(Unintended) Electoral Effects of Foreign Aid Cesi Cruz University of California, San Diego Christina J. Schneider∗ University of California, San Diego Abstract. Can foreign aid projects that are designed to minimize capture by polit- ical elites increase the recipient government’s chances of reelection? We argue that foreign aid can increase the chances of reelection even if incumbents in recipient countries have little or no control over the allocation of resources. First, govern- ments can use the receipt of these projects as a signal of their competence to extract resources from donors. Second, the receipt of foreign aid projects allows govern- ments to hide a strategic redistribution of their own local budget resources in favor of increased targeted spending. To test our theoretical hypotheses we analyze the reelection of incumbents at the municipal level in the Philippines where the World Bank implemented a community-driven development program. This aid program is an ideal test case because capture of foreign aid resources by the political elite was minimized. Our statistical analysis provides robust support for our theory. ∗Corresponding author (
[email protected]). We thank Marisa Abrajano, Claire Adida, Seth Hill, Phil Keefer, Chris Kilby, Salvo Nunnari, Bernhard Reinsberg, Branislav Slantchev, Jennifer Tobin, Johannes Urpelainen, Tom Wong, and the participants of the International Political Economy Society conference (2011), the HALBI workshop, and the IR workshop at UCSD for their incredibly helpful comments. Schneider gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hellman Founda- tion and the UCSD Academic Senate. 1 Introduction It is common wisdom that foreign aid and domestic politics are highly interrelated.