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NCSEJ WEEKLY NEWS BRIEF Washington, D.C. July 29, 2016

Firebombs hurled at Hasidic luminary’s grave in Ukraine JTA, July 26, 2016 http://www.jta.org/2016/07/26/news-opinion/world/firebombs-hurled-at-hasidic-luminarys-grave-in- ukraine

Unknown perpetrators hurled firebombs at the gravesite of a Hasidic luminary in central Ukraine.

The incident in Shpola, a city located 120 miles south of the capital, Kiev, occurred Sunday evening, according to Eduard Dolinsky, director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee.

On Monday, Dolinsky wrote on Facebook that the perpetrators tried to set on fire a structure built near the gravesite of Aryeh Leib, who died in 1811 and was an important disciple of Dov Ber of Mezeritch, an influential 18th-century Hasidic rabbi.

Separately, approximately 200 people in the west Ukrainian city of Ternopil presented local authorities with a petition to remove from the city’s coat of arms a star shape they said was a Jewish symbol, the Star of David.

The coat of arms of Ternopil features a fortress above the star shape that has six points and comprises 12 triangles – half of them khaki colored and the rest blank. Under the star is a horizontal crescent divided into a khaki half and a blank one. The shield bearing those symbols is crowned by the Ukrainian trident — the Sign of Princely State of Volodymyr the Great, which is the main national symbol and the country’s coat of arms.

The petitioners want the city to “replace the Jewish Star of David with the traditional Ukrainian octagon” and “complement the star and crescent with a Christian cross, which must go back to the top of the trident,” the news website Ukraina Moloda reported Friday.

They cited the writings of a Ukrainian fundamentalist Christian who said the Star of David is “associated with the symbol of the antichrist.”

Moldovan Parliament condemns Holocaust Publika, July 22, 2016 http://en.publika.md/moldovan-parliament-condemns-holocaust_2625535.html

The Chisinau Legislature has passed a political declaration on accepting the Report of the International Committee for the Holocaust. The document condemns the persecution and extermination of Jews by the Nazis and collaborators on the current territory of Moldova from 1937 to 1944.

The Declaration also condemns any attempts of ignoring and denying the Holocaust and brings homage to its victims and survivors.

The Parliament sees the declaration as very timely, under the conditions in which ethno- and xenophobia mutilate people and take new shapes in the whole world.

"Condemning and recognizing the Holocaust is not just a political act, it’s a social act, clearly expressing that, by memory and history, we’ll never admit any actions and positions endangering human values. It’s a proof this society is mature, tolerant, European, open, knowing to justly appreciate the past and which will defend its future from intolerance and manipulation," reads the declaration.

The MPs urge academics, schools and universities to start courses, discussions and symposiums dedicated to the Holocaust, in order to educate the spirit of tolerance, humanism and mutual respect within society.

"We commit not to allow that ideologies, people or organizations should try reviewing history and denying the Holocaust. We consider that by education, research, public discussions, the memory of the Holocaust victims will be honored, and the crimes – condemned, so that xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism should not find place in Moldova. Suppressing the truth, the collective memories is not specific to the Moldovans, who have resisted all the attempts of revising the past," the document specifies.

The Elie Wiesel committee, constituted in Romania, presented the report in 2004, according to which, only in 1941, from 45,000 to 60,000 Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Bucovina, and from 105,000 to 120,000 Jews died after being expelled from the Transnistrian area.

Church Procession Passes Peacefully in Kiev Despite Grenade Threat Times, July 27, 2016 https://themoscowtimes.com/news/controversial-church-procession-takes-place-in-kiev-54750

A controversial Orthodox church procession and prayer service has passed peacefully through Kiev despite earlier reports that grenades had been laid along the route.

The service, arranged by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, saw over 5,000 people march through the Ukrainian capital. A prayer service dedicated to the Baptism of Kievan Rus at Saint Vladimir Hill, a symbolic landmark near the site of a 10th century mass baptism, was also used to call for peace in the country.

Ukrainian intelligence agencies reported earlier in the week that the Russian special services intended to use the procession to “provoke” Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the country's only formally recognized Orthodox church, but has faced increasing pressure for its "ongoing allegiance" to .

The procession was originally barred from entering Kiev due to reports that grenades had been laid along the route, the reported Tuesday.

The march was permitted to proceed amid heightened security measures. Parade participants passed through metal detectors with the help of nearly 6000 law enforcement officers, while bus routes were altered and streets were blocked.

The route of the march was intended to symbolize the unification of Ukraine coming together, with believers moving along two routes across the country to meet each other in Kiev.

