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Mehnaaz Momen

THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Ideals and Reality The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics Mehnaaz Momen The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics

Ideals and Reality Mehnaaz Momen Social Sciences Texas A&M International University Laredo, Texas, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-61529-5 ISBN 978-3-319-61530-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1

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Sometime between the American Revolution and the American Constitution, Immanuel Kant wrote that “out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.” James Madison and Thomas Jefferson would have agreed, for as they crafted their new nation, they observed that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary,” and that “man is the only animal which devours his own kind.” Jefferson seemed resigned to the darker failures of all nations, revolutions, and political projects: “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.” Now, during this moment when the colonists were finally freeing themselves from British rule, many Americans were quite giddy and thrilled, like the patriot Samuel Adams, who voiced the possibility that the United States was going to be exceptional: “Our contest is not only whether we ourselves shall be free, but whether there shall be left to mankind an asylum on earth for civil and religious liberty.” Adams conceded that the United States was not going to be perfect, but he and many others hoped aloud that this nation might be far less crooked than whatever existed in Europe and elsewhere. He was certainly not the last American to believe that the United States was destined for greatness. In our own time, after five or six decades of ethnic studies scholarship, much of which has fundamentally revised our understanding of the Revolution and the Constitution, we know that the people who might have agreed most with the pessimism of Kant, Madison, and Jefferson may have been those who were never invited to the Constitutional Conventions. Native Americans on the frontier, especially in the Ohio River Valley, saw

vii viii FOREWORD the American victory over the British as a catastrophe. African American slaves, those being held by masters like Madison and Jefferson, had to endure this execrable institution for three decades longer than the Africans under the British empire. For members of both groups, the white folks were devils indeed, devouring people and lands as fast as possible, and otherwise making a mockery of their lofty claims that “all men are created equal.” Why am I in chains, then, and why are you claiming my lands for yourselves? From these perspectives and with these histories in mind, we agree now that there was nothing straight at all about the American Revolution, the American Constitution, or the United States. The creation and extension of this nation accelerated removal, increased enslavement, and manured the earth with blood, and by the end of the nineteenth century, more than one hundred years after the Revolution, Native Americans were still being removed. The Spanish and the Mexican governments had attempted to subjugate the Native Americans too, but without question the Americans were the most successful, conquering the Mexicans, and then the Apache, the Sioux, and the Comanche as well. This alternative, darker view of the United States as a rolling, ongoing catastrophe has come to us fairly recently. Even in the mid-twentieth century, the great British philosopher Isaiah Berlin used that Kantian phrase, “the crooked timber of humanity,” as a lens to criticize the criminal naiveté of various idealisms of the twentieth century, including fascism, totalitari- anism, and communism. It’s one thing to imagine a workers’ paradise, or lebensraum for a national socialist state lasting for thousands of years, Berlin noted, but the realities of communism and Nazism were so horrible that no one should believe a Stalinist or a Nazi. Never again. Such idealism could kill, it was dangerous. In the postwar world, when communists were still a threat, Berlin and others suggested that the Western liberal democracies, with all of their flaws and incomplete citizenships, were much better, perhaps more grown-up and knowing and less idealistic, or at least less prone to ideals that brought only pain and death even to their truest believers. Were the Western democracies in fact better? Was the United States bending, like an arc in a moral universe, toward justice? During the civil rights movement, some said that the United States was progressing toward justice, toward an inclusive republic free from tribalism, racism, and exclusion. Here was Barbara Jordan, the first African American woman to serve on the Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives, in 1974: FOREWORD ix

“My faith in the Constitution is whole, it is complete, it is total.” Against President Nixon, embroiled in scandal, she said, “I am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the Constitution.” Her words were so striking, but the context was even more remarkable—she was an African American woman in Congress, a lawyer herself, rebuking publicly a very white American President. She did this while proclaiming her love and devotion to the nation’s founding document, perhaps almost forgiving or forgetting the flaws in it that had once enslaved her ancestors. No historian could imagine this scene in 1794, and so in 1974, many Americans saw this as progress, as a direct sign of a radical bending toward a new nation, more just and fair than ever before. Yet in 1974, the United States was still fighting a war in Vietnam, a war that would consume three million Vietnamese lives, North and South. This was not the first war, of course, that the Americans had fought in Asia. Vietnam was preceded by the Filipino “insurgency” following the Spanish-American War in 1900, the Pacific War against the Empire of Japan in 1941, and the Korean War in 1950. These wars were all strangely related: the Japanese had attacked the Americans in the Philippines at the same time as they were attacking Pearl Harbor, but then American planes took off from Japanese bases in their attacks on Korea, and then the Koreans fought alongside the Americans in Vietnam, where at least four thousand Korean troops died under joint South Korean and American command. All that time, from Jim Crow to the civil rights movement, the United States was fighting wars in Asia. The Americans still have bases throughout Europe and Asia, in the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea (but not in Vietnam). So many Americans have since come and gone through Korea, and so many Koreans have come and gone through the United States, that in a place like Seoul, it’s sometimes easy to forget that it’s not Koreatown in Los Angeles. War, migration, and citizenship are part of a single story: I am Korean American because my family migrated from Korea to the United States, but I’m certain that that would not have happened unless the Americans had come to Korea first. After 1975, in the month when my family arrived in Los Angeles and Saigon fell, some might have said that the American wars in Asia were coming to an end, that this was it. No more would the United States pursue foolish adventures to promote democracy in foreign places, as though they were naive enough to think that they could spread their ideals as if x FOREWORD they were napalm or defoliant. But we now know, of course, that that did not happen: Vietnam has since been succeeded (or has it been repeated?) by Iraq and Afghanistan, where Filipino American, Korean American, Vietnamese American, African American, Mexican American, Native American, and white American soldiers have fought and died together. Has this been “progress”? Is it progress when a person of Filipino ancestry—whose very ancestors may have been “insurgents” in the eyes of other Americans—is now killing “insurgents” in Iraq or in Afghanistan, in military efforts to make these places safer for American ideas and principles? Was it progress when the author of a few of the more infamous “torture memos” during the war on terror was a Korean American law professor? These questions raise at least the possibility that race-based inclusions have their downsides, that whatever arc there is in the universe, it might need to go a lot further to get anywhere near the universe of justice. In the prologue to his study of the Vietnam War, or rather his study of how we remember the Vietnam War, the novelist and literary critic Viet Thanh Nguyen wrote: “I was born in Vietnam but made in America. I count myself among those Vietnamese dismayed by America’s deeds but tempted to believe in its words.” Even for those of us who are here as American citizens because of American imperialism, because of its wars, the promise of the United States remains compelling, its words and ideals have become our own. It’s strange to belong now to a country that had sent so many soldiers to kill people who look just like me, and it’s even stranger still when I go abroad, to Europe or even to Asia, where no one has mistaken me for anything other than an American. In public, in Europe and in Asia, I too have praised the Constitution, believing in its words, forgiving or maybe forgetting those many times when its ideals didn’t come close to reality. This book by Professor Momen is so stimulating and interesting because it measures so well the distances between the histories that we Americans would like to celebrate and the actual deeds that still cause so many of us dismay, between how we would like to think of ourselves and how we are, and the future we would like to imagine against the nightmares that might still come true. The United States remains a nation that embodies paradox. We are more open than ever before, at least to immigrants with skills and capital, and we also deport more people than ever, hundreds of thousands every year. We allow anyone to vote without respect to race or national origin, but we also disenfranchise people who’ve lived here for more than a decade. We have been on the leading edge of the information FOREWORD xi technology revolution, and yet we wince at every presidential tweet. Technology is wonderful, but as any yeoman farmer might agree, a series of all false, half false, and screed-like tweets in the wee hours of the morning isn’t healthy for any tree, including the tree of liberty. It’s just too much manure. All kidding aside, in a profound way these days, many of us are revisit- ing those concerns about the crooked timber of humanity and how men are not angels. We may be more critical than ever of the original framers, but what might they say of us now? They might wonder whether the United States could still be an asylum on earth for civil and religious liberty, or whether that will not be true. They might worry that some Americans have misunderstood them entirely—they meant “if men were angels, no government would be necessary,” not that “government is not necessary.” And when they said, “man is the only animal that devours his own kind,” they didn’t mean for this to be a prescription. For all American citizens—however we got here and whatever our color—the American experiment seems to be endangered, more fragile than ever before. This book is so valuable for this moment because it calls its audience to be more than idle spectators. Perhaps we should try idealism all over again, to rethink our common citizenship, even though dismay and disappointment are real possibilities, as they always have been in this strange and contradictory nation.

Professor of Asian American Studies John S.W. Park University of California, Santa Barbara May 30, 2017 Preface

This book has been not only an academic exercise for me, but also an inquiry into where I stand as a professional and where I belong as a citizen. I came to America as an international student and went through the various transitions from being an immigrant with a work visa to a permanent resident to a citizen. Most of the phases I went through happened during the shift from the INS to the Department of Homeland Security, so I had first-hand experience with bureaucratic black holes and the Kafkaesque absurdity of the whole system. As someone who grew up outside the United States, I have also had a very different take on US foreign policy and globalization issues. However, as a student of government, my theoretical basis for understanding government has always been deeply rooted in US history and political ideologies. The last twenty years since I have been living in America have also displayed a contrast in terms of communication: from the days of writing letters and making very expensive and poor-quality international calls to having free, easy, always-accessible multiple modes of reaching anyone anywhere in the world. While I can look up almost any songs, poems, or movies on YouTube, buy any ingredients that I pine for, and feed my nos- talgia in so many different ways, I am not so sure whether the notions of the melting pot and cosmopolitanism are opposites, or whether there are overlaps, or whether we need completely new notions to capture our realities. Another huge source of confusion and motivation brewed because of Laredo, the border city where I live and teach, as many of our premises about belonging and boundaries are always being challenged in everyday

xiii xiv PREFACE life here. My students are well aware of the history that always glosses them over, the political issues that miss their reality, and the cultural visibility that pushes them into a pre-assumed category. In all my classes, whether it was a freshman level government class, an upper level elective class on immigration, or a graduate level class on ethics, I tried my best to bridge theory and reality, which are often locked in their own domains. This book, in many ways, reflects my struggles to capture these anomalies and ambiguities, as they add color and tone to the story of citizenship, which often remains hidden and neglected. The journey of writing this book has been long and winding, and I have a number of people to thank for not giving up on me. The person who would have been the happiest to see this book would have been my dad, but I was too late to hand him the product. Throughout the editing process, I kept remembering how I had helped him once in preparing the index for his book, and how frivolous I had been in that role. My professors at the University of Dhaka and Cleveland State University always had enormous confidence in me. Special thanks to Helen (Dr. Helen Liggett) for showing me how to find meaning from texts, photo- graphs, and real-life events. My heartfelt thanks to Dr. John S.W. Park, Dr. Aziz Rana, Dr. Saskia Sassen, and Dr. Kevin R. Johnson for their kind words and valuable time. Thanks to my colleagues at Texas A&M International University for long enduring the conversation about my book, and thanks also to the writing center, the library, and our student assistants for lending a helping hand. Much of the research for this book was done at the University of Texas at Austin library and I thank that institution as well. My mother, sister, and friends also kept up the pressure to finish the book and get it published. Thanks to Nausheen and Moniza for always being there for me. The other person who was involved with the book, from its inception to publication, from being my hardest critic to my inspiration, is my part- ner Anis. Thanks for the questions, confusions, and the keen eyes during editing.

Associate Professor Mehnaaz Momen Texas A&M International University Laredo, TX May 25, 2017 Contents

1 Introduction: The Paradox of Citizenship 1

2 American Identity: Ideals Versus Illusions 25 The Rhetoric: The Greeks, the Romans, and the British Heritage 28 The Reality: Rewriting History, Changing Marketplace 35 The Paradox: Self-Identity of the American “People” 41

3 Nation-Building: Nation-States Versus Empire 65 The Rhetoric: Manifest Destiny 68 The Reality: Territory Minus the People 75 The Paradox: Impossible Republic, Elusive Empire 82

4 World Relations: Hegemony Versus Globalization 107 The Rhetoric: American Exceptionalism 110 The Reality: Alliance of the State, Market, and Military Power 115 The Paradox: The Cosmopolitan Versus the Patriot 129

5 Immigration: Becoming “Us” Versus Remaining “Them” 145 The Rhetoric: Rules of Inclusion and Exclusion 148 The Reality: The Rites of Passage 156 The Paradox: Immigration as a Political Tool 164

xv xvi CONTENTS

6 State Power: Technology Versus Technology 189 The Rhetoric: Transparency and Accountability of Government 192 The Reality: Expansion of State Power 197 The Paradox: Public Engagement, Segregation, and Loss of Civil Liberties 204

7 Conclusion: The Paradox Continues… 229

Selected Bibliography 243

Index 259 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Paradox of Citizenship

Living and working in the border city of Laredo, I have always been conscious of the conflicting meanings of citizenship in legal, political, and social terms, especially whenever I have to cross the checkpoint to leave the city. The city where I blend in physically, with its majority Hispanic population, is also the city where linguistically I remain an outsider and am continuously being reminded and asked about my immigration status, as I am compelled to carry my passport every time I cross the checkpoint to go north of Laredo.1 One September morning, as I was boarding a plane from Laredo, the customs officer asked whether I was from India. Conscious of my rights as a citizen and clutching my American passport, alert and defensive, I answered, “Close to India, Bangladesh.” The customs officer lowered her voice, “I am makingchicken makhani tonight. Do I need tomatoes?” Relieved, as I said no to tomatoes and gave her additional information on the proper spices, I became conscious of an odd feeling of warmth that supplanted the usual angst of border negotiations. I realized that probably for the first time my “otherness” was being deemed not as a scary trait to be monitored, but as an exquisite attribute that had become useful. Instead of making me feel distant and excluded, this encounter somehow connected me with the official on a human level. I could imagine her cooking dinner, her brow furrowed over the proportions of spices, dipping a spoon and tasting her meal, happily turning the stove off. It was not my American passport that had conjured the magic to

© The Author(s) 2018 1 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_1 2 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP change how I was being treated and how I dreaded going through security in the post-9/11 years. Instead, an unrelated gesture from a customs officer conveyed that I was not being doubted, but rather being accepted as part of the mad rush. Although this particular incident did not signal the end of being singled out or being subjected to more inquiries, it certainly changed my perception of inclusion even during the peak of the recent exclusionary measures. How do individuals grapple with these mixed signals? Where do these particular events fit into the political and legal landscapes? How do citizens make meaning out of their relations with the state when the rhetoric and reality clash? Can these differences between what is prescribed (i.e., the official version) and what is practiced (i.e., our lived experience) be analyzed to better understand the quandary of citizenship in what many are claiming is a postnational era? This book is rooted in the desire to capture the meanings of difference, otherness, exclusion, and inclusion in American citizenship over time by connecting different themes that add meaning to citizenship practices. At what point do we become citizens? Do we claim our citizenship rights when we are born or when we take our oaths? Do we become citizens when we vote? When do we know that we belong to the in-group? What threatens this membership? American history points toward race, ethnicity, and immigration as obvious points of confrontation and departure regarding citizenship rights, but these issues are part of a larger story of confusion and ambiguity in American citizenship, one that started even before America emerged as a nation-state. Narratives of citizenship often follow a linear trajectory focusing on legal changes and social meanings for particular groups, whereas American history is replete with instances of minorities who were not only denied citizenship, but even after legally gaining status were denied its privileges because of racial and ethnic prejudice. I want to extract the disjointed, confusing, and ambiguous fissures that go beyond the internal issues of race, ethnicity, and immigration to include issues such as national identity, global hegemony, and state power to uncover a more complete picture that is continuously in the making. I am interested in the paradoxes of citizenship, their production and continuation, and their implications for our lives and statecraft. What I have tried to do in this book is to undertake an archeological expedition2 into different aspects of citizenship, focusing on the anomalies and paradoxes, and illuminating how they form a bigger picture, one that is never complete, but certainly becomes more complex as we see the high ideals, pragmatic self-interest, and ingrained prejudices clashing with each other. 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 3

My thesis is that the maturation and growth of ideas of citizenship in the American polity lie in the paradoxes and anomalies rather than in coherent narratives of the ideological, racial, legal, or political dimensions of citizenship. There have been numerous attempts to decipher citizenship through the linear evolution of citizenship rights by means of the expansion of minority political rights, as discussed, for example, by Weiner,3 or immigration legislation, the other storyline in American citizenship, as documented by scholars such as Park, Motomura, and Ngai.4 I want to focus on citizenship in the broader political realm, connecting national identity formation, the expansion of the American nation, globalization, immigration, and technological developments to illustrate the composition as well as the asymmetrical aspects of American citizenship and its implications. My goal is to analyze and explain the notion of citizenship in the United States in light of its history and trace its transformations at critical junctures. To chart these turning points of crisis and challenge, I have delved into the construction (encompassing both the official and the unintended factors) of American identity, nation-building, global hegemony, immigration, and state power to analyze how these five areas of discourse have shaped American citizenship. Each of these paradigms—national identity, state expansion, global status, immigration, and state power—contains only a partial story of American citizenship, and the full meaning of citizenship evolution can only be understood through the analysis of connections and disconnec- tions between and among these paradigms. The aspect of minority rights, for example, can be read very differently in each of these models. With the expansion of the American state, new minorities were included and new rules of exclusion were set up to keep most minorities out of the citizenship fold. Yet, with every foreign war, the American nation witnessed the participation of minorities in warfare, leading to their gaining of citizenship rights. Moreover, in each of these paradigms several problematic or controversial aspects of citizenship, especially concerning state power, are normalized. With each technological advancement, the tools to check state power become theoretically available, yet it is the state which seems to exert more and more power over citizenship practices, as these ambiguous advances become part of everyday life, and are justified and normalized. Each of the paradigms contains several paradoxes, and yet the incompatible aspects of power and privilege, and the processes of being subaltern, are normalized in each of these spheres. In this book, I try to decipher the hidden meanings and real-life implications along with the 4 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP official versions of each of the five threads of the story of American citizenship. The paths of legalization through immigration and social acceptance as an American deviate more often than they intersect, and often immigration laws have to be understood for their symbolic significance rather than their original intention or their applicability in real life. I have explored the meaning of citizenship from three perspectives— the rhetoric, the reality, and the consequent paradoxes—in each of the paradigms. The official storyline is often captured in the legal transformation of citizenship rights, the criteria for eligibility, the rules of exclusion and inclusion, and so forth. The rhetoric section of each of the five segments of the citizenship narrative follows the logic and construction of a linear history of citizens and state relations, mostly set out in a coherent, logical, and somewhat legal documentation. African Americans became citizens as a result of the Civil War, Hispanics joined American citizenship through territorial expansion, Native Americans were legally excluded from becoming citizens, and a special category was created for Puerto Ricans, all of these being examples of such rhetoric. Citizenship rights and privileges cannot be fully understood if defined only from above, ignoring the real-life implications of such rules which may or may not follow the official interpretation. The rights of African American citizens in the era after the Civil War when their citizenship rights were being challenged in the social setting—a process that seeped into the legal and political arenas—provide an appropriate example of how the meaning of citizenship can diverge in real life from its official definition. Throughout American history, the racial and ethnic biases of citizenship narratives capture this perspective. Along with race, immigration policies that fulfill political purposes other than immigration per se, adventures in empire in the garb of spreading democracy, and expansion of state power in the name of national security, all are examples of how citizenship rights and privileges change when we look beyond the formal definitions and take into account the real impact of policies on citizens. The context and practice of citizenship rights are captured in the reality section of the five citizenship paradigms. The last section, the section dealing with the paradoxes, is the analysis of the collision of the rhetoric and the reality. The Constitution was a political compromise between large and small states and the American people were bequeathed with a republic, which idolized democratic principles while keeping the excesses of democracy in check, and, most prob- lematically, adhered to racial prejudices while making claims of equality 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 5 and liberty for all. The simultaneous political desire for a small but strong state is all but impossible to attain. The point is to understand the symbolism of how these anomalies allowed the American empire to expand, yet allowed the American people to claim that they never aspired for an empire. The symbolic meanings of immigration policies often serve the domestic agenda, while the significance of the hydra-headed tools of technology and the implications of the cultural divides in American politics can be deciphered with the aid of this perspective. Most studies on citizenship expose its many problems and contradictions, but fail to show how these very contradictions are structured, retained, and mimicked through the ambiguities and multiple threads of citizenship principles and practices. My purpose is to bring to light how these paradoxes thrive and are normalized, and to show how different legal, social, political, and cultural meanings evolve from these anomalies, meanings that often contradict each other. I am interested in documenting the parallel versions of the rhetoric and the reality, and uncovering the paradoxes and the processes of normalization for each of these paradoxes. These five paradigms are separate threads of the same storyline from different perspectives and power relations, often mirroring yet contradicting the narrative of citizenship in the American nation. When we look back at the literature of citizenship studies, we have to start with one of the most accepted and lauded theories of citizenship, developed by T.H. Marshall. The three elements of citizenship—civil (individual freedoms), political (individual and group rights over the state), and social (obligations of the state toward individuals)—according to Marshall, form a hierarchy of citizenship rights and are built on each other, and are thus understandable in a chronological fashion. Civil rights guarantee individual freedom, with the backing of the rule of law and a system of courts. The political part of citizenship consists of voting, campaigning, running for public office, and protesting—in essence, the right to participate in the political process. According to Barbalet, “the social element of citizenship is made up of a right to the prevailing standard of life and the social heritage of the society.”5 Critics have already pointed out that Marshall neglected the relationships and overlaps among different categories. The more pressing problem for the American context is that this theory can just as easily be proven as subverted. If we apply Marshall’s theory to mainstream white America, the rights and privileges of citizenship do indeed generally follow a logical growth pattern; for different minority groups, instead of a linear increase of rights, 6 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP there have been ebbs and flows, often affecting each minority group differently. Moreover, for Marshall, the welfare state is the ultimate goal where the formal framework of political democracy is in control of the social consequences of capitalism.6 One can only become a full member of a particular society with the approval of the state, and the corresponding civil, political, and social rights are to be gradually earned. The state is imagined as a benign force committed to redistributive politics without any intrusion into the private lives of citizens. Marshall was optimistic about the redistributive characteristics of the welfare state; decreasing class inequality based on economic growth and political maturity was the ideal situation for him, as it was at that point where citizenship rights came to a full circle.7 Marshall’s theory was developed at the peak of the idealization of the European welfare state, whereas the welfare state has always been under attack theoretically and politically in the American context as being somewhat un-American. Although we can probably trace the beginnings of the social rights of American citizenship back to the pension for Civil War veterans, almost all meaningful expansion through Social Security, Medicare, and welfare measures occurred in the twentieth century. Social rights for Americans evolved not only as a response to labor demands at home, but also as a part of capitalist appeasement to the rising communist threat around the world. Social Security, unemployment, and even employment-based healthcare were not only vehemently opposed at the time of inception, but even after having become established and rooted in the political and economic systems, vilification of these policies has kept erupting at various stages of the political cycle. The attempt to limit social rights, whether through excluding people on the grounds of eligibility (from the undeserving poor to legal immigrants), or on the basis of economic stability, has always gained some traction in American politics.8 Another unique characteristic of the American system lies in the fact that many social rights—such as Social Security or the recent concessions toward more affordable, more universal healthcare—are traditionally tied to employment, and thereby subject to the power of private entities, with the government playing only a regulatory role. So in many ways Marshall’s theories have limited application to the American case. In the ensuing years, there have been many more nuanced theories to explain American citizenship, and I would group them into three main categories: (1) those derived from a political analysis of citizenship, based on inclusion or exclusion of various groups within the American fold, 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 7 mostly defined by their race and ethnicity. Both legal provisions and social norms are analyzed in the production of rules of inclusion and exclusion, and often connect America’s imperial adventures with the domestic struggles for minority rights. The prejudices based on race and the ironies of immigration laws have been intricately captured by Park, Ngai, and Motomura, to name just a few leading scholars. Ediberto Román has further chronicled the connection between empire and the citizenship rights of minorities. I want to add the dimensions of identity, nation-building, and the role of technology to this particular stream of thought; (2) those based on a concept of identity grounded in race or multiculturalism. Engin Isin and Bryan S. Turner are prominent scholars who study the array of norms of exclusion. The difference between this variant of scholarship and my thesis is that instead of focusing on particular groups based on race, gender, and sexual orientation, my focus is to trace the evolution of these norms, as I try to capture and connect the very dynamics of citizenship—a non-linear, contingent, and reversible phenomenon with many fluid meanings that the mainstream discourse of identity doesn’t always capture; and (3) postmordern theories of citizenship, attentive to the spaces and dislocations of nationalism, are often deeply skeptical of the state’s benign intentions toward citizens, and focus on the inherently contradictory nature of citizenship. Scholars like Saskia Sassen and Aihwa Ong question the very basis of citizenship, interrogating the benevolent intentions of state policies and power relations with respect to citizens and non-citizen workers. My work is informed by these sensibilities, but I want to connect the postmodern angst of dislocation and insecurity to the threats of globalization and increased competition for established citizens, and the larger implications of these dynamics in reshaping citizenship rights. Rinku Sen, in The Accidental American: Immigration and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, writes about the travesties of the transition of an illegal alien to a citizen in the context of September 11.9 What makes her work remarkable is how she lets the protagonist, Mamdouh, speak in his own voice, as he is the coauthor of the book. I pay special attention to such nodes of power while documenting the narrative of citizenship. To reiterate, theories of citizenship abound, and have even prolifer- ated in recent years, as citizenship has become a fertile area of research because of the simultaneous forces toward integration and disintegra- tion; yet many of these theories focus on one or the other element at the risk of excluding some other critical element. My basic proposition 8 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP is that American citizenship can best be understood as a fine interplay between history and law, culture and imperialism, economics and technology, identity and abstraction, and that a complex enough story that captures how different variables interact with and alter the others is yet to be told. I hope the variables I expound will move us forward in that direction. There are too many paradoxes and contradictions involved in each of the variables to sustain any of the orthodox theories of linear citizenship rights, but at the same time the radical uncertainty of postmodern theories of citizenship does not take into account certain long- term historical stabilities. The exclusion of changing economic impulses, both domestically and internationally, disallows a nuanced enough story of citizenship, and the story of economic doctrines and practices simply cannot be told without regard to the role of the state—another area which many theories leave out at the risk of insufficiency. This book tries to address both of these factors thoroughly. Moreover, as far as the role of the state is concerned, its role vis-à-vis other states simply cannot but be an integral part of the story of citizenship, both in the past and today. Citizenship also has to be understood in terms of the discourses it inhabits, and thus the transformations in the global economy, political systems, cultural tolerance, legal interpretations, and technological tools all need to be incorporated and analyzed in searching for the meaning of citizenship. In this book I am trying to weave a story connecting these different strands by paying special attention to the mismatches and conflicts. The case that I will present is that the five crucial themes that form the story of citizenship are: (a) American identity—which captures the evolution of American identity and the ideology of nationalism; (b) nation-building—which covers the extension of the American state as well as the increasing and/or decreasing rights of American citizens; (c) global relations—which focuses on the transformation of state services and the rights of citizens; (d) immigrant nation—the discourse regarding insiders and outsiders; and (e) state power—which highlights the new norms of hegemony in global politics with decreased civil liberties within the state. What makes this book stand out from mainstream explorations in citizenship issues is its perspective, which goes beyond the analysis of official historical, legal, or political documents and events, and searches for the factors from our lived experiences that have impacted citizenship but are seldom articulated as part of political discourse. I seek to develop a framework that will allow me to explore citizenship beyond its linear and ratio- 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 9 nal evolution, and yet be a tool to explore the asymmetry and connect the contradictions to understand the expansive narrative of citizenship. The coherent storyline of citizenship is well-documented in legal and historical accounts, while the incoherent parts are rationalized in racial and sociocultural chronicles. The clashes between the two versions are often explained away as political manipulation, with each version ignoring the inherent element of how the production, justification, and implementation of official accounts, sociopolitical reality, and manipulation and obfuscation of legal and cultural norms have symbiotic roots, enabling and nurturing the other incoherent segments of citizenship narratives. I would like to demonstrate that from the very beginning American citizenship has charted out a path fraught with paradoxes. The settlers in the New World appropriated the rights of citizenship yet denied Native Americans the same rights, based on their ethnocultural concept of nationhood (a paradox I will expound in detail in Chap. 3). The rules of denial of citizenship rights followed a racial bias, but were also tinged with an economic rationale that allowed new and lowly groups to enter and gradually assimilate when their labor was needed in the expanding nation. This was true of the Irish, who were compared to African Americans, but their expanding number, participation in the Civil War, and labor power uplifted them to the white category.10 Americans, or at least the colonists, were constructing the ideology of American citizenship even before they became citizens themselves.11 As subjects of the British colony, they were in charge of determining who would be categorized as settlers and who would remain outside that status, temporarily or forever, even before they joined the ranks of citizens themselves. This discourse came full circle after the Revolution as the founding fathers were engaged in deciphering the meaning of being an “American,” and their intellectual endeavor and ongoing mass consciousness blended and collided to produce the “American identity,” the focus of my second chapter. Despite some strong racial prejudices, America evolved as the land of immigrants, mainly because of the growing need for labor for the ever-expanding nation, the proportion of foreign-born and naturalized citizens always evoking the need to define the core American identity.12 Economic and political crises intensified this debate, starting from the Mexican War all the way to consideration of attacks on Syria, from the panic of 181913 right down to the modern-day great recession of 2008. The schizophrenia in narrating the history of freedom-loving yet slave- owning people colored every aspect of the American identity: the view of 10 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP the self as heroic and the denial of aggression on one’s own part; the view of others as enemies waiting to be converted to American ideals; and the often contradictory views about government, which show up in a preference for both small and strong government.14 The Declaration of Independence, which claimed dignity for all lives, and the Constitution, which legalized slavery, coexist to form the forever paradoxical political space of the American national psyche. These logical inconsistencies carried over into American nationalism and American identity, both of which contain overlapping yet contradictory elements. The contradictions of American identity were normalized by allowing both the rhetoric and the reality to exist. The high ideals of Greek and Roman citizenship and the practice of inclusion and participation were revered, while legal documents like the Constitution constructed a complicated process of participation ensuring elite dominance in the political arena, and slavery and naturalization laws created social exclusion based on race while hailing equality in the same breath. One common and logical way to look at citizenship in multiracial America is through the lenses of race and ethnicity, but even at first glance the linear model of “legal to political to social rights of citizenship”15 is inadequate at best and faulty at worst in explaining the complexities of different rights for different races and ethnicities in America. When we look at the three types of civil, political, and social rights for American citizens, we find that race has played a defining role in these rights, as some races were able to enjoy some civil and political rights from the very beginning while others were completely barred from gaining any rights. As more and more ethnic groups got accepted into the privileged criteria of citizenship at different points in history, the definition of racial categories also continued transforming.16 The other interesting part of the changing perceptions of racial and ethnic categories and relations is contained in the complex history of American adventures all over the world. As the former colony emerged into a democratic republic in the eighteenth century, more civil and political rights followed, although only for white men. And as the republic acquired imperial ambition and started conquering and controlling territories, beginning with the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars, new groups of people entered the compass of citizenship, people who were earlier deemed ineligible for citizenship. The expansion of the American empire further complicated the rights of people, not only in the ceded territories of Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other such acquired 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 11 terrains, but also among the existing population by forcing the government to come up with new rationales for exclusion or inclusion. New modes of exclusion had to be enacted for free blacks (neither citizens nor aliens) and Hispanics (technically ineligible for naturalization, but considered citizens because of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).17 It is, in fact, the selective measures that allowed the inclusion of some races while obstructing others, normalizing the paradox of the immigrant nation which did not embrace all people with the same vigor and accord them similar rights in the new land.18 When we add immigration to the equation, the issues of race and ethnicity get even more convoluted. On the one hand, there was relative openness to outsiders, along with rigid constraints for some insiders, namely Native Americans and African Americans, essentially based on race; however, the evolving immigration laws of America reflect not only racial biases but also economic calculation and political manipulation. Thus race becomes a particularly fluid thing in the history of American citizenship because politics often determine race.19 African Americans had to prove their loyalty over and over in the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the world wars to be able to gain or translate their legal rights in political and social terms. In the last decade and a half, when the political discourse has been closing off any space to include undocumented immigrants into the citizenship category, non-citizen soldiers have been fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—a fact that hardly raises anyone’s concerns. Immigration, which is an essential part of American citizenship, contains another interesting paradox: immigration laws have always had far- reaching consequences for the existing population as well as for new members, as demonstrated in the recent Real ID Act20 where all citizens and legal residents have to prove their legal status, in order to make people without legal status ineligible for driver’s licenses. Often, various immigration laws are a reactionary response to domestic politics rather than representing any consistent rationale for controlling and including new flows of people. Internal changes in regulation regarding immigration, naturalization, and even the rights of citizens are often influenced by ancillary political events. It is noteworthy that immigrants in various states lost their voting rights in local and state elections after the Mexican War, which accorded legal status to a huge group of Hispanics.21 The internment of Japanese Americans followed the principle of “another nation within a nation” that was applied to Native Americans.22 The Nisei, second-generation Japanese Americans and essentially Americans 12 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP by birth, had to regain their citizenship status by fighting in the Second World War.23 If relations and conflicts with the outside world have always impacted American citizenship, the next obvious question is how does globalization affect the ongoing construction of citizenship? Globalization is not really a new phenomenon for America, as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were both marked by America’s engagement with the world. Globalization between the Second World War and the 1990s is commonly referred to as Americanization. Globalization, however, has acquired varied traits in the last few decades: it is widely believed that America alone no longer has the mantle to define the nature and thrust of globalization, and the depth and scope of the globalized world are being shaped by other nation-states and non-nation-state actors alike. The economic insecurity that is the culmination of deindustrialization, military misadventures, and failing to compete with emerging economies has unleashed a revival of reactionary ideals in American politics, which is pushing for a narrow view of citizenship and immigration.24 The American government has already cut back on various social provisions such as welfare and Medicare for legal immigrants unless they formally become citizens, under the auspices of welfare reform in the generally pro-immigrant era of the 1990s. In the age of terrorism, as with earlier scares, civil rights are constantly being balanced with security measures throughout the world, which is something I address at length in Chap. 6. Technology has bequeathed unlimited information-gathering power to the state, and the scare of terrorism has allowed the state to use and justify maximum disciplinary power over its citizens, as demonstrated by the exiled whistleblower Edward Snowden. The process of globalization has been thought to be associated with the diminishing power of the state, as it has introduced new concepts such as the “global elite” who are free from a narrow nation-based identity, but wield tremendous power over global economic policies. These global elites or cosmopolitan elites are accompanied by the simultaneous flows of guest workers, illegal immigrants, and environmental refugees. The most striking recent global phenomenon is without doubt the rise of non-state- sponsored terrorism, which has given considerable authority back to nation-states. America, in the post-9/11 world, has used state power against its own citizens to the level of extrajudicial killings, without suffering any serious repercussions.25 It is also very important to realize and document the moments of symbolic gestures, gestures that often contradict mainstream policies, yet, 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 13 instead of challenging such policies, end up subtly strengthening the very policies by providing a mere schism for the opposite actions and normalizing the overall policy. If we look at the alarming rate of deportations of illegal immigrants in the last two decades, we find that in the midst of the continued practice of unusually high numbers of non-criminal deportations, the DREAM Act,26 which would have affected only a small number of such illegal residents who were brought to America as minors, remains a powerful symbolic gesture. Instead of strengthening an argument for a just and fair immigration reform, administrative orders which provide temporary relief and illusionary stability end up normalizing the practice of continuous deportation as they create a new category of illegal immigrants who are “worthy of sympathy.” These five paradigms—of American identity, nation-building, global relations, immigration, and state power—constitute the essence of each chapter. Each of these paradigms suggests a current example, a kind of mini-case that exemplifies the detailed description of the rhetoric and the real policies, and the gaps between the two versions. Although I have gone back in history to demonstrate the long process of how ideologies surrounding citizenship have been manufactured, what they have implied, what they have actually meant, and how they have been used as tools by the state, the cases used in all the sections are current, as the production of such ideologies is ongoing and their utility has never ceased to exist. Another point to ponder is how porous and interconnected these different paradigms are, a fact that is also accentuated by my selected examples, as they each contain elements of different aspects of citizenship. Chapter 2 of this book traces the paradoxes in American identity, paradoxes that began with the founding of the nation: the dual identities of sanctimonious settlers and prosecutors of the native population; and the different strands of conflicting characteristics that were allowed to coexist, and blossomed to reflect even more contradictory elements. The Constitution is the perfect example of the bifurcating American identity, high in idealism yet compromising with the realities at hand. It heralded equality and the right to life, liberty, and freedom, and yet simultaneously also sanctioned slavery and stripped human rights from African Americans, articulating the epitome of a paradox. The founding fathers of the nation were on a mission to construct an American identity, and for this they relied on both Greek and Roman ideologies of statecraft and politics.27 The Greek model of citizenship was generally closed, though porous for a few talented warriors, while the Roman model of the expansive empire 14 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP opted for a relatively inclusive model of citizenship. American citizenship followed the principle of rigid exclusion for African Americans and Native Americans, while incorporating inclusions for white immigrants through naturalization. The founding fathers were not only charting out political institutions but were building the foundation of American nationalism, an idea that was meant to inspire equality and freedom even if it was limited to mostly white males.28 The American marketplace, at the same time, was undergoing a completely novel expansion which provided space for common people who were able to convert economic success into social prestige and political power. The Constitution introduced many layers and twists, as Gary B. Nash and Gordon S. Wood aptly demonstrate in great detail, to control overenthusiastic citizen participation on the political front, while leaving the marketplace generally alone. The promise of egalitarianism flourished in the market, though minorities remained excluded on the social and political fronts. This perception of egalitarianism rested on the value of individualism, avoiding the issues of group identity and prioritizing civil society over the state. Chapter 3 depicts the transformation of the American state, its territorial expansion, its imperial conflicts, and the consequent overall impact on citizenship rights and privileges. The expansion of the American state was built on conquering the natives, starting from American Indians to Hispanics. This heritage has been effectively utilized in arguing for foreign adventures, in Hawaii, the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam, and leading to present-day Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans, as a nation, have had a tendency to glorify their imperial ambition as bringing freedom to the rest of the world (a justification rooted in Manifest Destiny and used by all political leaders up to and including President Obama), and have used the twin notions of American exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny to mask the subjugation and exploitation of foreign peoples and faraway territories.29 Historically, as a consequence of territorial acquisitions, federal power outgrew state power, and the Civil War especially strengthened the federal government to lay down—and, more importantly, take over—the implementation of immigration, naturalization, and citizenship laws and provisions. These conflicts among levels of state power are far from over as we see anti-immigrant and anti-federal policies being adopted in states like Arizona and Alabama, while the mayors of Los Angeles and Chicago declare their cities as sanctuary cities.30 Chapter 4 explores the impact of global relations and competition on American citizenship. American citizenship has consolidated much of its 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 15 meaning at crucial turns in history, during both internal conflicts and global adventures, and including the more recent advent of terrorism as a major political force. The Spanish-American War acted as patriotic relief for Civil War-ravaged America. Trade relations with countries all over the world and the success of American goods in securing the world market paved the way for American hegemony, which in turn was protected and expanded through military might. The expansion of state power continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries despite some domestic protests, and the pillars of military might, trade relations, and the cultural fable of America—most recently under the umbrella of “soft power”—dominated the world front.31 On the domestic front, the impact of globalization on the economy and citizenship has been far more complicated. The deindustrialization that started in the 1960s reached a crescendo in the 1990s, when industries started relocating to the regions of cheap labor.32 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened the Canadian and Mexican markets, at the same time as “border protection” arose as a key issue in the political discourse. What is interesting is that all the efforts meant to protect American jobs within the borders, a demand that reached a pinnacle in the 1999 Seattle anti-globalization protests, are again visible in the Trump era against immigrants, especially undocumented ones.33 While the skilled workforce, both native and immigrant, has benefited from globalization in general, it is unskilled laborers—native, immigrant, or undocumented—who together have shouldered the economic loss. Unlike past decades when the expansion of American power was translated into greater citizenship rights, such as the GI Bill or the inclusion of minorities, the American state has recently been on a path of reduction of the social rights of citizenship, after the transition to a neoliberal economy. Even in the prosperous decade of the 1990s, welfare reform was enacted to significantly limit the eligibility and hence the number of recipients. Chapter 5 is my analysis of the concept of citizenship through the evolution of immigration legislation and the implications of various pieces of legislation. Historically, naturalization laws in America have tended to be racist,34 while immigration more or less allowed people to come in when their labor was being sought.35 State-controlled immigration ended with the problematic inclusion of Hispanics into the citizenship fold after the Mexican War; the implementation of race-based immigration laws, such as the law barring the Chinese in 1882, and then establishing quotas for different countries starting in 1921, for a while made race and ethnicity the 16 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP sole criteria of American citizenship. The 1965 immigration law eliminated formal racial prejudices and established economic viability in the labor market as the main vehicle for immigration.36 Side by side, the provisions for family reunification, war brides, and refugees brought people from distant shores to this land, provisions that started after the Second World War to accommodate war brides and were amped up during the Cold War to allow communist defectors to immigrate. Historically, the tightening or relaxation of regulations was rooted in the economic demands of a particular time, though ideology often loomed large, as demonstrated by the anti-immigrant Know-Nothing Party37 in the 1800s; similarly, post-9/11 immigration legislation (or lack of comprehensive immigration reform) and enforcement have been shaped by ideology rather than responding to economic needs. The immigrant’s rites of passage to American society have always been fraught with discrimination, the immigrant having to suffer many ironies before receiving ultimate social approval. Such paradoxes of citizenship continue amid present challenges of terrorism and muddying concerns about who is entitled to the privileges of citizenship. The examples of three different American citizens charged with aiding terrorists, each of whom was accorded very different legal rights and procedural recourses, speak volumes about our confusion, unease, and ambiguity today regarding citizenship. John Walker Lindh,38 the Caucasian American found in Afghanistan with the Taliban, was tried under the traditional criminal justice process with all his fundamental rights intact, even though he was labeled an “enemy combatant.” Yaser Esam Hamdi,39 born and raised in the United States, of Saudi Arabian descent, and also captured in Afghanistan along with the Taliban, was given the same label of “enemy combatant,” yet had to face a military tribunal without due process. When the government deemed he was no longer a threat, the only option for Hamdi was to enter a plea agreement, which revoked his citizenship without convicting him of any crime; he ended up being deported to Saudi Arabia with a pledge never to return to the United States. José Padilla,40 born and raised in the United States, and of Hispanic descent, was suspected of preparing a terrorist attack. As an “enemy combatant,” he was jailed in military prison without being afforded trial, the right to counsel, or any other due process. After three years of detention in solitary confinement without being charged with the crime he was arrested for, in 2005 he was at last indicted for “conspiring to murder, kidnap, and maim people overseas” and removed to a federal prison. He was found guilty of all 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP 17 charges and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and his mother filed a case alleging torture by the government, which was thrown out of court.41 The three different ways an American citizen was granted or denied due process occurred in the persistent shadow of racial inequality mingled with paranoia regarding terrorism. What is equally telling is how the first “enemy combatant” was framed in the media as a “confused young man,” while the other two, despite being born and having lived in the United States all their lives, never garnered any sympathy or doubt about their alleged guilt. Chapter 6 explores the expansion of the state’s power with the advent of higher levels of technology, and how this power is being used to control citizens. With the growth of the federal government’s power since the Civil War, the US government has been continuously extending its control over the private lives of citizens with new legislative means and the redefinition and broad interpretation of existing measures. Most of these intrusions have become pervasive because of the nature of recent technological innovations, which enable the collection, storage, and use of a humongous range of data with relative ease and low cost. These same technologies are supposed to enhance efficiency in service delivery and transparency in government. Citizens are supposed to exercise their rights and control over the state in an accessible and convenient manner because of these technologies, but the true picture is that these advanced techniques of discipline and control have curtailed much freedom and autonomy. The new virtual public sphere at first glance allows more people to chime in, but in other serious ways paves the way for the panoptican,42 where all of us are constantly being monitored. WikiLeaks, perhaps the paradigmatic example of the counter use of technology by citizens to hold the government accountable, has revealed the extent of intrusive government tactics but has largely failed to ignite mass anger. Rather, the people involved with WikiLeaks, like Julian Assange, are facing trial, or are on the run, like Edward Snowden. The concluding chapter further connects the five themes and the paradoxes within each of them, and shows how they strengthen and support each other. The study of what it has meant to be a citizen of the United States at different times has been complemented in this book by an analysis of how citizenship rights have also implied different obligations and privileges for completely different groups of people. America’s unique history as a settler nation and its various global ventures, including the fights against communism and fascism, and most recently terrorism, make it an 18 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP interesting case to study the shifting balance of power between the state and the citizen. The concurrent trends of globalization and technological innovation, which simultaneously threaten and strengthen the power of the state, have further complicated the issues of citizens’ rights and the legitimacy of state intrusion in private lives. At the onset of a possible weakening of the American empire, citizenship rights and privileges are being rewritten and justified according to economic rationales, technical know-how, and the ever-lasting war on terror. The contribution of this book is to unearth the coherent links as well as asymmetries in the evolution of citizenship in relation to American identity, nation-building, global relations, immigration, and technological development. While all of these aspects have been studied in relation to American citizenship, there seems to be a dearth of scholarly effort to bring all the separate strands together to decipher the complex story of citizenship. Immigration and race have always been the dominant threads in understanding US citizenship. The significance and even the connotation of both of these themes change drastically when we study them in the context of domestic or external political conflicts or issues such as white- only naturalization or the Mexican War. Additionally, the issue of technology has barely been linked with all the other aspects of citizenship to show how the state actually uses power. These multifaceted aspects of citizenship in relation to state power are at play in both the internal and global arenas, and the illumination of these polygonal nodes requires an in-depth understanding of American history. What I find fascinating are the discernible trends between the past and the present: the construction of American citizenship seems to follow time-tested trajectories of history, justifying the rules of inclusion, exclusion, and privilege. My attempt has been focused on the parallel yet often dissimilar accounts of American citizenship, their overlaps and their displacements, and the overall impact on the notion and evolution of citizenship.

Notes 1. Aside from the customs checkpoint at the physical border between the United States and Mexico, all border cities have an additional checkpoint inside the United States, where every single person going toward the mainland, regardless of their citizenship status, is required to prove their legal status. Though usually occurring within a few miles from the actual border, these checkpoints can be set within a hundred miles and surround a NOTES 19

complete city with another level of border control. See https://www.aclu. org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone. 2. Following Foucault, I am interested not only in the historical and legal changes in citizenship, but also in how the surrounding social and political discourses make those changes possible. The connections and disconnec- tions between and among the different aspects of citizenship are thus the pillars of the discourse of citizenship. Taking Foucault’s cue of illuminating the system of thought and knowledge, I focus on how anomalies and paradoxes are permitted, constructed, and maintained within the discourse of citizenship. 3. See Mark S. Weiner, Americans Without Law: Racial Boundaries of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2006), for a detailed analysis of race and citizenship. 4. For a detailed discussion of the legal evolution of immigration provisions, see Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); John S.W. Park and Edward J.W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 5. J. M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle, and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 6. 6. Bryan S. Turner, ed., Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 6. 7. Maurice Roche, “Citizenship, Social Theory, and Social Change,” Theory and Society, 16, no. 3 (May 1987): 367. 8. The present conundrum about the healthcare debate—whether healthcare is a right or a privilege—has reached a crescendo amid attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (which, though a market-based program, offers protections to the most vulnerable population in the form of several mandates and targets to expand coverage) with the American Health Care Act (which focuses on giving all power back to the market and would slash the healthcare coverage of an estimated twenty-four million people). 9. Rinku Sen with Fekkak Mamdouh, The Accidental American: Immigration and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2008). 10. James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 78–91. 11. Paul A. Varg, “The Advent of Nationalism, 1758–1776,” American Quarterly, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1964): 171. 20 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP

12. For detailed analysis, see Ediberto Román, The Other American Colonies: An International and Constitutional Law Examination of the United States’ Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 13. The first major peacetime financial crisis driven by the Napoleonic Wars that led to a collapse of the American economy, persisting through 1821. 14. For detailed discussion, see Daniel J. Elazar, “From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,” Publius, 25, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 15; Charles S. Hyneman, The American Founding Experience: Political Community and Republican Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); and George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 15. The linear model of “legal to political to social rights of citizenship,” as espoused by T. H. Marshall, one of the most notable scholars on citizenship. 16. One such interesting transformation is that of the Irish, from a lowly despised race to the white category, which is duly discussed in several chapters. 17. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican War in 1848, and subsequently the United States gained five hundred and twenty-five thousand square miles of land which were part or all of the states of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Texas, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. Most of the eighty thousand Mexicans opted to become American citizens, and were promised full citizenship rights with suffrage and property protection. 18. Ediberto Román, The Other American Colonies: An International and Constitutional Law Examination of the United States’ Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 20–25. 19. See Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 67–92. 20. Enacted in 2005 as a response to terrorism, the Real ID Act issued new federal standards for state-issued driver’s licenses and non-driver identification cards. The most significant consequence of the law has been the non- eligibility of undocumented residents in getting a driver’s license. NOTES 21

21. The suffrage rights of non-citizens were restricted after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See Monica W. Varsanyi, “The Rise and Fall (and Rise) of Non-Citizen Voting: Immigration and the Shifting Scales of Citizenship and Suffrage in the United States,” Space and Polity, 9, no. 2 (2005): 114–19. 22. Dustin Tahmakera, “‘Pale Face ’Fraid You Crowd Him Out’: Racializing ‘Indians’ and ‘Indianizing’ Chinese Immigrants,” in Immigrant Rights in the Shadows of Citizenship, Rachel Ida Buff, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 142–55. 23. John S.W. Park, “On Being Here and Not Here: Noncitizen Status in American Immigration Law,” in Immigrant Rights in the Shadows of Citizenship, Rachel Ida Buff, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 28–39. 24. One of the influential works comes from noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), as he raises the fear of Mexican immigrants who remain immigrants, never evolving into settlers, and bringing their cultural values to change “our” American creed. 25. American teenager Abdur Rahman al-Awlaki was killed by a CIA-led drone strike in Yemen in 2011, an attack about which America concedes that he was not targeted but merely happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/ how-team-obama-justifies-the-killing-of-a-16-year-old-american/ 264028/. In 2017, his eight-year-old sister was killed in a similar raid conducted jointly by the United Sates and the United Arab Emirates. http:// www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/politics/yemen-raid-daughter-al-qaeda- leader/. 26. The DREAM Act (acronym for the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act) is intended for undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as minors, and would grant conditional residency and finally citizenship if they meet further qualifications. This proposed legislation is yet to be transcribed into law; alien minors only have temporary relief from deportation through an executive order initiated by President Obama, which is itself under question with the Trump administration in power. 27. See Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992); J. M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle, and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); and Murray Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987). 22 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP

28. See Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005) for the most comprehensive analysis. 29. See George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); and Charles S. Hyneman, The American Founding Experience: Political Community and Republican Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994) for detailed discussion. 30. A sanctuary city is one that limits its cooperation with the national government’s efforts to enforce immigration law. Although a number of cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago have historically sided with their undocumented population by not allowing their law enforcement officers to carry out immigration or deportation-related duties, this conflict between the state and federal level and even the state and local level has reached a climax in the Trump administration, as the federal government is threatening to hold back federal money unless states, cities, and counties cooperate to enforce immigration policies. For more details on the ongoing conflict, seehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/ sanctuary-cities/ and http://www.ksat.com/news/smallest-oldest-sanctuary- city-challenges-state-ban?cid=KSAT_12_&_KSAT.com. 31. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 32. See Nicholas Guyatt, Another American Century?: The United States and the World Since 9/11 (London: Zed Books, 2003) and Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). 33. President Trump has committed to expand the deportation of undocumented immigrants, build a wall on the southern border, and restrict both low-skilled and high-skilled immigrants to the American economy. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/technology/h1b-visa-facts- tech-worker.html. 34. See Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America: Immigration and Immigrant Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998) and Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). NOTES 23

35. See John S.W. Park and Edward J.W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005). 36. See Christian G. Samito, Becoming American Under Fire: Irish Americans, African Americans, and the Politics of Citizenship During the Civil War Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009) and Desmond King, The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 37. The Know-Nothing Party, also known as the American Party, was a prominent US political party during the late 1840s and the early 1850s, and is (in)famous for its opposition to immigrants and Catholics. 38. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Walker_Lindh. 39. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaser_Esam_Hamdi. 40. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Padilla_(prisoner). 41. For a detailed discussion, see Ediberto Román, Citizenship and Its Exclusions: A Classical, Constitutional, and Critical Race Critique (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 1–4. 42. The concept is borrowed from the Greek mythological character Panoptes, a giant with a hundred eyes, and refers to a type of institutional building designed by the English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, where the inmates of an institution could be observed by a single watchman without their knowledge. CHAPTER 2

American Identity: Ideals Versus Illusions

Although the formation of American identity predates the birth of the American nation, or even escalating discontent as British subjects, a conscious process to construct American identity emerged in the political psyche only after the success of the American Revolution. The identity that the founding fathers were grappling to articulate did not quite follow the one that had been incubating when they were American colonists and revolutionaries; the points of departure in the two distinct attempts are important indicators of discord in demarcating an American identity. As settlers, the new inhabitants of the American nation claimed their rights to equitable treatment and equal status on the basis of ancestry throughout the pre-Revolutionary period. The political rhetoric shifted from ancestry to ideology during the Revolution, as American identity favored abstract notions of citizenship, often borrowed from the Greek and Roman creeds, avoiding the ever-present thorny issues of race, ethnicity, class, and gender. The definition of American identity was often in conflict with the social connotations of what it meant to be an American and a citizen in a newly liberated country. This chapter is about the gaps between the legal and social meanings of American identity, the political processes that have both connected and disregarded the gaps, and their impact on citizenship rights and practices. American identity began in the duality of being both settlers and con- querors, victims and heroes, mirroring their parallel historical tracks. During and prior to the American Revolution, it was far easier to be a mere settler,

© The Author(s) 2018 25 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_2 26 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS victimized and oppressed. After the Revolution, the celebration of victory brought the concepts of freedom and liberty to the core of the American nation as well as the American psyche. Although these ideals were incompatible with the existing system of slavery, race hierarchy, and subjugation of Native Americans, the focus was to weave a story of the American nation and Americans, one that did not distort the high ideals by acknowledging contradictory social and legal norms. Meanwhile, the booming marketplace of the new nation opened up economic access to many more common citizens; this access and subsequent success had substantial social meaning and political ramifications for the rights and privileges of citizenship. The founding fathers had to deal with these inconsistencies in their design of political documents and systems. The American identity that emerged from the Revolution thus contained a bifurcated process: high ideals being inscribed in legal and political terms, with rapid social and economic changes constantly reshaping those very constructions.1 If we try to excavate the historic point when Americans started viewing themselves as different than British subjects, that point of divergence between the British and American identity illuminates one essential aspect of American identity, fraught with paradox from the very beginning.2 Although Americans started their journey to citizenship as subjects of a colony, continuous warfare and the process of subjugation of the natives enabled the American settlers to claim a status that was very different from that of passive subjects who obey the king’s command. Unlike the subjects in a monarchy, feudalism, or tyranny who have obligations, not rights and privileges, American “subjects” were able to claim a much more active role in the new nation without being citizens because of the geographical distance of the new territory. Their ongoing battles with the native population and their struggles for everyday existence also reinforced their claim to the land.3 The American identity originated in this paradox: socially and politically, on the domestic front, they became and acted as active citizens, while the legal status of citizenship and equal rights along with inhabitants of the mother country continued to elude them. If the identity of being a British subject was contentious and ambiguous, the identity that emerged from the ashes of the Revolutionary War produced even more complications. When the thirteen colonies joined rather abruptly against the British and succeeded in creating a new nation, one of the foremost concerns, at least in the minds of the founders, was to articulate the political ideology of the new nation. The first few decades after the Revolution were marked by integral struggles to cultivate a unique 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS 27

