wary of a reunified Korea led by Seoul, but no longer. Some prominent Chinese scholars have begun to advocate abandoning Pyongyang in favor of a better relationship with Seoul. Even Xi has been surprisingly vocal about his support for Korean reunification in the long term, albeit through an incremental peace process. In a July 2014 speech at Seoul National University, Xi stated that “China hopes that both sides of the peninsula will improve their relations and support the eventual realization of an independent and peaceful reunification of the peninsula.” …China’s likely strategic assertiveness in a Korean war would be driven largely by its concerns about the Kim regime’s nuclear arsenal, an interest that would compel Chinese forces to intervene early to gain control over North Korea’s nuclear facilities … Beijing is also concerned that a reunified Korea might inherit the North’s nuclear capabilities. My Chinese interlocutors seemed convinced that South Korea wants nuclear weapons and that the United States supports those ambitions. They fear that if the Kim regime falls, the South Korean military will seize the North’s nuclear sites and material, with or without Washington’s blessing. Although this concern may seem far-fetched, the idea of going nuclear has gained popularity in Seoul. And the main opposition party has called for the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula-an option that the Trump administration has been reluctant to rule out.

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It’s hard not to conclude that while China is content with a Kim in Pyongyang, it is much more worried about that same regime possessing nuclear weapons. What makes an adversary uncomfortable is not inexorably a net positive for the United States, but in this case, it might well be. David Lai makes the case for “solving the North Korea problem the Chinese way”; in other words, first normalizing relations with Pyongyang before backing Chinese efforts at disarmament. This seems a wise course of action. Much as China has, until recently, only half-heartedly cooperated with sanctions resolutions on North Korea, so too will the United States cooperate with a Chinese-led denuclearization push. But such a process needn’t be a hasty one. The only way accepting North Korean nuclear weapons would be a net strategic gain, however, is if there is little-to-no change to the U.S. posture in South Korea. Acknowledging the North’s nuclear status does not mean dismissing the threat it would continue to pose to the South, and our forward presence there is a vital strategic asset to the United States in an era of growing Pacific salience. Rajan Menon has proposed a similar end to the denuclearization push, but whereas he proposes that this be accompanied by “an end to patrols over South Korea and international waters off North Korea” and “a reduction in the frequency of U.S.-South Korean military exercises,” such changes would ultimately defeat the purpose of changing our North Korean nuclear policy. It’s important, too, to condition any U.S. acknowledgement on North Korea making concessions. There is a broad range of requests that would represent positive policy outcomes, depending on the executive branch’s preferences. Advance notice of missile and nuclear testing (or even adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), establishing a “hotline” linking Pyongyang, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo for crisis management, visible human rights changes like work camp prisoner releases or allowing humanitarian workers into the country, withdrawing artillery from the Kaesong Heights – some combination of these or others should be sufficient to justify changing U.S. policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It’s rare that a nation is presented with a win-win-win scenario, but if bold enough to accept this manageable additional risk, the United States can emerge from this missile crisis in a stronger strategic position than before, with an adversary forced to reinforce an additional front and with our own hand strengthened. While the Trump-Kim summit – and indeed, any diplomatic efforts whatsoever – might now be a flight of fancy, with the ascension of John Bolton to national security advisor, negotiations remain the single best means of resolving the current Korean crisis. The United States stands to gain much: not least of all, avoiding a needless war. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-strategic-wisdom-of-accommodating-north-koreas- nuclear-status/ Return to top

Boston Globe (Boston, Mass.) On Iran and North Korea: Don’t Trust, and Verify, Verify, Verify By Ernest J. Moniz March 27, 2018 RONALD REAGAN invoked the Russian proverb “trust, but verify” when negotiating nuclear disarmament with the Soviet Union, but in recent negotiations with Iran and upcoming talks with North Korea, our North Star was and must be “don’t trust, and verify, verify, verify.” The most robust verification measures the world has ever known are the heart of the Iran nuclear agreement, officially the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The unique verification regime