IMF To Provide Moldova $179 Million In Loans Linked To Economic Reform RFE/RL, July 27, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/imf-provide-moldova-179-million-loans-linked-economic-reform- /27883567.html

The International Monetary Fund agreed on July 26 to provide Moldova with $179 million in loans over three years if the government carries out economic reforms.

Moldova is one of Europe's poorest nations and the news is a boost to the new government in office since January. The IMF left Moldova in September 2015, saying it would not negotiate loans in light of the disappearance of some $1 billion from three Moldovan banks in a scandal that rocked the country.

Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip told The Associated Press that the IMF's return to Moldova "brings back optimism at home and helps restore our credibility abroad."

Filip added his government remains committed to European-style reforms and is "keen to attract foreign investment: in this sense we undertook a series of economic and banking reforms, which provide the basis for future sustainable growth."

The IMF, whose staff visited Chisinau for 10 days, stressed that the government needs to improve the business climate, carry out critical banking reforms, and ramp up its anti-corruption fight to access the loans.

The deal must also be approved by the IMF's board in October.

U.S. rabbi calls on Pope to remove church at Auschwitz JTA, July 28, 2016 http://www.jta.org/2016/07/28/news-opinion/united-states/u-s-rabbi-calls-on-pope-to-remove-church-at- auschwitz

One the eve of Pope Francis’ visit to Auschwitz, a U.S. rabbi has called on him to remove a Catholic church from the premises of the Nazi death camp.

The letter sent from Rabbi Avi Weiss, national president of AMCHA-Coalition for Jewish Concerns, was firstreported by The Algemeiner on Wednesday. Francis arrived in Poland Wednesday to participate in the church’s World Youth Day. He is scheduled to visit Auschwitz-Birkenau on Friday.

Weiss’ letter protesting the presence of the Parish Church of Brzezinka on the grounds of Auschwitz was sent to the pope through New York Archbishop Timothy Dolan.

In the letter, Weiss says that the presence of the church at the former death camp site is a “clear violation” of a 1987 agreement between Roman Catholic Cardinals and Jewish leaders, which he says: “stipulates in clear language that ‘there will be no permanent Catholic place of worship on the site of the Auschwitz and Birkenau camps.'”

“I have deep respect for people of all faiths, symbols and places of worship of all faiths, but a church does not belong at the largest Jewish cemetery in the world,” Weiss wrote in the letter. Weiss previously protested against the Carmelite convent established by the nuns in 1984 on a building on the grounds of Auschwitz. It was closed by Pope John Paul in 1993.

“It was Pope John Paul who demanded that the nuns leave the convent at Auschwitz One. I ask that you find similar courage and close the church at Birkenau, and have it moved elsewhere,” Weiss concluded.

Francis is the third pope to visit Auschwitz.

Polish Court Limits World War II-Era Restitution Claims in Warsaw By Joanna Berendt New York Times, July 27, 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/europe/polish-court-limits-world-war-ii-era-restitution- claims-in-warsaw.html

Poland’s constitutional court on Wednesday upheld a 2015 law that significantly limits the rights of people whose property in Warsaw was seized during or after World War II, and their descendants, to apply for restitution.

The decision effectively removes the ability of former owners who missed a December 1988 deadline, set by the former Communist government, to file claims. And for those who met the deadline — but whose cases have languished, in some cases, for decades — the law sets up hurdles that may be nearly impossible to clear.

“This is a very unjust decision,” said Gideon Taylor, chairman of operations at the World Jewish Restitution Organization, which is based in Jerusalem.

In a statement, he added: “This decision highlights the need for Poland, at long last, to do what all other countries in the former Soviet bloc have done: establish a national program to provide all Jewish and non- Jewish former owners, and their families, the opportunity to claim restitution or compensation for their property confiscated during the Holocaust or by the Communist authorities.”

Advocates of restitution objected to three provisions of the law that was upheld on Wednesday.

First, the law does not allow claims by property owners and their relatives who missed the 1988 deadline, even if they had fled abroad to escape anti-Semitic violence or Communist persecution. Second, in pre-1988 cases that have languished, the law gives former property owners or their families only six months — from the date the law takes effect — to assert their claims and another three months to prove their claims, a threshold that could be impossible for many claimants to meet. Finally, the law removes the right of ex-owners to seek the return of large categories of properties, including those used by the government.

The mayor of Warsaw, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who helped craft the legislation, defended it as a “transitional” solution to a national problem. “The biggest sin of the Polish state is that it hasn’t passed a law that would resolve the issue of restitution once and for all,” she recently told the broadcaster TVN24.

Under Polish law, former owners can bring private restitution claims in Polish courts; some Jewish claimants have been awarded compensation. But the process is difficult, time-consuming and expensive, and few claims have been successful.

