The Misuse of Android Unix Domain Sockets and Security Implications Yuru Shaoy, Jason Ott∗, Yunhan Jack Jiay, Zhiyun Qian∗, Z. Morley Maoy yUniversity of Michigan, ∗University of California, Riverside {yurushao, jackjia, zmao}@umich.edu,
[email protected],
[email protected] ABSTRACT eral vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2011-1823, CVE-2011-3918, In this work, we conduct the first systematic study in un- and CVE-2015-6841) have already been reported. Vendor derstanding the security properties of the usage of Unix do- customizations make things worse, as they expose additional main sockets by both Android apps and system daemons Linux IPC channels: CVE-2013-4777 and CVE-2013-5933. as an IPC (Inter-process Communication) mechanism, espe- Nevertheless, unlike Android IPCs, the use of Linux IPCs cially for cross-layer communications between the Java and on Android has not yet been systematically studied. native layers. We propose a tool called SInspector to ex- In addition to the Android system, apps also have access pose potential security vulnerabilities in using Unix domain to the Linux IPCs implemented within Android. Among sockets through the process of identifying socket addresses, them, Unix domain sockets are the only one apps can easily detecting authentication checks, and performing data flow make use of: signals are not capable of carrying data and analysis. Our in-depth analysis revealed some serious vul- not suitable for bidirectional communications; Netlink sock- nerabilities in popular apps and system daemons, such as ets are geared for communications across the kernel space root privilege escalation and arbitrary file access. Based and the user space.