Compendium of Policy Briefs April 2019 The Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) is a -based non-profi t, non-partisan, research and analysis organization founded in early 2011. GIP strives to strengthen the organiza- tional backbone of democratic institutions and promote good governance and development through policy research and advocacy in . It also encourages public participation in civil society-building and developing democratic processes. Since December 2013 GIP is member of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

*This publication has been produced from the resources provided by the National Endow- ment for Democracy. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessar- ily refl ect the views of the Georgian Institute of Politics and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Editor: Kornely Kakachia Authors: Salome Minesashvili Levan Kakhishvili Bidzina Lebanidze Nino Robakidze

Printed by: Grifoni

© Georgian Institute of Politics, 2019 Tel: +995 599 99 02 12 Email: [email protected] www.gip.ge 3 FOREWORD Since the mid-2000s, democracy has regressed ’s democratization, hampering the in nearly every part of the world. The global establishment of a stable party system. The watchdog Freedom House1 has recorded de- 2018 presidential election was a clear example clines in global freedom for 12 years in a row. of the trust crisis and the extreme polarization Some states where democracy was believed to challenging Georgian democracy. While polit- be well-rooted have regressed under populist ical rivalry is part of any functioning democra- pressure with authoritarian tendencies. cy, in Georgia it has turned into polarization, rather than pluralism, limiting the public nar- While democracies have not collapsed, cur- rative and causing the fragmentation of the rent trends in global politics show that mod- political landscape, which is a major setback ern democracy is challenged by resurgent au- in the struggle to win back public trust. The thoritarianism, weakened liberal democratic negative campaigning, harsh accusations and values, and rising populist movements as attempts to demonize opponents that charac- well as a sharp decline in ’ trust in po- terized the election left little space for struc- litical parties and institutions. These negative tured election programs and an issue-oriented tendencies are observed both in consolidated debate. They also diminished voters’ ability democracies, like those in the US and Europe, to make an informed choice.4 The negative and in hybrid regimes, such as Georgia. pre-election environment created fertile soil Against the global trend of democratic stag- for political apathy and citizen nihilism and, nation and backsliding, Georgia, which a few not surprisingly, public approval for political years ago looked like a prime example of de- parties has decreased. Recent polls show that mocratization in the Eastern neighborhood, only 13 percent of Georgians believe parties has also stagnated in recent years.2 While represent the interests of citizens.5 the country has made some achievements in The trust crisis has been further deepened by terms of fulfi lling some tasks from its Euro- polarization in the media landscape. Most peanisation agenda, Georgia’s path towards mainstream media outlets are either affi liated democracy is far from complete or perfect.3 with political parties or have aligned their ed- The present challenges of polarization and itorial policies to political agendas, contribut- the rise of populism are adding to a political ing to polarization in Georgian society. Inter- climate that was already less than favorable national election observation missions noted for Georgia’s unconsolidated democracy. the widespread use of aggressive and violent The high degree of polarization among polit- rhetoric in television programs.6 Besides, ma- ical parties remains a major stumbling block jor media outlets essentially became the in-

1 Michael J. Abramowitz, Democracy in Crisis. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/free- dom-world/freedom-world-2018 2 Georgia: Key Developments in 2018 Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/georgia 3 Eastern Partnership Index 2017. Georgia. P.56 Available at: https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/#- section-fi llup-1 4 OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission. Georgia – Presidential Elections, Second Round. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. November, 2018. Available at: https://www.osce.org/ odihr/elections/georgia/404642?download=true 5 National-Democratic Institute. Public Opinion Polls. December 2018. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/ sites/default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_Political%20Poll%20Presentation_December%202018_English_Final.pdf 6 OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission. Georgia – Presidential Elections, Second Round. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. November, 2018. Available at: https://www.osce.org/ odihr/elections/georgia/404642?download=true 4 struments of the election campaigns, embrac- or the media but in democracy itself. Accord- ing biased positions. This partisanship caused ing to recent NDI polls, only 43 percent of the decline of public trust in the media, which citizens believe Georgia is a democracy, com- is now considered a source of disinformation pared to 46 percent who do not.7 This defi - by a large part of society. Civil society orga- cit of belief in Georgian democracy is at its nizations are also facing a wave of distrust. highest level since 2013, showing an urgent Polarized and partisan media outlets and civ- need to rebuild faith in democratic process- il organizations are usually more vulnerable es and institutions by developing practical, to negative external infl uences. Although it is issue-based platforms and inspiring voter diffi cult to draw a clear line between polar- confi dence. In this environment, crucial ques- ization and pluralism, attempts to do so can tions about how the government and society have an important positive impact on efforts should address polarization and distrust to turn polarization into pluralism, therefore should be put forward. This publication has encouraging democratic values and creating been developed under the project — “Polar- sustainable public trust in the political pro- ization as a stumbling block in Georgia’s de- cess. The democratic system is primarily built mocratization” — supported by the National on a stable competitive party system as well Endowment for Democracy and implement- as a strong and independent media, which ed by the Georgian Institute of Politics. contributes by keeping voters well informed The four policy briefs in the publication in- so they can ensure the accountability and re- troduce policy recommendations to tackle sponsibility of the government. However, in the trust crisis, polarization, and populism in an environment where those actors are expe- Georgia. In particular, the publication focus- riencing a trust crisis, the gap for other actors es on the effect the decreasing level of trust to shape the public narrative — including rad- in political parties has on democratization in ical groups and populists that position them- Georgia and the effect rising nationalist pop- selves as speaking “in the name of the peo- ulism has on Georgia’s European integration. ple” — expands. These radical groups have This publication is intended to create a foun- become a serious challenge to the established dation for discussion and serve as a resource structure and politics of Western democracy. for government offi cials, civil society repre- A similar trend is observed at all levels of pub- sentatives, fi eld experts, academics, citizens lic life in Georgia. Although the root causes as and other stakeholders who are engaged in well as the infl uence of radical populism can Georgia’s democratic development. differ in Europe and Georgia, right-wing rad- ical groups unambiguously harm the stability of the political system as well as democratic Dr. KORNELY KAKACHIA values. Therefore, a response should be found before these groups shatter political processes and gain signifi cant political powers.

Polarization and radicalization lead to a lack Director,Director of trust not only in particular political parties Georgian Institute of Politics

7 National-Democratic Institute. Public Opinion Polls. December 2018. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/ sites/default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_Political%20Poll%20Presentation_December%202018_English_Final.pdf SOCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN GEORGIA

SALOME MINESASHVILI1

7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Neither populist nor right-wing move- id basis for extreme right-wing move- ments are new in Georgia but their ments. Some of the social conserva- combination is more of a recent devel- tive values remain ingrained over the opment. A commonly assumed right- years, but what is alarming, the public wing populist party has made it to the has become more skeptical towards parliament in 2016 and at the same migrants, one of the major issues pro- time nationalist groups have gained moted by these groups. Moreover, increased visibility over the past three social and economic conditions are years. The paper examines the extent increasingly perceived as worsening, to which these right-wing and nation- trust in politicians, political institutions alist populist groups refl ect social val- and fellow citizens is breaking down ues among Georgian public. It also and these factors are usually used for explores the changing perceptions in explaining rising populism. Although Georgian society that are widely as- nationalist populists in Georgia still re- sociated with rising right-wing pop- main marginal, these changing public ulism. The overview of opinion polls perceptions indicate at their increased suggests that public values create a sol- prospects for mobilizing support.

SUMMARY

A wave of right-wing, nationalist populism the increased visibility of far-right groups.2 is sweeping the Western world, illustrated And, while they are nothing new for Geor- by Brexit, the election of US President Don- gia, the extreme right-wing movements ald Trump and the rise of right-wing par- have become especially active in the coun- ties across Europe. Although neither pop- try over the past three years. While far right ulism nor right-wing movements are new groups in Georgia remain rather marginal, to Georgia, the combination of the two and they are increasingly making advances and their legitimization by legislative rights is the potential for them to gain momentum is a more recent development over the past vividly present.3 two decades. As a result of the 2016 parlia- mentary elections, the Alliance of Patriots The rise of right-wing populism is arguably of Georgia, which is commonly assumed to related to multiple factors affecting societies be a right-wing populist party, managed to in developed states. Economic grievances overcome the 5% threshold and secure seats after the fi nancial crisis partly explain the in the legislative body, while several liberal increased support for radical parties, while parties were left behind. This development some attribute a major role to cultural back- has taken place against the background of lash against liberalism and increased levels

1 Salome Minesashvili – Policy Analyst, Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP). 2 Sichinava, D. and Tangiashvili, N. (2018). Anti-Western discourse in social media. Inter- view. Radio Free Europe. https://bit.ly/2MJHFVZ 3 Stephan, A. (2018). Defi ning the far-right in Georgia: from the neo-Fascists to populist parties. Georgian In- stitute of Politics (5). 8 of social conservatism, especially in terms grants and basic arguments against liberalism of attitudes towards immigration. Others that are similar to those being used by right- combine two of the main points —liberal wing populist parties across the West. Taking normative order as well as economic trou- into consideration the marginal positions in bles have left parts of society isolated and society, do these groups have the chance to marginalized. It is precisely these disenfran- secure increased support in Georgia? To what chised members of society who are the most extent do they refl ect social values in Georgian inclined to become supporters of radical po- society and thus have a potential base for sup- litical parties. port? And are there developments, in terms of Georgians’ economic and social views, that Georgian right-wing populist parties and can also shed light on the increased visibility movements are also picking up points on mi- of right-wing populist groups?

DISCOURSE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN GEORGIA

Far-right groups in Georgia vary from mod- gration laws.4 The Georgian National Unity erate to extremist and accommodate dif- became visible as they organized a count- ferent types of actors, including informal er-rally to the May 2018 protests against gov- groups operating through social networks, ernment raids on night clubs.5 institutionalized groups registered as NGOs and political parties. The most prominent Despite their diversity, these groups share of the actors to come forward since 2016 several messages that defi ne them as right- include the Alliance of Patri- wing but some of them are also on the popu- ots of Georgia (APG); the Georgian March, list spectrum. Right-wing populism generally which at some point also announced plans to tends to claim their nation as a morally su- form a political party and Georgian National perior group comprising of citizens, known Unity. The latter two have made a name for as “ordinary people”.6 This implies a vertical themselves through their xenophobic and opposition against elites and a differentia- anti-liberal public protests. In July 2017 the tion between the “ordinary people” and the Georgian March held anti-migration protests political and legal elites who are accused of in the center of Tbilisi, on Aghmashenebeli being loyal to their own interests over the in- Street, which is known for its Arab, Iranian terests of the nation. They maintain that elite and Turkish restaurants. During the protest, groups create a profi t maximizing group and more than 2000 Georgian March supporters are guilty of corruption and greed and de- demanded the deportation of illegal immi- priving citizens of what they deserve7 while grants and the tightening of national immi- being indifferent to the struggles of people.8

4 Georgians march against “uncontrolled immigration” in Tbilisi. (2017). JAM News. 15 July 2017. Available at: https://jam-news.net/georgians-marched-against-uncontrolled-migration-in-tbilisi-a-photo-story/ 5 Ulta-nationalist counter rally kicks off in central Tbilisi. (2018). Georgia Today, 13 May 2018. Available at: http://georgiatoday.ge/news/10254/Ultra-Nationalist-Counter-Rally-Kicks-off-in-Central-Tbilisi 6 Mols, F. and Jetten, J. (2016). Explaining the appeal of populist right-wing parties in times of economic pros- perity. Political Psychology, 37, 275-292. 7 Hameleers, M. (2018). A typology of populism: toward a revised theoretical framework on the sender side and receiver side of communication. International Journal of Communication, 12, 2171-2190. 8 Staerkle, C. and Green, E.G.T. (2018). Right-wing populism as a social representation: a comparison across four European countries. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 28(6), 430-445. 9