The city of Warsaw has long had the practice of appointing a trustee to represent the anonymous heirs of unclaimed property — even if the rightful heirs are all deceased. The practice was costly, and in some cases, property developers abused the legal uncertainty to acquire buildings.

“The tribunal ruled that if someone didn’t file a restitution claim for 70 years, then it is fair to assume that they have agreed that the ownership of a given property should be passed onto the city of Warsaw,” Bartosz Milczarczyk, a spokesman for the mayor’s office, said in a phone interview on Wednesday. He added: “There are numerous buildings in Warsaw that have not been claimed by anyone and they deteriorated. We needed a legal way to prevent that.”

Advocates of restitution opposed the law, though they agreed with Ms. Gronkiewicz-Waltz that a national solution was required.

“We want a national program that would enable rightful property owners to file claims which would be examined in a public and transparent process,” Mr. Taylor said. “The process should end with restitution where possible or with compensation where not possible.”

He said the issue was a moral, not a legal, one. “Only by dealing with the past will Poland be able to move forward,” he said.

A 1945 decree transferred ownership of properties within the city’s prewar boundaries to the city government. It allowed former owners of those properties to assert ownership rights, but the Communist government rejected or failed to review most of those claims, according to the World Jewish Restitution Organization. Thousands of cases remain open.

Norman Trysk-Frajman, 86, a Holocaust survivor, is among those affected by the court’s ruling. Mr. Trysk- Frajman’s grandparents owned two apartment buildings in Warsaw; he said that he has the property deeds, and that he and three cousins in France are the only rightful heirs. He never filed a restitution claim because he did not know he had the right to do so.

“Our forefathers, who were slaughtered during the war, left it to us,” Mr. Trysk-Frajman, speaking by phone from his home in Florida, said of the properties. “It is rightfully ours and I cannot imagine that anyone in the world would disagree with this under normal circumstances.”

Mr. Trysk-Frajman added: “Our lives took a drastic turn during the war when practically all of my family were murdered. Yet, it is decades later and I still have to worry how I will survive the next day, though this time it is because of my family’s desperate financial situation. Often we have to choose whether to pay for medication or food. This is not right; we should not have to endure such hardship after everything we have been through.”

The case was referred to the court by Bronislaw Komorowski, who was Poland’s president until August, and raised concerns about its legality.

The conservative Party, which swept to power in October, has taken a hard-line view, declaring that restitution legislation is not necessary because the past is the past.

Armenia Revolts: Forget Social Protest, This Time It’s Serious By Grigor Atanesian Moscow Times, July 27, 2016 https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/armenia-revolts-forget-social-protest-people-demand-regime- change-54745

That thousands of Yerevan residents should take to the streets, as they have done every day this past week, is no real surprise. It is, after all, the fourth summer in a row that mass protests have gripped the Armenian capital. In 2013, demonstrators protested price hikes for public transportation. In 2014 it was pension reform. In 2015, what started as a protest against higher electricity bills became the so-called “Electric Yerevan” movement that Russian state-controlled media hyperbolically compared to Ukraine’s Maidan.

But this summer’s protest is different — not so much in form, but in character. No longer are the demands social and economic; now the ultimatum is regime change. Yerevan residents are rallying to voice their support for an armed militant group that seized a police station in the Erebuni district on July 17. The militants are demanding the release of all political prisoners and the resignation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. They call themselves “The Sassoon Daredevils” after the title of a medieval Armenian epic about the strongmen of Sassoun — a historic region of Armenia — and their struggle against Arab invaders.

Among these latter-day Daredevils are two heroes of the Karabakh War of 1992-1994, Pavlik Manukyan and Araik Khandoyan. Both are renowned throughout Armenia and the international Armenian diaspora.

Most Daredevils members support The Founding Parliament movement, the main non-systemic opposition force in the country. One of their first demands was the release of Jirair Sefilian, leader of The Founding Parliament, who was arrested in June.

The Daredevils released all their hostages on July 23 on the condition that a press center be erected in the compound they control. But the authorities responded in the usual way for a former Soviet republic. State- controlled television made no mention of the takeover of the police station for the first two days. Police dispersed supporters with excessive force. Video cameras captured riot police kicking demonstrators who had fallen to the ground. Road workers suddenly decided to lay new asphalt in front of the presidential palace and all official government spokespeople seemingly disappeared. Only on July 22, five days after the armed conflict began, did a notice appear on President Sargasyan’s website condemning the militants.

On July 27, it was reported that the militants had once again taken in hostages, though this information is disputed and difficult to verify.

The National Security Service is calling the takeover a terrorist attack, but the number of Armenians who disagree with that assessment is growing daily. Armenian society has a deep aversion to all acts of violence. The bloody ethnic conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan and the terrorist attack against the parliament in 1999, when masked gunmen killed eight deputies, is still fresh in people’s minds. Paradoxically, however, it is the very rejection of violence that many Armenians have come round to supporting the Daredevils.

