Junos® OS Protocol-Independent Routing Properties User Guide Copyright © 2021 Juniper Networks, Inc

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Junos® OS Protocol-Independent Routing Properties User Guide Copyright © 2021 Juniper Networks, Inc Junos® OS Protocol-Independent Routing Properties User Guide Published 2021-09-22 ii Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, California 94089 USA 408-745-2000 www.juniper.net Juniper Networks, the Juniper Networks logo, Juniper, and Junos are registered trademarks of Juniper Networks, Inc. in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks, service marks, registered marks, or registered service marks are the property of their respective owners. Juniper Networks assumes no responsibility for any inaccuracies in this document. Juniper Networks reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or otherwise revise this publication without notice. Junos® OS Protocol-Independent Routing Properties User Guide Copyright © 2021 Juniper Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. The information in this document is current as of the date on the title page. YEAR 2000 NOTICE Juniper Networks hardware and software products are Year 2000 compliant. Junos OS has no known time-related limitations through the year 2038. However, the NTP application is known to have some difficulty in the year 2036. END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT The Juniper Networks product that is the subject of this technical documentation consists of (or is intended for use with) Juniper Networks software. Use of such software is subject to the terms and conditions of the End User License Agreement ("EULA") posted at https://support.juniper.net/support/eula/. By downloading, installing or using such software, you agree to the terms and conditions of that EULA. iii Table of Contents About This Guide | xiii 1 Overview Protocol-Independent Routing Properties Overview | 2 2 Junos OS Routing Tables Configuring Junos OS Routing Tables | 4 Understanding Junos OS Routing Tables | 4 Routing Table Features in Junos OS | 6 Understanding Default Routing Table Groups for Interface Routes on PTX Routers | 8 Example: Creating Routing Tables | 10 Requirements | 10 Overview | 10 Configuration | 11 Verification | 12 Example: Exporting Specific Routes from One Routing Table Into Another Routing Table | 13 Requirements | 14 Overview | 14 Configuration | 14 Verification | 20 3 Static Routes Configure Static Routes | 22 Understand Basic Static Routing | 22 Example: Configure IPv4 Static Routing for a Stub Network | 22 Requirements | 23 IPv4 Static Routing Overview | 23 IPv4 Static Route Configuration | 24 Verification | 28 Example: Configure IPv6 Static Routing for a Stub Network | 31 iv Requirements | 31 IPv6 Static Routing Overview | 31 IPv6 Static Route Configuration | 32 Verification | 36 Static Route Preferences and Qualified Next Hops | 38 Understanding Static Route Preferences and Qualified Next Hops | 39 Example: Configuring Static Route Preferences and Qualified Next Hops to Control Static Route Selection | 40 Requirements | 40 Overview | 41 Configuration | 42 Verification | 46 Conserving IP Addresses Using Static Routes | 49 Understanding Static Route Control in Routing and Forwarding Tables | 53 Example: Preventing a Static Route from Being Readvertised | 54 Requirements | 54 Overview | 54 Configuration | 55 Verification | 62 Verifying the Static Route Configuration | 63 Bidirectional Forwarding Detection for Static Routes | 65 Understanding BFD for Static Routes for Faster Network Failure Detection | 66 Example: Configuring BFD for Static Routes for Faster Network Failure Detection | 69 Requirements | 70 Overview | 70 Configuration | 71 Verification | 76 Understanding BFD Authentication for Static Route Security | 79 Example: Configuring BFD Authentication for Securing Static Routes | 81 Requirements | 82 Overview | 82 v Configuration | 83 Verification | 88 Example: Enabling BFD on Qualified Next Hops in Static Routes for Route Selection | 91 Requirements | 91 Overview | 91 Configuration | 92 Verification | 96 Static Routes for CLNS | 101 Understanding Static Routes for CLNS | 101 Example: Configuring Static Routes for CLNS When No IGP is Present | 101 Requirements | 101 Overview | 102 Configuration | 102 Verification | 104 4 Route Aggregation Configuring Route Aggregation | 107 Understanding Route Aggregation | 107 Example: Summarizing Static Routes Through Route Aggregation | 116 Requirements | 117 Overview | 117 Configuration | 118 Verification | 125 5 Martian Addresses Recognize Martian Addresses for Routing | 129 Understanding Martian Addresses | 129 Example: Removing the Class E Prefix on Martian Addresses | 131 Requirements | 131 Overview | 131 Configuration | 131 Verification | 134 6 Packet Forwarding vi Configuring Packet Forwarding Behavior | 138 Understanding Indirect Next Hops | 138 Example: Optimizing Route Reconvergence