When coupled with rightist elements, this re- gram and calls for people to behave in ac- sults in a nativist approach. Right-wing pop- cordance to the “Georgian spirit,” which the ulism is organized by horizontal and vertical party defi nes as “dedication to the home- dimensions of differentiation.9 But the right- land, devotion to faith in God, love for ev- wing element also adds horizontal opposi- erything Georgian and respect to our native tion to these groups with nativist character.10 language.”15 This opposition to horizontal out-groups fre- quently results in anti-immigrant attitudes11 Within similar rhetoric, other groups em- but also opposition to other religious and phasize a “dying homeland”16 and defi ne sexual minorities. Right-wing populists are threats to Georgian traditions as liberalism generally against multicultural and liberal —its advocates are called “liberasts” (com- policies.12 Therefore while vertical exclusion bination of liberal and pederasts) — sex- represents the populist dimension, horizon- ual minority rights and gender equality.17 tal falls in line with right-wing socio-cultural Within this line, the West is pictured as de- beliefs.13 Thus right-wing populists purport moralized and is accused of spreading and to defend people against the establishment encouraging homosexuality.18 In terms of and against outsiders. Georgian right-wing anti-Western propaganda, rhetoric on losing groups also share these features, to an extent. identity and the imposition of demoralized They are primarily nationalist and justify values in the context of the West doubled in their policy positions on the basis of nation- 2017, compared to the previous year.19 Sex- alism; they are also anti-migrant with racist ual minorities and an equal role for women and xenophobic rhetoric and anti-Western in the society are a sensitive part of this dis- attitudes.14 course and are allegedly described as prima- ry threats to the notion of family, a central Nativism with a stress on patriotism and a tradition of Georgian identity. Family on the commitment to Georgian traditional val- other hand is regarded not only as a pillar of ues and Orthodox Christianity is one of the Georgian identity, but also as a basis of state major features of right-wing populists. For stability and strength.20 After a campaign by example, the Alliance of Patriots (APG) em- right-wing groups, including a demand for a phasizes “true patriotism” within their pro- referendum on the defi nition of marriage by

9 Brubaker, R. (2017). Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40, 1191-1226. 10 ibid 11 Golder, M. (2016). Far-right parties in Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 19, 477-497. 12 Inglehart, R. F. and Norris, P. (2017). Trump and the xenophobic populist parties. The silent revolution in reverse. Perspectives on Politics, 15(2), 443-454. 13 Giebler, H. and Regel, S. (2018). Who votes right-wing populist? Geographical and individual factors in seven German state elections. WISO Discourse, 14/2018. 14 Stephan (2018). 15 Kakachia, K. and Kakhishvili, L. (upcoming). Contextualizing populism in Georgian politics. Working paper. 16 Stephan (2018). 17 ibid 18 Larsen, J. (2017). To understand constitutional reform in Georgia, look beyond the president. Georgian Insti- tute of Politics, 4 May 2017. http://gip.ge/understand-constitutional-reform-georgia-look-beyond-president/ 19 Kintsurashvili, T. (2018). Hate speech. Media Development Foundation. 20 Minesashvili, S. (2017). Orthodoxy as soft power in Russia-Georgia relations. In: Joedicke, A. (ed.). Religion and soft power in the South Caucasus. Routledge. 10 the members of the APG, Georgian March - into the country. That further exacerbating and Demographic Society XXI,21 a constitu- fears that Muslim migrants were already tional amendment was passed in October fl ooding the country and taking over Geor- 2017 to defi ne marriage as “a union between gian land.27 a man and a woman for the purpose of cre- ating a family.”22 In addition to its right-ring social values, the APG also aligns with populist movements These groups employ rather aggressive in terms of the anti-elitism elements in its rhetoric against foreigners and migrants. program. It advocated for rule by the Geor- While the APG does not explicitly target im- gian people and direct democracy, the dis- migrants, it is known for strong anti-Turk- missal of unacceptable government offi cials ish sentiments and xenophobic rhetoric.23 In and the reversal of the laws and rules that July 2017, the Georgian March held protests the group disagrees with.28 The party is not against “illegal migrants, including slogans necessarily anti-institutionalist or anti-dem- such as “Georgia for Georgians,” “Go back ocratic, since it still seeks to acquire power where you belong”.24 The APG members through elections.29 But since its populism also attended the protests and acted as bail have a rightist fl avor, its demands, made in guarantors for arrested Georgian March the name of people, are against liberal de- leaders in March 2018.25 mocracy. The mobilization of right-wing populist Far-right movements are largely anti-mi- groups is a notable trend in the West and grant and anti-Western, however they man- is gaining momentum in Georgia as well, age to link the two as well. For instance, the which makes the question of their social un- visa liberalization topic was successfully derpinning more important. Which factors related to “migrant threat”.26 The visa free are believed to fuel public support for right- regime was portrayed as a double threat wing populists? Research from case studies because it was perceived both as a risk that on the situation in developed countries helps Georgians would leave the country and a di- identify some of the underlying factors for rective from the EU that Georgia had to al- public support for this rising phenomenon. low migrants – especially Muslim migrants

21 Georgian president blocks referendum to ban same-sex marriage. (2016). Democracy and Freedom Watch. Available at: https://dfwatch.net/georgian-president-blocks-referendum-bid-to-ban-same-sex-marriage-44376 22 Civil.ge. (2017). Key points of newly adopted constitution. Available at: https://old.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=30474 23 Stephan (2018). 24 Jam news (2017). 25 Stephan (2018). 26 Jgharkava, I. (2017). Anti-migrant rhetoric in Georgia: do far-right groups threaten Georgia`s pro-European discourse? Georgian Institute of Politics, 16(2017). 27 Shiffers, S., Hegedüs, D., Minesashvili, S., Bakakuri, T., Tchipashvili, L., Gelhaus, L., Le Grix, V. and See- bass, F. (2018). Normative power vs. Democratic backsliding: European values in the EU and Georgia. POLIS, GIP, Argo. Available at: https://polis180.org/blog/2018/11/21/geoeuvalues-policy-paper-normative-pow- er-vs-democratic-backsliding/ 28 Kakachia and Kakhishvili (upcoming). 29 Ibid. 11 SOCIETAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISTS Right-wing and nationalist populism is are compared, cultural values are constant weeping across Europe and North Ameri- predictors for increased support for populist ca.30 Numerous studies have been conduct- parties that include extreme leftist and right- ed to outline societal factors that help to un- ist ideological attitudes, anti-immigrant at- derstand this phenomenon. Most consider titudes, mistrust of national and global adverse economic circumstances and chang- governments and support for authoritarian ing cultural frameworks. Part of the expla- values.35 Economic woes and the feeling of nation lies in economic grievances and poor being in a disadvantaged social position economic performance. But the latter is pre- contribute to resentment towards elites and sumed to “have blown wind into the sails” to the scapegoating of immigrants.36 In addi- of already existing nationalist movements.31 tion, feeling at odds with post-materialistic Others refer to increased feelings of social and multicultural values within liberal dem- marginalization that has also developed in ocratic frameworks contribute to the feel- relation to economic and cultural factors.32 ing of social marginalization.37 Some mea- surable values from opinion polls include Due to various reasons, the past several nostalgia about social conditions, which years have been characterized by a slow- are perceived as being better for everyone down in overall income growth as well as in the past; pessimism about the future of an increase in income inequality as higher their societies; lower subjective social status income groups disproportionally benefi ted (satisfaction with their lives and material sit- over this process.33 While poor economic uations); lower trust in people; lower satis- condition cause frustration and support for faction with the state of democracy in their extreme parties, that alone has not been a country; lower trust in political elites; and suffi cient condition for the ascent of right- changing cultural values related to gender wing populism. Cultural factors are also in equality, multiculturalism, secular values play, since economic hardships amplify the and LGBTQ rights.38 tendency that pre-existed among socially conservative people, including strong an- What is the state of these factors among the ti-immigrant attitudes and distrust of polit- Georgian population and can some develop- ical establishment.34 Economic factors only ments be noted in past years that coincide indirectly led to increased populism: when with the increasing prominence of far-right the impact of cultural and economic factors groups?

30 Golder (2016); Mudde, C. (ed.). (2017). The populist radical right: a reader. New York: Routledge. 31 Springford, J. and Tilford, S. (2017). Populism – culture or economics? Center for European reform. Available at: https://www.cer.eu/insights/populism-%E2%80%93-culture-or-economics 32 Gidron, N. and Hall, P.A. (2017). Populism as a problem of social integration. Available at: https://scholar. harvard.edu/fi les/hall/fi les/gidronhallapsa2017.pdf 33 Springford and Tilford (2017). 34 Ibid. 35 Inglehart and Norris (2016). 36 Golder, (2016); Müller, J. W. (2016). What is populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 37 Gidron and Hall (2017) 38 ibid 12 SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE VALUES IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY

Among Georgians, while support for civic ligious diversity, in the country as a nega- democratic values has increased over time,39 tive development. Out of those, 65% have a in terms of the traditional values associat- negative attitude towards general and eth- ed with liberal democracy, the country re- nic diversity and 41% view religious diver- mains “deeply socially conservative.”40 This sity negatively due to the perceived threat especially concerns the values that far-right to culture, traditions and national unity. In groups pick up: the topic of gender equality addition, about 85% of Georgians would not associated with family values; the attitude like a neighbor of different ethnicity or reli- towards minority groups, including ethnic, gion. Despite these attitudes, the majority of religious and especially sexual minorities; Georgians (76-80%) consider it important to and lastly, towards migrants based on eth- protect the rights of religious or ethnic mi- nic differences. norities. But this attitude does not extend to the least tolerated group in Georgia — sex- According to the 2018 CRRC survey on ual minorities — as only 33% of people be- hate speech, more than a third of Georgians lieve it is important to protect the rights of consider diversity, including ethnic and re- LGBT groups.41

39 Shiffers et al (2018). 40 Mestvirishvili, M. and Mestivirshvili, N (2014). I am Georgian and therefore, I am European: re-searching the Europeanness of Georgia. CEJISS, 8(1). 41 CRRC. (2018). Hate crime, hate speech, and discrimination in Georgia. Available at: https://caucasusbarom- eter.org/en/hs2018ge/codebook/ 13

Tolerance towards sexual minorities has al- holds especially true for Asians, Africans ways been low in Georgia; the LGBTQ com- and Muslim. For instance, the number of munity has faced public resistance to their those who disapprove doing business with right to exercise their constitutional rights. Turks, Arabs, Iranians, Indians, Chinese Examples include the mass and violent pro- and Africans (about one third) increased test over a gay-right rally in May 2013 and between 2015 and 2017.43 At the same time, fi erce resistance to the 2014 anti-discrimina- one third of Georgians disapprove of doing tion legislative bill. Homosexuality is unac- business with Muslims.44 ceptable for almost 90% of population; that number barely changes over the course of Conservative social values are rather in- several years of surveys. In the 2018 survey, grained within Georgian society and the respondents identifi ed LGBTQ people as majority views correspond to the discourses one of the least desired neighbors for Geor- of far-right groups when it comes to the top- gians, second only to criminals.42 ic of sexual minorities and women’s rights. On the other hand, while only a minority of While conservative values are not new in Georgians have negative attitudes towards Georgia and remain quite rooted in the pop- migrants, their number has tripled in the ulation, recent trends note some changing past two years. While conservative values attitudes towards migrants. When it comes among the society are important to take into to migrants, negative attitudes have in- consideration, they create a basis for rising creased since 2015. In that year, a small num- right-wing populism when combined with ber of people (5%) expressed negative feel- economic hardship and feelings of social ings towards foreigners who come and stay isolation. Have there been developments in Georgia longer than 3 months. By 2017, in these terms among the Georgian popula- number had increased to 16%. This attitude tion?