Armenian society is, essentially, too small for corruption and crime to remain hidden. A consensus has formed that the authorities use their monopoly on violence for personal gain. People remember how President Serzh Sargsyan came to power by suppressing mass protests that followed presidential elections in 2008. They remember how police used force to disperse the protesters, causing the deaths of eight demonstrators and one soldier.

The Founding Parliament movement has never advocated the use of force to achieve a regime change, and the seizure of the police station seems to be a gesture of despair from some of their veteran members. For years, Jirair Sefilian and his supporters took to the streets with placards, recorded video messages, traveled around the country in caravans and used every possible peaceful means of protest available. As a result, they were arrested, given hefty prison sentences and beaten by people in civilian clothes.

Armenia celebrates 25 years of independence in 2016, although it is difficult to find a single citizen who would characterize the country as free and independent. According to official statistics, more than 600,000 people emigrated from Armenia during those years; unofficially, it may have been as many as 1 million. Like Ukraine, Armenia was slated to sign an Association Agreement creating a free-trade zone with Europe at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013, but after a closed meeting with President in Moscow, President Sargsyan announced that he was rejecting integration with Europe in favor of joining the Eurasian Economic Union.

Over the past decade, Armenia has handed Russia control over many of the country’s strategic facilities, including the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, Armsberbank (The Armenian State Savings Bank that later became a branch of Russia’s VTB bank), the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant, and many other assets. And yet, over the past five years, Russia has sold Azerbaijan — Armenia’s main foreign enemy — offensive weapons worth more than $4 billion. Azerbaijan used those Russian weapons during a four-day clash with Armenia in April 2016 that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 Armenian soldiers.

A consensus has formed in Armenian society that corruption and the authoritarian regime are the main problems facing the country, and that they are destroying the economy and threatening Armenia’s sovereignty. The groundswell of support for the Sassoon Daredevils, taking in everyone from retirees to youth carrying smartphones, is an indication that the ruling elites are not in for an easy ride.

Ukraine urges world community to increase pressure on Kremlin to stop escalation in Donbas Ukrinform, July 26, 2016 http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/2056567-ukraine-urges-world-community-to-increase- pressure-on-kremlin-to-stop-escalation-in-donbas.html

Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appealed to its international partners to step up political and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin in order to stop dangerous escalation of conflict in eastern Ukraine, according to a statement released by the Foreign Ministry.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is deeply concerned about the worsening of security situation in the zone of the anti-terrorist operation. The militants backed by the Russian Federation shelled positions held by Ukrainian Armed Forces in 189 episodes during the July 22-24 period," the diplomats have noted.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry demands that the Russian Federation as a participant in the Minsk agreements urgently fulfill its obligations to withdraw its servicemen, mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Donbas, put a stop to unlawful supplies of weapons and military equipment to the militants, resume the work which is conducted by SMM OSCE.

The diplomats said that "deliberate escalation of the security situation I occurring amid massive deliveries by the Russian Federation of military equipment, arms and ammunition, deployment of new mercenaries and military personnel from Russian Armed Forces in Donbas."

Since the beginning of July, 19 train echelons filled with armaments and military equipment crossed the unmonitored section of the Ukrainian-Russian border from the Russian Federation. Russia delivered 19 units of T-72 tanks, three Grad multiple rocket launching systems, 2 self-propelled artillery systems, 11 armored personnel carriers and vehicles in violation of international law and its commitments to control arms exports.

The diplomats also noted that "intimidation of observers of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine have been clearly traced, obstructing their work of monitoring and verification under a mandate which was also approved by the Russian Federation."

Such Kremlin’s rhetoric, the Foreign Ministry says, is confirmed by the position of the Russian delegation taken at the Minsk talks, where it tries to act as an observer and advocate of the illegal armed groups in separate areas of Donbas instead of making them implement the Minsk agreements in full.

Russia also demonstrates such behavior relating to agreements reached in Normandy format, avoiding their implementation or deliberately trying to distort their meaning. In particular, it relates to framework principles of pulling off troops away from the contact line that has been agreed by military advisers in this format on 15-16 June, 2016. Ukraine’s Deadly Profession: Three Journalists Attacked in July By Melinda Haring Atlantic Council, July 27, 2016 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraine-s-deadly-profession-three-journalists- attacked-in-july

On July 20, investigative journalist Pavel Sheremet was assassinated in Kyiv. Sheremet hosted a morning show at Radio Vesti and was a top reporter at Ukrainska Pravda. A crusading journalist and native of Minsk, Belarus, he had already been expelled from both Belarus and Russia. He was killed by a car bomb.