American identity that would encapsulate pride and unity.4 This construction of identity was not only in the political forefront, as in the writing of the Constitution itself, but also in narrating the history of America, as well as in the rapidly changing reality of the lived experience of the common people. While the ideological discourse of who we are never really ends, the beginning of the conversation that is reflected in the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the debates and interpretations of the Constitution merits special attention. After the Revolution, the nature of citizenship and the state-citizen relationship became the pivotal points of transformation as a republic was emerging from the shadows of a monarchy. Citizenship rights that were finally enshrined in the Constitution were rather different than the ideals of the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods. While the founders were searching through political ideologies from the Greeks and Romans to lay the foundations, the sweeping socioeconomic changes called for quite a different set of pragmatic responses to managing the political process of statecraft. The framers tried to contain some of these democratic powers through the Constitution that strengthened the federal government, but the state and local governments that emerged after the Constitution also retained much say about the political and, more importantly, the social meaning of citizenship rights and privileges.5 While the meanings and implications of American identity expanded with historic events such as the Civil War, the basic paradox of being both a victor and a victim, both active and passive, both patriotic and anti-government, has roots in the confusion, construction, and contradictions of the early years of the republic. The founders were engaged in rummaging through the Greek and Roman models of citizenship (and distancing themselves from the British model) not only to envision a political philosophy of state but also to enunciate the role of the citizenry in the political process. The transition from a monarchy to a republic was also a makeover from subjecthood to citizenship, a right that could not be bestowed on everyone regardless of race, ethnicity, and gender; accordingly, different rules and norms had to be enacted to control and restrict the citizenry, and new categories had to be developed to cordon off people and justify such obstructions. The Revolution and the Confederation called for a much more active citizenry, as Gordon S. Wood has painstakingly chronicled, whereas the Constitution was partly enacted to check the democracy and active citizenship that were creating mass uprisings in the new nation. Even when the Constitution 28 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS curtailed direct democracy in the political sphere, in the socioeconomic arena people continued to be participative and active citizens.6 The mani- festations of the distance between the rhetoric and the reality are pronounced in the perception of public spaces, the attempt to bridge the communitarian and liberal philosophies, and the prescribed role of the citizen in the Constitution that was being undermined by laws such as the Alien and Sedition Acts.7

The Rhetoric: The Greeks, the Romans, and the British Heritage In pre-Revolutionary America, British settlers in North America referred to themselves as “British colonists” as late as 1759. During the Seven Years’ War, Americans bore the label of Britons with pride. Their identification of themselves as Englishmen owed much to the French encircle- ment of the colonies. It was only after the conquest of Quebec that the name “American” became something more than a geographical expression.8 While each foreign war tested and strengthened colonial unity, resentments against new taxes and restraint of trade started to build up from those very entanglements. Americans were becoming increasingly conscious of the label of “subject” assigned by the British and their subsequent treatment as unequal people. In the years leading up to 1776, the nationalism of the colonists exhibited a dual nature: loyalty to the mother country combined with an increasing awareness of their own separateness and importance. The former nationalism that had focused on the British Constitution was undergoing a subtle shift whereby a high degree of autonomy for themselves was becoming the center of their attention.9 After the Revolution, the new nation emerged in the midst of ideological, political, and socioeconomic confusion. The shape of American nationalism and American identity emerged amid this confusion and so did the subsequent political, socioeconomic, and intellectual dimensions of nation- building. The founding fathers looked at the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome to build up an identity for the new nation. But while the theo- reticians of the American nation toiled over ideologies and texts, politics and economics took unpredictable turns and instigated new expectations from the government that had the effect of changing the rights, privileges, and obligations of citizens forever. What remains the most interesting part about this trajectory is how the ideological and real trends simultaneously complemented and contradicted each other. THE RHETORIC: THE GREEKS, THE ROMANS, AND THE BRITISH HERITAGE 29

Greek history seemed to be the obvious starting point for the American political elites to chart out the paths of nation-building and political processes. The notions of the social contract and mutual obligation, inherent in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics, had already served to justify the American Revolution. Ignoring the collectivist trends and indisputable state power inherent in these texts, the founding fathers turned to the higher ideals of individual rights and limits to state power.10 The Magna Carta of 1215 between King John and the aggrieved barons was perhaps the first tangible social contract. Thomas Hobbes envisaged government by consent, but the ruled had to surrender all individual rights to the ruler. John Locke’s social contract first added the obligation of the ruler to protect the life, liberty, and property of his subjects.11 Based on the resurrec- tion of ancient ideals, the American Revolution constructed a new and reciprocal relationship between the state and the citizen in modern times. The other source of inspiration came from the grandiose Roman Empire, its institutional arrangements, its logic and grammar of expansion, and its management of conflicts. While the imperial ambition of the United States followed the trend of Rome, it did not adopt the inclusionary norms of citizenship that were the basis of the Roman Empire. The Roman model of political institutions was deemed ideal for the structure of the new nation, but in actuality the political process tended to mimic the Greek model. While the founding fathers attempted to emulate the best of these models, they changed some of the basic aspects of Greek and Roman citizenship. The structural organization of the polity followed the Roman bureaucratic model, while it was the Greek spirit of democracy that inspired such institutions. As the state grew physically and its politics matured, the Greek and Roman influences tended to coexist, but were never quite harmonized in the American model.12 The Greek and Roman models of citizenship serve as ancestors for most Western systems of governance, but the immutable differences spark a number of paradoxes, as the democratic process and the bureaucratic structure often follow and prioritize different aspects of governance and allow for different levels of citizen participation. It is indeed difficult to reconcile the spirit of freedom-loving individualistic Americanism with empire-building, and though expansion of territory and invasion of foreign countries have occurred throughout America’s history as a nation, American identity has always steered clear from that of an empire. American identity followed a bifurcated path, acknowledging and proclaiming one aspect while silently pursuing the opposite facet all at once. The self-righteous ideology of American identity, 30 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS promoting the values of liberty and freedom, continues to fail to acknowledge these recurring contradictions and ironies.13 The American political system is indebted to the Greek and Roman political traditions, but these traditions contain inherent contradictions. The Greeks and the Romans had different models of citizenship: the former espoused citizenship as a sociopolitical identity, while for the latter it was a legal status. The Greek ideology of citizenship was rooted in the philosophy of community building; the emphasis was on the intricate rules of inclusion rather than on absolute exclusion. Citizenship was a highly privileged status, based upon and sustained by the helot14 underclass. The conditions of basic equality, civic duty, participation in state services, and defending the country were the prerequisites of becoming a citizen. Acceptance by every member of the community was needed to ascertain that an individual was worthy of the status bestowed upon him. A citizen soldier was expected to risk his life to save the city rather than for personal glory.15 Athenian citizenship, a pragmatic variant of the Greek model, was based on blood ties and the myth of common ancestry, yet it was not a totally closed system. Skilled craftsmen, willing to migrate from various parts of the Mediterranean, were bestowed with citizenship privileges. Until the fifth century BC, inclusion of a skilled outsider into Greek society was difficult, but not impossible.16 For the first wave of immigrants to America, a similar logic of constrained inclusion was the guiding principle in community building. Anti-immigrant backlashes occurred periodically, but it was possible for immigrants to prosper in America and form their own communities. At the same time, the rule of exclusion—whereby people who were excluded from the category of full citizenship, such as the helot, were excluded forever—certainly influenced the non-admissible category of African American slaves. The Spartan version, another variant of the Greek model, contained the militaristic bent encapsulated in the idea of the citizen as warrior, ever ready to sacrifice his life for his country. This definition of loyalty and patriotism has never ceased to inspire people, ranging from the Peloponnesian War to America’s longest war against Afghanistan.17 The Spartans considered manual labor beneath them. The enslaved population tilled their land, while they defended and governed the state. Citizenship was a privilege, as the status of adulthood did not necessarily translate into citizenship. Acceptance in the community was observed through an election process, and all community members had veto power. The state was imagined as an organic expression of the community where inclusion was THE RHETORIC: THE GREEKS, THE ROMANS, AND THE BRITISH HERITAGE 31 restricted. The constant fights against Native Americans, the dependence on slave labor (both white and black servitude), and the pride and claim over conquered communities in the pre-Revolutionary era are not far from this model. The Greek notion of paideia, a well-rounded civic education system emphasizing areté (i.e., goodness, virtue, and excellence), went along with philia (i.e., independence of mind and individual commitment to civic responsibility). The agora (town square) provided the space to live out this ongoing process of education through encounters involving business affairs, gossip, philosophy, and politics.18 One of the characteristics of Greek democracy was the lack of formal organization, and the survival of the ideal of citizenship depended on the fluidity and ambiguity of the concept of the citizen. Foreigners were excluded, but not always; slaves could become citizens. As Riesenberg notes, citizenship was “monolithic, hierarchical, and discriminatory”—in other words, “organic.” The poorest citizens had access to the legislative assembly, yet the wealthier class retained real political control. The immigrants or the metics were granted an inferior legal and political status, yet they could be highly educated, own property, and end up influencing the political system.19 The idea of such an unequal equality was also present in American society in the pre- Revolutionary days, where the abstract value of equality among the settlers coexisted with the reality of social hierarchy. In contrast to these Greek models, Roman citizenship was imagined as a legal relationship with the state. Instead of the rituals of inclusion, they had categories for excluded people, yet a porous enough system whereby people belonging to one category, such as slaves, could become free, or soldiers could be bestowed with property after courageous battles, and become citizens. Exclusion meant more burdens in taxes and less flexibility in trade, rather than complete servitude. Since citizenship was defined as a legal status, rather than a sociopolitical identity, it was possible for anyone to move up the hierarchy of different categories. Bravery and victory in battles often translated into freedom and citizenship status for slaves. Irrespective of political participation, for some of the categories citizenship was a right. Loyalty and obligation to the state were expected and acknowledged, but not as mandatory preconditions of becoming a citizen. Citizens enjoyed the protection of the state, but had few opportunities for participation in state matters. Power was being shared, negotiated, and fought for between the emperor, the senate, and the consuls. The assembly—the peoples’ representatives—had symbolic 32 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS power. The state was a purposive organization; it existed for the people, or more precisely, for the elite who were in charge. Citizenship was understood in terms of legal expectations and power, in contrast to an ethical relationship between the individual and the community. Rome built an empire on citizenship, using it to reward allegiance and service.20 The American idea of citizenship in the colonial era mimicked partly the Spartan and partly the Athenian model of sociopolitical identity, in the self-imagination of the European settlers. The pilgrims on the Mayflower made the Mayflower Compact21 even before they landed in the new nation. There were no rituals for inclusion, but property ownership and involvement in the community were essential to practice the rights of the citizen. The American Revolution, however, shifted the narrative of privileges to rights. John Locke’s social contract engraved the idea of obligation on both the rulers and the ruled, and confirmed that the state existed for the citizenry. The rules of exclusion included the demarcation of Native American nations and the existence of slavery laws. American national identity may have started with Greek ideals, but as the nation shifted from a small community-centered to a broad state- centered one, especially with the Constitution, the Roman model came more into play. The Constitution emulated a conscious attempt to move toward the Roman model with the political institutions it designed, such as the legislature and federal laws defining naturalization, but the consciousness of the Greek model was never lost. These contradictions are reflected in the perception and policies of citizenship. The rules of exclusion from American citizenship have been defined in legalistic terms and at the federal level, but the rules of inclusion continue to be defined from the social and cultural perspectives. While throughout the nineteenth century no one other than a “white” could naturalize, which races were indeed white was being decided on a social level. The Irish became white when their numerical power was sought after in electoral politics; much later, Hispanics in several states were successful in getting into the coveted white category.22 African Americans had to fight against explicit rules of exclusion from citizenship; their legislative victories more often than not were insufficient to allow inclusion, which was being established in the race-based society. The conflict between the legal and social meanings is, in fact, an inheritance of American identity: we see the contradiction recently when we discuss the “undocumented resident” (who lacks legal citizenship, but may very much be part of the American social fabric) or in the backlash regarding the first THE RHETORIC: THE GREEKS, THE ROMANS, AND THE BRITISH HERITAGE 33

Miss America of Indian descent (who has legal citizenship but stirred up the debate, “Is she/can she be one of us?”).23 Immigration policies and their interpretation and implementation exemplify the haphazard combination of the Greek and Roman models. The federal government had set the laws of naturalization and immigration focusing on who should not be allowed to become an American citizen, but the interpretation of such laws was very much a reflection of expanding or shrinking social acceptance and cultural tolerance, often with regional variance. The dual, ambiguous, and constantly shifting character of American consciousness is reflected in policies concerning minorities and immigrants, complicated by international issues. Just as the Civil War proclaimed the victory of federal power but had to accommodate negotiations with the principle of states’ rights on virtually all the important national issues, similarly the Roman model of citizenship dominated the official rules and regulations without challenging the social consciousness that seeped in from the Greek model. Whether we argue today about healthcare or ethnic profiling, the divergence between the Greek and Roman perceptions of the citizen’s rights, responsibilities, privileges, and rites of passage comes into play. The recent debates on healthcare— whether or not the Republicans might succeed in repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—are indeed rooted in the philosophical debates about the limits of obligation of the state itself.24 The parallel effort to purge the British part of their identity from national consciousness is similarly worth noting. The one British heritage that was irreversible as a common bond to unify all citizens was the English language. Americans aspired to develop an American English reflective of American uniqueness and, more importantly, different from British English. Unlike the British division of the aristocracy and the commoners, which influenced the use of language, Americans had an opportunity to establish a national language. Noah Webster25 and John Adams had the vision that American English would replace French as the next universal language.26 By the 1780s, there were literary and political maga- zines—namely Noah Webster’s American Magazine, Columbian Magazine, and New York Magazine—trying to cultivate the distinctive American voice. The Revolution stirred up an American identity that was difficult to reconcile with the British heritage and made it necessary to invent a national character. Naming the new country was the first step in imagining the national identity. In 1792, the United States of Columbia was 34 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

considered as an option to commemorate Columbus’s discovery of America. Columbia seemed like an apt replacement for Britannia in new compositions as it had the “same rhythm and number of syllables,” while another suggestion was Fredon or Fredonia. Ultimately, however, the United States of America, “the prejorative label” that had been applied by the colonists, took precedence.27 President George Washington’s acute effort to distinguish between the monarchy and the presidency and his tightrope walk to select state celebrations that might be deemed respect- able yet not monarchical were also struggles to simultaneously accept British heritage yet try to be distant from it. The very different philosophies from Greek and Roman roots were coalescing without the effort to resolve or bridge the inconsistencies; the respective political philosophies contained ambiguities while these were being reimagined for American soil. Perhaps one of the most pertinent examples is the constitution of the American public sphere, how it was redefined for America by selectively borrowing from Greek and Roman conceptions. It followed neither the strong communitarian ethics of the Greek prioritizing of obligatory participation, nor the libertar- ian contractual ethics that respected the public/private divide. One can early on discern the parallels between the public/private and national power/states’ rights divisions, evolving into full-blooded conflict later down the line. The core of Greek citizenship was participation, which occurred in the public sphere. The public sphere accommodates the overlapping identities of citizens, where they can interact and negotiate over the social and political aspects of life.28 Some scholars argue that in the absence of a strong controlling central power the public realm expanded rapidly, while other scholars point out that the primary concern of most people remained private rather than public.29 The government was small and consensual with a tiny bureaucracy and basic judiciary, and did not have much scope for the exercise of legislative or police actions.30 In the newly constructed American state, representation, however, liberated its citizens from the onerous duties of self-government, allowing individuals to direct their energies to private pursuits that would promote commerce and enhance individual independence. While the Athenian civic ethic prioritized public welfare over private welfare, the American republic defined private freedom as the core of civil liberty and citizenship in America. For the Greeks, however, politics was the collective arena in which people sought to judge the meaning of the good life.31 The THE REALITY: REWRITING HISTORY, CHANGING MARKETPLACE 35

American civic ethic was more concerned with the freedom of the individual from the interference of the state. Classical republicanism,32 stemming from Greek roots, encouraged public virtue by demanding the sacrifice of private desires and interests for the sake of the public interest, whereas private desires and individual freedom were the cornerstones of American republicanism. The liberalism adopted by the American polity focused on private pleasures, whether they were narrow economic gains or ideological principles such as freedom.33 Instead of a robust participatory plane that accommodated everyone, for Americans the public space became a utilitarian site where people would convene if their interests matched or clashed.

The Reality: Rewriting History, Changing Marketplace The political elites were not the only ones who were trying to exhume the roots of American identity and package it for the masses as the political foundation of the new nation. The definition of who is an American, or what constitutes an American, was consistently being transcribed below the surface of political documentation (such as the Constitution) by the common people in terms of social norms, political practices, and economic privileges in everyday life. These versions that sprung up from beliefs, prejudices, and necessities were often in conflict with the official version. Jefferson may have had the dream that the noble savages would one day join the American race,34 but for the common people, Native Americans remained the “other,” who became farther and farther removed from their lives. Traders settled in America and continued to flourish even when they could not become citizens. Just as the politicians and historians were chronicling the birth and silhouette of the new nation, the norms of social acceptance and abhorrence were undergoing transition following political upheaval and the thriving marketplace. In the pre-Revolutionary era, the need for a distinct American identity in a political sense was almost redundant, as identity was essentially tied with residency in the self-contained thirteen colonies, and being a British subject was the political marker of citizenship. Nevertheless, there was an intellectual effort to distinguish “Americans” from “others,” the others being Native Americans and later African slaves. The conscious effort of defining an American started with the creation of a mythic past that was 36 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS supposed to make up for the lack of a common past, history, and ethnicity. In the American imagination, they were a distinct people ideally located along the process of social development. The aboriginals were the hunters and gatherers, while the settlers went through the phase of agriculture, and finally arrived at commerce, the last stage of social evolution. As Native Americans represented the initial stages of history, it was justifiable to exclude them from citizenship. Actually, they provided a useful contrast between barbarity and refinement, a contrast also strengthened by the illusion that America was farther removed from barbarity than Europe.35 The rules of exclusion were framed in legalistic terms by making the “others” outcasts, but the norms of inclusion depended on the sociocultural perception of the American identity of “self” and nationhood. The sources of the sense of American identity were also older than the nation itself. It began with the belief in America’s special destiny, even a divine mission, which was widespread in the colonies. If the wilderness and Protestant ideology helped to construct the Puritan myth, the Revolution strengthened it. The Puritan myth of being entrusted with a civilizing mission would later morph into the idea of Manifest Destiny.36 From the very beginning, the ideas of civic culture and equal citizenship were hailed, while ignoring the irony of such ideals which were absent for a substantial portion of citizens. The rapidly changing society focused on individualism, egalitarianism, and democracy as the core of American identity and nationalism, but conveniently refrained from challenging slavery or patriarchal rules that were inconsistent with the ascribed values. Thus the civic culture—the basis of identity—articulated the values that people were comfortable identifying with, while remaining silent about the incoherent system that produced the opposite of that very civic culture.37 The American Revolution bound the thirteen states with a common interest—their shared destiny—which did not preexist but was imagined at the time of Revolutionary fervor. In the aftermath of the Revolution, however, the differences between the thirteen colonies, between farmers and landowners, and between traders and bankers, started to emerge. The prospects for a shared future became muddied with real-life conflicts, and attention shifted to the past rather than to the future in search of the bonds that would tie the new nation together. To take root in the popular mind, American nationalism had to be reshaped and expanded beyond the Revolution itself. Furthermore, as occupation of Native American land THE REALITY: REWRITING HISTORY, CHANGING MARKETPLACE 37 continued with new zeal and fervor, there was a need for a mythological narrative to justify these acts and define them as nation-building. The founding fathers were therefore not only attempting to construct a shared vision for the future, but they were indulging in a reconstruction of the past as well.38 Instead of the cumbersome presence of indigenous people, America’s past became defined by nature—pristine and waiting. Nature, for Jefferson, assumed the retrospective logic by which diverse objects and people could be brought together in a coherent narration. The New World made it possible to experiment with new forms of national consciousness. While rejecting the European past, Jefferson came up with a version of America’s past where nature awaited people, a vast landscape yearning for the proper population to tame it and build a nation, and the presence of Native Americans became part of the untamed barbaric nature that had to be dealt with cruelly only to be kind. This mythic past of the American landscape can be uninterruptedly reconciled with the heroic narration of modernity and nation-building. The cornerstone of American nationalism was of course the Revolution itself. The construction of a past for nation-building not only relied on filling the void of historical memory, but also reshaped that memory by purging the discomforting parts. One of the most immediate consequences of the Revolution for citizenship was how Native Americans were clearly excluded from it. Their siding with the British provided the justification to strip them of any rights and even drive them away from their lands. The claims of inherent rights obviously did not extend to native territories or their autonomy. Although Jefferson had idealized the “noble savage,” for all practical purposes they remained outside the realm of citizenship. Jefferson insisted that Native Americans differed from European inhabitants of America only developmentally, taking pains to establish the racial likenesses linking Europeans to American natives. Native Americans thus became the living relics of America’s ancient past. Jefferson theoretically envisioned continuity between the ancient American past and the national future, as long as the eventual transformation of Native Americans into citizens fell short of occurring.39 The myth of the noble savage roman- ticized selective aspects of Native American life to make it admissible to the imagination of American nationalism, while real Native Americans remained outside the periphery of the American nation and identity.40 Jefferson’s attempts to incorporate the noble savage into American nationhood in reality kept them at a safe distance from American identity itself. 38 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

The image of the mythic past seeped into the imagination of American nationalism, and the logic of exclusion was internalized in the popular mindset. The American Constitution is hailed as a just contract between the state and citizens in the modern era, yet it contained the three-fifths rule, which was labeled as one of the great compromises in the Constitution itself. American identity was centered on the idea of the rejection of illegitimate hierarchy and restrictive citizenship, but the new political contract and allied institutions upheld immoral power and citizenship restrictions over a large group of people. Even though the process of nation-building occurred through driving away Native Americans from their land and on the backs of slave labor, American identity continued to be defined in terms of autonomous, morally upright individuals engaged in peaceful public life. Benedict Anderson has taught us how all nations are imagined,41 but what is distinct for America is how this imagination was geared toward both the future and the past. The collective articulation of a patriotic narration of who Americans are focuses on the future as well as the past, but unlike other nations, which could draw from the glory of their forefathers, the vacuum of a common heritage for Americans had to be built upon a mythic past. The weaving of the mythic idyllic past was not enough to bond Americans who were loyal to their thirteen colonies rather than their newly acquired identity.42 The Constitution that created a strong continental-sized national republic was very different from the prevailing self-identification and spirit of the countrymen of the thirteen colonies. The transformation from a monarchy to a republic not only offered more rights and privileges to citizens as opposed to subjects, but it also demanded more from them. It demanded a certain political virtue and a loyalty to the idea of the common good, even at the cost of private desires. Some level of equality—or at least perceived equality—was needed to create a political environment where everyone would feel that they had a stake in government. At the same time, individualism called for economic and social fluidity where anyone could aspire to be rich and powerful and be able to attain it with hard work and merit. American society opted to pursue the dual values of individualism and egalitarianism without ever connecting the incoherencies. Later, the American Constitution continued this paradox by accommodating the ideals of civic freedom as much as racial prejudice. In the meantime, more radical changes were taking place beyond the political spectrum in America in the marketplace and seeping into the THE REALITY: REWRITING HISTORY, CHANGING MARKETPLACE 39 social scene. Business emerged as the major activity that defined new social relations, as an extraordinarily high proportion of people became involved in internal trade. The Revolutionary War destroyed old mercantile firms in the North and tobacco plantations in the South, and simultaneously opened up new sources of profit, heightening the transitory character of great fortunes and of the social prestige attached to them. Wealth became the prime qualification for entry into an elevated social rank and provided access to the ministry and the military, which had traditionally been held in high regard and guarded against entry by the common man.43 The colonial aristocracy had always been rather weak in the absence of clear rank or class distinctions. Moreover, there were neither oppressive established churches nor titled nobility. Unlike Europe, there were no masses of people sunk in poverty. As a result, with the exceptions of slaves, indentured labor, and underage young men, average white males were free from intrusion from the state or church. Colonial aristocracy was much more porous than its British counterpart as it allowed entry to make up for the lack of gentility.44 Wide landownership made colonial society quite egalitarian. Two- thirds of the white colonial population owned land, compared to only one-fifth of the English population. The propertyless in America tended to be either recent immigrants or young men awaiting their inheritance or the opportunity to move and acquire land. Freehold tenure is not complementary to subordination or dependence. Class differences, however, were perceived as natural and inevitable. The landowning “yeoman” farmers, while protesting against the concentration of property in the hands of the few, also wanted to maintain some level of inequality in society. Still, there was an overall consensus that liberty and great inequality do not go hand in hand.45 Landownership was the cornerstone of the idea of independence in eighteenth-century America. For most white settlers, land was not only a means of living, but it also satisfied property requirements for voting, and in general the notions of independence and autonomy were intricately related with landownership. The idea of both political and economic independence was rooted in the idyllic vision of a self-contained life, where the government could not bother one.46 The founding fathers spent a considerable amount of time trying to come up with a narrative of American identity and nationalism in a way that would not only purge the problematic aspects (slaves and Natives) from the narrative, but also keep it porous enough to make room for “desirable” people as needed. Even when the Revolution was being hailed 40 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS as a just war, and Native Americans were paying for their sin of assisting the British, the loyalists were being accepted back into the fold with an oath of allegiance and accompanying disenfranchisement. The first state naturalization laws and all the discussions around them were a way to accommodate the former loyalists as well as immigrants. In many states, loyalists were restricted in their civil rights after the oath. It is interesting to note that although women were regarded not to have political will, wives or mothers of known loyalists were forced to take oaths of good behavior. This underlined a rather vicious part of citizenship, of forced conformity rather than organic common bonds, existing side by side with the natural rights model.47 American identity was not porous for everyone, especially those belonging to the wrong race. In the imagination of a genealogical nationalism, African Americans remained forever inadmissible to national citizenship. Unlike Native Americans, African Americans resided within American society, making it impossible to resolve the problems of slavery in nationalism and identity through theory only. Already the vision of natural rights was proving to be awkward, as it fed the freed slaves’ enthusiastic notions of rights and freedoms. The slaves were very much part of the present, literally bearing the hard labor of nation-building, but they could only figure as “others” in American identity, with no space delineated in either the past or the future. Their presence remained a constant reminder of the paradoxes of American identity. From the inception of the nation to the recent Hurricane Katrina debacle, this racialized construction of American nationalism would remain problematic with respect to a continuous narration of citizens’ rights. The real meaning of American identity and citizenship often remains veiled in the paradoxical drifts of ideological, political, and socioeconomic realities. If the institution of slavery was not problematic enough, the presence of free or non-enslaved blacks made the situation even more cumbersome. The term “free Negroes” is a misnomer, as they were very closely regulated in their property and persons; nevertheless, they existed to challenge the myth of American citizenship containing the large gap occupied by non-citizens and non-persons. Interestingly, the lives of free blacks or mulattoes were intertwined with state citizenship while lacking national citizenship. For free people of color, each state offered a different range of limited rights (suffrage was out of the question), which were liable to change all the time. They were not aliens, yet had fewer rights than white aliens. The states’ intrusion into the bodies, property, and movements of THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 41 their black residents proves that the fork between federal and state authority over citizenship existed from the moment the republic was born. Borrowing the British idea of the denizen,48 some rights were accorded to free colored people, though the subsequent phase of naturalization, which existed for the denizen to transform into a citizen, was denied to black American denizens. The rights of denizens were conditional and could be revoked or expanded at the will of the authorities. Free blacks were neither citizens nor aliens; and they were neither non-persons like their enslaved brethren, nor could they claim personhood in any meaningful way as white citizens could.49 From the Revolutionary era onward, many American leaders promoted the popular notion that Americans had a distinctive character, rooted in their freedom-loving Anglo-Saxon ancestors, which set them apart from and above blacks, Native Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, and Filipinos, who were unfit for self-government. Although this notion was later reinforced by racialist anthropology and eugenics, Enlightenment doctrines of human moral inequality and environmentally induced racial differences were also well-respected ideas in the early years of the republic. Overtly racist doctrines began to dominate in the late Jacksonian period, marked by new immigration, Indian removal, westward expansion, the Mexican War, and further polarization over slavery. Although Enlightenment liberal doctrines with their broad cultural definition shaped Americanism, it was undermined by a religion and race-based identity. “Anglo-American Protestantism,” with sharp ethnic as well as religious features, came to define Americanism, as issues of race, such as slavery, became cumbersome, and as more non-Protestant immigrants arrived in America.50 This religion and race-based identity may have dominated the ideological sphere of the self, but the growing economy made room for people of different denomi- nations and hues (even if blacks could not be incorporated in that spectrum), and this self-definition was being challenged at the level where people were in constant contact with these less threatening “others.”

The Paradox: Self-Identity of the American “People” American identity and nationalism started taking shape not only in the midst of developing ideological notions about who Americans should be, but also amid the emerging reality of who they were becoming in the new nation. The clashes between the ideals and the reality are contained in the compromises of the Constitution, the disparities and confusions that were 42 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS dominating the socioeconomic contours of the thirteen colonies that were striving to come together. The changes in the early republic occurred both in the assembly halls and in the marketplace, often reinforcing but also contradicting each other. The American identity that emerged on the relatively level playing field (minorities and women excluded) of trade and commerce contained egalitarian and anti-authoritarian traits. In comparison, the American identity enshrined in political documents—Thomas Paine’s Common Sense,51 the Articles of Confederation, and finally the Constitution—was becoming much more complex, compromising, and subtle than the common perception of the citizen. The American in the town hall and the American in the marketplace did have overlapping traits, but their differences are the more illuminating part of the story of the construction of American identity. Americans may have become legal citizens only after the Revolution, but they were quick to grasp the socioeconomic implications of their new political identity. Basking in the glory of victory, they started demanding more and more political rights from the state and were willing to participate more in political vocations. The founding fathers responded to these demands by reducing the property qualification for voting, broadening suffrage to include all taxpayers, extending the vote even to non-taxpaying white males, and getting rid of covertures. More public access to elections and political processes generated even more demand for political access. Expanded suffrage resulted not only in local leadership by common folks, but also the definition of the “common good” was being interpreted as constituting local interests.52 The Revolution paved the way for ordinary men of humble and rural origin to be elected as representatives. Giving in to the ideal of egalitarianism and the rhetorical battle of the role of the common people in public life, the Constitution came into play to perfect the political ideal as well as to manage the political reality by constructing impediments to local autonomy to control the excess of people power.53 The opening of the political system to everyone (minus slaves and women) allowed nearly all adult white men to vote, which was indeed a revolutionary principle. The requirement of owning fifty acres of land or property worth fifty pounds was removed from the 1776 Constitution. Anyone who was twenty-one years old and paid any state or local taxes was eligible to exercise the rights of citizenship. Almost 90 percent of the male (white) adult population qualified under this category.54 The claim to natural rights worked well as an abstract value as well as a political tactic, but to translate it to everyday terms would threaten the power of government THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 43 and the social order. The elite voiced their amused premonition that women and young lads would demand suffrage, while not even uttering the more real fear pertaining to slaves and other minorities.55 The doctrine of natural law had always served as a useful tool to protest against unjust treatment by the colonists. As they had claimed that natural law was weightier than the British Constitution itself, it was inevitable that American citizenship would be founded upon natural law, with its rights and duties borrowed from the British common law system. The consent between the governed and the government was to be the basis of society and government, and a wide variety of statutes were drawn up to fill in the details of citizenship by putting forth new regulations on naturalization, treason, crime and punishment, and property rights. It was already established that inherent natural rights were attached to individuals. Taxpayers had to consent to pay taxes. Representatives were directly responsible to their constituents, and open to instruction. The vote became a right attached to personhood rather than to property.56 It should also be noted that the common language of natural rights did not automatically apply to every group of people. Slaves, or even free blacks, attempted to claim the logic and rationale of natural rights, but their appeals were contained in the paradoxical nature of American identity and the political system that sprung from that notion of self-image.57 The principle of Jus soli, citizenship as birthright on native soil, is an inheritance from British culture, but had to be refashioned in the American context because of the existence of slaves. Jus soli became the operating principle for all free white persons, while slaves were relegated to property status.58 The Articles of Confederation, along with Common Sense, were the first documents where the articulation of self-identity and the definition of American nationalism started to take shape. While these texts were singu- larly important in igniting the imagination of the American people, it was the Constitution that was the first formal contract between citizens and their government.59 These three frameworks of governance and the power of the people are often referred to in one breath, ignoring the paradoxical role of citizens and the expectations from the government in each of the texts. The purpose of Paine’s Common Sense was to appeal to the public,60 and hence its utility after the Revolution receded. The Declaration of Independence had a far deeper impact on American society and American institutions. In a mere ten years, however, it was replaced by the Constitution. The Constitution not only moderated the tone and spirit of 44 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS the Revolution in government, but it was also a rational contract between the state and the citizen in peacetime. The political elites were concerned about the expression of this newly discovered power, and by the 1780s the political crisis of the day was the excess of democracy. The theoretical assertion of all men being created equal was being tested as farmers, artisans, and other workers aspired to high government office and in many instances indeed ended up getting elected. The Revolution had borrowed the notion of natural equality from theoretical jurisprudence and ignited the imagination of the common people. This idea was the key to connect to the common people and unite them in the midst of war and Revolution. However, during nation- building and identity formation, the same notions of natural equality and active citizenship were not only redundant but also rife with risks.61 The line between the gentry and the common people was quite blurry in America, which prepared the imagination of the common people to believe in the popular and egalitarian rhetoric of the Revolution. As aspiring commoners became wealthy, literate, and independent, awe and respect for social ranks started to disappear. As Wood notes, “By 1828, Noah Webster in his dictionary saw the term ‘gentleman’ merely as a cour- tesy title, of general address, applied most appropriately to ‘men of education and good breeding, of every occupation.’”62 While touting equality for all men, the assumption about political leadership was that it belonged to a certain class, namely the 5 to 10 percent of property owners who claimed natural aristocracy. It was only property ownership along with its dress codes and codes of behavior that could elevate one into the natural aristocratic class. It was the landed gentry—independent gentlemen of leisure—who were expected to supply the necessary leadership in government. Even “professionals”—like lawyers, doctors, clergymen, and military officers—were considered a rank lower in society, as they had not expended the labor and pain necessary to procure property. The “gentlemen” also considered electioneering, political parties, or even canvassing beneath them. But their social preeminence suddenly was not enough to guarantee their political leadership. The popularity of the common folk often trumped the system.63 The final straw in the series of social and political upheavals was Daniel Shays’s uprising in the summer of 1786. It was not only high taxes, imprisonment for debt, and the short supply of money that triggered Shays’s Rebellion, but the newfound belief in the people’s power also played a significant role in motivating the common people to act against the government. THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 45

Shays’s group stopped the collection of taxes, closed the courts, and tried to seize arms from an armory. These actions strengthened the belief that too much democracy was indeed troublesome and that the power of democracy needed to be limited or controlled for its own good. Although the founders talked about a little rebellion as an occasional medicine for sound democracy, their fear of the unraveling of the republic was much stronger than the theoretical impulse for democracy.64 The Union, conceived in an emergency situation, now needed to be reshaped for peacetime. The founding fathers fought over the meaning of the Union. The differences in habits, produce, commerce, and internal policy among the states and their consequences for the Union did not escape the concern of the founding fathers. The legal rights and privileges of citizens also remained unequal among the thirteen states, which was one of the reasons why the Articles of Confederation had to be replaced with the Constitution. The citizens were more loyal to their own free and independent states rather than to the American nation itself.65 An American identity with its own distinctive language, manners, customs, and political and religious sentiments was yet to emerge as a multitude of ethnicities comprised Americans, a reality that was perceived as troublesome.66 When the compact or contract among the thirteen states was faltering amid the rebellions against the Union, the Constitution provided a new notion of contract, one that brought the individual citizen to the forefront. Instead of the community-centered model of citizenship that existed in the Confederation, the Constitution promoted the idea of a contract between the individual and the federal government. The bond that connected the citizens—natural rights—was defined vaguely as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but with all its limited applications and ironies, it became an inherently American phrase. Natural rights acquired divine sanction; as Hamilton claimed: “The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments and musty records…. They are written…by the hand of divinity itself and can never be erased or obscured by moral power.”67 The federal Constitution of 1787 was an attempt to tame the passion- ate undertones of the Revolution. It was a response to popular social developments, an attempt to mitigate their effects by new institutional arrangements. Concurrently, the new Constitution was perceived by many as a way to scale back the Revolution. The spirit of “liberty” was being redefined as reason and order. The Articles of Confederation had been too democratic, and the common people had run amok with notions of liberty 46 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS that threatened elite interests. The policies of paper money, re-evaluating the war debt, and debt relief were all popular economic policies and contained built-in seeds of turbulence. The Constitution, in short, was largely a way to contain the Revolutionary spirit.68 Madison’s Federalist No. 10 was perhaps the most famous and frank acknowledgement of the degree to which private interests of various sorts had come to dominate American politics. Madison and the Federalists were willing to allow these diverse competing interests free play in the new Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation were unable to control the anachronistic trends and were felt to be inadequate for the restless democratic and capitalist society that was rapidly emerging in America. The perception of active citizenry during the Revolution was countered by the systematic obstacles to direct democracy in the Constitution, and this reveals the story of the power struggle between the elite and the common man in the aftermath of the American Revolution. The democracy that emerged from the Revolution and the democracy that was imagined tended to be quite different. Bouton argues that it was a disappointment for ordinary white folks, especially as the elite continued to tweak the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship to their own advantage. The Constitutional Convention was perceived by many as a counter-revolution which centralized power at the very top, leaving the ordinary folks behind. The struggle for more political access and for more wealth equality was carried on not by radicals but by mainstream people. The definition of good government that had previously encompassed democracy and equality changed to liberty, which came to mean undeterred private property ownership and civil liberty; the former prioritizing only a segment of society and the latter restricted for the non-white, non-male part of the population.69 The French Revolution was yet another wake-up call to differentiate from anarchy as the American self was redefined. Just as Americans tried to distance themselves from the British by downplaying the cultural affini- ties, they tried to distance themselves from the full-blown impact of the French Revolution, even though many of the basic principles of the French Revolution mirrored their own. The French Revolution tested the theoretical ideals of American nationalism and citizenship in a profound way. Based on the same foundational principles of liberty and autonomy, it represented chaos and anarchy to the American founders. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were a direct response to that fear. These Acts not only undermined freedom of speech and freedom of the press but the very THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 47 spirit of the Revolution, by usurping from the people the power to criticize government by labeling it seditious, and by empowering the government to judge what was seditious.70 The most general and far-reaching alteration of social structure lay in the redistribution of economic power inherent in migration to thinly pop- ulated America. Suddenly, virtually all freemen owned land, often more than enough to assure subsistence. Owing to its scarcity relative to land resources, the value of labor for every individual rose sharply, and thus labor was freed from any traditional social controls.71 In retrospect, the seeds of disparity between the North and the South would continue to grow, but for the time being the development of the free market and the expansion of foreign trade and commercial ventures maintained the illusion of quite an egalitarian America. The regional differences in social transformation of the colonies through commerce contained and nourished the seeds of North-South divergence. The development of the free market was as much of a social novelty as it was an economic one. It changed the relationship of person to person and of persons to government. The blurring of the distinctions between gentlemen and commoners in America also changed the focus of the educational system. Rapid commercialization raised the level of literacy. One of the strongest motives behind literacy was not to read the scripture but to engage in trade and business. By the early years of the nineteenth century, people in New England had a level of literacy that was second only to Scandinavian countries. The different members of the aspiring middle class all wanted an education, though not necessarily a classical one but something that would be useful in their lives.72 As local communities sprang up, people converged around their professional and class interests. As Wood describes, “Merchants and creditors called for high taxes on land in place of tariffs, less paper money, the protection of private contracts, and the encouragement of foreign trade. Artisans lobbied for the regulation of the process of agricultural products, the abolition of mercantile monopolies, and tariff protection against imported manufactured goods. Entrepreneurs everywhere petitioned for legal privileges and corporate grants.”73 The market in goods and labor started to take over the traditional direct consumption economy. The free-market economy demanded political liberalism as the basis of the state. The American Revolution had incorporated anti-colonial fervor, but the American Constitution adopted exactly the same techniques of the 48 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS predecessors to subjugate minorities once the colonized were free. Americans reiterated the values of British liberty and justice and claimed that they applied to them as well, but these values were not applicable to black slaves and Native Americans. The consciousness of constitutional rights has roots in the positive notions of self-ownership and citizenship— in the idea of autonomous individuals capable of imagining and realizing personal futures for the pursuit of happiness. The wrongs that constitutional rights would redress have usually been tied to structures of inferior status and dependency, such as slavery and covertures. But these very wrongs were approved by the Constitution. The Constitution is usually hailed as a structure of rights that rose above and countered the real social order of oppressive relations, but this ignores the fact that maintaining that very social order was one of the purposes of the Constitution.74 The contradictions of citizenship rights and privileges for women followed a simultaneous tortured narrative where the ideal and the real, the legal and the social aspects, tended to clash with and contradict one another. The new rights conferred on citizens began with limited gender implications, since these rights were understood as the rights of men. But by the late eighteenth century, there were voices like Mary Wollstonecraft and her American counterpart Judith Sargent Murray who initiated the uncomfortable discussion over women’s rights. Although in a spiritual or social sense the question of equality sparked debate among the most progressive elements, these discussions or concessions had little political and no legal implications. Women remained legally dependent on men. When the Supreme Court in Connecticut ruled in 1788 in favor of a married woman’s right to dispose of her property as she wished, the ruling was criticized for loosening the bands of society.75 On the new and changing social front, however, women were starting to mingle with men on nearly all occasions. While women’s education was endorsed, their own educational role was confined in the home to children. Still, the equal but separate doctrine was being challenged on many fronts. One of the cornerstones of civil society was defined in terms of the treatment of women, and respectful treatment of women acquired a moral undertone as it distinguished civil society from its savage opposites. Common law also defined the status of citizens in accordance with office, property, household position, race, gender, infirmity, and age. Women and men had very different rights and duties according to common law, but white women had an essential role in state-building and even republican citizenry. Their status as Americans was never denied and their presence at THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 49 all social and informal political gatherings was encouraged, so long as their participation was not accompanied by any rights.76 Another example of these anomalies and contradictions regarding the self-identity of Americans, especially in relation to citizenship, is the process of naturalization, and it follows that the first series of naturalization laws in America contain the paradoxes of American identity. In the “citizenship bill” crafted by Jefferson in 1790, there were procedures for naturalization along with the process of relinquishing that character and becoming an alien, which was also regarded as an inherent right, even though common law treated expatriation as renunciation of one’s allegiance, and abandonment of citizenship.77 The next bill of 1794, however, was focused on limiting the asylum seekers from Europe who were supposedly contaminated by the French Revolution. Finally, the Alien and Sedition Acts captured not only the extent of the perceived threat against the republic, but also the expectations from citizens. The law constrained and regulated the entry of foreign seditious elements into the nation and simultaneously put forth a concept of the ideal national character: ancestry, manners, character, habits, language, and support for government.78 The Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Friends and Enemies Act, and the Sedition Act drew the lines between citizens and immigrants pro- foundly. The quest to establish a myth of the “true American” was aided by such legislation, but it was not a smooth process. The domestic political fight between the Federalists and the Republicans was being contested over the ideals of “states’ rights” and the “rights of man.” During the first ninety years of the republic, states that were eager for manpower granted resident aliens most privileges, including the franchise.79 The legitimacy of federal power to regulate entries by foreigners was in a way a challenge to federal power to define the meaning of a true American as opposed to the exercise of such power by local sovereignties. But eventually the Federalist notion of a uniform national citizenship won over as the American state expanded, and naturalization and immigration laws became more of a federal concern usurping the local and state authorities of their nation- building capabilities and powers.80 American identity is a result of conflicts: born in the American Revolution, bred in the contradictions between the North and the South, and fought over in the Civil War. Historians cite the Civil War as the war that redefined American identity. Between the period of the American Revolution and the Civil War, the constant struggle of defining an American identity was going on. Although the Civil War is the symbol of 50 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS the abiding differences between the North and the South, it also reinforced a dangerous tradition of a theoretical and real-life divide in dealing with thorny issues. Theoretically, African Americans were granted citizenship, but it took them almost a full century through political and often violent struggle to realize the promises of the Civil War. The ideal American citizen, active in politics and just in society, follows if we believe in the power balance and mechanisms provided in the Constitution, yet it is the same Constitution that often remains silent and powerless when injustices occur against ethnic groups, whether they be African Americans, Japanese Americans, or detainees at Guantánamo Bay. The Constitution contains this schizophrenic tendency at many different levels: it idealizes democratic institutions, but the form of representative government often favors, or at least tolerates, a passive citizenry. The individual identity of Americans remained that of a self-sufficient, individualistic, freedom-loving people, but American nationalism produced another image of Americans. The American, following the nationalistic persona, was supposed to prioritize loyalty to the nation over individual freedom and unity of the nation over community bonds, while aspiring to expand the American way of life beyond its territorial boundary, as was his “Manifest Destiny.” This new American was very different from the yeoman Jefferson had envisioned: self-sufficient, communitarian, morally upright, and freedom-loving.81 These two imaginations of American identity were, in fact, porous, and both kept on borrowing from the other. The American identities from the individual and nationalistic perspectives may differ, but both have been ever-present in the national psyche, and keep on conflicting yet reinforcing the other image. American nationalism contained two mutually exclusive imaginations, one ideal and one pragmatic, and attempted to harmonize these in the Constitution. For the various minorities in America, warfare has promoted citizenship more than any other measure, yet Americans have always been compelled to provide a moral undertone to each foreign transgression, from the Spanish-American War to Iraq and Afghanistan.82 Even though the Constitution contains racist exclusionary notions, it simultaneously critiques laws and other forms of official power that produce social hierarchy, division, and violence. The American Constitution occupies two different realities and operates concurrently between the real and ideal worlds of politics. Self-government has remained a cornerstone of Americanism, yet it has been thwarted from the very beginning as a political process by a myriad of institutions and divisions of power. THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 51

American nationalism thus produced a schismatic identity. For the individual, Americanism came to be loosely defined as the sum of canonic ideals: self-government, equal opportunity, freedom of speech and association, and belief in progress as well as loyalty to the nation.83 The communitarian value of self-government and the liberal value of equality of opportunity have never ceased to clash. If American identity had dual meanings in the individual and national contexts, the Constitution actually sharpened the ambiguity rather than resolving it. The character of American nationalism after the Revolution was drastically changed with the adoption of the Constitution. The establishment of centralized government far more powerful than most people desired symbolized elite recognition that mutual interest was not sufficient to hold the Union together. With the federal government’s financial and political power, Americanism also became meaningful in an international context. Instead of focusing on who Americans were, the focus shifted to how Americans were different from the rest of the world. This ideology of American exceptionalism helped justify genocide, slavery, and imperial adventures. The pre-Revolutionary concept of American identity was not only based on the ideal of individual freedom, but also freedom from the state. The American Constitution, the most important tangible product of nationalism, expanded civic rights and added political rights, but also made it impossible for the citizen to gain complete freedom from different levels of government. From the Revolution to independence, and from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, the American identity that emerged went through several cycles of reincarnation, and there were new winners and losers at each stage in the game of writing history. The common beliefs about the citizen’s political and economic rights in the pre-Revolutionary, Confederate, and Constitutional eras were strikingly different. The journey from the monarchy to the republic not only changed the elite of the society and the mechanisms for their ascension to power, but also the very processes of becoming part of the elite itself. One of the most rapid changes between the Revolution and the Constitutional Convention was the socioeconomic metamorphosis that swept the growing nation. As discussed, the American identity in the yeoman farmer’s imagination and the identity discernible from the documents of the founding fathers are not exactly similar. The ten years of the Confederacy were a period of clashes between traders and farmers. While these disputes are not uncommon in any society, with the Constitution the American state actually set down the rules to prioritize certain aspects of 52 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS society and economy over others. The identity that was located in a pastoral, rustic, self-contained, and individualized world often clashed with the new economic reality where different interests collided, group-based politics originated, and conflicts emerged amongst geographical regions. The Constitution was fundamentally about how to resolve or manage these conflicts. We find the same interest collisions when we trace the argument for and against globalization in the last couple of decades—between workers and companies, between the losers and winners of the new economic shift. American identity thus has been, from the very beginning, oscillat- ing between the ideal rooted in a mythic self-image and a dynamic one that responds to the realities of the day. The individual identity of Americans developed as both a conscious and unconscious response to a number of factors: the clash between the identities of the religiously persecuted and the invaders in the new land; the simultaneous acts of conquering and belonging in that land; and the parallel processes of vanquishing natives yet forming new communities. In contrast, the transitions in the nationalist identity are easier to detect: in the denunciation of British identity; in the creation of a distinct American identity; and in the designs of political and social institutions. Nationalism operated at a far more conscious level than individual identity formation, but the processes of identity formation and nationalism remained mutually reinforcing, even when these did not follow the same direction. Just as the contradictions of the Greek and Roman models of state and citizenship engulfed the American idea of citizenship, in designing political institutions and processes the founding fathers borrowed from both classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism, which opened up another layer of discord. While Locke prioritized private rights, classical republicanism remained committed to communal goals at the expense of private desires. The American Revolution and the early republic embody a history of conflict between a populist majority, usually agrarian, against a narrow aristocratic or business minority.84 For America, it was the Constitution that changed the importance of the relationship between the individual and the community. American nationalism replaced the communitarian imagination of Americanism in the political arena but preserved it at the ideological level. The identity of an American has always remained caught between the two versions: the ideal and the pragmatic. Americans have typically based their sense of identity on the state rather than the political community, even when the territory of the nation was expanding. The political community of a given territory includes people THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 53 both inside the government and outside the government, people who provide demands and supports that energize and sustain the political system. The political community, which encompasses foreign relations, competition, and anxieties, is much broader than the political system.85 In America, it was the individual rather than any existing or potential group who became the basis for aspirations, expectations, and political demands. Thus the perception of society was that it was composed of men of equal standing, and discussions about the power of any social group—clergy, aristocracy, guilds, corporations, peasants—were generally not brought to the fore. Individualism rests on an egalitarian, optimistic view of civil society, a society that precedes government. Compared to Europe, where there were severe ethnic and religious factions, the self-perception of Americans was rooted in taming the wilderness and setting up new societies. Instead of trying to control it, the effort of government was to sustain such civil societies.86 Liberal citizenship draws from a legacy that rejects communal bonds and ethnic relations, in order to arrive at core principles that might include more people. The porousness of liberal citizenship, and its reluctance to trace a strong line between the insider and the outsider, encourages a diversity in which common bonds with fellow citizens are never prioritized.87 The distinctive feature of liberalism is its acknowledgement of both private and public pursuits, and its prescribed limits on the state with regard to private pursuits. In contrast to freedom from state interference with respect to individual private pursuits, republican thought emphasizes institutions and practices that focus on common goals and collective self- governance.88 In the post-Revolutionary period, the tensions between the liberal and republican ideals manifested themselves in the Constitutional Convention. The Federalists prioritized the liberal notions of individual freedom and property rights, while the republican anti-Federalists wanted to protect communities. The Constitution promotes a liberal ideology, but the significance of communities, local autonomy, and state citizenship—all republican notions—were duly integrated into the Constitution.89 The contractual vision of citizenship, which forms the basis for contemporary liberal views, is rooted in the political philosophy of Locke and Hobbes. A liberal citizen is an autonomous individual who is not deeply connected to community and therefore possesses thin identity. In contrast, civic republicanism proposes a thick identity, as common traditions, understanding, and public engagements are shaped by that identity.90 This thick identity is apposite for an exclusive model of citizenship. As long as the territory of the nation-state was fixed and loyalty to the nation was 54 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

unambiguous, thin identity supplemented the inclusive principles of citizenship. America was struggling between inclusive and exclusive policies as it acted as an empire while its self-image remained that of a republic. Even as the exclusionary principles of citizenship have been transformed into more inclusionary ones, the rites of passage for immigrants have remained extremely long and strenuous. The era of multiculturalism and globalization throws yet another challenge at America’s inclusive policies. While thick identity is incomprehensible for America, can thin identity survive the breakdown of territorial and economic boundaries between nations?