42 CRRC. (2018). Hate crime. 43 CRRC. Caucasus Barometer. Available at: https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/datasets/ 44 CRRC. (2018). 14 CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AMONG GEORGIANS

Public opinion on economic conditions and For instance, the number of respondents ex- performance of political elites has become pressing a favorable opinion about govern- more negative over the past several years. ment has decreased from 69% in 2014 to 34% According to IRI polls, there has been an in- in 2018 and for the same time period, the crease in the number of people who express number with an unfavorable opinion has in- an unfavorable opinion of the government, creased from 45% to 60%.45 parliament and political parties since 2014.

Georgians’ optimism about the country’s fu- has also worsened. The number of those who ture has also waned since 2013. The number thought that their household’s fi nancial con- of those who thought the country was going dition has considerably worsened over the in the wrong direction has increased from course of the last 12 months has increased 22% (2013) to 67% (2018). Likewise, people’s from 7% (2014) to 29% (2018).46 perception of their own fi nancial situation

45 International Republican Institution (IRI). (2018). Public opinion survey: residents of Georgia. 10-22 April 2018. Available at: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/fi les/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf 46 IRI (2018). 15

Another important factor defi ning people`s that they are respected. Less trust indicates perception of social marginalization is their alienation of mainstream politics and more trust in other people. This implies the extent inclination to vote for radical parties.47 The to which they feel part of the existing nor- number of Georgians who distrust other mative order, engage themselves in social people has increased from 35% in 2013 to activities and the extent to which they feel 52% in 2017.48

47 Gidron and Hall (2017). 48 CRRC. Caucasus Barometer. 16

Overall, over the past several years, Geor- formance of political elites and trust other gians are becoming more pessimistic about people less. the future, are more frustrated with the per-

CONCLUSION

The overview of opinion polls suggests that with heightened pessimism about the coun- public values create a solid basis for extreme try’s future. In combination with social con- right-wing movements. Some social con- servative values, these factors are often used servative values remain ingrained over the for explaining radicalization in Europe and years, but the latest developments are more the US. However, these tendencies by them- alarming. In fact, along with the increased selves do not necessarily suggest the rise of visibility of right-wing populism in Geor- right-wing populism in Georgian politics. gia, the public has become more skeptical In fact, far-right groups remain marginal towards migrants, one of the major issues and the APG only acquired 5% of votes, just promoted by these groups. Moreover, so- enough to enter parliament. As long as far- cial and economic conditions are increas- right groups follow a violent agenda, such ingly perceived as worsening, while trust in as the Georgian March and the Georgian politicians, political institutions and fellow National Unity, it is unlikely they will gain citizens is breaking down and the emphasis mass public support. However, one should on economic hardship is further increasing not ignore the possibility that they will gain 17 popularity if they formulate their positions these groups in Georgia, despite their mar- in more viable ways, especially since the ginal character, have managed to challenge fi ndings show fertile ground in terms of so- the advocates of democratic and European cial values and economic perceptions among values, i.e. the groups that have to counter Georgian public as well as their increasing the myths and the baseless fears spread by resentment towards elites. In the end, the the extreme right-wing and right-wing pop- rise of such groups in Europe and beyond ulist propaganda. When faced with such a is largely attributed to parties that exploited situation, it becomes vital to mobilize the existing economic or social developments opposite side. and mobilized their supporters. Moreover,

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the Georgian government:

 Strengthen democratic institutions and ant that the ruling party and its mem- rule of law. bers do not echo hostility towards mi- grants or avoid expressing its position  Both the government and the ruling on basic human rights in order to seek party should openly distance them- a political advantage. selves from the right-wing populist parties and groups.  The government should make it a pri- ority to reduce poverty, unemploy-  The government should take measures ment and economic hardships by against those groups, including the ex- equipping vulnerable groups in the so- treme right-wing groups whose activ- ciety with new skills for work. A clear ities breach constitutional norms and and long-term plan of countering these principles. The latter groups should issues should be publicized. This way not be encouraged by an appeasement they can also publicly demonstrate policy or ambiguous response from the their responsiveness to the concerns offi cial side. and grievances of voters.

 Show clear commitment to democratic  Offi cials also need to publicly count- values. Basic principles of democracy er the myths and phobias spread by and human rights should not become a right-wing populists. matter of political debate. It is import- 18

For civil society organizations in Georgia:

 Push the government to take measures  Organize informative campaigns against those groups whose actions on European and democratic values breach constitutional norms. and their compatibility with national identity and traditions. These should  Organize informative and evi- counter the existing ideas about their dence-based campaigns to counter far- exclusive nature. right groups’ spread of baseless fears. Some examples can include widely  Engage the most “vulnerable” groups publishing the real numbers of mi- in social activities. People who feel dis- grants coming to Georgia or land own- tance not only from immigrants but ership by foreigners. also from institutions and their fellow citizens are the most inclined to take radical positions. DECREASING LEVEL OF TRUST IN GEORGIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY AND HOW TO AVOID NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES?

LEVAN KAKHISHVILI 1

21 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Trust in political parties in Georgia has cluding CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer and dropped from 21 percent in 2012 to 8 percent NDI public opinion polls, which provide in 2017. Although the level of trust has nev- insights on public perceptions and beliefs. er been particularly high, this trend should Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that raise concern and inspire political parties to the low level of political trust is perilous for act. Political trust is mostly determined by Georgian democracy — specifi cally for po- societal beliefs and political institutions. This litical parties’ ability to perform their rep- paper analyzes both of these dimensions resentative functions. Political parties and to demonstrate the roots of the distrust. In other stakeholders interested in Georgia’s terms of beliefs, the paper explores four as- democratic consolidation should be aware pects of trust as perceived by the Georgian that the high share of distrustful voters has public: competence, benevolence, integrity, a direct impact on the level of citizens’ par- and predictability. The paper also considers ticipation in politics. Specifi cally it means the role of political institutions. In particu- their involvement in party politics will re- lar, it discusses the lack of transparency of main low. Therefore, this paper elaborates political parties, which adds to voters’ lack a number of recommendations for Georgian of awareness and knowledge — and leads political parties, civil society organizations to low levels of trust. The paper includes an and think tanks in Georgia as well as donor analysis of a range of public opinion sur- organizations to take action to increase trust veys conducted between 2015 and 2018, in- in political parties in Georgia.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL TRUST AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GEORGIA

The phenomenon of political trust is often from 2012 to 2017, trust towards Georgian overlooked when analyzing the process of political parties decreased from 21 percent democratization in Georgia. One reason for to 8 percent, while distrust increased from this could be that trust is a complex concept 22 percent to 43 percent.2 The majority of with multiple components. It is not very respondents, however, were indifferent (43 easy to contextualize its relevance within percent of respondents said their neither ongoing political processes. However, the trust nor distrust political parties in 2017) degree to which the public trusts political or were unable to answer the question (the institutions and actors, such as political par- combined total of don’t know and refuse to ties, can have signifi cant implications for the answer equaled 8 percent).3 Even though the process of democratization and, eventually, level of trust was far from ideal in 2012, such for democratic consolidation. For example, a drastic drop should alarm Georgian polit-

1 Levan Kakhishvili is a policy analyst at Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) and a Doctoral Fellow at Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences (BAGSS) at the University of Bamberg in Germany. 2 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017). “Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset Georgia”. Re- trieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 3 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017). “Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset Georgia”. Re- trieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 22 ical parties. The implications of a low level text translates into negative consequences of trust, particularly for political parties, are for the democratic consolidation of Georgia. two-fold: distrustful voters will not vote in Due to the lack of trust, voters will abstain elections and will not work and/or volun- from participation in politics:6 participation, teer for a political party.4 Furthermore, high however, is the cornerstone for participato- distrust towards political parties indicates ry democracy. As a result, there is an urgent that the linkage between parties and voters need to act on this problem and design ways is weak; voters have a largely negative view to increase public trust in political parties of the performance of political parties; and over time. This paper analyzes the phenom- fi nally, voters have limited knowledge of, enon of public trust towards political parties and experience with, the workings of politi- in Georgia and provides recommendations cal parties.5 Putting this issue in a larger con- on how to increase political trust.

WHAT IS TRUST AND HOW CAN IT BE ANALYZED?

Trust implies that a person or a group of in the following sections below). And fi nal- persons depends or relies on another actor ly, certain types of institutional frameworks with a feeling of relative security.7 It exposes lead to higher levels of trust. Of the three as- the trustor’s vulnerability and inherently in- pects outlined above, the second two are the cludes the risk that some endeavors may not most important for Georgian political par- succeed. Three aspects of trust are extreme- ties because while it is hard to change a pre- ly important in order to understand trust as disposition to trust, beliefs can be nurtured a political phenomenon. First, some people and institutions can be built. Moreover, the are more inclined to trust than others — this fact that in 2012 the public had signifi cantly is a character trait. Second, certain beliefs higher trust levels and lower distrust lev- lead to higher levels of trust, such as believ- els, means that the predisposition to trust, ing that the trustee has enough competence, although important, is less relevant for this benevolence, integrity, and predictability so discussion. Consequently, the roots for the that the trustor chooses to rely on them (each problem should be found in beliefs and in- of these qualities are discussed individually stitutions.

4 Ceka, B. (2012). “The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe”. Comparative Political Studies. 46(12), 1610-1635. DOI: 10.1177/0010414012463908. 5 Berlin, D. and L.J. Lundqvist. (2012). “Do Leopards Ever Change Their Spots? The Development of Po- litical Trust among Swedish Green party Sympathisers”. Environmental Politics. 21(1), 131-152. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2011.643372. 6 Ceka, B. (2012). “The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe”. Comparative Political Studies. 46(12), 1610-1635. DOI: 10.1177/0010414012463908. 7 McKnight, D.H. and N.L. Cherrany. (2001). “Trust and Distrust Defi nitions: One Bite at a Time”. In: R. Fal- cone, M. Singh, and Y.-H. Tan (Eds.): Trust in Cyber-societies. Springer-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg. 23 TRUSTING BELIEFS: HOW DO GEORGIANS JUDGE POLITICAL PARTIES?

The four beliefs that comprise one dimen- conducted for the purpose of evaluating sion of trust are competence, benevolence, how society’s beliefs impact its trust in po- integrity, and predictability. It is worth con- litical parties. It is still possible, however, to sidering them one by one to understand fi nd data across various databases, includ- how the Georgian public sees political par- ing CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer and NDI ties and why the lack of trust towards them public opinion polls (all surveys were con- exists. The data available is not perfect as ducted between 2015 and 2018), that can be publically available surveys have not been closely related to these beliefs.

Competence

The trustor, in this case the Georgian public, followed by the issues related to territorial should believe that the trustee, i.e. political integrity.8 Table 1 below provides data about parties, can resolve the issues that concern the perceived competence of main Georgian the voters the most. According to public political parties in six different policy areas opinion surveys, economic and social issues that are important for the public. are the top priorities for Georgian society,

Table 1: Perceived competence of Georgian political parties

Which political party do you trust most to manage the following issues? (%) Military Restoring and Political Economic territorial defense Democratic # party development Education Healthcare integrity capabilities development Georgian 1 Dream 24 28 37 16 26 27 United National 2 Movement 11 12 10 6 13 10 Alliance of Patriots of 3 Georgia 3 3 2 2 2 2 European 4 Georgia 7 6 6 4 6 7 5 Other party 6 5 4 4 5 6 6 No party 22 17 14 40 16 17 7 DK/RA 27 28 26 28 33 31

Source: The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2017.” Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019.

