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NDA Techniques for Spent Fuel Verification and Radiation Monitoring

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NDA Techniques for Spent Fuel Verification and Radiation Monitoring STUK-YTO-TR 133 FI9700145 AUGUST 1997 NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring Report on Activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR) Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards Matti Tarvainen Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Helsinki, Finland Ferenc Levai Technical University, Budapest, Hungary Timothy £. Valentine Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA Mark Abhold Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA Bruce Moran USNRC, Washington D.C., USA The conclusions presented in the report are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY (STUK) P.O.BOX 14, FIN-00881 HELSINKI, FINLAND Tel. +358-9-759881 Fax +358-9-75988382 V 9-0 1 ISBN 951-712-222-5 ISSN 0785-9325 Oy Edita Ab Helsinki 1997 STUK-YTO-TR 133 RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY TARVAINEN, Matti (STUK), LEVAI, Ferenc (Budapest Technical University), VALENTINE, Timothy E (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), ABHOLD, Mark (Los Alamos National Laboratory), MORAN, Bruce (USNRC). NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring. Report on Activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR). Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-TR 133. Helsinki 1997. 23 pp. + Annexes 24 pp. ISBN 951-712-222-5 ISSN 0785-9325 Keywords: safeguards, spent fuel, NDA ABSTRACT A variety of NDA methods exist for measurement of spent fuel at various stages of the disposition process. Each of the methods has weaknesses and strengths that make them applicable to one or more stages in disposition. Both passive and active methods are, under favorable conditions, ca- pable of providing either a mapping of an assembly to identify missing fuel pins or a measurement of the fissile content and some are capable of providing a mapping of a canister to identify missing assemblies or a measurement of the fissile content. However, a spent fuel measurement system ca- pable of making routine partial defect tests of spent fuel assemblies is missing. The active NDA methods, in particular, the active neutron methods, hold the most promise for pro- viding quantitative measurements on fuel assemblies and canisters. Application of NDA methods to shielded casks may not be practical or even possible due to the extent of radiation attenuation by the shielding materials, and none of these methods are considered to have potential for quantitative measurements once the spent fuel cask has been placed in a repository. The most practical approach to spent fuel verification is to confirm the characteristics of the spent fuel prior to loading in a canister or cask at the conditioning facility. Fissile material tracking sys- tems in addition to containment and surveillance methods have the capability to assure continuity of the verified knowledge of the sample from loading of the canisters to final disposal and closing of the repository. RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY STUK-YTO-TR 133 CONTENTS ABSTRACT Page 1 INTRODUCTION 5 2 ROLE OF VERIFICATION MEASUREMENTS 6 3 POTENTIAL SPENT FUEL MEASUREMENT POINTS 8 3.1 IAEA spent fuel verification criteria 8 3.2 Spent fuel flow chart 8 3.3 Measurement point categorization 10 3.4 Conditioning of spent fuel 10 4 PROPERTIES OF SPENT FUEL AND CONTAINERS 11 4.1 Spent fuel parameters 11 4.2 Disposal containers 12 4.3 Mixed emplacement 12 5 APPLICABILITY OF NDA-METHODS TO SPENT FUEL VERIFICATION 14 5.1 Measurement principles 14 5.2 Instruments for spent fuel verification 15 5.3 Fissile material tracking 16 6 CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING NDA TECHNIQUES 17 6.1 Gross defect verification of assemblies 17 6.2 Partial defect verification of assemblies 17 6.3 Radiation monitoring of casks 18 6.4 Unsolved NDA problems 19 REFERENCES 20 ANNEX 1 Description of NDA Methods 24 A1.1 Cerenkov 24 A1.2 Passive gamma-ray techniques 24 A1.3 Active gamma-ray techniques 25 A1.4 Passi ve neutron techniques 26 Al .5 Active neutron techniques 27 A1.6 Other techniques 29 A1.7 Table A1.1, NDA methods for spent HEU fuel 30 A1.8 Table A1 .II, NDA methods for spent LEU fuel 31 ANNEX 2 List of NDA instruments 32 ANNEX 3 Relevant R&D projects 41 A3.1 Fissile material measurement through the cask wall 41 A3.2 Pu measurement of spent fuel 42 A3.3 Partial defect testing of multi-assembly configurations 44 A3.4 Verification of casks by passive neutron detection 46 ANNEX 4 Summary of work plan for SAGOR (Task C 799) 47 STUK-YTO-TR 133 RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY 1 INTRODUCTION A joint task of the Member State Support main concerns include the amount' of nuclear Programmes called "Programme for Develop- material deposited and its isotopic composition. ment of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent The ultimate objectives of safeguards, i.e. "the Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR)" has timely detection of diversion of significant been carried