Tajikistan Tier 1 | Uscirf-Recommended Countries of Particular Concern (Cpc)

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Tajikistan Tier 1 | Uscirf-Recommended Countries of Particular Concern (Cpc) TAJIKISTAN TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) KEY FINDINGS The government of Tajikistan suppresses religious activity been imprisoned, and 13 were sentenced to prison terms in independent of state control, particularly of Muslims, Protes- June 2016, including two IRPT leaders who were jailed for tants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and imprisons individuals on life. Jehovah’s Witnesses remain banned. Based on these unfounded criminal allegations due to their Muslim identity. concerns, as it has since 2012, USCIRF again finds in 2017 In 2016, there were mass raids and arrests of alleged Salafi that Tajikistan merits designation as a “country of particular Muslims across the country. In 2015, a Tajik court banned concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom as “extremist” the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan Act (IRFA). The State Department designated Tajikistan as a (IRPT), whose legal status was part of the country’s post- CPC for the first time in February 2016 and did so again in civil war peace treaty; since then, 150 IRPT members have October 2016. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT • Continue to designate Tajikistan as a participated in or responsible for human • Press for at the highest levels and CPC under IRFA; rights abuses, including particularly work to secure the immediate release • Lift the waiver on taking an action as a severe violations of religious freedom, of individuals imprisoned for their consequence of the CPC designation and such as the “specially designated peaceful religious activities or religious negotiate a binding agreement with the nationals” list maintained by the Treasury affiliations and press the Tajik govern- government of Tajikistan, under section Department’s Office of Foreign Asset ment to treat prisoners humanely and 405(c) of IRFA, to achieve specific and Control, visa denials under section 604(a) allow them access to family, human meaningful reforms, with benchmarks of IRFA and the Global Magnitsky Human rights monitors, adequate medical that include major legal reform, an end Rights Accountability Act, and asset care, and lawyers and the ability to to police raids, prisoner releases, and freezes under the Global Magnitsky Act; practice their faith; greater access to foreign coreligionists; • Work with the international commu- • Ensure that the U.S. Embassy, including should an agreement not be reached, nity, particularly during OSCE events at the ambassadorial level, maintains impose sanctions, as stipulated in IRFA; on countering terrorism, to include appropriate contacts with human rights • Condition U.S. assistance to the Tajik private and public criticism of Tajiki- activists and religious leaders; and government, with the exception of aid stan’s approach to regulating religion • Ensure continued U.S. funding for Radio to improve humanitarian conditions and and countering extremism, which risks Ozodi; and radicalizing the country’s population; advance human rights, on the govern- • Ensure that INTERPOL implements ment establishing and implementing a • Urge the Tajik government to permit announced reforms to more effec- timetable of specific steps to reform the visits by the UN Special Rapporteurs on tively process complaints about the 2009 religion law and improve condi- freedom of religion or belief, the inde- misuse of international arrest and tions of freedom of religion or belief; pendence of the judiciary, and torture; set extradition requests, known as “red • Use targeted tools against specific specific visit dates; and provide the full notices,” to pursue political and reli- officials and agencies identified as having and necessary conditions for such visits; gious dissidents. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM | ANNUAL REPORT 2017 www.USCIRF.gov | [email protected] | @USCIRF TIER 1 TIER TAJIKISTAN BACKGROUND foreign coreligionists; and imposes state controls on the Tajikistan is an isolated and impoverished country. content, publication, and import of religious materials. In the 1990s it experienced a five-year civil war that Small Protestant and other groups cannot obtain legal resulted in over 100,000 deaths; the post-war amnesty status under the burdensome registration requirements. included many Tajik officials responsible for torture. Jehovah’s Witnesses were banned in 2007 allegedly for The government is weak and highly corrupt, and 40 causing “discontent” and for conscientious objection to percent of the country’s gross domestic product is from military service. labor remittances, mostly from Russia. With the Russian In 2011 and 2012, administrative and penal code economy’s recent downturn, hundreds of thousands of amendments set new