The Paradox Continues…

American Identity in the Era of Trump Supporters

The 2016 presidential election has encapsulated American politics by opening up a volatile discussion about the rights, privileges, and powers of citizenship. The divergence between how we want to define ourselves and how we are defined based on our actions and preferences is not new, but a precarious tone has recently been added to the always ongoing debate about who we are. In globalized, multicultural, and neoliberal America, it remains unclear who has the power to control this discourse. Michael Savage, the right-wing radio talk show host, echoes the emotions of a large number of Americans, certainly of Trump voters, when he says, “In the past people would come over and become Americans. Now they come over and they want you to become them. They want you to speak Spanish, they want you to act Muslim, they want you to give up going to the church and go into a mosque.”91 It is irrelevant whether these sentiments are true or not; what is relevant is the fueling power of such sentiments to drag a huge number of passive citizens to the polling booth and deliver the presidency to Trump, even though the policy changes brought about by the administration preferred by Trump voters are likely to inflict the most harm upon themselves. In the aftermath of the 2016 electoral victory, Trump voters, who had been invisible on the political landscape and were often deemed the most dispensable part of the American economy, have finally stepped out into the open with their citizenship power to challenge THE PARADOX: SELF-IDENTITY OF THE AMERICAN “PEOPLE” 55 the neoliberal economy that has made them obscure and expendable. The economic struggle for a vast majority of the underclass is not about climbing the ladder of success, it is about not falling further behind. The economic frustration has added to the grievance for lost power in the form of numeric majority, cultural superiority, and political dominance. American identity has often been defined on the basis of exclusion. Historically, the rules of exclusion have centered on the notions of race, ethnicity, and national origin, but in the present neoliberal economy people are excluded because of their lack of economic desirability. It was always the majority who had the power to decide upon and decree the rules of exclusion, but this power has slipped away from the white underclass, who were in agreement with the rules because they always benefited from them disproportionately. In the depoliticized economy, the only way to reclaim the mantle of the majority is through redefining national identity to exclude the groups who are deemed to be illegitimate competitors and usurpers. Neoliberalism is a set of economic and political policies and ideologies favoring corporatism, privatization of public enterprises, and the reduction of state power and intervention in the economy.92 By prioritizing the market over nationality, neoliberalism has unsettled the notion of citizenship as a legal right tied to the territorial nation. Citizens who do not possess skills in the new economy are excluded from a number of citizenship privileges through impersonal administrative strategies. Moral citizenship rights have been detached from legal citizenship status.93 The total acceptance of the market rationale in politics has left little room for articulation and expression of economic discrimination; the only language that is allowed and heard needs to be framed by cultural agony and marginalization. What is most important for Trump voters is the seeming coherence of a cultural identity that can preclude anyone on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, and is echoed in the proposed deportation plan, refugee ban, and a whole series of policies that reflect the rhetoric of “Make America Great Again!” The wide chasm between the rhetoric and the reality of American identity in this era rests on the neoliberal economy, which has devalued the national, and therefore, paradoxically, created more cultural space to redefine American identity. 56 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

Notes 1. See the following texts for details of the exciting history of the formative period: Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), and Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992). 2. Varg identifies the point at which the colonists stopped considering themselves Englishmen and began more often to think of themselves as Americans as a key turning point in American identity. “His Majesty’s subjects” or “His Majesty’s Colonists” or “Royal Americans” had been the unanimous identity prior to 1764, but the symbiotic identity of the British and Americans was completely shattered during the American Revolution. Paul A. Varg, “The Advent of Nationalism, 1758–1776,” American Quarterly, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1964): 178. 3. James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 78–91. 4. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 254–60. 5. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), 229–59. 6. Ibid., 336. 7. Passed in 1798, in the aftermath of the French revolution, the Alien and Sedition Acts allowed the president to imprison and deport non-citizens who were deemed dangerous or were from a hostile nation, and made the naturalization process much longer, from five to fourteen years. 8. Paul A. Varg, “The Advent of Nationalism, 1758–1776,” American Quarterly, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1964): 169–81. 9. Ibid., 178. 10. Sherrill Stroschein and Peter Juviler, “Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community,” Political Science Quarterly, 114, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 451–53. 11. Ibid., 436–37. 12. For a detailed discussion, see Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2006). 13. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 3–84. 14. The unfree population who mainly worked in agriculture and occupied a status between free men and slaves. NOTES 57

15. Plato divided citizens into four classes according to the differing proportions of property ownership. Aristotle, instead of wealth-based distinctions, came up with the categories of resident aliens with the right of access to courts; disenfranchised citizens; undeveloped citizens; and superannu- ated citizens. Both Plato and Aristotle were reflecting a reality where citizens were not treated equally, and wealth, age, or birthright became the justifications for the scale of privileges associated with citizenship. For details, see Derek Heater, A Brief History of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 14–21. 16. Murray Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987), 58. 17. Pat Tillman, the football star, who at the peak of his career left the playing field to fight in Afghanistan, comes to mind. His death by friendly fire was covered up by the US administration as death by enemy fire. While the Tillman family was persistent about the truth surrounding his death, his brother kept serving in Iraq. Tillman himself, apparently, did not believe in the legitimacy of the Iraq War, but that did not affect his commitment toward the military. See http://www.documentary.org/magazine/ legend-pat-tillman-deconstructing-military-myth. 18. Murray Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987), 62. 19. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 28. 20. Derek Heater, A Brief History of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 30–33. 21. The Mayflower Compact was a social contract between different groups of settlers who were fleeing religious persecution and were on the ship Mayflower; they agreed to abide by a social compact for the sake of order and survival. It is regarded as the first governing document of the American nation. 22. The most comprehensive scholarship on this transition is by Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (London: Routledge, 2008). 23. The winner of the 2013 Miss America Pageant was Nina Davuluri, an American citizen of Indian heritage. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Nina_Davuluri. 24. After taking office in January 2017, President Trump has joined the Republican congress in its numerous attempts to repeal and replace the ACA, which was one of his signature campaign promises. Although the ACA is a market-based system which prioritizes the interests of insurance companies, it does contain several government mandates, the most important being that no one can be denied health insurance for preexisting conditions. The Republican stand on healthcare is that it is not a right but a 58 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

privilege, and that government should not dictate to either the market or individuals when it comes to healthcare. 25. Noah Webster, Jr., the “Father of American Scholarship and Education,” was an American lexicographer, textbook pioneer, English-language spell- ing reformer, editor, and political writer. 26. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 49. 27. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 41. 28. Margaret R. Somers, “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and the Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy,” American Sociological Review, 58, no. 5 (October 1993): 589. 29. Jack P. Greene, ed., The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 10. 30. Ibid., 8–11. 31. Noëlle McAfee, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 2. 32. As a guiding political philosophy that was accepted by the founding fathers, republicanism stresses liberty and inalienable individual rights as central values, assuming people sovereign as a whole, and expects citizens to undertake their civic duties independently. 33. Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 46. 34. Jefferson was fascinated with Indian culture and language, though this fascination did not stop him from hatching a policy for the removal of Native American tribes from their lands, especially at the western border along the Mississippi river. His complex and paradoxical views are contained in his writings and letters. In an 1803 private letter to William Henry Harrison, Jefferson wrote: “To promote this disposition to exchange lands, which they have to spare and we want, for necessaries, which we have to spare and they want, we shall push our trading uses, and be glad to see the good and influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands…. In this way our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi…. Should any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our final consolidation.” Thomas Jefferson, “President Jefferson to NOTES 59

William Henry Harrison: February 27, 1803,” in Documents of United States Indian Policy, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 22. 35. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43. 36. Manifest Destiny was a widely held belief in the United States that its settlers were destined to expand across North America. This concept was based on the special virtues of the American people, their institutions, and their mission to spread their ideas worldwide. Newspaper editor John O’Sullivan is generally credited with coining the term Manifest Destiny in 1845 to describe the essence of this mindset, and it has been used to justify both territorial conquests and foreign aggressions throughout history. 37. Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 30–32. 38. The American Revolution filled the void of an honorable past by becoming the country’s cherished history. The founding fathers spent considerable time designing all sorts of emblems, Latin mottos, and commemorative models, and sat for long hours to have their portraits painted in the midst of their Constitution-writing and their military campaigns. The Revolution and the early republic created an outpouring of artistic and iconographic works as well as literary novels, all of which served as the basis of the creation of a mythical past, free from Native American genocide and other problematic parts of US history. For explicit details, see Gordon S. Wood, “The Significance of the Early Republic,”Journal of the Early Republic, 8, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 1–20. 39. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 212–15. 40. The Native American practice of cultivating basic crops such as maize, squash, and beans, without logging the forest, plowing the land, milling the grain, or using domesticated animals did not qualify as proper agriculture, and therefore their right to the land was undermined. David Reynolds, America, Empire of Liberty: A New History of the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 8–9. 41. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983). 42. The bond that glued the thirteen states together had its roots neither in American history nor in American culture, but in the imagined shared future. Such traces of the imagination of the founding moment of America are visible in Thomas Paine’s narration. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution both are focused on the future and on prospective ideologies, glossing over the realities of the time. Both Gary B. Nash and 60 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

Gordon S. Wood have covered these aspects thoroughly. For detailed discussion, refer to Gordon S. Wood, “The Significance of the Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic, 8, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 1–20, Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), and Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005). 43. Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New York: Norton, 1988), 292–95. 44. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20–27. 45. Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” The Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107–08. 46. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 215. 47. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 53–58. 48. Denization, an obsolete common law process originating in the thirteenth century, granted a foreigner some rights similar to British subjects, specifically the right to hold land. The denizen was neither a subject (with citizenship or nationality) nor an alien, but had a status akin to permanent residency today. In the United States, this term was applied to free Negroes, or non-slave black persons, prior to the abolition of slavery, and Native Americans who were considered citizens of a tribal domestic nation, but not of any state or the United States. 49. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 137–38. 50. Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41, no. 2 (June 1988): 233–35. 51. Common Sense was a pamphlet written by Thomas Paine in 1775–1776, advocating independence from Great Britain to the people of the thirteen colonies. This remains one of the most important political documents that spurred and justified the American Revolution, persuading the common folk to rise up against the British colonizers. 52. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16–17. 53. Ibid., 22–31. 54. Ibid., 498. NOTES 61

55. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 210–15. 56. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), 233–36. 57. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 307–57. 58. In the court battle of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) regarding black citizenship, the court ruled in favor of states’ rights and proclaimed that a black person is not entitled to citizenship status. The Fourteenth Amendment, much later in the day, firmly establishedJus soli and expanded citizenship rights not only to blacks but to anyone born on American soil. The birthright citizenship issue has been revived again in the era of failed immigration reform and anti-immigrant fervor. Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Mass Immigration and the National Interest (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 33–35. 59. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 268–77. 60. Nash notes how its simple language did not impress John Adams. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (London: Penguin, 2005), 190. 61. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 29. 62. The original connotation of the term “gentleman” implied nobility, those who were propertied men and who did not have to work for money. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalization of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992): 345. 63. According to John Adams, the distinction between gentlemen and commoners was the “most ancient and universal of all divisions of people.” Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20–27. 64. Bruce Kuklick, A Political History of the USA: One Nation Under God (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 75. 65. Max Savelle, “Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the American Revolution,” The American Historical Review, 67, no. 4 (July 1962): 914. 66. In the census of 1790, 60 percent claimed English ancestry. The rest were German (nine percent), Scots (eight percent), Scots-Irish (six percent), Irish (four percent), Dutch (three percent), and French, Swedes, Spanish, and people of unknown ancestry. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39. 62 2 AMERICAN IDENTITY: IDEALS VERSUS ILLUSIONS

67. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 27–28. 68. Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” The Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 176. 69. Ibid., 4–7. 70. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 104. 71. Richard D. Brown, “Modernization and the Modern Personality in Early America, 1600–1865: A Sketch of a Synthesis,” The Journal of Inter disciplinary History, 2, no. 3 (Winter 1972): 201–28. 72. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), 349. 73. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18. 74. Hendrik Hartog, “The Constitution of Aspiration and ‘The Rights That Belong to Us All,’” The Journal of American History, 74, no. 3 (December 1987): 1017–20. 75. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 501. 76. In New Jersey, propertied women were enfranchised, though it might have been quite unintentional. The voting record of women in 1790 prompted the state to pass a law to disenfranchise them in 1807. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 49–53. 77. Ibid., 104. 78. Ibid., 132–40. 79. Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41, no. 2 (June 1988): 238. 80. Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 275–88. 81. Eric Kaufmann, “‘Naturalizing the Nation’: The Rise of Naturalistic Nationalism in the United States and Canada,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40, no. 4 (October 1998): 669–70. 82. J. M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle, and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 37. NOTES 63

83. Michael Kazin and Joseph A. McCartin, eds., Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 1. 84. Gordon S. Wood, “The Significance of the Early Republic,”Journal of the Early Republic, 8, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 1–20. 85. Sherrill Stroschein and Peter Juviler, “Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community,” Political Science Quarterly, 114, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 439. 86. David M. Ricci, Good Citizenship in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64–65. 87. William James Booth, “Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders, and the Ethics of Membership,” The Review of Politics, 59, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 267–77. 88. Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41, no. 2 (June 1988): 229–30. 89. Ibid., 237. 90. Pamela Johnston Conover, Ivor M. Crewe, and Donald D. Searing, “The Nature of Citizenship in the United States and Great Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes,” The Journal of Politics, 53, no. 3 (August 1991): 802. 91. John Avalon, Wingnuts: How the Lunatic Fringe Is Hijacking America (New York: Beast Books, 2010), 78. 92. Patricia Ventura, Neoliberal Culture: Living with American Neoliberalism (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 2. 93. Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 5–8. CHAPTER 3

Nation-Building: Nation-States Versus Empire

Americans came of age as citizens bathing in the glory of the Revolution, but within the short span of the eighteenth century, their self-identity as American citizens had to encounter a number of paradoxical features: the high ideals of equality, while maintaining exclusion for certain groups in society; encouraging political engagement and absolute liberty, while the power of the state invariably grew to check the limits of individual freedom; and superfluous economic and military power with a global reach, while retaining the preference for small government. All of these paradoxes clouded the notion of what American identity was, and produced mutually exclusive characteristics that seemingly were contained in the new and growing nation engaged in the quest for self-identification. The American Revolution transformed Americans from subjects to citizens, but it would take multiple wars, especially the Civil War, to uproot state identity and forcefully replant national identity as the cornerstone of citizenship. The events of the nineteenth century would further add to this confusion by expanding the nation, adding new groups of people, and introducing new processes of “othering,” some sanctioned by the state, some rooted in social norms. As discussed in Chap. 2, in the early years of the republic, America was undergoing a transition from a monarchy to a republic, from disgruntled subjects to legitimate citizens. The story of the next chapter of the American nation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the story of expansion and empire-building. Wars and conflicts changed the shape of the country and altered the concepts of

© The Author(s) 2018 65 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_3 66 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE nationalism, identity, and citizenship. This chapter is about the domestic impact of American expansion, both in terms of territory and the power of the federal government, on American citizenship. The norms of citizenship were being rearticulated in the growing nation through wars, legislation, and both shrinking and expanding access points to practice citizenship rights. To uncover the evolution of citizenship as the state rose to unprecedented power, my focus is on the simultaneous expansion of the American state and the re-articulation of the rules of exclusion, along with the subtle theme of othering that flowed into and shaped both domestic and international conflicts. The escalation of domestic power in America is intricately tied to its territorial expansion, which started with an imperial desire for the outright conquest of colonies, manifested in events like the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War. The thirst for territorial growth, however, morphed into a desire to dominate worldwide trade and commerce, as military power was used to preserve dominance and also maintain a few protectorate outposts. The quintessential nature of the American empire, if indeed there is an American empire, differs from other empires not only in term of its emphasis on soft power (or commercial and cultural influence) rather than hard power (or military dominance), but also in terms of how it has impacted citizens within America. Unlike the strategy of total supremacy over vanquished areas, America did not follow a universal method of domination. As American territory expanded domestically, certain regions were given statehood, while other regions remained in perpetual ambiguous status. Although geographical proximity played an important role in the fate of a conquered region, the potential for economic growth was perhaps the more important criterion.1 Not surpris- ingly, the territorial acquisition of foreign land was followed by rigid rules of exclusion for people, especially minorities, residing within the country. On the domestic front, each territorial annexation with its subsequent growth of state power continued to transform federal-state-individual relations. In an ironic twist for the revolutionary nation, the American public sphere acquired the anti-government spirit, perhaps to balance the growing power of the state over its citizens. I pay special attention to the changes in the rights, privileges, and obligations of American citizenship that occurred in these tensions between and among the civil society, the individual states, and national government. One of the fundamental changes in US citizenship came through the Civil War, not only in terms of acknowledging race as the point of discrimination 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE 67 and privilege and redefining inclusion, but also through the expansion of federal power over the states and the subsequent privileges and limitations of citizenship. It can be argued that after the Civil War, national citizenship overshadowed state citizenship and there emerged new attempts to redefine American identity, this time not proceeding from the glorious Revolution but from the ashes of the Civil War, which had to be labeled as the greatest tragedy because the process of othering was rather challenging between brothers. The narration of the history of the Civil War from the Northern and Southern perspectives still contains huge discrepancies, and the divisions surrounding the Confederate flag still emerge in current political discourse.2 As the American nation-state acquired more physical territory, it ended up with new racial and ethnic groups of inhabitants in the conquered lands, shaping its subsequent ideas and practices of citizenship. Beginning with the conflicts with the Native Americans up to the Spanish-American War, the history of expansion of the United States had been a continuous one within the continent. In 1787, the nation grew to include the Northwest Territory. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 extended its boundaries across the Mississippi. The war of 1812 resolved remnants of territorial skirmishes with the British. Texas became part of the history of expansion of the United States in 1845, and Mexico ceded its lands in the West and Southwest in 1848 and 1853. Washington and Oregon joined the nation in 1853 and 1859 respectively. Alaska was purchased in 1866. All these acquisitions of territories followed a pattern of territorial transformation of governance and eventual statehood, usually after the majority of the inhabitants of these territories became white.3 For example, Alaska achieved statehood only after the 1950 census showed a clear majority of white inhabitants. Citizenship rights and privileges also changed with the nature and mode of the system of authority of the state. The expansion of federalism, which followed the territorial expansion and strengthening of the American government, shaped the notion of citizenship, especially by equating race and citizenship to keep out the people of the newly acquired lands (along with African American slaves). The Civil War changed the legal status of African Americans, though the actual citizenship rights continued to elude most of the former slaves. The federal government did consolidate more power to enforce the states to accept and allow African Americans as full citizens. While the transfer of power from the state to the federal level was in process, citizenship was being reinterpreted from sociopolitical to legalistic terms as is demonstrated by the long history of civil rights cases. 68 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

Another significant impact of the Civil War was how the American nation shifted its focus toward more distant lands and refashioned the logic of exclusion for newcomers to the nation. The American state was incorporating more people as recipients of citizenship rights, but this inclusion was often offset by erosions of citizenship rights. The ebb and flow of state power is analyzed in this chapter from two perspectives: how the physical expansion of the state in territorial terms was translated (more often, refrained from being translated) into citizenship rights; and how the power to define the eligibility for citizenship shifted solely to federal quarters and yet a strong anti-government fervor developed and was nourished all through history. My focus is to walk through this history of transformation of the American state and record the instances when citizens lost or gained power in the frictions between civil society, the states, and the federal government.

The Rhetoric: Manifest Destiny The founding fathers had always nurtured the dream of a more expansive America, though they were reluctant to include as fellow citizens the people who would come with the territory. The physical expansion of America had started with the conquest of Native Americans, but they were kept conveniently out of the citizenship umbrella. The acquisition of Florida from Spain, the Louisiana Purchase from France, the annexation of Texas, the Mexican War and the Gadsden Purchase, the purchase of Alaska, and the expropriation of Indian lands, all followed the imperial dream.4 The imperial dream was justified through a unique concept of Manifest Destiny, which claimed white supremacy and a divine blessing to conquer lands and expand the blessed nation. Manifest Destiny was an equally useful tool for territorial expansion as well as internal acquisition of land. The moral- political superiority on the one hand asserted racial exclusivism, yet on the other hand paved the way for the redemption of inferior races at the cost of giving up their inalienable rights of freedom and property ownership. The treatment of Native Americans, African Americans, and other minorities also provided a template for how to treat the vanquished peoples of the newly acquired lands. American expansion into Mexican territory from the time of the Texas Revolution to the Mexican War posed such questions, and even though the citizenship rights of Mexicans were protected under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the property rights of Mexicans THE RHETORIC: MANIFEST DESTINY 69 often followed the tortuous logic of land acquisition in Native American territory.5 Divine sanction through Manifest Destiny thus justified all acts of war and aggression. The actions resulting from it were interpreted as express- ing idealism, since acquisition of new land was seen to have extended liberty to oppressed people, and it was of course an obligation to uplift and regenerate backward peoples such as Mexicans. As inferior races did not use the land properly and hindered progress, it followed that the land should belong to the superior race. The phrase could accommodate exu- berant nationalism, racism, and arrogance, and indeed justified westward expansion and even adventures in foreign lands, which continue to this day in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.6 Manifest Destiny, in essence, sums up the expansionist thrust of the pre–Civil War era as it justified the annexation of Texas, Oregon, and California, literally meaning that the expansion of the United States to the Pacific Ocean and beyond was being blessed by God. The mindset of Americans during the nineteenth century was ready to accept the notion of Manifest Destiny for various reasons. Southerners, initially suspicious of big government and neither proponents of nor firm believers in the concept, were on board when they needed new land to expand cotton production and new slave states to preserve their power in Congress. Population growth was an important impetus for westward expansion as there was a limit to the number of people who could be supported by the simple methods of agriculture. For the people who lived on the frontiers, economic self-sufficiency was the motivation to support acquisition of land. The United States in the early 1800s was no different than the developing countries of today with high population growth rates, large numbers of people in the rural sector, poor transportation and communication, infectious diseases, and rampant conflicts between and among ethnoreligious communities. Free public education existed only in the New England area.7 Just as more land was needed to support the expanding population, the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy also compelled the need for new lands and ports that could accelerate trade and commerce. It was trade, transportation, and communication that elevated the status of the United States to a developed country and dramatically changed the lifestyle of its inhabitants. As farmland and the number of eager settlers grew, so did the pace of industrialization, new technology, and new opportunities in North Atlantic 70 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE markets. A rapidly growing domestic market enabled unprecedented economic growth. By the early nineteenth century, industrial exports loomed larger as the domestic economy shifted away from agriculture to industry. The relative decline of agriculture in favor of industry transformed the labor force, creating more demand for skilled factory workers who would be European in descent rather than the slave labor of African descent. But Americans were also uncomfortable with the European model of growth which included overcrowded cities, degrading factory work, social aristocracy, corrupt elites, powerful central government, and political upheavals. Although the American economy grew rapidly, the idealized pastoral life as a form of autonomy remained an important part of nation-building, though the commitment to free trade was also added to the vision.8 The Louisiana Purchase, one of the most important real estate deals in history, added eight hundred and twenty-eight thousand square miles to the nation, doubling its territory (at a cost of roughly fifteen cents per acre). By making available the land necessary for continued expansion of agriculture, ensuring commercial growth, and easing the European threat, the purchase appeared to ensure the preservation of the republic.9 The annexation of Texas added more lands to the South, but also instigated the Mexican War. From the Mexican perspective, the United States encouraged its citizens to infiltrate Texas, incited and supported their revolution, and then moved to absorb the renegade state. A dispute over the Texas boundary finally ignited the Mexican War, which would change the nature of the American empire and the very definition of citizenship, as legal rights and social privileges would begin to collide rather than follow the simpler rule of exclusion based on race. If the Louisiana Purchase exemplified the notion of Manifest Destiny, the annexation of Texas strengthened it, and the Mexican War finally took it to a whole new dimension, paving the pathway to empire.10 The self-righteous self-image of American identity was the cornerstone of Manifest Destiny. This national identity of Americans, or at least of the Anglo elite, hinged on racial superiority, which justified invading the lands of people from “lesser” races both in the domestic and international arenas. The emergence of America as a political entity coincided with the growth of global capitalism and provided Americans the opportunity to build their identity in sharp contrast with the rest of the world. The differences with the internal others, namely Native Americans and African Americans, had the uncomfortable connotations of subjugation, whereas the differences with the other countries and races were built on feelings of THE RHETORIC: MANIFEST DESTINY 71 moral superiority and natural rights bestowed on the nation because of its unique character. Manifest Destiny was thus not only a useful tool for territorial expansion, but also for defining who “Americans” were. The American self-image, born in the afterglow of the Revolution, justified all aggressions and repackaged them as acts of honor. Starting from the civilizing mission toward the Native Americans to the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all aggressive measures have been defined as following a noble cause, even when the motivations for such wars remain very much in doubt. The American psyche, along with each of the territorial expan- sions, internalized this notion and forever accepted liberty, freedom, and justice as the immutable American creeds. The contradiction of the lack of these very characteristics in the lives of an ever-expanding group of minorities continued to escape the mainstream white mindset. It is worth men- tioning that Manifest Destiny was only used to justify wars against racial inferiors, not racial equals.11 Racial perceptions were reflected on the warfront as well. The conflicts along the northern border with British Canada never erupted into outright battles, unlike the southern or western borders. Despite the strain of Anglophobia, respect for Britain remained high during the antebellum era. There was concern that rebellions in Canada in 1837–1838 might spark yet another Anglo-American war, but Americans showed unusual restraint even after the burning of the American ship Caroline in US waters, and declared neutrality. The long-disputed boundary between Maine and New Brunswick was perhaps most contentious, yet different maps were used for the resolution to convey to each side that they got a better deal.12 Oregon was an exception to the budding Anglo-American accord, but eventually the United States and Britain had to reach a consensus to share North America. The importance of the Oregon Treaty consisted in its provision of a precious channel to the Pacific as well as undisputed possession of a vast amount of territory, including all of the future states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and parts of Montana and Wyoming. The Oregon settlement freed America to drive its war power against Mexico.13 The Mexican War rejuvenated and established the notion of Manifest Destiny as a cornerstone of American nationhood and identity. This was undoubtedly the most important territorial acquisition that changed the definition of citizenship in America by adding a large number of non- white people as legal citizens, although in the social and political arenas these citizens could hardly enjoy equal rights. The territory Mexico ceded became part of the Union, but gained statehood only after enough white 72 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE settlers formed a majority in the states. The most problematic group were the Mexicans, who came with the land attained by the Mexican War and had citizenship rights according to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Native Americans and African Americans, however, remained inassimilable and boxed into different legal categories, from which there was no path to citizenship. American expansion and racial history share a parallel yet uncomfortable path in terms of the rationale and logic of exclusion for minorities throughout history. The American empire has remained a fascinating concept, as it has been an anomaly along multiple dimensions. Contrary to the usual practice of proclaiming territories acquired through brutal force, Americans exercised a combination of military and moral might guised under Manifest Destiny, where white settlers would populate new territories and exercise informal methods of control over the land and inhabitants. In the initial stages, America transformed occupied territories like Hawaii and Alaska into states and avoided the pitfalls of an empire. The informal occupation of foreign lands was followed by military and diplomatic action to convert these lands into American territories, and only in the end were most of these territories annexed as states.14 The Civil War was perhaps the only serious challenge to the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny. Initially a great blow to American identity and nationalism, it prompted a desperate need for a coherent narrative to justify the horror. Confederate nationalism upheld the honor of the South and the capacity of the people to sacrifice their blood. The “lost cause” acquired a sacred status that hasn’t lost its aura throughout the South to this day. The hostility toward the Yankees soon became converted into similar sentiments toward the former African American slaves all through the Reconstruction era. The death and destruction was justified in the name of purification, which came to mean national purification with time. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Anglo-Saxon militarism became a part of Northern nationalism and eventually merged into the consciousness of white Southerners.15 It is probably not coincidental that during the Civil War American coins were engraved with “In God We Trust.”16 American history, especially Southern history, portrays the Civil War as a Greek tragedy where fate led brother against brother, and through the bloodshed a pure and unified America emerged. In this tragic landscape what was needed was the unity of the Northern and Southern units, while the black man remained absent from that trajectory. The depiction of the Civil War in popular literature like Gone with the Wind renders the white Southerner as the hapless THE RHETORIC: MANIFEST DESTINY 73 victim. Even the more sympathetic Uncle Tom’s Cabin ends with the African American protagonist George Harris moving to Liberia, where he can finally be free and live with equal dignity, a deal that America was ready to offer.17 The Spanish-American War reincarnated the notion of Manifest Destiny with full vigor and patriotic energy. Recuperating from the Civil War, the prospect of fighting in an exotic foreign land was a powerful antidote to the confusion of nationalism and self-identity, uniting Americans against the new enemy. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was indeed a watershed moment in the historical geography of US expansionism. This war also marked a shift from territorial acquisition to economic and political control of conquered lands. Unlike earlier territorial acquisitions, such as northern Mexico, Alaska, and the Louisiana Purchase, all the territories wrested from Spain after 1898 were held as some form of colonial possession, never to be fully incorporated into the nation-state. After this last serious attempt by the United States toward extraterritorial colonization, US expansionism took an increasingly geoeconomic rather than colonial form.18 American territorial ambitions were transformed in the late nineteenth century, as the United States, along with Western European economies, was moving toward the global integration of markets. The Industrial Revolution and subsequent technological improvements created surplus capital and the need to invest it. The search for raw materials and for markets for manufactured products dominated the national interest rather than political and military supremacy.19 It is this transition from the agrarian economy to an intercontinental market that demanded a free marketplace. Agricultural exports generated and sustained economic recovery from the depression of the 1870s, and were deemed necessary for industrialization and for foreign currency.20 Both the imperial outburst and the subsequent path of controlling the world marketplace were triggered by economic reasons and supported by popular consensus. The agrarian and commercial interests intersected, and foreign policy emerged as a strategic tool to manipulate and maneuver the world market, which is addressed in Chap. 4. Advances in military technology also made empire-building seem relatively easy. For America, each outpost offered trade benefits yet was comfortably distant enough from the mainland. Opening and protecting foreign markets was deemed essential for the increasing output of American farms and factories. This was the remedy to the problem of overproduction that had led to painful economic downturns in the 1870s, 1880s, and especially the 1890s.21 74 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

After the depression of the 1890s, the disastrous frequency of business crashes was traced to overproduction, and market penetration beyond the national boundary was thought to be the solution. Imperial ambition was justified as the search for new markets. The United Fruit Company, for example, imported bananas from Honduras for the American market, and the American empire did not distinguish its interests from that of the United Fruit Company. Unlike previous empires, which focused on extracting natural resources and cheap labor, for the United States these phases were a build-up to the ultimate goal of expanding the US market. America stirred up revolutionary fervor in Cuba and Hawaii for the purpose of territorial expansion of the market, whereas it tried to maintain stability in other countries like Honduras and Nicaragua—where the market was already expanded—using military might and supporting brutal dictators. The expansion of the market was supposed to equal progress for not only America, but for all of civilization.22 From the late nineteenth century onward, American imperial under- takings sought out markets rather than territories and moved their attention to commercial expansion, with the goal of unbridled economic growth beyond the American land. With the subsequent wars in the distant lands of the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam, attention shifted from a settlers’ empire to an overseas empire. American military power and entrepreneurial spirit merged on the international front to conquer markets throughout the world. American hegemony and its implications for American citizens acquired yet another subtle change of moral leadership when American empire shifted its focus to markets from territories, which I discuss in the following chapter. Although the expansion of markets triggered imperial ambition, the American empire, in the minds of its proponents—and to a large extent its people—signified more than only material interests. Imperial exploits and the rhetoric that justified them were fundamental to the maintenance of a manly national self- image, framed by a triumphant creed of moral revitalization.23 The self- image of moral superiority persists till today, as incidents like the My Lai Massacre,24 the Abu Ghraib prison torture,25 the extrajudicial imprisonment and torture at Guantánamo prison,26 and the civilian killings in Afghanistan hardly make a dent in the self-righteous image of the American. THE REALITY: TERRITORY MINUS THE PEOPLE 75

The Reality: Territory Minus the People The expansion of American territory did not start with foreign wars or the Revolution; the roots of US imperialism were planted in the battles with Native Americans. US policy toward the native peoples was historically a policy of separation, fortifying the physical boundaries between Native Americans and whites, a policy that was followed in the conquered territories. As the economy grew and land became more needed, Indian lands were deemed desirable because they were underutilized by a supposedly lesser race. The Native American tribes paid a high price for siding with the British during the Revolution. Even the tribes that had stayed neutral and had supported Americans were not exempt from land grabbing. The war that sealed the fate of Native Americans by transforming them from vicious enemies to people at the mercy of the American government took place in 1812. The Creek Nation was invaded from three sides and villages were destroyed, leaving a mere fifteen percent of their population alive. Andrew Jackson, the architect of US expansionism, imposed the Treaty of Fort Jackson to force the tribe to cede over twenty-two million acres in Alabama and Georgia, more than half of their territory. Native Americans would never again have the support of any external power like the British or the Spanish, and US expansion in their lands would proceed unre- strained.27 Tribes like the Cherokees who had allied with the United States during the war of 1812 found themselves in the same quandary as the other tribes. In the Southwest, Jackson extorted a fraudulent treaty with unauthorized Cherokees to obtain the land that had been taken by the Treaty of Fort Jackson, and this illicit treaty was quickly ratified by the Senate. In the Northwest, tribes were forced to declare themselves allies and comply with the Treaty of Ghent.28 By a series of such deceitful treaties, Jackson obtained three-quarters of Alabama and Florida, one-third of Tennessee, one-fifth of Georgia and Mississippi, and smaller portions of Kentucky and North Carolina.29 The state and federal governments may have been engaged in an ideological battle over power during the making and in the aftermath of the Constitution, but both layers of government agreed with each other and worked quite amicably regarding issues of Native American land. While the federal government had the sole authority to make treaties with Native American tribes, it was the respective states that possessed autonomy to deal with the tribes on the basis of such treaties. When conflicts erupted 76 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE between settlers and Native Americans over land rights, the states inevitably favored white settlers30 and the federal government often refused to settle these conflicts or interpret its own treaties. Until 1870, this policy centered on moving Native Americans west of the Mississippi, driving them onto reservations with the threat of military force. In 1870, the policy of open battle and physical seclusion morphed into a more sophisticated technique through the legal structure. The new set of policies prompted the abolition of customary tribal law and the elimination of tribal jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters, and replaced those with American substantive and procedural principles. These land grabbing practices mimic the expropriation of Mexican lands after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. A broad goal of assimilation was underwritten in policies toward Native Americans. The push for such policies also came from the missionaries or (so-called) humanitarians who wanted to replace the Native way of life with an American one. The widespread and systematic reforms required the federal programs to restructure the intimate elements of native life. The assimilation of the native population was possible only through the alteration of native laws.31 The whites’ toleration of Native Americans and adjustment to aboriginal ways of life varied from one colony to the other, and it was ultimately a national Indian policy that established the federal government’s authority over Indian domains. Nevertheless, the tribes that made substantial progress toward assimilation, like the Cherokees, did not enjoy any more citizenship rights or privileges than other native tribes. Under the national Indian policy, full control of frontier regions replaced trade and treaty relations with Indian tribes. This takeover through federal authority made the implementation of the policies of removal and exclusion easier.32 With its blanket authority, the federal government started to exercise its power to reshape the tribal territories. Although trials of crimes committed against Native Americans by Native Americans were left to the authority of Indian tribes under the General Crimes Act of 1817, the Bureau of Indian Affairs often intervened; notably, in 1882, even after a murder trial was settled under Sioux tribal law, the agency initiated a trial in the Dakota territorial court. Although the Supreme Court rejected the Dakota court’s authority over Indian criminal law, it did not question the federal government’s jurisdiction over native sovereignty. Just as Marbury v. Madison (1803) accrued authority for the Court through temporary abnegation of its power, similarly the case of Crow Dog (1883) advanced national authority THE REALITY: TERRITORY MINUS THE PEOPLE 77 over Native Americans by denying one specific use of state force while sug- gesting that a still larger governmental capacity lay within constitutional reach. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville offered an ironic account of federal law and policy regarding Native Americans. He described in detail the suffering inflicted on native peoples through the coercion that took place under cover of legality. He was taken aback by how the formalities of law destroyed the rights of Native Americans, the very rights pertaining to their sovereignty and citizenship.33 Finally, in 1887, the Dawes Act34 completed the process of distributing lands and undermining tribal power throughout America. It was the potential for hundreds of thousands of acres of new settlements and railroad building that prompted substantial changes in Indian policy. Under the Dawes Act, the United States fundamentally restructured the property regimes of scores of individual societies, and it did so without the consent of their people—an extraordinary imposition of state power on behalf of a nation that preferred limited government.35 By that time, the already outnumbered Native Americans were further dwindling as a result of warfare, starvation, and disease. The massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890 probably marked the end of Native American resistance and the overwhelming domination of the white settlers over their land, livelihood, and culture.36 The insatiable thirst for land first quarantined Native Americans in less desirable parts of the nation and later ended up uprooting them from their territories. The demand for labor in the expanded labor market was first met with indentured servants, which later hardened into a much more rigid system of slavery and acquired a racial dimension. Native Americans remained ineligible for full citizenship until 1924. They had been assigned an unnamed category in American history, where even conditional citizenship through various laws, treaties, and allotments became unattainable unless the price was paid with full submission to the state. The doctrine of plenary power37 constitutionalized the inferior status of citizenship of Native Americans and resulted in the loss to the Indian nations of ninety million acres of reservation land, more than two-thirds of their former holdings.38 The price of full citizenship with voting rights came with the submission of territory and autonomy. American westward expansion, which uprooted the native tribes along its way, was pushed forward by powerful economic needs. The growing nation initially needed more cultivable lands, and with the fervor of industrialization, new markets to sell the excess products. When the speculative bubble burst in 1819, there was the first collective awak- 78 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE ening to the capitalist reality of boom-and-bust. At first, the Great Migration39 itself halted as people could not afford to buy land, prices of agricultural commodities hit rock bottom, and jobs in growing cities tended to disappear.40 What is interesting is that the depressions in 1819 and 1837 were preceded by excess production, which made new markets seem to be the logical answer to that particular economic problem. Wheat and corn production in the Northwest and booming cotton production in the South provided the economic justification for slavery as well as for expansion to new territories. Most importantly, by 1840, aided by roads and canals, the US economy matured and became interdependent.41 The 1840s and 1850s delivered economic growth along with slavery and expansion. Population and immigration were growing as new states joined the Union. By 1840, the United States had twice as many railroad tracks as all of Europe. American exports, mostly cotton, swelled from an average of seventy million dollars during 1815–1820 to two hundred and forty-nine million dollars in the decade before the Civil War. The development of a domestic market had made America self-sufficient.42 The Civil War temporarily halted this expansion, but subsequently it directed the nation’s energy outward toward new wars and settlements. In the United States, before 1861, Union was an incomplete concept, especially in the South. The Union victory occurred at a time when new nation-states were emerging around the world. Most importantly, the Civil War fused nationalism with liberalism, giving significant moral purpose to nationalism.43 On the domestic front, the hopes of benefits from emancipation were fading for blacks in the Reconstruction era, especially in the South. As Reconstruction faltered amid the black codes and lynching practices, the sociocultural aspects of racism morphed into harder legal barriers for the blacks, while white Southerners became a part of the narrative of American nationalism. This nationalism, rooted in both Northern ideology and Southern pride, fused together to justify imperial advances against the lowly races.44 The Spanish-American War of 1898 provided fertile ground for strengthening nationalism through war with the outside enemy. This was also the beginning of foreign wars where the ambition was much more subtle than an absolute territorial grab. In the Philippines and Cuba, the aspiration was more for a settlement with access to coaling stations for American ships rather than for outright conquest. Cuba became a US protectorate, but the Philippines couldn’t be subjugated even temporarily THE REALITY: TERRITORY MINUS THE PEOPLE 79 without an obvious war. The Filipinos’ determination to resist domination pushed Americans into brutal measures, which were justified as directed against an uncivilized people. It is remarkable how the logic and techniques of foreign conquests parallel the invasion of Native Americans. With the sole exception of the Civil War, all wars within the continent and outside its periphery have followed the logic of American exceptionalism and actually were a continuation of empire-building efforts. The territorial acquisition thus was as much an expansion within the American region as it was throughout the world. This legacy of bellicose land grabs and mask- ing the attempts as Manifest Destiny blindsided Americans from looking into the inconsistencies of citizenship rights, as the premise behind conquering “other” people or territories was that they were “lesser” people and hence ineligible for citizenship. Even the wars that dealt a blow to American power, such as the Vietnam War, did not put a dent in this self- perception. The Vietnam War certainly halted imperial ambition, only for it to be revived with the success of the first Gulf War and to play out in full force on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. The logic and mechanisms of warfare against Native Americans were often seamlessly expanded to the wars that took place outside the US territories. In 1871, the Supreme Court gave Congress authority to waive old Indian treaties, and to make new laws for Cuba, which were later applied to the Philippines. Many Civil War veterans simply continued their careers on the battlefields of the Philippines. The treatment of civilians as belligerents and of death and destruction as collateral damage had already occurred in the Civil War, but in the foreign land when the target was a people perceived as an inferior race, the eradica- tion of a whole way of life became far more brutal. As with Native Americans, deliberate extermination became a policy, and racism reinforced militarism against the lesser races. The continuity between counterinsurgency wars that are internal and external to the empire is almost unbroken.45 The Spanish-American War and the conquered Mexican territories opened the path to citizenship to different groups of people, often considered utterly unlike Americans. The acquisition of continental lands in pursuit of economic interests could be justified easily, but the ambiguous status of the residents of Puerto Rico and Guam reflects a huge disconnect between American egalitarian ideals and the reality of American practices in citizenship. America was eager to benefit from the newly acquired territories, but mostly avoided the thorny issue of the rights and privileges of 80 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE occupied peoples.46 The eventual process of statehood was that a territory would become a state after a period of tutelage, when enough people, presumably men of Anglo-Saxon descent, would have settled in the territory. Puerto Rico and Guam never fulfilled that condition. The Jones Act of 1917 granted the people of Puerto Rico US citizenship; however, this citizenship comes without representation rights. The only exception in this regard is Hawaii, where the territorial clause and the conditions for statehood were not applied. American sugar planters in Hawaii, having overthrown Queen Liliuokalani’s native government in 1893 with the collusion of the US State Department, declared themselves a republic and elected the pineapple grower Sanford B. Dole president. Because Hawaii held a higher commercial value as a source of business and because of its strategic location on the trade route, Congress eventually granted statehood to Hawaii, overlooking the majority of its population: Japanese and Chinese, with a sizable number of Hawaiian aborigines.47 With the occupation and eventual statehood of Hawaii in 1898 and 1959, respectively, the American presence in the Pacific was achieved. Although the American empire was not sea-based, the importance of seaports such as Cuba and Hawaii did not escape the country’s leaders. Cuba was at the gateway to the Caribbean Basin, and its proximity to Central and South America only added to its geopolitical value. By 1898, Spain had lost control over Cuba and Puerto Rico. Along with inciting a coup in the Republic of Panama to get access to the Panama Canal, by the early 1900s Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Cuba had been occupied by Americans, at least temporarily. Unlike the Caribbean and Western Pacific dominions, most of the territories in South and Central America, inhabited by brown people, were not sought perma- nently as territories, but the interference in the politics of South and Central America through diplomatic and military means continues to this day.48 In America’s imperial journey, there have been a few stumbling blocks such as Cuba and Vietnam. What was much more challenging than territorial victory was how to (or not to) absorb the local population and accord (or deny) them equal rights and privileges. As long as citizenship was understood from an asocial dimension, the category remained porous and the entry and exit of various groups into this privileged category could not be fully controlled. As the state gained more territory and acquired greater power, the definition of citizenship shifted from a social connotation to a legal classification. This enabled the federal government to supersede civil THE REALITY: TERRITORY MINUS THE PEOPLE 81 society and state authority in determining immigration, naturalization, and citizenship. Social norms, which were under the purview of civil society, were replaced by definitions of race set by the federal government and often conceded by the court system. The new legal norms eventually allowed the national government to be the only authority on interpreting immigration and citizenship issues. When racial differences were transformed into legal categories, civil society lashed back by interpreting existing laws to target minorities. Race and the law regarding citizenship rights became mutually constitutive, and together they created a language of national identity to leave out the “outsiders” who were defined not only as immigrants, but also as racial inferiors. As the preoccupation with President Obama’s birth certificate has recently shown, the issue of “race” has never totally lost its currency as a key feature of citizenship. It should be mentioned that the process of transition to America as empire did not occur without challenges. While in the 1790s different attitudes toward the French Revolution had defined Americans as Federalists or Republicans, the domestic differences centered on westward expansion and Indian policy, and war against Mexico divided Americans along the ideology of nationalism and the very meaning of being an American. The Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, and the occupation of the Philippines, all were severely confronted by those Americans whose identity was rooted more in a moral and cultural superiority rather than a military and economic one. Mark Twain’s sarcastic writings against the pacification of the Philippines tore through the self-righteousness of American nationalism.49 What should also be underscored in the discourse of citizenship is that the American imperial domain consisted for a long time of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Panama Canal Zone, Palau, Guam, the northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and several nearby islands. The four million people living on three hundred thousand square miles were under federal authority, but had limited and varied citizenship rights without political representation and, in some instances, suffrage.50 It is the territorial distance that can be credited for perpetuating the ambiguous political status, which is defined by close economic ties accompanied by social detachment to these islands. Citizenship, even in present-day America, thus remains uneven not only in its social and political implications, but even in terms of legal rights. Aron argues that it is the domestic system that differentiates an empire from a republic. As the empire expands territorially, the rights of citizens 82 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE within the territory begin to get restricted. Going back to the Roman Empire, we find that the enslavement of people in newly conquered lands is typically followed by the loss of liberties at home. The domination of a state, even when it is mainly directed outward toward colonies or subjugated peoples, does slip inward and change the nature of the republic. Athens and Sparta both started with an imperialistic bent, but, over time, while Sparta focused on conquests and control, Athens prioritized peace and common defense with its allies.51 Reconciling empire and liberty was a historic obsession of not only the founders, but of American political thinkers and historians as well. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially as the tools for fighting terrorism have stretched inside the mainland, this impossible alliance has been questioned again.

The Paradox: Impossible Republic, Elusive Empire The expansion of American territory included more lowly races as American citizens, such as Hispanics after the Mexican War, while the federal government emerged as the sole arbitrator of bestowing citizenship rights upon these new groups. While the state governments gave up power to officially determine naturalization, immigration, and citizenship laws, they held back enough authority to pass and implement legal impediments toward the practice of citizenship rights by any groups that were perceived unworthy of full citizenship rights. The treatment of Hispanics varied from state to state depending on their numeric, social, and economic significance. Slavery was argued to be a states’ right; the Civil War overturned that argument but the new obstructions of poll taxes, literacy clauses, and the like all over the Southern states compromised the rights of African American citizens without challenging the constitutional guarantees of suffrage. It was in this very space, where legal protections were swayed by social norms and with time the social prejudices were written into laws, that the lynching of African Americans based on flimsy or imaginary accusations, often with court sanctions, took place. The distance between legal and social rights is not entirely new for minorities, but in America the divergence between legal and social rights only grew with more legal guarantees. Legal rights for different groups of minorities steadily escalated after the Civil War under the authority of the federal government, but the local communities, often with state governments’ support, diluted those very rights. The federal takeover of immi- THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 83 gration, naturalization, and citizenship became the official norm, while the already existing anti-government fervor in the American public space acquired a moral and vigilant undertone when monitoring the citizenship rights of minorities. The legal and sociocultural acceptance of minorities and immigrants has therefore followed the paradoxical twists and turns of demanding more from government and being anti-government at the same time. What makes the paradox captivating is how it coincided with a number of other anomalies in the American character. With the expansion of domestic territory, Americans supported the growth and power of their country on the world stage while nurturing anti-government zeal in their political discourse. The historical paradigm shift, from Confederation to federalism, followed by colonial conquests, strengthened the power of the federal government with each successive territorial gain. Although “states’ rights” remained a volatile political issue regarding slavery, the growing power of the federal government was well-suited to the newly acquired territories. Federalism allowed the United States to recognize several hundred Native American tribes within its borders as “domestic dependent nations” with certain resid- ual rights of sovereignty and certain powers reserved to them, while leaving the actual court cases and the interpretation of treaties to the respective states. The United States still retains federacy arrangements with Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas. The Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, formerly trust territories of the United States captured from Japan in the Second World War, all still carry the inheritance of a special status rooted in the days of imperial adventures.52 The thirteen colonies historically enjoyed far more power and authority in ascribing legal status to residents within their particular boundaries. American colonists had accepted aliens as fellow subjects without any permission from the British Parliament as they had little choice but to attract newcomers to become militarily and economically strong in their remote communities. Although the legal authority of colonial governments to admit foreigners to the status of English subjects was questionable, the colonies quickly began to exercise this power, receiving no challenge from London until the late seventeenth century. The Virginia Act of 1680 centered authority in the Royal Governor and explicitly stated that rights conveyed by naturalization were local ones restricted to the colony.53 84 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

After the Revolution, the states developed the notion of volitional allegiance when assigning citizenship or alien status to persons who had once shared British subjectship.54 Pennsylvania allowed every foreign settler of “good character” who took “an oath of allegiance or affirmation” the status to acquire “land or real estate.” After a year’s residence he was to be deemed a free denizen with all rights except to be elected a representative, which required two years of residence. Vermont followed this legislation; Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia had longer residency requirements; while Maryland required a declaration of “belief in the Christian religion.”55 The circumstances of life in America reinforced the tendency toward a subject status that remained quite uniform on the whole. There were exceptions like Virginia, which put “all aliens” on the same footing as “Irish servants without indentures,” but overall the foreign immigrants’ contribution to the welfare of the community—its military security, economic prosperity, and rapid and sustained growth—was obvious and highly valued. To limit their rights was senseless on the grounds of self- interest. Admission to the community in England remained a matter of grace and favor, but in America aliens enjoyed much more extensive rights.56 With new territorial acquisitions, along with citizens, non-citizens (slaves), and citizens with limited rights (women), a new category of “settler citizens” emerged. This term was evoked to distinguish between the original people of the land and the white settlers.57 The distinction between territories and states emerged as an important factor to justify the exclusion of people from full citizenship rights, and it was the denial of full citizenship rights that ultimately distinguished the territories from the states. Following the logic of exclusion of Native Americans, it was possible to devise a system to include people in America without granting full citizenship rights. The residents of Guam and Puerto Rico lack full representa- tional rights even today. With its conquests, the United States not only broke the previous pattern of territorial acquisition and entered into an imperial phase of national political development,58 but also added different categories of citizenship by denying full rights and privileges to the people of these territories. While the exclusions affected the minority races in conquered or annexed territories, the logic of denying full citizenship rights originated from the practice of denying Native Americans and African Americans their place in society. The responsibility for making such demarcations and decisions evi- dently shifted to the federal government, and legal definitions and inter- THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 85 pretations served as the official tools, though the application of such laws was haphazard and very much tied to the local context. The federal government took over most aspects of citizenship such as immigration and naturalization laws, while leaving problematic aspects like slavery, or later, discrimination against minority citizens, to the states. The Constitution enacted a Union whose key values were that it was nation-centered and embodied liberal republicanism, both of which theoretically guaranteed equal rights for citizens. But the political price of the compromise leading to the Constitution was to preserve many state powers regarding minority citizens (or more precisely, lack thereof) and to provide slaveholders with new national guarantees like the Fugitive Slave Law.59 The exercise of the centralized power of the state in defining citizenship began with naturalization laws and acquired unchallenged dominance after the Civil War. Arizona’s immigration law of May 2010—the state passed a resolution to carry out federal immigration functions through questionable means—is a recent notable attempt by a state to challenge federal authority. During the period preceding the Civil War, states routinely expanded the state franchise to newcomers in order to increase population and gain seats in Congress. Federalism permitted considerable discretion in civil matters, including the legal and real implications of state citizenship, and voting by non-citizens was common through the early twentieth century. As immigration was viewed primarily from the framework of leading toward a robust economy, immigrant suffrage was not controversial; rather, it was tied to the process of civic duty and becoming a citizen. During the colonial period, non-citizens not only voted but also held public office. The right to vote was linked mainly to property, age, sex, and race rather than to citizenship, and before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment the legal interpretation of “inhabitants” easily included immigrants. Even after the federal government’s exclusive power to naturalize aliens was clarified, distinctions between state and national citizenship permitted states to grant aliens the franchise by declaring them state citizens or pre-citizens.60 Prior to the Civil War, much of the regulation of immigration remained within the purview of individual states of the Union, even though naturalization was based on federal law. The first naturalization law of 1790 was an enactment of one paragraph and less than three hundred words; it was replaced in 1795 by an act more than three times as long; this in turn gave way in 1798 to a statute of some two thousand words; and finally what proved to be the enduring statement of naturalization policy came in 86 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