8 On the priorities of the Georgian public and how political parties respond to them in their party manifestos, see: Kakhishvili, L. (2017). “Is Democracy Possible without Stable Political Parties?” [online] Georgian Insti- tute of Politics. Available at: http://gip.ge/6401/ 24

The data shows that in fi ve out of the six pol- those who cannot answer the question) the icy areas, the most frequent answer is either share would range from 40 percent in the “Don’t know/Refuse to answer (DK/RA)” case of healthcare to 68 percent in the case of or “No party.” The exception to the rule is restoring territorial integrity. healthcare — a fi eld where the Georgian This data demonstrates that either has implemented reforms, includ- voters do not believe that parties are compe- ing the introduction of universal healthcare. tent in the indicated policy areas or voters These changes seem to be appreciated by the simply cannot reasonably judge their com- public, hence the result of 37 percent of the petence. The latter might be a result of the population entrusting the management of lack of information about political parties, healthcare to the Georgian Dream. However, their fi nances, activities and goals. However, if the shares of “DK/RA” and “No party” are when it comes to the goals of political par- combined (putting together the respondents ties, another belief — benevolence — comes who do not trust these issue to any party and into play.

Benevolence

In order for political parties to enjoy higher serve the interests of the trustors or the in- levels of public trust, voters should believe terests of someone else. The December 2018 that parties work toward goals that are im- public opinion poll, commissioned by the portant for society. Therefore, benevolence National Democratic Institute (NDI), pro- as a belief refers to what kind of judgment vides data regarding this questions, shown trustors make about trustees: either trustees in Chart 1 below.

Chart 1: Interests of Georgian political parties 25

As the data indicates, only 13 percent of the cation between parties and voters. Both of Georgian public believe that Georgian polit- these problems suggest that the party-voter ical parties are benevolent, i.e. serving the linkage in Georgia is weak. interests of the voters. This is an alarming fi gure for political parties in Georgia if they Furthermore, perceptions on the benevo- want to build up public trust. This fi gure lence of political parties are harmed by neg- becomes even more important considering ative campaigning. Negative campaigning that undecided respondents (those who an- is defi ned as when candidates or parties swered DK/RA) represent only 10 percent focus more on the shortcomings of their of the population. The vast majority of so- competitors rather than what they them- ciety believes that political parties in Geor- selves can offer to the public. According to gia represent either their own interests — 44 the NDI June 2018 opinion poll, prior to the percent — or the interests of their leaders 2018 presidential elections, almost three out and/or donors — 31 percent. These two an- of four Georgians thought that candidates swers represent the opinions of three out of should spend “a little” or no time criticiz- four voters. These numbers may point to ing the competing parties.9 Research had two different problems: either political par- demonstrated that negative campaigning re- ties are genuinely unable to represent public duces the level of trust in political parties.10 interests or there is ineffective communi-

Integrity

When the trustee is believed to be truthful in political parties, which can also be used as and fulfi lling promises, in other words to be a proxy indicator for integrity. a person of integrity, the trustor can rely on them, which leads to a high level of trust. Chart 2 (below) provides data about the Although there is no data in public opinion importance of pre-election platforms and surveys about how citizens judge the integ- promises for Georgian voters. The data rity of Georgian political parties, it is still clearly demonstrates that for over a half of possible to explore the importance of prom- the population, pre-election promises play ises when voters make decisions on how to a consistently important role when they de- vote in the elections. Furthermore, there is cide for whom to vote. data about the perceived level of corruption

9 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2018). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2018”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 10 Ceka, B. (2012). “The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe”. Comparative Political Studies. 46(12), 1610-1635. DOI: 10.1177/0010414012463908. 14 https://eurasianet.org/node/82261. 26

Chart 2: Importance of pre-election platforms and promises for voters

Source: Author’s calculations based on fi ve datasets.11

These fi gures indicate that integrity is im- in political parties represent only 14 percent portant for Georgian voters but does provide of the population, while almost half of the any insight into the level of perceived integ- public — 46 percent — believes that “there is rity of political parties, which would require some corruption” in political parties.12 different data. However, it can be argued that citizens’ perception of the level of cor- Of course, one cannot trust institutions if it ruption in political parties may suggest the is believed they are corrupt. The lack of in- public’s overall view on the integrity of po- formation about the inner workings political litical parties. Interestingly, according to the parties in Georgia also impacts the public’s latest NDI public opinion of December 2018, trust level, which can be concluded from the those who believe that there is no corruption data discussed above.

11 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2015). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, November 2015”. Re- trieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Cen- ters. (2016a). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarom- eter.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2016b). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, March 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2016c). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, November 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017) “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2017”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 12 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2018). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, December 2018”. Re- trieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 27

Predictability

The fi nal belief that increases levels of trust polls conducted between 2015 and 201713 is the predictability of a trustee, which refers demonstrate that the past performance of to the idea that the trustor can safely predict a political party is even more important to the actions, good or bad, of the trustee. Sim- voters than pre-election promises. Between ilarly to integrity, it is only possible to eval- 65 to 74 percent of respondents prioritize the uate a proxy indicator as there is no data on past performance of political parties over how the Georgian public perceive the pre- pre-election promises. This means that the dictability of political parties. However, it is public is willing to trust better performing possible to discuss how important a party’s political parties and political parties should past performance is for voters. take these beliefs into consideration when designing and implementing their strategies The data from fi ve different NDI opinion and action plans.

INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF TRUST: ARE PARTIES SUFFICIENTLY INSTITUTIONALIZED TO INCITE TRUST?

It is believed that strong institutions contrib- As part of the June 2017 NDI public opinion ute to increasing political trust levels.14 The poll,15 respondents were asked about whose logic behind this idea is that institutions can opinion matters most when deciding wheth- provide guarantees, contracts, regulations, er elections in Georgia were well organized. rules and procedures that ensure the fulfi ll- Respondents could pick up to three items ment of promises or success in a risky en- from a list of ten. The most frequent choice deavor. Consequently, for political parties, it was “my own opinion” — 46 percent of re- is important to be perceived by the public as spondents say that their personal opinion strong institutions. This can be achieved by matters the most in deciding about how well developing more transparent decision-mak- elections are run. The opinion of the Central ing practices, especially in such areas as Election Commission (CEC) and foreign ob- elaborating policy platforms, nominating servers tied for second with 23 percent each. candidates or recruiting new members. Data The opinion of the political party, which the shows, however, that parties are not per- respondent supported, was picked by 16 ceived as strong institutions that would act percent of the population only. These fi gures as protective structures. indicate the preference for personal opinions

13 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2015). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, November 2015”. Re- trieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Cen- ters. (2016a). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarom- eter.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2016b). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, March 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2016c). “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, November 2016”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017) “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2017”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 14 McKnight, D.H. and N.L. Cherrany. (2001). “Trust and Distrust Defi nitions: One Bite at a Time”. In: R. Fal- cone, M. Singh, and Y.-H. Tan (Eds.): Trust in Cyber-societies. Springer-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg. 15 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017) “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2017”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 28 as opposed to institutions, which suggests tutionally or programmatically very differ- the weakness of political institutions. ent from each other can be found in the June 2018 opinion poll, which asked respondents Furthermore, to emphasize the personalization the following question: “Thinking generally, rather than the institutionalization of political do you think which party is in government parties, one can consider the question of the makes a big difference, some difference or relative importance of a candidate vis-à-vis the no difference for the health of the economy?” party promoting the candidate for voters. Ac- Two out of fi ve respondents reported that this cording to data from the June 2017 survey, 50 makes no difference for the health of the econ- percent of respondents attribute more impor- omy. This fi gure can be interpreted in two tance to the mayoral candidate, compared to 38 ways (see Chart 3 below). A rather optimistic percent who said the party promoting the can- interpretation would an assumption that 42 didate was more important.16 Consequently, if percent of Georgian voters believe each and Georgian political parties aim at establishing every political party is suffi ciently benevolent themselves as institutions that last longer than to act in the best interest of the nation. A much any particular political leader, it is necessary more pessimistic, and perhaps more realistic, to become more institutionalized, transparent, interpretation would be that the public does and better linked with supporters. not view political parties as signifi cantly dif- ferent from each other in terms of their ideo- One fi nal piece of data that suggests that the logical programs, which leads to an unhealthy public does not view political parties as insti- distance between parties and voters. Chart 3: Does it make a difference which party is in government?

16 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2017) “NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, June 2017”. Retrieved through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org on 08.02.2019. 29

The degree of closeness between a political of trust in the political system.18 Therefore, party and its supporters, as research demon- Georgian political parties should prioritize strates, can be a much better indicator of establishing close linkages with their sup- why the level of political trust is low than, porters as quality seems to be more import- for example, an overall number of support- ant than the quantity of supporters when it ers.17 Consequently, when voters do not comes to understanding trust as a political feel a strong link to any political party, it is phenomenon. more likely that the public has a lower level

CONCLUSION: HOW TO INCREASE TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES?

This paper has demonstrated that the Geor- shown that all this data indicates that the gian public does not trust political parties linkage between parties and voters is weak and this is rooted in two dimensions of and that the public does not understand the trust. First, Georgian voters tend to believe inner workings of political parties due to the that political parties do not have the neces- lack of transparency. These conditions lead sary competence to manage various policy to the disillusionment of the public with pol- areas of concern for the public; that parties itics in general and the lack of willingness to primarily represent the interests of their join and/or work for parties. This suggests own or those of their leaders and/or donors; a low level of political participation, which that the integrity and predictability of polit- threatens the process of the consolidation of ical parties are important in decision-mak- the young Georgian democracy. ing process when it comes to voting. And Consequently, there is an urgent need for second, parties are not perceived to be suf- various actors, primarily, political parties, to fi ciently institutionalized to serve as guaran- take action in order to build political trust in tees they will implement their own promises Georgia. To this end, the recommendations and make a difference when an individual elaborated below should be considered. party comes to power. It has been already

17 Hooghe, M. and A. Kern. (2015). “Party Membership and Closeness and the Development of Trust in Polit- ical Institutions: An Analysis of the European Social Survey, 2002-2010”. Party Politics. 21(6), 944-956. DOI: 10.1177/1354068813509519. 18 Hooghe, M. and A. Kern. (2015). “Party Membership and Closeness and the Development of Trust in Polit- ical Institutions: An Analysis of the European Social Survey, 2002-2010”. Party Politics. 21(6), 944-956. DOI: 10.1177/1354068813509519. 30 RECOMMENDATIONS

For Georgian political parties:

 Strengthen links with voters by elab- infl uencing voting behavior in Geor- orating ideologically consistent poli- gia. cy platforms, communicating prom- ises clearly and understandably, and  Increase the transparency of their in- overall being predictable in ideolog- ner workings through institutional- ical terms — As public opinion data ization – Almost half of all Georgian demonstrates, pre-election promises voters believe that there is some level are one of the key factors that infl uence of corruption in Georgian parties. This the electoral behavior of the Georgian harms the perception of parties’ integri- voter. Although it may be tempting for ty as voters are unable to judge wheth- political parties to be opportunistic and er a particular political party is truth- make popular and/or populist prom- ful and is willing to keep the promises ises, parties should be methodical so they give. Research demonstrates that that the public perceives each individ- more informed citizens tend to trust ual party as predictable, which leads to more. Increasing the transparency and higher levels of trust and eventually to clearly communicating how political favorable electoral behavior. parties work, i.e. opening the meta- phorical black box of parties, will help  Build their own portfolio as compe- citizens develop more trusting beliefs. tent and benevolent actors caring for However, it is also necessary that par- the public interests – The Georgian ties have institutionalized procedures public believes that political parties in such as transparent nomination, re- Georgia serve their own interests and cruitment and other decision-making not those of society at large. Further- processes. more, citizens have a low opinion of the competency of political parties in  Nurture democratic values in the so- the most important policy areas. For ciety – According to research, citizens parties to gain the public’s trust, it is develop higher levels of trust when necessary that they act in the best in- they share the values of the potential terest of the society as defi ned by their trustee. Political parties as the key to own policy platforms (see the previous successful democratic performance recommendation). However, at the should have shared democratic values same time, it is vitally important that across the whole ideological spectrum. each individual party clearly commu- Furthermore, they should also nurture nicates to the public about their work the same values in society so citizens and how these efforts improve the lives see parties as closer to themselves. Ex- of Georgian voters. This will help citi- isting research shows that democracy zens better judge the past performance is not prioritized enough in Georgian of parties, which is another key factor party politics, which needs to change. 31

 Minimize negative campaigning pri- stead of demeaning competitors. Such or to elections – Polls show that the an approach would eventually lead Georgian public does not like it when to increased trust levels. This does candidates criticize other parties. not mean that due criticism should be Consequently, negative campaigning avoided during the campaigning. It should be marginalized in the political should not be the primary focus of any mainstream. Political parties should self-respecting political party or a can- focus on their own policy offerings in- didate, however.

