The logic of costly punishment reversed: expropriation of free-riders and outsiders ,†
David Hugh-Jones Carlo Perroni University of East Anglia University of Warwick and CAGE
January 5, 2017
Abstract
Current literature views the punishment of free-riders as an under-supplied pub- lic good, carried out by individuals at a cost to themselves. It need not be so: often, free-riders’ property can be forcibly appropriated by a coordinated group. This power makes punishment profitable, but it can also be abused. It is easier to contain abuses, and focus group punishment on free-riders, in societies where coordinated expropriation is harder. Our theory explains why public goods are un- dersupplied in heterogenous communities: because groups target minorities instead of free-riders. In our laboratory experiment, outcomes were more e cient when coordination was more di cult, while outgroup members were targeted more than ingroup members, and reacted di erently to punishment.
KEY WORDS: Cooperation, costly punishment, group coercion, heterogeneity JEL CLASSIFICATION: H1, H4, N4, D02