It would be easy to dismiss Sheremet’s murder as an outlier. Unfortunately, it’s anything but. His death is merely the most drastic example of the steady deterioration of press freedom in Ukraine in recent months.

One day before Sheremet’s murder, Maria Rydvan, the editor of Forbes Ukraine, was stabbed three times in Kyiv; she had been walking in the park of the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. Fortunately her injuries were only minor.

On July 25, the head of Business Censor, Sergei Golovnyova, was beaten in the well-to-do Podil section of Kyiv by two men who took nothing from him.

Kristina Berdynskykh, a reporter for the New Time magazine who often writes about Ukraine’s oligarchs, said she has received multiple death threats in recent months. No charges have been brought against any suspects.

After Sheremet’s murder, Ukrainian authorities promised Olena Prytula, Sheremet’s partner and the owner of Ukrainska Pravda, a security detail. Sheremet had been driving Prytula’s car when the bomb went off.

Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko stated that he has opened a case against Vadim Troyanov, the first deputy head of the Ukrainian National Police, who had been shadowing Sheremet and Prytula. Khatia Dekanoidze, the head of the National Police, said that Troyanov will be questioned after he returns from his holidays. But their common boss, Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov, claimed that these suspicions against Troyanov are without merit.

It’s unclear who is behind Sheremet’s murder. But critics have accused the government of harassing and trying to silence nettlesome journalists over the past several months.

On April 26, the Ukrainian government banned the country’s top television host, Savik Shuster, a Canadian national, from working in the country. Shuster hosts Ukraine’s most popular Russian-language talk show, Shuster LIVE; four million people tune in each week.

Some have speculated that Shuster may have annoyed President Petro Poroshenko personally on one of his April shows. Shuster asked his audience to respond to the president’s claim to that he has “shown determination” in the fight against corruption. Ninety-three percent of the audience disagreed with the statement.

Shuster took the case over his work permit to court, and so far he’s won.

In May, Ukrainian hackers leaked the names and contact details of more than 4,500 journalists, cameramen, producers, stringers, translators, and drivers who have worked in areas under the control of pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine. The journalists worked for major international media outlets like , the BBC, AFP, and Al-Jazeera, nonprofits such as Human Rights Watch, and local outlets.

The website on which the leak appeared, Myrotvorets, was co-founded by Anton Herashchenko, an MP and adviser to Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov. Herashchenko also published the list on his Facebook page. He accused the journalists on the list of aiding terrorists and spreading Russian propaganda. Avakov praised the publication of the list and blamed the journalists for registering with the separatists.

The leak was condemned by journalists and rights groups alike.

“Releasing this information—which may not even be accurate—was extremely irresponsible,” said Steven M. Ellis, director of advocacy and communications at the International Press Institute. “Not only could it lead some journalists to fear to take necessary steps to ensure their safety in an extremely dangerous area, but it might make some avoid reporting there at all for fear that they face mob violence or prosecution once they leave.”

On May 24, Myrotvorets released a second list that included the home addresses of 239 Ukrainian and international journalists working in Russia.

Poroshenko condemned the release of the data on June 3, calling it a “mistake.”

While Ukraine by and large enjoys a lively and free media, there are problems. The country's ten most popular television channels are all owned by businessmen whose primary business is not media. And then there’s the danger of reporting.

Sheremet’s murder has sent a “chilling signal,” said former VICE reporter Simon Ostrovsky in a July 27 interview. “To a lot of journalist in Ukraine it feels like a return to the bad old days of the 1990s when reporters were attacked and murdered and the perpetrators went unpunished.”

Ukraine’s friends and backers must continue to highlight all of the attacks, harassment, and violence its journalists face.

Journalists in Ukraine are counting on the West to draw attention to the uptick in violence. "I realized that journalists' best protection is maximum publicity, information support from colleagues from other media in covering the case, rather than law enforcement," Berdynskykh has written.

“If Ukraine's leaders are serious about press freedom, they will move quickly to solve this case and bring to justice those responsible for silencing Sheremet's powerful journalistic voice,” wrote Ann Cooper, former executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists. She’s right. Ukraine must move quickly for Sheremet’s sake, and for the sake of his courageous colleagues.

Keeping Bankers’ Hours, European Observers Miss Most of Ukraine War By Andrew Kramer New York Times, July 27, 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/europe/ukraine-war-osce-observers.html?_r=0

As the afternoon shadows grow long, nocturnal creatures begin to stir. A stray cat rises from a nap, stretches and trots off to hunt. Overhead, swallows swoop and screech in the deepening twilight.