1802 in a slightly longer law. These four basic acts, although supplemented and modified, retained their essential character until after the Civil War.61 Essentially, only “free white persons” had the right to naturalize, and even when in 1870 the act was amended to include blacks, the term “free white persons” was retained to exclude immigrants who were non-white from naturalization.62 The Civil War established the federal government’s undaunted authority over matters of race, naturalization, and immigration. It was not an accident that the first meaningful shift to federal immigration law, as opposed to state law, occurred soon after the Civil War. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act63 barred only new laborers from entering the United States, and exempted merchants, teachers, students, and travelers. The right to remain in the United States and the right to re-enter became dependent on documentation, and an elaborate system of registration, certification, and identification evolved to sort out eligibles from ineligibles. Although in 1856 Congress had asserted the exclusive right to issue passports and mandated that they be issued only to American citizens, the individual states and even municipalities frequently distributed them along with the Department of State prior to the Civil War.64 The changing nature of immigration, naturalization, and citizenship policies was impacted by the strengthening authority of the federal government, but the meanings of immigration, naturalization, and citizenship were being produced in the sociopolitical reality. Well into the 1920s, mass migration to the United States was first and foremost labor migration, and it was primarily social relationships in the context of work that defined an immigrant’s place in the nation.65 The rules of exclusion had shifted from absolute bars against anyone deemed undesirable in the nation to allowing people whose labor was needed in the growing economy. Hence, rather than immigration, it was the process of naturalization which was the more important avenue toward citizenship. The legal structure, both at the state and the federal level, often reflected the will of the political elites and accentuated social norms. The subjugation and exploitation of the African American population in the South prior to the Civil War and in the Reconstruction era occurred with federal indifference if not tacit approval.66 The impact of the Civil War on engen- dering a rigid meaning of citizenship cannot be overemphasized. The most important power shift, from the social connotations inherent in civil society to a legal definition, was through the legislative process of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenets of national citizenship, birthright THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 87 citizenship, and the power of the federal government over national citizenship rights, all were established by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the same time, this notion of national citizenship relegated vast areas of life, including employment, housing, transportation, and public accommodation, to private or non-state actors. It was not until the second civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that the federal courts and Congress returned to the principles of national citizenship and a strong federal obligation to protect civil rights.67 Although the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 gave citizenship rights to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, it was not until 1898 through a court case that the situation for children born to aliens was clarified. To acquire citizenship jure soli, a person must be born both in the United States and be subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Prior to 1934, only those children whose fathers were citizens and had resided in this country were citizens at birth. The children of female citizens could only enjoy the same status if they resided in the United States. It was with the 1940 Naturalization Act that the child of one citizen and one alien parent who had established residency in the United States acquired the right to become a citizen. The bar against illegitimate children or children of a polygamous marriage was also waived.68 The Constitution had remained silent as to who was a citizen and what rights and privileges a citizen enjoyed. Using the terms “inhabitants,” “persons,” and “citizens” interchangeably, it left to each state the authority to determine various qualifications such as suffrage, jury duty, and the like. Individuals were first and foremost state citizens, and through state citizenship, citizens of the United States. The significance of state citizenship was challenged during the Civil War and the notion of national citizenship has dominated the American imagination ever since the Civil War. The Constitution clearly distinguished between three groups of people: Native Americans, who were labeled as members of separate nations; slaves, who were categorized as “others”; and “the people,” integral members of the community.69 It should also be noted that the notion of denying the privileges and immunities of citizenship to paupers and vagabonds, initiated in the Articles of Confederation, was not repeated in the Constitution. Federal laws could bar people from joining the ranks of citizens, and social norms could obstruct some citizens from exercising those rights, but the expanding economy generally embraced all people and opened up avenues that were porous and amorphous. The mobility of the work- 88 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE force during the 1870s and 1880s was not a matter of choice. Working- class men and women frequently moved in search of seasonal employment. The expansive and fluid economy of mid-nineteenth-century America was a breeding ground for social mobility. The demands of the economy broke the bars of restrictions that were often class-based. Not only were suffrage rights tied to property, but deep into the nineteenth century, the right to travel was restrained by strict local laws defining who could gain a “settlement” in a town and in what way lay a claim on town charity. The right to travel freely within the US was established only in 1941.70 The Civil War was also the culmination of black aspirations impacted by the presence and visibility of minorities in society and their relative economic successes. By 1815, the United States had approximately two hundred thousand free African Americans as a result of combined state and individual liberation. The large majority of “free Negroes” lived in cities, working mostly in service occupations. Often excluded from skilled jobs, they frequently worked as sailors. The black enclaves in the cities emerged as beacons of freedom and shelter for all African Americans. The apolo- getic attitude toward slavery, common around 1815, soon took the new shape of planter paternalism. The notion of paternalism shifted the discourse from self-interest and violation of natural rights to a humbler rational reasoning to justify slavery. Slave owners insisted that “Negroes” as a race were childlike and needed to be taken care of, which was being provided on the plantations.71 But blacks continued to acquire land and build churches, schools, and other organizations, and, in essence, cultivate a new black identity and political consciousness, testing American identity and nationalism in fundamental ways. The African American presence in literature, in music (especially the blues), and in the arts would provide the social space needed to meaningfully gain the political rights of citizenship through the civil rights movement. If the presence of the slave population was problematic for American identity and nationalism, the other minority races, who came to America for economic reasons, proved to be cumbersome as well. The Chinese were lured to America to perform backbreaking work in western mines and on the transcontinental railroad. They faced a fierce reaction not only because of their growing numbers and cultural differences, but also because of their willingness to work for cheaper wages. In 1879, Congress passed a bill limiting the number of Chinese who could come into the country on any ship. By 1894, the Chinese government THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 89 consented to a new treaty that absolutely prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years. A sharp rise in the number of Italian immigrants and an increase in gang warfare caused rising tension in cities where the Irish were prevalent. At the same time, the State Department pursued quiet and persistent diplomacy, and eventually voiced dissatisfaction with Russian anti- Semitism when American Jews traveling to Russia faced severe discrimination. Although Russia pointed fingers at how the Chinese were treated in America, this might have been the first humanitarian cause that the United States seriously pursued.72 “Mexicans” posed a thorny problem by introducing, for the first time, an ethnic group, vexingly multiracial in character, who had legitimate political rights as citizens, though without the social allowances that were essential to translate the theoretical provisions of citizenship rights into actual practices. It is not at all surprising how Mexicans lost their land in skirmishes and court cases with the Anglo population following the Mexican War. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo conferred citizenship rights on the inhabitants who came along with the conquered land through the Mexican War, but as a race they remained inadmissible through naturalization. The differentiation of American Mexicans and Mexican Mexicans hinged on the term “illegals,” a category that emerged in the early twentieth century and reframed a whole race, irrespective of their legal status. “Illegal” became constitutive of “Mexican,” referring not to citizens of Mexico, but to a wholly negative racial category, which comprised both Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans in the United States. As Ngai has argued, “The construction of Mexicans as an illegal and illegitimate foreign presence in their former homeland played a central role in the reorganization of the agricultural labor market in the 1920s. The development of commercial agriculture required the creation of a migratory work force and the destruction of all vestiges of the old patrón- peón relationships of mutual obligation that had characterized the late- nineteenth-century ranch economy. Casting Mexicans as foreign distanced them both from Anglo-Americans culturally and from the Southwest as a region; it stripped Mexicans of the claim of belonging they had had as natives, even as conquered natives.”73 In 1930, the Census Bureau enu- merated Mexicans as a separate race as persons born in Mexico or with parents born in Mexico and who were not definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese. As Ngai further explains, “Distinguishing a separate race of illegitimate foreigners, official policy hardened the idea of Mexicans 90 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE as a disposable labor force and facilitated the deportation and repatriation of over four hundred thousand Mexicans (half of them children with United States citizenship) during the Great Depression.”74 The practice of excluding people from citizenship was based not only on race, but also on their political affiliations. Economic transformation and the changing composition of immigrant flows also heightened worries about subversive influences, especially with the arrival of more immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The fear was that radical political agitators were coming to America to foment industrial strife. The Haymarket Square strike and riot in Chicago on May 5, 1886 resulted in eight anarchists—seven of them German immigrants—convicted for their part in the bombing, four of whom were hanged. When President McKinley was assassinated in 1901, the assassin was Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist and an American citizen. But his name was alien enough to intensify the xenophobia, and in a 1903 statute, Congress barred the admission of anarchists, or persons who wanted to overthrow or jeopar- dize the government using any form of violent means.75 The origins of laws to exclude or deport non-citizens based on national security or ideology lie in the 1880s amid the growing power of labor, dominated by ethnic minorities. A flurry of ideological and national security immigration statutes became the law around the end of the First World War. In 1918, Congress authorized the deportation of aliens who were members of anarchistic and similar classes. In addition, the government started to bring criminal charges against radicals. Russian Jewish anarchist Jacob Abrams was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets that criticized President Wilson’s war policies and called for a general strike.76 Around the same time, modern nation-states, with the invention of the passport system, acquired the power to monitor the movements of their people across national territories.77 The anxiety of early twentieth-century America is also apparent in the changing sociocultural meanings of race and thus American identity. Since the interpretation of federal laws often relied on sociocultural significance, the mainstream perception of American identity became a marker of naturalization and citizenship. In 1909, a federal court in Georgia ruled that George Najour,78 a Syrian, was eligible for citizenship based on commonly accepted categories of the human race, as “Syrians” fell under the Caucasian or white division. Although the federal courts accepted Syrians, Armenians, and Asian Native Americans as whites and allowed them to naturalize THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 91 between 1909 to 1923, in the Ozawa case79 this logic was reversed by claiming that the Japanese could not be considered Caucasians, as whites and Caucasians were not the same. Within three months, in the Thind case,80 the Court rejected the claim of whiteness via the Aryan race by an Asian Indian. What is further revealing is that the court asserted that the words “free white persons” needed to be interpreted through the understanding of the common man.81 Simultaneously, racial categories garnered more fluid meaning when they pertained to non-black racial groups. European immigrant groups, like the Slavs, Celts, Jews, and Italians, started claiming common membership in the Caucasian race, and were often granted reluctant entry when their numbers became amplified (the Irish) or when they participated in wars (the Irish/Italians/Jews). The entry of African Americans and Hispanics (those who could not pass as whites), however, was strictly restricted from the porous race categories.82 Under the common law doctrine of coverture, a woman’s citizenship status, like her legal identity, was tied to her husband’s status. An alien (white) woman gained citizenship by marrying a male citizen, but a native-born woman lost her citizenship if she married an alien. Before 1907, marriage to an alien could deprive an American woman of her citizenship, especially if she resided abroad. Upon termination of her marriage, she could regain her citizenship.83 As more and more people needed to be integrated as citizens, former slaves, or naturalized white immigrants, the rights of citizens simultaneously continued to shrink. One of the ways whereby it was possible for the state to pursue these apparently conflicting paths was by introducing new categories and by enacting laws that would exclude some of these categories from full citizenship rights. Before the Civil War, courts used cultural connotations to define citizens. Citizenship rights were denied to women and blacks by portraying these groups as children and outsiders. The Fourteenth Amendment included all people born or naturalized in the United States as citizens, but narrowly defined citizenship rights to exclude suffrage. This new legal definition was contradictory to cultural beliefs about citizenship. The community civic classes included a new group, children, in this discourse. Citizenship no longer required independence, but it also no longer entailed political rights for children.84 The expansion of American territory and state power not only demanded the evisceration of the sovereignty and autonomy of Native Americans and 92 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE other minorities, it also transformed the political space of citizenship. We need to go back in history to carefully study the construction of the American public sphere to locate the aspects of citizenship that were allowed public expression and the ones that were pushed off into the private domain. The American civic ethic was always more concerned with the freedom of the individual from the interference of the state, and as a result the attention was mostly toward guarding the private sphere and maintaining its sanctity from all kinds of intrusion.85 The American public sphere often kept out controversial notions such as slavery, and instead used the public sphere to convene on matters that had more local texture. From the early days of the republic, states’ rights often replaced the language of the domestic sphere, and racial, ethnic, gender, or any other controversial issues were placed into the private domain. The transformations in all three distinct spheres—the state; the civil society; and the domain of family, kinship, and other relationships—are key to deciphering a citizen’s standing and status. The construction of the public sphere has been shaped by the very different ideologies of individualism and communitarianism.86 American nationalism and national identity upheld both the individualistic contract theory of Hobbes and Locke and a tradition of civic republicanism based on communitarianism, but ignored their critical tension. In individualism, the state is only a necessary instrument to mediate conflict and regulate action so that individuals can have the freedom to pursue their private ends, whereas the state is the very locus of citizenship activities in the civic republican tradition. Freedom and autonomy to pursue individual interests are the goal in individualism, while the common good, which often requires the submission of individual interests, is the desired end in civic republicanism.87 The participatory privileges of citizenship, in terms of private rights and political voice, often contradict each other as these pursue very different ends. Although the ideals of individualism and civic republicanism have coexisted in American history and throughout the formation of the American state, it is important to understand how one has overshadowed the other with support from rising state power. Imperial rhetoric was rooted in an appeal to individual experience, merging manliness and militarism, and shifting to the personal rather than the political. The connotation of nineteenth-century manliness consisted of honest labor, economic independence, devotion to family and community, and moral THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 93 values. As agrarian society gave way to industrialization and commerce, manliness acquired a more individualistic and rugged dimension, better suited to domestic feats in the course of westward expansion and imperial ventures abroad.88 The widespread distribution of land in America had powerful consequences, psychological and political, as well as economic. Ownership of land translated into independence and autonomy, which is the very basis of individualism. The respect for religion and the acceptance of the church’s authority were perhaps the only dents in the sense of individualism. As interdependence among the agricultural helping hands—the blacksmiths, the storekeepers, and the millers—strengthened community bonds, the notion of individualism itself acquired a moral undertone.89 Americans in the revolutionary and early national periods had a rich cultural concept of citizenship, as discussed in Chap. 2, whereas the Constitution focused on only the legal aspects of citizenship, additionally raising vexing problems about the relationship between state citizenship and national citizenship. According to classical republicanism, citizenship is a status reserved for the elite who must participate in public affairs. While the Constitution limited citizens’ political participation through representative government, it expanded the base of people participating in politics. The new egalitarian concept of citizenship helped fuel a critique of suffrage restrictions based on property; during the first half of the nineteenth century, most states revoked these restrictions.90 Citizenship rights are anchored in both social and political domains. The founders had feared women outside the domestic realm as wanton and avaricious and assigned them their own place in the private domain, just as the red and black people possessing a wild nature and unruly passions were doomed to their own territories. In the moral, civilized, republican life, women could enjoy a distinct social status as long as they knew their proper place in society. Since most controversial issues of equality and justice, whether they were gender or race related, were relegated to the private sphere, women’s entry into the job market was framed as a regional, temporary, and idiosyncratic trend rather than a substantial change in the public sphere. When plentiful cotton from the South required more labor, the skills of using spinning wheels and handlooms came to be much in demand and women started to work in factories. Cities like Lowell, Massachusetts, recruited young women and housed them in company-owned boardinghouses. These “Mill Girls” typically 94 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE worked for a few years prior to marriage, so their entry into the workforce was deemed safe enough not to challenge the social order.91 The transformations in the American public school system perfectly capture some of the contesting ideas in the construction of the public sphere in America. The American public school was created out of the overlap of individuals’ private spaces and civic interests. The struggle over general systems of state-funded schooling started in the early republic. While Americans agreed on the importance of educating the youth, for almost a good hundred years they refused to tax themselves to provide free public education. The concern over local taxes, institutional regulation, and the dominance of the federal government overruled any national standards or cosmopolitan vision for American education.92 When school reformers called for more centralized town and state administrative systems, this clashed with the long-standing tradition of local control. Elite Southerners preferred private academies rather than public schools on the charge that public school teachers were the instruments to forge a uniform national culture resting on hostile “northern” values.93 It was only in the late nineteenth century that state governments accepted responsibility for schooling; this stemmed from anxiety over the prospect of an unruly working class, the attendant threat to the virtues of agrarian society, and the appearance on American shores of more and more non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants.94 Structural changes in the nation’s territory, transportation systems, and economy strengthened the case for public schooling. Employers also wanted urban laborers and factory workers properly social- ized in “American” values. The public space of the school system shaped and reshaped itself in its responses to the private needs, desires, and com- mitments of its students. Children and parents often bargained with the school to get special treatment in light of religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other cultural differences. As a result, the American school was located in the public domain, but continuously accommodated private desires and local community values. A good citizen was supposed to have “proper regard for the welfare of the community,” according to the citizens’ education curriculum of 1915, advocated by the National Education Association Committee. Cooperation and community-building replaced the earlier notions of political rights and participation.95 The thread that runs most prominently through congressional debates on the naturalization acts is the concern to promote responsible citizenship, based on personal character and adequate experience of (or at least exposure to) republican institutions. For the founding generation, responsible citizen- THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 95 ship or commitment to certain civic virtues was essential, and political participation was one of the key elements of such virtues.96 But as more ethnic communities joined the ranks of citizenship, the definition of citizenship started to acquire an apolitical character, which in reality was mired in politics. The ethnic and racial prejudice against Eastern and Southern European, Asian, and Mexican immigrants undoubtedly colored this vision, but what is noteworthy is that this new civics was being taught to native as well as immigrant children. In the new civics, behavior became more important than political principles. It is ironic that public schools became one of the most important grounds where civil rights issues were fought in the 1950s. From Brown v. Board of Education to integration and school busing, all were intertwined with racial justice, economic opportunity, and federal authority over local school boards. The Brown v. Board of Education decision provided the federal government with moral authority, and the segregationists in the South further legitimized that authority.97 In a reverse trend that has originated in the last few decades, more and more states are allowing public funds to be used for vouchers for charter schools and private schools. Even with policies like “No Child Left Behind,” which attempts to establish a common core for education, the central authority of the federal government in directing public education is not as firmly rooted as it was in the recent past.98 Americans rejected the notion of limited government from the New Deal era onward, but they did not replace it with a government that would plan their economic and political lives for them. Instead they established a national government whose primary purpose was to provide a minimal redistribution to spearhead economic growth.99 Liberalism, especially from the 1960s onward, far from being a doctrine that was anti-state in essence, became the central justification for strengthening the efficacy of the state machinery. Instead of containing the growth of government, it aspired to be part of government. The cause of political equality became subservient to economic liberty, and the defense of economic liberty gradually shifted to conservatives. When the ethos of the free market contradicted any social justice issues, liberalism ended up prioritizing political or cultural values over the principles of economic liberty. Historically, the strength and weakness of liberalism has consisted in its indifference regarding moral positions. As soon as the state became the major apparatus for liberals to mobilize it toward their ends, mainstream liberalism tended to lose touch with civil society. Progressive liberals were 96 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE equally challenged by libertarians, the New Left, communitarians, and neoconservatives. Many claimed that in its expressions in radical feminism and in affirmative action policy, liberalism sanctioned the invasion of privacy, the curtailment of the freedom of association, and the erosion of contractual liberty. If indeed the values of individualism were lost, they were not replaced by traditional communitarian values. The concept of civil society was hijacked by communitarians, while neoconservatives rejected liberalism for its lack of a moral undertone. As a result, America became more bureaucratized and regulated, losing both individualistic and communitarian values as the basis of society.100 The theories of less governance, new public management, and reinventing government, which followed in the late twentieth century, enabled the notion of the depoliticized citizen. The Reagan Revolution of the 1980s had already rolled back the government, the Clinton administration legitimized it through large-scale privatization, the Bush administration tested the concept of a semi-privatized military on the warfronts of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Obama administration continued the same policies. In the new paradigm, instead of political participation and social obligation to the community, what is prioritized is the consumer right to have the freedom to make well-informed choices about high-quality commodities and services in the public and private sectors. These choices become the measuring stick for the health of democracy, even when they fail to influence public policy. When citizenship is largely measured in consumer rights, accountability for public policies is often undermined. The voices of the Gulf of Mexico residents, both after Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill, thus remain silent or ineffective, as the government and the private sector squabble about responsibility and accountability. I have tried to show the correlation between territorial expansion and the shrinkage and selectivity in citizenship rights; between the seemingly contradictory paths of legal inclusion proceeding at the same time as social exclusion, which may or may not converge at a particular point in time; and between the growth of the American state and the transition to an apolitical public sphere. My goal has been to untangle the theme of state power, a key feature in shaping citizenship in legal, political, and even social terms. State hegemony and citizenship rights are reciprocal, but the relationship between these two seems to be inverse at times. The American example reveals that as the nation-state gains strength in political and economic terms—as has been the case with the rise of the American nation- state in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries—states can THE PARADOX: IMPOSSIBLE REPUBLIC, ELUSIVE EMPIRE 97 limit and expand citizenship rights concurrently. The American state used its legal apparatus to limit such rights to selective groups, a process no doubt aided by the rise in federal power over state authorities, the emergence of a form of liberalism that promoted state power, and the weakened civil society that came about as a result.

The Paradox Continues…

Foreign Wars: Keeping Empire, Destroying the Nation

John Geddes served in Iraq as a private military contractor, one of the estimated eight thousand mercenary soldiers who are still in Iraq.101 The nature of neoliberal warfare is best captured in his words: “They come from across the globe—former Special Forces soldiers from Britain, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and every country on the European mainland. There are Gurkhas too, from the Himalayan foothills, and Fijians from the South Sea Islands. There are men who learned their skills with the Japanese antiterrorist paramilitaries and men who have fought in the vicious bush wars in Zimbabwe. There was even one guy who’d served in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army before heading off to earn a dangerous fortune in Iraq. Chilean commandos and Sri Lankan antiterrorist experts, who’d fought the Tamil Tigers for years, joined the mercenary gold rush to Iraq, as well. They don’t share a common ideology or a common loyalty, but what they do share is a thirst for adventure and a hunger for big bucks, and Iraq is the one place they are certain to find both.”102 The use of mercenary soldiers and the outsourcing of war to private enterprises has assumed novel characteristics for the neoliberal global economy. The army has always been a major beneficiary of the welfare state’s huge social safety net (like tax incentives or subsidized home mortgages) that has been erected historically to support those serving in the US military.103 Older forms of imperialism depended directly on conquest and colonial rule, but the global capitalist system does not rely on territorial occupation or direct imposition of a political system, because it can impose upon and manipulate any part of the world through economic regulations.104 98 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

The capitalist nature of globalization, generally understood as neoliberalism, has freed nationalism from the state. The problem with empire in the neoliberal economy is that it does not care about nationalism. Although the war on terror supposedly sought to preserve our way of life through fighting long wars, the argument for nationalism is difficult to maintain in the presence of mercenary armies and outsourced war. The paradox of continuing to support both nation and empire is finally at peril in the globalized world where the nature of capitalism requires different modes of domination and profit, not necessarily benefiting the nation-state. Nationalism, in this new context, has to be defined within the narrow cultural framework of identity, while economic policies opt to serve neoliberal capital. Global capital only requires that nation- states perform the administrative and coercive functions to maintain legal and social order.104 The war on terror created a surplus imperialism, as we shifted away from capitalist imperialism to a globalized imperialism where military power is employed in a different way than how it used to serve the capitalist economy and the territorial state.105 It is generally agreed that the US military’s use of private military contractors and private security contractors has undermined US military and policy efforts.106 Aidan Delgado has painstakingly elabo- rated on the Abu Ghraib prison situation from the standpoint of an American soldier who decides to become a conscientious objector. What comes across is his feeling that in Abu Ghraib he too became a prisoner, sharing the schedule and mindset which for him was sharing the punishment.108 The most recent notable example of outsourcing and therefore denationalizing war was perhaps the rise of Blackwater, the private army started by billionaire Erik Prince, who holds a strong Christian Right agenda. Scahill points out how US troops have been subject to enforceable rules of engagement and prosecuted for violations, while this was not the case for contractors. Private contractors operated during the early years of the war on terror in a gray zone, and the military was reluctant to oversee these massive private forces and granted them virtual immunity.109 The rise of Blackwater on the one hand represents the epitome of the military-industrial complex, yet on the other hand it subverts military power by allowing the unprecedented growth of private mercenaries with few controls by the state.110 NOTES 99

Though private military contractors have recently been subjected to regulations, the trend that has already been established is omi- nous. Numerous violations of army regulations as well as human rights provisions that the United States formally agrees with were reported in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. It would be a mistake to believe that these policies of empowering corporate power do not have domestic consequences.111 There has always been an implicit understanding of the purpose of foreign policy among the general public, and a tacit agreement with the government regarding warfare and its different modes of control, including suppression and torture. The connection between the suppression of citizenship at home—for example, with the escalating number of unarmed minorities killed by the police—and the state of human rights around the world, reflects the shrinking distance between nation and empire.

Notes 1. For an excellent analysis and comparison within various territories, refer to Ediberto Román, The Other American Colonies: An International and Constitutional Law Examination of the United States’ Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 2. A number of Southern states consider the Confederate flag a part of their proud heritage, even though it signifies a dark mark in American racial history. It has been used as a tool against school segregation protests. South Carolina displayed the Confederate flag atop its state house from 1961 until 2000. In 2003, Democratic presidential contender Howard Dean was severely criticized and forced to apologize for using the notion of the Confederate flag to describe Southern voters and appeal to them (http:// www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/01/elec04.prez.dean.confederate.flag/). In 2014, the state of Georgia approved a specialty license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag, keeping the fight to define American identity alive (http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/confederate-flag-ga-car-plates-22577493). The state flag of Mississippi still contains the image of the Confederate flag. 3. Mark S. Weiner, Americans Without Law: The Racial Boundaries of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 67–8. 4. The dream of expansion spread from the tip of Florida all the way to Canada. The French and Indian War led to the occupation of land and the formation 100 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

of the Ohio Land Company, in contrast to the British battles with Native Americans which often ended only in peace treaties. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 53–6. 5. Rosemary Radford Ruether, America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence (London: Equinox, 2007), 73–97. 6. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 180–1. 7. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 41–3. 8. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 28–41. 9. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 107–8. 10. Ibid., 110–15. 11. The problematic aspects of British heritage were resolved within a few decades of the American Revolution, and Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity was once again celebrated in the mid-nineteenth century. This also paved the way for cultural homogenization, and the Spanish, Dutch, French, Swedes, and Germans, and later the Irish, Italians, and Jews, all had to go through periods of discrimination and distrust to earn the right of entry into mainstream society. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 12. Ibid., 184–7. 13. Ibid., 189–94. 14. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 56–7. 15. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 13–7. 16. David Goldfield, America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a Nation (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 360. 17. Ibid., 79–81. 18. Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41, no. 2 (June 1988): 231. 19. Richard D. Brown, “Modernization and the Modern Personality in Early America, 1600–1865: A Sketch of a Synthesis,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2, no. 3 (Winter 1972): 205–7. 20. William Appleman Williams, ed., From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Wiley, 1972), 137. 21. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 50–1. NOTES 101

22. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 201–2. 23. Ibid., 279–85. 24. The My Lai Massacre, a mass killing of about five hundred unarmed civilians, took place in March 1968, and remains one of the most shocking episodes of the Vietnam War. Although it prompted global outrage and strengthened domestic opposition to the war, only one of twenty-six soldiers charged with a criminal offense was convicted, and his life sentence was commuted to three and a half years of house arrest. 25. In US-occupied Iraq, prisoners held in Abu Ghraib prison were tortured with physical and sexual abuse, rape, sodomy, and murder by the US Army, Central Intelligence Agency, and private contractors hired by the army. The human rights violations were condemned at home and abroad, though the Bush administration claimed that these were isolated incidents. About thirty lower-level military personnel were charged with maltreatment, aggravated assault, or dereliction of duty, though the authorization of such torture came from high up in the military authority, including memos from then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 26. The Guantánamo Bay detention camp was established by President George W. Bush’s administration in 2002 during the War on Terror. Located within Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, war prisoners and alleged terrorists have been detained indefinitely without trial and several inmates have been severely tortured. This camp is considered a major breach of human rights by Amnesty International. President Obama failed to close GTMO, as it is often referred to, but reduced the number of inmates held there. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp. 27. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131–2. 28. The peace treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom that ended the war of 1812, whereby the United States got back approximately ten million acres of territory near Lake Superior and Lake Michigan and in Maine. 29. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25–6. 30. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 15. 31. Mark S. Weiner, Americans Without Law: The Racial Boundaries of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 25–6. 32. Charles S. Hyneman, The American Founding Experience: Political Community and Republican Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 33–7. 33. Mark S. Weiner, Americans Without Law: The Racial Boundaries of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 40–2. 102 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

34. The Dawes Act authorized the President of the United States to survey American Indian tribal land and divide it into allotments for individual Indians. The Act provided that the government would classify as “excess” those Indian reservation lands remaining after allotments and sell those lands on the open market, allowing purchase and settlement by non-Native Americans. 35. Ibid., 37. 36. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 15–7. 37. Under US constitutional law, plenary power is a form of power that has been granted to a body, or person, in absolute terms, with no review of, or limitations upon, the exercise of that power. The assignment of a plenary power to one body divests all other bodies from the right to exercise that power, where not otherwise entitled. Plenary powers are not subject to judicial review in a particular instance or in general. https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Plenary_power. 38. Ediberto Román, The Other American Colonies: An International and Constitutional Law Examination of the United States’ Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 93–8. 39. The Lewis and Clark Expedition (1804–1806) opened up the Oregon Trail, and from the early to mid-1830s the Oregon Trail and its many off- shoots were used by about four hundred thousand settlers, farmers, min- ers, and their families. 40. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 142–6. 41. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137. 42. Ibid., 178. 43. Ibid., 225. 44. Ibid., 21. 45. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 33–4. 46. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 110–24. 47. Ediberto Román, The Other American Colonies: An International and Constitutional Law Examination of the United States’ Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 16. 48. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 58–62. NOTES 103

49. Ibid., 51–52. 50. Ibid., 37. 51. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 254–60. 52. Daniel J. Elazar, “From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,” Publius, 25, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 15. 53. Methods varied from colony to colony, but generally bore some resem- blance to the English practices of executive denization and legislative naturalization, and reflected some familiarity with established principles of allegiance and subjectship. Although the imperial government claimed the power to review colonial legislation and to prevent objectionable acts, the naturalization policies in the colonies developed locally without interference from England. For details, see James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 78–91. 54. For details, see James H. Kettner, “The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance,” The American Journal of Legal History, 18, no. 3 (July 1974): 208–42. 55. James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 213–18. 56. Ibid., 112–27. 57. The conquests of Puerto Rico and the Philippines were welcome for the territory and for trade routes, but the “half-civilized” people in these territories remained inadmissible. Mark S. Weiner, Americans Without Law: The Racial Boundaries of Citizenship (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 72. 58. Ibid., 67–68. 59. The Fugitive Slave Law or Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required that all escaped slaves were, upon capture, to be returned to their masters and that officials and citizens of free states had to cooperate in this law. 60. Marta Tienda, “Demography and the Social Contract,” Demography, 39, no. 4 (November 2002): 602–3. 61. Charles S. Hyneman, The American Founding Experience: Political Community and Republican Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 75. 62. Evelyn Glenn, “Citizenship and Inequality: Historical and Global Perspectives,” Social Problems, 47, no. 1 (February 2000): 4. 63. The Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers, the first law implemented to prevent a specific ethnic group from immigrating to the United States. 64. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 94–7. 104 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

65. Catherine Collomp, “Immigrants, Labor Markets, and the State, a Comparative Approach: France and the United States, 1880–1930,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 44. 66. In 1804, Congress had prohibited international and domestic slave trade in Louisiana, but in 1805 refused to renew this ban. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 107. 67. Evelyn Glenn, “Citizenship and Inequality: Historical and Global Perspectives,” Social Problems, 47, no. 1 (February 2000): 4–5. 68. F. V. L., Jr., “The Nationality Act of 1940,” Virginia Law Review, 27, no. 4 (February 1941): 531–6. 69. Evelyn Glenn, “Citizenship and Inequality: Historical and Global Perspectives,” Social Problems, 47, no. 1 (February 2000): 5. 70. Linda K. Kerber, “The Meaning of Citizenship,” The Journal of American History, 84, no. 3 (December 1997): 833–4. 71. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 57–8. 72. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 282–4. 73. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 91. 74. Ibid., 91. 75. Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 39. 76. Ibid., 41. 77. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 78. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dow_v._United_States. 79. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ozawa_v._United_States. 80. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Bhagat_Singh_Thind. 81. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 84–5. 82. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 95. 83. F. V. L., Jr., “The Nationality Act of 1940,” Virginia Law Review, 27, no. 4 (February 1941): 537. 84. Julie A. Reuben, “Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the Redefinition of Citizenship in the Progressive Era,” History of Education Quarterly, 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 408–10. NOTES 105

85. Margaret R. Somers, “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy,” American Sociological Review, 58, no. 5 (October 1993): 589. 86. Individualism emphasizes independence and self-reliance as the core values of society, while communitarianism emphasizes the connection between the individual and the community as the basis of social identity and social formation. 87. Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics, 19, no. 2 (January 1989): 253. 88. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 21–22. 89. The custom of shaking hands, a gesture of social reciprocity, had replaced bowing in America. Although the existence of the system of slavery points toward a rigid hierarchy in society, African Americans and other lowly races were not considered part of society; conversely, white propertied men believed in resolute egalitarianism. American republican ideology thus strengthened the yeoman farmer’s autonomy and suspicion toward all authority. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37–9. 90. Julie A. Reuben, “Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the Redefinition of Citizenship in the Progressive Era,” History of Education Quarterly, 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 407. 91. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 133–4. 92. Robert E. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760–1800 (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 113–7. 93. Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 216–8. 94. Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American CIVIC Life (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 93. 95. Julie A. Reuben, “Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the Redefinition of Citizenship in the Progressive Era,” History of Education Quarterly, 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 399. 96. Charles S. Hyneman, The American Founding Experience: Political Community and Republican Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 135. 97. The Bilingual Education Act, Higher Education Act, Title IX, and similar legislation paved the way for myriad federal regulations and associated bureaucracies. All the issues concerning public schools—enrollment, funding, textbooks, exams—became highly politicized amid the competing voices of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as school boards, 106 3 NATION-BUILDING: NATION-STATES VERSUS EMPIRE

and even parents bickered then as now about affirmative action, creation- ism, school prayer, and the like. 98. One of the most spectacular experiments has been undertaken in the state of Louisiana. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one of the first reforms to take place was to convert its one hundred and seven schools (out of one hundred and twenty-eight) into charter schools. The charter schools have the authority to hire and fire their own faculty as well as design their own rules and curriculum. New Orleans has curtailed the school bus service to neighborhoods with sparse population, so parents without cars have a hard time if they can’t get their children into classrooms nearby. For heartbreak- ing details, see Kenneth J. Saltman, Capitalizing on Disaster: Taking and Breaking Public Schools (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007). 99. Bruce Frohnen, The New Communitarians and the Crisis of Modern Liberalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996). 100. John Gray, Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought (New York: Routledge, 1993). 101. There are roughly three contractors for each soldier in Afghanistan. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-the- silent-majority-of-obamas-military-mercenaries-iraq-afghanistan/. 102. John Geddes, Highway to Hell: Dispatches from a Mercenary in Iraq (New York: Broadway Books, 2008), 49. 103. Jennifer Mittelsadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 2–3. 104. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003), 21. 105. Ibid., 140–1. 106. Ibid., 5–7. 107. For a detailed description, see George C. Lovewine, Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism: Private Military Companies and American Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 108. Aidan Delgado, The Sutras of Abu Ghraib: Notes from a Conscientious Objector (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 74. 109. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007). 110. Blackwater came under extensive scrutiny after its employees were convicted of killing fourteen unarmed Iraqi civilians in 2009 and received mea- ger punishment. The company changed its name to XE Services, then again to Academi, after coming in for severe criticism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academi. 111. Betsy DeVos, the new education secretary in the Trump administration, is the sister of Erik Prince. CHAPTER 4

World Relations: Hegemony Versus Globalization

Americans became citizens through the American Revolution and set up rules of exclusion to citizenship rights for non-white races as the country expanded and more and more diverse ethnic groups became part of American life. The meanings of American citizenship are not only contained in the journey of becoming united, becoming a nation, and becoming an empire (though an unconventional one), but much of the nature and trends of American citizenship are derived from its relation to and image on the world stage, in terms of conflicts, competition, and reconciliation. In the previous chapters, I discussed both the shrinkage and expansion of citizenship rights that mainly occurred for particular races as the American territory and the diversity of its people multiplied in the nineteenth century. The story of citizenship in twentieth-century America became much more complicated than issues of race and ethnicity, as most of the social rights of citizenship were introduced in the early and mid- twentieth century, rights that are still being debated in the political arena. This chapter is about the meaning of citizenship that emerges from escalating American power and influence on the global stage, the clashes and conciliations with foreign countries that have changed the nature of citizenship rights. The belief about American exceptionalism1 turned to almost messianic proportions with the early victories in various domestic and foreign conflicts. In 1776, Americans were inspired by the notion that the United States was the new locale for a new civilization. After securing independence,

© The Author(s) 2018 107 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_4 108 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION instead of perfecting the union as a conscious process by dealing with ills like slavery, the focus shifted to taking the message of liberty and democracy to the world. Implicit in this policy was the thought that US power and rights were God-gifted natural inheritances. The idea of Manifest Destiny justified the occupation of Native American lands, the annexation of Texas, and the biggest prize of all, the gains of the Mexican War.2 American foreign and trade policies were based on this singular belief, and often military power supplemented the exercise of power when foreign policy and trade policy fell short in achieving the desired goals. The domestic wars which resulted in expansion of American territory, and the foreign wars which mainly conquered and secured markets for American products, followed quite the same rationale and justification. It is imperative to note how the notion of Manifest Destiny was incorporated in new discourses over progressivism, civilization, and modernization. As the American populace internalized the myth of America and its exceptionalism, issues like slavery, discrimination toward minorities, and militant foreign policies were smoothed over in the main narrative of benign American power. The same Manifest Destiny was interpreted as the God-given mission of bringing progress, liberty, and modernity to uncivilized regions like the Philippines or Vietnam, and it even made an appearance in the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout US history, a majority or at least a critical mass of Americans has granted spontaneous consent to foreign policy decisions, regardless of the bloodshed and misery caused by these policies.3 All these global exertions—their rationale, their projected goals, and their actual impact—shaped American identity and nationalism in profound ways by both conforming to and yet challenging the underlying myths that constructed the very impulses. A number of citizenship rights, especially social rights such as welfare and Social Security, were at least partially the result of the Cold War, to portray an alternative to the ideals of socialism where labor rights accrued a moral dimension. The Second World War put the ascending American empire on an altogether unprecedented pedestal. American financial institutions and the long-lasting cru- sade between communism and capitalism paved the way for economic imperialism. The United States emerged not only as a winner, but also as a moral protector of the wronged throughout the world. As the only country which emerged from the war richer and relatively unscathed, it used moral, military, and economic leverage to form hundreds of military bases around the world, adopt an expansive internationalism in its foreign 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION 109 policy, and extend its soft power through aid packages to counter the communist threat.4 The creation of world bodies like the League of Nations, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank consolidated American power rather than challenging it. The internationalization of financial markets, the wilting Japanese economy, the aggressive restructuring of the US economy, and the implo- sion of communism paved the way for yet another phase of American dominance in the 1990s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, American hegemony became unchallenged and globalization often came to mean Americanization. The effects of globalization on American culture and governance remain more significant compared to any other nation. The globalized economy and its associated market demands pushed for the 1965 immigration reform that opened the floodgates to immigration from all parts of the world. The United States became the hub of the international capital market. Being able to attract the best brains, the United States enjoyed access to international capital and labor, both high-skilled and low-skilled, at various critical phases of development.5 Globalization may have had a very America-centric beginning and hub, but that influence is being challenged. The international integration of trade and fiscal markets has produced more interdependence among economies, and migration everywhere is associated with greater social and cultural interaction. The relative size of such economies, the speed of change, the rapidity of international transactions, and the complexity of global markets have all changed the nature of the state’s authority over its own domestic markets.6 In an ironic twist, one of the most significant ideological challenges to American power has come from unexpected quarters, through the non- state actors called terrorists whose operations also boast of a global plat- form. At the same time, the explosion of terrorism in a global form has elevated the power of the state as the only legitimate authority to fight against chaos and violence worldwide. Thus globalization has simultaneously confronted the state’s authority over its own citizens, while extending the state’s reach beyond its traditional territorial boundaries. The ambiguities defining the public and private aspects of life and those defining the political and economic borders of nation-states have forced the American state to rethink its notion of citizenship rights and obligations. This chapter explores how globalization has changed the relationship between the American state and the citizen. The parallel yet paradoxical trends of political and economic challenges toward American hegemony 110 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION and the expansion of American military power over the world have had a profound impact on citizenship rights and practices. The extent of power the state has lost because of globalization has been more than compensated for by strengthening technological hegemony in the era of terrorism and anti-terrorist state violence. The impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is not limited to the economy and trade, but is forcing citizens to rethink the conception of the border in new terms, though the old perceptions of borders and boundaries dominate the policy domain. My purpose is to decipher if the power of the American state over its citizens has decreased and/or increased, and in which directions these changes have occurred and why.

The Rhetoric: American Exceptionalism From the very beginning of the American nation, internal and external warfare to expand and build the nation was accepted as the necessary and usual means to retain power. One of the most interesting points in the expansion of the American empire is how the logic and trajectory of military power shifted to trade power and vice versa. The unusual ambiguity about the American empire—the vehement disagreement about its very existence—is rooted in the framework of the rhetoric of American global relations, situated in an ideology that emphasizes freedom as an abstract notion, stripping it from its political meaning. The American psyche not only accepted freedom as the regnant ideology of American foreign policy, but the notion of the market also emerged as a sacred realm, and protecting its freedom, often from government, loomed large over all other political freedoms. The Monroe Doctrine7 justified all global aggressions following the notion of Manifest Destiny that purified the brutal takeover of Native American lands as well as the Mexican War. The enduring essence of the Monroe Doctrine has repeatedly contributed to US exceptionalism and the politics of identity. The elements of the doctrine served to legitimize expansionist ambitions and unite the nation as an exceptional people. Its flexibility enhanced its endurance, as US opportunism utilized the concept throughout history.8 The Monroe Doctrine defeated the isolationist trends in the early 1800s and continued to grow and ultimately dominate US foreign policy. During President Wilson’s era, national self-determination was coupled with the liberal- capitalist economic order, an ideological combination that was quite well- suited to US interests and security in the international arena. After the THE RHETORIC: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 111

Second World War, the postwar policy of redeveloping the wayward, formerly belligerent nations of the Axis also fed into US trade policies, which were focused on identifying new markets to sell excess products. The spirit of commerce has inspired and shaped America’s relationship with the world since its colonial inception. The paradox of free trade along with the protection of American goods was evident from the very beginning. America’s first president, George Washington, ordered an American- made suit for his inaugural address and laid down the example of buying American goods first. The protection of domestic goods remained a recur- rent theme in American politics, and the interests of American producers and American workers were indeed prioritized in much of America’s trade and industrial policies. Especially after the War of 1812, a more nationalistic mood prevailed and the idea of protection of domestic industries gained currency.9 Access to free trade became a foundation for American commercial policy and was soon inscribed into its foreign policy, which often attacked any obstructions in the marketplace abroad and lauded open markets as markers of freedom and democracy. At its initial stage, the clamor for global expansion and the opening of new markets came most sharply from American farmers and industrialists, who were burdened with overproduction; each new economic crisis only deepened the need for stable and expanding foreign markets. By the early twentieth century, America emerged as a robust and trusted supplier of diverse consumer goods in the world market. The US entry into the First World War was closely bound up with these global ambitions and interests.10 As Cox and Skidmore-Hess explain, “The United States emerged from World War I as a creditor nation, and US commercial and investment banking interests were eager to take the lead in lending money to Germany and other European countries to facilitate increased US investment and trade.”11 The liberal internationalist bloc of US-based multinational firms had already aided in the expansion of US investment in Western Europe during the 1920s. The New Deal bloc was led by the ideology and interest of liberal internationalism.12 As American industrialization erupted in success, the entire world became a desired market, and competing and succeeding in the world market overpowered both the need for and the fear of protecting domestic industries. America was the prime world exporter of cotton until the 1870s, a commodity that is land- and labor-intensive. By 1900, however, America became a diversified exporter of value-added manufactures as well as commodities. American-made farm machinery 112 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION became indispensable to agricultural fields worldwide. All over the world, consumer goods like typewriters, phonographs, and sewing machines proudly bore the mark “Made in America.” America’s rapid transformation from a supplier of supplementary raw materials to competitive primary manufactures aroused concern in Great Britain and Europe.13 The commercial ambition replaced the lust for land, but along the way the ideology of free trade morphed into the utilitarian motive in such a way that free trade was translated as freedom and American trade expansion began to be interpreted as an ideological pursuit. Liberal republicanism, the political basis for America, was hailed as the best model of governance, and Americans believed that taking the model to all corners of the world was not self-serving, but was rather an act of benevolence and altruism. American foreign policy, following the construction of nationalism and self-identity, relied on the myth of American exceptionalism, which in the global arena always started with the assumption that America’s overtures were guided by moral values, not self-interest. The ideology of expanding freedom and the concept of Manifest Destiny were mutually supportive. The Spanish-American War opened up new territories where both military and economic interests started to expand. By this time, the nation not only had surplus product but also surplus capital to export. American entrepreneurs exploited mines and built railroads in other countries, especially those with friendly environments for foreign investment. The government, often the State Department, made it a priority to retain the necessary welcoming environment for investment.14 Abandoning the military takeover of foreign countries, a more feasible method was identified through US corporations and magnates investing in raw material extraction and manufacturing in foreign lands; this allowed rubber merchants, gun manufacturers, and railroad companies to expand their commercial ventures, especially under the Monroe Doctrine.15 American globalism may have started with firepower, but it soon gave way to the means of trade and economic dominance, though the military muscle always aided both economic and foreign policies. It is absolutely imperative to recognize the connections and mirror effects of domestic and foreign wars. The discourse of American civilization pitted against savage Native Americans resurfaced in the bipolar con- ceptual division in the Monroe Doctrine, where the Old and the New Worlds were seen as vastly different from each other.16 The Civil War, THE RHETORIC: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 113 which had shattered the notion of national identity, was overshadowed by the new endeavors and adventures, which bonded Northern and Southern white males while keeping out blacks and poor whites in the South. In order to fully reconstitute the identity encapsulated in the myth of America after the Civil War, white men from the South were reincorporated within the imagined national identity.17 Although trade, economic, and foreign policy became interdependent to the extent that they were often instruments of each other, yet in the American mass consciousness, their self- identity remained as liberators of oppressed people. In the period between 1898 and 1914, US interests shifted from the national to the international scale. Although capital accumulation and expansion of trade and markets shaped US dominance, the political and economic interests had cultural undertones that acquired their own influence and strengthened the pursuit of American policies and interests. It was in this period too that Alfred Thayer Mahan pictured the US as the natural successor to British sea power and that Brooks Adams announced the age of American Empire.18 What is striking is how these global ventures affected the brewing problems within the nation. American hegemony in the world was often translated as white supremacy within the nation. Imperial experiences resurrected tensions between national identity and the aspiration for power, but these were soon smoothed over in the national narrative of the ambitious and freedom- loving American. It was also new technology that made both globalization and imperialism possible by raising the output of industrial and agricultural products and by connecting world markets. New technology also boosted the cost of war and its destructive potential. Most importantly, technology brought information not only to the doorsteps of the political and economic elite, but to the common man as well. The “penny press,” or cheap newspapers, reached the masses, and transatlantic tourist travel became cheaper and faster, making room for the middle class and even the working class in search of new venues of leisure.19 It was the mobility of the people both domestically and worldwide that changed their self-perception and expectations from the government. In the absence of adequate technology, the control of mobility and migration by governments mostly involved recordkeeping, without directing its shape in any meaningful manner. At the end of the Cold War, America ascended to unchallenged power, and globalization served to reinforce this power. Earlier, American policy had deliberately promoted norms and institutions such as the General 114 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the IMF that sought to create an open international economic system after 1945. The only remaining barrier was the communist governments, and in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union and of China’s turn to an open economy, American soft power seemed to have won out.20 The expansion of soft power was often sprinkled with military intervention, resulting in a unique display of American hegemony on the world stage. Although the Vietnam War challenged the morality of such hegemony, the claim of American victimhood (because of misguided policy and the number of dead American soldiers in the Vietnam War) somewhat preserved the moral undertones of American foreign policy, at least for some at home. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only strengthened and deepened American hegemony, but also elevated the moral position of capitalism itself. The period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center comprised a long decade in which globalization, as promoted by America, seemed to be rational, desirable, and inevitable.21 Anti-imperialist groups, though vocal ever since the Mexican War, have never gained much traction in US politics. Empire mostly remained an invisible part of the American way of life, and the negation of imperial power became the norm. Maybe the only real exception has been the anti- war protests during the Vietnam War. The number of dead soldiers and issues concerning the surviving soldiers who were able to return spurred a real movement that challenged US hegemony from a domestic perspective, focusing on the cost of retaining imperial power. The most important change for citizenship provisions as a result of the Vietnam War was the discontinuation of the draft,22 thereby converting the military machine to a voluntary instead of an obligatory responsibility. The United States had apparently figured out how to be interventionist on the world stage, and yet retain its reputation as the benevolent policeman in the eyes of most of its own people. The US role in shaping political and economic realities around the world kept escalating, especially in the 1990s, but the American public remained extremely disengaged from the process.23 In the unipolar world, worries about overextension faded and the success of the first Gulf War, especially in terms of the acquiescence of the world to go along with American policy, strengthened US standing and justified the American self-identity as the world’s policeman. The only change was the Reaganite philosophy of permanent military supremacy morphing into the Clintonian urge to deploy American power to dominate the processes of globalization.24 The softer Clintonian imperial proj- THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 115 ect again hardened and militarized in response to the September 11 attacks. After a brief interlude with Obama, when the United States continued both overt and covert warfare with military presence and drone warfare, with the Trump presidency we may again be on the path of unabashed belligerence and military might.

The Reality: Alliance of the State, Market, and Military Power The American aspiration for global dominance had roots in westward expansion; the resulting trade and commerce certainly cemented the yearning for American dominance all over the continent, and after that the entire globe. What has unfolded in the path of America’s escalating power is how the thirst for supremacy has remained the same, while the means to acquire hegemony have kept changing. The lust for more cultivable land was quenched with westward expansion and the Mexican War. But the problem with foreign territories was that they came with inhabitants. Usually, after the number of white settlers exceeded the native population, the territories would be granted stateship and included in the Union, as discussed in Chap. 3. But as the American empire began to target places far away from the nation, this method was discarded. For a handful of exceptions like Puerto Rico and Guam, another compromise was invented whereby they remained American territories; their citizens neither became citizens nor remained aliens for years to come. For the rest of the territories, American hegemony was practiced indirectly through the exercise of a mix of trade and foreign policies, replacing direct militarism and occupation. In the American lexicon, liberty and free trade were treated synony- mously. In the liberal formula, free trade enhanced prosperity and peace, which in turn enhanced democracy. The American myth also contributed to the idea that capitalism and democracy were interdependent. Although American expansionist policies have often challenged democratic governments (Allende in Chile)25 and supported dictatorships (the Shah in Iran),26 the assumption that American interests and democratic ideology are somehow integrated still dominates the American self-image. In the same vein, Guatemala’s land reforms27 could easily be labeled socialist, and armed aid to the militia to topple the legitimately elected government could be defined as aiding freedom, because freedom encompassed making business profitable for the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. The 116 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION invisible hand of the market always remained tangible in American politics and policies, especially those related to other countries. If American hegemony was based on the myths of nationalism and exceptionalism, then American success in the world market solidified those beliefs with a new mythical redefinition of freedom. American foreign policy has always oscillated between the pursuit of power and material opportunity on the one hand and the maintenance of its stated ideals on the other,28 and whenever the two purposes have conflicted, it has invariably sided with American interests. The continuation of the American myth of benevolence from the country’s foundation to recent developments in foreign policy has played an important role in reaffirming American identity itself. Just as the Revolution filled the gap of a common glorious purpose, the myth to civilize the world and imagine the enemy as barbarian promoted patriotic consensus and helped build a common national identity. Whenever the nation faced a challenge, whether it was slavery or economic recession, the expansion of the “empire of liberty” continued to affirm the myth of America.29 The greatest challenge to American identity was perhaps the Civil War, but in a way the Union’s victory reaffirmed the myth of America. The Civil War also brought together the divergent Northern and Southern parts of American self-perception, and in the aftermath these seemingly incoherent identities cohabited, while all the negative characteristics of the “other” personified African Americans. Just a couple of decades earlier, the Mexican War had added new dimensions to the maligned “other”: Mexicans joined the category of inhabitants residing in the Union but unworthy of citizenship. It is interesting to note that their exclusion, unlike that of Native Americans and African Americans, was not aided by any legal definition (on the contrary, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,30 the original inhabitants had citizenship rights), but through sociocultural prejudice, economic discrimination, and biased policies on the whole. After the Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to African Americans, rigid legal exclusion lost its utility as the main tool to keep out potential citizens. Citizenship rights were often denied to minorities by merging them with barbaric foreigners. As every successive victory in warfare affirmed the nation’s destiny to lead the world into a new era of global republicanism, the perception of the enemy—the “other”—continued to become more and more vile in the American consciousness. The more vicious the enemy became in the American comprehension, whether the enemy was inside or outside the THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 117 nation, the easier it was to pursue brutal policies to subjugate him. Violence against extreme enemies, from Indian savages to modern-day terrorists, is integral to American national identity. The United States often chooses to go to war (though they are never represented as wars of choice), having seized opportunities to engage in militarism throughout its history. War clearly defines the barbaric “other,” and brings unity, loyalty, and patriotism to the core of political discourse. Even if the wars do not start as popular ones, with time, especially when they are prolonged and inconclu- sive, they end up reasserting national identity and cultural hegemony. From the early battles to tame the frontier to the more recent war on terrorism, the myth of American exceptionalism has always served as the ideological justification.31 Even when American nationalism started making room for some of the “lower” white races such as the Irish and the Italians, it remained ambiguous about complex political and citizenship issues.32 American liberalism,33 with all its inclusive nuances, also veered away from the more complicated dimensions of citizenship and ended up providing the ideological basis for American hegemony. American liberalism took on the progressive role expected of a social democracy domestically, but internationally it supported strengthening American global power by replacing the notion of empire and imperialism with free trade and the export of American values. As long as American power was not overtly imperial in nature, liberalism endorsed various economic and political initiatives supporting empire. The morphing of the state and the market also had tremendous impact on the domestic social and cultural spheres. When America was becoming more industrial and foreign trade-oriented in the Gilded Age,34 a common social agony concerned how money and its institutional arms had become the pivotal points of the economy. The simultaneous fear of and fascination with money engulfed the common people, who were used to living and trading mostly in close-knit rural communities. As entrepreneurs became dependent on borrowed money to finance their businesses, waste, fraud, and corruption made their way into the American economy. The countryside was not exempt from the infusion of capital and markets. But even the depression of the 1870s could not fully dampen the enthusiasm for money. While the lamentation over dissolving social bonds and the corrosive power of money was going on, more and more youngsters left their ancestral homes in search of fortune in big cities. Intelligence and enterprise became the most sought-after character traits, replacing thrift and forethought. With the rise of fashion, gambling, and the lottery, 118 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION thrift—a fundamental Protestant value—starting losing its appeal. By1890 lotteries had to be forbidden in all states except for Louisiana. The new commercial public sphere also made room for the well-dressed, articulate, and forthright new “American girl.”35 By the 1920s, financial success had become the primary social barom- eter in America. Just as the burgeoning middle class made its presence felt in the social and political spheres, the existence of the urban poor and of the growing underclass could not be denied anymore. However, the presence of the poor and the underclass in the American public space has always been controlled. As if the lack of social status and political clout had not been enough of a deterrent, the cities pushed away their undesirable inhabitants to areas where they became physically invisible to mainstream society. After the success of the modern civil rights movement, the arrival of poor people of color in the cities was countered by white flight into the suburbs; physically and metaphorically, American urban spaces became divided into two distinct spaces, with the cities embodying a dystopia. Although the more recent urban movements are mindful of such divisions and have attempted to design spaces to accommodate people from all classes, the public sphere in America has typically offered little room for the poor. Now that the public sphere is being organized digitally, even though theoretically it offers equal access to everyone, it is the poor who are more likely to be left behind in the new public sphere of the twenty- first century. The ascendance of the market in American political and social life has also changed the construction and notion of the public sphere within America. Marden argues that the public sphere as a vibrant political space has been largely neglected in contemporary accounts of nationalism. The nation-state has been the critical political unit of reference throughout the modern period, not only as the natural home of democratic traditions, but also for the profound relationship that has bound the state and the citizen within the parameters of mutual obligation under the rubric of the social contract.36 Just as the public sphere has lost a lot of its political dynamism in return for greater social and commercial access and mobility, the ascendancy of state power has also pushed the public sphere toward a more market-oriented direction rather than its local, political, and spontaneous origin. With globalization, the nationalist discourse of the public sphere has ended up in further uncharted territory, toward a global civil society that exists through technology rather than local connections. THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 119

After the Second World War, the broad consensus ruling American policy circles involved not only the ideological thrust of the Marshall Plan,37 but also its intended goal: the reconstruction of a global free-trade system. The New Deal at home expanded the social rights of citizens, although with the aid of corporatist regulations. The postwar economic boom and the financial bull market that lasted through the 1950s provided space for American finance, within New Deal regulations, to further deepen its markets at home and to extend abroad. Financial capital emerged as a powerful force in American society, especially after the end of the fixed exchange system led by the United States in the 1970s. Even though the New Deal steered away from extending control over the international movement of capital, its direct and active role in the privatization and liberalization of finance worldwide is undeniable. Through the IMF/ World Bank consensus prescription of “structural adjustment” in the 1980s, Third World countries pursued policies of privatization and liberalization, contracting state services and often deepening existing social inequalities, and yet becoming more crisis-prone.38 The global market truly became interconnected and interdependent in the 1990s. The neoliberal revolution of the 1980s and 1990s finally unleashed the forces that made Wall Street the central location of the world economy. As neoliberal policies pushed for “less government,” with an agile and flexible center surrounded by a thriving private sector, the public sector became thinner all over the globe, though the private sector did not always grow to fill the slack. America and Britain had Reagan and Thatcher at the helm, and for the rest of the world, especially the Third World, the World Bank and the IMF were advocating the same policies. Just as globalization pushes finance and investment to the center of the developed world, cheap labor has been pushing most of the manufacturing and industrial jobs out of the developed centers to the poorest corners of the globe. New technology, which was supposed to create new and advanced opportunities for First World labor, has ended up replacing that very labor. From the 1960s onward, America’s dominance in the world market has consisted in its role as the major world consumer, not the major producer. China and India, with their expanding economy and rising middle-class, have emerged as major consumers, and are often regarded as threats to the US in the fully interconnected global market. The US dominates the global economy because the rules of finance continue to be rooted more in speculation than production and consumption.39 120 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

The most important aspect of the global market that has somewhat redefined American citizenship rights in recent decades is the emergence of NAFTA and the subsequent impact on the economy. Bilateral or mul- tilateral trade treaties are not new, but NAFTA expanded the vista of trade treaties in America by promising to open the border itself. The border between the nation-states of Canada, America, and Mexico has not been obliterated, but it has certainly become much more porous after NAFTA. What is interesting is that the borders of both the northern and southern ends of America are much more permeable when we take account of financial transactions, whether they are in the form of goods or investments. When we focus on the movement of people, especially along the southern border, it is quite a different story. One of the most important consequences of NAFTA is the annihilation of protectionist policies and departure from the principle of state protection for each country’s own industries. Just as the Mexican corn farmer cannot compete with the cheaper subsidized corn from America that has overtaken the Mexican market, American workers also have little recourse when American factories shut down and move to the South to maximize the gains from cheaper labor there. Another aspect that makes it so problematic to decipher the overall impact of NAFTA is its regional variance. Cities that harbored traditional industries have lost most of their sources of employment, while cities along the southern border have literally grown into major urban and business nodes because of the flow of money and business after NAFTA.40 Although NAFTA did revive the urban work sectors in Mexico, it was ultimately responsible for much of the rural job losses. Since the passage of NAFTA in 1994, the number of Mexicans trying to cross the border illegally has grown tremendously.41 We also find that the money, manpower, technology, and political will to defy illegal crossings have erupted at the federal, state, and local government levels. The “open border” and the “border crossing” have become such corrosive terms that the very connotation of the “immigrant” is in danger of becoming a negative idea for the first time in modern American history. Again, the fear and loathing of open borders exists only with respect to people. Nevertheless, the tightening of the border for checking human mobility adversely affects the mobility of finance as well. Farm owners in California have been relocating to Mexico,42 as it is much easier to invest in new land there rather than dealing with the perpetual dearth of farm workers taken away by Immigration and Customs Enforcement THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 121

(ICE). Moreover, because of NAFTA, it is easier to export Mexican- grown food back to the United States. In the prosperous 1990s, immigrants mostly connoted high-value skilled brainworkers in Silicon Valley, but twenty years later, immigrants in the common lexicon represent Mexican border-crossers taking away jobs belonging to American citizens.43 Regardless of the market verdict on the border, the mass definition of the border remains fearful, resentful, and murky. Political leaders follow the mainstream mania, while carefully preserving the openness of the border for business. Whether or not the border is open or closed is not a binary issue anymore. The complexity of changes taking place suggests that borders are present but often permeable; they are disappearing in some aspects of life, while getting more discernible in defining citizenship. The new waves of skilled and unskilled workers in the global markets have transformed the forms and meanings of citizenship. Although citizenship is conveniently thought of as a political right within a sovereign state, globalization has brought to the fore economic calculation as a major element in immigration laws and the migrant’s choice of abode. As Ong trenchantly explains, “international managers and professionals possess the material and symbolic resources to manipulate global schemes of cultural difference, racial hierarchy, and citizenship to their own advantage” and “state regimes are constantly adjusting to the influx of different kinds of immigrants and to ways of engaging global capitalism that will benefit the country while minimizing the costs.” Furthermore, “nation- states constantly refine immigration laws to attract capital-bearing subjects while limiting the entry of unskilled laborers.”44 The current controversy over the half a million dollar “golden visa,” available to rich investors, provides the contrast of keeping the American economy open to the elite and the investors.45 Labor market shifts and changes are associated more with the globalized market rather than as a result of bargaining with trade unions, or demand and supply in the domestic market.46 In general, the pressures in a globalized market restrain economic growth among less-skilled workers at the lowest common denominator, where international competition is fiercest, but reward those with scarcer talents, skills, and training. Education and training play a stronger role in determining access to higher-paid jobs, and eventually long-winded but predictable and stable avenues to citizenship.47 Present-day enthusiasm for international cooperation and open markets represents a pragmatic response of business 122 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION leaders and elected officials to changing opportunities. Rapidly improving technology and communications, as well as dramatic improvements in transportation and shipping, have spanned the continents and integrated markets, shrinking time and space. The Cold War national rivalries have now become transformed into commercial competition,48 though in the era of President Trump it remains to be seen whether or not military contention will erupt once more. The economic core of the empire is an expansive capitalist mode of production, based on the extraction of profits from the accumulation and investment of capital. Global capitalism is still largely distinguished by the hegemony of the US economy, both as a market for goods and as a desti- nation for capital. Roaming the world, US transnational corporations function as agents for capital accumulation and production. Their drive for profit makes capitalism both relentlessly expansive and prone to contradiction and crisis. When the growth of corporate profits started to decline in the United States, capital migrated to the speculative sector, where a period of hyperactive growth in high-technology stocks was carefully nursed by a low-interest-rate policy. As a result, a regressive redistribution of income followed. There are now two layers to the economy: “real capitalism,” which follows the rules of the market, and “virtual capitalism,” which is driven by technology and finance and in which expectations overshadow performance.49 The state is changing its shape in postindustrial societies, but not in the way that critics of globalization had expected. The postindustrial state has not so much reduced its investments in public goods as it has changed, in fundamental ways, the way it provides public goods to its citizens. Some suggest that the emerging role for the state is that of a financier of public goods rather than the direct provider—such as the US government’s role as a regulator of healthcare policy, leaving the bulk of activities to the market, yet setting the guidelines for eligibility. The state is ever-present in new forms. It is changing by balancing the political demands of citizens with the economic policies of neoliberalism. As Cameron and Stein argue, “The state sets the rules of the game, and then allows an ever-increasing number of social actors to join together to reframe the social contract constructed in the twentieth century. Relevant here is the radically different capacity of various social sectors to speak and act within the newly emerging sociopolitical order. The face that the postindustrial state is showing to its citizens is changing, but this transformation in the face of the state cannot be explained only, or even THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 123 largely, by the growth of global markets and global institutions.”50 As nation-states have stepped back from decision-making, the gap has been filled by the market; thus, economic power in the market determines the nature of democracy, as we can see from the role of corporations in US politics.51 Citizenship provisions for minorities in America were deeply impacted by all the domestic and international wars. Minorities in America, even when they were not accepted as citizens socially and legally, were always allowed or even sought after to fight in each and every war that America fought. The American Revolution barred the entry of Native American tribes from citizenship in a wide sweep, making no distinction between tribes who had sided with the British and those who had supported the revolutionaries. African American slaves who fought on behalf of the Union were promised emancipation, and although there may have been individual cases where these promises were honored, as far as the ethnic group was concerned the bloodiest war in US history needed to be waged to free the slaves.52 Minorities who served in the world wars were disheartened, as they were treated worse than enemy prisoners in their own country. But these broken promises do not capture the nuances of the admission of minorities into the compass of citizenship. Each war in American history needed and embraced soldiers of color. Social exposure within the country, and even more so in the wider world, made the boundaries of citizenship a little more porous, even when the process was not strong enough to crack apart the legal barriers at home. Domestically, the stature of the Irish became elevated from lowly whites to “one of the whites” after their participation in the Civil War on behalf of the Union. The civil rights movement was much influenced by the dashed hopes of African American soldiers who served in the segregated army and were sent to the back of the line to claim their rightful benefits in the form of education and housing policies offered to veterans. Japanese Americans’ only means to escape the concentration camps was to join the US army. Filipinos also demanded citizenship based on their war services. The practice of accepting non-citizens as combatants and awarding them with citizenship when (and if) they return from the warfront has been an age-old way of extending citizenship to Mexicans and other Latin Americans. Different wars not only enabled minorities to join the mainstream effort to embellish American hegemony, but these wars also exposed 124 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