penalties, including large fines Tajik workers have returned home to few job prospects and prison terms for religion-related charges, such as and increasing social tension. organizing or participating in “unapproved” religious Over 90 percent of Tajikistan’s estimated popu- meetings. Alleged organizers of a “religious extremist lation of 7.9 million is Muslim, most from the Hanafi study group” face eight- to 12-year prison terms. A 2011 school of Sunni Islam; about 4 percent are Ismaili Shi’a. law on parental responsibility banned minors from any The country’s 150,000 Christians are mostly Russian organized religious activity except funerals. The State Orthodox, but also include Protestants and Roman Department noted that “Tajikistan is the only country Catholics. There also are small numbers of Baha’is, in the world in which the law prohibits persons under Hare Krishnas, and the age of 18 from partici- Jehovah’s Witnesses, and pating in public religious fewer than 300 Jews. activities.” Tajikistan’s Tajikistan’s legal Although a legal role for the extremism law punishes environment for free- IRPT was part of the post-civil war extremist, terrorist, or dom of religion or belief peace treaty . the Tajik government revolutionary activities sharply declined after banned the IRPT as an extremist group. without requiring acts several highly restrictive that involve violence laws were adopted in or incitement of immi- 2009. The 2009 religion nent violence. Trials law sets onerous registration requirements; criminal- under these charges lack due process and procedural izes unregistered religious activity and private religious safeguards. The Tajik government uses concerns over education and proselytism; sets strict limits on the num- Islamist extremism to justify actions against partici- ber and size of mosques; allows state interference with pants in certain religious activities. the appointment of imams and the content of sermons; The State Department noted that the Tajik gov- requires official permission for religious organizations ernment’s list of groups banned as extremist includes to provide religious instruction and communicate with nonviolent religiously linked groups such as Hizb U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM | ANNUAL REPORT 2017 www.USCIRF.gov | [email protected] | @USCIRF TIER 1 TIER TAJIKISTAN ut-Tahrir, Tabligh Jamaat, the Muslim Brotherhood, reported that Khatlon region law enforcement officials and Group 24 (a Tajik political opposition group), along “encouraged” 6,673 women to stop wearing Islamic with recognized terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, the headscarves as part of a national campaign; throughout Taliban, the Islamic Group (Islamic Community of Paki- the country, police also detained hundreds of thousands stan), the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, the of bearded men, took their fingerprints, and forced Islamic Party of Turkestan (former Islamic Movement of them to shave. After 2004, the Council of Ulema banned Uzbekistan), and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Although a legal role women from attending mosques; in 2014, it said it would for the IRPT was part of the post-civil war peace treaty, allow women to attend mosques and female students in September 2015 the Tajik government banned the at religious schools to become imam-hatibs (imams’ IRPT as an extremist group. assistants). In January 2017, in a sign of continuing official disapproval of conservative Islamic clothing, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS the chair of the state committee for women and families 2016–2017 suggested that “depravity” was the “norm” for women Restrictions on Muslims adhering to “foreign ideals,” such as the Middle East- The religion law restricts Muslim prayer to four loca- ern-style hijab. tions: mosques, homes, cemeteries, and shrines. In 2016, Tajik officials continued to monitor mosque attendees Trials and Imprisonment of Muslims for views they deem extremist or critical of the govern- In 2016, Tajik law enforcement officials prosecuted ment and installed more surveillance cameras and dozens of individuals for alleged links to banned metal detectors, Forum 18 reported. The government Islamic groups or international terrorist networks. also restricts Muslim religious dress and limits the num- Due to Tajikistan’s flawed judicial system, it is almost ber and age of hajj (religious pilgrimage) participants, impossible to ascertain the accuracy of such charges. In prohibiting anyone under the age of 35 from taking part. May 2016, five imams—Alisher Olimov, Kobil Sangi- The official State Committee on Religious Affairs nov, Gufron Anvarov, Dovud Okhunov, and Khurshed (SCRA) controls the selection and retention of imams Bofarov—were arrested in the Sogd Region for alleged and the content of their sermons. The government pays membership in the banned Muslim Brotherhood;
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