For civil society organizations and think tanks in Georgia:

 Produce accountability reports for and effectively communicating it with each political party in the parlia- the public will help citizens increase ment – Evaluating the performance their knowledge, leading to more trust- of each parliamentary political party ing beliefs. However, the challenge for as opposed to their own pre-election civil society is that the public has com- promises will be extremely useful for parably low level of trust in NGOs as judging all four dimensions of trusting well. beliefs — competence, benevolence,  Incentivize constructive discussion integrity, and predictability — for each and contribute to raising public individual party. Additionally this will awareness on issues related to neg- also increase the transparency of party ative campaigning – Civil society or- politics. Consequently, the fi ndings of ganizations and think tanks have the such research, effectively communicat- potential to identify cases of negative ed to the public, can have signifi cant campaigning and provide recommen- impact on how the level of awareness dations on how it is possible to focus of Georgian voters. on positive promises instead of po- litical competitors disparaging each  Contribute to increasing transparen- other. For this purpose, an analysis cy in Georgian politics through reg- of party manifestos and the extent to ular informational campaigns and which public statements of individual research on party politics – Civil so- politicians relate to the policy offering ciety organizations and think tanks outlined in their respective party pro- have a signifi cant amount of expertise grams should be conducted during on Georgian party politics. Therefore, each election cycle. expanding this expertise even further 32

For donor organizations:

 Support public opinion polls related cate with the public – Political parties to monitoring trust levels in politi- as key institutions in a representative cal parties in Georgia – Opinion polls democracy are severely understudied evaluating four dimensions of trusting in Georgia. Incentivizing research on beliefs — competence, benevolence, in- political parties will help civil society tegrity, and predictability — will con- organizations, think tanks and univer- tribute to a better understanding of the sities deepen their understanding of phenomenon of political trust in Geor- the topic. However, all of these projects gia. should have a strong communication component so that the fi ndings reach  Support projects aimed at study- Georgian voters and shape their un- ing political parties in Georgia, how derstanding of party politics. they work and how they communi- RISE OF NATIONALIST POPULISM IN GEORGIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

BIDZINA LEBANIDZE1

35 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This policy brief explores to what extent the few controversial steps taken by the Geor- rising wave of populist nationalism in Geor- gian government to accommodate populist gia affects the process of Georgia’s approx- nationalism has not signifi cantly damaged imation to the EU. Normatively speaking, the process of country’s functional and in- the populist nationalist discourse in Georgia stitutional approximation to the EU, either. is Eurosceptic as it legitimizes itself through Nevertheless, in the long run, the further opposition to progressive and liberal-dem- strengthening of populist nationalism can ocratic values which are part of EU’s nor- undermine the normative and functional mative script. So far its impact on the actual foundations of Georgia’s democratic devel- process of Georgia’s European integration opment and European integration, as has has been rather negligible, however. Geor- been a case in other countries. It can weaken gia remains the most pro-European state the permissive consensus among Georgian among the Eastern Partnership (EaP) coun- citizens and force the populist Eurosceptic tries, with more than 80% of population sup- agenda on the government and other reform porting the country’s EU membership. The actors.

MAPPING THE POPULIST SPECTRUM IN GEORGIA

Georgia has recently witnessed a surge in Among political groups, many analysts con- populist nationalist sentiments. Following sider the opposition party Alliance of Patri- the trend in many European countries, pop- ots of Georgia (APG) to be the most import- ulist nationalist actors are actively shaping ant actor.2 The party has been represented the political scene in the country and putting in the Georgian parliament since the last immense pressure on traditional political parliamentary elections. Other parties that parties. Georgia’s populist spectrum consists are viewed as populist nationalist include of three types of actors: political groups, so- Democratic Movement – United Georgia cietal groups and media actors. The Geor- (DM), (FG) and a number of gian Orthodox Church (GOC) cannot per se smaller parties.3 The ruling party the Geor- be considered a nationalist populist actor gian Dream (GD) may not fi t the populist but some of the actions and vocabulary used nationalist narrative but some of its mem- by the clergy contribute to strengthening the bers, including former and current Members populist agenda in the country. of Parliament (MP), can be characterized as

1 Bidzina Lebanidze – Senior Policy Analyst, Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) 2 Michael Cecire, “The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia. It’s time for the West to stop taking Tbilisi for granted.,” 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/09/the-kremlin-pulls-on-georgia/, accessed March 2019; Tamar Khorbaladze, “Homophobia and gender identity,” 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/Homopho- bia-ENG-web%20(1).pdf, accessed March 2019; Adriana Stephan, “Defi ning the far right in Georgia: From neo-fascists to populist parties,” 2018, http://gip.ge/defi ning-the-far-right-in-georgia-from-neo-fascists-to- populist-parties/, accessed March 2019; Tornike Zurabashvili, “Georgia: the Populist Break-in,” 2016, https:// old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=29626, accessed March 2019. 3 Tamar Khorbaladze, “Homophobia and gender identity,” 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/Ho- mophobia-ENG-web%20(1).pdf, accessed March 2019. 36 populist and xenophobic.4 The GD is also and minority rights, and was involved in vi- criticized time and again for its inadequately olent accidents against journalists and pro- soft treatment of violent extremism by pop- gressive social activists.8 There are also oth- ulist groups.5 Moreover, sometimes there er smaller organizations and societal groups is an impression that there is a subtle part- that have a more moderate public presence nership between the GD-run government but have signifi cant impact on political pro- and populist actors. GD founder and patron cesses in the country. Bidzina Ivanishvili once described the DM and the APG as a third force of Georgian Finally, the public visibility of the populist politics,6 boosting the legitimacy of the two nationalism discourse is ensured by a range opposition parties considered as populist. social media platforms and TV media actors. In 2018, the APG reciprocated when it cam- The TV station “Obieqtivi” regularly offers its paigned in favor of the presidential candi- air time to popularization of populist nation- date supported by the GD, and campaigned alist topics. There are also many Facebook against the opposition nominee. groups and pages that have thousands of fol- lowers9 and spread homophobic, xenophobic Populist social movements are also gaining and anti-Western content on social media. traction. There are a number of well-orga- nized groups that can easily mobilize thou- As in case of EU countries, populist10 na- sands of people and accumulate voices of tionalism in Georgia is informed both by dissent and advocate for populist demands. poor socio-economic conditions (poverty, The political movement “Georgian March” unemployment and inequality) and cultur- has been one of the most active societal play- al anxieties.11 Yet, whereas socio-economic ers on populist nationalist scene. The orga- conditions sometimes are the main trigger nization, which has up to 20,000 followers for popular discontent with the government on Facebook,7 organized a number of rallies and the mainstream politics, the popular against immigrants, the liberal drug policy narrative promoted by populist nationalist

4 For a few examples see: DFWatch, “Georgian MP wants ‘sexual orientation’ deleted from anti-discrimination law,” 2015, https://dfwatch.net/mp-wants-sexual-orientation-deleted-from-anti-discrimination-law-38333, accessed March 2019. Tamar Khorbaladze, “Homophobia and gender identity,” 2015, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/ uploads/library/Homophobia-ENG-web%20(1).pdf, accessed March 2019. 5 Zaza Abashidze, “The Georgian March against migrants and NATO,” Jam news, 2018, https://jam- news.net/the-georgian-march-against-migrants-and-nato/, accessed March 2019; Thea Morrison, “Geor- gian NGOs:“Inadequate” Reaction from State Encourages Extremist Groups,” Georgia Today, 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/9579/Georgian-NGOs-Claim-%E2%80%9CInadequate%E2%80%9D-Reac- tion-from-State-Encourages-Extremist-Groups, accessed March 2019. 6 Civil Georgia, “Local Elections Boost Alliance of Patriots Ambitions for Parliamentary Polls,” 2014, https:// old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27395, accessed March 2019. 7 Source: Facebook.com, available at https://www.facebook.com/qartulimarshi/, accessed March 2019. 8 Zaza Abashidze, “The Georgian March against migrants and NATO,” Jam news, 2018, https://jam-news. net/the-georgian-march-against-migrants-and-nato/, accessed March 2019. 9 For instance, the Facebook page “Anti-Liberal Club” has 50,595 followers and “Georgian Idea” has 64,147 followers. There are also more than a dozen of Facebook pages with more than 10,000 followers. Source: All data can be found on www.facebook.com (accessed 2 March 2019). 10 Under the term populism this paper understands far right and right-wing populism. Left-wing populism, which is also widely present in Georgia, is beyond the focus of this paper. 11 Francis Fukuyama, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism,” 2018, https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/ en/articles/news-and-expertise/francis-fukuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801.html, accessed March 2019. 37 actors mostly revolves around identity-re- facilitate each other in various ways. This lated and cultural issues. Three such topics policy paper discusses all three discourses can be identifi ed that score very high on na- in detail and explores their implications for tionalist populist agenda: illiberalism, xe- Georgia’s normative and functional approx- nophobia and tacit anti-Westernism. The imation to the EU and to the overall process three discourses are interconnected and of democratization.

MAIN DISCOURSES OF POPULIST NATIONALISM IN GEORGIA

Illiberalism

The populist nationalist narratives have some of identity and values.14 According to the foundations in traditional values at societal study, among the top messages was the West level. Like many other Eastern European was trying to “impose homosexuality” (232 states, Georgia is a deeply conservative soci- mentions) and other “unacceptable values” ety with strongly held family and traditional (64 mentions) on Georgia, as well as fi ght- values (table 1). Eurosceptic actors in Geor- ing against “Orthodox Christianity” (28) gia, which are comprised of political parties, and Georgia’s “national identity and tradi- social movements and media outlets, try to tions” (48).15 Some messages even claimed capitalize on Georgians’ strong conservative the West tried to impose “incest, pedophilia, attitudes and cultivate the image of the EU zoophilia, perversion” in Georgia (21 men- as immoral, decadent and opposed to tra- tions).16 As a result, a value gap emerges ditional values.12 For instance, being aware that puts some segments of Georgian soci- of deep societal resentments toward sexu- ety at odds with EU’s normative script. For al minorities, they often depict the EU “as instance, the Georgian citizens who oppose a purely LGBT-promoting community.”13 Georgia’s EU membership frequently men- According to one report that studied the an- tion the weakening of “Georgia’s cultural ti-Western propaganda in Georgia over the identity” (24%) as one cause for concern17 year of 2016, more than one-third of a total or argue that the visa-free regime with the of 1258 anti-Western messages published by EU “will degrade Georgia’s morality” (26%) illiberal media outlets, political parties and and as a result Georgia “will lose its national societal actors in Georgia concerned issues identity” (22%).18