Soon, the human inhabitants of this town in eastern Ukraine set about their evening rituals.

Green-clad soldiers strap on their helmets and load their guns, while -clad European cease-fire observers pocket their notebooks, climb into their cars and drive away. And then the fighting starts.

This improbable routine between soldiers and monitors with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe plays out nightly, illustrating the glum quagmire of the Ukraine war, now entering its third year.

“I never see them here at night,” said Tatyana Petrova, whose apartment looks over a parking lot that is a frequent listening post for the monitors. “In the evening, I look out and they are gone, and then the concert starts.”

Avdiivka, a warren of back streets eerily overgrown with years of untended vegetation, is the most troubled flash point along the so-called line of control separating Russian-backed separatists from the Ukrainian Army.

The unarmed monitors, mostly European diplomats seconded to the mission, are empowered to listen for cease-fire violations, escort humanitarian aid and negotiate local truces. But they patrol only during the daytime.

This adherence to bankers’ hours and other signs of weakness in their mandate are doing little to help end the only active war in Europe, at a time when the Continent’s security is already unraveling from terrorism and tensions over migration.

Typically, the O.S.C.E. reports from dozens to hundreds of cease-fire violations daily. The Ukrainian Army reports several deaths per week, commensurate with the casualties of the United States Army during the Iraq war. The United Nations says nearly 10,000 people have died in eastern Ukraine since March 2014.

Out on patrols, whenever military commanders on either side object to their presence, the monitors turn and leave, no questions asked. During one recent patrol I accompanied, a Ukrainian military nurse shooed monitors away.

The mission now has about 100 budgeted yet unfilled positions, partly because European public employees are loath to interrupt long summer vacations. It is a seasonal dip, O.S.C.E. officials say, caused by member governments struggling to recruit for summertime rotations.

Emblematic of the group’s weak hand, one key mission of observers stationed at two crossing posts on the Russian-Ukrainian border has conceded to Russian pressure not to use binoculars, lest the observers observe too much.

Britain’s ambassador to the Vienna-based security organization, Sian MacLeod, quipped on about that concession, “What’s to hide?”

In March, Russia’s continued refusal to permit the use of binoculars at these sites attracted harsh criticism from the American mission’s chargé d’affaires, Kate Byrnes. In response, Russia’s ambassador, Aleksandr K. Lukashevich, said that “the possibility of using binoculars was being considered.”

And yet in June, the matter was still unresolved, with the European Union issuing a statement condemning Russia for obstructionism in “small measures, such as the use of binoculars.” No progress has been made, largely because the 57-nation group, which includes Ukraine and Russia, makes decisions by consensus.

The group’s mandate is limited to peace monitoring, not peacekeeping — an important distinction. The teams driving along potholed roads in armored, white Toyota Land Cruisers are not supposed to become human shields separating combatants, but rather to remain close enough to observe the fighting.

“Becoming the buffer, or the shield, is not our role and would exceed our mandate,” Alexander Hug, the Swiss diplomat who leads the on-the-ground monitoring as deputy chief of the mission, said in an interview. The mission has about 600 observers deployed along the front line, he said.

Mr. Hug said instances of the pro-Russian side blocking access for observers had doubled over one weeklong reporting period this month, leaving the mission little recourse but to report the obstructions.

To be sure, individual monitors undertake grave risks for an unambiguously noble goal of ensuring an impartial, third-party presence along the front, discouraging flare-ups and saving civilian lives.

The O.S.C.E. has opened “forward patrol bases” in hotels in small towns more stable than this one, and leaves video cameras rolling at night. And it recently received mobile homes paid for by Switzerland, painted and white, so monitors could spend the night in more remote locations.

But the organization is still struggling to adapt to the circadian rhythm of a war fought mostly at night. Its absence after dark is a striking feature of the Ukraine conflict.

“We call them deaf, dumb and blind,” said the Ukrainian military nurse who ordered the observers out of her field hospital. She offered only her nickname, Romashka, a typical practice for soldiers here. “They know nothing. They see nothing. They are too soft.”

On a recent afternoon in Avdiivka, whose prewar population of 35,000 people has decreased by about half, monitors wrapped up at the close of business at 5 p.m., as usual. By and large confined to their hotels after dark, monitors say they pass the time watching television, surfing the internet or chatting with colleagues. They can listen for violations from inside the hotels.

The sun set through a beautiful layer of pink, horsetail clouds and then it was officially night. A distant shot rang out. High above, a rebel spotter drone buzzed past. Today’s Headlines: European Morning

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To cover the increase in violence after observers left, I awaited the onset of the nightly fighting in a trench on the town’s edge, overlooking a reedy swamp that acts as a buffer zone. Soldiers of the 58th Brigade waited, smoking. The metallic zing of a bullet flew past overhead.

