Issue No. 1308 30 March 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // Feature Report “Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Clarify Long-Term Uranium Enrichment Mission Needs and Improve Technology Cost Estimates”. Published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office; February 2018 https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690143.pdf The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is taking or plans to take four actions to extend inventories of low- enriched uranium (LEU) that is unobligated, or carries no promises or peaceful use to foreign trade partners until about 2038 to 2041. Two of the actions involve preserving supplies of LEU, and the other two involve diluting highly enriched uranium (HEU) with lower enriched forms of uranium to produce LEU. GAO reviewed these actions and found the actual costs and schedules for those taken to date generally align with estimates. NNSA and GAO have identified risks associated with two of these actions. One of these risks has been resolved; NNSA is taking steps to mitigate another, while others, such as uncertainty of future appropriations, are unresolved. NNSA’s preliminary plan for analyzing options to supply unobligated enriched uranium in the long term is inconsistent with DOE directives for the acquisition of capital assets, which state that the mission need statement should be a clear and concise description of the gap between current capabilities and the mission need. The scope of the mission need statement that NNSA has developed can be interpreted to meet two different mission needs: (1) a need for enriched uranium for multiple national security needs, including tritium, and (2) a specific need for enriched uranium to produce tritium. The DOE directives also state that mission need should be independent of and not defined by a particular solution. However, NNSA is showing preference toward a particular solution—building a new uranium enrichment capability—and the agency has not included other technology options for analysis. Without (1) revising the scope of the mission need statement to clarify the mission need it seeks to achieve and (2) adjusting the range of options it considers in the analysis of alternatives process, NNSA may not consider all options to satisfy its mission need. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS US Nuclear Stockpile Decreasing in Size, But Not Capability Perry Sees Plutonium Pit Work Staying at LANL ‘into the Future’ Energy Secretary Rick Perry Promises More Triggers for Nuclear Weapons Want to Demolish a Uranium Enrichment Facility? Ask a Pipe-crawling Robot First Navy to Congress: Columbia-class Submarine Program Still on Schedule with Little Margin for Error US COUNTER-WMD For Special Operations Forces, Fighting WMD Means Getting Deeper Into Enemies’ Leadership and Decision-Making Raytheon to Begin Modernizing Missile Defense US ARMS CONTROL How to Spot a Nuclear Bomb Program? Look for Ghostly Particles It’s No Cold War, but Relations with Russia Turn Volatile National Security Veterans Urge Trump Not to Scrap Iran Nuclear Deal ASIA/PACIFIC Japan’s Top Diplomat Taro Kono Mulls Attending Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Meeting Russia, China Eclipse US in Hypersonic Missiles, Prompting Fears EUROPE/RUSSIA Poland Officially Signs Deal to Buy Patriot from US Spying on U.S. Nuclear Submarine Base Factor in Closing of Russia’s Seattle Consulate Russia to Receive Entire Fleet of Upgraded Supersonic Nuclear-Capable Bombers by 2030 European Powers Press for Iran Sanctions to Buttress Nuclear Deal MIDDLE EAST Saudi-led Coalition Threatens Retaliation against Iran over Missiles Netanyahu: Israel Has Consistent Policy – Prevent Enemies from Obtaining Nuclear Weapons INDIA/PAKISTAN China Sell DANGEROUS Nuclear Weapons to Pakistan as Conflict with India ESCALATES US Slams Pakistani Firms with Sanctions for Nuclear Trade WW3: India Will 'DESTROY Pakistan and CRIPPLE China in Two-front Nuclear War' COMMENTARY A North Korean Gordian Knot: Undoing the Nuclear Link The Strategic Wisdom of Accommodating North Korea’s Nuclear Status On Iran and North Korea: Don’t Trust, and Verify, Verify, Verify Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // US NUCLEAR WEAPONS Defense News (Washington, D.C.) US Nuclear Stockpile Decreasing in Size, But Not Capability By Daniel Cebul March 27, 2018 WASHINGTON — The number of nuclear warheads kept in U.S. stockpiles decreased by nearly 200 since the end of the Obama administration, according to information released by the Defense Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists. This reduction brings the total number of warheads down to 3,822 as of September 2017. While this downsizing may seem to contradict the Trump administration’s position on U.S. nuclear posture, these reductions reflect “a longer trend of the