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // developed to monitor Iran goes well beyond what any other nation is subject to under the nuclear safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that countries don’t divert nuclear materials from peaceful energy programs to build nuclear weapons. Critics of the Iran agreement suggest that it creates a nuclear-armed Iran, simply delayed by 15 years. The facts say otherwise. The core of the Iran agreement is an explicit commitment from Iran that it will never seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, accompanied by permanent prohibitions on key nuclear weapons development activities and significantly expanded monitoring of Iranian compliance. The monitoring requirement is nothing like the inadequate verification that was in place in Iran in the past, because Iran must permanently accept an IAEA regime that allows inspectors access to any site suspected of housing prohibited nuclear weapons-related activities, including military sites. Although other countries have signed up to allow IAEA inspectors access beyond acknowledged nuclear sites, only Iran is bound to grant access to suspect sites within a fixed period, less than a month. The IAEA and leading nuclear experts are confident that any uranium or plutonium, the materials necessary for nuclear weapons, can be detected within the access time frame. If Iran denies timely access to a suspected nuclear site, sanctions on Iran can be quickly snapped back in place, and the world will be required to enforce them. There is no sunset. In addition to the permanent requirements and restrictions, the Iran agreement put in place other extraordinary long-term arrangements, some out to 2041, for inspecting all of Iran’s nuclear-related activities, from uranium mining to the manufacture of centrifuge components. Adherence to the agreement, and recognition of its rigorous verification regime, is especially important as President Trump heads toward a possible summit discussion with Kim Jong Un. There’s no question that there are many differences between negotiating with Iran and North Korea, given that North Korea has nuclear bombs and Iran does not. The Iran negotiations worked because the United States and its partners focused specifically on verifiably preventing a military nuclear program, while North Korea negotiations will succeed only if they address security issues comprehensively. Even with those differences, however, the verification approach in the Iran agreement should inform any negotiations with North Korea. Conversely, if Trump withdraws the United States from the agreement, with Iran complying and with our allies clearly committed to its continuation, he will have compromised the most stringent nuclear verification standard ever achieved, with no credible prospect for restoring or improving it. Such a move would hand Iran a political “wedge” dividing the international community, and undercut vital arguments for verification of any agreement reached with North Korea. As with Iran, there cannot be an acceptable agreement with North Korea without an extraordinary and enforceable verification regime. Trump has the opportunity to make two crucial decisions in May. On Iran, the clear choice is to continue to adhere to the agreement while taking strong action to address other regional issues with allies and friends. On North Korea, he can take a very important step toward resolving the seemingly intractable nuclear issue by gaining North Korea’s commitment to negotiating a similarly stringent verification regime. There is no point to detailed negotiations without that commitment. North Korea, the only country to test nuclear explosives this century, has discussed a freeze of nuclear and missile testing during negotiations. However, a freeze has impact only if North Korea also suspends activities that could lead to the quick development of a bigger nuclear program if negotiations do not succeed. We can easily detect nuclear and missile tests that would violate a freeze, but a halt to production of nuclear weapons material needs a verification regime akin to that in Iran. The IAEA has no doubt learned lessons in Iran it could apply to North Korea, just as the Iran

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // negotiations were informed by the verification weaknesses exposed in previous agreements with North Korea. Like Iran, North Korea failed to meet its international commitments when it developed a pathway to a bomb. Like Iran, it has lost the trust of the international community and is under heavy sanctions. Like Iran, North Korea must be subject to a stringent verification regime as part of any meaningful agreement that eventually leads to nuclear disarmament. In coordination with our regional partners, “don’t trust, and verify, verify, verify” should guide any summit discussions and subsequent negotiations with North Korea. https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/03/26/iran-and-north-korea-don-trust-and-verify- verify-verify/Rf4yxsjKFxeT8sUhBzxC7I/story.html Return to top

War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.) Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons By Austin Long March 26, 2018 “Crazy.” “Dr. Strangelove weapons.” These were just two of the more colorful reactions to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revelation of new exotic nuclear delivery systems in a March 1 speech. The system receiving the most attention is a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile with intercontinental range, though the Status-6, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed long-range underwater vehicle, has also drawn comment. Why would Russia, which has over 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads that can already be delivered from existing ballistic and cruise missiles, invest in these new, exotic — and, according to some, crazy — systems? The answer is deeply rooted in two of the defining events of modern Russian and Soviet history: the Great Patriotic War (or World War II) and the Cold War. Far from being crazy, these “new” Russian nuclear weapons have their origin in an abiding fear and respect for U.S. nuclear and missile defense capabilities. This history has implications for the future of U.S.-Russian arms control, which will remain bleak absent a return to limitations on missile defense to address Russia’s longstanding concerns. Stalin and Defending Against the Bomb The roots of Russian insecurity go back to the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. While the traditional barriers to invading Russia — vast spaces, harsh weather, and Russian fighting spirit — held against German ground forces, the same cannot be said of aerial attack. Soviet air defenses were inadequate to counter Luftwaffe air raids, vaulting over the barriers and striking the Soviet interior. While the Soviets were eventually able to adjust the organization and equipment of their air defenses, the Red Army was well aware of the damage done to Germany by their allies’ massive strategic bombing campaign. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki underscored that in the next war, traditional Russian defensive advantages would count for nothing. The horrifying Nazi devastation of the Soviet Union took years — next time, it might only take days or even hours. Stalin launched crash programs to build atomic bombs and the means to deliver them. Notably, he also undertook a series of efforts to ensure defense of the Soviet Union against the atomic bomb.