American soldiers, minorities and whites alike, to citizenship norms and practices in other parts of the world. Various social rights of citizenship for all Americans often came about as a direct result of war. The pension for Union soldiers and war widows after the Civil War was perhaps the first of these social rights that the state honored. The Social Security Act of 1935 paved the way for more substantive rights like unemployment benefits. The act itself was a response to the economic crisis following the stock market crash, and addressing high unemployment was a major part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. But it was the initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s that enabled a large group of people, especially those belonging to the working class, to take advantage of state-sponsored social protections. The Social Security Act of 1965 transformed the trust fund by adding Medicare and Medicaid and linking it to the “Great Society” program of President Johnson. These programs of Social Security, unemployment benefits, Medicare, and Medicaid, all sought to counter the notion that only communism was a labor paradise. It is not coincidental that throughout the Cold War, such provisions became more and more generous, reaching a peak in the 1970s in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Social rights for American citizens have followed rather a circumventive path through the labor market rather than a direct covenant between the state and its citizens. Key social citizenship protections in America are often not offered directly by the state, but rather through employment. The government has set the rules and the base requirements for such social rights. The welfare program, which shifted authority to state governments from the federal government after the 1996 welfare reform, offers quite diverse provisions for the poor in each of the fifty states. Federal policy stimulated the growth of the employer-based system of health coverage via tax incentives. Pensions, health insurance, childcare, and parental leave are all related to employment and managed by corporations, and therefore differ from corporation to corporation. Even though government regulations are the basis of social coverage, many of these regulations are enforced by private litigation. American social coverage, unlike that of European countries, has remained uniquely private in its origin and execution. The right to social protection is linked to employment rather than citizenship, and the state only plays a weak role in this form of “corporate welfarism.”53 As the transition to the neoliberal economy approaches completion, the budget proposal of 2017, echoing other recent budget proposals, slashes welfare, Medicare, and education funds, THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 125 deeply impacting the working class, while reducing corporate taxes to help the richest segments of society.54 The ideological challenge of equality posed by the socialist model to capitalist countries has been met by some level of accommodation to socialistic provisions while keeping the market structure intact. We can see variants of this accommodation all over Europe. The American model, instead of directly participating in this negotiation, mainly compelled the private sector to take the lead. The government pays indirectly through foregone tax revenue, and benefits are handled through private entities. Childcare, pension, insurance, and health insurance have been financed in large measure by tax incentives that transfer a large proportion of the final cost to the federal government. Even in arenas in which the American state has developed its own social programs—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—public policy creates a two-tiered system in which the employed or formerly employed population enjoys a higher level of benefits. As the private sector has emerged as one of the major players, it has introduced new complexities in the already tiered and complicated system. Federal policy requires employers to extend benefits to all employees; employers have come up with the new category of “non-employees” to avoid tax penalties. This ambiguous tier contains employees who are contract, part-time, and temporary workers, and thus ineligible for benefits. As government regulations allowed more people to be eligible for social benefits, the category of “non-employee” started to bulge, starting from the 1970s onward.55 The immigration legislation of 1965 also marks the growing influence of market ideology and the dominance of the private sector. Immigration in America has also become tied to employment, as opposed to most European countries where individuals can apply to be accepted as residents based on their economic and cultural potential before they land in those countries. Other than family-based immigration, immigrants need to be contributing parts of the American economy before they can peti- tion their employers to apply for labor certification on their behalf. Instead of providing labor with more social rights, the American model has empowered employers and the private sector. Immigration policy is a good example where ideology and the market have clashed. Immigration provisions after 1965, which are discussed in detail in Chap. 5, have been skewed toward high-skilled workers, following the ideological impulse of attracting the best and brainiest people from all over the world. The market, however, demands not only high-skilled workers, but low-skilled 126 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION workers as well. In fact, in the service economy, most of whose jobs can be outsourced, it is the low-skilled service-sector jobs that constantly demand new workers. The number of H-1B visas (reserved for high-skilled employment) has continued to increase despite the tense anti-immigrant tenor, while provisions for the legal entry of low-skilled labor remain inadequate, even before the Trump administration makes further drastic changes; the market demand for low-skilled labor in America would be unmet if not for illegal entries. The American state confronted the threat of socialism not only by incorporating programs to make capitalism more appealing and fair to the common people, but also by curbing the rights of citizens if they preferred the tenets of socialism. The Red Scare reached its infamous height in the 1950s, when McCarthyism landed hundreds of Americans in jail for dis- loyalty or treason charges. Although the first Red Scare originated just prior to America’s entry into the First World War as a response to the rising power of communism, Senator Joseph McCarthy took the second wave to a new level of distrust, conspiracy, and abuse of governmental power. Although the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), brought formal charges against hundreds of people and prosecuted even more people by simply putting their names on a blacklist, few of those charges were fairly adjudicated and proven. The paranoia of worker emancipation had led to the first Red Scare, the fear of communist power led to the second, and the current anti-Arab and anti-immigrant sentiment is similarly fueled by the fear of terrorism. What often remains under the radar in these discourses is how the paranoia toward “others” actually ends up harming American citizens. While the competing ideological position of socialism resulted in more social rights for American citizens, the most recent challenge to the notion of the state in general, and the American state in particular, is impacting American citizenship in a restrictive mode. After the fall of the Soviet Union as the bastion of communism and the adoption of capitalism (though only the market part) by China, the only formative challenge to the model of the Western nation-state has been the rise of twenty-first- century terrorism. Terrorism, not a novel concept, was a mere nuisance from the law and order perspective in the twentieth century, but in the new century it has emerged and is being treated as an ideology that has filled the void of an opposing philosophy to capitalism. The excesses and abuses of the market economy have been fused with perceived cultural THE REALITY: ALLIANCE OF THE STATE, MARKET, AND MILITARY POWER 127 components such as liberty and individualism, and have come to be defined as the “Western way of life,” while ignoring specific policies that are being contested by the terrorists. While nation-states can and do claim a moral position against terrorism, the number of dead civilians caused by terrorist bombings and by unmanned drones to capture those very terrorists compete for the accolade of causing the highest number of casualties. The events of September 11 have certainly been a turning point for American politics, in terms of the relation of the government to its citizens and to the rest of the world. As a response to the attacks, the state emerged with all-powerful tools to capture terrorists, with the effect of squashing many civil liberties. It should be noted that American citizens themselves prioritized safety at all costs, and enabled the state to adopt measures contradicting privacy and liberties. Perhaps the greatest example of the changing state-citizen power balance is the Patriot Act. Passed only forty-five days after the September 11 attacks (yet lengthy enough to be three hundred and forty-two pages), the Act gives the government unmitigated power to define terrorism, use all means (including interception of oral, wire, and electronic communications of all citizens) to detect terrorist intent or connections, merge the issues of domestic and international terrorism, and hold citizens and non-citizens indefinitely without pressing charges. The Patriot Act violates at least six of the ten original amendments known as the Bill of Rights—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments—and possibly the Thirteenth and Fourteenth as well. Although, after the initial paranoia generated by the attacks, the Patriot Act has been duly criticized and some of its tenets have even been challenged in court, almost all of its provisions have been reauthorized in 2015. The global implications of terrorism reach beyond its organizational structure, utilizing borderless techniques and an international scope of operations. Al-Qaeda and its succeeding organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), represent the new terrorism in the age of globalization. Confronting America’s hegemony in the Middle East is daunting, as most of the rulers of the Arab nations have been propped up or at least supported by America. The September 11 attacks were, in a way, a sign that America had lost control over the globalization discourse, as the terrorist attack was, in fact, a triumph of globalization itself. Globalization, coupled with terrorism, has ended up paradoxically reinforcing national identities and loyalties against the new and dangerous “other.” This strengthening of the state as 128 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION a response to a globalized issue is not unique. In previous decades, Washington’s war on drugs had enabled the United States to influence Latin American governments, politics, and economics beyond mere law and order or criminal issues.56 America’s response has been a combination of the old techniques of attacking and occupying foreign countries and new technologies of intelligence and warfare. The new terrorism—or more accurately, the response to the new terrorism—has managed to produce a series of immediate changes in the daily lives of most Americans.57 In the relatively short interlude between the fall of communism and the terrorist attacks, during the prosperous 1990s the major ideological challenge was globalization itself, in terms of diminishing the state’s authority over the citizen. Instead of citizenship and nations as focal points in political discourse, the new notions of human rights and global citizenship were emerging as alternate ways of framing political relationships. It seemed— although in retrospect, only for a brief period—that the state had lost its traditional authoritarian edge and that the power balance between the state and the citizen had altered considerably. If the state had lost some of its power, the vacuum had been filled by multinational corporations, not citizens. Globalization and deterritorialization, which were originally perceived as threats to state power, have ended up making both the state and the corporations more powerful by stripping power from the individual. Late capitalism in its global form weakened state power with respect to corporate power, but strengthened state power in relation to citizens, armed as it was with new technological know-how. Most importantly, terrorism has elevated the status of the state as the moral savior of civilians from unpredictable and irrational casualties. State power, however, is equipped and is enthusiastic enough to cause as many or more civilian casualties while going after terrorists, though those casualties have by now become accepted as collateral damage. One of the most important parts of the self-identity of Americans was that American citizenship entailed all the rights and privileges anyone could aspire for. This belief follows from American exceptionalism and trust in the American democratic apparatus. During any global encounter, this belief in superiority, tinged by racism but more ideological in nature, always spurred on the foot soldiers and justified any and every act of aggression. But this ideology did not go unchallenged. The communist model emerging after the Second World War was perceived as the Red Menace, but increased labor rights in the socialist system did give reason for pause. Although America did not follow the path of the social democ- THE PARADOX: THE COSMOPOLITAN VERSUS THE PATRIOT 129 racies prevalent in Europe, its capitalism did incorporate a number of social rights to elevate the capitalist model among its laboring class. Although domestic discrimination triggered minority outbursts, often exposure to the rest of the world strengthened the rationale for minorities’ political rights and paved the way for more inclusive citizenship. In a twist of irony, the most recent ideological blow to American citizenship has come via terrorism, as the state response to curtail and apprehend terrorists ineluctably keeps on shrinking the rights of American citizens and redefines the obligations of the state.

The Paradox: The Cosmopolitan Versus the Patriot Citizenship has definitely been impacted by globalization, not only in terms of redefinition of rights and privileges, but also in terms of allowing new entrants into the sweep of American citizenship. Globalization, in a perverse way, has altered the contract between the state and the citizen by allowing new categories of people to join the state without the status of citizenship. Global capitalism, even in its late phase, did not make the state wither away, but certainly changed our sensibility toward citizenship. In an interconnected world of overlapping economies and interpenetrating cultures, the very meaning of national belongingness has acquired a new significance. It redefines the notion of political community, as economic interdependence allows for policy impact across political borders. Cultural ties actually lead to the new identity of cosmopolitan citizenship. Global connections often replace national identity by fusing individuals across all sorts of boundaries.58 In place of national identities and forms of citizenship, postnationalists foresee a rise in transnational identities and citizenship practices that transcend the boundaries of national political communities. Postnationalists locate moral obligation and primary allegiance toward individual human beings in the universal community of humanity. The new identities that rest on globalization are varied and more suitable to the sensibilities of the twenty-first century where the definition of “us” goes beyond regional commonalities. The challenge comes from the alternate vision of radical democracy or cosmopolitanism,59 which rejects the definition of citizenship as the property of either the state or the nation, and as such offers a postnational concept of citizenship.60 As the nation-state loses much of its previously unchallenged sovereignty, nationalism appears to be on the ascendancy. The new nationalism contains a 130 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION paradox, whereby the power of the state has weakened yet the influence of nationalism has grown. This new form of nationalism is a product of the internal crisis of the state in the age of globalization as well as a result of the postmodern search for community and identity. Human rights appear in a new normative framework and a new transnational discourse and structure that not only celebrate, but also actively promote, human rights as a world-level organizing principle. Personal rights, through the universal extension of human rights, can become available to individuals who fall outside the status of national citizenship.61 International civil society is interested in challenging the labor policies of multinational corporations, local customs like female circumcision, state practices like torture, and even the exclusive control of nations over immigration policy. As much as the transnational flow of capital, the new human rights politics are part of what has come to be called “globalization.”62 So far, it is probably the cosmopolitan elite who are able to transfer citizenship privileges to different locales, but for the vast majority of people, especially migrant workers, the ones who are actually stateless, the reality is very different. The influx of such immigrants in the Western hemisphere is a product of globalization, and has often met with growing anti-immigrant sentiment and a revival of racial politics, especially when competition for jobs in a depressed economy becomes steep, and social provisions like welfare become more precarious as more people try to access services. Often cut- backs in the welfare state are justified as a response to keep out newcomers or latecomers from these citizenship privileges. Permanent residents in the United States, even if they have been in the country for a long time and are contributing to the economy (the US path to citizenship is quite long and tortuous), are not eligible for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, unless they become citizens, as established by the welfare reform law of 1996. While the increasing integration of the US economy into the global economy is blamed for the loss of manufacturing plants and therefore jobs, the dominance of US agricultural products in the world market, which is also possible because of market integration, is left out of the mainstream discourse of globalization. The social consequences of globalization have an even greater impact on citizens than its economic effects. Postnationalism claims that globalization is calling into question political identities and soli- darities that are based on territory, as common interests can overlap across national boundaries. Citizenship has been subject to national THE PARADOX: THE COSMOPOLITAN VERSUS THE PATRIOT 131 law while the domain of human rights has been in international law, but integrated and overlapping global reality has severely undermined the autonomy of the two distinct spheres.63 Ong argues that “In the era of globalization, individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion of citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power. ‘Flexible citizenship’ refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions.”64 At the same time, it seems highly unlikely that in the neoliberal economy migrant workers would be able to be covered by the notion of flexible citizenship. However, for high-skilled migrants, even though their rights and privileges have been curtailed, the notion that they can arrive from any part of the world and seamlessly fit into the economy, taking jobs away from natives, has fueled the opposite way of understanding citizenship: a deeply nativist, race-oriented, and anti-immigrant identity, one that is often associated with the notion of patriotism. Anti-immigrant discourse is not new to America, but in the era of globalization this discourse has flourished with the charge that new immigrants do not want to assimilate. In the past, the characterization of unassimilability was premised on cultural and racial grounds. Although cultural and racial grounds still dominate, the additional fear today is that the new immigrants have created an alternative experience and paradigm in the United States to that of assimilation, namely a form of belonging and community that accepts multiple national affiliations as normal.65 In America, the rise of cosmopolitan identity is being countered by a new patriotic Americanism. Based on the right-wing manipulation of fear, along with global awareness there has been a resurgence of small-town consciousness as the “real” American consciousness; patriotism is often defined as the staple for this rooted, real people. The 2008 presidential election seemed at the time an exemplary stage for such paranoia and patriotism. The manifestation of Joe the Plumber,66 the Minutemen67 on the border, and finally Sarah Palin as the savior of small-town, rural, mainly white America, spoke volumes to this trend. But the deification of small- town white America was extended manifold in Donald J. Trump’s election campaign. The cultural legacy of globalization may be cosmopolitan in character and quite benign in its universalization in fashion and pop culture, but there is little doubt that the economic legacy is something quite different.68 132 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

The new American patriot was born in the economic insecurities resulting from recession, unemployment, decreasing social rights, and, of course, the perception of unfair competition on a global level and with non-citizens within America. The ascendency of Trump to the American presidency is the perfect embodiment of a backlash, the culmination of the economic frustrations and cultural insecurities of a large number of voters who feel left behind in the neoliberal economy; they have successfully exercised their only remaining power of citizenship, deploying their suffrage right to redefine the obligations of the state and its relationship to its true citizens. Although the 2016 campaign was filled with promises to revive the old economy (such as coal mining) and literally shut America from outsiders (with the construction of an impenetrable wall between the United States and Mexico)—and also, interestingly, to take away some of the citizenship rights like healthcare—in terms of enacting real policies, the new administration is facing a series of predictable obstacles. As Cohen states, in the era of globalization, “the world is [not only] being organized vertically by nation-states and regions, but horizontally by an overlapping, permeable, multiple system of interactions. This system creates communities not of place but of interest, based on shared opinions and beliefs, tastes, ethnicities,...religions,...cuisine, the consumption of medicines,... lifestyles, fashion, music, etc.”69 Multiple cultures are being synchronized in a complex way, with particular elements from different cultures mixing and matching differently in each setting. The new immigrants, the high-skilled legal ones, are often transnationalists, who cannot be exclusively defined by a single national identity. Aided by technology— the ease of travel and communications through cheap phone calls, the internet, and social media—they are able to maintain connections with their home countries, which may lessen the need for exclusive national identity. They bring a type of diversity that is often perceived as threatening the assimilation paradigm, and therefore national unity.70 The parameters of citizenship have rapidly evolved in the era of globalization. The new immigrants of today often maintain affiliations with their sending countries, creating transnational social, political, and business networks. They do not always follow the traditional paradigm of assimilation into the American mainstream and exclusive national affiliation. The most undeniable indicators of the changes to what citizenship means today are the permanent populations of undocumented immigrants residing in Western industrial nations. It is estimated that ten to twelve million undocumented immigrants reside in America, many of them working in THE PARADOX: THE COSMOPOLITAN VERSUS THE PATRIOT 133 physically intensive low-wage jobs that American citizens are unwilling to accept. It is understood among economists and immigration scholars that undocumented workers are a reality of the global economy that is not going away. Permanent undocumented immigrants are part of the broader evolution of citizenship that challenges traditional distinctions between the “alien” and the “citizen.”71 The construction of cosmopolitans versus patriots is not without complications and ironies. As the categories of “Mexican” and “illegal immigrant” have blended in the public consciousness, there has emerged a new politicized identity slot for Mexicans, where they are trying to marry their Mexican heritage with American culture and reclaim their place in it. The marchers in support of a fair and just immigration reform in 2006 and 2007 adopted political slogans in Spanish, carried Spanish-language protest signs, displayed Mexican flags, and sang a mariachi-style version of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” The undocumented workers or illegal immigrants were negotiating to become American citizens, but their claim on American cultural space was through Mexican cultural elements. Unlike the waves of previous immigrants from Europe and Asia, significant numbers of Hispanics in the United States have demanded equal language rights while carving out a political space for themselves.72 American citizenship has gone through serious transformation with global engagement, whether it has been trade or war. Although America’s global adventures started in territorial acquisition, soon the selected path to exercise hegemony was through trade and diplomacy, not direct warfare. Wars, domestic and international, opened avenues for minorities— first as soldiers, then forming the basis for demanding more political rights, and eventually citizenship. America’s dominance in the world market, especially after the Second World War, solidified its political dominance as well. What has impacted American citizenship most throughout its relation to the rest of the world are the ideological alternatives to the American citizenship model. American citizens’ social rights of welfare, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid may have been mainly the result of the impulses of the New Deal era, but those rights were also perceived and presented as better alternatives to the socialist model. The Red Scare jeop- ardized civic liberties, and the drama of the 1950s has now re-emerged into full-blown and spectacular form with the aid of new technologies. Globalization has created a new consciousness of the global cosmopolitan citizen, yet it encourages another newly minted patriotic model, which thrives on fear and insecurity. 134 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

Global integration is not a new phenomenon, but it is differentiated from its historic predecessors by the great complexity, speed, and intensity of cross-border transactions that challenge the traditional dominance of the state and the principle of self-determination. Globalization is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, comprising elements as dispa- rate as international trade and capital flows, internationalization of marketing and purchasing, increases in electronic communication and information transfer across borders, linguistic and cultural interpenetra- tion, global environmental degradation that has no regard for state boundaries, the flow of populations (tourists, immigrants, refugees, labor migrants, and various categories of stateless people), and the threats posed by international crime and terrorism. Globalization also entails growth in the number and influence of non-state actors and forms of private authority that at times cooperate with and at other times conflict with state actors. Examples include large transnational corporations, currency traders, international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations, and international non-governmental organizations and social movements.73 As Cameron and Stein have aptly pointed out, “The nation-state remains an indispensable institution, under virtually all foreseeable contingencies. It is still the primary provider of social justice, and uniquely accountable to its citizens for their governance. The state will not continue to function, however, with its established roles and responsibilities unchanged from the last half century. The state faces new and powerful challenges to its core mandates.... The state has the capacity and the opportunity to make important strategic choices about what kinds of economic, social, and cultural investments it will make. These challenges will differ, depending in part on the pace and intensity of globalization, in part on the specific impact of globalization on a particular state and particular sectors, in part on the institutional capacity of the state, and, in part, on the quality of political leadership and the resilience and vibrancy of society.”74 Nationalism cannot be contained within the categories of political community which equate the nation with the state, for the state is not the only way to define national community. What is, in fact, occurring is the release of the nation from the state. The nation has become a free-floating signi- fier, which can be used by many social actors; it is no longer dominated by the state. It is the release of the nation code from the state that has multiplied the discourses of nationalism in recent years. The main difference between the new and old nationalism is that today nationalism has become a nationalism of exclusion. The old nationalism was based on an ideology THE PARADOX: THE COSMOPOLITAN VERSUS THE PATRIOT 135 of inclusion and was part of nation-building. The core components of language, religion, territory, and ethnicity were rooted in homogeneous cultures and uniform educational systems.75 Does globalization really threaten state sovereignty? The reduced political salience of territorially concentrated national identities and forms of citizenship is gradually supplanted by new forms of identification and political solidarity that transcend the borders of both nations and states. But is it only a form of cultural postnationalism? Or is social and political mobilization increasingly taking place outside the boundaries of nation- states and national political communities? If territories and nationalities play a less important role in the determination of political identities, will there be a gradual erosion of national communities? Nationalism today no longer appeals to this ideology but to identity, and with the gradual freeing of the state from some of its traditional functions, social identities as well as particular national cultures can assert themselves in a variety of ways. The rise of nationalism can thus be seen in the context of the new processes of globalization, which have uprooted the state and set off a whole series of identity politics.76

The Paradox Continues…

Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The Expendable People

After taking office in 2017, one of the first initiatives in the form of an executive order signed by the forty-fifth President, Donald J. Trump, has been regarding refugees, banning any asylum seekers from seven predominantly Muslim countries and labeling the order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” While this policy accentuates candidate Trump’s campaign promise of banning all Muslims from coming to the United States, which had overwhelming support from his supporters, the executive order has been challenged in the courts for violating the establishment clause, and even a later weakened version has failed to convince the judiciary of its constitutional backing. As of now, this has not emerged as a policy, but the attempt signifies an interesting change in the American mind regarding the construction of asylum seekers and refugees, a group that enjoyed empathy and benign support but has now been recategorized as probable terrorists and lurking national threats. 136 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

The policy of allowing asylum seekers and refugees on American soil is rooted in imperial enterprise. Often when Americans left a conquered territory (like the Philippines), the native supporters who feared repercussions from their countrymen made an appeal to seek refuge in America. It was only after the Second World War that the United States, along with many of its European allies, ratified international and domestic laws that accepted the right of people to peti- tion for asylum when they had credible fear of prosecution because of their race, religion, national origin, social group, or politics, and came up with a process of granting them legal status. Generally, there has been insignificant political controversy about the transition of asylum seekers to citizens. The desirability or undesirability of refugees in American history has had a strong connection with their race, but in the 1980s the national origin of asylum seekers emerged at the forefront of the debate. Reversing a more or less inclusive policy for refugees, the Reagan administration denied ninety-seven percent of Salvadoran and ninety-nine percent of Guatemalan asylum applications. The people fleeing the civil wars from those countries were being massacred by US-backed dictators. Often they were denied refugee status, as the official position denied the existence of any bloodbath in those countries. Only as a response to a class-action lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) did the United States agree to grant hearings to two hundred and forty thousand asylum cases. Asylum seekers from Nicaragua and Cuba received preferential treatment; Haitian refugees, in contrast, received discriminatory treatment.77 If the Cold War and its associated proxy wars politicized the construction of the category of refugees and asylum seekers, in the 1990s the neoliberal economy added yet another aspect which changed the perception of refugees in American politics. Major domestic and immigration policies in the 1990s curtailed the rights of immigrants, non-immigrants, and even citizens, and one of the fundamental rationales to justify such policies was the perceived economic contributions of different groups of people in America. Just as the poor and minorities were categorized as criminals and domestic burdens, immigrants and refugees were categorized as unknown threats and economic burdens. One of the most prominent policies THE PARADOX: THE COSMOPOLITAN VERSUS THE PATRIOT 137 of the 1990s was welfare reform, which was a response to the challenges of immigration (specifically, low-skilled immigration), neoliberalism, and globalization. Access to healthcare, education, and social services in general has been fundamentally impacted by welfare reform for all people, citizens and non-citizens alike. There have been fundamental changes in our criminal justice system to accommodate the new category of criminals, those who are not only non-citizens but anti-citizens. Undocumented immigrants are now referred to as lawbreakers and criminals who made a conscious decision to disregard US laws. Violating immigration laws has become tantamount to joining gangs, committing violent crimes, and being national security threats.78 Included in the same category are often people who are seeking asylum or waiting for the asylum process to be completed. Another law passed in 1996 (the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, or IIRIRA) allows for “expedited removal,” meaning that essentially anyone without proper documentation can be handcuffed, interrogated, and deported without facing a judge. An immigration inspector now has more discretionary power than a judge. The 1996 law also requires those who pass the credible fear of persecution test to be placed in detention while their application for asylum moves to the next stage for review.79 Detainees are now subject to longer periods of confinement, and the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) does not treat asylum seekers any differently than others who may be in jail for criminal activities. The USCIS does not even keep separate statistics for refugees and asylum seekers. The average stay in such prisons is fourteen to sixteen months, often extending to three to four years. Because of the overflow of detainees, county jails and private prisons are commonly being utilized.80 Now that the federal government has revoked the Obama administration policy of not using private prisons for federal prisoners, this number can only grow upward.81 The transition to the neoliberal economy has been made complete by putting away the expendable population in prison, for profit to boot. The latest travel ban may have been overturned because it overtly targeted Muslims and was too broad, and thereby created havoc for people working for the United States in allied countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, but the perception and status of asylum 138 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

seekers and refugees in American politics has already changed pro- foundly. Even when they enjoy spontaneous support from citizens taking to the streets against the travel ban, the category they inhabit is tantamount to being criminals, and the onus of proof that they are worthy of empathy and eligible to enter the United States has been shifted squarely to their shoulders.

Notes 1. The notion of American exceptionalism can be traced to French political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville, the first writer to describe the country as “exceptional” in 1831 and 1840. The idea that the United States is inherently different from other nations is also rooted in the American Revolution, as it claimed to create “the first new nation” based on liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, republicanism, democracy, and laissez-faire economics. Along with this belief in uniqueness and superiority, there is a corresponding belief about having a unique mission to transform the world. 2. David Ryan, U.S. Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 26–27. 3. Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2. 4. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 64. 5. Eric Rauchway, Blessed Among Nations: How the World Made America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006), 19. 6. Peter Taylor-Gooby, Reframing Social Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20. 7. The Monroe Doctrine, from 1823 onward, was used to exert US influence in the New World, also comprising Latin America, where new European colonies were not welcome. It was in the 1930s that this principle was reinterpreted and largely accepted as a proclamation of non-intervention and multilateralism. 8. David Ryan, U.S. Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 40–55. 9. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15–17. 10. Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 114–115. NOTES 139

11. Ronald W. Cox and Daniel Skidmore-Hess, U.S. Politics and the Global Economy: Corporate Power, Conservative Shift (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 21. 12. Ibid., 21–24. 13. Ibid., 59. 14. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 276–9. 15. Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 49–52. 16. David Ryan, U.S. Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 9–12. 17. Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 84. 18. See Hixson for an interesting description of the merging of economic interests and American empire. The global ambition can be detected in Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show which traveled the world, the pictures of the most exotic places of the world becoming accessible to the middle class via the iconic National Geographic magazine, the accelerated expansion of missionary work to Asia and Africa, and the capture of the world market by US multinational firms—railroads, oil, electrical, steel, and car companies. Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 14. 19. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 48–9. 20. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 80–1. 21. Ibid., 75–81. 22. The draft lottery system was introduced in 1969 to randomly select men (born between 1944 and 1950) for military duty through an executive order issued by President Nixon. Previously, the method of conscription had been used in the American Civil War, the two world wars, and the Korean War. The draft evoked massive resistance during the Vietnam War, with protests con- sisting of draft-card burning and flight to Canada. After a prolonged battle in the Senate, a draft renewal bill was approved in 1971, but by early 1973 the government proclaimed that no further draft orders would be issued. 23. Nicholas Guyatt, Another American Century?: The United States and the World Since 9/11 (London: Zed Books, 2003), xii–xvi. 24. Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 26. 25. Salvador Allende, the first Marxist president of Chile from 1970 until 1973, was overthrown by a military takeover before he could complete a 140 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

full term in office. The United States opposed Allende before and after his election by organizing anti-Allende propaganda, financing opposition candidates, reducing economic aid, and finally by orchestrating the military coup. The US government never formally acknowledged its role in the coup, though then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger agreed that the United States had created conditions in which the coup could take place. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Salvador_Allende. 26. The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 involved overthrowing Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was supported by the United States, and, in fact, came to power because of a US-orchestrated coup that ousted the demo- cratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, because his policy of nationalization of the Iranian oil industry was against American and British interests. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Mosaddegh. 27. During the Guatemalan Revolution in 1952, the Agrarian Reform Law, or Decree 900, was passed to redistribute unused small pots of lands to indigenous peasants. Along with major landowners, the United Fruit Company (a US-owned company), and ultimately the United States, felt threatened with this communist policy and instigated the 1954 military coup which deposed President Arbenz and resulted in decades of civil war. https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decree_900. 28. David Ryan, U.S. Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 3–4. 29. Ibid., 53. 30. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican War (1846–1848) by laying down the limits and boundaries of settlement between the United States of America and the Mexican Republic. It gave the United States the Rio Grande as a boundary for Texas, and gave the United States ownership of California and a large area comprising roughly half of New Mexico, most of Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. Mexicans in those annexed areas had the choice of relocating to within Mexico’s new boundaries or receiving American citizenship with full civil rights. Over ninety percent chose to become US citizens. The treaty called for the United States to pay fifteen million dollars to Mexico and to pay off the claims of American citizens against Mexico up to three and a quarter million dollars. https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Guadalupe_Hidalgo. 31. David Ryan, U.S. Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 114–5. 32. Any controversial policies—such as closing the Guantánamo prison, extraordinary rendition, torture, privacy rights, and civil liberties—are all lumped together with war to justify them; as a result, questioning these policies can easily be framed as being unpatriotic or being disloyal to American values, to the extent of aiding and abetting the enemy. American NOTES 141

opposition to foreign policy, especially war, typically gains momentum only after the death of American soldiers becomes substantial in number. 33. Classical liberalism, with individualism and civil liberty at its core, incorporated the values of equality and social justice in the New Deal era. The progressive form of liberalism thus became dependent on the nexus of state power. Liberalism, especially from the 1960s onward, far from being a doctrine that was anti-state in essence, became the central justification for strengthening the state. The concept of civil society became neglected, and instead found a skewed place in the ideology of communitarianism. Once the state became the pivotal focal point in political ideology, citizenship became intricately tied with the legal definition provided only by the state. 34. “The Gilded Age,” which lasted from the 1870s till the end of the century, is known for simultaneous rapid economic growth due to industrialization and abject poverty and inequality, especially among new immigrants to America. A precursor to the Progressive Era, this period is associated with corruption, prohibition, urbanization, and the failures of Reconstruction in the South. The term is borrowed from Mark Twain’s 1873 novel, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today, which satirizes an era of serious social problems. http://en.wikipedia.og/wiki/Gilded_Age. 35. For a detailed analysis of the social and cultural changes, see Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 65–7. 36. Peter Marden, The Decline of Politics: Governance, Globalization, and the Public Sphere (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), xi–xiii. 37. The Marshall Plan was an American initiative to aid Western Europe, in which the United States gave over thirteen billion dollars in economic support to help rebuild Western European economies after the end of the Second World War. The plan was in operation for four years beginning April 8, 1948. The goals of the United States were to rebuild war-devas- tated regions, remove trade barriers, modernize industry, make Europe prosperous once more, and prevent the spread of communism. https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan. 38. Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings, eds., American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 18–39. 39. Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 102. 40. I lived as a graduate student in Cleveland, one of the cities that paid the steepest price for the open border initiative in terms of lost employment, eroding manufacturing base, and migrating citizens. The campus where I teach now is in Laredo, one of the places that became a significant city overnight because of NAFTA. Most of Laredo’s private investments are flowing from cities like Monterrey in Mexico. The differences in the connotations of NAFTA in these two places are astounding. 142 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

41. The number of attempted illegal crossings has also decreased dramatically following the more recent economic collapse in America. See Peter Andreas, “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post- NAFTA Era,” Political Science Quarterly, 113, no. 4 (Winter 1998–1999): 591–615. 42. As reported in the New York Times by Julia Preston, “Short on Labor, Farmers in U.S. Shift to Mexico,” on September 5, 2007. http://www. nytimes.com/2007/09/05/us/05export.html?_r=1. 43. Arizona has passed a series of anti-immigrant policies starting in 2010, and though challenged in the Supreme Court, one of the most controversial provisions, that of checking the immigration status of anyone who can reasonably be suspected by local police, has passed Supreme Court muster. Arizona was followed by other states, particularly Alabama and Georgia, in attempting similar legislation. 44. Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 112. 45. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/8/15578060/ eb-5-kushner-trump-china. 46. Organized labor has a history of being condemned in the American mind, and labor resistance has often been labeled communistic or anarchistic and a threat to patriotic unity; the collective power of trade unions has diminished considerably in the neoliberal economy. 47. Peter Taylor-Gooby, Reframing Social Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26. 48. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 280. 49. Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 86–9. 50. David Cameron and Janice Gross Stein, “Globalization, Culture, and Society: The State as Place Amidst Shifting Spaces,” Canadian Public Policy, 26, no. 2 (August 2000): 9–10. 51. Craig N. Murphy, “Political Consequences of the New Inequality,” International Studies Quarterly, 45, no. 3 (September 2001): 350. 52. York, the African American slave of Clark, who was part of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, was the only one not to receive any accolades for his contribution to the westward expedition. He had to wait thirteen years after the expedition to get his freedom. 53. Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 51–2. 54. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-budget- proposal-slashes-spending-by-36-trillion-over-10-years/2017/05/22/69 dbdb5e-3f1c-11e7-adba-394ee67a7582_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top- NOTES 143

table-main_budget-935pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_ term=.4e0979801392. 55. Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 71–72. 56. The United States has meddled in various Latin American countries’ domestic politics (Columbia, Mexico) and uses its apparatus of international organizations, trade treaties, and even non-governmental organizations to carry out its interests. See James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century (London: Zed Books, 2001), 142. 57. Clayton D. Brown, Globalization and America Since 1945 (Wilmington: SR Books, 2003), 128–30. 58. Sofia Näsström, “What Globalization Overshadows,”Political Theory, 31, no. 6 (December 2003): 826. 59. The simplest definition of cosmopolitanism is the idea that human beings all belong to a single community, but the common connotation of cosmopolitanism is the existence of various ethnic, cultural, and/or religious backgrounds in a locality and the inhabitants’ comfort and appreciation of interaction with each other. 60. Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 51. 61. Human rights are based on an ethical and legal concept of the individual; citizenship rights are based on a political and legal understanding of the individual. They share a legal conception of the individual, but differ with respect to their universality. Human rights are basic ethical rights that all individuals enjoy by virtue of their common humanity, whereas citizenship rights are specific to a particular political community. 62. Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 3 (December 1999): 1231–2. 63. Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 69–70. 64. Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 6. 65. Ibid., 2–3. 66. Joe the Plumber manifested during 2008 political campaign when a small business owner from Ohio, Joseph Wurzelbacher, asked then candiadate Barrack Obama a question regarding his tax policy. Senator John McCain dubbed him as “Joe the Plumber,” and he was mentioned numerous times to make the point that Obama was out of touch with average Americans. Eventually it was discovered that Joe was not a plumber, yet he became an important symbol for the McCain campaign and even campaigned with him. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_the_Plumber. 144 4 WORLD RELATIONS: HEGEMONY VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

67. The Minutemen monitor the US/Mexico border to curtail illegal arrivals and assume extrajudicial power as citizens. The name derives from the Minutemen who fought in the American Revolution. As an activist organization, they have volunteers who guard the southern border as well as lobby for stricter immigration regulation and enforcement. http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Minuteman_Project. 68. Peter Marden, The Decline of Politics: Governance, Globalization, and the Public Sphere (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 21. 69. Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers,” International Affairs, 72, no. 3 (July 1996): 517–18. 70. Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 2–3. 71. Michael Chang, Racial Politics in an Era of Transnational Citizenship (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 100. 72. Ibid., 552–5. 73. Siobhan Harty and Michael Murphy, In Defense of Multinational Citizenship (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005), 139. 74. David Cameron and Janice Gross Stein, “Globalization, Culture, and Society: The State as Place Amidst Shifting Spaces,” Canadian Public Policy, 26, no. 2 (August 2000): S20. 75. Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 95–8. 76. Ibid., 95–8. 77. Michael Welch, Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 85. 78. Christina Gerken, Model Immigrants and Undesirable Aliens: The Cost of Immigration Reform in the 1990s (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 43. 79. Michael Welch, Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 86–87. 80. It is estimated that the USCIS holds more than twenty thousand detainees—”criminal aliens,” asylum seekers, and refugees—in a vast network of about eighteen detention centers and nine hundred county jails. For a detailed discussion, see Michael Welch, Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 90–108. 81. http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/320915-trump-admin- rescinds-plan-to-reduce-private-prisons. CHAPTER 5

Immigration: Becoming “Us” Versus Remaining “Them”

Immigration has not been merely a path to citizenship for a settler nation, it has always been the path to citizenship for a huge portion of those who belonged to the American nation. The definition of “us” and “them,” perhaps because of this history, has always remained utterly significant as a marker of national identity. The first generation of settlers quite easily categorized the native inhabitants as the “other” and consequently barred Native Americans from joining the ranks of citizenship. With each new wave of arrivals, however, the need to distinguish between “us” and “them” increased, and the trend in the thirteen colonies was to deal with the issue in a more sociocultural manner than a legalistic one. It is also important to note that until the twentieth century, it was naturalization, not immigration, which dominated the fierce political debate.1 The presence of African American slaves (not exactly immigrants) reinforced the need for a more distinct and clear boundary along the “us” and “them” divide. “Race” was the obvious choice to categorize people and keep the undesirable groups out of citizenship privileges, though their labor and their participation in various wars were always in demand. Since the connotation of race often depended on social perception, acceptance in mainstream culture generally preceded legal inclusion. Wars, for minorities in America, often served as the path to social acceptance and legal citizenship. It is fascinating to explore the processes through which different racial and ethnic groups became accepted in American society.

Not all racial and ethnic groups, however, were lucky enough to experience their acceptance as a function of changing dynamics in domestic politics, the passage of time, or the increase of tolerance in American society. The bloodiest war in American history, namely the Civil War, could not guarantee the full inclusion of African Americans. Most of their struggle of becoming full American citizens was fought and won through the judicial system. Meanwhile, as the country grew in the extent of territory where non-white people resided, “race” became a contentious guard post to keep out the undesirables. The Hispanics residing in the West and the Southwest that belonged to Mexico were conquered by the United States and became part of the United States as legal citizens, but often their legal rights were relegated in favor of social prejudice, the kind of prejudice still prevalent in contemporary times. “Race” and its selective definitions served to keep out many minority groups such as the Chinese, Arabs, and Indians from naturalizing, though not necessarily from immigrating to America. The conflicting needs of acquiring new labor versus retaining American identity from the intrusion of others was preserved through a paradox, by allowing immigration but restricting naturalization. As long as race worked as the logic of exclusion, the process of naturalization safeguarded the American identity of white Protestant Anglo-Saxons, while immigration responded to market demand and allowed labor from all the lowly races to American shores. Not only did immigration legislation shift back and forth between the principles of community-building and labor demand, but the limiting role of naturalization policies made certain that entrants to American territory would be denied citizenship privileges for all their lives, the lives they spent working in America. The lack of any coherent ideological criteria for admission, legitimation, and exclusion of immigrants to this country reiterates the paradox of allowing yet not accepting others into the citizenship arena.2 Even after the 1965 immigration laws, which formally ended racial biases in immigration and naturalization, ambiguity and selective interpretation for different groups of immigrants remain part of US immigration policies. The methods of inclusion into mainstream society have always been far more ambiguous and unpredictable for various immigrant groups compared to the clear hostility of exclusionary measures. The age-old rites of passage for minorities involved their long-term presence, some articulation of their loyalty (often participation in wars), their indispensability to the economy through hard work, and perceived attempts to integrate into 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” 147 society. Prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and quotas based on national origin enacted in 1921, the modes of social integration would slowly change perceptions about an immigrant community and relabel them white to be able to naturalize. Almost all Eastern European immigrant groups went through the process of rejection, seclusion, and eventual acceptance. The presence of the Hispanic population in America at a time when no non-whites were eligible to naturalize seriously challenged the “race” criterion for eligibility to citizenship. Until the early twentieth century, Hispanics were trying to shed their mixed-race status by persuading the government to categorize them as white.3 While race has colored the rules of exclusion from American citizenship, inclusion into mainstream society has occurred through legal avenues to naturalization, which usually follow social acceptance of a particular group. The legal definition of citizenship superseded the sociocultural perception only after the federal government had replaced the state governments’ authority in naturalization and immigration, which occurred during the course of rising federal power in the aftermath of the Civil War. In antebellum America, states had rights over naturalization provisions in their respective jurisdictions. After a hundred and fifty years of uncon- tested federal authority over immigration laws, in recent times numerous states and localities are starting to respond to their own realities of the legal and illegal presence of immigrants. Defying federal authority comes in many shapes today, ranging from local acceptance of the Mexican Consular ID card to allowing driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants, and everything in between. The state of Arizona took the lead in passing a law enabling local police officers to check the immigration status of anyone who “can be reasonably suspected.”4 Now in the Trump Presidency, conflicts are brewing over sanctuary cities, namely cities that refuse to use local law enforcement officers for deportation or any other federal purpose, and instead offer safe haven to their undocumented residents. The most recent example occurred in the state of Texas where the legislature passed SB4 to undermine Austin’s declaration of itself as a sanctuary city.5 The influence of the market in shaping American immigration has been one of the consistent factors throughout history. African American slaves met the need for cheap labor in the agricultural fields, but the shift to manufacturing in the early industrial era required skilled labor in the factories. Much later, the growth of science and technology in the 1960s prompted an open immigration policy that attracted the best minds from 148 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” around the world.6 Immigration policy inscribed “economic productivity” or “employability” as the major criteria for eligibility for naturalization after 1965. It is significant that even with degree holders at the highest levels, it is not the individual but rather the employer who petitions for an immigrant, arguing for his/her contribution to the American economy. Alongside the economic criterion, marriage, family reunification, and asylum and refugee status allow new immigrants every year. Instead of having an open debate about the provisions that allow new entrants without having to prove their economic mettle, immigration policies have adopted long delays and rigid interpretations of eligibility to control or slow down the number of immigrants through marriage, family reunification, and refugee and asylum provisions.7 The existing maze of immigration policies, along with their flawed implementation, has been further complicated by the insertion of issues such as terrorism and border security into the mix. What poses a challenge is that it is now politically incorrect to accede to certain racial and ethnic biases, so immigration discourse is often contested over symbolic issues rather than clear articulation of underlying problems.

The Rhetoric: Rules of Inclusion and Exclusion The immigrant nation selected naturalization as the path to becoming an insider and crafted intricate policies regarding eligibility to naturalize. Immigration policies mostly reacted to market demand and were adjusted depending on labor needs. Historically, not all immigrants had the right to naturalize, and it was only in 1965 that the two sets of provisions meaningfully merged. By differentiating sharply between immigration and naturalization, by keeping the two separate, the American nation pursued fulfilling its economic need for more workers while retaining its social demand to not include all foreigners, especially those who belonged to the lower races, into the citizenship fold. As long as it was possible to explicitly disqualify certain groups of people from ever becoming citizens, immigration remained somewhat open, while naturalization was severely restricted and politically contested.8 Since the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act, both immigration and naturalization have been controlled through administrative road- blocks rather than unambiguously explicit policies. The rules of exclusion have generally been written in legalistic terms, but the rules of inclusion into American mainstream society have always been socially defined. The conflicting values underwriting American rigid race-based provisions of THE RHETORIC: RULES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 149 naturalization versus open immigration policies somewhat veiled racial prejudices and, most importantly, the link or the lack thereof between immigration and citizenship. The first set of bars against immigrants appeared in 1864 against “convicts,” “paupers,” and “persons with contagious diseases”—people who might become public charges. The focus on immigration was contained in the desire to meet the economic demands of labor and growth, peppered with anxieties about the cultural contamination from lesser races and the influence of such races on the overall society. “Immigration” in post- Revolutionary America was essentially a state issue related to labor demand. As demand for labor was being met by slave labor, the presence of other indentured laborers and especially “free blacks” became problematic. In the pre–Civil War era, South Carolina required sailors of African descent to remain in jail until their ship disembarked.9 Indentured servitude as a source of new immigrants eventually did decline over time, but the demand and supply of cheap labor continued to serve as a key incentive for immigration. The rules of exclusion toward immigrants who could potentially be an economic burden (the sick, the paupers) or a political burden (free blacks, low races who could not assimilate) worked quite well.10 The nation’s first census in 1790 did not include information about national origin or ancestry. Immigration was unrecorded before 1820 and classified until 1899 under “races and people.”11 Immigration from Europe was encouraged until the 1880s to meet labor demand in the agricultural fields and rising industries. The logic of who should be allowed to emigrate depended mainly on the labor potential of the immigrant. Not only do we begin with the stark absence of any federal legislation restricting the flow of migration, but also with the dominating trend of land grants provided by the states as well as other incentives to immigrants to settle in the offering states. About ten million people, mainly from the British Isles, Ireland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries, emigrated to America between 1776 and the Civil War. Along with immigrants from Northern Europe, the door to America was quite open for people from Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.12 The consensus about immigration, at least at the elite level, favored white Europeans. The wealthy and skilled were sought after, with the assumption that assimilation was a must. Although it was the economic rationale of labor demand that served as the overarching justification for immigration, ideological principles were not absent from immigration and naturalization. The most remarkable example of such an ideological deterrent was the series of laws known as 150 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which were designed to keep out new immigrants who would disrupt the social structure within the United States. The arrival of political refugees displaced by the French Revolution was deemed problematic because the new entrants were likely to impact domestic politics as well.13 The Naturalization Act of 1798, part of the Sedition Act, lengthened the period of residency to fourteen years before one was eligible for naturalization, and also authorized the President to deport foreigners who were considered dangerous. The act barred political refugees, but had little effect on prohibiting the access of skilled and unskilled laborers to the pre-industrial economy. The political debate was usually around issues of naturalization and assimilation, while states managed the messy process of immigration.14 The first serious challenge to “race” as the operating principle for immigration, and especially naturalization, came with the Mexican War, as has been discussed in Chap. 3. The annexation of Mexico and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 posed a different kind of challenge, as the new American states agreed to confer citizenship rights upon the native Mexican population but were reluctant to grant them these rights in practice. Mexicans were real misfits in the black-and-white political contours of American society. Mexicans were neither white nor black, nor even a convenient lower race who could easily join the “black” category. The one- drop (of blood) rule that took care of mixed-race children and relegated them to the black category hardly applied to a whole group of people with mixed-race ancestry.15 Moreover, many of them claimed European ancestry and were able to pass as white. The impact of these new entrants into the citizenship category challenged the simple racial bias with long-standing impact. Meanwhile, the economic rationale allowed more and more people from different cultures and racial backgrounds to work in the railroads and mines as well as in the agricultural fields and factories. The arrival of each immigrant group triggered new anxieties, and was often dealt with by enacting new obstacles to naturalization, though not necessarily impeding immigration. While Mexicans in the newly acquired lands could not legally be barred from citizenship, “Orientals,” who occupied a similar status in the race hierarchy, faced explicit bars to citizenship.16 The fear regarding the intermingling of lower races with mainstream society pertained not only to Asians, but to Mexicans and African Americans as well. In the mid- 1800s, when America had a sizable population of blacks, Hispanics, Eastern Europeans, and even Asians, “race” became the operative mechanism to THE RHETORIC: RULES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 151 exclude people of lowly races from ever becoming citizens. Although the Asians, Mexicans, and African Americans all had their separate assigned spaces in the race hierarchy, punishing one often served as a sufficient disciplinary technique for all other races. The definition of “race,” although based on the alleged science of eugenics, was in reality very much a social construct.17 As immigrants from Asia crowded American shores, merely controlling the naturalization process was not deemed enough to regulate their growing presence. The first restrictive immigration legislation, which took effect in 1875, actually prohibited forced labor from China and Japan. Coolie labor contracts were declared illegal, but this did not restrict Chinese immigration other than forced labor or immoral labor (prostitu- tion). The American fear of miscegeny had paved the way, at first by allowing Chinese prostitutes to American shores, and then by being fearful of the impact and banning their illicit labor. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 finally barred the entry of any Chinese for ten years, which was made a permanent bar in 1904 but later rescinded in 1943. This was the first explicit bar (unless we count the three-fifths rule) against a racial group that immigrated to America.18 With this Act, all avenues of citizenship for the existing Chinese in America were closed and any future entry to this country was also barred.19 Interestingly, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act did not affect other minorities of color. Japanese immigration, for instance, was prohibited much later, after 1924. The definitions of “race” and “racial categories” became a conundrum for the American government and for minorities as well; often these issues ended up in the courtroom. With the advent of “race” as the focal point of denying naturalization, and later immigration, the federal government became the only arbiter in deciding who belonged to what category and shaping the racial formation of the nation.20 The position of Japanese, Asian Indians, Armenians, Syrians, and Mexicans remained ambiguous amid the black-and-white race-based policies prevalent in the American polity. On the multicultural economic front, it was difficult to keep social taboos intact. At the same time, the biological determinations of race theory, which arranged all races in a hierarchical order, added the elements of paranoia and hysteria at the prospect of inter- racial sexual relations and mixed-race progenies. Since immigrants were competing with each other in the labor market, racial prejudices and violent outbursts were not limited to white versus non-white groups. Competition on the factory floor often erupted into race riots. At the 152 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” same time, the fear of miscegeny captivated society. On the whole, racial and sexual fears kept the different races apart from each other.21 A number of racial prejudices were also influenced by regional and local biases. While the Chinese Exclusion Act was being crafted to keep out excess labor from the railroads in the West, the unruly Irish were being unfavorably compared to the disciplined Chinese in the East. Between 1887 and 1923, the federal courts heard twenty-five cases challenging the racial prerequisites to citizenship. The rulings in the beginning displayed regional and individual biases, but soon emerged as a single voice to exclude all non-white immigrants from naturalization. In 1895, the US Supreme Court addressed the case of a Japanese woman, Nishimura, who had landed in San Francisco claiming to be the wife of a legal immigrant. When she was being deported, her lawyer claimed her right of due process, but the court denied her that right even though she was physically present in the United States. Nishimura’s presence on American soil did not guarantee her constitutional protection as she was not a citizen. Federal immigration law ignored presence within the territorial border.22 With the landmark rulings in Ozawa v. United States (1922)23 and United States v. Thind (1923),24 which have been discussed in Chap. 3, the court established a racial logic that simply barred all non-white races from citizenship without referring to the earlier legislative discourse, which at least attempted to establish a logical argument to defend quota laws through eugenics.25 The Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917 excluded Orientals, defined as persons living in Asia and the Pacific Islands. Along with “idiots,” “professional beggars,” “feeble-minded persons,” and “all persons physically and mentally defective,” there were two new bars against “polygamists” and “anarchists.” By this time, literacy tests (which were enacted almost twenty years ago) were being implemented to prevent low-skilled immigrants, especially Mexicans, from entering the United States. Anti-alien sentiment rose to a peak before the First World War, and the victory of the restric- tionists was reflected in the Immigration Act of 1917, which doubled the head tax on immigrants. The ultimate punishment for immigrants came with the Quota Act of 1921, which changed the focus to selection and exclusion rather than admissibility in immigration legislation. Quotas based on national origin were the first successful immigration policy that actually reduced the number of immigrants. Quotas favored the countries of older immigration, so Northern and Western Europe had six times the quotas than Southern and Eastern Europe.26 THE RHETORIC: RULES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 153

Finally, the Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration to a hundred and fifty thousand aliens a year based on national origin quotas. Ngai argues that national origin quotas were not only discriminatory, but reflected strong race-based nativism, based on the ideas of eugenics, which favored Northern Europeans over less desirable races. This law actually constructed a white American race, lumping together all people of European descent and differentiating them from the non-white category. Ngai suggests that immigration law and policy targeted a racial and ethnic remap- ping of the nation, including immigration of African Americans to the North from the South, de facto segregation in Northern cities, and forced assimilation of American Indians. It is noteworthy how race altered the meaning of nationality as well. Although the law excluded native citizens of China, Japan, India, and Siam, each of these countries received a minimum quota of one hundred, making room for non-Chinese from China, non- Japanese from Japan, and so forth. Likewise, the independent African nations of Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa received quotas of one hundred each. The definition of “native stock” was persons who were descended from the white population, not all persons. Likewise, the definition of “foreign stock” applied to descendants of all whites who immigrated to the United States after 1790. Just as blacks, mulattoes, descendants of slave immigrants, and free Negroes were excluded from the category of “native stock,” so were Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians from the category of “foreign stock” because of their ineligibility to become citizens.27 The Congress and the Court defined Asians as non-whites, but the problem of racial classification of Mexicans remained vexing. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo gave the right of citizenship to Mexicans in the ceded territory, yet they were hardly regarded as fellow citizens. The Mexican’s legal status as a white person was difficult to prove, but equally difficult was to overturn the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Gadsen, and numerous others between the United States and Mexico, which reaffirmed the legal status of Hispanics. By the late 1920s, at the beginning of the economic depression, the United States started enforcing the literacy test, the provision of excluding persons who were likely to become public charges, and the ban on contract labor. As a result, legal immigration from Mexico decreased, but these procedures had little impact on the increasing number of illegal immigrants. The border patrol was formed in 1925 and unlawful entry became a felony in 1929.28 All these provisions to root out unwelcome immigrants were intensified in the 1930s when the unemployment rate reached historic highs. 154 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

The exclusion of aliens from the United States on the grounds of their political views somewhat replaced race as the key to immigration and naturalization laws for forty years, from the early 1920s to 1965.29 As Motomura has documented, in 1919 “federal authorities in eleven cities swooped down on meetings of the Union of Russian Workers and arrested and detained hundreds of non-citizens believed to be radicals and revolutionaries. A leader of the operation was young J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Justice Department’s General Intelligence Division who would become FBI direc- tor five years later. The federal government hastily deported hundreds of non-citizens, many on a specially chartered transport ship bound for Finland. In January 1920, more raids in thirty-three different cities rounded up about three thousand non-citizens thought to be communists.”30 The Alien Registration Act of 1940 defined and prohibited subversive acts, created five new classes of deportable aliens, and required registration and fin- gerprinting of aliens older than fourteen years who had remained in the United States for more than thirty days. The leading immigration issue since the First World War had been concern about the political ideologies of immigrants.31 The Act also made aliens deportable for past membership in subversive organizations for no matter how short a period of time or how far in the past. The Internal Security Act of 1950 required the Communist party, party members, and subsidiary organizations to register with the federal government. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act added a new provision: an individual’s refusal to testify about subversive activity within ten years of naturalization was grounds for revoking US citizenship.32 Monica W. Varsanyi has traced the role of immigration in setting the boundaries of citizenship through changes in the eligibility for suffrage. She argues that historically there remained a gap between territorial and popular sovereignty, and it was only in the mid-1960s that this gap was legally closed by the usurpation of authority over immigration issues by the federal government. Citizenship, suffrage, and immigration all have remained closely connected and have mutually produced specific minority categories, with far-reaching social and political implications. Naturalization in the United States as well as suffrage qualifications (property-owning, racial, religious, and gender qualifications) were locally determined both before and after the American Revolution. In fact, the states attracted settlement with the promise of state-level suffrage for aliens. The state of Ohio enfranchised “all” white male inhabitants of twenty-one years of age and above who had lived in the state for one year in 1802. The states’ alien suffrage practice did not go unchallenged but was upheld in the 1840 THE RHETORIC: RULES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 155

State Supreme Court case siding with the state of Illinois. As late as 1875, the Supreme Court ruled that suffrage was not a right of citizenship but a state privilege, by citing alien suffrage to rule against a Missouri woman33 who sued her state government over suffrage rights.34 As long as immigration was an economic and labor concern, it was regarded under the states’ commercial rights. With the great wave of immigration and westward expansion, the need to entice settlers lost currency and the practice of alien suffrage gradually diminished. Georgia was the first state to repeal noncitizen voting rights in 1877. It was only as recently as 1996 that voting by non-citizens in a federal election became a crime.35 The explicit shift of the focus of American immigration from “race” and “political desirability” to “economic desirability” took place through the 1965 immigration reform. The Hart-Cellar Bill of 1965 embodied the spirit of the civil rights movement and opened the door to America to all races and ethnicities, as long as they could prove that their presence in America was financially beneficial to the economy. Immigration policy shed its racial bias in official form, but “race” never really disappeared from the connotation of who is a desirable immigrant. Instead of a clear- cut racial prejudice, a new set of biases that went hand in hand with domestic and international politics emerged and shaped the interpretation, implementation, and discretionary scope of immigration policies. An immigrant from Cuba was granted automatic asylum as soon as he or she touched American soil,36 whereas a Haitian person is still imprisoned when caught if he or she is lucky enough to avert gunshots by American coast- guards in the Gulf of Mexico. It is not so much the lighter skin shade of Cubans, but rather their communist government, which has prompted such welcoming measures for them. During the Cold War, in fact, people fleeing from communist countries—writers, scientists, sportsmen, any citizens belonging to the Soviet Union or its satellite regions—had relative ease of entry to the United States as asylum seekers. In comparison, the vast majority of people fleeing wars and massacres in South and Central America, in which America was often playing a significant role, had very difficult obstacles to entry in America.37 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment38 that allowed any Soviet Jew automatic refugee status. When people from countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador were being persecuted by the very governments the United States had propped up, often they were granted entry on humanitarian grounds, but could not be accorded the coveted “refugee” status because of US support 156 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” for their respective governments.39 What they were usually granted was “temporary protected status,” which implied that they were not technically illegal, were allowed to work, and would not be prosecuted, but most importantly, also had no route to citizenship as their status remained forever temporary.40 The Bush government went a step further and revoked this unwritten privilege of indefinite stay, and deported thousands of people who came to America in infancy but were non-citizens. The difference from the earlier periods is that instead of general inclusionary or exclusionary principles, these laws apply to specific groups of people and remain hidden from political discourse. Minority politics in America, especially interethnic conflict, has been shaped considerably by the preferences and prejudices of immigration policies. Given the role of “race” as a gatekeeper to integration in American society, it probably should not be shocking to discover the re-emergence of “race” as a new norm of exclusion. In post-9/11 America, being Muslim, or being thought of as Muslim, can open up immigration investigations and delay work permits, residency, and citizenship. There have been many cases where people from the Middle East or from the Indian subcontinent have been prosecuted by immigration officials for omissions or errors in documentation.41 The then INS conducted visible raids at high-profile public events such as the Super Bowl 2003 (Operation Game Day)42 and the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. In November 2002, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated the replacement of over twenty-eight thousand immigrant airport screeners with US citizens who were slated to earn higher wages. Critics claim that immigration enforcement is often used as image control for the government’s national security programs, as immigrant communities face heightened xenophobia at the local and state levels.43 The new norms of exclusion to American citizenship that are inscribed formally in the application process for permanent residency are sexual orientation, the presence of the HIV virus in the bloodstream, and political membership in communist organizations.