out under Task JNT C799. For quantities of nuclear material from peaceful practical reasons, SAGOR has been divided nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear into 10 separate Activities (see Annex 4), the weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices last being compiling of an integrated final or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of report Activity 6 "NDA techniques for spent such diversion by the risk of early detection", fuel verification and radiation monitoring" has can be achieved using conventional safeguards been carried out in co-operation with the measures while the material is in the con- Support Programmes of Finland, Hungary and ditioning facility or even in an open repository. USA. How this goal can be reached in conditioning facilities and open repositories using non- Developing safeguards for final disposal issues destructive assay (NDA) is the main topic of a challenge to the safeguards community and this report. In the case of a closed repository, safeguards experts. Conventional safeguards is the NDA techniques measuring radioactivity of directed to nuclear material that can be handled, spent fuel are no more applicable and this phase measured and monitored. All of the safeguards of the final deposition is not handled in this measures developed, so far, are based on this report. assumption. Final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories is a challenge because The report covers a wide range of measurement none of the conventional features are valid once activities. Section 5 deals with the applicability the container has been placed into the repository of different measurement principles for NDA of and the access backfilled. Nuclear material can spent fuel. Conclusions of the present NDA no more be handled, measured or even moni- techniques are drawn in section 6. Annex 1 tored. The safeguards measures should focus on includes a summary of the principles and indirect objects like surface of the closed methods and Annex 2 lists existing NDA repository [1]. instruments that are available or under devel- opment. These methods can be used in planning Final disposal in geologic repositories is meant the safeguards verification activities of the final to be an irreversible process. In this light, deposition. Annex 3 lists R&D projects which verification measurements of the declared para- are considered to have the highest relevance for meters of the nuclear material have to be the future final deposition safeguards measure- performed in a way to give all answers to the ments. questions made now and also in the future. The RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY STUK-YTO-TR 133 2 ROLE OF VERIFICATION MEASUREMENTS Independent verification of spent nuclear mate- lation techniques of the fission product gamma- rial by the IAEA makes use of NDA measure- rays. Burnup (exposure), i.e. energy released ments. The material to be deposited has been per unit mass, can be directly verified only under IAEA safeguards during the front-end of during power production. Fission product the fuel cycle prior to entering the conditioning gamma-rays can, however, be used for indirect facility and the repository. Also verification verification of the burnup and the contents of measurements have been performed as a part of transuranic isotopes. In addition to the gamma- the routine safeguards activities. Prior to load- ray methods, passive and active neutron assay ing into the storage containers to be deposited, can be used for verification of fissile content of spent fuel assemblies may loose their integrity spent fuel. under consolidation and conditioning. Verifi- cation measurements need to be optimized to One of the main parameters to be verified prior give full and continuing assurance that the to final deposition is the completeness of the operator declared data are complete and correct. declared data. The optimum amount of infor- The logical order of safeguards measures is mation a verification measurement can produce schematically shown in Figure 1. gives assurance that the material declaration relates to the material measured, that the The triangle of Figure 1 applies also to the isotopic composition and mass data are correct safeguards of the conditioning facility. In de- and that no material is missing or has been signing the safeguards measures, verification of replaced by dummies. Because spent fuel declared data is logically followed by con- verified at the conditioning facility has been tainment and surveillance (C/S) to maintain cooled and stored for decades, no details of continuity of the verified knowledge. In an open earlier verification measurements may be avail- repository, use of C/S methods for monitoring able anymore or can be verified by re-measure- of cask movements is foreseen. ments. In this light, one of the main goals of the verification measurements at the conditioning Spent fuel arriving at the conditioning facility facility should be to give assurance that spent has operator declared mass, isotopic com- fuel assemblies and rods are really irradiated position, burnup and cooling time data The nuclear material.
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