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First, he launched air defense organizational reforms, culminating in the 1949 creation of a separate branch of the Soviet armed forces focused on strategic air defense. This created an enduring bureaucratic advocate for air and, later, missile defense. Then, in 1950, Stalin created a research and development organization focused on surface-to-air missiles that was essentially co- equal with the atomic bomb and offensive missile projects. Surface-to-air missiles were key to defending against high-flying nuclear bombers and, in the future, ballistic missiles. The Soviets, living with the searing memory of the Great Patriotic War linked to the possibility of nuclear war, took strategic defenses extremely seriously. Stalin’s efforts bore fruit a decade later when, in 1960, a Soviet surface-to-air missile downed an American U-2 spy plane. Less well-known is that the Soviets performed their first successful test intercept of an intermediate-range ballistic missile less than a year later. By the mid-1960s the Soviets had greatly expanded the areas of the country protected against air attack and begun deployment of a missile defense system around Moscow. Fear of Checkmate: Soviet Views of the Missile Defense Competition Even so, the Soviets were well aware of the limits of both their offensive and defensive forces relative to the Americans. The United States in the mid-1960s had a vastly more capable offensive nuclear force — if it invested as extensively in missile defense as the Soviets had, it would likely have had an equally huge advantage in that area as well. A CIA estimate from 1966 assessed likely Soviet responses to various proposed U.S. missile defense deployments, concluding: While we worry about their strengths and our vulnerabilities, they worry about our strengths and their vulnerabilities … From their point of view either the [missile defense] Posture A or the Posture B program would threaten eventually to degrade the deterrent power of their strategic attack forces. The Soviets took missile defense so seriously that they did not want to lose a competition in the field. Better that neither side have missile defenses than the United States be superior in offense and defense. Thus, despite intense interest in missile defense for both strategic and bureaucratic reasons, Soviet leaders were eager for an arms control agreement to end the competition. A Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1970 assessed that the Soviets would be interested in arms control limits on missile defense based in large part “on a fear that U.S. technology could put it ahead in this field.” Such limits were codified in 1972 as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Freezing missile defense also allowed the Soviets to agree to limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons, as embodied in the agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. Yet as Brendan Green and I have described, limits on the number of arms did not limit competition over the quality of those arms. The United States began improving the accuracy of its nuclear weapons and the intelligence to find elusive targets like submarines and mobile missiles. By the early 1980s, Soviet leadership was increasingly fearful that the United States was developing the capability to neutralize the Soviet strategic deterrent with offensive strikes. The head of the KGB (and soon-to-be leader of the Soviet Union) Yuri Andropov concluded in 1981, “The US is preparing for war but it is not willing to start a war … They strive for military superiority in order to ‘check’ us and then declare ‘checkmate’ against us without starting a war.” It was in this context that President Ronald Reagan announced in 1983 the Strategic Defense Initiative, a comprehensive missile defense program sometimes derisively called “Star Wars.” To the Soviets, already concerned about U.S. technical advantages in missile defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative was an obvious complement to existing U.S. capabilities to attack Soviet nuclear forces. Some Soviet calculations suggested that by the mid-1990s, when U.S. nuclear modernization was complete, a Soviet retaliatory strike following a U.S. nuclear first strike might only be able to hit