The Reality: The Rites of Passage The dual practice of allowing people through immigration but not including them as citizens has continued throughout American history. Behind the immigration legislation, what often remains hidden is the construction of elaborate rites of passage that survive despite changes in immigration laws and continue to disqualify people from citizenship eligibility regardless THE REALITY: THE RITES OF PASSAGE 157 of legal provisions. Historically, when race was the only marker for naturalization, races that were regarded as low and non-white had to wait out their turn through a long period of discrimination and humiliation, until finally there was acceptance into mainstream society. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, social acceptance meant being redefined as white. The Italians, the Irish, and virtually every group other than Anglo-Saxons had to go through their period of intense discrimination before being labeled “white.” The Irish were compared to the blacks, especially when they arrived en masse between 1845 and 1852, fleeing from the potato famine, and were converging in cities and working in factories. While their labor was quite useful, their presence and visibility irked “white” society, which couldn’t legitimately deny the Irish a place in the white race. The large number of Irish immigrants and their alleged derogatory cultural practices were labeled a burden on the British government, just as the slaves were said to be a drain on the American government. There were newspaper columns and cartoons portraying them as “white monkeys.”44 Social acceptance for Irish Americans came via the route of their participation in American wars. Irish Americans served in the Mexican War to demonstrate their loyalty, participated in the militia to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, and fought on the side of the Union during the Civil War. The wartime conversion to citizenship as recognition for serving in the military, in fact, started with Irish Americans.45 They were perhaps more comfortable with the notion of national citizenship that arose from the Civil War battlefields. Their numerical power also ended up being their saving grace, as they were courted as a voting block as soon as they were able to naturalize. It is also notable how after the Civil War, the mass black and rural exodus to urban America had to compete with the Irish for the lowest-paying jobs in factories. The violence and riots between black and Irish workers continued until the Irish were socially elevated to the white slot, which was beyond the reach of African Americans. The path to full citizenship for African Americans was long and mean- dering, with obstacles that were both legal and social, often the most tangible compared to other groups. Although they were not immigrants technically, their transformation into citizens impacted other immigrant groups tremendously. The incorporation of African Americans into the American nation as non-persons remains one of the few fatal flaws of the Constitution. The same Constitution atoned for its shortcomings in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments by banning slavery, removing the three-fifths clause, providing full citizenship rights to people 158 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” of African American ancestry at both the federal and state levels, and purging race as a criterion for voting. From the Civil War (1861–1865) to the civil rights movement (1955–1968), the journey of African Americans to exercise their legal rights as citizens is full of violence and bloodshed, as they resisted legal codes of discrimination such as poll taxes and social brutalities such as lynching. The moral victory in the Civil War and the promise of the federal government to compensate for slavery with a mule and forty acres of arable land were never really honored, especially in the Southern states in which the white elite were reluctant to let go of their control and exploitation of the black population.46 Black codes47 like the poll tax,48 the literacy clause, and the grandfather clause were implemented with the aid of local and state police, who were not at all hesitant to use unnecessary force. The legal structure cooperated with or at best turned a blind eye to the socially sanctioned punishment of lynching, usually aimed at young enterprising black men, without any proof of wrongdoing. An accusation of a sexual advance against a white woman was reason enough for a frenzied brutal killing by mutilation and hanging, which also served as a social occasion for a picnic. The legal citizenship rights of African Americans were in stark opposition to their level of social acceptance, where they were both figuratively and literally segregated.49 African Americans emerged as a minority group and claimed their rightful place in American society mainly through insistence on exercising their legal and political rights. Social acceptance always lagged behind the political presence of this particular minority group. African Americans, or least a group of African Americans, seriously considered leaving America, as society was adamant not to grant them equality and respect. Back-to-Africa movements predated the Civil War and were periodically rekindled with enthusiasm between the 1890s and 1920s. It was part of the white one- nation ideology and it had support from black nationalists as well. The US government bought land on the grain coast of Africa, later called Liberia, and segregation and violence in post-Reconstruction America gave rise to repatriation.50 A similar spirit of political identity was unleashed in the civil rights era, to oppose school segregation, to fight police brutality, to participate in long marches under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., to stir up nationwide and even worldwide awareness of citizenship rights, and to follow the Black Panthers with dignity to a dream of self-sufficient communities. The last was a dream that ended in disappointment and agony, amid charges of drug trafficking, imprisonment, and police killing THE REALITY: THE RITES OF PASSAGE 159 of key leaders of the Black Panthers; many believe that it was the FBI that infiltrated the Black Panthers with drugs, to crush the movement. Tolerance of African Americans in mainstream society grew with their educational accomplishments (which flowered into the Harlem Renaissance), their success in carving out a political space in the hostile society, and their participation in America’s wars. Back in 1918, W.E.B. Du Bois had urged African Americans to hold off on the issue of racial equality until the end of the European war, but eminent African American leaders were questioning the participation of black soldiers in the Second World War.51 Decolonization and other nationalistic movements made American racism a part of the global experience rather than an isolated peculiarity. Nazism and racism had disturbing parallels, which were not lost on the black community. African Americans encountered racism and prejudice within the armed services. Military service had evolved as the place for assimilation, yet African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Japanese American Nissei all had to serve in segregated units.52 African Americans, along with other minorities, vehemently questioned their second-class citizenship after serving in the army. The end of segregation in education and housing came via the courts, and finally the Civil Rights Act of 1964 delivered equal protection for African Americans. The election of Barack Obama is often considered a bookend to American intolerance of the black race, but the opposition to his policies remained color-coded, and violations of the civil rights of African Americans hardly decreased during his presidency. The process of integration of Native Americans into mainstream society remains incomplete, and their absence from prominent social and political platforms speaks volumes about their exercise of citizenship. Incidentally, the native inhabitants of the American land were the last minority group to gain legal citizenship in 1924.53 Like all other minority groups, their involvement in wars was one of the most important paths to citizenship. Half of all Native American men living on reservations enlisted for the Second World War. The efforts toward inclusion in mainstream society included land reforms (discussed in Chap. 3); schooling children through compulsory English-only instruction, changing the names of children, Christianizing them, and placing them with white families during vaca- tions; and establishing casinos on Native American reservations for economic revitalization. All the while, appropriation of Native American lands continued, especially where the lands contained rich mineral resources. Replacing land grabbing, the twenty-first-century federal policy is to dump nuclear wastes on or near Native American lands. 160 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

The principle of “another nation within a nation,” which was developed to validate Native American reservations, was applied to the Japanese in the concentration camps during the Second World War. The internment of Japanese Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor was also an extension of the new norm of punishment for immigrant minorities: exclusion from society. Although both German Americans and Irish Americans were targets of “one hundred percent Americanism” during the two world wars, the most shocking punishment was toward Japanese Americans. President Roosevelt signed an executive order, EO 9066, in 1942 to place Japanese Americans in internment camps as a military necessity two months after the Pearl Harbor attack. The US Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of military curfew regulations under war powers. The court also supported the legality of evacuating US citizens of Japanese ancestry, though not without dissent.54 Unlike the Nazis who were “bad Germans,” the Japanese were perceived through the biologically determined race theory as a race that would always be inassimilable, and hence a security threat. President Roosevelt even encouraged the scientific investigation of Japanese skull sizes. Both first-generation Japanese Americans, the Issei, who did not have the right to naturalize, and their American citizen children, the Nisei, were interned. Internment was a signal that even within the physical territory of the nation it was possible to exclude people from citizenship rights.55 For the Nisei, who were legal American citizens, the only way to find their way back into society was, unsurprisingly, through war, by enrolling in segregated military units and fighting against Japan to prove their loyalty to America. As Native American reservations were already normalized in the American political and social psyche, it was relatively easy to construct the internment camps and imprison a whole group of people (many of them citizens) based on their racial ancestry. German Americans, incidentally, faced more opposition and tests of loyalty prior to and during the First World War compared to the Second World War. The German language was prohibited in schools and in public throughout the Midwest in the late 1910s. Twenty-one states enacted foreign language laws to purge German from the schools. A schoolteacher named Robert T. Meyer of Zion Parochial school was arrested for teaching and reading German to an eighth-grade student on May 25, 1920. German Americans started changing their surnames to avoid humiliation and even prosecution. Germantown in Nebraska changed into Garland, and Berlin in Iowa was renamed Lincoln.56 German Americans who THE REALITY: THE RITES OF PASSAGE 161 worked on factory floors and were enthusiastic about joining or forming unions also went through a perilous journey to citizenship, peppered with punishments and accusations of harboring socialistic inclinations and dis- loyalty to America. The Cold War and its associated paranoia toward socialism also expanded the growing penal modalities to American citizens. Senator Joseph McCarthy waged war against alleged socialist infiltrators working in government. His long list of communist spies was fictional, to put it mildly. Yet most people who were on that list ended up being investigated, detained without any proof of wrongdoing, deprived of their careers, imprisoned, and in some instances even deported out of the country.57 The trials for the thousands of accused persons, almost all of them American citizens, were actually extralegal procedures and unconstitu- tional. The recent systematic targeting of Muslim Americans is following the path of McCarthyism without the necessary lessons having been learned. Hispanics, another group of original inhabitants, enjoyed the legal status of citizenship, but without social sanction, and therefore found themselves occupying a second-tier status and constantly fighting for their rightful place. The states conquered through the Mexican War became part of the Union only after the white settlers outnumbered the native Hispanic people. In the resulting conflicts over land, the courts invariably favored whites over Hispanics. Along with lawful citizens of Mexican descent, the influx of labor from Mexico has remained a consistent fact throughout history, even though the ebb and flow have been choreo- graphed with domestic economic needs. These entrants were not eligible for citizenship as they were not white (unless they passed as white).58 Racial profiling to target illegal entrants could not exclude legal Mexican Americans. Competing for low-wage labor, Mexican Americans were eager to distinguish themselves from the poorer farm laborers. The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), a political organization for Hispanic Americans, began with an anti-immigrant stance and promoted programs for Mexican American integration in America, one aspect of which was to persuade the federal government to classify Hispanics as white. The flow of Mexicans vastly increased during the Second World War due to increasing labor demand in the United States as well as the revolutionary upheaval within Mexico. Wartime legislation lifted the prohibition against agricultural and railroad workers, excused literacy requirements, 162 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” and, in essence, institutionalized a “back door” policy of immigration. Unlike the blacks and Chinese, they were neither bound nor ruled out from the citizenship category altogether, but became a part of society within the ambiguous category of illegal aliens.59 As mentioned earlier, Mexicans were stripped of their right to the land as they were categorized as illegal. Eventually, a separate race category was created for Mexicans in the 1930 census, which validated the repatriation of four hundered thousand Mexicans, irrespective of their citizenship status, during the Great Depression.60 With the ongoing deportations of undocumented workers, where legal citizens are often caught in the wide sweep of enforcement, it is difficult to claim that the rite of passage for Hispanics, and Mexican Americans in particular, has eased up. The current backlash against Mexican immigrants has, in essence, fused the categories of illegal and Mexican in public discourse and has brought out “race” as a strong marker of citizenship again. Race has clearly re-emerged as a rite of passage to citizenship after September 11, as xenophobia against Muslim Americans has been justified. According to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the post-9/11 anti-Muslim backlash, in terms of hate crimes, harassment, violence, and discriminatory practices, has shown an accelerated growth pattern.61 New security measures since September 11, for instance at the airports, also tend to isolate Arabs and Muslims from the general population and legitimize racism. These actions are often deemed acceptable, if not necessary, to prevent further terrorist attacks. The imaginary line that separates “radical Muslims” from “moderate Muslims” remains elusive. In the absence of any criteria that distinguish radical Islamists from Muslims, the visual markers of religion, such as headscarves worn by women or beards by men, are interpreted as dangerous ones.62 Since social acceptance has always served as an undertone to immigration and interethnic relations, the lack of overall tolerance fuels unpredict- ability and anxiety in the application and interpretation of immigration laws. The proof of admissibility to the club of American citizenship started becoming long and demanding in the mid-1990s. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) allows for the deportation of permanent residents for not only felonies but also for minor criminal convictions. Although the Supreme Court has overturned a case involving driving under the influence (DUI) and has stated that some criminal convictions should not count as aggravated felonies,63 it has retained the force of the new removal rules. Disregarding their THE REALITY: THE RITES OF PASSAGE 163 length of stay in the United States, refugees and permanent residents who had been in this country since infancy have been deported. Immigration rules have made the status of lawfully admitted persons contingent on their employment status. The work visas for high-skilled professionals are petitioned through employment, and if their job is terminated, they fall “out of status” unless they are able to land a new job and restart the peti- tion process within ninety days.64 The one secure rite of passage to American citizenship had been marriage. Even during the restrictive period between 1924 and 1952, selective admission was made possible through the War Brides Act of 1945 and 1950, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and 1951, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Hungarian Parolees Act of 1958, the Refugee Escapee Act of 1960, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and similar provisions. Congress was forced to pass a body of temporary legislation to accommodate escapees from Western Europe, China, and the various communist countries of Eastern Europe.65 The vast number of people who were in these asylum categories as well as the war and postwar brides and grooms of personnel in the armed forces formed the ever-expanding non-quota category. Since 1945 onward, non-quota immigration has exceeded quota immigration.66 The creation and multiplication of different categories in immigration—war brides, refugees, skilled workers, and temporary workers—all share a stark similarity with segregated race politics within the United States. But marriage has ceased to be the way to acquire citizenship. Not only is the DHS examination and definition of what constitutes proper marriage fraught with subjectivity, inconsistency, and exercise of irrational discretion, anyone who entered the United States illegally after 2001 is barred from the country for ten years regardless of marital status with a citizen. Although there is a provision to apply for a hardship waiver, it is exceedingly difficult to qualify for and remains very subjective. The norms of inclusion in American society have always been informal compared to the legally inscribed mechanisms of exclusion. America’s policies toward new immigrants have been framed as “benign neglect,” as the country has had no full-fledged urban, minority, or migrant assimilation policies. Ethnic diversity is celebrated, but gets problematic whenever attempts are made to legally incorporate it. Spanish has emerged as the de facto second language, but it would be an uphill battle to officially recognize the fact.67 The increasing visibility of politicians who are minorities can be interpreted as a sign of the integration that emerged in the post- 9/11 era of distrust of minorities. African American integration in 164 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

American society started through education and political participation in local elections. Hispanics, with generally low education and employment status, have become politically active through their demands for immigration reform—ironically the kind of immigration reform that proposes to keep many of them out of citizenship status. Even the most reviled group, Muslims, are coming forward to engage in dialogue about Islam, America, and their place in both. The ferment over the proposed mosque near Ground Zero in New York, which was actually a community place with a prayer room, was also a positive sign of political negotiation in American society and politics, as this was definitely a break from the secluded spheres that minorities had inhabited.68

The Paradox: Immigration as a Political Tool The paradox of opening up avenues for immigrants and yet hesitating to allow them through those very legislative channels keeps shaping US immigration policies. What needs to be acknowledged is that the construction of this paradox is systematic, intentional, and indeed the cornerstone of US immigration policies. Instead of a policy that clearly articulates eligibility criteria for new entrants, we have thousands of provisions that apply and result in quite different access to American citizenship for different people, depending on where they are coming from, why they are coming to America, and the context of politics when that particular set of rules was enacted. A lot of the immigration policies were a response to, or at least coincided with, domestic interests, especially those related to minority populations. The rites of passage for immigrants were filled with modes of discipline and punishment, which very easily were applied to different groups, domestic and foreign alike. The story of the changing immigration narrative contains the story of ethnic subjugation and the claims of ethnic groups in the American polity. A fair and just immigration reform is very difficult to achieve, not only because of the lack of cohesion about the value and utility of immigration, but also because it would require giving up selective criteria and ambiguities in immigration law as the mechanism for controlling new entrants, and thereby also compromising the domestic political agenda. The 1965 immigration reform established market need as the main avenue and logic for immigration, but it did so alongside retained provisions for family reunification, refugees and asylum seekers, and so on. Instead of ever having an open debate on any of these provisions, the THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 165

American nation has made these provisions easier or harder depending on the perceived need of the moment. Refugees from different parts of the world have different eligibility criteria, and it is an open question whether they can be labeled refugees or not, the decision solely dependent on American discretion. People fleeing from a dictatorial regime supported by the United States may not be entitled to refugee status, while immigrants from communist countries may qualify for easier access to citizenship. When increasing numbers of people qualified under family reunification, the length of the wait became longer and longer and the proof of marriage became more tortuous. The ebb and flow of immigrant workers in the American market not only correlates with market demand, but economic conditions have also always shaped the law enforcement part of immigration control. Immigrants in America, especially in the industrial era, were a source of cheap labor that could be easily racialized and gendered for maximum exploitation, and subjected to various mechanisms of social control and punishment that shaped the political economy of capitalism.69 Just as African slaves fueled the agricultural economy, immigrants in the late nineteenth century solved the labor question. Employers reduced or stabilized wages in every industry and region where immigrants were heavily concentrated. During and after the Civil War, immigrant workers were imported to break strikes and undermine unions. These workers were often kept in isolation or judiciously mixed with other workers of different nationalities and languages so that class consciousness would not be formed. When American labor vociferously protested against wage- depressing mechanisms, immigrant workers were demonized and subjected to vigilante and informal punishment. Anti-immigrant protests became violent in the depression of 1837–1843.70 After the Civil War, there was a significant decline in the labor force participation of African American women and children and the demand for African American men increased in the war-ravaged South. Most Southern states opted for “Black Codes” to regulate the servants’ duties and even the details of their personal lives. African American migration to the North was prohibited by imposing license fees on labor recruiters after the Civil War. The economic and information costs of migration significantly deterred group migration, which was not only a form of political protest, but also often the only avenue to escape lynching and other forms of white lawlessness. The emigrant agent laws were a reaction to the large-scale migrations of African American workers in search of 166 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” better social, economic, and political conditions. Southern states also invigorated vagrancy laws that prohibited temporary unemployment, and a vagrant had to pay a huge fee or had to be “hired out” to a planter. African Americans were forced to stay with their employers when their contract expired, as traveling in search of a new job would make them vagrant.71 It is noteworthy that the anti-Chinese legislation was enacted in a period when Reconstruction had collapsed, Plessy72 had legalized segregation, and the Dawes Act had laid down the allotment policy for Native Americans. But it was not only the Chinese who were being excluded from society. The restrictions on Chinese laborers were eventually expanded to Filipinos. In 1905, the school board in San Francisco segregated the education of Japanese American children into a separate Asian school.73 It is also interesting to note that while Chinese laborers were being demonized as “coolie labor” and “leeches” and being barred, Chinese merchants were deemed honorable and respectful. The Japanese did not face derogatory racial prejudices until they had acquired enough land as farmers. When the Japanese were in the internment camps, their property was confiscated, but it was later returned and they did eventually receive reparations, which neither African Americans nor Native Americans ever received. Mexican labor was sought after as it was a cheap substitute for European labor. The most important virtue of Mexican laborers was that they were expected to return to Mexico after performing seasonal agricultural work. When the need for Mexican laborers on Southwest agricultural farms and on the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroads increased, they were exempted from the literacy test in 1917. The bracero program institutionalized control of the supply of labor by allowing laborers to enter when needed and legally assuring their departure.74 The bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States that initiated the bracero program between 1942 and 1964 supplied much-needed labor during and after the Second World War, until the 1965 immigration policy legally allowed the entry of labor from non- white regions into the United States. As this “back door” seasonal work replaced the front door of permanent European immigration, the immigrant stream in the mid-twentieth century tended to be composed mainly of men. In a strictly gendered labor market, women dominated garments, domestic service, laundry, and light manufacturing, while men were often young adults working in the agricultural and later the meat packing industry.75 THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 167

It is interesting to note that the offensive term “wetback” originates in Texas, the state which was exempt from the bilateral agreements between Mexico and the United States, but where workers arrived anyway by crossing the Rio Grande River to fill the demand on the agricultural fields. The relabeling of Mexicans as illegals and foreigners occurred when the agricultural labor market was undergoing a shift. The ranch economy, as stated earlier, was based on a patron–peon relationship of mutual obligation, while the new commercial agriculture required a migratory workforce. It was the wartime bracero program that allowed in one hundred thousand Mexicans as seasonal workers; the program was terminated in 1964 after the need for labor was satiated, leaving a huge number of Mexicans in the United States without legal status, forever intertwining the definitions of Mexicans and illegal aliens.76 Whenever the need for labor decreased, the INS would launch high- profile raids—such as the one known as “Operation Wetback” (1954–1955)—and of course these raids coincided with each economic downturn. The 1924 Immigration Act not only restricted entry to the United States, but also led to the mass deportations of Mexicans and Mexican Americans. In Los Angeles alone, one-third of the Mexican American community left. California’s Alien Labor Act of 1931 prohibited firms from hiring foreign workers for any publicly funded construction. During the depression era of the 1930s, and after the Korean War, Mexican agricultural workers were deported en masse. Operation Wetback remains one of the most comprehensive deportation campaigns in US history.77 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, shifted the focus to the economy by legalizing the admission of “skilled workers” who were urgently needed. However, the Act also sought to protect American workers through the insertion of the provision of “labor certification,” which would assert that new immigrant workers would not adversely affect the wages or the working conditions of American workers. The exclusion and deportation rules based on political grounds were also inserted in the 1952 legislation during the Cold War era. The 1965 Immigration Act, which ended the quota system based on national origin and instead embraced an open door policy for immigration, is usually hailed as the end of the exclusionary immigration era. The 1965 immigration reform does signal a change in the nation’s ideology, and this change was undoubtedly a reflection of domestic political progress. The 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed race-based discrimination in 168 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” employment and public accommodations, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 banned such discrimination in registration and voting.78 Since immigration policies have always been shaped by the domestic political consensus, the 1965 immigration bill echoed a similar ethos by outlawing quotas based on national origin and establishing the same numerical cap for all countries. The American foreign policy of containment also triggered a more open immigration policy. We should not neglect the fact that the Act of 1965 was passed in a period of economic growth that reflected the overall optimism of the nation as well as the spirit of racial equality. The 1965 immigration legislation attempted to overturn racial bias, but in its application restricted the entry of poorer laborers from Mexico, Central America, and South America. Since the 1965 legislation required certain desirable or needed abilities for employment-based labor visas, the vast number of unskilled workers did not qualify for that category even when their labor was needed in this economy. People who worked in the medical profession, science and technology, and the like, were given preference for labor certification, while unskilled labor often had to cross the border illegally.79 The end of national quotas clearly signaled the prioritizing of the economic rationale for immigration; high-skilled people fit into that category, while officially designated low-skilled people did not meet the official criteria—yet they had to be accommodated somehow, as they were much needed at the time of the economic boom. It is highly pertinent that many of the immigrants to this country after the 1965 legislation came not only through legal channels for work-related purposes, but also through legal non-quota channels, namely family reunion and asylum. The annual ceiling of one hundred and twenty thousand on the Western hemisphere did not take into account these numerous groups of non-quota immigrants. In fact, the entire period following 1965 is characterized by copious temporary provisions, which in effect make the immigration system a two-tiered one: people who migrated because of occupational skills, and refugees and asylum seekers from communist countries. The present US immigration system incorporates a myriad of admissions and removals, based on various levels of “usefulness.” The lack of official access to poor, low-skilled people in the 1965 bill was balanced by backdoor entries; the present laws on deportation mimic the gap between legal provisions and implementation of such provisions. The exclusion of undesirables is not inscribed in the law, but it is apparent in practice. This practice, in turn, has created underground immigration— THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 169 people who remain illegal, as the process of legalization systematically dis- criminates against them. After 1965, instead of fundamental immigration reform policies to address unresolved issues, we find mostly the enactment of supplementary measures: measures that were adopted to deal with specific situations, and measures that can (and do) change drastically. The categories of eligible immigrants grew as rapidly as these categories became manifold. Although the desirability of skilled labor was the cornerstone of various pieces of immigration legislation, racial prejudice did not totally fade away. Along with that, a new principle of political desirability started shaping these auxiliary immigration laws. As a result, a subtle overtone of ambiguity and subjectivity developed in the application of such legislation. This new structure of immigration law has completely succeeded in keeping the recipients in continuous fear of violating any of its excruciating procedural requirements. At the same time, the very room for subjectivity, the periodic supplementary provisions, and especially the amnesty of 1986, also encouraged a feeling of hopefulness among illegal immigrants. The Immigration Reform Act of 1986 (which contained the aforemen- tioned amnesty provision) was a response to accommodate the growing numbers of undocumented immigrants—that is, immigrants who had entered the United States without inspection or overstayed their visas—in mainstream society. Under the amnesty, 2.7 million illegal immigrants were legalized, thereby leaving out yet another category of illegal immigrants, the ones who were denied amnesty, to fight through the follow-up LULAC and other class-action lawsuits. The federal government shifted some responsibility to employers, as employers who knowingly hired illegal immigrants had to pay punitive fines. However, the monetary fine for employers was negligible, and furthermore this provision was hardly ever enforced with full vigor. The 1986 Act also created the provision for three hundred thousand agricultural guest workers annually from Mexico. As border regulations became stricter, these guest workers and other temporary workers opted to stay in the United States rather than risk re-entry by returning to Mexico. A category for low-skilled immigrants, which does not involve expensive and dubious renewals every year and is rational both from the market and labor perspectives, is yet to emerge in the US immigration system. The amnesty in 1986 and periodic intensification of deportations of illegal immigrants have done little to deter new streams of people from crossing the southern border in search of work. The 1990 Immigration 170 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

Act, which increased measures to keep out such people and also intensified penalties against employers, was in part a response to the frustration concerning the presence of growing numbers of illegal immigrants even after amnesty. Likewise, the 1996 IIRIRA tightened immigration, eliminated welfare benefits for legal permanent residents, and allowed more funding for border control, but did not necessarily reduce the numbers permitted by prior legislation.80 The enforcement on the border has failed to keep people out, but undocumented Mexicans tend to stay longer in the United States, since it is harder and more expensive to move back and forth between the United States and Mexico. Since the 1965 immigration legislation, there have, in effect, been two immigration policies in America: the official open door policy for the skilled worker, and the unofficial back door that remains partially open for the unskilled worker.81 While the debate on immigration focuses on the disproportionate number of Mexicans crossing the border, it often neglects the impact of policies like NAFTA or globalization in general as the trigger for such migration. NAFTA opened up the exchange of products and investments across borders but, perversely, tightened the human exchange. Although urban Mexico experienced new opportunities for the factories that took advantage of low labor costs, rural Mexican farmers could not compete with the cheap American corn that flooded their market.82 Small farmers lost their land and livelihood, migrated to the factories in Mexican cities, and when those got crowded, they crossed the border to come to the United States. Compared to the constant fear of getting caught and being deported, crossing the border remains relatively easy even with enhanced border security. Federal dollars have poured into border militarization, but it is the states that take the initiative to implement such programs, and, as such, tighter scrutiny or a partial wall in a region only shifts the flow of illegal immigrants rather than address the root problem.83 The 1986 and 1990 laws enabled a large influx of migrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The enforcement provisions of these Acts, which penalize employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants, never established a reliable identification system for employee eligibility. Many of the provisions of both these Acts, originally intended to decrease the new pool of entrants, actually ended up increasing immigration. An ideological convergence in favor of sustaining robust immigration was produced by two distinct forces in American history: the continuing legacy of the civil rights movement, and the resurgence of the free market philosophy in the 1980s. The 1986 and 1990 laws were supported by a fragile THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 171 coalition of liberals and conservatives for very different reasons. The immigration laws, in fact, accommodated the ideals of liberalism and market dominance at the same time.84 The failure of the Senate to open the floor for debate on proposed immigration reform plans under the Obama administration was perhaps an indication of the increasing lack of conciliation between market demands and the liberal philosophy of citizenship rights. In the last couple of decades, provisions that have denied or reduced privileges to various groups of legal immigrants have been inserted in administrative measures or as part of policies such as the welfare reform law of 1996 (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA). These underhanded strategies, along with more explicit reactionary post-9/11 measures to scrutinize immigrants (Muslims especially, but not that community alone), have multiplied the already existing ambiguities in the immigration system. These tactics enable the government to exercise absolute power over not only immigrants, but over citizens as well. When immigration status needs to be checked to obtain or renew a driver’s license, every single citizen is obliged to prove his legal standing as a citizen or legal resident. For Medicare and Medicaid, elderly citizens, sometimes with faltering memory and sometimes with poor recordkeeping, have to produce passports or birth certificates to prove their eligibility.85 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the US government initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),86 requiring visitors from twenty-five countries to be fingerprinted, photo- graphed, and interrogated. Although the stated aim of this program was to detect immigrants with suspicious backgrounds, in essence hundreds of thousands of law-abiding immigrants had to undergo this process of registration. None of the twelve hundred men who were detained for months or even years in the aftermath of September 11 were ever charged with any crime related to terrorism, but seven hundred and fifty-two of them were charged with immigration-related violations.87 Legal status, which is supposed to safeguard legal residents, has been blurred, as racial profiling is incapable of deciphering immigration status.88 In the current anti- immigrant environment, even birthright citizenship is under attack. The argument to rethink birthright citizenship is ostensibly about discourag- ing illegal immigrants from having children who automatically become American citizens, but there is also an embedded demographic concern as America becomes more and more non-white because of the higher fertility of non-white citizens and residents compared to the white stock. 172 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

American prisons are swiftly being filled with non-citizens who, instead of being deported to their home countries, now serve longer and longer prison terms, regardless of their criminal history. In the federal system alone, non-citizens make up twenty-five percent of the total prison population, a stark rise, especially after September 11. Not only has the length of the sentences increased, there are more refugees and asylum seekers as well as low-skilled laborers, along with people who have criminal records. It is supposed to be a deterrent against continuous border crossings, but the costs are borne by taxpayers. The 1996 IIRIRA established the pre- sumption of guilty until proven otherwise for foreigners in immigration cases, and confinement as the default remedy. The 2001 Patriot Act changed the way asylum seekers were dealt with, introduced new offenses, and elevated the status of offenses89 for which legal resident aliens can be deported. Asylum seekers are now detained during the period that immigration officials ascertain the veracity of their claims. Most immigrants and asylum seekers, even those without any criminal record, are now detained prior to deportation or removal.90 Illegal immigrants are not only detained in local jails located hundreds of miles from their families, they are also frequently transferred, often without notifying their families or legal counsel. The bloated bureaucracy of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—formerly INS—often cannot keep up with caseloads, and as a result misplaces documentation, or even worse, detainees. Detainees are subjected to harsh conditions and deplorable living arrangements without adequate medical and mental healthcare. Asylum seekers or undocumented detainees are placed with murderers, sexual molesters, armed robbers, and the mentally disturbed. Complaints of sexual assault and rape against fellow detainees and guards are very common.91 For some hapless people, their ambiguous status is part and parcel of their never-ending nightmare. The United States has no official diplomatic ties with Iran, Palestine,92 Gaza, and some of the former satellites of the Soviet Union. Detainees from these countries cannot be repatriated, as many have been stripped of their birth citizenship when they emigrated, and so they remain in indefinite detention.93 The practice of “extraordinary rendition” has expanded the government’s reach to citizens from other countries, and allowed the government to renounce any accountability by outsourcing investigation, imprisonment, and torture to yet other third countries. It is chilling that the USA Patriot Act can easily be applied to all citizens as well as suspected criminals. Section 215 of the Act bestows on the THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 173 government legal authority to obtain documents, records, books, and anything tangible for investigation as long as it is not solely to check First Amendment rights. Section 412 strips constitutional protections from non-citizens, and allows the attorney general to label anyone a “terrorist” at his/her discretion. Prison and detention centers have acquired a vibrancy and legitimacy, and serve as “surrogate ghettos” to contain and institutionalize ambiguous categories of people between citizens and aliens.94 While the US Supreme Court was pondering the right of Guantánamo Bay detainees to challenge their imprisonment in federal court by writ of habeas corpus,95 the government argued that the Constitution did not apply in full in US dependent territories. Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the detainees, it was reluctant to address constitutional rights in non-state territories. The most famous case was Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006),96 where the Supreme Court ruled that the Bush administration lacked the authority to set up war crimes tribunals and special military commissions, as these violated both military justice and the Geneva Conventions. A look at the most recently proposed immigration bills reveals the level of anti-immigrant sentiment, but also the extent of punitive measures that would not be limited to illegal entrants to this country. The proposed (but failed) House Bill 4437 (the notorious Sensenbrenner bill of 2005) not only criminalized illegal immigrants themselves, but also extended the felony to healthcare professionals, religious organizations, and even acquaintances—anyone who was aware of the illegal status of a person and did not report this to the authorities. Essentially, it left enough ambiguity for all three hundred million-plus Americans to be considered felons at some point in their lives. This Sensenbrenner proposal also authorized local police officers to detain illegal immigrants, with federal agents having the same authority. Representative Sam Farr (D-Carmel) compared this bill to the internment of Japanese Americans. The various Senate versions of recent immigration proposals appeared to be more lenient: they only made illegal presence a misdemeanor instead of a felony (for example, the 2006 Bill Frist version). The 2005 McCain-Kennedy version contained a guest worker provision that penalized illegal workers with a two-thousand- dollar fine and an eleven-year waiting period to become citizens. The Cornyn–Kyle version of the same year proposed an alternate guest worker plan, where the illegal worker had to go back to the home country after his/her temporary permit expired and reapply for temporary work status. Although the senators were displaying passion for their respective posi- 174 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” tions, all these proposals actually increased the cap on the H-1B visa, which is for skilled workers. Another provision all the versions agreed on was the registration of the twelve million undocumented immigrants. Similarly, in 2013 Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida) proposed a non- immigrant visa for undocumented people, and an arduous path to eventually absorb them as citizens.97 It should be noted that recent immigration reform bills have not only produced fear among immigrant communities,98 but immigrant groups have organized spontaneously and taken over the streets of Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other major cities with large Hispanic populations. Even schoolchildren have walked out of classrooms in protest all over the country. Instead of major Hispanic political groups like LULAC and La Raza, it has been the common immigrants who have taken the lead in these demonstrations. The participation of diverse immigrant communities, legal and illegal alike, has also been an indication of the recognition among immigrant communities that the effects of such laws are not limited to illegal immigrants alone. Although in the Trump era we have seen large spontaneous protests against the travel ban of immigrants from certain specified Muslim countries, we have also seen widespread deportation and even deportation orders issued to “Dreamers” (i.e., undocumented immigrants, who were brought to the United States as minors).99 The new laws on checking immigration status to obtain a driver’s license and obligatory verification of employee documents are examples of measures that are enacted to monitor immigrants, both legal and illegal, but in practice end up supervising the whole population. The eighty-two billion dollar military spending bill that passed in May 2005 contained a second piece of legislation called the Real ID Act. The law mandated state uniformity in driver’s licenses as determined by the DHS. All state databases have since been interlinked to provide instantaneous checking of data. In effect, the driver’s license is now a national ID card, which is used not only for standard identification, but also to open bank accounts, to collect Social Security, or to access any government services.100 The takeover of power from the state governments by the federal government was an example of the spillover of immigration issues. The control of the vast dataset of the whole population was not left in the hands of the respective states. If future immigration reform bills do not accommodate the economic principle of labor demand, we will surely witness more of these power struggles between and among the federal, state, and local agencies. THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 175

In terms of inclusion to mainstream society, America, with all its history of minority oppression, is still one of the few places where immigrants are comfortable with American identity from almost their first day in the land. This was the culmination of a spirit of tolerance, rewarding enterprising attitudes wherever immigrants came from, and a system of social mobility that benefited everyone. “Race” was unsurprisingly the modus operandi when America itself was struggling to both assimilate and segregate different ethnic populations among its native stock. Just as mainstream society ended de jure discrimination, but not de facto discrimination, immigration policies in the post-1965 era have openly welcomed high-skilled labor, but created a back door for the large pool of low-skilled people who are in demand but not necessarily welcome in this country. The dynamics of immigration did swing heavily toward the economic rationale after the 1965 immigration reform. The transformation to the service economy demanded both very high-skilled and low-skilled labor. While high-skilled labor could immigrate from almost anywhere in the world and be a part of American society in almost no time, low-skilled labor had an inadequate quota in the legal system. Low-wage labor heeded market demand by crossing the border, which in times of high labor demand remained quite porous. The transitions over the course of history in American immigration legislation are compelling, as they provide a revealing discourse of racial and ethnic history. The norms of exclusion in America began with “race” and even after a considerable shift from racial and ethnic considerations, the social, and even to some extent the legal, mechanisms seem to be embracing the age-old tested and failed racial prejudices. As problematic as this is, what often remains neglected is the link between the ethnic groups which are being excluded through immigration regulations and the ethnic groups inside mainstream society which have been secluded in the same manner. Did the widespread acceptance of or acquiescence with torture in Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and “collateral damage” on the war fronts in distant lands, shape our indifference to the sufferings of Hurricane Katrina victims? The Governor of Louisiana threatened lawbreakers in the Katrina aftermath by stating that the US military patrolling New Orleans was just back from Iraq and knew how to shoot. Six police officers were charged with killing civilians and hiding evidence in the days after Hurricane Katrina.101 The principle of demarcating between “us” and “them” may originate to differentiate between very distinct people, but once the principle is internalized, it can be quite easily replicated even 176 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM” among close neighbors. The disciplinary mechanisms to promote assimilation into society or the punishment rituals to expel people from the country have often been extended to the native population in various forms of discrimination, segregation, and internment. As the twenty-first century unfolded with a renewed threat of terrorism, immigration provisions were more closely scrutinized to bar the “them” among “us.” But the modalities of scrutiny do not spare legal citizens. Technology allows the government to collect and maintain large databases, and analyze real-time information of truly vast magnitude. By definition, these databases pertaining to driver’s licenses, employment, airport security, or anything else, contain data regarding the whole population residing in the United States. While checking the eligibility of people to drive, work, or board planes, the onus of responsibility is on the individual to prove his status if his name appears on the wrong lists. The no-fly list102 contains names of thousands of citizens without any connection to terrorism, including children, and even when the mistake is clear (such as the six-year-old girl who ended up on a terror watch list),103 it is exceedingly difficult to get the name deleted from the list. Between the categories of citizens and illegal immigrants, there are millions of legal immigrants, who can be in many different categories. Often sweeping legal changes do not address the transitory nature of these categories. The government’s database to check the eligibility of employees, E-Verify,104 is notorious for both informational and technological flaws, and as such many citizens have been adversely affected. While we remain captivated by the power of technology in this era, we neglect to see how it expands government control over citizens as well as immigrants. Although all immigrant groups in American history have gone through a predictable period of discrimination and often explicit punishment for their presence, they did succeed in gaining their rightful legal status as citizens, especially after the 1965 immigration reform. There was an implicit understanding that once a group underwent this rite of passage, its place in American society would become secure. In the last decade and a half, however, “race” has re-emerged as a vast obstacle to social acceptance, paving the way to legal discrimination. The anti-immigrant sentiment against Muslims (who can be of almost any racial/ethnic ancestry) has been pervasive, and is often justified as a reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The anti-immigrant sentiment against Mexican low- skilled laborers had started earlier and only intensified during the recent THE PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL 177 economic recession. The high number of those illegally present among Mexicans and their perceived lack of interest in integrating into American society are explained as the root causes. In the absence of a clear marker, appearance (especially applicable to Muslim women with headscarves and Muslim men with long beards) and class (as the marker of illegal presence) have emerged as new modes of social discrimination and humiliation. With new technological tools, the whole population can be under constant surveillance. After all, how else can we separate citizens from non- citizens, and legal from illegal immigrants?

The Paradox Continues…

The “Dreamers”: The Creation of Good Versus Bad Undocumented Aliens

For the last few decades, immigration has once again emerged as one of the most controversial and divisive political issues. One of the thorniest problems in immigration is the presence of about eleven to twelve million undocumented people, who are already in the United States, already part of the social, cultural, and economic system, except for their political status. The perception regarding undocumented immigrants is that they are the poorest, and therefore the most expendable, as their skills can easily be replaced. When this premise was challenged by a substantial number of people who are American in every way except for the legal distinction and who do not fit into the common presumptions about undocumented aliens, there arose a new category called Dreamers, replicating the familiar American tradition of constructing categories of good immigrants versus bad immigrants and often pitting them against each other. More than one million children and youth share the common traits of growing up in America, going through the educational system, and yet lacking legal status and, more importantly, any path to legalize their status. In spite of their different class, ethnic, sexual, gender, and regional backgrounds, the immigration system has imposed upon these individuals a similar experience and fate. This has made them a group that is distinct from other immigrants and 178 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

nationals alike.105 In most states, these children have been allowed to go to college, sometimes qualifying for in-state tuition, sometimes burdened with out-of-state tuition, but right after they finish their degrees, they become ineligible to work. Without a work permit or a Social Security number, and often without a driver’s license, everyday life becomes a surreal struggle for someone who has grown up in America and has no other home to go to. The proposed DREAM Act of 2010 (originally proposed in 2001) would have provided permanent residence to young adults who came to America before they were sixteen, and could provide documentation of five consecutive years of residence. To be eligible, one needed to have graduated from high school in the United States or to have earned a General Educational Development (GED) certificate. Additionally, one would have had to register for selective service or the military draft, and being charged with a serious crime would have been a disqualifier. The House passed the legislation in 2010, but the Senate stalled it, as it did not have the sixty votes to overcome a Republican filibuster.106 In 2012, with an executive order, the Obama administration established a new short-term immigrant visa with work authorization (and eligibility to get driver’s licenses) for young adults who would have been eligible for the DREAM Act, through what is called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In 2014, the Obama administration expanded DACA for an additional two years, and expanded the populations eligible to apply.107 With the Trump administration’s re-energized deportation policy and openly adversarial position on immigration, illegal immigration, and undocumented residents, the feeble protection afforded by DACA seems inadequate and ineffectual. The Trump administration has already started deporting DACA recipients despite their protected status.108 The Dreamers adopted the strategy of turning to the media, especially social media, going all over the community with an unapolo- getic message of claiming to be American and demanding the political right of a path to citizenship.109 While they deserve a lot of credit for carving out a space for themselves, especially in the current anti-immigrant environment, the space they were accorded was a restricted one, reserved only for those worthy of empathy because NOTES 179 they were deemed not to have decided to become undocumented. The rest of the undocumented people remained in a category that has been criminalized and stripped of dignity. The Dreamers, in contrast, are considered the “good undocumented,” though without any substantial rights, and although much of the blame has shifted from them, it has not led to any solutions. One of the best examples of such a conundrum is Jose Antonio Vargas, a journalist, filmmaker, and immigrant rights activist who claims to be an American, just without proper documentation. Born in the Philippines and raised in America, he has worked for The Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, Philadelphia Daily News, and The Huffington Post, and is a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Breaking News Reporting. Vargas published his own story in the New York Times in 2011 in an effort to promote dialogue about the immigration system and to advocate for the DREAM Act. A year later, the Obama administration announced that it was halting the deportation of undocumented immigrants aged thirty and under, who would have been eligible for the DREAM Act. Vargas, who had just turned thirty- one, did not qualify. He was arrested by immigration authorities while trying to fly out of the border town of McAllen, Texas, but was released several hours later, after being questioned. After being in the United States for over twenty years, being an outstanding journalist and an active community member (if not a citizen), he continues to be an undocumented alien with no path to legalize his status.110

Notes 1. Monica W. Varsanyi, “The Rise and Fall (and Rise) of Non-Citizen Voting: Immigration and the Shifting Scales of Citizenship and Suffrage in the United States,” Space and Polity, 9, no. 2 (2005): 114. 2. Daniel J. Tichenor, “The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981–1990,” Polity, 26, no. 3 (1994): 339–40. 3. Hispanics were classified as “white” in Texas and California, but not in all states. 4. In November 2004, Arizona voters passed Proposition 200, which criminalized state employees who provided services to undocumented immigrants. In May 2010, Arizona passed a law empowering its local law enforcement officers to carry out immigration queries against whomever 180 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

they deemed suspicions. A legal immigrant is supposed to carry his/her authorization papers at all times and can be imprisoned without them. The Supreme Court has allowed this provision, though it took down several more intrusive provisions. 5. The federal government has already threatened these cities, and though states like New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, and California are supporting the policies in New York City, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, the state of Texas has passed SB4 to withhold money from Austin unless it gives up the mantle of a sanctuary city. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/15/mayor-says-chicago-will-always-be-sanctuary-city-in- face-deportation-threats.html and https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/08/texas-gov-abbott-springs- surprise-on-critics-signing-sanctuary-cities-ban-unannounced-on-facebook-live/?utm_term=.ebf5a2d2d97c. 6. Aristide R. Zolberg, “Reforming the Back Door: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective,” in Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics, Virginia Yans- McLaughlin, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 316–8. 7. For a detailed discussion, see Catherine Lee, Fictive Kinship: Family Reunification and the Meaning of Race and Nation in American Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013). 8. For details, consult Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) and Bill Ong Hing, Defining America Through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004). 9. Edward J.W. Park and John S.W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11. 10. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 23–8. 11. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (1999): 71. 12. Ernest Rubin, “The Demography of Immigration to the United States,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 367, no. 1 (1966): 15–22. 13. Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, U.S. Immigration in the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015), 25. 14. Peter Schrag, Not Fit for Our Society: Immigration and Nativism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 23. 15. Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 50–5. 16. Ibid., 85–8. NOTES 181

17. Most of the laws prohibiting the Chinese did not impact Japanese immigrants, as they were not labeled “Oriental”; furthermore, their entry and status in the United States was shaped by a special contract with the Japanese emperor, the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907, whereby the Japanese government promised to restrict emigration and the United States promised not to prosecute the existing Japanese in America. 18. The three-fifths rule was the compromise between the larger and smaller states regarding political representation at the time of the Constitutional Convention. The slave population was counted as three-fifths of their total number as the basis for apportioning representatives and presidential electors. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Three-Fifths_Compromise. 19. Marion T. Bennett, American Immigration Policies: A History (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), 14. 20. Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 38. 21. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 96–9. 22. John S.W. Park, “On Being Here and Not Here: Noncitizen Status in American Immigration Law,” in Immigrant Rights in the Shadows of Citizenship, Rachel Ida Buff, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 28–9. 23. In 1922, Takao Ozawa filed for US citizenship under the Naturalization Act of 1906, which allowed white persons and persons of African descent or African nativity to naturalize by claiming their race to be “white.” Justice George Sutherland found that only Caucasians were white, and therefore the Japanese, by not being Caucasian, were not white and instead were members of an “unassimilable race,” lacking provision in any Naturalization Act. 24. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind was a case in which the US Supreme Court decided that Bhagat Singh Thind, who was a Punjabi Sikh settled in Oregon, could not be a naturalized citizen of the United States, because he was not a “white person” in the sense intended in the relevant 1790 statute governing naturalization. Although Thind argued that as an Indian he belonged to the Aryan and therefore the Caucasian race, the Court found that “the Aryan theory, as a racial basis, seems to be discredited by most, if not all, modern writers on the subject of eth- nology,” and noted that “the Caucasic division of the human family is ‘in point of fact the most debatable field in the whole range of anthro- pological studies,’” and that “white people” should be understood in its popular, and not scientific, sense. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ United_States_v_Bhagat_Singh_Thind. 182 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

25. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (1999): 83–4. 26. Edward P. Hutchinson, “Immigration Policy Since World War I,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 262 (1949): 15–8. 27. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (1999): 69–73. 28. Ibid., 89–90. 29. Roger Daniels and Otis L. Graham, Debating American Immigration, 1882–Present (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 117. 30. Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41–2. 31. Edward P. Hutchinson, “Immigration Policy Since World War I,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 262 (1949): 18–20. 32. Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41–2. 33. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_v._Happersett. 34. Monica W. Varsanyi, “The Rise and Fall (and Rise) of Non-Citizen Voting: Immigration and the Shifting Scales of Citizenship and Suffrage in the United States,” Space and Polity, 9, no. 2 (2005): 114–9. 35. Ibid., 120. 36. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 categorized all Cubans as political refugees and guaranteed them legal immigrant status within a year of arrival, but with normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, this Act has already been weakened and eventually will be rescinded. 37. Roger Daniels and Otis L. Graham, Debating American Immigration, 1882–Present (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 175. 38. https://www.hias.org/lautenberg-amendment. 39. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum- policy-reagan-era 40. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 41. A permanent resident of Palestinian origin was denied citizenship since he had not informed the government of his address change. He, however, petitioned and won his case after it was revealed that the DHS (then the Immigration and Naturalization Service or INS) never came up with a form or a process to notify the change of address. The form now exists at the DHS website, and all non-citizens must notify the government of any address change; failure to do so can be a plausible cause for deportation. https://www.ilw.com/articles/2002,0807-baldwin.shtm. NOTES 183

42. http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=16897. 43. Eunice Hyunhye Cho, “Beyond the Day Without an Immigrant: Immigrant Communities Building a Sustainable Movement,” in Immigrant Rights in the Shadows of Citizenship, Rachel Ida Buff, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 28–9. 44. For historic illustrations and an interesting analysis, see Leo Chavez, Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 45. Christian G. Samito, Becoming American Under Fire: Irish Americans, African Americans, and the Politics of Citizenship During the Civil War Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 23–9. 46. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 128–32. 47. Along with the poll tax, literacy tests and the grandfather clause were used in the Southern states to stop African Americans from exercising their right to vote after the Civil War. The poll tax was a flat fee required before voting; literacy tests were used to disenfranchise uneducated blacks; and the grandfather clause allowed exemptions from education, property, or tax requirements for voting for those whose forefathers had enjoyed voting rights prior to 1967, which essentially meant that the waivers could not be allowed for a single black person as no former slaves had voting privileges. 48. The poll tax was not only high, but also collected just before Christmas, functioning as a deterrent to black voting. 49. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 105–7. 50. Desmond King, The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55. 51. Ibid., 84. 52. Ibid., 130–1. 53. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 286. 54. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered forced relocation and incarceration of people of Japanese ancestry, between one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand, of whom more than sixty percent were American citizens. These camps were mainly on the Pacific coast, where most Japanese Americans lived. Those who were as little as one-sixteenth Japanese, along with orphaned infants with “one drop of Japanese blood,” were placed in internment camps. This executive order was challenged in the Supreme Court, but the Court upheld the validity of the executive order, avoiding the issue of incarceration of US citizens without due process. In 184 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

1980, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), appointed by President Jimmy Carter, concluded that the incarceration had been the product of racism. President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which apologized for the internment on behalf of the US government and authorized a payment of twenty thousand dollars (equivalent to forty-one thousand dollars in 2016) to each camp survivor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Internment_of_Japanese_Americans. 55. Desmond King, The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 89. 56. Louis Fisher, The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America’s Freedoms (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 119–23. 57. Ibid., 168–71. 58. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 95. 59. Aristide R. Zolberg, “Reforming the Back Door: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective,” in Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics, Virginia Yans- McLaughlin, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 318–9. 60. Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History, 86, no. 1 (1999): 91–2. 61. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/muslim-hate- crimes-increased-2016-islamophobia-donald-trump-latest-a7735141.html. 62. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich, “Quandaries of Integration in America and Europe: An Introduction,” in Managing Ethnic Diversity After 9/11: Integration, Security, and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective, Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 4–5. 63. David G. Savage, “Justices: DUI Not Grounds for Deportation,” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2004. http://www.latimes.com/news/ nationworld/nation/la 110904scotus_lat,0,5613485.story?coll=la- home-headlines. 64. John S.W. Park, “On Being Here and Not Here: Noncitizen Status in American Immigration Law,” in Immigrant Rights in the Shadows of Citizenship, Rachel Ida Buff, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 34–5. 65. Philip Q. Yang, Post-1965 Immigration to the United States: Structural Determinants (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 14. 66. Ernest Rubin, “The Demography of Immigration to the United States,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 367, no. 1 (1966): 21. NOTES 185

67. Patrick Ireland, “Security and/or Participation: On the Need to Reconcile Differing Conceptions of Migrant Integration,” in Managing Ethnic Diversity After 9/11: Integration, Security, and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective, Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 20. 68. A thirteen-story Islamic community center was proposed within two blocs of the World Trade Center site, which led to the eruption of a huge controversy. As of 2016, financing had been secured for a forty-three- story “high-end” condo with room for an Islamic cultural museum. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Park51. 69. Kitty Calavita, “Immigration, Social Control, and Punishment in the Industrial Era,” in Race, Gender, and Punishment: From Colonialism to the War on Terror, Jeanne Flavin and Mary Bosworth, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 120–33. 70. Ibid., 119. 71. David E. Bernstein, “The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans,” Texas Law Review, 76, no. 4 (1998): 781–7. 72. Plessy v. Ferguson was the landmark case in 1896, where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of racial segregation as long as separate but equal facilities were provided by the states. 73. Desmond King, The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51–2. 74. Jonathan Xavier Inda, Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology, and Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 70–3. 75. Kitty Calavita, “Immigration, Social Control, and Punishment in the Industrial Era,” in Race, Gender, and Punishment: From Colonialism to the War on Terror, Jeanne Flavin and Mary Bosworth, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 125–7. 76. Jonathan Xavier Inda, Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology, and Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 67–70. 77. When there was a sudden increase in the demand for agricultural labor, such as in California, there were attempts to “dry” the “wetbacks” by allowing them to enter illegally, arrest them, and make them work at agricultural farms during their imprisonment. Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 155–6. 78. For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Voting Rights Act, see Gary May, Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 79. Edward J.W. Park and John S.W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 13–14. 186 5 IMMIGRATION: BECOMING “US” VERSUS REMAINING “THEM”