Soon enough, shooting erupted all around, with bullets fired from the pro-Russian line smacking into the abandoned country houses where the Ukrainian conscripts sleep during the day. A .50-caliber machine gun answered. Soldiers ran about, crouching for cover.

Pvt. Denis Krylov ran for the trench wearing just the striped military undershirt he had been sleeping in during the day.

“You arrived for the start of the disco,” Sgt. Ruslan Pilipenko, the commander of this position, said of the nighttime fighting.

“Everybody is fed up with this war,” Private Krylov said. “People want to go on with their lives.” He told me ruefully he had left his meal, a bowl of borscht, unfinished in the house that was hit.

The shooting escalated until around 9 p.m., when heavy artillery that neither side is supposed to deploy opened up somewhere in the Ukrainian rear, firing toward rebel positions with distant booms.

Ambulances streaked through the streets, carrying the wounded. The fighting, soldiers said, followed the typical nighttime rhythm, even if it seemed more intense than usual.

That evening, three Ukrainian soldiers died and 16 were wounded along the line of control.

The scars of Ukraine's war in Mariupol Deutche Welle, July 28, 2016 http://www.dw.com/en/the-scars-of-ukraines-war-in-mariupol/a-19430738

The war has moved into the suburbs of Mariupol: It sleeps during the day, and rages at night. The demarcation line dividing the separatists from areas more or less controlled by the Ukrainian government is about six kilometers (3.7 miles) outside the city limits.

The war in Donbass has left its mark on the port city. The former police headquarters is covered by a tarp. It hides the fact that the building can no longer be used because so many of its offices have been burnt out.

"Mariupol is Ukraine," is written across the tarp in four languages - Ukrainian, Russian, English and Greek. Mariupol is an ancient Greek commercial settlement, a polis, in which some 20,000 Greeks still live today. The police headquarters was occupied by separatists in the spring of 2014; then fighters from the Ukrainian "Azov" volunteer battalion drove them out.

Yet normalcy did not return with the liberation of Mariupol. Evenings, the city seems strangely deserted, despite high summer temperatures, there are very few people moving about. Only a few motorcyclists hang out in front of a bakery near the city theater - which only advertises Russian-language plays. Taxis drive past, but they pay no attention to the few tourists that attempt to hail them.

The streets of Mariupol are empty - most people are staying home

"You have to call the taxi dispatch office," advises a motorcyclist. No one stops here anymore, for security reasons. And the dispatch centers will only accept orders when callers give a specific destination. Also for security reasons. Attacks and kidnappings have been on the rise in Mariupol lately.

Nevertheless, many people have fled to the city - Mariupol's population has grown by roughly 100,000 residents since the war began. According to the Ukrainian government, some 1.8 million people in the country are now inland refugees. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates the number to be around one million. Numbers are imprecise because many residents have not registered as refugees. Others have registered despite the fact that they are not on the run, but rather have remained in areas controlled by the separatists. In order to receive their Ukrainian retirement payments they must prove that they reside in non-occupied areas.

Those who have to make the arduous journey across the demarcation line each month are happy to pick up the supplementary inland refugee payment. And that is having consequences for the Ukrainian welfare state and the people that live here. Yelyzaveta Levchenko and her family are officially registered as inland refugees. After fleeing Luhansk in the summer of 2014, the mother of four and her husband have been living in a suburb of Mariupol.

Lots of uncertainty - but no money

Ukraine pays her and her family 70 euros ($77) in child benefits and about 90 euros special assistance for inland refugees each month. The family of six cannot live on this 160-euro payment, especially since neither parent is currently employed. And now even this money has stopped - the government has been unable to hand out the payments since May.

That is a catastrophe for Yelyzaveta, who says "pension tourism" from the occupied areas is the reason for the impasse."The state has no idea how to continue dealing with the inland refugee problem," she told DW.

At least the city itself has come up with a few ideas, and with the help of the UN it is connecting organizations that care for refugees.

But much more has to be done in the meantime says Pablo Mateu, director of the UNHCR in Ukraine. "We can repair their houses, but if there aren't any jobs people will not return to their villages. That is exactly where economic and development programs must be directed."

'City of Solidarity'

But such programs cost money - money that the Ukrainian government will not be able to raise for some time. The societal consequences of the war and the repair of infrastructure in the Donbass will continue to be a challenge for the national budget for generations.

First, tiny steps will have to do, even those that are merely symbolic. Mariupol, which, thanks to the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has been able to master the flow of inland refugees surprisingly well, bears the title "City of Solidarity" - the UN has designated it as such for its generous reception of inland refugees.