12 Nelli Babayan et al., “10 Years of the ENP - The Way Forward with the EaP,” 2015, http://maxcap-project. eu/sites/default/fi les/sites/default/fi les/policy-briefs/maxcap_policy_brief_01.pdf, accessed January 2016. 13 Ibid. 14 Tamar Kintsurashvili, “Anti-Western propaganda,” 2015, p. 13, http://www.media-diversity.org/en/ad- ditional-fi les/documents/Anti-Western_Propaganda_Media_Monitoring_Report.pdf, accessed January 2016. 15 Ibid., p. 14. 16 Ibid., p. 14. 17 NDI, “Public attitudes in Georgia Results of a April 2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia,” 2017, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/fi les/NDI%20poll_April%202017_Foreign%20Affairs_ENG_vf.pdf, ac- cessed August 2018. 18 NDI, “Public attitudes in Georgia Results of a November 2016 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Geor- gia,” 2017, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/fi les/NDI_November%202016%20poll_Issues_ENG_vf.pdf, accessed April 2017. 38

Table 1: % who say – is morally wrong

Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.” Accessed May 23, 2018. http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/ social-views-and-morality/

The Georgian government seemed to bow pose of founding a family.”20 Amid rising to societal pressure a few times and took protests the government also backtracked some controversial steps to avoid the pop- on its plans to legalize medical marijuana ulist backlash. For instance, the govern- cultivation21 but did not challenge the deci- ment recently adopted a constitutional ban sion of Georgia’s Constitutional Court about on same-sex marriage.19 The Article 30 of abolishing administrative punishment for the new constitution defi nes “marriage as a its use — effectively legalizing the private union of a woman and a man for the pur- consumption of the drug.22

• Impact on Georgia’s approximation to the EU

How much does the rising challenge of il- tomatically translate into overall Euroscepti- liberal actors and discourses affect Georgia’s cism. On the contrary, public surveys show democratization and European integration that Georgia is still the most pro-European process? On balance, the dominance of illib- state among all EaP countries with 80%23 eral or social-conservative views on certain of the population supporting EU member- issues among Georgian citizens does not au- ship.24 Moreover, EU is still the most trusted

19 Ron Synovitz, “Georgian Dream Doubles Down on Same-Sex Marriage Ban,” RFE/RL, 2017, https://www. rferl.org/a/georgian-dream-doubles-down-same-sex-marriage-ban/28577114.html, accessed March 2019. 20 Matsne.gov.ge, “Constitution of Georgia,” 2019, https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/30346?pub- lication=35, accessed March 2019. 21 BBC, “Church protests halt Georgia cannabis law,” 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from- elsewhere-45563477, accessed March 2019. 22 Shawn Wayne, “Smoking Marijuana Legalized in Georgia,” 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/11592/ Smoking-Marijuana-Legalized-in-Georgia, accessed March 2019. 23 NDI, “Public attitudes in Georgia Results of a April 2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia,” 2017, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/fi les/NDI%20poll_April%202017_Foreign%20Affairs_ENG_vf.pdf, ac- cessed August 2018. 24 For the same period the support for EU membership was only 53% in Ukraine and 47% in Moldova. Source IRI, “Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine,” 2017, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/ fi les/2017-may-survey-of-residents-of-ukraine_en.pdf, accessed February 2019. IRI, “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Moldova,” 2017, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/fi les/wysiwyg/2017-11-8_moldova_poll_ presentation.pdf, accessed February 2019. 39 international actor, with 69% of public trust rived right of residence in their territory.”28 (the highest number among all EaP states) However, according to the same ruling, “the compared to 55% trust towards the United member states have the freedom whether or Nations (UN), 54% for NATO and 18% for not to authorize marriage between persons the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).25 The of the same sex.”29 This basically means that strengthening of populist sentiments and Georgia will not be obliged to legalize the the government bowing to populist pres- same-sex marriage even in case it joins the sure appear to have not impacted Georgia’s EU.30 This is not to say that sexual minori- functional approximation to the EU. For in- ties in Georgia encounter no problems. As stance, in legal terms, the constitutional ban a matter of fact, Georgian society is largely on same-sex marriage does not contradict EU unsupportive of the LGBTQ community. regulations. It is worth noting that in many The often soft approach by the government EU member states, same-sex marriages are towards social-conservative and far-right still illegal and in some cases a matter of sim- activists leaves minorities and other vulner- ilar constitutional bans.26 On the other hand, able groups exposed to physical violence in 2018, in a landmark case against Romania, and societal stigmatization.31 Hence, unlike the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the much-feared same-sex marriage, the favor of EU residence rights for same-sex protection of the civil and political rights spouses.27 The ECJ argued that EU member of minorities will certainly become an issue states are not entitled to “obstruct the free- should Georgia move closer to EU member- dom of residence of an EU citizen by refus- ship. ing to grant his same-sex spouse […] a de-

25 Ecorys, “Open neighborhood - communicating for a stronger partnership: connecting with citizens across the Eastern neighborhood,” 2016, p. 23, https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/fi les/publica- tions/2017-02/EU%20Neighbours%20East_Full.report_6.pdf, accessed February 2019. 26 Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Same-Sex Marriage: Global Comparisons,” CFR, 2017, https://www. cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons, accessed February 2019; Guardian, “Gay spouses have rights in all EU countries, says European court offi cial,” 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ society/2018/jan/11/gay-spouses-rights-all-eu-countries-european-court-adviser, accessed February 2019. 27 BBC, “Same-sex spouses have EU residence rights, top court rules,” 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-44366898, accessed February 2019. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Same-sex marriage should not be confl ated with the legal recognition for same-sex couples, however. Com- menting on Georgia’s constitution draft, the Venice Commission pointed to the fact that the “the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) requires member states to provide legal recognition for same sex cou- ples; non-recognition of the legal status of relationships between same-sex partners appears to amount to a violation of Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR.” Source: Venice Commission, “Georgia. Draft opinion on the draft revised constitution,” 2017, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffi le=C- DL(2017)019-e, accessed March 2019, p. 12. In 2015 seminal case of Oliari and Others v. Italy, based on Art. 8, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) asserted that “the absence of a legal framework recognizing ho- mosexual relationships violates the right to respect for private and family life.” Source: Giuseppe Zago, “Oliari and Others v. Italy: a stepping stone towards full legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Europe,” 2015, https://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/09/16/oliari-and-others-v-italy-a-stepping-stone-towards-full-legal- recognition-of-same-sex-relationships-in-europe/, accessed March 2019. 31 RFE/RL, “LGBT Supporters Rally In Tbilisi, Despite Fears Of Violence,” 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ fearing-violence-georgian-rights-groups-cancel-event-aimed-against-homophobia/29232476.html, accessed February 2019. 40

Xenophobia

In addition to its strong attachment to ho- Arabic states, Iran, Turkey and China.32 On mophobic illiberal values, Georgia’s popu- the other hand, anti-immigrant and xeno- list discourse also revolves around the topic phobic attitudes are less visible towards the of xenophobia. Like the trend in EU member US, the EU countries, some of the post-So- states, Georgian xenophobia is quite selec- viet states and, interestingly, also towards tive. It is mostly directed against immigrants Russia (Figure 1). from certain non-Western countries, such as

Figure 1: Georgian attitudes towards different ethnic groups33

32 CRRC, “Is xhenophobia on the rise in Georgia?,” 2014, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2014/09/is-xe- nophobia-on-rise-in-georgia.html, accessed March 2019; CRRC, “Caucasus Barometer 2017 Georgia,” 2017, https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017ge/codebook/, accessed March 2019; CRRC, “Georgians have more negative attitudes towards the Chinese than other foreigners in Georgia,” 2017, http://crrc-caucasus. blogspot.com/2019/01/georgians-have-more-negative-attitudes.html, accessed March 2019. 33 CRRC, “Caucasus Barometer 2017 Georgia,” 2017, https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017ge/code- book/, accessed March 2019. 41

Over the last few years, far-right groups of Georgian lands.35 Offi cial data shows and activists organized a number of anti-im- that the real number of foreigners purchas- migrant rallies that attracted thousands of ing Georgian arable lands is rather small, if supporters. What is more, their demand for citizens of Georgia’s post-Soviet neighbors toughening the country’s immigration laws are not included.36 Nevertheless, in 2013 the and restricting land sales to foreigners has Georgian government could not withstand been gaining popular support. According to political and social pressure and imposed the 2018 NDI survey, 56% of the population restrictive measures against the acquisition was of the opinion that “Georgia should lim- of arable lands. Later, the restrictive clause it the number of immigrants to the country” was also included in the new constitution and 72% thought that “employers should that entered force in January 2019 — a step prioritize hiring Georgians over foreigners considered by many as “a populist exercise regardless of qualifi cations.”34 According to in economic nationalism.”37 The move was another survey from 2017, 64% of Georgians harshly criticized by local watchdogs and were strictly against the foreign acquisition opposition parties, especially by the splin-

34 NDI, “Public attitudes in Georgia Results of December 2018 survey,” 2018, http://caucasusbarometer.org/ downloads/NDI_presentation/NDI%20Georgia_December%202018%20poll_Political_ENG_Version%20Fi- nal.pdf, accessed February 2019. 35 OC Media, “Georgia temporarily lifts ban on sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens,” 2018, https:// oc-media.org/georgia-temporarily-lifts-ban-on-sale-of-agricultural-land-to-foreign-citizens/, accessed Feb- ruary 2019. 36 State Commission on Migration Issues, “2017 Migration Profi le of Georgia,” 2017, http://migration.com- mission.ge/fi les/migration_profi le_2017_eng__fi nal_.pdf, accessed January 2019. 37 EurasiaNet.org, “Georgia Keeping Its Land Off-Limits for Foreigners,” 2017, https://eurasianet.org/geor- gia-keeping-its-land-off-limits-for-foreigners, accessed February 2019. 42 ter groups of the former ruling party who interests of Georgian citizens” and the for- adhere to a neoliberal economic script. In a eign citizens who want to live and work in similar fashion, last year the Georgian par- Georgia should provide an “adequate con- liament voted to restrict the granting of res- tribution” to Georgia’s economy.39 Overall, idence permits to foreign citizens. The bill as is the case with rising illiberalism, the GD tightens the fi nancial requirements for issu- government has been trying to accommo- ing property-based, labor, investment and date the anti-immigrant sentiments through permanent residence permits.38 According legislative changes to prevent further popu- to Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze, the regu- list backlash and to win the right-wing elec- lation of residency issues should “meet the torate.

• Impact on Georgia’s approximation to the EU

But to what extent does the anti-immigrant Georgia’s restrictive land policy is nothing trend in Georgian society and politics in- new; it follows the example of the majority fringe on Georgia’s European integration? of the Eastern European EU members. The As a matter of fact, the protective anti-mi- EU allowed them to impose restrictions on grant policies adopted by the government land acquisition by the foreign investors do not per se contradict the majority of EU through a series of transitional agreements.42 regulations or adopted practices within the Hence, even in the rather unlikely case that EU. In fact, many EU member states resort Georgia becomes an EU membership candi- to similar practices of land protection. The date anytime soon, technically it will not be guideline issued by the European Commis- a serious challenge to make the protective sion to the EU member states allows for land policy comply with EU regulations. various protective measures. According to Second, negative attitudes among Georgians it “agricultural land is a scarce and special are mostly directed against certain groups of asset, which merits special protection.”40 The countries, especially those from the Middle economic rationale behind the ban is debat- East. Investments from EU member states able. Some observers argue that ban will con- are perceived more favorably and are often tribute to reducing future investment and more welcomed. For instance, according to “perpetuating rural poverty.”41 However, it a CRRC survey from 2017, in terms of con- does not per se damage or infringe on the tribution to the economic development of prospects of Georgia’s approximation to the Georgia, Americans and Europeans enjoy EU. Two points should be made here. First, the highest level of trust among Georgians

38 Agenda.ge, “Parliamentary committee confi rms changes for residency permits for foreigners,” 2018, http:// agenda.ge/en/news/2018/2330, accessed March 2019. 39 Ibid. 40 European Commission, “Sales of farmland: Commission issues guidelines to Member States,” 2017, http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3901_en.pdf, accessed January 2019. 41 Hans Gutbrod, “Ban on Foreign Ag-Ownership in Georgia — Why Leases are Not the Solution,” 2017, https://medium.com/@hansgutbrod/ban-on-foreign-ag-ownership-in-georgia-why-leases-are-not-the-solu- tion-6abdb72706e1, accessed January 2019. 42 Simon Marks, “Eastern Europe turns back on single market,” 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/east- ern-europe-versus-the-single-market/, accessed January 2019. 43

(fi gure 2).43 Therefore, even for the most far- nomic and fi nancial presence of the EU and right actors, campaigning against the eco- its member states does not make much sense.

