Heritage Special Report SR-xx SR-95 Published by The Heritage Foundation JuneMarch 6, XX, 2011 2011 Problems in British Foreign Policy By Dr. Robin Harris The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense. Our vision is to build an America where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish. As conservatives, we believe the values and ideas that motivated our Founding Fathers are worth conserving. As policy entrepreneurs, we believe the most effective solutions are consistent with those ideas and values. This paper is part of the American Leadership Initiative, one of 10 Transformational Initiatives making up The Heritage Foundation’s Leadership for America campaign. For more products and information related to these Initiatives or to learn more about the Leadership for American campaign, please visit heritage.org. Problems in British Foreign Policy By Dr. Robin Harris About the Author Dr. Robin Harris served during the 1980s as an adviser at the United Kingdom Treasury and Home Office, as Director of the Conservative Party Research Department, and as a member of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Downing Street Policy Unit. He continued to advise Lady Thatcher after she left office and has edited the definitive volume of her Collected Speeches. Dr. Harris is now an author and journalist. His books include Dubrovnik: A History (Saqi Books, 2003); Beyond Friendship: The Future of Anglo–American Relations (The Heritage Foundation, 2006); and Talleyrand: Betrayer and Saviour of France (John Murray, 2007). His history of the British Conservative Party will be published later in 2011. © 2011 by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: http://report.heritage.org/sr0095 Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. Contents Section I: True and False Lessons from Libya ............................................. 1 Section II: Past Developments in British Foreign Policy ..................................... 3 Section III: Conservative Foreign Policy Thinking ......................................... 7 Section IV: Britain and the Arab Crisis ................................................. 11 Section V: Britain and Libya ......................................................... 13 Section VI: British Foreign Policy and Defense: The Missing Dimension ....................... 17 Abstract It may take years before the results of NATO’s military operations against Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s Libyan regime can finally be judged, but the issues raised by the crisis are of immediate importance. First, the way in which the operation has been conducted is a reminder of the importance to the United States of its European allies. The assumption which perennially surfaces in the U.S. State Department—that America should primarily be looking in its alliances to a Pacific or other non-European orientation—has yet again proved ill founded. Second, Libya offers a bad model for the future. NATO’s effectiveness and even existence depend on the recognition that it will often depend in practice on “coalitions of the willing.” The willing, though, need to be led, and it is an even more fundamental principle of the Alliance—one rooted in history and in relative power—that such leadership must come from the United States. Third, the leadership role which, by default, has fallen to Britain and France is also likely to lead to “Coalitions of the willing” need to be led, and problems because it fosters damaging illusions. In it is a fundamental principle of the NATO the light of Libya, for example, the U.S. may come to Alliance—one rooted in history and in rela- tive power—that such leadership must come expect too much of Britain, and the British, for the sake from the United States. of political image-making, may be tempted to indulge that expectation. To achieve some diplomatic success without being overshadowed by America is a British political priority. Yet without the commitment of substantially more defense resources, Britain will be unable to do more than strike a pose, and the West can least afford posing because security threats—notably a rising China, a revanchist Russia, a still incorrigible Iran, and a mad, bad North Korea—are real, and only strong American leadership can meet them. To face these and other challenges will require more, not less, U.S. defense effort. Any illusions, like that of the U.K.’s adopting a leading role in key regions, can only weaken the American national consensus that is required. Britain’s problems go beyond the financial and economic difficulties which, rather than foreign affairs, are the main preoccupation of British public opinion. They go to the heart of British foreign policy itself. To explain why this is so, one needs to stand back from events in Libya and look back some way into the past. Section I True and False Lessons from Libya At the time of writing, the outcome of NATO’s military operations against Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s Libyan regime is unclear. Indeed, it may take years before the results can finally be judged. But the issues raised by the crisis are several and of immediate importance. First, the way in which the operation has been conducted is a reminder, if one were still needed, of the impor- tance to the United States of its European allies. The assumption which perennially surfaces in the U.S. State Depart- ment—that America should primarily be looking in its alliances to a Pacific or other non-European orientation—has yet again proved ill founded. This confirmation of the importance of its European allies to the U.S. means, by extension, that the effective- ness or otherwise of America’s foreign and security policy is therefore bound up with how these allies manage their affairs, and particularly with how much they invest in their defense. Allowing pacifism or neutralism, let alone anti- Americanism, to gain a grip in Europe is therefore a risk that the U.S. cannot afford now any more than it could during the Cold War. Second, however, Libya in different respects offers a Allowing pacifism or neutralism, let alone anti- bad model for the future. NATO’s effectiveness and even Americanism, to gain a grip in Europe is a risk existence depend on the recognition that it will often de- that the U.S. cannot afford now any more than it pend in practice on “coalitions of the willing.” As in the could during the Cold War. case of Libya with Germany and Turkey, some NATO members will be highly unwilling, but at least they do not materially impede or seek to veto action once decided. The willing, though, need to be led, and it is an even more fundamental principle of the Alliance—one rooted in history and in relative power—that such leadership must come from the United States. In the present operation, the U.S. has taken a back seat and has not even attempted the role of back-seat driver. Its messages have changed, for example, from open skepticism about applying a no-fly zone to emphatic support for one. President Barack Obama has even, in a joint newspaper article with United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, signed up to the aim of régime change.1 Yet that is not what U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 actually proposes. The resolution was adopted with- out opposition but with five abstentions (including, significantly, the two other permanent members, Russia and China) precisely because it did not go as far as Britain and France (and now America) ideally want. Thus, it limits itself to authorizing Chapter VII action to enforce a cease-fire; protection of civilians (though excluding “a foreign occupation force of any form”); a no-fly zone; an arms embargo (which, despite allied frustration, presumably in- cludes the rebels); and an asset freeze. The resulting uncertainties about exactly what current aims are and about U.S. intentions and willingness to give them effect more generally are obviously unhelpful. Third, the leadership role which, by default, has fallen to Britain and France is also likely to lead to problems because it fosters damaging illusions. Of these, there are two subsets. 1. Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, “Libya’s Pathway to Peace,” The New York Times, April 14, 2011. 1 Special Report 95 The first is the subset of lingering illusions about France as an ally. France sees itself—particularly since the elec- tion of President Sarkozy in May 2007—as having a special sphere of interest in North Africa and is keen to ensure that is recognized both within the European Union (EU) and outside it. Asserting this claim, mainly in Libya against the country’s traditional regional rival there, Italy (the colonial power), is thus settled French policy. France is also now pursuing a commercial interest. No one—not even Tony Blair—flattered and fêted Colonel Qadhafi with such over-the-top extravagance as did Mr. Sarkozy in Paris in December 2007. For the same reason, once Qadhafi’s days looked numbered, no power has bombed the Colonel’s headquarters in Tripoli with greater gusto than the French. On top of this, Mr. Sarkozy has a presidential election to fight next year, and he badly needs a foreign policy success to prevent his losing it—or, on present projections, even reaching the second round. Finally, although France is now less troublesome within NATO, and although Mr.