80. David M. Reimers, Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 151. 81. Edward J.W. Park and John S.W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3. 82. Corn is highly subsidized in America, and the producers can make a profit even when selling corn below the production cost. 83. The city of Nogales suffered two deaths and millions of dollars in damage due to the backed-up flood waters caused by the border wall on either side of the Arizona/Sonora divide. http://texascivilrightsreview.org/ phpnuke/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1406. 84. Daniel J. Tichenor, “The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981–1990,” Polity, 26, no. 3 (1994): 336–40. 85. Donald Trump, even after winning the Electoral College vote, has been alleging widespread voter fraud by undocumented people. Although there is no proof of such occurrences, many Southern states have passed new laws requiring multiple proofs of citizenship and generally making the voting process more difficult for a substantial part of their citizens. 86. NSEERS, or INS Special Registration, was suspended in 2011, though the Trump administration has stated its desire to revive it. 87. Michael Welch, “Immigration Lockdown Before and After 9/11,” in Race, Gender, and Punishment: From Colonialism to the War on Terror, Jeanne Flavin and Mary Bosworth, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 156–7. 88. Cases where permanent residents have to go through unreasonably long periods of background checks, or where marriage petitions are denied on a whim, are increasing exponentially. 89. Permanent residents have been deported for possessing drugs and for drunk driving. According to the new definition, even shoplifting can be construed as a probable cause for deportation for a permanent resident. Possession of drugs, irrespective of volume, is defined as an “aggravated felony.” 90. For chilling details, read Deepa Fernandes, Targeted: Homeland Security and the Business of Immigration (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007). 91. Michael Welch, “Immigration Lockdown Before and After 9/11,” in Race, Gender, and Punishment: From Colonialism to the War on Terror, Jeanne Flavin and Mary Bosworth, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 138–46. 92. http://www.wral.com/palestinian-man-s-deportation-hits-snag-us- doesn-t-recognize-his-country/15717310/. 93. Ibid., 149–63. 94. Mary Bosworth, “Identity, Citizenship, and Punishment,” in Race, Gender, and Punishment: From Colonialism to the War on Terror, Jeanne NOTES 187

Flavin and Mary Bosworth, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 138–46. 95. The detainees at Guantánamo Bay have petitioned more than two hundred times for their right to appear in court. The Patriot Act had restricted the right of habeas corpus to resident aliens; this was done to allow suspected terrorists to be held without legal counsel or trial and avoid the protection of habeas corpus. Boumediene v. Bush (2008), however, established that Guantánamo detainees have a right to habeas corpus, are entitled to the legal protections of the US Constitution, and are able to bring their petitions to US courts. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habeas_ corpus_petitions_of_Guantanamo_Bay_detainees. 96. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05–184. 97. https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/rubio-outlines- elements-of-his-new-immigration-plan/?_r=0. 98. The Washington Post reported that in a Philadelphia community, there was a widespread rumor that federal agents were hauling up illegal immigrants from their jobs and deporting them. A large number of Hispanic workers stayed home and did not even dare to go out to buy food on the “Tuesday of Fear,” or Martes de Miedo. Darryl Fears, “Immigration Debate Heats Up,” Washington Post (March 21, 2006), A03. 99. Robert Koulish, Immigration and American Democracy: Subverting the Rule of Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 68–9. 100. Ibid., 96–100. 101. http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/07/three_cops_ accused_of_danziger.html. 102. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Fly_List. 103. http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/ohio-6-year-oid-turns-upon-terror-watch-list/19532082. 104. E-Verify is an internet-based program managed by the DHS and the Social Security Administration (SSA) to weed out ineligible workers. 105. Walter J. Nichols, The DREAMers: How the Undocumented Youth Movement Transformed the Immigrant Rights Debate (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 2. 106. Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, U.S. Immigration in the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015), 23. 107. Ibid., 24. 108. http://thehill.com/latino/329389-first-protected-dreamer-deported- under-trump. 109. Walter J. Nichols, The DREAMers: How the Undocumented Youth Movement Transformed the Immigrant Rights Debate (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 4–5. 110. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jose_Antonio_Vargas. CHAPTER 6

State Power: Technology Versus Technology

The story of American citizenship not only follows the narratives of expansion, internal conflicts, foreign relations, and immigration, but also of the extension and practice of state power through both conventional and unconventional means. Although domestic and international combat captures the essence and nature of state power, this is not the only tool that has been used to expand such power. For much of the late twentieth century and the twenty-first century, the exercise of government power has manifested itself through technology, and new tools of control have manifested themselves through major technological developments. The potential of technology to both expand and limit government power is multifold and paradoxical; yet technology is often perceived as neutral, and its political role has usually not been under the spotlight. Historically, the American state grew more powerful with territorial acquisitions, military triumphs, and economic successes. As the state expanded, American citizens curtailed state power with demands for more political, economic, and social rights through various political movements, social uprisings, and conventional processes for policy changes. The state responded by allowing more rights for citizens, but also by shrinking those very rights when the demands by citizens were perceived to weaken the state. While racial and political movements, domestic and foreign conflicts, and immigration and naturalization laws and their enforcement are easier to detect, the way technology factors in the power balance between the state and the citizen is often less tangible. The balance of power between the state and

© The Author(s) 2018 189 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_6 190 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY the citizenry is complicated and multifaceted, as various tools of technology can simultaneously strengthen and weaken both state power and citizenship rights and can also take place discreetly, outside the political discourse. This chapter is about these new means of control, both in the hands of the government and citizens, and the new conflicts pertaining to demarcation of the boundaries of state power. America’s position as global hegemon and its predominance in global relations has obviously impacted the contours of citizenship rights and eligibility over the years. Just as citizens have demanded more social, political, and economic rights through initiation or expansion of government services, they have also demanded the government to act both to preserve privacy and to ensure more security. The demarcation of power between the state and the citizen is not only inscribed in legal measures, but is also shaped through social perception and economic reality. Although surveillance of mass data to monitor the lives of ordinary citizens has become basic to everyday life, the acceptance of such mechanisms has undoubtedly been influenced by our changing notions of privacy, privacy rights, and the relation between privacy rights and security. One of the key debates in the twenty-first century concerns privacy rights, as even the accurate definition of privacy for this era remains up in the air. Once data about the private aspects of life can be proven to have any utilitarian purpose (such as medical records), it is relatively easy for major institutions to record such data and share it among interested parties. No form of personal information remains inherently personal, or difficult or expensive to collect; nor is it deemed exclusively private by the government or citizens.1 The policies and tools used to provide both safety and privacy rely on enormous capabilities for collecting, storing, analyzing, and utilizing data regarding the everyday activities of all people, and have a global reach. Along with these tools or mechanisms of control, there has been a huge transition in our everyday lives, with the use of various social media where personal privacy rights are being given up voluntarily.2 There is a parallel change in the aggregate mindset of citizens, from prioritizing protection of our private lives from the government to asking the government to protect us from all unforeseen dangers.3 Starting from the newspapers and all the way up to the internet, the state has always been cognizant of the significance of shaping and manipu- lating public discourse. New technology often starts off cocooned under government supervision, but as soon as it reaches the market, commercial 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY 191 zeal may take it in quite other directions.4 What makes late twentieth- century and early twenty-first-century technology worthy of focus is that the new technologies are not just modalities of control, but that they have emerged with lives of their own and a multifaceted tug-of-war has flourished between the state, citizens, and other parties to gain control over each other through technological means. The 2016 election and Donald J. Trump’s victory show us the power of fake news, where a few individuals with relatively few resources were able to influence the minds of voters and dominate the topics that were covered in the political cycle.5 Compared to the discourse on the influence of technology, issues such as efficiency, productivity, and customer satisfaction are often more prominent than the balance of power between the state and its citizens. From the point of view of political power, technology is often relegated to passive status as only a method to implement government policies, though the very existence of technology often amplifies the meaning of existing policies and creates the conditions in which new and more intrusive policies can be imagined.6 America’s modern prison-industrial complex could never have materialized or been managed without sophisticated data collection and data sharing. The walls along the California/Mexico border under the auspices of “Operation Gatekeeper” were built from the material residues of the Gulf War.7 The unmanned drones which are flying over the Afghanistan/Pakistan border are also being utilized on the US/Mexico border. Throughout American history, wars have served to normalize the expansion of government control. Many of those modes of control would have been meaningless without the accompanying technology. The over- reaching use of surveillance after the September 11 terrorist attacks is incomprehensible without the capability to collect, store, share, and disseminate unlimited amounts of data. Technology in the modern era also stands out because it has changed the very topography of the public sphere by inserting the internet in our spatial world. The shape and vibrancy of the public sphere is directly related to defining the rights, privileges, and obligations of citizens, along with the actualization of such provisions. The nature and depth of public engagement in the era of the internet are also very different compared to past transformations triggered by radio or television. The overload of information dissuades us from political participation, but at the same time creates the first-ever painless opportunity to team up with people from all over the world to take up a common cause. Public engagement with each other, and especially between opposite camps, has been considerably 192 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY altered as we are able to create and thrive in our own smaller forums, instead of a common public sphere.8 The fragmented and polarized spaces of postmodern public encounters often create the illusion of having more control over government as opposed to the real exercise of power. The nature of interaction between citizens and government, and in fact any political interaction, contains both horizontal (between peers) and vertical (between different levels of power holders) elements. The contours of such relationships are often lost in cyberspace, which assumes and is, in fact, designed for horizontal relations.9 The initiation and use of technology in government not only represents the spirit of innovation, but also idealism toward the role of government itself. Does the use of technology really enhance our control over government? Alternatively, how does it impact the government’s control over us? The government is using technology to regain control over citizens— ironically, the very power that had eroded because of technology and globalization. Hence, the focus of this chapter is the impact of technology on the nature of governance and the content of citizenship. Technology has been inserting new norms of inclusion and exclusion, altering the scope and depth of the public sphere, simultaneously limiting and expanding public engagement. Through all these acts, it has been changing the relationship between the state, the market, and citizens, and subsequently redefining our expectations about government, citizens’ rights, the public sphere, public engagement, and the practice of citizenship.

The Rhetoric: Transparency and Accountability of Government The foundation of liberal democracy depends on citizen participation, and large-scale citizen participation has been aided and strengthened by various technological innovations such as print media, public broadcasts, and the internet. When we think of scientific advancements like the steam engine, automobiles, mechanical cotton pickers, and hydroelectric dams, all of these technological icons sought to make life easier by subjugating nature, and thereby making the citizen’s stake in government larger. Science and technology, through industrialization, had changed the economic basis of society and these changes had shaped the political process to a great extent. Large-scale manufacturing and industrialization created the wage labor system, which, on the one hand, diminished peoples’ control over their labor, but, on the other hand, created a systematic process THE RHETORIC: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT 193 of inclusion of the common people into the political process. The demand for immigrant labor and the escalation of technological development also share a parallel trend. Despite racial, gender, and class obstacles, in general economic growth and prosperity continuously eased the barriers for citizenship practices by introducing new norms of inclusion: allowing the common people a greater role in local politics; providing structural assis- tance to immigrants; and raising aspirations about government itself.10 The expansion of government and the escalation of technological innovation have a symbiotic relationship in American history: government has been dependent on technology to carry out its ever-increasing functions, while, simultaneously, technological development has been contingent on government support. Enlightenment philosophy and the modernizing culture of technology went hand in hand, as government sought to utilize technology to reach out to the people. Technology relentlessly expanded the scope and depth of citizenship by allowing citizens to be more informed participants in the political process and by creating the access points through which large-scale participation was made possible. Although the benefits of most technologies were unequally distributed, there was an overall consensus about the benefits for society at large. The government was the perceived and actual gatekeeper of the fair distribution of technological benefits.11 The founding fathers as well as the common citizens had an optimistic belief in science and technology, which has held up all the way to the very recent political regime of President Trump, which has decreed, for instance, that the federal agencies in charge of environmental and scientific policies should not share information with the public or the media.12 Bimber traces the creation of the US postal service and the vibrant newspaper industry as the first stage of technological innovation, which facilitated the national flow of political information and served to expand the participatory nature of the democratic process.13 The second wave of technology began as the Gilded Age passed into the Progressive Era: the nature of work changed, expanding manual work and service jobs, along with the proliferation of professional positions where information and communication played central roles.14 From the late nineteenth century through the 1950s, the modernist culture of technology connected science, citizens, and liberal democratic politics to each other. The expansion of technology and its associated political role, however, generally excluded minority groups. Government, along with communities, often used the same democratic tools, such as newspapers, to promulgate rumors of 194 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

African American violence and often to initiate violence.15 The alliance between modernist technology and government increased during and after the Second World War with endorsement from the public.16 The third information revolution, associated with the emergence of broadcast media, had a profound impact on candidate selection, campaigning, leadership strategies, political identification, and social identification, and was the root of pluralism by making it possible for the mass audience to engage in politics.17 The high expectations from science and technology in terms of progress and prosperity were somewhat analogous to the growing expectations from government and the desire for increased participation in government. The group interests of these classes, occupations, and professions fed competitive political parties. Scientists staged public demonstrations of their inventions, allocating a crucial role to ordinary citizens.18 Modernist technology also helped the citizen to develop a greater sense of competence. That tradition continued well into the Progressive Era: the role of citizens as judges of technology is reflected in the Wizard of Oz.19 In an earlier time, Newton had gone out of his way to prepare accessible versions of his theory specifically for the general public. The assumption was that ordinary people could rely on their own senses to understand science and technology. The Industrial Revolution transformed the scale and complexity of political information, and although the scope of citizen participation was extended, the quality of participation started to decline. With the growth of the scale of technology, not only did technology become increasingly complex, it also became an end in itself rather than an instrument of human betterment.20 Postmodern technological culture, emerging in the late twentieth century, on the surface seems to embody the principles of unlimited access and ultimate inclusion, until we take a stab at examining the inclusion from an equity standpoint. While a sizeable portion of civil society is now connected through the internet, we also have to acknowledge that every citizen does not have adequate access to the new form of civil society. The digital divide that is most pronounced between low-income and high- income citizens as well as the younger and older generations should not be overlooked. A number of federal programs, aiming to lessen this divide by focusing on schools in poor urban and rural areas, have provided public computers and internet access, and the use of such programs by minorities remains high. There is almost a sixty percent gap in the use of home computers between the richest and the poorest categories of students.21 THE RHETORIC: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT 195

Nevertheless, at least theoretically, the potential of enhanced citizen participation through the digital forum cannot be denied. Information and communication have been relatively scarce, costly, and unevenly available to political actors. The evolution of parties and interest groups, and the success of candidates, all depended on the manipulation and maneuvering of this information. But the ongoing Information Revolution has altered this foundation by making information abundant and readily accessible.22 Technology, which was enthusiastically accepted for its role in providing for the greater good in the Progressive Era, became a tool in the hands of citizens to measure accountability and efficiency in government. The wide-scale distrust in government which manifested as a result of the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War initiated new mechanisms for accountability and citizen participation. Soon these values morphed into an easier tangible device of measurement, the measurement of efficiency. The rise of New Public Management as a theory of good governance in the discipline of Public Administration23 and its adoption in the National Performance Review24 by Vice President Al Gore reflected the initiative to make government responsive, results-oriented, and agile during the Clinton era. This had serious consequences for shifting power into the hands of the government, as efficiency justified all actions, citizens became customers, and the focus shifted from the process of governance to mere delivery of services. As economic efficiency and profitability became the sole motivations of government, New Public Management emerged as a convenient tool for concealing the political force of surveillance power.25 It is perhaps not an accident that the ideological changes in the perception of governance, citizen participation, and administration, all have paralleled changes in the world of technology. Numerous writers have credited postmodern technology with too much power to threaten existing social arrangements. For example, Michael Strangelove praises internet technology for disrupting the social order by undermining corporate culture as well as state authority.26 He examines the new communicative freedoms, but downplays the new powers of the state and the corporate world. On the international stage, Twitter and Facebook have been regarded as indispensable tools for the 2009 Iranian revolution (which failed) and the 2011 rebellion in Egypt (with ambiguous consequences). In Iran, technology could not compete with the oppressive power of government, while in Egypt the government’s abuse of power by shutting down the internet could not thwart the enthusiasm and commitment of the Egyptian people. Although we marvel 196 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY at the role Facebook and Twitter played in the Arab Spring, when we realize that the Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak has been released from prison even as the political prisoners who brought about his downfall lan- guish in jails, we are compelled to rethink our amazement at technological reach. The question that needs to be answered is whether or not the internet can function like a truly democratic and egalitarian public space. Most of the cyber communities on the internet have been discussion groups composed of individuals with narrowly defined common interests. All the important political blogsites, such as The Drudge Report, Breitbart News, RedState, Salon, The Huffington Post, DailyKos, among others, are intricately associated with a pre-established ideology. The process of cyberbal- kanization, whereby the inhabitants of online communities self-select into self-interested groups, is anathema to the offline communities we actually live in. In real-life communities, we have to deal with everyone we bump into, not just those with whom we are already in agreement. Looking at an earlier iteration of the internet, David, Helin, and Reeher held: “The internet tends to be primarily a source for passive private entertainment and the purchase of traditional retail goods, rather than active real communication. The internet is creating virtual malls rather than virtual villages.”27 Recently, however, the internet has domestically been a powerful force behind burgeoning social justice movements, such as the Occupy movement and Black Lives Matter (BLM). Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’s campaign, despite the candidate having been a self- declared democratic socialist, would not have been conceivable without the potency of the internet to leverage his support to a far greater magnitude (falling just a couple of million votes short of the eventual nominee, Hillary Clinton) than would have been possible under traditional technologies. Yet in the end the campaign lost, and on the opposite side is the dependence of voting integrity on new technologies, which have come under sharp criticism for being unreliable, or vulnerable to manipulation or even corruption, as is shown by the lawsuits filed against election officials in states such as Massachusetts, Nevada, Colorado, New York, and California during the course of the 2016 Democratic primaries, following a trend established in 2004 when Diebold voting machines first came under scrutiny for voting and tabulating irregularities. The power of the internet to disrupt social arrangements should not be underestimated, but it is yet to overpower political institutions. THE REALITY: EXPANSION OF STATE POWER 197

Science has been linked to progressive liberalism and democracy since the enlightenment, based on the assumption that rationality and science would liberate the human race from ignorance, prejudice, and injustice. But we also need to examine the type of technology that is promoted by the government and the level of access that is enjoyed by all sectors of society. Widespread access to high-speed internet in Europe follows the model of public transportation, while the struggle of the cable and telephone companies in the United States to obstruct such access mirrors the strategy of automakers to destroy light rail decades ago. In our mainstream media, radio, television, and computers not only spread literacy and political knowledge, they also, at the same time, make literacy and political knowledge less relevant, as they often discourage deeper analysis of politics and policies in favor of superficial sound bites. Technology can stunt as well as enhance the civic polity. Technology can help democracy only if it follows a political model that is truly democratic in nature.28

The Reality: Expansion of State Power The new technologies of the twenty-first century allow widespread data collection, preservation, and usage with relatively little cost, and the US government has utilized this opportunity to extend its control over the private lives of citizens. Various new legislative measures and the implementation of dormant administrative measures in the post-9/11 era are examples of such initiatives. Although September 11 and the associated alleged security risks continue to serve as an excellent means to justify the new intrusive role of government, in reality a number of these statutes precede the historic event. Most of these pervasive changes have only become possible because of the new era of technological innovation. These are the same technologies that are intended to enhance efficiency in service delivery and transparency in government. Citizens are supposed to exercise their rights and control over the state in an accessible and convenient manner because of these very technologies. A political environment where safety overshadows privacy concerns lends legitimacy to implement such measures and to drown out confronting voices.29 Another major factor in the realm of technology intervening between the state and the citizen is the private sector. The expansion of the market—from the post-Revolutionary era to the New Deal, and from the aftermath of the Second World War to the rise of a unipolar America after the demise of the Soviet Union—has always had a profound impact on US 198 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY citizenship, as has been discussed in the previous chapters. In the twenty- first century, the alignments between and among government, citizens, and the markets have become murkier and more haphazard than ever before, as no one group can claim and retain the mechanism of control over technology in any profound way.30 For example, the US government has sought and received support from high-tech companies to expand wiretapping on citizens. This affiliation between the government and the market has definitely reduced the citizen’s privacy rights, as we will see in the Edward Snowden case, discussed briefly at the end of the chapter. Even though these actions seriously compromise our privacy rights, they will probably be continued both by the government and the market. The perfect example of a mutually beneficial alliance between the government and the market at the expense of citizens’ interests is the plan to undermine net neutrality,31 which will allow the market to shape which sources of information are easily available to the people, and thereby mold the level of influence of each website, blog, promotional material, or anything that has a presence on the internet. Protesters from the left and the right have united on issues of privacy violation and the market’s usurpation of virtual space, which is now deemed a vital public space, but government policies seem to adhere to corporate demands. Technology has always had a special, though deeply ambivalent, relationship to democracy. Democracy depends on reflection, involving time- consuming interaction among multiple actors. Democracy is not only slow, but also makes room for pondering, rethinking, and absorbing the consequences of previous decisions. It demands periodic silence as well as communicative exchanges. Political reasoning is complex and nuanced, dialectical rather than digitally oppositional.32 The pace of change in government is designed to be slow, while technological development leaps forward with much greater energy. Technology, even when it is not incu- bated in the marketplace, more often than not has depended on government support. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is part of the Department of Defense, has not only been responsible for the development of emerging technologies for use by the military, but has provided significant technologies that have influenced many non- military fields such as computer networking, and that have been the basis for the modern internet and graphical user interfaces in information technology. The relationship between technology and the government has been mutually supportive, with a complementary element, as is exemplified THE REALITY: EXPANSION OF STATE POWER 199 by different military projects that have spilled over into the mainstream, such as the computer itself and, of course, the internet.33 The technological innovations of the late twentieth century have dis- rupted the comparatively linear model of mutually beneficent state- technology relations. Computer technology and digital software enable the government to collect and centralize a wide array of information on citizens (and non-citizens), and the same technology allows the government to disseminate the data to the local level. The rising practice of local- level law enforcement agencies as executors of federal immigration policies is an appropriate example. We have much more access to information at all layers of government because of e-government, yet this tool is more commonly deployed in a one-way direction, to learn about different procedures or download relevant forms, but not as often to hold government accountable. The avenues to voice our dissatisfactions have been reduced to the feedback or comments boxes, which in all probability are less productive than letters to the editor, but can be equally gratifying.34 The expansion of services over the internet has added more expediency and an array of new capabilities, but this new form of relationship with the government has eroded our proprietorship right over the government. As mentioned earlier, the New Public Management or Reinventing Government theory in Public Administration, which incidentally overlaps with efforts to expand technology in government functions, has replaced the notion of the citizen with the image of the customer. The customer may have more rights over the immediate transaction, but has a lesser stake in the company. The aspect of anonymity often liberates participants from any kind of accountability. We do not have to encounter the physical environment or the bureaucratic obstacles of government offices, but our relations with government are being managed through what is projected on computer screens, which may or may not reflect the real intricacies of government. The internet was supposed to enhance citizen capabilities to hold government accountable by adding millions of watchful eyes, but the watchful eyes are meaningless if they cannot lead to policy changes.35 Technology is often less a determinant than a mirror of the larger society. Who owns it, how it is used, who is using it, and to which ends it is being used are the questions that we need to seek answers to. The late nineteenth-century technologies suited the mass transportation system as well as the growth of the automotive industry. It was a conscious political decision that translated the technologies of the internal combustion engine and the electric motor into a full-fledged suburban society.36 Internet 200 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY technology certainly has democratic potential, but so far we have mostly reproduced the traditional political structures and processes in cyberspace, amplifying their use, though there are examples where technology has subverted the traditional media as a political tool. Without the fairer virtual sphere of campaign advertisements and campaign financing, Barack Obama would probably never have succeeded in outperforming Hillary Clinton as the Democratic nominee in the 2008 election. Similarly, without the use of the internet, it is inconceivable that Bernie Sanders would have emerged as a main contender in the Democratic Party. At the same time, without the internet and social media (and maybe fake news), there would have been no Trump presidency. Technology has indeed amplified the scope of state power, but by doing so has redefined the relationship between the state and the citizen. Instead of disseminating more power to individuals, technology has allowed the government to exercise more control over citizens. A number of controlling mechanisms of the state seem less obtrusive, but can actually be more intrusive when technology replaces traditional means.37 Using technological devices is often touted as the preferred option, though people living in border cities such as Arivaca, Arizona, and dealing with unmanned drones constantly prowling their neighborhoods, would certainly disagree. They are not only bothered by the noise these drones produce, but also by the fact that these drones are equipped to take pictures that can easily capture the private moments of citizens within their own homes.38 The government has very efficiently exploited the dual nature of technology: by disseminating responsibility while retaining more control over our lives (the Department of Homeland Security lists the names of deport- ees, and it is the individual’s responsibility to check the status of his case, as opposed to getting notification in the mail); by providing a litany of information about the minute details of services; and by transforming every aspect of our individual lives into data points.39 In the recent past, American citizens have been asked and encouraged to detect the terrorist behavior of strangers and neighbors and to notify the authorities, and there have been numerous examples of citizens being booted off airplanes on the basis of alleged fear from fellow passengers, often stoked by hearing a foreign language.40 A free society and a fearful society demand very different sets of behavior from the people. The key dynamic between surveillance and democracy that has emerged as a major factor is perhaps the role of private corporations. The profit THE REALITY: EXPANSION OF STATE POWER 201 model of large corporations, whether they constitute search engines or social media, is based on collecting large swaths of information about our preferences, ranging from consumer products to personal behavior, helped by the large part of our private lives now taking place in the surveillance- induced virtual world. The internationalization of surveillance has occurred rather smoothly since September 11, when the US government put pressure on smaller nation-states to share and collect data; with available technologies such as biometric identification, this was easily achieved.41 In 2006, President Bush admitted that he had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to spy on Americans without warrants, and had subpoenaed the search records of several large internet companies including Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL. Only Google refused to hand over the information, citing trade-secret protections.42 In the twenty-first century, territorial control over certain technologies by the nation-state is no longer the issue, because states can use the technologies beyond their national borders as long as they can justify their use politically. Just as terrorism has seriously challenged the state monopoly of violence, the free flow of technology on the global front and its equally well-distributed sharing mechanisms may, at first glance, seem to be a serious handicap to the exercise of authority by any country.43 Authorized in the Bush era, the NSA can intercept communications within the United States and confronts an overwhelming flood of telecommunications to monitor. Instead of bothering about warrants, the NSA got access to the switching systems of telecommunications companies as per the President’s order, and swept in vast amounts of international and domestic communications. This actually covered the whole world, because the internet infra- structure is concentrated in the United States, and many international communications end up going through the switches physically located in the United States.44 The most important recent examples of the overreach of government power through technology pertain to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Patriot Act. The FISA Court was created in 1978 and allows electronic surveillance of all US persons for counterintelligence purposes, with a prior judicial warrant by the special court. The probable cause does not need to prove that a crime has been committed, and in emergency situations it even allows surveillance for a short period before seeking the warrant. Tension exists between civil liberties and the FISA Court provisions, which have allowed secret deliberation from the very beginning. The intelligence community historically has enjoyed broader 202 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY latitude in cases concerning counterespionage compared to criminal investigations, and the FISA Court has rarely turned down requests for surveillance orders.45 Whatever authority was lacking in FISA, the Patriot Act added the fin- ishing touches. Investigations of a wide range of documents—physical records, computer files, library records—were all permitted as long as there was a “significant purpose,” while the concept of “authorized investigation” tore down the already feeble barriers between criminal and foreign intelligence-gathering mechanisms. For any case where the investigator at his discretion serves a national security letter, the data cannot be disclosed to anyone else, which is known as the “gag rule.”46 The definition of potential or real international threats is very vague under the Patriot Act, as a warrant can serve to authorize a search that might produce either intelligence or evidence of an ordinary crime. The Patriot Act also allows “roving wiretaps” of any phone used by a target, which can in turn target the numbers called by the target.47 The surveillance initiatives stemming from the Bush administration’s war on terror opened up a huge profit potential for private companies that have the capacity to collect mass data, ranging from market research databases to courthouse records, and from public records to credit and insurance records.48 Nothing much changed during the Obama years and is unlikely to change during the Trump presidency. The internet has undoubtedly changed the nature and limits of privacy. Any presence of people on the internet can be aggregated, turned into consumer profiles, and added to public records. The Alien and Sedition Acts may have been the first tool for government to control dissent, but all through the years, especially during real and perceived crises such as the Civil War or fear of communism in the 1950s, the US government has never been hesitant to use legislative measures to thwart privacy and other citizenship rights in the name of security or self-defense.49 Under the Patriot Act, internet access providers, telephone companies, credit organizations, travel agencies, and libraries, all are obliged to provide information to the government,50 and for the first time the government has the capacity to collect, store, analyze, and use the information whatever way it deems necessary. It is well-documented how the Patriot Act has been used to track organized criminals, anti-war protesters, homeless people, and even pranksters.51 Mobilizing global information and technology systems is the lynchpin of preventive and preemptive war. Back in the Cold War era, the demarcation was between us and them, between good and bad, THE REALITY: EXPANSION OF STATE POWER 203 but in the era of terrorism, there is no clear dichotomy, as the endpoint seems to be the construction of a pervasive techno-military matrix.52 High-tech has spawned a new generation of technological utopians whose principal allegiance is not to the public sector but to the private, whose preference is for big corporations rather than efficient government, and whose aspiration is for personal profit rather than serious social change.53 Even though certain technologies may be inherently disaggre- gating and devolutionary, ownership of these technologies’ hardware and software remains aggregating and centralizing. Theoretically, the computer-aided voting mechanism is highly democratic, but it mimics the power structure when a corporation like Diebold can maintain absolute authority over the software used to count votes, as was true during the 2004 and 2008 elections. As commerce leads toward monopoly, it mandates privatization, and privatization of certain government services is the complete antithesis of democracy. Often decentralization and privatization are treated in a similar vein, but increased decentralization allows pluralis- tic decision-making, while privatization segregates the public from the policy-making process. With too much privatization, the values of public willingness and the public good are compromised, dealing a blow to the essence of democracy.54 The security apparatus in the United States and in many Western nations has been justified as the only way to thwart terrorists. Citizens often do not know whether or not the huge amount of tax money that pays for these measures in fact succeeds against terrorism, but the inconveniences, intrusions on privacy, and complaints against the management of such mechanisms are not treated seriously. The violations of privacy and civil rights have their extreme manifestation in cases where overcautious security measures have actually resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians at the hands of the authorities. Rigoberto Alpizar was shot to death in December 2005 by US Marshals inside an aircraft at Miami airport when he attempted to leave the plane and allegedly threatened having a bomb. The screams by his wife that he had bipolar disorder and had not taken his medicine were disregarded, and although no ammunition or bomb was found on him, the officials were cleared of any charge of wrongdoing.55 By accepting the political role of technology, it can be subjected to critical analysis and debate. Citizens can be involved in decisions regarding the use of technology, and there can be regulatory boards to investigate the social, environmental, and economic impact of technologies. This needs a user-centered philosophy of design.56 Even though surveillance and 204 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY democracy occupy the opposite ends of the spectrum, the use of surveillance for more democracy, such as police bodycams (body cameras), is possible. In democracies, citizens also expect to scrutinize government actions. Police brutality has always been a part of public discourse, and especially political discourse, since these brutalities are often evidence of racial bias. Racial prejudice against African Americans is well-documented, and this has recently reached a pinnacle with the violent murder of unarmed civilians such as Michael Brown,57 Eric Garner,58 and Sandra Bland.59 The quest for visibility, transparency, and accountability has only increased in the era of renewed police killings.60

The Paradox: Public Engagement, Segregation, and Loss of Civil Liberties One of the most important changes spawned by technology is the expansion and redefinition of public space, which now includes the virtual space of the internet. The production, nature, and transformation of the public sphere in America are all directly related to changing ideas about citizenship. The public sphere that followed the Articles of Confederation was vibrant enough politically to challenge social norms, though it was seg- mented regionally. The Constitution tamed the political vibrancy to some degree, as discussed in Chap. 2, but the public sphere became larger, more connected, and brimful of ideological discourses stemming from economic and social upheaval. Prior to the 1930s—that is, before the growth of the state and the liberal embrace of state power as the core device to bring to life the values of liberalism—both communitarians and liberals wanted to keep the government out of the public sphere.61 The public sphere became the epitome of politics and citizenship issues during the civil rights movement. Now the technology of the internet has opened up a new public sphere in the virtual terrain, a space that can be simultaneously global yet insular, as it allows people not to connect with people who do not believe in the same ideology. In the new virtual space, the government has started out with more power and is actually seeking for more ways to monitor citizens in every imaginable manner, though the same technologies can theoretically be used by citizens to monitor the government in its use or abuse of power.62 The internet has emerged as the newest form of the public sphere, replacing the old form of community spaces where citizens interacted and grouped together to support or oppose government initiatives. In com- THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 205 parison to the older generation of the passive technologies of radio and television, the internet is no doubt much more active in carving out virtual community spaces. This virtual space can succeed as a public space when it builds on or leads to a real public space of citizen discourse, not when it replaces an existing public space with something weaker. Civil society has historically fulfilled a role deemed unsuitable for government. The traditional public spaces of parks, clubs, and churches used to serve as the underpinnings of civil society; here, people would form bonds with each other, not necessarily to form alliances for or against the government. These were the forums where public opinion would be formed, debated, and explored. The government remained absent from these public spaces unless a public meeting demanded the presence of government representatives. These forms of public spaces are still operating, but the use of cyberspace as public space is swiftly becoming the preferred way and eroding the political significance of these older community spaces. In the new forum, knowing how to manipulate the technology, being able to afford one’s own personal computer, and possessing web-savvy skills to articulate one’s interests make one a player, but to become a key player one still needs access to the old media like television or radio, where one’s voice can be heard by all, not only by those who share the same interests and passions. The new public space of the internet has fundamentally changed the nature of citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-government interaction. Contemporary high-tech societies demand a significant redefinition of the public sphere comprised of new sites for information, discussion, con- testation, political struggle, and organization, including broadcast media and the new cyberspace as well as the interactions of everyday life.63 The idea of the internet as a space contains certain paradoxes: to what extent is it real? Is it public or private? Who retains control over the flow of information on the internet? Can it really function as a public space? It can be argued that the internet has provided citizens unprecedented access to government: we can find information, download relevant information, and access services far more easily, in less time, and often even by paying less. This convenience, however, demands a price: our control over our individual information has been lost to a considerable extent, without any doubt. Tracking anyone’s private information—whether by government, companies, or private entities—now involves merely a few clicks and a rudimentary fee. Citizens are also giving up their privacy rights, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes to avoid conflict with state power. 206 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

The new public sphere of the internet can be seen as both private and public, strengthening individualism and collectivism simultaneously, by allowing the space to exercise our consumerist and communications instincts. Most importantly, as a tool of public engagement, the internet creates the illusion of connecting communities, but in reality it mostly connects like-minded people who believe in common causes. There may be exchanges of opinions and viewpoints, but the opposing viewpoints end up on separate blogs or are ignored as radical comments when tres- passing occurs. Being on the same page now has a literal implication without the figurative connotation. As noted earlier, the leading political blogs like The Huffington Post, The Drudge Report, and DailyKos report the same instances, but from completely different points of view. The world- views of Trump supporters and Clinton supporters in the 2016 election proved to be polar opposites, and neither side knew how to approach the other side in a real political dialogue.64 The potential for real dialogue between people with dissimilar political ideologies is yet to emerge in the digital public space. Gouge argues that the territory of cyberspace is constituted as a frontier, where the state and citizenship remain in a consensual illusion that discourages us from examining the real relations on the ground. The engaged consumer in virtual reality and the productive citizen in a community are not one and the same.65 Cyberspace, like outer space, is the new frontier, which has to be tamed and made into a new civil democratic territory. The cyber frontier is driven and peopled by entrepreneurs who are devising new ways to explore its money-making potential. The narrative of cyber technology fosters a retreat into a frontierist hyper- individualism, but instead of taking us to the future we are being forced to step back to the real world of old political relations and maneuvers.66 In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas identified “political participation as the core of a democratic society and as an essential element in individual self-development.... [He] contrasted various forms of an active, participatory bourgeois public sphere in the heroic era of liberal democracy with the more privatized forms of spectator politics in bureaucratic industrial society in which the media and the elites controlled the public sphere.”67 The idea of the panopticon, introduced by Foucault, has been supplied with unprecedented energy as government enjoys unparalleled control over civil society. Our e-mails, our telephone conversations, all are vulnerable to wiretapping, aided by continuous real-time surveillance, and THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 207

concern over security is reshaping even the most traditional institutions like schools. Schools have special significance in the trajectory of citizenship, as racial equality was contested over equal access to schools, and the end of segregation gave new meaning to citizenship rights. Schools in America, particularly those in poor neighborhoods, have now become barricaded places of fear. Armed guards, body searches, and dogs are not anomalies, but rather a routine part of the school experience. Surveillance is so pervasive that one wonders what future generations who are completely used to intrusive measures and lack of privacy will feel about the basic rights of citizens and the level of government intrusion in everyday life.68 The Patriot Act created a new federal crime of domestic terrorism, but it is so broad that students have been expelled from schools for making terrorist threats, as any “acts dangerous to human life” can now be deemed terrorist acts.69 Public education was supposed to enable its recipients to find ways for meaningful political participation. The growing use of technology in the classrooms has not only changed the structure and processes of education, but it has transformed the nature and content of liberal education itself. While opting for more perfect techniques to impart information, we have sacrificed the values of normative reason, moral judgment, and reflection. The university has replaced its historical mission of teaching the student the art of learning and actively engaging with the provision of skill-sets that are deemed valuable in the job market.70 Training for such skills often results in unreflective technicians. Technology through the web and other multimedia techniques makes huge classrooms possible, but often takes place at the cost of interaction and dialogue about the learning process. The structural transformation of the public sphere, to use Habermas’s terminology again, has also transformed the nature of public engagement. Just as it has created billions of private niches to fill the void of apathy caused by non-news, the internet has also become the main host of private citizens who vow to fill the lacuna of the absence of information. The emergence of blogs as players (or at least engaged observers) in politics during their halcyon days in the mid-2000s was, of course, made possible through the internet. During the 2008 primary and general elections, the power of the blogosphere in engaging citizens, and making them politically aware, interested, and invested, reached a pinnacle. At the time, the whole notion of public engagement in government, politics, and citizenship seemed to be changing toward a positive and optimum direction. Yet all that engagement invariably led to the polarization of opinions, with no 208 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY path left for reconciliation, as the 2016 election and the resulting Trump presidency demonstrate. The internet, like traditional media, has equal potential for depoliticizing the public realm by replacing the emphasis on politics with sensational issues framed in an apolitical way. This new generation of technology boasts of being free from authoritarian control, but it can and has been, in many instances, co-opted by the existing power structure. It was possible for Howard Dean in 2003 to reach the grassroots and build a support base through the internet. But his fate as the Democratic candidate was decided on the turf of real politics. The 2006 midterm election was another example of internet activism transforming into real votes, but it fell short of achieving real results translating into lasting policy changes, as the Iraq War continued with a surge and the conditions became ever riper for the financial collapse. In 2008, we had Barrack Obama who garnered the youth power through new technological spaces to beat both his Democratic and Republican challengers, namely Hillary Clinton and then John McCain. Tech-savvy groups soon became an essential part of existing political institutions in Washington, DC, yet their outreach to citizens and their supporters through virtual public forums has remained rue- fully superficial and inadequate. The search for a new leader in self-avowed democratic socialist Bernie Sanders is clear proof of the impotency of the Democratic Party in retaining millennial supporters. In essence, people power has not been translated into political power; rather, the existing political reality has toned down the new expectations. The dissatisfaction over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was what boosted internet activism; it was the internet which evolved as the premiere tool of campaigning in the 2008 election, the adept manipulation of which led to Obama’s nomi- nation by the Democratic Party and ultimately to his presidency. But the foreign policy decisions of the Obama administration, the failure to close the Guantánamo Bay prison, the continuation and expansion of drone warfare, and the large-scale deportation of undocumented immigrants were rarely influenced by the demands of his supporters. The function of the new technologies exemplified by the internet has shifted from facilitating rational discourse and debate within the public sphere to shaping, constructing, and limiting public discourse to those themes validated and approved by media corporations, as more often than not it follows the structure and content of the established media. While criticism of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars abounded on the internet, the coverage and analysis on the political blogs, which can be categorized as THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 209 virtual public spaces because of their readership, did not for the most part question the official guidelines of reasoning and critique that were distin- guishable from television news channels. Hence, the interconnection between the spheres of public debate and individual participation that was supposed to challenge political information and spectacle has not been realized to its true potential. The citizen-consumer may feel active, but his/her role in disputing the official version of any political event remains limited.71 The public sphere has historically operated as an informal sphere of sociality, located somewhere between bourgeois civil society and the state or government, and in that space, political and social functions manifested. Any public sphere with democratic significance not only allows access to people with divergent opinions, but makes it possible for opposing argu- ments to be heard and debated upon. The central features of internet and computer-mediated communications generally undermine the sort of public sphere and political communication that are required for genuine democratic deliberation.72 The internet has opened up a potentially unbounded space for communication and interaction; it has added new dimensions through speed and scope. Although there is no argument about the quantity and velocity of interaction, it has sacrificed some of the essential features of dialogue, in the quality of back-and-forth exchanges and the signification of responses. The internet may well be a free and open space, but it is a commercial marketplace.73 The virtual public space holds its promises and has the potential to increase and deepen the conversation because of its speed and scale. The potential of an open egalitarian public square in the virtual realm is not in doubt, though similar access by everyone to the electronic media still remains a significant obstruction to the realization of the promise of this virtual public space. We now live in a world in which, more than ever, fantasy and reality are impossible to distinguish, a statement which does not need any more emphasis in the Trump era. Information can be manufactured, twisted, multiplied, and disseminated without limit. The mass population was brought into politics through the connection and participation that went hand in hand with industrialization. The nature of political involvement in the postindustrial world often rewards technical skills and brings only those to the forefront who are able to master such expertise.74 Within the American state, we have seen a new move toward private responsibility for traditional public services. As mentioned before, the 210 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY theories of small government from the Reagan era to the Clinton–Gore National Performance Review support that shift in the name of efficiency. While we can debate the real impact of welfare reform (where responsibility was delegated to the state from the federal level), some of the basic functions of government have been dismantled without the presence of viable agencies—be they public, private, or non-profit—to fill the void. The plight of the residents of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is an example of the absence of government from time-honored services. Most of the structures of public housing in the city of New Orleans were demol- ished without providing any alternative to residents.75 All of this information was available on the internet, as were the avenues of complaint and criticism, but the residents of New Orleans did not succeed in holding the government culpable in spite of the plethora of evidence of mismanage- ment and criminal negligence of the demolishment process. The shift from public functions to private organizations often hides significant issues from public discourse, as private organizations seldom face the same level of scrutiny and demands for transparency by the public. The rise of private prisons and the lack of control over these prisons by citizens is another example of how the responsibilities of safekeeping have been privatized and commercialized. The enormous profit in the prison business lies at the root of the emergence of these private facilities, and various technologies that are eventually used against citizens are tested first at these prison sites.76 Most of these prisons have been constructed by partnerships between private prison companies and local governments on speculation that immigrant incarceration will continue to skyrocket. This expansion is also a direct result of increased enforcement along the border due to anti-terrorism initiatives. Steve Logan, CEO of Cornell Corrections, has shamelessly commented that September 11 brought many benefits for the industry because of the “heightened focus on detention” of immigrants and suspected terrorists.77 Stakeholders in both the private and the public realms have been looking to the federal government to provide them with prisoners.78 These prisons, and actually all new rules of exclusion, target the immigrant population as well as terrorists.79 Just as private prisons often serve as laboratories to test out various mechanisms of punishment, often bor- dering on torture, border cities are the testing grounds for implementing new norms of segregation. The wall that was erected to save the city of Brownsville80 from the invasion of illegal border-crossers ended up flood- ing the whole city, as the waters of the Rio Grande could not flow back to THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 211

Mexico. Radars, censors, cameras, and other technological apparatuses on the nine ninety-eight-foot towers or the virtual wall in the border city of Arivaca, Arizona,81 are not only eyesores, but also seriously compromise the privacy of the inhabitants. Yet in 2017, the government contemplates a shutdown over the funding for the border wall which candidate Trump promised to build and which President Trump is adamant to deliver.82 Cyberspace evolved without any conscious attempt to create, institutionalize, expand, and protect itself as a public space,83 but it has often been co-opted by existing institutions in the real political world. MoveOn. org began as a site that would provide an alternative space for common citizens to bring up issues and find ways to influence the political process. Its success as a third space for political issues did reach a crescendo, but declined as soon as it started endorsing the Democratic Party and aligned itself squarely with the Democrats. Although politically active and successful, this internet-based citizens group has become an extension of current politics rather than an alternative to major political party positions. It is far more accessible than the political parties and far more decentralized, but the choices it offers now are as limited as American politics. The Huffington Post, which had emerged as the liberal blog in the second half of the 2000s, was bought by AOL for a significant sum of money in 2011, after which the site’s anarchical nature gradually lapsed. These rapid political and commercial takeovers of public spaces that have only evolved over time because of the unstinting commitment and time of many individuals who want to raise their voices against established institutions in politics do not bode well for the idea of an alternative third space, which a lot of people seem to be searching for. There are some examples of successful public engagement through the internet, but to what extent these are sustained and meaningful remains to be seen. In the previous decade, at the moment the blogs emerged, it was citizen bloggers who brought to attention Senator Trent Lott’s racist remarks,84 and as a result of the backlash the Senator had to step down from his Senate Majority Leader position. But within the short span of a year, he was elected Minority Whip in the next Senate. The entire furor on the blogosphere could not derail his comeback into politics. Public engagement on the internet generally suffers from this “Trent Lott Syndrome”: it is possible and relatively easy to focus on sensational aspects of political speech, and provoke and create pressure to punish/reward a particular behavior, but there is less of an ability to lead to a more substantive and lasting outcome. We are watching a similar critique of President 212 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

Trump’s sensational speech, but a substantive critique of his authoritarian populism is yet to emerge. It is possible to arrange anti-war demonstrations all over the world at the same time, as happened in 2003 at the moment blogs emerged, but it is far less likely that this impressive display of active citizen participation might lead to real policy changes. The most successful examples of using technology to hold the government responsible come from lone-ranger individuals like Edward Snowden, Julian Assange, and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. Julian Assange and his WikiLeaks85 transformed the notion of classified information by sharing it with the whole world. His documents range from evidence of extrajudicial killings in Kenya, toxic waste dumping in the Ivory Coast and torture in the prisons of Guantánamo Bay, to classified details on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Chelsea Manning, the US soldier who leaked information about torture to WikiLeaks, was court-martialed for disclosing nearly three-quarters of a million classified, or unclassified but sensitive, military and diplomatic documents and thereby violating the Espionage Act. She was convicted to thirty-five years in prison, reduction in rank to a private, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable dis- charge, though she was released from prison due to a pardon by President Obama.86 The history of America is replete with attempts to use technology to exclude minorities from citizenship practices. With widespread data mining and manipulation, the process of exclusion from citizenship rights has penetrated all aspects of society. The three-strikes laws in a number of states utilize state and federal data to access criminal records and bar convicted felons from voting. New data processing software is being used to monitor various behavior patterns such as travel, credit card usage, and reading habits; no one can remain outside these processes.87 The construction of the category of “illegal immigrants” and their equation to unethi- cal, disorderly, dependent, and criminal persons started in the post-1965 period, but new technology has enabled the government to group them together and control them with periodic threats much more efficiently. The application of various technologies also makes it acceptable to subject them to various punitive actions in the name of protecting the greater good of the community.88 September 11 fatally linked illegal immigration, border security, and terrorism, and created the fantasy of absolute control over the territory of the nation-state. The broad acceptance of border control techniques has seldom been accompanied by the question of how THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 213 these same measures can be used against citizens. The practice of monitoring the border now includes equipment associated with warfare, and many of these surveillance methods are being used in our daily travel well inside the country.89 Similarly, the disenfranchisement of felons raises not only a crucial ethical debate, but the technical hubris which makes it possible also has to be taken into consideration. While the 2000 Florida election fiasco brought to the fore the routine discounting of military ballots, the uproar against the disenfranchisement of the “good citizens” overshadowed the disenfranchisement of the so-called bad citizens, namely the tens of thousands of felons who were not allowed to vote.90 The right to vote is the simplest and most basic form of citizenship right, not something that can be traded off. This suspension of democratic rights is another form of exclusion. It is noteworthy that supreme courts in Israel, Canada, and South Africa have all restored inmate voting, as has the European Court of Human Rights. In Israel, the Supreme Court even restored the voting rights of Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin. In each case, despite different political and legal traditions, the right to vote outweighed all other considerations as a fundamental element of democracy.91 Since September 11, government websites have become an increasingly important and explicitly rhetorical window on public agencies for many Americans. Government websites were anticipated as the source of information for anxious citizens. The FBI website had thirteen times more hits and the White House four times more in the month immediately after September 11, 2001.92 In 2006, Indiana University student Christopher Soghoian posted an online airline boarding pass generator to bring attention to the vulnerabilities in the airport screening procedures of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). As three thousand five hundred people visited his website and personalized their boarding passes, the US District Court of Southern Indiana enabled federal agents to search his apartment and seize his property, and he became mired in two separate legal investigations by two federal agencies. Rather than looking at his post as an exercise of his First Amendment right to criticize the government, he was viewed as causing an intentional security threat. In fact, using Microsoft Publisher, it took only ten minutes to produce a boarding pass just like Soghoian’s. This represents much more than a one-time intrusion of the state into an individual’s private life. This example shows that surveillance and automation made possible through the computer 214 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY and the web simultaneously reinforce existing authority structures and challenge those sources of power.93 While examples of extension of government authority abound, the challenges so far have been limited to symbolism rather than leading to serious changes in policy or accountability. Rutgers University art professor Hasan M. Elahi used new technologies to sabotage existing power structures with the same techniques of surveillance as the TSA to undermine the very nature of surveillance itself. After being detained in 2002 at Detroit airport as a suspected explosives expert, he knew was being watched and had perhaps made it to the terrorist watchlist. He used a combination of photo blogging and GPS tracking to publicize his moment-to-moment location and activity and maintain a perfect alibi at all times. His website94 included copies of his debit card transactions and other minute details of his everyday activities. Apparently, he sought to protect his privacy by giving it away. His techniques allowed him to watch the government agents watching him through his server logs, which revealed visits from computer users with official government IP addresses. This, according to Losh, is the new “‘sousveillance’ [which] reasserts citizens’ rights to the commons by ‘uncovering the panopticon and under- cutting its primacy and privilege.’”95 Information always promises (though it may not always deliver) greater political inclusiveness, and successive waves of technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, radio, television, satellite transmission, and comput- erization fulfill this promise to a certain degree. The paradox lies in the fact that while the current technology amplifies citizen involvement, it has also reduced the depth and scope of the discourse of citizen participation by dividing the digital civil society into mutually exclusive worlds. In these different slots, citizens keep exchanging their viewpoints with like-minded people, and dismiss any argument that is in opposition to theirs. What we often end up with are very different viewpoints, but no forums to bridge these differences. Instead of utilizing the boundless territory to connect and reach a consensus between opposing groups, the digital space is mostly utilized as an extension of the existing political divide. The extent of participation thus fails to be translated into impact on policies, while more participation provides the illusion of a more vibrant democracy.96 Just as the modality of immigration (the process of exclusion) begins with enemies (terrorists), followed by non-citizens (illegal aliens) or with citizens who do not attract sympathy from fellow citizens (convicts), the nature of technology and its undaunted usage have already been applied THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 215 to monitor all citizens regardless of their legal status. Data mining allows the government to not only access private information with complete ease, but to also use such data for whatever purpose it deems necessary. The appending of the two categories of illegal immigrant and criminal has already been established, and local law enforcement officers often check the immigration status of traffic violators. Following the same impulse to cut back on rights, in an all too typical case representing countless others of its kind, a permanent resident lost his legal status in the United States because of a drunken driving charge and was deported back to Haiti.97 The state and technology have historically shared a symbiotic relationship in the history of the American nation, and technology has often been used to carry out the government’s ends. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, technological growth changed expectations on the part of citizens about the responsibilities of the government, while enabling the government to carry out its ever-expanding mission. New technologies also changed the political process by allowing, and sometimes even demanding, more participation. Simultaneously, many of the new innovations also sub- dued the extent of political participation by setting up superficial norms and similar measurements of participation itself. The current technological innovations are generations apart from the older ones in terms of their capability to reach into the minute details of citizens’ lives. New technologies have reshaped the public space and re-energized public engagement. What is often neglected is how they create a common interest on the part of the state and the market to gather information and utilize it for commercial and political purposes. The danger from this new generation of technology is the centralization of power on the part of government, even as the illusion takes hold that citizens are more in control of their government.