Figure 2: Georgian attitudes towards different ethnic groups44

• Anti-Westernism The third pillar of populist nationalist dis- gian nationalist populists also campaign course is tacit anti-Westernism. The majority against the infl uence of “foreign-fi nanced” of nationalist populist groups share a more NGOs, which they claim undermine Geor- accommodating position towards Russia gia’s national identity, especially against the and more distance from the West. For in- Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF) stance, Georgian March leaders believe that in Tbilisi, which is a local branch of George Georgia’s territorial integrity can only be re- Soros Foundation’s global network.47 Hence, stored through dialogue and close relations in line with European populists, Georgian with Russia45 and to restore relations with populist nationalists use the script of nega- Russia, Georgia needs to stop being “con- tive Western infl uence to advance their po- trolled by the agents of the West.”46 Geor- litical agenda. 43 CRRC, “Georgians have more negative attitudes towards the Chinese than other foreigners in Georgia,” 2017, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2019/01/georgians-have-more-negative-attitudes.html, accessed March 2019. 44 Source: CRRC, “Georgians have more negative attitudes towards the Chinese than other foreigners in Geor- gia,” 2017, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2019/01/georgians-have-more-negative-attitudes.html, ac- cessed March 2019. 45 Zaza Abashidze, “The Georgian March against migrants and NATO,” Jam news, 2018, https://jam-news. net/the-georgian-march-against-migrants-and-nato/, accessed March 2019. 46 Ibid. 47 Civil Georgia, “Ultranationalists Rally Against Soros Foundation, Land Ownership Changes,” 2017, https:// old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30436, accessed March 2019. 44

Formally none of the populist nationalist populists also try avoiding being labeled as actors question Georgia’s pro-Western ori- “pro-Russian.” They generally refer to them- entation, however. In its party program, the selves as pro-Georgian, which means being APG formally supports Georgia’s member- at equidistance with both Russia and the ship in the EU and NATO but they also un- West.49 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the derline that since these organizations are not APG and other populist nationalist actors ready to accept Georgia as a member, the have a more Russia-friendly policy com- Georgian government should pursue a more pared to traditional parties and CSOs. They pragmatic foreign policy.48 Hence enlarge- also have close contacts with Russia-funded ment fatigue in the EU and NATO clearly societal foundations and other actors that plays into the hands of populists. They also promote Russian soft power in the post-So- understand that the Georgian public still viet world.50 has negative attitudes towards Russia, so

• Impact on Georgia’s approximation to the EU

As in the cases of homophobic and xeno- ments of Georgia’s population. The GD gov- phobic discourses, the anti-Westernism pro- ernment’s sometimes soft attitude towards moted by populist nationalist actors does anti-Western local actors further legitimiz- not have a major impact on Georgia’s re- es their political agenda. In the long-term lations with the EU in terms of sectoral or perspective, if not checked, it may result policy-level approximation. However, in the in erasing the permissive consensus which long run, the promotion of an anti-Western currently exists in Georgian public towards narrative can weaken societal support for Georgia’s European integration, turning it Georgia’s European perspective and solid- into constraining dissensus.51 ify anti-Western sentiments in some seg-

48 Alliance of Patriots of Georgia, “Our Vision & Program,” 2019, http://patriots.ge/our-vision-program/, accessed March 2019. 49 Ibid. 50 TI Georgia, “Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism,” 2018, https://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/anato- my-georgian-neo-nazism, accessed March 2019. 51 Permissive consensus means tacit acceptance of European integration by the population. Constraining dis- sensus is the opposite process when the population turns into a veto actor. See: Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dis- sensus,” British journal of political science 39, no. 1 (2009). 45 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the impact of Georgian populism the political agenda in the country and have on the country’s actual European integra- pushed the Georgian government to part- tion process is not easy to pin down. Where- ly accommodate its pro-European reform as some areas such as the protection of mi- agenda with populist Zeitgeist. Moreover, nority rights remain highly problematic, as socio-economic conditions are changing there is no evidence of stagnation or rollback very slowly, and the majority of the popu- in the process of Georgia’s functional or in- lation is still suffering from social hardship stitutional approximation to the EU due to and unemployment, the further strengthen- rising populism. At best, its impact on the ing of populist sentiments is to be expect- process of Georgia’s European integration ed. Therefore, both the Georgian govern- remains debatable and should be the sub- ment and civil society, with the assistance ject of further research. So far, the populist of the EU and other Western actors, should actors have failed to directly sabotage Geor- take active measures to prevent the further gia’s relations with the EU. Nor have they strengthening of Eurosceptic populism in managed to turn public sentiment against the country. To do so, this policy brief pro- the country’s European integration project. poses a number of policy recommendations for the Georgian government and civil soci- Nevertheless, the threat of populist nation- ety actors as well as the EU and other inter- alism should not be underestimated. The national actors present in Georgia. populist nationalists are already shaping

Recommendations for the Georgian government and civil society organizations:

 Debunk the reductionist myth about civilization that are overshadowed by the EU by highlighting the holistic im- populist rhetoric such as the Age of En- age of EU norms and values and by of- lightenment, democracy, political ac- fering a counternarrative that may be countability and transparency, welfare attractive to the Georgian population. state, effective governance, solidarity This counternarrative may include a and subsidiarity. stronger focus on issues such as wel- fare state, social rights, political free-  Strengthen the teaching of Europe- doms, high environmental standards, an languages in primary and second- solidarity, low degree of corruption ary school curricula. All groups of the and human and professional govern- population, but especially the youth, ments. should be able to receive and under- stand information about the EU direct-  Introduce core courses on political ed- ly from European information sourc- ucation in schools that specifi cally fo- es. This will also reduce the harmful cus on the EU, but also on those found- propaganda waged by Russian — and ing norms of European and Western some local — TV channels and internet 46

sources. In terms of political education  The government and political par- and the teaching of European (and ties should draw a clear line between Georgian) languages, pay more atten- moderate conservative values, which tion to the population in minority re- are widely shared by the Georgian gions, who have a greater exposure to population, and populist national- Russian-language propaganda. ism narratives. Whereas traditional conservatism is fully compatible with  Sponsor television programs on na- EU values, populist nationalist narra- tional and regional TV channels that tives should be considered harmful for will objectively broadcast develop- Georgia’s European integration. ments in EU countries. Focus specifi - cally on economic success, human and  The government should increase its technological progress and the stories effi ciency in the areas that may act as of common people in EU countries. possible triggers for an increase in far- right and Eurosceptic populism. They may include better protection of state borders and tighter control of illegal migration fl ows.

Recommendations for the European Union and EU member states:

 EU should strengthen democratic used by Eurosceptic groups. The EU conditionality against Georgian state and its member states need to improve authorities so the population under- their communication strategy with stands that the EU and European states the Georgian public. The EU should, care more about Georgian population for instance, sponsor ads on national than the Georgian government. That and regional TV channels in order to will contribute to neutralizing the Eu- promote what the EU does for and in rosceptic actors’ anti-Western narra- Georgia. tive, which portrays the Georgian au- thorities as Western puppets and the  Even though the EU does not like the West as an imperial great power. language of political symbolism, it should promote the image of a stron-  EU’s public image in Georgia suf- ger, principled and more effective EU fers mostly because the EU does not to counter the populist narrative of a do enough to raise public awareness weak and ineffi cient union that is un- about its activities in the regions and able to cope with its internal and exter- minority areas. As a result, the Euro- nal problems and is not taken seriously pean narrative is hijacked and mis- by other actors. POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA: THREATS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN GEORGIA

NINO ROBAKIDZE1

49 ABSTRACT

Traditional liberal democratic states across comes problematic during politically im- the world are concerned about the issue of portant events, for instance during election political polarization. At the same time, the cycles. Some argue that a polarized media media, one of the major democratic insti- environment is not a real problem if the tute, is also facing new challenges. Trust of media environment in the country, in gen- towards traditional media, particularly for eral, is pluralistic and voters have access to some specifi c social groups, is defi ned more different media outlets. Is the fragmentized by the media outlet’s political sympathies or Georgian media environment a threat in it- ideological perspective than by profession- self and to what extent will media outlets alism and objective reporting. be able to fulfi ll one of the major functions of journalism – public forum function – and Political polarization is also a challenge for prepare citizens for informed political deci- Georgian media outlets. It particularly be- sions?

INTRODUCTION

Media pluralism is one of the chief criteria TV channels Imedi and Rustavi 2 – that are to assess the state of a democracy. It implies main competitors4 and at the same time are that media is independent from political in- associated with two leading political parties: fl uence, serves public interest and properly Imedi with the ruling party Georgian Dream refl ects the diverse views of the society and and Rustavi 2 with the highest ranking op- the political spectrum.2 It needs to be not- position party – United National Movement. ed that only the multiplicity of media out- Reporters Without Borders,5 has assessed lets that are divided in accordance with the media in Georgia as “Pluralist but still very spheres of political infl uence, does not imply polarized,” since 2013, which has a negative media pluralism and this condition is not impact on the media environment in gener- enough for democratic standard. The exis- al. tence of various TV channels affi liated with political parties might be assessed as virtual A polarized media environment has signifi - pluralism.3 However, a democratic society cant infl uence on public attitudes. The sub- also requires diverse and pluralistic media jective reporting of events which, instead of in terms of its content. conveying facts, explicitly states positions either in favor or in opposition of one of the In recent years, the two leading Georgian major political powers, has become charac- media outlets are two private companies – teristic of Georgian media environment. In

1 Nino Robakidze - Media researcher, SAFE Initiative Eurasia Center Manager, IREX. * The author is grateful to Mariam Grigalashvili for her contribution to research for the paper. 2 Peruško, Z. (2010). The Link That Matters: Media Concentration and Diversity of Content. in B. Klimkiewicz (ed.), Media Freedom and Pluralism: Media Policy Challenges in the Enlarged Europe, Central European Uni- versity Press, pp. 261-273 3 Ibid. 4 TVMR GE. (February 2018). The most rated of 2017 #1. Available at: https://bit.ly/2UTjcjP 5 Reporters Without Borders. (2018). 2018 World Press Freedom Index. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/georgia 50 this context, political processes in 2018, spe- aspect is the extent to which Georgian TV cifi cally the presidential elections, were par- media comply with basic standards of jour- ticularly interesting. The 2018 presidential nalism. This paper focuses on TV channels elections illustrated the negative infl uence and examines their role and infl uence over of media polarization on political processes the polarization of the public and democrat- and the importance of media pluralism for ic processes of the country. More specifi cally, the country’s stable democratic develop- by reviewing the 2018 presidential election, ment. we examine how objectively and impartially media outlets reported the diversity of opin- Today television is still the chief source of ions surrounding various social or politi- information is still a television, according cal issues that were important for the pub- to the Caucasus Barameter public survey. lic. This analysis allow us to see the extent 73% of respondents reported that TV chan- to which media outlets enable the political nels are their primary source for information fragmentation of society, deepen confronta- about political developments.6 This means tion among various interest groups and cre- the role of TV channels is critical in the pro- ate different political realities for audiences cess of forming public opinion about ongo- with different political opinions. ing political processes. Another important

MEDIA POLARIZATION AND ELECTIONS OF 2018

Classical symptoms of political polarization ical parties became even more explicit. The are the increasing popularity of populist cases of biased reporting became more ob- groups in society; basing political debates vious; in addition, negative reporting of un- on populist or emotional, not rational, argu- favorable candidates was observed, which ments; promoting “us” and “them” dichot- resulted in a violation of professional media omy in the political vocabulary; dehuman- ethics and the cases of manipulation.8 izing political opponents and mobilizing supporters against them instead of support- The results of media monitoring during the ing your own ideas.7 2018 presidential elections clearly indicate that oppositional TV channel – Rustavi 2 – Media coverage of the 2018 elections under- mainly reported about Georgian Dream, the scored problems in terms of both the lack of candidate it supported and the Georgian political culture and unhealthy media en- government in a negative context. Mean- vironment. If earlier the leading TV chan- while, TV channel Imedi negatively report- nels alluded to specifi c political affi liations, ed on theUnited National Movement, while during the elections the division of TV chan- using a neutral tone in reporting about the nels in groups of infl uence of different polit- government and the Georgian Dream and

6 Caucasus Barometer. (2017). Main Sources of Information – First Source. Available at: https://caucasusba- rometer.org/en/nj2017ge/INFSOU1/ 7 McCoy, J., Rahman, T. and Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42. 8 Media Monitor. (2018). Final Report of media monitoring of elections, 2016-2018. Available at: http://medi- amonitor.ge/. Accessed on March 6, 2019 51 the candidate it supported. Imedi political presidency, while Rustavi 2 used its infor- programs mostly focused on the negative mational-political programming against Sa- consequences if the United National Move- lome Zurabichvili,9 the candidate supported ment candidate – Grigol Vashadze – won the by the ruling Georgian Dream party.