by Enabling Indirect Next Hops on the Packet Forwarding Engine | 139 Requirements | 139 Overview | 140 Configuration | 141 Verification | 152 7 Troubleshooting Troubleshooting Network Issues | 156 Working with Problems on Your Network | 156 Isolating a Broken Network Connection | 157 Identifying the Symptoms of a Broken Network Connection | 159 Isolating the Causes of a Network Problem | 161 Taking Appropriate Action for Resolving the Network Problem | 162 Evaluating the Solution to Check Whether the Network Problem Is Resolved | 164 Checklist for Tracking Error Conditions | 166 Configure Routing Protocol Process Tracing | 168 Configure Routing Protocol Tracing for a Specific Routing Protocol | 172 Monitor Trace File Messages Written in Near-Real Time | 175 Stop Trace File Monitoring | 176 Tracing Global Routing Protocol Operations | 177 Understanding Global Routing Protocol Tracing Operations | 177 Example: Tracing Global Routing Protocol Operations | 178 Requirements | 179 Overview | 179 Configuration | 180 Verification | 184 8 Configuration Statements vii access (Static Access Routes) | 190 access-internal (Static Access-Internal Routes) | 191 active | 193 aggregate (Routing) | 195 as-path (Routing Options) | 198 auto-export | 201 autonomous-system | 204 bfd | 207 bfd-liveness-detection (Routing Options Static Route) | 211 brief | 215 color | 218 community (Routing Options) | 220 confederation | 223 destination-networks | 225 disable (Routing Options) | 227 discard | 229 dynamic-tunnels | 231 export (Routing Options) | 234 export-rib | 236 fate-sharing | 239 filter | 241 firewall-install-disable | 243 flow | 245 forwarding-table | 247 forwarding-options | 249 viii full | 256 generate | 256 graceful-restart (Enabling Globally) | 259 import | 261 import-policy | 263 import-rib | 265 independent-domain | 267 indirect-next-hop | 269 indirect-next-hop-change-acknowledgements | 271 input (Routing Options RIB) | 273 install (Routing Options) | 275 instance-export | 277 instance-import | 279 interface (Multicast Scoping) | 280 interface (Multicast Static Routes) | 282 interface-routes | 284 jeb | 287 krt-nexthop-ack-timeout | 289 longest-match (Static Routes) | 291 lsp-next-hop (Static Routes) | 294 martians | 296 maximum-paths | 298 maximum-prefixes | 300 med-igp-update-interval | 303 metric | 304 ix metric (Aggregate, Generated, or Static Route) | 306 metric (Qualified Next Hop on Static Route) | 308 multicast | 309 next-hop (Access) | 312 next-hop (Access Internal) | 314 no-delegate-processing | 315 no-hierarchical-ecmp | 317 nonstop-routing | 318 num-65-127-prefix | 320 options (Routing Options) | 322 per-route-accounting | 324 p2mp-ldp-next-hop | 326 p2mp-lsp-next-hop | 328 passive (Routing Options) | 329 policy (Aggregate and Generated Routes) | 330 ppm | 332 precision-timers-max-period | 335 preference (Access) | 336 preference (Routing Options) | 338 prefix | 340 prefix-65-127-disable | 342 qualified-next-hop (Access) | 345 qualified-next-hop (Access-Internal) | 346 qualified-next-hop (Static Routes) | 348 readvertise | 350 x resolution | 353 resolution-ribs | 356 resolve | 358 restart-duration | 360 restart-duration (Routing Options) | 362 retain | 364 rib (General) | 366 rib (Route Resolution) | 369 rib-group (Routing Options) | 371 rib-groups | 373 route (Access) | 375 route (Access-Internal) | 377 route-distinguisher-id | 379 route-record | 381 router-id | 382 routing-options | 385 scope | 386 scope-policy | 388 spring-te-lsp-next-hop | 390 source-address (Routing Options) | 392 source-routing | 393 ssm-groups | 395 static (Routing Options) | 397 tag (Access) | 403 tag (Routing Options) | 405 xi threshold (Multicast Forwarding Cache) | 407 traceoptions | 410 unicast-reverse-path | 414 9 Operational Commands clear bfd adaptation | 418 clear bfd session | 420 show bfd session | 422 show as-path | 433 show as-path domain | 439 show as-path summary | 442 show chassis forwarding-options | 445 show interfaces routing summary | 449 show route | 453 show route active-path | 467 show route all | 474 show route aspath-regex | 477 show route best | 480 show route brief | 485 show route cumulative | 488 show route detail | 490 show route exact | 523 show route export | 527 show route export vrf-target | 531 show route extensive | 535 show route export vrf-target | 559 xii show route forwarding-table | 562 show route forwarding-table interface-name | 578 show route hidden | 582 show route inactive-path | 587 show route inactive-prefix | 592 show route instance | 595 show route label-switched-path | 602 show route localization | 604 show route martians | 607 show route next-hop | 611 show route protocol | 615 show route range | 623 show route resolution | 630 show route snooping | 636 show route source-gateway | 640 show route summary | 648 show route table | 657 show route terse | 682 xiii About This Guide In Junos OS, routing capabilities
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