Pentagon working to reduce excess numbers of warheads while upgrading the remaining weapons,” according to Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at FAS. In October 2017, President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis denied reports claiming the president was calling for an increase in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. “Although defense hawks home and abroad will likely seize upon the reduction and argue that it undermines deterrence and reassurance, the reality is that it does not; the remaining arsenal is more than sufficient to meet the requirements for national security and international obligations,” Kristensen said. “On the contrary, it is a reminder that there still is considerable excess capacity in the current nuclear arsenal beyond what is needed.” The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review introduced two new low-yield nuclear-capable weapons to the U.S. arsenal, a sea-launched cruise missile and a nuclear-tipped D-5 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile. Although the necessity and cost of these systems have been heavily questioned by critics, the capabilities have been defended by those inside the Pentagon as a necessary response to the return to great-power competition and a rapidly evolving 21st century threat environment. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/03/27/us-nuclear-stockpile-decreasing-in-size- but-not-capability/ Return to top The Los Alamos Monitor Online (Los Alamos, N.M.) Perry Sees Plutonium Pit Work Staying at LANL ‘into the Future’ By Tris DeRoma March 23, 2018 Plutonium pit manufacturing and whether Los Alamos National Laboratory will remain the center of plutonium pit production was the highlight of Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. U.S. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., asked Secretary of Energy Rick Perry how confident he was that Los Alamos would be able to get 80 pits manufactured a year by 2030. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1308 // The National Nuclear Security Administration is expected to release an analysis of alternatives study by May 11 that may favor moving the facility to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. “Now there’s talk of stopping and recalculating and looking at another approach. I just don’t think we have the time to do that,” Reed said. “Sen. Heinrich (D-N.M.) and I have discussed this at length many times. I’ve been to Los Alamos and I’ve visited P-4 (the plutonium manufacturing facility) out there, and it is populated with some very extraordinary men and women,” Perry said. “…Los Alamos is going to be the center for plutonium excellence for as long into the future as there is a future.” Perry further added that manufacturing at least 30 plutonium pits are guaranteed at the Los Alamos plutonium pit manufacturing facility. He also acknowledged however that the Department of Energy is going to take a hard look at the NNSA’s analysis of alternatives document before the May 11 deadline. “I think we know, to get the job done… I think 2026 is for the 30 pits per year to be done… the 31 through 80… I think it’s important for us to be able to send a clear message that we can get it done, that we can get it done in a timely basis in a way that the taxpayers know we are thoughtful about their concerns,” Perry said. Heinrich recited testimony given Tuesday before the committee by USAF Gen. John Hyten, where he emphasized the Department of Defense’s requirement of 80 pits per year by 2030, and having Los Alamos National Laboratory have the first 30 pits done by 2026. Heinrich echoed Reed’s statement in another criticism of the NNSA’s pending analysis of alternatives document, and how there is no time to reconsider another site. The document is allegedly considering the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site as another option for plutonium pit manufacturing. “Spending three years on what I have viewed as a flawed analysis of alternatives does not inspire confidence in regards to the timeline,” Heinrich said. “As you know, I had serious doubts about the NNSA’s analysis of alternatives study to meet the 80 pits per year, and in December, I sent you a letter citing specific concerns with the AOA, in that the modular approach at Los Alamos was not even considered.” Heinrich asked Perry if the modular approach would be fully considered in the analysis of alternatives study the NNSA is considering. Perry said that it would be. Heinrich also asked the secretary if he and Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Dan Brouillette would also do a detailed review of the modular design approach before the analysis of alternatives document came out May 11. Heinrich also wanted assurances that the best available cost estimates are used and that the recommended option will meet U.S.