Media Monitoring of Presidential Elections (Mediamonitor, 2018)10

According to the “Media Monitoring of 2018 Grigol Vashadze during the pre-election Presidential Elections of Georgia,” in ad- campaign.12 More or less neutral position dition to the tense pre-election campaign, was maintained by the TV channel “Pirveli” particular attention should be paid to using and Adjara Public Broadcaster. It is worth hate speech in the media. The cases of ethi- noting that political bias of TV channels to- cal violations were detected in reports pre- wards different political groups is refl ected pared by Rustavi 2 on Salome Zurabichvili, on the attitudes of the audience towards including journalists using cynical and iron- major TV channels. Neither of the two most ic texts.11 According to the research, during popular TV channels – Imedi and Rustavi 2 the election period, negative coverage of Sa- – enjoys a high level of viewer trust: 26% of lome Zurabichvili between the fi rst and the respondents trust TV channel Imedi while second tours sharply increased (from 59% to 20% distrust it, while 20% trust and 27% dis- 89%) on Rustavi 2, while Imedi aired criti- trust channel Rustavi 2. Majority of viewers cal assessments of former president Mikheil have neutral attitudes towards both of these Saakashvili, United National Movement and TV channels13.

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 National Democratic Institute (2018). Public Opinion Polls in Georgia. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/ sites/default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_Issues%20Poll%20Presentation_December%202018_English_Final.pdf 52

Trust in Media (National Democratic Institute, 2018)14

The latest wave of political polarization in 2016 parliamentary elections, three parties the media, in which peaked during the 2018 passed the threshold and all three of them presidential elections, started much earli- actively used their infl uence over specifi c er. The tendency was already visible in the broadcasters during the political battles.16 2012 and 2016 parliamentary elections.15 The As a result, interests and issues relevant to practice of using popular and infl uential TV the majority17 — of people having voting media as a political tool was already visible rights were practically missing in political during the pre-election media monitoring of discussions, what contradicts the principles the 2016 parliamentary elections. During the of pluralistic and representative democracy.

14 Ibid. 15 Media Monitor (2016). Results of media monitoring of 2016 parliamentary elections. Available at: http:// mediamonitor.ge/fi les/MM%20Final%20Report%20(Geo).pdf 16 Transparency International Georgia (2015). Who owns Georgia’s media. Available at: https://www.trans- parency.ge/ge/post/report/vis-ekutvnis-kartuli-media 17 36% of the citizens with voting rights do not have an expressed political preferences for any of the political subjects. Also a number of citizens support political actors that do not have to the infl uence to manage media resources. National Democratic Institute (2018) 53 MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLARIZATION

Media pluralism is directly related to public in December indicate notably different at- pluralism and at the same time, media plays titudes towards issues of public policy as an important role in polarizing the public.18 well as events, or more specifi cally towards In the beginning of 2019, representatives of the facts that can be checked. For instance the National Democratic Institute in Georgia whether or not the criminal situation has published the results of its most recent pub- worsened: if 60% of the supporters of United lic opinion survey in Georgia.19 The opinion National Movement think that the criminal polls were conducted in December 2018, situation in the country has worsened, only when both rounds of the presidential elec- 19% of the supporters of Georgian Dream tion were already over. The poll included party gave similar answer.20 Their responses questions that refl ected the extent to which did not appear to be infl uenced on the offi cial the citizens’ conceptions of specifi c issues statistics on the level of crimes committed in differ according to their political preferences. the country. The same trend was observed in other issues, including their assessment of The results of the opinion polls conducted the country’s development.

Criminal Situation (National Democratic Institute, 2018)21

18 Martin, J.G and Yurukoglu, A. (2017). Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization. American Economic Review, 107(9), 2565-2599 19 National Democratic Institute (2018). Results of December 2018 Public Opinion Polls in Georgia. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/publications/results-december-2018-public-opinion-polls-georgia 20 National Democratic Institute (2018). Public Attitudes in Georgia. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/ default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_Issues%20Poll%20Presentation_December%202018_English_Final.pdf 21 Ibid. 54

For example, 42% of the respondents who the country is going in the wrong direction. did not identify themselves as the supporter During the past 10 years, 53% of indepen- of either partythink that the country is go- dent voters believe the criminal situation ing in the wrong direction, only 15% of the has worsened, compared to for 60% of Unit- supporters of ruling Georgian Dream felt ed National Movement supporters. Howev- the same. However 67% of the supporters of er, just 19% of Georgian Dream supporters the most popular opposition party, the Unit- felt the same way.22 ed National Movement, said they believe

Country Direction (National Democratic Institute 2018)23

On the surface, there is nothing special in The polarization of the media is refl ected the fact that supporters of various political in the level of public trust in the media it- parties perceive public policy issues through self. The majority (64%) of the population different lenses. However, the surveys show believes that the media has passed on dis- that these differences increase year by year, information at some point. However, which which could be an indication of the political broadcaster is accused of spreading disin- fragmentation of society.24 formation changes according to the party

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Caucasus Research Resource Center. Public Opinion Surveys 2014-2018. Available at: https://caucasusba- rometer.org/en/ 55 supported by the voter. For instance, 37% of way. On the question whether or not they the supporters of Georgian Dream think that have received disinformation from Rustavi TV channel Imedi (channel associated with 2 (TV channel associated with United Na- Georgian Dream) never spreads disinforma- tional Movement), 40% of the United Na- tion, while only 4% of the supporters of the tional Movement supporters and 6% of the United National Movement think the same Georgian Dream supporters state “never.”25

Perceived Disinformation on TV (National Democratic Institute 2018)26

25 National democratic Institute (2018).Public Opinion Poll in Georgia. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/ sites/default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_Issues%20Poll%20Presentation_December%202018_English_Final.pdf 26 Ibid. 56 CONCLUSION

It is important to note that unlike the neigh- Media is an important source of public po- boring countries, a diverse media land- larization.29 Public opinion surveys show scape still exists in Georgia.27 In addition to that public opinion is divided according to the popular, politically affi liated national party-political preferences that decrease the broadcasters, there are several smaller TV opportunity for constructive political debate channels and groups of investigative jour- and threaten democracy. The fact that me- nalists. The number of online media outlets dia easily becomes a tool for political fi ghts is increasing and it would be mistake to state in countries like Georgia can be easily ex- that their work does not have an impact on plained. In countries with little democratic public opinion. However, the main chal- experience, media, as a business, does not lenge for Georgian media today is not the have the tradition and experience of an in- lack of numerous media collectives with dif- dependent fi nancial existence. If we look at ferent editorial policies, but the lack of me- the history of strong Georgian TV channels, dia platforms that can gain the trust of the we will see that these media outlets explic- wider public and can also properly present itly served groups with different political a diversity of opinions in society, and create interests or were even created to be used an atmosphere for constructive, argumenta- as political tools. Public trust in, and public tive dialogue for different social or political opinions about, popular TV media outlets groups and, in this way, respond to society’s were established based on these subjective chief concerns.28 or objective circumstances.

The 2018 presidential elections in Georgia Naturally, the political polarization of society once again illustrated the political polariza- is not solely a Georgian problem. What’s more, tion of the media and the society in relation as various research illustrates, this problem is to two major political poles, the Georgian particularly acute for traditional liberal dem- Dream and the United National Movement. ocratic states.30 However, with states with The primary tool for both of these political low social capital, political fragmentation parties was mobilizing supporters against can become an insurmountable problem and their opponents and both political actors ac- can cause irreversible damage to democracy. tively used the media resources at their dis- While media pluralism is a signifi cant char- posal to accomplish that goal. acteristic of democracy, media polarization, if ignored for too long, may trigger extreme confrontation between social groups.

27 Freedom House. (2018). Freedom in the World 2018- Georgia. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/ report/freedom-world/2018/georgia 28 Kovach, B. and Rosenstiel, T. (2014). The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect, New York, United States, Three Rivers Press 29 Martin, J. G. and Yurukoglu, A. (2017). Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization. Economic Review, 107(9), 2565-2599 30 McCoy, J, Rahman, T and Somer, T. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Pat- terns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42. 57 RECOMMENDATIONS

For political actors:

 While changing the country’s laws judiciary is a precondition for improv- concerning the media, advertisement ing the media environment and the and similar fi elds, the government standards of the freedom of expres- should consider the recommendations sion; issued by NGOs or think-tanks work- ing on the issues related to media in  Political leaders should stop turning the country, as well as recommenda- journalists and media outlets with a tions from international organizations different political outlook into enemies; and donors; potential changes in the hostile and threatening statements are existing legislation regarding these is- particularly unacceptable from civil sues should be discussion publicly, in servants and high ranking political of- a format that involves independent ex- fi cials; perts and international expert circles;  Political actors, and particularly the  While reforming the judiciary system, representatives of the government, consider the recommendations of civil should stop boycotting various media society and international assessments, outlets during important political de- since the existence of the independent velopments.

For professional organizations and civil society:

 Journalists should reduce subjec- initiatives that will assist the refl ection tive reporting and using hate speech of political pluralism in media and en- when reporting on party candidates. able media to fulfi ll the function of pub- Balanced news with no subjective as- lic forum. Work with journalists shall sessment will increase the trust of the be intensifi ed to develop and spread population in specifi c TV channels, as strategies and practices that foster a well as in the journalists of the given balanced presentation of diverse opin- TV channel; ions; information campaigns against hate speech and violation of ethical  Media outlets should work on im- code shall be organized; proving self-regulating standards and should be more actively involved in  Professional organizations and NGO professional discussions to better use representatives working on issues re- self-regulating mechanisms in order to lated to the media should spend more improve the trust levels towards them; time researching the process of away from political polarization in the me-  While partnering with media, the NGO dia fi eld. sector should incentivize projects and 58

For international Donors:

 More attention should be paid to the re- for partnerships (fi nancial support, ports on media polarization and prob- joint projects, advertisements), donors lems in media prepared by the civil shall be guided by universal principles sector and monitoring missions; ruling of journalistic ethics and professional and opposition parties’ attempts to use standards; media polarization in media outlets affi liated with their interests should  Media monitoring shall be maintained become the part of negative condition- and strengthened to enable the analy- ality. The principle of conditionality sis of dynamics of media development shall be applied toward media outlets in perspective. as well. While choosing media outlets