The Paradox Continues…

Edward Snowden: The Usurpation of Citizenship Rights

One of the most intriguing examples of the use of technology to undermine state power in our time has manifested in Edward Snowden. Snowden, a federal government employee, acted as a whistleblower and was denied the protections legally allowed to whistle- blowers; instead, he was charged with compromising national security 216 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

and had to flee the country. This example demonstrates, on the one hand, how the state uses technology to pry upon the intimate lives of citizens, thereby controlling all private aspects of life, and, on the other hand, how easy it has become to reveal the wrongdoing of government using the same widespread data that is collected on citizens. Edward Snowden was a young tech specialist hired by a private company commissioned by the NSA, and had a bright future ahead of him.98 He decided to give up his secure career and life by releasing information on how the US government was spying on its own citizens. Facing charges of stealing government property, punishable by decades in prison, he opted to flee the country and was granted asylum in Russia. Although neither the abuse of state power over citizens nor targeting dissent is new to American history, Snowden’s story deserves special mention because of the breadth of information and the ease of acquiring it, and how the conflict of power between the state and the individual was performed and is still being performed on the global stage. The United States has a long history of prioritizing national security over civil liberties, starting with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. In the aftermath of the Second World War, especially from the 1950s onward, the new institutions (the CIA was created in 1947 and the NSA in 1952, while the FBI had existed from 1908) geared up their functions with enhanced technology and, more importantly, with legislative and ideological backing. The NSA has a track record of unlawfully targeting American citizens, such as boxer Muhammad Ali, writer Benjamin Spock, actress Jane Fonda, Martin Luther King, Jr., and numerous other political critics or activists.99 The Patriot Act authorized the US government to widen the scope of its surveillance programs, as the September 11 attacks seemed to justify state power without any limits. The FBI issued national security letters (NSLs) to communications providers, banks, phone companies, and internet companies, demanding their data and forbidding them from revealing the fact, a process that was validated under section 505. These administrative subpoenas did not even need prior judicial approval. Section 215 of the Patriot Act served as the basis of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) ruling that Verizon data could be collected, procedures which President Bush’s THE PARADOX: PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, SEGREGATION, AND LOSS OF CIVIL... 217

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board called an “impermissible interpretation.” The FBI had issued fifty-six thousand such demands, and though the constitutionality of such orders had been challenged as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, there is no assurance from the government that it is not still collecting such data.100 In the post-9/11 world, the issue of national security enjoys such an all-encompassing definition that whistleblowing, an accepted and respected method of holding the government accountable, has now become synonymous with treason. The government’s failure to give advance warning of al-Qaida’s surprise attack on September 11 was compensated for by exhausting its total capability of amassing information on every single person. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures against citizens without probable cause or a warrant, but these intrusions are now accepted as a part of life. The NSA can collect and store the content of communications between US citizens gathered outside the United States as part of foreign intelligence investigations, without warrants or court orders and without informing Congress.101 The NSA and the FBI monitor the e-mails of prominent Muslim Americans, and even though ethnic profiling is not allowed by law, we have come to accept it as a rational necessity.102 Unlike Julian Assange or Chelsea Manning, Snowden did not publish a mass of raw information in a public forum; rather, he entrusted the three journalists he had confidence in with all his misappropriated data, asking them only to publish documents that would not endan- ger public safety.103 Manning released to Assange’s website WikiLeaks about seven hundred and twenty thousand secret documents from the State and Defense departments, and Assange published them on the internet. The NSA still does not know the full extent of information Snowden stole and passed on to journalists Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Barton Gellman, but it estimates the number to be 1.7 million classified documents, concerning some of America’s most closely guarded secret surveillance programs.104 In the only case dealing with the question of whether Snowden’s acts caused damage to our national security, Klayman v. Obama (2013), federal trial judge Richard J. Leon asserted that the NSA’s surveillance program had thwarted as many as fifty-four terrorist 218 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

attacks, but was unwilling or unable to offer any proof to substantiate that position.105 Any argument regarding national security now justifies the use of state power, whether it is against terrorists or American citizens. The secrecy machine costs over seven billion dollars a year to run, at an incalculable cost to litigants, historians, common sense, and notions of democracy.106 Back in the 1970s, when the Pentagon Papers were released and revealed how the US government had sur- reptitiously bombed Cambodia and Laos, Daniel Ellsberg, the journalist who disclosed this information, was charged with conspiracy and espionage, but the charges were dropped and he was rewarded with numerous awards; eventually, the Pentagon Papers were declas- sified and publicly released. Snowden was also not the first person from inside the NSA to reveal information about the overreach of counterterrorism programs in the post-9/11 world. Thomas Andrews Drake, a US Air Force and Navy veteran, followed the proper channels, from the NSA’s Inspector General to the Pentagon and to the House and Senate congressional oversight committees. In 2007, the FBI raided his home, and after four stressful years, having pled guilty to a minor misdemeanor, the major charges which would have put him behind bars for thirty-five years were dropped.107 What stands out in the Snowden case is how far the state has been willing to go to punish an individual for whistleblowing, an act which is both legal and deemed necessary for the democratic process. Snowden still faces charges of espionage and theft of government property, punishable by at least thirty years of prison.108 His residency permit was extended for three more years in Russia, which has allowed him to avoid extradition for now. The usurpation of citizenship rights on the basis of perceived treason, a practice that had originated with the Alien and Seditions Act as far back as 1798, was ruthlessly pursued during the Red Scare of the 1950s, and seems to have become reincarnated in the twenty- first century with even more vigor and capability. No one seems immune from the all-seeing and all-knowing government, the highest beneficiary of technology that allows surveillance at all hours over everyone in any part of the world. NOTES 219

Notes 1. James B. Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange for Security and Convenience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), iii–xv. 2. In the transparent and connected world of Facebook and Instagram, people, especially the younger generation, do not seem concerned with the sanctity of privacy. 3. Since the Columbine school shooting, the use of video devices in public schools has been widespread and non-controversial. See further discussion in Dennis Bailey, The Open Society Paradox: Why the Twenty-First Century Calls for More Openness—Not Less (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2004), 76. 4. The telephone was supposed to replace the telegraph for real-time data swapping, without the realization of its social interaction potential. 5. See the following sources for an interesting description and analysis of the 2016 election and the impact of fake news: https://web.stanford. edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ technology/0/fake-news-origins-grew-2016/; https://www.buzzfeed. com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news- on-facebook?utm_term=.wuAJYD8Zy#.qhPm1pO2d; http://www. newstatesman.com/world/2016/11/did-fake-news-facebook-swing- us-election; and https://qz.com/896758/a-new-study-kills-the-notion- that-fake-news-swung-the-us-election-to-trump/. 6. Alfred W. McCoy has connected the dots of empire-building and the emergence of the police state in his book Policing America’s Empire. While he focuses on the colonial Philippines, the analogy can easily be extended to Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only do the “water cure” for Filipino insurgents and the “waterboarding” of recent enemy combatants bear eerie similarities, these imperial gambits normalize the use of force and brute power on the domestic front as well. The recent abuse of civil liberties—which originated in the Bush era, continued throughout the age of Obama, and will now probably be magnified in the era of Trump— is a product of heightened paranoia, enhanced technological know-how, and general acquiescence stemming from the acceptance of brutalities and violence inflicted on people regarded as enemies. We may define the “others” as vile and subject them to the harshest punishments, but we often internalize the principles and modalities as we constantly try to root out the “others” from our own “self.” Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 7. See M. Huspek, “Production of State, Capital, and Citizenry: The Case of Operation Gatekeeper,” Social Justice, 28, no. 2 (2001): 51–68 for a 220 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

detailed description of the construction of the wall on the San Diego/ Tijuana border. 8. See the following books and articles for a detailed analysis: Peter M. Shane, ed., Democracy Online: The Prospect for Political Renewal Through the Internet (New York: Routledge, 2004); James Bohman, “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for Transnational Democracy,” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, eds. Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 131–55; Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992). 9. Catherine Gouge, “‘New World’ Citizenship in the Cyberspatial Frontier,” in Adrift in the Technological Matrix, David L. Erben, ed. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2003), 78–82. 10. Richard M. Merelman, “Technological Cultures and Liberal Democracy in the United States,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 25, no. 2 (2000): 171. 11. For a detailed discussion, see Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-agencies-ordered- to-restrict-their-communications/2017/01/24/9daa6aa4-e26f-11e6- ba11–63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?utm_term=.918c0acc744f. 13. Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–20. 14. Ibid., 63. 15. Newspapers often printed stories of African American crimes, which more often than not were untrue, but were the instruments for lynching or other modes of violence. 16. See Bimber and Merelman for an interesting discussion about the role of the common people in enthusiastically supporting the use of technology in government. Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–20; Richard M. Merelman, “Technological Culture and Liberal Democracy in the United States,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 25, no. 2 (2000): 173–5. 17. Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 75. 18. Richard M. Merelman, “Technological Culture and Liberal Democracy in the United States,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 25, no. 2 (2000): 173. 19. Ibid., 174. NOTES 221

20. Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18–22. 21. Peter Levine, “The Internet and Civil Society,” in The Internet in Public Life, Verna V. Gehring, ed. (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 79–81. 22. Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 89–90. 23. David Lyon, ed., Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2006), 280–8. 24. See the discussion by James D. Caroll, “The Rhetoric of Reform and Political Reality in the National Performance Review,” Public Administration Review, 55, no. 3 (May–June 1995): 302–12. 25. David Lyon, ed., Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2006), 288. 26. Michael Strangelove, The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti- Capitalist Movement (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 19–21. 27. Steve Davis, Larry Elin, and Grant Reeher, Click on Democracy: The Internet’s Power to Change Political Apathy into Civic Action (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 12–3. 28. Ibid., 87–94. 29. The uproar about screening passengers for airline safety is an apt example of how safety is defined. The health hazards of the screening machines remained absent from any scrutiny, as these procedures are deemed to shield us from terrorist attacks. The leaking of thousands of images that could easily be turned into naked pictures received a lot of attention, but the privacy concerns are often defined as inconveniences and are relegated to the backburner as safety concerns are on the table. The invasive technology is accompanied by pat-downs of private parts, which may well be a reflection of societal tendencies converging with technological preferences. 30. Many of the government-funded virtual simulations such as Virtual Battlespace, for example those reported at http://publicintelligence.net/ the-u-s-militarys-video-game-training/, are used to train military personnel, and have been expanded to emergency first response, disease preven- tion, physical and mental patient rehabilitation, and similar applications. 31. “Net neutrality, the concept that internet providers should treat all data that travels over their networks equally, became law in 2015 after the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided to regulate the internet like a basic utility. This allowed the Commission to require internet service providers (ISPs) to adhere to public interest obligations, such as ensuring that ISPs respect customer privacy and provide subsidized 222 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

service for Americans who fall below the poverty line.” http://www. recode.net/2017/3/3/14797306/trump-fcc-undo-network-neutrality. Net neutrality is now under threat, as the Republican congress has rolled back regulations on Internet providers. https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/18/fcc-votes-to-start-rolling- back-landmark-net-neutrality-rules/?utm_term=.392ca38c2853& wpisrc=nl_tech&wpmm=1.” 32. Benjamin R. Barber, “The New Telecommunications Technology: Endless Frontier or the End of Democracy?” in A Communications Cornucopia: Markle Foundation Essays on Information Policy, Roger G. Noll and Monroe E. Price, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 72–3. 33. Ibid., 74–80. 34. See discussion in James Bohman, “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for Transnational Democracy,” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 131–55. 35. Catherine Gouge, “‘New World’ Citizenship in the Cyberspatial Frontier,” in Adrift in the Technological Matrix, David L. Erben, ed. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2003), 80–2. 36. Benjamin R. Barber, “The New Telecommunications Technology: Endless Frontier or the End of Democracy?” in A Communications Cornucopia: Markle Foundation Essays on Information Policy, Roger G. Noll and Monroe E. Price, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 70–4. 37. D. Clayton Brown, Globalization and America Since 1945 (Wilmington: SR Books, 2003), 137. 38. http://badcopnews.wordpress.com/2007/04/30/arivaca-arizona-residents-upset-about-virtual-border-towers-despite-border-illegal-crossings-and-infestation/ and http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4599. 39. The Real ID law has mandated all states to change driver’s licenses to include digital information, and is surely designed to increase the government’s ultimate control over the mobility of citizens; the cost of this gigan- tic measure, however, rests on the states, and ultimately the taxpayers. Under the provisions of the Real ID act, the onus of responsibility to prove citizenship or legal status is transferred to the people, while the use, storage, and future use of such data remain unquestioned, as the concern for national security has absolved this measure of any potential wrongdoing. 40. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/delta-responds-youtube-star-adam- saleh-arabic-discrimination-accusation/. 41. Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas, eds., Surveillance and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 10–2. NOTES 223

42. David H. Holtzman, Privacy Lost: How Technology Is Endangering Your Privacy (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 212. 43. A closer look reveals that while the Chinese authorities may have aspired to shut down Google for not abiding by the censorship rules set by the Chinese government, in the end the economic price of not renewing Google’s license outweighed the political benefits of shutting down Google. 44. David H. Holtzman, Privacy Lost: How Technology Is Endangering Your Privacy (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 145–51. 45. James B. Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange for Security and Convenience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 52–4. 46. Ibid., 55–7. 47. Harold F. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 143–5. Incidentally, this was the plot for the movie Rendition which came out in 2007. 48. Ibid., 57. 49. David H. Holtzman, Privacy Lost: How Technology Is Endangering Your Privacy (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 212–5. 50. Armand Mattelart, The Globalization of Surveillance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 143. 51. David H. Holtzman, Privacy Lost: How Technology Is Endangering Your Privacy (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 220–8. 52. Armand Mattelart, The Globalization of Surveillance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 50. 53. Howard P. Segal, Future Imperfect: The Mixed Blessings of Technology in America (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 164. 54. Benjamin R. Barber, “The New Telecommunications Technology: Endless Frontier or the End of Democracy?” in A Communications Cornucopia: Markle Foundation Essays on Information Policy, Roger G. Noll and Monroe E. Price, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 81–3. 55. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/ article756169.ece?token=null&offset=12&page=2. 56. Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas, eds., Surveillance and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 94–5. 57. The shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, after reportedly robbing a convenience store, evoked a huge protest nationwide and resulted in the Black Lives Matter movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Michael_Brown. 58. Eric Garner died in Staten Island, New York City, in a chokehold during an arrest attempt by the officers of the New York City Police Depart 224 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

ment (NYPD) in 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Eric_ Garner#Eric_Garner. 59. Sandra Bland was a twenty-eight-year-old black woman who was found hanged in a jail cell in Waller County, Texas, three days after being arrested during a traffic stop in 2015. Her death was ruled a suicide, and was protested amid the growing number of incidents of racial violence. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Sandra_Bland. 60. See the following sources for a few examples of the recent wave of brutal police killings of unarmed civilians, which are only getting attention in public forums because of technological evidence: http://www.anonews. co/cam-video-policebrutality/; http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/29/ us/louisiana-body-cam-shooting/; and http://www.nydailynews.com/ news/crime/milwaukee-killed-sylville-smith-blocks-body-cam-footage- article-1.2921556. 61. The public sphere idealized by communitarian philosophy is well-formed, connected, and intense, but restricted; on the other hand, the public sphere in the liberal imagination would be larger with more porous boundaries, and more inclusive in nature. 62. The government can prosecute computer hackers anywhere in the world if a “federal interest computer” has been targeted. In 2006, the Senate voted to ratify the “cybercrime” treaty with broad definitions lacking privacy protections yet internationalizing it so that crimes committed in any country that is a signatory to the treaty can be investigated by any other signatory country. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed an executive order centralizing in the NSA the power to monitor the computer networks of all federal agencies, which now allows federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor private, domestic networks if unauthorized intrusions are suspected. In 2009, a new cybersecurity office was created in the White House, and a new military command dedicated to cybersecurity in the Defense Department. The government has emergency powers to shut down any internet traffic or private internet system if there is a potential threat, which again depends on the definition provided only by the government. See http://blogs.ajc.com/ bob-barr-blog/2010/06/21/government-pushing-to-control-internet/ and http://news.cnet.com/8301–13578_3–10320096–38.html. 63. Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, The Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in Perspectives on Habermas, Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 279. 64. There are plenty of discussions on this topic: http://www.latimes.com/ politics/la-na-pol-trump-divide-20161109-story.html; https://news.vice. com/story/journalists-and-trump-voters-live-in-separate-online-bubbles- mit-analysis-shows; and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/clinton- trump-facts_us_5800e7dbe4b0162c043b6d5a. NOTES 225

65. Catherine Gouge, “‘New World’ Citizenship in the Cyberspatial Frontier,” in Adrift in the Technological Matrix, David L. Erben, ed. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2003), 78–80. 66. Ibid., 81–2. 67. Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, The Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in Perspectives on Habermas, Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 262. 68. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/09/schools-surveillance-spying-on-pupils; https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ archive/2016/09/when-school-feels-like-prison/499556/; and http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/-school-surveillance_ b_1967748.html. 69. Bernardine Dohrn, “Homeland Imperialism: Fear and Resistance,” in Pox Americana: Exposing the American Empire, John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney, eds. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), 158. 70. Richard Stivers, Technology as Magic: The Triumph of the Irrational (New York: Continuum, 1999), 208–9. 71. Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, The Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in Perspectives on Habermas, Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 265. 72. James Bohman, “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for Transnational Democracy,” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 131. 73. Ibid., 134–5. 74. Geoff Mulgan, Politics in an Antipolitical Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 27–8. 75. Read https://www.thenation.com/article/requiem-bricks/ for the largely neglected story in the regular media. 76. Abbe Mowshowitz, Virtual Organization: Toward a Theory of Societal Transformation Stimulated by Information Technology (Westport: Quorum Books, 2002), 13. 77. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/09/911-immigration_ detention_business_for_profit_prison_n_951639.html. 78. The new Trump administration has rescinded the Obama administration’s policy of phasing out private prisons to hold federal inmates. http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-justice-department-rescinds-order-1487893081-htmlstory. html. 79. In a pilot program run by the Colorado State Corrections Department, low-risk inmates were used to harvest the produce back in 2007. Under the program, farmers paid a fee to the state, and the inmates were paid about sixty cents a day. See Dan Frosch, “Inmates Will Replace Migrants 226 6 STATE POWER: TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

in Colorado Fields,” New York Times, March 4, 2007. http://www. nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04prisoners.html and http://www.latimes.com/business/careers/work/la-oe-rodriguez30apr30,0,3806011. column. 80. See http://borderwallinthenews.blogspot.com/ and http://www. brownsvilleherald.com/articles/mounting-114434-agricultural-rio.html. 81. http://badcopnews.wordpress.com/2007/04/30/arivaca-arizona-residents-upset-about-virtual-border-towers-despite-border-illegal-crossings- and-infestation/ and http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4599. 82. In the 2016 election campaign, one of the most popular as well as detested issues was the construction of a border wall between Mexico and the United States to stop the flow of undocumented people, an extremely expensive project, which President Trump is still insisting that Mexico will pay for. 83. James Bohman, “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for Transnational Democracy,” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 143. 84. Trent Lott commented that had Senator Strom Thurmond, who ran a campaign to protect segregation, won the presidency in 1948, we wouldn’t have had to deal with racial issues. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2002/dec/20/usa.sarahleft. 85. WikiLeaks was founded in 2006 by Julian Assange, an Australian internet activist, who has published classified and secret information about governments worldwide and claims a database of ten million documents. For a basic description, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks. 86. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelsea_Manning. 87. The inspection of foreign visitors with SENTRI and US-VISIT, which use biometric technology to verify an alien’s identity and categorize low- risk and high-risk visitors, has triggered almost no outcry, as these now serve as points of exclusion. 88. Jonathan Xavier Inda, Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology, and Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 112. 89. Ibid., 136. 90. Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 185–6. 91. Ibid., 232. 92. Elizabeth Losh, Virtualpolitic: An Electronic History of Government Media-Making in a Time of War, Scandal, Disaster, Miscommunication, and Mistakes (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 140. 93. Ibid., 199–202. 94. http://elahi.umd.edu/track/. NOTES 227

95. Elizabeth Losh, Virtualpolitic: An Electronic History of Government Media-Making in a Time of War, Scandal, Disaster, Miscommunication, and Mistakes (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 210–9. 96. Benjamin R. Barber, “Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy,” Political Science Quarterly, 113, no. 4 (1998–1999): 573–89. 97. David G. Savage, “Justices: DUI Not Grounds for Deportation,” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2004. http://www.latimes.com/news/ nationworld/nation/la 110904scotus_lat,0,5613485.story?coll=la-home- headlines. 98. Before being hired by a private contractor, Snowden had worked for the CIA, the NSA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), following the trend of how the distinctions between government employees and private sector employees have become porous, ambiguous, and frankly meaningless. 99. Luke Harding, The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (New York: Vintage, 2014), 87. 100. Ronald Goldfarb, ed., After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 18–9. 101. Ibid., 19. 102. Ibid., 8. 103. Ibid., 30–1. 104. Luke Harding, The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (New York: Vintage, 2014), 89–100. 105. Ronald Goldfarb, ed., After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 29. 106. Ibid., 39. 107. Luke Harding, The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (New York: Vintage, 2014), 51. 108. Ronald Goldfarb, ed., After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 4–5. CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: The Paradox Continues…

The ideology and practice of American citizenship are at a crossroads at a time when the United States is slowly losing its hegemony on the international stage, and is confronted with numerous economic and security issues that are redefining citizenship rights at home. American citizenship has been consciously defined through selecting and negating various ideologies like the Greek and Roman models, the tenets of federalism, and, most importantly, the negotiations between the communitarian and liberal philosophies. In a parallel way, American citizenship has been shaped by the continuous political, economic, and social transformations that made a struggling new nation a global power. The theoretical debates and the lived experiences that have shaped American citizenship often did not follow a logical trajectory, but in fact trailed off in opposite directions. The founding fathers idealized life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all, while ignoring the day-to-day injustice of slavery. This gap between the abstract notion of citizenship and the practice of citizenship rights continues until today. The American ideal of citizenship evolved from a closed race-based exclusionary model to a much more inclusionary model suited for an open society and a porous economy. While it is easier to trace the legal changes in immigration and naturalization laws, the social acceptance that often acts as a catalyst to realize rights and privileges is often much more complicated. The African American population gained citizenship with the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, but after a century of persecution and discrimination against blacks, the Voting Rights Act needed to be

© The Author(s) 2018 229 M. Momen, The Paradox of Citizenship in American Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61530-1_7 230 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… enacted in 1965 to protect their suffrage rights. The Voting Rights Act has been consistently renewed since then, the last renewal taking place as recently as 2006, but in 2013 the Supreme Court struck down a key provision which required most Southern states with a history of racial discrimination to get federal permission to change their voting laws. Since then, a number of states like Texas, South Carolina, and Ohio have passed voting laws that require multiple IDs or photo IDs, generally restricting voter access.1 The contradiction between the theoretical understanding of citizenship and its real-life implications, especially for minorities, is not accidental; rather, this gap between the abstract and lived experience provides the grounds where the myths of American identity and American exceptionalism can materialize. The construction of American identity is so invested in the mythic past that even now the acknowledgment of past injustices can result in furor among at least some Americans. The acknowledgment of wrongdoings by the American government toward Native American tribes—a non-binding apology with no policy implications—was regarded as controversial in 2009.2 After fourteen years of litigation, a lawsuit was settled to compensate black and Native American farmers for years of discrimination, which again was questioned for whether or not it was politically motivated and biased rather than seeking the attainment of justice.3 President Obama was accused of not believing in American exceptionalism, an allegation that comes with political costs, even though the policies of his administration did not veer from sustaining the American empire at any cost. This contradiction between the theoretical and practical elements of citizenship has shaped American self-identity as well as national identity. The American self-identity of an independent, just, and freedom-loving people remained intact in the midst of empire-building. European settlers were being offered land to develop and settle, while the Native American land grab was managed with legal and political maneuvers along with violent wars against Native people on this land. Since Native Americans always challenged the myth of the settlers as belonging to the land, their place in American history continues to be ungraciously acknowledged, to say the least. It seems not only ironic, but also somewhat logical, that they were the last ethnic group to gain citizenship in America. American hegemony exercised through military and economic power paved the way for new paradoxes in citizenship. The exposure to the wider world served as an acute reminder of the second-class status of American soldiers of 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… 231 minority descent. Wars—starting from the War of Independence until the Second World War—simultaneously benefited minorities by offering lucrative careers in an otherwise discriminatory environment, and also inadvertently challenging the very logic of discrimination by binding different racial and ethnic groups for a greater purpose. Wars also replenished citizens with more basic rights as American capitalism was forced to compete with the provision of social rights overseas. As an immigrant nation, we can trace the legal provisions for both migration and naturalization for different racial and ethnic categories to uncover the paradoxes in immigration philosophy. Migration in America historically has remained quite open, even when naturalization laws prohibited any non-white migrants from becoming citizens. After the changes enacted to the immigration laws in 1965, which allowed for immigrants from all over the world and made room for different kinds of people in a complex web of categories, the focus has shifted to migration from naturalization in the discourse of citizenship. Since birthright citizenship is currently under assault, as President Trump has proposed to end it4 just after being elected, maybe the old battles are not over yet. The use of technology has traditionally empowered the government as well as the citizen to exert control over each other. The first and second generations of technological innovations like the newspaper, radio, television, and railroads, all expanded the principle and practice of citizen participation and accountability. The presence and participation of government in such mediums also grew exponentially. The paradox in present-day technological development is that although it has far more potential to enable citizen participation, it often creates the illusion of more room for public participation while allowing for little or no change at the policy level. While the level of citizen participation and its effectiveness depends on the political system, what is unique in this era is the coexistence of the multifaceted potential and the element of delusion in the new generation of technology. Virtual public spheres do exist, but often remain limited in their impact. On the other hand, government is able to utilize the potential for both centralization and decentralization of information-gathering and dis- semination capacity and sidestep the question of accountability and transparency in the name of security. The paradoxes in each of the paradigms of citizenship I have discussed— nation-building, empire-building, globalization, immigration, and technology—intensify when we try to make sense of all five paradigms together and search for a coherent narrative of citizenship rights and inclusion/ 232 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… exclusion in America. From the perspective of nation-building, absolute citizenship rights were touted when the Revolutionary War was taking place, but soon the political rights of all citizens were much constricted with strict exclusionary policies toward minorities. The construction of American identity, however, remained rooted in the ideals of direct democracy, an illusion that still dominates the political discourse. American self- identity and national identity never seriously acknowledged empire, but with the growth of territory, new classifications had to be envisioned to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, and new rules had to be enacted to keep out not only non-citizens but, more importantly, undesirable citizens from practicing their citizenship rights. Globalization was the basis for the American Century, which reshaped American capitalism and citizenship in response to new ideological challenges to be more inclusive and benevolent, but the current wave of globalization is associated with loss of economic hegemony and terrorism, and has, in fact, eroded the scope of citizenship by shifting power to the state and corporations. Immigration mostly followed the principle of gradual inclusion of minorities, halted during economic downturns but usually generous during times of prosperity. The official repudiation of race and ethnicity as criteria for naturalization occurred with the 1965 immigration law, but nationality and class continued to dominate the provision of asylum and work-based entries. The fear of losing global hegemony, terrorism, and the recent recession have all unleashed new norms of exclusion and discrimination based on race and ethnicity, and sanctified in the name of national security. Technology historically has been the harbinger of citizen participation, which is both amplified and contested with the new digital devices that allow for political manipulation and the creation of a greater illusion of participation than ever imagined. If the age of American exceptionalism is indeed drawing to an end, what does that foretell for American citizenship? Can American self- identity and national identity hold on to the myths that justified ascendency in the global arena when America no longer dominates the world? Americans have led the agenda of globalization as their destiny; in the midst of growing consensus about the alleged loss of American power because of globalization, how can the American empire be sustained and justified? Immigration as an ideology is under attack, and often the vexing problem of illegal immigration dominates the whole array of immigrant issues; can Americans reach the consensus to opt for a rational, open, and vibrant immigration policy which can revive the economy as has happened 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… 233 in the past? Can technology balance the power of the citizens over government and the government’s power to keep the citizens secure at the same time? The emergence of American identity was one of the catalysts for the American Revolution, but political independence was not sufficient to amass a collective identity that enjoyed social consensus. The founding fathers dug through the Greek and Roman histories to assemble designs of political institutions and mechanisms of political processes. The American Revolution itself was characterized as the sacred bond that unified citizens of the thirteen colonies. The shared destiny, however, did not emerge from a shared past; the hollow of a common heritage was filled with a mythic past, a past that harmonized the “noble savage” in a barren landscape with ferocious wars between Native American tribes and white settlers. True to the construction of this past, post-Revolutionary America was hailed as the land of the free, while enslavement of a huge group remained acceptable social practice. These contradictory ideologies have shaped both American nationalism and American identity in a profound way. Just as racial discrimination was separated from much-coveted American values, the Constitution upheld the revolutionary spirit of political vibrancy but made self-government more layered and convoluted. The social and economic mobility of the mass of common people compensated for lost political power, and the identity of the American people incorporated a sense of self-sufficiency, not so much in social and economic terms, but in terms of being independent and distant from government. American identity contained the paradox of being freedom-loving while denying freedom to some others. The reconciliation of this particular contradiction through the Civil War was also bifurcated: the principle of equality and citizenship for African Americans was accommodated ideologically, even as the practice of such values was prohibited politically and socially. The domestic incoherencies of American identity were resolved theoretically with equal citizenship rights, but to this day the practice of citizenship rights is often criticized as uneven and discriminatory. The notion of American exceptionalism has served as the basis for uniting the contradictions of American identity; without that focus on a common future, these incongruities of citizenship rights become situated in the present and need to be addressed in the immediate political context. America has faced this challenge often, most notably during the Civil War and the civil rights movement, and in both instances expanded the definition and scope of citizenship. 234 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES…

If the construction of American identity was problematic because of contradictory elements, then the expansion of the nation validated the contradiction by opening up new grounds to exercise firepower while preserving the higher values for fellow citizens if they belonged to the right ethnicity. The idea of Manifest Destiny justified the practice of land grabs such as the Louisiana Purchase, the Texas annexation, and the Mexican War, as well as foreign adventures. The chasm in American identity following the Civil War was healed through the Spanish-American War by directing the wrath to another new enemy, who did not challenge the idea of a nation or identity, but rather unified the nation (with some notable exceptions) toward a common purpose. The discomfort with large and powerful government took a back seat while imperial excursions transpired to reap economic benefits for American citizens. The federal takeover of citizenship regulations started with Native American territories and expanded as new territories were being appended to the nation. The vexing logic of granting statehood to some, holding back that status for others (until white settlers attained majority), and bestowing the ambiguous category of US territory to the rest, was left at the behest of the federal government. The Civil War also elevated the moral stance of the federal government. What is interesting is how, as more territories with undesired or less desired people became part of the American fabric, American citizenship rights began to shrink. The practice of non-citizen voting came under attack and had to be scrapped from several states after the surge of Hispanics in the newly acquired territories of the Mexican War, who were legally citizens but could not be allowed to practice their rights as yet. The problem of people residing in faraway occupied colonies, such as the Filipinos, also turned knotty when those people sided with US interests and fought alongside the US army. The provision of bestowing citizenship on non-citizen military personnel fighting on behalf of the United States continues to this day. Wars in foreign lands not only involved eradicating the enemy, but often created huge groups of refugees and allies who made a moral claim to American citizenship. America’s direct and indirect involvement in global political turmoil subsequently brought many asylum seekers to this country. Perhaps learning from past inconveniences, the latest wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have allowed only a handful of native people belonging to those countries to claim asylum even when they risked their lives on behalf of the United States. 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… 235

The question that follows is whether American society will transform itself from an open to a relatively closed society, as the tension between “us” and “them” will have to take place on the domestic front, mimicking the “us” and “them” divide in the international arena. The term “terrorist,” the new enemy of recent years, remains ambiguous and hazy, and citizens belonging to the wrong religion or ethnicity have to forever strive to differentiate themselves from this porous category and prove their right to claiming American citizenship. In the past, socially accepted notions of racial hierarchy exacted a similar price from African Americans, Hispanics, and in fact all minority groups at some point in time, but this new intangible categorization as opposed to an assigned category may be more troublesome to deal with. The vibrant public sphere will remain filled with cacoph- onies of blame and frustration, while claiming the categorizations of “patriot” versus “enemy,” the same “us” versus “them” divide we have seen at various stages in history, re-emerging with new vigor and malice. This question of where America and its elaboration of citizenship is headed has become poignant and alarming after the victory of Donald J. Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States. The definition of “us” has gone back to its racial roots, and there have been multiple attempts to banish the undesirables through enacting a travel ban,5 as discussed in Chap. 3, or by literally building a wall6 on the southern border. American power expanded all over the globe with not only firepower, but, more importantly, through more subtle economic and cultural influences. American global hegemony is intertwined with the American Century, spanning the entire twentieth century. American interests in overseas trade and commerce have always been intricately connected with foreign policy, and decoupling these interests has never been on the agenda of the American state. Following the logic of American exceptionalism, overt and covert American manipulation in global politics sustained American economic and cultural hegemony. The changes in the global market structure are threatening not only to American power, but also to its self-image as the most powerful nation in the world. The public sphere is now more market-oriented compared to its local, political, and spontaneous origins. Technology binds global society, and though America remains the major player, it has to acknowledge the other growing powers in current world politics. America may have reached its pinnacle by first exporting its products and then its cultural artifacts throughout the world, but now America’s economic woes are being blamed on the very principle of globalization. 236 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES…

Deindustrialization may have cost American jobs, but the cost of isolation would be much higher for an economy that constantly needs new blood and ideas. The effects of various anti-terrorism policies have already made a difference to white-collar immigration and a reverse brain drain is slowly surfacing. Historically, international exposure has replenished American citizenship by inserting the elements of social rights such as welfare and workers’ unions, but the new mode of globalization under- mines any social rights that add to labor costs. After the fall of the Soviet Union, American capitalism does not have a competing ideology to check its excesses. In the new global arena, there are now two opposing models of citizenship: the patriot and the cosmopolitan. The patriots are wary of global relations, whether they are economic or political, and they opt for an insular society while supporting the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy to retain American power. The cosmopolitans have benefited or aspire to benefit from the new model of globalization, and see themselves as part of a global civil society rather than only as Americans. This ideological battle is being fought under different names in the media, on the campaign trail, and through the voices of disgruntled citizens. President Trump got elected largely because of his promise to bring back American jobs. His voters responded to his rhetoric of putting America first, his theme for his inaugural address, ignoring the reality of a global financier who has businesses all over the world, the very process of globalization being the key element of Trump’s success and prosperity. The paradox of rhetoric versus reality could not be clearer than if we take a look at the Trump voters. The various attempts to overturn the ACA are going to have negative ramifications on the poor and working class, who make up the majority of Trump supporters. Actually, the definition of patriot perfectly fits the average Trump voter, while cosmopolitan applies to the more privileged elites who believe in the rhetoric of globalization while ignoring the reality of American empire. This is in all probability the crossroads for American citizenship, and citizens, by embodying either of these values, will choose the political direction and the level of openness of American society. American citizenship has derived much of its meaning from its naturalization and immigration policies. Naturalization, not immigration, dominated the citizenship discourse of the early republic, as the focus was to keep people belonging to less desirable groups (usually defined in racial and ethnic terms) out of mainstream society while allowing them to emigrate to and work in the United States. After the open door immigration 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… 237 policy of 1965, which more or less allows legal entrants a path to citizenship (although a long and complicated one), the focus has shifted to immigration, with illegal immigration capturing a disproportionate share of attention. When race defined the rite of passage to citizenship, ethnic minorities like the Irish, Italians, and even Hispanics contended to be classified as “white.” Almost every ethnic and racial group had to go through a path strewn with contention, legal exclusion, and intricate rules of inclusion leading to citizenship. For minorities, wars often opened up avenues to enlist, which led not only to legal status, but also social acceptance and the moral grounds to fight back against discrimination. What is interesting is how each group had to battle very similar prejudices at different points in history; without the convergence of similar interests at the same time, minority relations in American politics have emerged as contentious rather than being unified around a common cause. American citizenship legislation buried racial and ethnic discrimination in the comprehensive 1965 law, although many asylum provisions still contain preferential elements—if not in racial terms, then wrapped up in political ideology. The 1965 immigration law was also more focused on high-skilled labor, and the avenues for much-needed low-skilled labor were somewhat neglected in this vision of attracting talent to America. Illegal immigration, historically associated with agricultural jobs, quickly filled the demanding meatpacking districts, construction works, and a myriad of other service industries. Market demand for labor has always played a key role in immigration law, especially in terms of its interpretation and implementation. American citizens are more comfortable accepting outsiders when the economy is thriving. While it is not surprising to watch an anti-immigrant backlash during recessionary times, the fear of terrorism has also unleashed an ideological shift around the whole notion of immigration. A comprehensive immigration law to smooth over the bureaucratic backlogs, update asylum provisions, and provide solutions to accommodate the vast number of illegal immigrants (allegedly eleven to twelve million) seems farther and farther away from realization in the present political climate. As an immigrant nation, even with a history of prejudice and discrimination, the level and nature of American assimilation had always been unparalleled; slowly, that essential ingredient of immigration and citizenship is drowning in the midst of anti-Hispanic and anti-Muslim rhetoric in this current resurgence of past anti-immigrant waves that never completely faded away. If American society opts for an insular model and the model of the patriot ends up dominating that of the cosmopolitan, 238 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… then American immigration will lose much of its ideological relevance in defining citizenship, and the practical implications on the culture and the economy will not be negligible. American citizenship in recent decades has been impacted by the new generation of technologies—technologies that simultaneously empower the state at the cost of citizenship rights, while increasing the ability of citizens to hold the government accountable. Technology and government control have often been reconciled in the consumer society through private ownership and access to consumption, while following government regulation. At each historical juncture, new technologies like radio, television, and railroads have all aided social mobility and political participation, but the capabilities of the latest generation of technologies are pushing toward unfamiliar territory. The new public sphere of the web has neither been tamed by the government nor has been taken over fully by commercial interests. Citizens have more say and space to engage with the government and with each other, potential that is being utilized by many. The intangible and ambiguous space of the web may have expanded the hori- zon of the public space, but it has also allowed citizens to quarantine themselves with like-minded people. Public engagement has increased in scope but not in depth, as the profusion of presence in the new public space compensates for the lack of meaningful dialogue. The government has gained a new purpose with the fear of terrorism, and is utilizing the potential of digital technology to monitor citizens at an unprecedented level. Whether or not the days of American monopoly on global power are over, the use of technology to limit and check citizens will continue, as the mechanisms are already in place and invested for. In fact, the available technological power and the moral ground of fighting terrorists provide America with the last prospect to hold on to its power and maneuver global politics toward its own interests. American citizenship may have borrowed from the Greek, Roman, and even British models, but what was derived and how it has evolved throughout the years has been truly American in character. The ideology and the practical part of citizenship have never been reconciled meaningfully, and this paradox probably stood out recently when the Tea Partiers, who were supposed to be “regular Americans,” became active and vocal, but not so much toward the burning issues of unemployment, healthcare, or the housing bust, issues that directly affected their livelihood and prospects; instead, they chose the relative abstraction of the national debt as their bête noire. The expression of dissatisfaction with policies and the 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… 239

ideological dialogue about the shape and extent of government thus follow parallel paths, taking place on the same political plane yet remaining removed from each other. It allows the proponents of small government to opt for fiscal responsibility in theory, and extend tax cuts and war expenses at the same time. This ideological and practical divide has allowed the American empire to stand on the moral ground of benevolence. The paradox may have served American interests abroad, but it has tarnished the power of citizenship on the domestic political front. It is only at rare junctures in history, such as the civil rights movement, when the ideological and real rights of citizenship come face to face and force us to settle the absurdities. The first opportunity that evolved after the blood and gore of the Civil War was quickly lost, as the inconsistencies of American identity were glossed over by renewed territorial ambition and the discovery of a new purpose—which was mainly economic, but dressed in the always available myth of Manifest Destiny—which once again allowed abstract and real-life citizenship rights to diverge. The stable supply of enemy figures with whom American goodness can be contrasted has been in short supply since the end of the Cold War. Terrorists, of course, have filled the slot for now, but they are much more ambiguous and loosely tied, compared to the sharp ideological contrast with communism. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea of preemption, the careless management of personnel, and the intentional and unintentional human costs, all have tainted America’s moral high ground. The same divide between the ideology and practice of citizenship bestows accolades on American soldiers while offering them very little support when they leave the war front. Minorities in America have had to struggle against both the ideological obstructions to citizenship, which were enshrined in legal codes, and the lived experiences that relegated them to a place below mainstream society. Often the battles against the clear legal provisions were won much more decisively than the latter fight that took place in everyday life. The American notion of citizenship has matured from the more explicitly exclusionary days, yet the norms of inclusion continue to get clouded with new prejudices and ideologies. As of now, Muslims and Hispanics are filling the niche of the most undesirable immigrants and citizens, as they are increasingly identified as terrorists and illegal immigrants rather than average citizens. As the state remains unable or unwilling to confront the inconsistencies between the law and reality, the interpretation and implementation of the law is acquiring a regional color. The presence of different 240 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES… groups of disaffected people, such as illegal immigrants or homosexuals, abounds in the public sphere, but their presence should not necessarily be equated with any political power (the illegal immigrants do not have any power, but the growing number of Hispanic voters who are also swing voters are often regarded as defending the interests of illegal immigrants who are largely Hispanic). The discriminatory “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy was finally taken down after two decades of continuous struggle, and deserves mention as a positive example. Immigration, once accepted as one of the defining elements of American citizenship, has become too strongly linked with illegal immigration, and decoupling these is as much of a challenge as arguing for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants who may have been active members of their communities for decades. The focus on illegal immigration, ironically, has negatively affected much sought-after high-skilled labor because of backlogs, arcane laws, and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The economy historically sets the trends for immigration, and economic demands have often reshaped ideological preferences in immigration. We will have to wait and see whether a resurgence of the economy can overpower the less than benevolent spirit of American citizens today. The ideological divide in the understanding of American citizenship is probably most coherent in its association with globalization. As a principle, Americans have considered the whole world as their legitimate playing field in economic, cultural, and often military terms. The United States still retains military outposts in almost ninety countries. The proponents of isolationism lost their argument as a result of America’s involvement in the Second World War, but their voices were never strong enough anyway to deter America from any adventures overseas. Global relations historically have benefited America, both politically and economically. They made it possible to wrap American identity in suitable cultural modes, and to export it worldwide and create an audience which often believed in this identity virtually as strongly as did native citizens. Most importantly, for citizens, global relations provided the ammunition to fight for more rights and to continuously elevate the image of American identity. The current mode of globalization has not been embraced as keenly as its earlier versions, as the pains of outsourcing, compared to corporate profits, have been too real to ignore. This has divided the model of citizenship between those who prefer an insular and America-centric identity, the patriots, and those who feel comfortable at the global level—the cosmopolitans. The categories of conservatives and liberals are somewhat parallel to, but not NOTES 241 perfectly correlated with, these new categories. The dialogue among citizens has become almost incoherent, as these two ideologies share much less common ground compared to conservatives and liberals. The new digital public sphere has accommodated the full spectrum of the ideological divide, but has also allowed them their neat little niches, and as a result they operate mostly among their own ideological group, and when they do confront each other, their positions seem irreconcilable. The new generation of technology also allows the government to take away essential citizenship rights to compensate for safety in a perilous world where individuals have successfully challenged the monopoly power of nation-states to wreak havoc on others’ lives. As American power diminishes on the war front and is challenged in the economic arena, technological dominance helps sustain America’s global power position. As America tries to retain its power on the global stage through both twentieth-century and twenty-first-century war machines, the casualty seems to be the scope of the depth of citizenship rights. American identity cannot hold on to the idea of American exceptionalism if America loses its relative monopoly of power. For now, the terrorist attacks and future fears of them continue to justify such measures as wiretapping and the data mining of citizens. A much more appropriate alternative would be to define American exceptionalism in inclusionary terms, through tolerance and goodwill, as opposed to victimhood and a power position. In the postindustrial world, neither manufacturing jobs are returning to revive America’s economy, nor can the growing service industry address the problem of growing inequality; only an open economy can attract the right talents and motivate citizens to strive to keep the myth of exceptionalism alive. The key to dominance in the global arena is through nurturing a cosmopolitan model of citizenship, a model that can compete and thrive without unnecessary use of power, but through true superior competence based on respect for universal values even when these contradict national interests.

Notes 1. https://www.aclu.org/news/voting-rights-act-what-expires-and-what- does-not. 2. http://nativevotewa.wordpress.com/2009/12/31/president-obama- signs-native-american-apology-resolution/. 242 7 CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX CONTINUES…

3. http://traditionofexcellence.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/obama-signs- bill-settling-african-american-farmers-and-native-americans-lawsuits/. 4. http://www.factcheck.org/2015/11/trump-challenges-birthright-citizenship/. 5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13769. 6. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/budget-trump- white-house.html. Selected Bibliography

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A 60n51, 65, 100n11, 107, 123, Abu Ghraib, 74, 98, 99, 101n25, 175 138n1, 154, 233 Afghanistan, 11, 14, 16, 30, 50, Americanization, 12, 109 57n17, 69, 71, 74, 79, 82, 96, Anderson, Benedict, 38, 59n41 108, 137, 191, 208, 212, 219n6, annexation of Texas, 68–70, 108 234, 239 Arab African Americans immigrants, 146 slavery, 13, 40, 82, 88, 105n89, Spring, 196 116, 157, 158 Aryan race, 91, 181n24 slaves, 30, 67, 72, 123, 145, 147 Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917, 152 three-fifths rule, 158 Assange, Julian, 17, 212, 217, 226n85 voting rights, 229, 230 asylum, 135, 148, 155, 163, 164, 168, Al-Awlaki, Abdur Rahman, 21n25 172, 216, 232, 234, 237. See also Alien and Sedition Acts, 28, 46, 49, refugees 56n7, 150, 202, 216 Athens Alien Registration Act of 1940, 154 citizenship, 30, 32 American Civil Liberties Union political system, 34 (ACLU), 136 American exceptionalism, 14, 51, 79, 107, 110–15, 117, 128, 138n1, B 230, 232, 233, 235 (see also Barber, Benjamin R., 222n32, Monroe Doctrine) 222n36, 223n54, 227n96 American Revolution, 11, 25, 29, 32, Bello, Walden, 22n32, 139n24, 36, 46, 47, 49, 52, 59n38, 141n39, 142n49

Bill of Rights, 127 147, 149, 157, 158, 165, 202, Bimber, Bruce, 193, 220n11, 220n13, 233, 234, 239 220n16, 220n17, 221n20, Clinton, Hillary, 96, 195, 196, 200, 221n22 206, 208, 210 Black Lives Matter (BLM), 196 Cold War, 16, 108, 113, 124, 136, Blackwater, 98, 106n109 155, 161, 167, 202, 239 Bouton, Terry, 46, 60n45, Common Sense, 42, 43, 60n51 62n68 communism, 17, 108, 109, 124, 126, bracero program, 166, 167 128, 141n37, 202, 239 Bradburn, Douglas, 56n1, 60n47, communitarianism, 92, 105n86, 60n49, 61n61, 62n67, 62n70, 141n33 62n76, 62n80 Confederation, 83 British, 9, 25, 26, 33, 35, 39–41, 43, Articles of Confederation, 27, 42, 46, 48, 52, 67, 75, 83, 84, 43, 45, 46, 51, 87, 204 100n11, 123, 157, 238 Constitution, 4, 10, 13, 14, 27, 28, colonists, 28, 43 32, 34, 35, 38, 41–3, 45–8, 50–3, Brown vs. Board of Education, 95 59n42, 75, 85, 87, 93, 157, 173, Bush, George W. (President), 96, 204, 233 101n25, 101n26, 156, 173, 201, cosmopolitan, 12, 94, 129–35, 236, 202, 216, 224n62 237, 240, 241 Cuba, 74, 78–80, 101n26, 136, 155, 182n36 C cyberspace, 192, 200, 205, 206, 211 capitalism, 6, 70, 98, 108, 114, 115, 119, 121, 126, 129, 165, 231, 232, 236 D Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Dawes Act of 1887, 77, 102n34, 21n25, 101n25, 216, 227n98 166 Chile, 115, 139n25 Declaration of Independence, 10, 43, Chinese 59n42 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 86, Deferred Action for Childhood 147, 151 Arrivals (DACA), 178 immigrants, 89, 151, 162 denizen, 41, 60n48, 84. See also settler civil liberties, 8, 34, 46, 127, 140n32, citizen 141n33, 201, 204–16, 219n6 disenfranchisement of felons, 213 civil rights, 5, 12, 40, 67, 87, 88, DREAM Act, 13, 21n26, 178, 179 95, 118, 123, 140n30, 155, 158, 159, 170, 203, 204, 233, 239 E Civil War, 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 27, El Salvador, 155 33, 49, 50, 65–8, 72, 73, 78, 79, Elahi, Hasan M., 214 82, 85–8, 91, 112, 113, 116, The Espionage Act of 1917, 90, 212 123, 124, 139n22, 140n27, 146, extrajudicial killings, 12, 212 INDEX 261

F hegemony, 2, 3, 8, 15, 74, 96, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 107–38, 229, 230, 232, 235 126, 159, 213, 216–18 Herring, George C., 20n12, 20n14, Federalist Papers, 46 22n29, 100n6, 100n9, 100n11, Fifteenth Amendment, 157 101n27, 102n41, 104n66, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 104n72, 139n14 (FISA), 201, 202, 216 Hispanic, 1, 4, 11, 14–16, 32, 82, 91, Foucault, Michel, 19n2, 206 133, 146, 147, 150, 153, 161, Fourteenth Amendment, 61n58, 162, 164, 174, 179n3, 187n98, 85–7, 91, 116, 229 234, 235, 237, 239, 240 French Revolution, 46, 49, 56n7, 81, immigrants, 11, 15, 82, 174, 150 187n98, 239, 240 Howe, Daniel Walker, 20n12, 22n29, 100n7, 101n29, 102n40, G 104n71, 105n89, 105n91 Gary B. Nash, 59n42 Hunt, Michael H., 22n29, 100n8, General Crimes Act, 76 100n21, 101n30, 102n36, GI Bill, 15 139n19 Gilded Age, 117, 193 Hurricane Katrina, 40, 96, 106n98, Greek 175, 210 citizenship, 34 Hyneman, Charles S., 20n14, 22n29, political institutions, 14, 233 101n32, 103n61, 105n96 political system, 31 Guantánamo Bay, 50, 101n26, 173, 175, 187n95, 208, 212 I Guatemala, 115, 136 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, (IIRIRA of 1996), 137, 162, H 170, 172 H-1B visas, 126 immigrants Habermas, Jürgen, 58n31, 206, 207, high-skilled, 22n33 224n63, 225n67, 225n71 low-skilled, 22n33, 152, 169 Hamdi, Yasser Esam, 16 undocumented, 11, 21n26, 22n33, Hamilton, Alexander, 45 132, 133, 137, 147, 169, 174, Hanson, Jim, 100n4, 100n14, 177, 179, 179n4, 208 102n46, 102n48, 138n4 unskilled, 15, 121, 150, 168, The Hart-Cellar immigration Act of 170 1965, 148, 155 Immigration Act of 1924, 20n19, Hawaii, 14, 72, 74, 80 153, 167, 180n11, 182n25, healthcare, 6, 58n24, 132, 137, 172, 182n27, 184n60 173, 238 Immigration and Customs Affordable Care Act (ACA), 19n8, Enforcement (ICE), 120, 121, 33, 57n24 172 262 INDEX

Immigration and Nationality Act of L 1965. See The Hart-Cellar League of Nations, 109 Immigration Act of 1965 League of United Latin American Immigration and Naturalization Citizens (LULAC), 161, 174 Service (INS), 156, 167, 172, Lears, Jackson, 22n34, 100n15, 182n41, 186n86 101n22, 102n45, 104n82, Immigration Reform Act of 1986, 105n88, 141n35, 183n46, 169 183n49, 183n53, 184n58 individualism, 14, 36, 38, 53, 92, 93, Liberia, 73, 153, 158 96, 105n86, 127, 138n1, Lindh, John Walker, 16 141n33, 206 Louisiana Purchase, 67, 68, 70, 234 Industrial Revolution, 73, 194 LULAC. See League of United Latin International Monetary Fund (IMF), American Citizens (LULAC) 109, 114, 119, 134 Lyon, David, 221n23, 221n25 Iran, 115, 140n26, 172, 195 Iraq, 11, 14, 50, 57n17, 69, 71, 79, 82, 96, 97, 101n25, 108, 137, M 175, 208, 212, 219n6, 234, Madison, James, 46 239 Magna Carta, 29 Irish, 9, 20n16, 32, 61n66, 84, 89, Manifest Destiny, 14, 36, 50, 59n36, 91, 100n11, 117, 123, 152, 160, 68–74, 79, 108, 110, 112, 234, 237 239 immigrants, 157 Manning, Chelsea, 212, 217 Issei, 160 Marshall Plan, 119, 141n37 Marshall, T.H., 5, 6, 20n15 Mayflower Compact, 32, 57n21 J McCarthy, Senator Joseph, 126, 161 Jackson, Andrew, 75 Medicaid, 124, 125, 130, 133, 171 Japanese, 50, 80, 89, 91, 97, 109, Medicare, 6, 12, 124, 125, 130, 133, 151–3, 160, 166, 181n17, 171 181n23, 183n54 mercenary soldiers, 97 Japanese Americans (see Merelman, Richard M., 220n10, “Orientals”; Issei; and Nisei) 220n16, 220n18 Jefferson, President Thomas, 35, 37, Mexican War, 9, 11, 15, 18, 20n17, 49, 50, 58n34 41, 66, 68, 70–2, 81, 82, 89, Jews, 89, 91, 100n11, 155 108, 110, 114–16, 140n30, 150, Jus soli, 43, 61n58 157, 161, 234 Mexico, 10, 18n1, 20n17, 67, 71, 73, 81, 89, 120, 132, 140n30, K 141n40, 143n56, 146, 150, 153, King, Martin Luther, Jr., 158, 216 155, 161, 166–70, 191, 211, Korean War, 139n22, 167 226n82 INDEX 263

Monroe Doctrine, 110, 112, 138n7. No Child Left Behind, 95 See also American exceptionalism North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 15, 110, 120, 121, 141n40, 170 N Najour, George, 90 Nash, Gary B., 14, 22n28, 59n39, O 60n42, 60n46, 61n55, 61n57, Obama, Barack (President), 14, 61n59, 61n60 21n26, 81, 96, 101n26, 115, National Performance Review, 195, 137, 159, 171, 178, 179, 200, 210 202, 208, 212, 219n6, 225n78, National Security Agency (NSA), 201, 230 216–18, 224n62, 227n98 Occupy movement, 196 National Security Entry-Exit Operation Gatekeeper, 191 Registration System (NSEERS), Orientals, 150, 152, 181n17 171, 186n86 othering, 65–7 Native Americans, 4, 9, 11, 14, 26, otherness, 1, 2 32, 36, 38, 40, 48, 58n34, Ozawa, Takao, 181n23 59n38, 59n40, 60n48, 68–72, 75–7, 79, 83, 84, 87, 90, 91, 100n4, 108, 110, 112, 116, 123, P 145, 159, 160, 166, 230 Padilla, José, 16 noble savage, 35, 37, 233 Paine, Thomas, 42, 43, 59n42, naturalization, 11, 14, 18, 32, 33, 41, 60n51 43, 56n7, 81, 83, 86, 89, 90, 94, panoptican, 17 103n53, 145–52, 157, 181n23, Park, John S.W., 3, 7, 19n4, 21n23, 232, 236 23n35, 180n9, 181n22, 184n64, laws, 10, 15, 40, 49, 85, 154, 189, 185n79, 186n81 229, 231 Patriot Act, 127, 172, 187n95, 201, neoliberalism, 55, 98, 137 202, 207, 216 net neutrality, 198, 221n31 permanent resident, 130, 156, 162, New Deal, 95, 111, 119, 124, 133, 163, 170, 182n41, 186n88, 215 141n33, 197 Philippines, 10, 14, 74, 78, 79, 81, New Public Management, 96, 195, 103n57, 108, 136, 179, 219n6 199 police killings, 158, 204 Ngai, Mae M., 3, 7, 19n4, 20n19, postnationalism, 130, 135 104n73, 104n81, 153, 180n8, privacy, 96, 127, 140n32, 190, 197, 180n11, 180n15, 181n20, 198, 202, 203, 205, 207, 211, 182n25, 182n27, 184n60, 214, 217, 219n2, 221n29, 185n77 221n31, 224n62. See also Nicaragua, 74, 80, 136, 155 surveillance Nisei, 11, 160 private prison, 137, 210, 225n78 264 INDEX public sphere, 17, 34, 66, 92–4, Snowden, Edward, 12, 17, 198, 212, 96, 118, 191, 192, 204–9, 215–18 224n61, 231, 235, 238, 240, Social Security, 6, 108, 124, 125, 130, 241 133, 174, 178, 187n104 Puerto Rico, 10, 79–81, 83, 84, Spanish–American War, 10, 15, 50, 103n57, 115 66, 67, 73, 78, 79, 81, 112, 234 Sparta citizenship, 30, 32 Q political institutions, 32 Quota Act of 1921, 152 political system, 82 state citizenship, 30, 40, 53, 67, 85, 87, 93 R surveillance, 190, 191, 195, 200–3, Reagan, Ronald (President), 119, 136, 206, 207, 213, 214, 216–18. See 210 also privacy Real ID Act, 11, 20n20, 174, 222n39 Reconstruction, 37, 72, 78, 86, 119, 166 T refugees, 12, 16, 55, 134–8, 144n80, terrorism, 12, 15–17, 20n20, 82, 109, 148, 150, 155, 163–5, 168, 172, 110, 117, 126–9, 134, 148, 171, 182n36, 234. See also asylum 176, 201, 203, 207, 212, 232, republicanism, 35, 52, 53, 58n32, 85, 237, 238 92, 93, 112, 116, 138n1 Thind, Bhagat Singh, 181n24 Roman Torpey, John, 103n64, 104n77 citizenship, 10, 13, 14, 25, 27, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 11, 29–31, 33, 52, 238 20n17, 21n21, 68, 72, 76, 89, political institutions, 29, 32, 52, 116, 140n30, 150, 153 233 Trump, Donald J. (President), 15, political system, 30, 233 21n26, 22n30, 22n33, 54, Román, Ediberto, 7, 20n12, 20n18, 57n24, 106n111, 115, 126, 131, 23n41, 99n1, 102n38, 102n47 132, 135, 147, 174, 178, 186n85, 191, 193, 200, 202, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 219n6, S 225n78, 226n82, 231, 235, 236 sanctuary city, 22n30, 147, 180n5 Twitter, 195, 196 Sanders, Bernie, 196, 200, 208 Sassen, Saskia, 7 September 11, 7, 115, 127, 162, 171, U 172, 176, 191, 197, 201, 210, undocumented people 212, 213, 216, 217 criminalization, 137, 173, 178, 179, settler citizens, 84 179n4 Shays, Daniel, 45 deportation, 21n26, 22n30, 22n33, Shays’ rebellion, 44 147, 162, 169, 178, 179, 208 INDEX 265

imprisonment, 44, 161, 172 (see also welfare reform, 12, 15, 124, 130, 137, unskilled immigrants) 171, 210 United Nations (UN), 109, 134 welfare state, 6, 97, 130 wetback, 167, 185n77 WikiLeaks, 17, 212, 217, 226n85 V Wood, Gordon S., 14, 22n28, 27, Vargas, Jose Antonio, 179 56n1, 56n5, 58n27, 59n35, Vietnam War, 79, 101n24, 114, 124, 59n38, 60n42, 60n44, 60n52, 139n22, 195 61n56, 61n63, 61n66, 62n72, 62n73, 62n75, 63n84 World War I, 90, 111, 126, 152, 154, W 160 Washington, George (President), 34, World War II, 12, 16, 83, 108, 111, 111 119, 128, 133, 136, 141n37, Weiner, Mark S., 3, 19n3, 99n3, 159–61, 166, 194, 197, 216, 101n31, 101n33, 103n57 231, 240