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Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions

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Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions «Despite its sovereign status, Tajikistan is quite limited in choosing some of the most key aspects of its foreign policy, including with regard to its relations with Iran»? – mentioned political analyst Parviz Mullodzhanov, in an article written specifically for CABAR.asia. Follow us on Facebook Iranian-Tajik relations are of particular importance not only for these two countries, since in the long run they can also influence the development of the situation in the region as a whole. Iran has always been interested in consolidating its position in post-Soviet Central Asia, considering this region as one of the main directions for breaking the geopolitical and economic blockade in which it found itself due to many years of confrontation with the West. From this point of view, Tajikistan, due to its linguistic and cultural proximity to Iran, is traditionally one of the key vectors of Iranian diplomacy in the region. Relations with Iran are also of particular importance for Tajikistan – and not only from its economic and geopolitical interests. The fact is that Tajiks and Persians are part of the so- called “Iranian world” – a single civilizational, historical and linguistic space that have connected both nations for many centuries. Despite the fact that this concept has a rather civilizational and humanitarian character, it also has a certain effect on geopolitics. In communicating with each other, the governments and politicians of both states, despite ideological differences, are somehow forced to take this factor into account. Meanwhile, despite the historical and cultural proximity, the presence of economic and geopolitical interests, relations between the two countries have always been complex and ambiguous. Periods of thawing and cooperation several times unexpectedly gave way to stages of misunderstanding, mutual complaints and cooldown in cooperation. As a result, Iranian-Tajik relations are still in a somewhat suspended and uncertain state – on the one hand, last year the parties took some steps towards each other, however, at the same time, there is still a fair amount of distrust and alienation between them. Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions New Dushanbe-Tehran Union: Diplomatic Support in Exchange for Investment? In which direction, cooling or thawing – will the pendulum of Iranian-Tajik relations swing in the next few years? How will these relations take shape in the light of recent events in the world and the region – the possible Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan, the aggravation of the Iranian-American conflict, a new phenomenon – the coronavirus pandemic? And how will the dynamics of these relations affect Iran’s policies and positions in the post-Soviet space and in Central Asia, including neighboring Afghanistan? In order to answer these questions, we will briefly consider the dynamics of the development of Iranian-Tajik relations, the interests and positions of the parties, the driving forces and factors that influence or may affect their further development. The dynamics of Iranian-Tajik relations In general, the history of the relationship between the post-Soviet Tajik political elite and the Iranian ruling regime can be arbitrarily presented as three successive stages: The first stage, which can be described as a period of geopolitical confrontation, falls on the first years of the civil war in Tajikistan. Iran initially provided significant political and, according to some, financial support for the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) after its military defeat and further expulsion from the country in 1992. During the civil war, a significant part of Tajik opposition leaders was based in Iran, due to which the Iranians could have a significant influence on the course of events in the inter-Tajik conflict. Accordingly, during this period, relations between the current Tajik government and Iran were openly hostile. The second stage , in the course of which there was a thawing of relations and the establishment of cooperation between countries, began simultaneously with the inter-Tajik peace process. The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has forced all major geopolitical players in the region to seek opportunities for an early end to the Tajik Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions conflict. Iran has acted as one of the guarantor states of the peace process. Together with Russia and the Afghan Northern Alliance, the Iranians put significant pressure on both sides of the inter-Tajik conflict, which allowed for an early conclusion of peace. One of the rounds of the inter-Tajik negotiations was held in Tehran. Photo: ozodi.org After the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1997, relations between Dushanbe and Tehran entered a period of stable development and thawing, which lasted almost for 13 years. During this period, Iran has become one of the main economic partners and investors of Tajikistan. In this vein, by 2013, trade between the two countries amounted to 292.3 million US dollars; Iran accounted for 9.9% of Tajikistan’s exports and 4.3% of the country’s imports.[1] Iran has invested quite serious funds in Tajikistan’s hydropower and infrastructure projects, the parties have also negotiated a number of joint projects in the field of communications and television broadcast. The Iranians have actively supported Tajikistan several times during its economic disputes and disagreements with its neighbors – primarily with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In turn, Dushanbe supported the interests of Tehran in the post-Soviet space, especially within the framework of various integration associations of the CIS countries, such as the EurAsEC. The third period , during which there was a sharp cooling of bilateral relations, originates in 2013. The first blow to Iranian-Tajik relations was the case of the famous Iranian Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions billionaire Bobak Zanjoni, who in Iran was accused of money laundering through some Chinese and Tajik banks. It was a sum of two billion dollars, which the disgraced businessman allegedly handed over to his Tajik partners. However, in response to a request from the Iranian side, the Tajik government replied that “the Iranian side has not submitted a single specific document on the capital of its billionaire Zanjoni in the banks of Tajikistan.”[2] The disagreement over the lost billions lasted for several years, significantly undermining relations between the two countries. The next blow was the adoption of Tajik opposition at the official level in Iran – first of all, Mukhitdin Kabiri, chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT, banned organisation in Tajikistan). In September 2015, Tajik authorities accused the IRPT of preparing a coup d’etat and banned its activities in the country from afar. The appearance of Kabiri at one of the official events in Tehran served as another impetus for a cardinal deterioration in relations between the two states. Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party banned in Tajikistan, Muhiddin Kabiri in 2015. Photo: Fars After that, a long and consistent propaganda and ideological company began in Tajikistan, within the framework of which Iran was accused of inciting a civil war in the 1990s, organizing war crimes during this period, preparing Islamic terrorists, and so on.[3] All cooperation programs with Iran were curtailed, and investment projects and plans of past Tajik-Iranian Relations Under the New Conditions years remained unfulfilled. Researchers still have not come to a consensus on the true causes of the cooling down in Iranian-Tajik relations. A significant part of them points to the Zanjoni case, believing that the latter affected the interests of influential business structures in the banking sector of the republic. The origins of the anti-Iranian company in Tajikistan largely come from external players, namely, the Saudis and the international Salafi lobby. Others point to the influence of Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf countries with which Iran is in permanent conflict. Proponents of the latter point of view believe that Tajikistan has become a hostage to the confrontation between the two main geopolitical centers of the Islamic world – Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both of these countries historically claim to be a leader in the Islamic world and fight for influence in Muslim regions, including Central Asia. In this scenario, Tajikistan and Tajiks, because of their linguistic, cultural and historical proximity to Iran and Iranians, are considered by the Saudis and Salafis as a weak link. Therefore, it is in relation to the Tajiks that the most intensified propaganda and organizational company is being conducted, the purpose of which is to salafize the society, change the identity and self-consciousness of the Tajik people, forcing anti-Iranian and anti- Shiite sentiments in the country. Thus, according to this point of view, the origins of the anti-Iranian company in Tajikistan are largely external players, namely, the Saudis and the international Salafi lobby. The unexpected thawing of Iranian-Tajik relations: what stands behind it? In June 2019, an unexpected warming again appeared in relations between the countries, mainly due to the changed position of Dushanbe. Thus, on June 1, Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Mukhriddin met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif in Tehran.[4] According to observers, this was the first diplomatic
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