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Emory Law Journal Volume 67 Issue 4 2018 The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet Shu-Yi Oei Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj Recommended Citation Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L. J. 655 (2018). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol67/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM THE OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT DRAGNET Shu-Yi Oei* ABSTRACT Taxpayers who hide assets abroad to evade taxes present a serious enforcement challenge for the United States. In response, the United States has developed a family of initiatives that punish and rehabilitate non-compliant taxpayers, raise revenues, and require widespread reporting of offshore financial information by financial institutions and taxpayers. Yet, while these initiatives help catch willful tax cheats, they have also adversely affected immigrants, Americans living abroad, and “accidental Americans.” This Article critiques the United States’ offshore tax enforcement initiatives, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act and the Internal Revenue Service’s offshore voluntary disclosure programs. It argues that the United States has been overly focused on two policy priorities in designing enforcement at the expense of competing considerations: First, the United States has attempted to equalize enforcement against taxpayers with solely domestic holdings and those with harder-to-detect offshore holdings by imposing harsher reporting requirements and penalties on the latter. But in doing so, it has failed to appropriately distinguish among differently situated taxpayers with offshore holdings. Second, the United States has focused on revenue and enforcement, paying less attention to the significant compliance costs and potential social harms that its initiatives create. The confluence of these two policy priorities risks creating high costs for the wrong taxpayers. While offshore tax enforcement may have been designed to catch high-net-worth tax cheats, it may instead impose disproportionate burdens on those immigrants and expatriates who have less ability to complain, comply, or “substitute out” of the law’s grasp. This Article argues that the United States should redesign its enforcement approach to minimize these risks and suggests reforms to this end. * Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am grateful to the participants of the Tulane Law School and Boston College Law School Faculty Workshops, the AMT Tax Conference, the SEALS Tax Law & Policy Discussion Group, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting Tax Panels, the National Tax Association Annual Conference, and the ClassCrits IX Conference for helpful feedback. My particular thanks to Hugh Ault, Allison Christians, Tessa Davis, Adam Feibelman, James Gordley, Leandra Lederman, Ann Lipton, Patricia McCoy, Susan C. Morse, Leigh Osofsky, James Repetti, Diane Ring, Adam Rosenzweig, Daniel Shaviro, Natalya Shnitser, and Stephen Shay for helpful comments and critiques. OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 656 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:655 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 659 I. THE VEXING PROBLEM OF OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT ............... 663 A. The Offshore Tax Enforcement Challenge ................................ 663 1. Citizenship-Based, Worldwide Taxation on a Heterogeneous Pool of Taxpayers ....................................... 664 2. Distinctive Enforcement and Compliance Challenges Across Borders .................................................................... 666 B. Pre-2008 Enforcement Initiatives .............................................. 668 1. Tax Treaty Provisions for Exchange of Information ........... 669 2. TIEAs and MLATs ............................................................... 669 3. The “Qualified Intermediary” Regime ................................ 670 4. FBAR Filing ........................................................................ 671 C. The 2008 Whistleblower Leaks .................................................. 671 1. The UBS Leak ...................................................................... 671 2. The LGT Leak ...................................................................... 673 II. THE U.S. APPROACH TO OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT ................... 674 A. A Taxonomy of Current Offshore Tax Enforcement Strategies . 674 1. Punishment .......................................................................... 674 2. Backward-Looking Regulatory Initiatives ........................... 675 a. Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs .................... 676 i. Core Program Features ......................................... 677 ii. Reduced Penalties and Simplified Procedures ...... 677 iii. Numbers ................................................................. 679 b. Swiss Bank Programs ................................................... 679 i. Origins of the Program .......................................... 680 ii. Program Details .................................................... 681 3. Forward-Looking Regulatory Initiatives ............................. 682 a. Obligations of Foreign Financial Institutions .............. 682 b. Obligations on Taxpayers ............................................. 684 i. New Requirements ................................................. 684 ii. Penalties ................................................................ 685 iii. Statutes of Limitation ............................................. 687 B. The Mechanisms That Drive Enforcement ................................ 688 1. Cascading Compliance ........................................................ 689 2. High Penalties and Open Statutes ....................................... 690 C. Has the U.S. Approach Worked? ............................................... 691 III. THE TROUBLING POLICY UNDERPINNINGS OF THE U.S. APPROACH .. 694 A. Domestic–Offshore Parity vs. Intra-Offshore Distinctions ....... 694 1. Expats, Immigrants, and Accidental Americans .................. 695 2. The Case for Intra-Offshore Distinctions ............................ 696 OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 2018] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT DRAGNET 657 a. Sources of Capital and Differential Levels of Culpability .................................................................... 696 b. Less Risk of Double Non-Taxation ............................... 697 c. Differential Enforcement Elasticities and Behavioral Responses ..................................................................... 698 i. Sticky Financial and Work Histories ..................... 698 ii. Differential Access to (and Use of) Advice ............ 699 iii. Sticky Holdings Beyond Bank Accounts ................ 699 d. Possible Knowledge Disparities ................................... 700 e. Uneven Collateral Consequences ................................. 701 3. The U.S. Mismanagement of Intra-Offshore Distinctions ... 702 a. Questionable OVDP Outcomes .................................... 702 i. Regressivity ............................................................ 702 ii. Quiet Disclosures and Offenders “At Large” ........ 704 iii. Streamlined Program Misuse ................................ 705 iv. Lack of Follow Up ................................................. 705 b. FATCA’s Likely Impacts ............................................... 706 i. A Wide Reporting Net ............................................ 706 ii. Uniformly Harsh Penalties on Heterogeneous Taxpayers ............................................................... 707 c. Insufficient Punishment for Major Offenders ............... 708 B. Compliance and Enforcement vs. Taxpayer Costs .................... 709 1. The Returns from Offshore Tax Enforcement ...................... 709 2. The High Costs of Offshore Tax Enforcement ..................... 710 a. High FATCA Implementation Costs ............................. 710 i. Costs to FFIs .......................................................... 710 ii. Costs to Foreign Governments .............................. 711 iii. FATCA Costs to the United States ......................... 712 b. Compliance Costs to Individual Taxpayers .................. 713 i. Costs Associated with FATCA Compliance ........... 713 ii. Costs of OVDP Participation ................................. 715 c. Other Costs ................................................................... 715 i. Taxpayer Substitution and Deadweight Losses ..... 715 ii. Taxpayer Privacy and Other Collateral Consequences ........................................................ 716 3. Cost Considerations and Social Welfare ............................. 717 C. Further Observations ................................................................ 718 1. A Predictable Hierarchy of Interests ................................... 718 2. Agency Costs ....................................................................... 720 IV. A GENTLER WORLD? A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM .......................... 722 OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 658 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:655 A. Potential Repeal of FATCA ....................................................... 722 B. Taking Intra-Offshore Distinctions Seriously ...........................
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