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100 American targets. An even modestly effective missile defense could cut that number in half, while a highly effective missile defense might reduce the number of targets struck to fewer than ten. U.S. “checkmate” looked increasingly possible — perhaps even likely. The Soviets began considering ways to neutralize the advantage of U.S. missile defenses. These included attacking space-based components of the system with anti-satellite weapons and building decoys for their existing missiles. More exotic asymmetric responses were apparently contemplated as well: A declassified article from the CIA’s professional journal notes, “General Secretary Yuri Andropov had considered such options as … developing and deploying underwater missiles that would not be affected by the space-based missile shield.” A 1983 U.S. intelligence assessment also noted the possibility that to counter U.S. missile defenses, the Soviets might eventually pursue “[n]uclear powered intercontinental cruise missiles” which “would have a greater payload capability, range, and ability to deploy advanced defensive electronics than present small cruise missiles.” In summary, nearly 35 years ago the Soviet leadership, fearful of renewed missile defense competition and U.S. nuclear modernization, began to mull exactly the sort of systems Putin revealed this month. They did so not because they were crazy, but because they were deeply fearful that the United States would resume missile defense competition in parallel with a competition over the quality of strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets doubted they could keep up in either competition — much less both — so asymmetric responses were their only hope. Within a few years the Cold War wound down peacefully, but historical experiences continued to underlie Soviet — now Russian — fears of missile defense. The Meaning of the Nuclear Precision Color Revolution: Russian Views Today Through the 1990s Russian leadership had no substantial fears of U.S. missile defense, as the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty was still in place and the country was dealing with a variety of domestic concerns. However, in the early 2000s, the United States began to pursue national missile defense, eventually withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Russian leaders were deeply concerned. In June 2000, Putin, near the beginning of his first term as president, remarked: … in the event of an official U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty Russia will be forced to consider the scenario whereby it may abandon its commitments not only under the START Treaty but also under the treaty of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles. The following year, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev “threatened the resumption of ‘three mighty programs [begun during the SDI era] to counteract asymmetrically the national missile defense of the United States,’” according to the declassified CIA article. Though it is unclear which programs exactly he was referring to, it is plausible that he meant the Status-6 and the nuclear-powered cruise missile. Regardless, Russian leaders made clear they might “abandon” the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and deploy asymmetric means to counter U.S. missile defense. In this way, Moscow telegraphed the deployment of the treaty-violating SSC-8 missile, the Status-6, and the nuclear- powered cruise missile more than 15 years ago. No wonder Putin claimed in his recent speech, “no one has listened to us … You listen to us now.” The rationale for these deployments is essentially the same as the one that drove their origins during the Cold War: fear that Russian strategic nuclear deterrent would be undermined if it could not compete with the United States in weapons technology. Thus, just as in the 1960s, it is not U.S. capabilities today (which are very, very modest) or tomorrow that worry the Russians — it is U.S. capabilities over the course of a long competition.

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However, there are two differences between Soviet fears of missile defense in the Cold War and Russian fears today. The first is the “precision revolution” in conventional munitions, which Russia has observed closely since the Gulf War in 1991. Based on these observations, the Russians now believe a massive first strike volley of conventional precision munitions could be effective in neutralizing much of their strategic deterrent. The second difference is the emergence of so-called “color revolutions” on the Russian periphery — successful uprisings against Moscow-friendly regimes that the Russians believe the West helped engineer. Together, these two new fears have led Russian leadership to fear it might face Western-sponsored unrest, which the West will support with precision munitions. The Russians think they have seen this movie before in Serbia, Libya, Iraq, and, if not for timely Russian intervention, Syria. Unlike these other states, Russia has a nuclear deterrent — which is why missile defense competition looks, if anything, more ominous to the Russians today than to the Soviets in the 1980s. For the Russian leadership, the “new” nuclear systems are not crazy or Strangelovian — they are intimately connected to regime survival. Implications for U.S.-Russia Arms Control None of the foregoing is intended to justify Russian behavior, particularly treaty-violating behavior. But it is important that U.S. policymakers understand the Russian perspective. Russian proclamations about missile defense are not mere propaganda, though they may overstate some of their views publicly to influence various audiences. So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition. Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position. This presents a dilemma for American policymakers, who clearly want to continue the ongoing U.S. deployment of limited missile defense capabilities against North Korea and Iran, even if they do not seek to neutralize Russia’s strategic deterrent, as the Kremlin fears. The instinct may be to simply proceed with missile defense despite the consequences for arms control. Yet there are real benefits to arms control with Russia, and so the United States seeks to preserve existing agreements, especially the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Given that the Russians have made clear they think that treaty was linked to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the only solution may be to start from scratch, with a broader set of negotiations that seeks new mutually acceptable limits on intermediate-range systems, “new” Russian systems, and missile defenses. The recently postponed U.S.-Russia strategic stability talks may be a venue to explore these possibilities. But if such an agreement is impossible, it likely spells the end of formal arms control for the foreseeable future. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will become a dead letter (if it is not already). Further strategic arms control after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires is unlikely. Would the United States — and especially the Senate — agree to a new treaty that does not cover Status-6 and the nuclear-powered cruise missile? Would the Russians agree to limit these systems without missile defense limitations? While tacit or non-treaty based agreements may be possible, the Russians have not shown much interest in these possibilities. Putin’s revelation of these “new” systems no doubt had many motives, but one was surely to underscore that Russia has long taken U.S. offensive forces and missile defenses very seriously.

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Rather than dismissing these systems as mere destabilizing aberrations or an element of Putin’s election posturing, policymakers should grapple with the implications. Unfettered U.S. missile defense might be worth the slow unraveling of the current arms control regime, but policymakers should not fool themselves into believing there are no costs to the unconstrained pursuit of missile defense. https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/red-glare-the-origin-and-implications-of-russias-new- nuclear-weapons/ Return to top

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ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

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