The Deputy Minister for the temporarily occupied territories, George Tuka, hopes that the honorary title will serve as an example for others. "Ukrainian society should show solidarity with Mariupol, now home to more than half a million people and where shots are being fired every day."

Donald Trump's Crimean Gambit By Krishnadev Calamur Atlantic, July 27, 2016 http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/trump-crimea/493280/

Donald Trump’s call on Russia to hack Hillary Clinton’s emails Wednesday resulted in widespread criticism. But his comments on , coupled with ones he made last week on NATO, are likely to have greater significance if he is elected president in November.

The question came from Mareike Aden, a German reporter, who asked him whether a President Trump would recognize Crimea as Russian and lift sanctions on Moscow imposed after its 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian territory. The candidate’s reply: “Yes. We would be looking at that.”

That response is likely to spread much cheer through Russia—already buoyant about the prospect of a Trump victory in November. But it could spread at least an equal amount of dread in the former Soviet republics. In a matter of two weeks, the man who could become the next American president has not only questioned the utility of NATO, thereby repudiating the post-World War II security consensus, he also has seemingly removed whatever fig leaf of protection from Russia the U.S. offered the post-Soviet republics and Moscow’s former allies in the Eastern bloc.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave Crimea, a region that had been part of Russia for centuries, to Ukraine in 1954—though, to be fair, Khrushchev probably didn’t foresee that the Soviet Union would be the stuff of history books less than four decades later. Russia maintained close links to Crimea even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It helped that of all the Soviet republics, save Belarus, Ukraine maintained the most pro-Moscow positions until 2014. More than half of Crimea’s 2 million people were Russian; Russia maintained a naval base in the region; and Russians retired in Crimea in large numbers. But when Ukraine’s pro-Moscow president, , was ousted, the tensions over Crimea became apparent.

In 2014, pro-Russian gunmen took over government buildings in Simferopol, Crimea’s capital, and held a referendum in May of that year in which an overwhelming majority of voters said they wanted to rejoin Russia. The West reacted with anger and imposed a string of sanctions on Russia—sanctions that even Putin acknowledged adversely affected Russia’s economy, which was already hurt by falling oil prices. Last year, on the anniversary of Russia’s annexation, the U.S. State Department said: “We do not, nor will we, recognize Russia’s attempted annexation and call on President Putin to end his country’s occupation of Crimea.”

Trump, as president, may reverse that policy, and if he does Ukraine won’t be the only country that worries. Another is likely to be Georgia, the former Soviet republic. A brief war with Russia—brief in that Georgia was crushed—in 2008 resulted in Russia extending support to two breakaway Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and wielding its influence with the rebels there. Russia’s recent military exercises, as well as its statements, have also worried Eastern European states such as Poland and the Baltic nations that share a border with it.

Until recently, many of them could have counted on NATO’s support, but Trump last week made military support conditional on whether those countries had paid their financial dues to the alliance—a marked departure from the security policy of every presidential nominee from either of the two major parties since NATO’s founding in 1949. As I pointed out at the time, “If Trump is elected in November and is true to his pledge, then few of NATO’s 28 members will qualify for U.S. support in the event of a war. Only the U.S., Greece, the U.K., Estonia, and Poland meet NATO’s guideline that defense spending constitute 2 percent of GDP.”

Now, with his comments on Crimea, Trump has given the foreign-policy establishment in the U.S. and Europe even more to consider before November.

Why Putin’s DNC Hack Will Backfire By Mark Galeotti Foreign Policy, July 26, 2016 http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/26/why-putins-dnc-hack-will-backfire-putin-clinton-trump/

The hack of the Democratic National Committee’s email servers and the subsequent leak of embarrassing internal documents appear almost certainly to have been carried out by Russian intelligence agencies, making it the most serious case yet of Kremlin interference in U.S. politics.

That it is a serious interference is clear. The confirmation — long suspected by many in the Bernie Sanders camp — that at least some DNC officials were on Team Hillary over the course of the Democratic primary has divided the party on the verge of its nominating convention and alienated Sanders’s base. If it hasn’t convinced them to back Donald Trump, it’s at least given them second thoughts about voting for Clinton.

The move has also helped cement Russian President Vladimir Putin in the minds of many U.S. observers as not only a strategic mastermind, but also the Trump campaign’s secret weapon. Clinton, the thinking goes, is regarded in Moscow as a classic, hawkish “Russophobe.” (Putin even blamed her for instigating the protests against his alleged rigging of elections in 2011.) Whereas Trump — with his focus on business, his apparent willingness to put realpolitik over moral considerations, his admiration for Putin, and his disdain for institutions like NATO — has thoroughly won over the Kremlin, even spurring some to refer to him as Putin’s “de facto agent.”

With the DNC hack, according to this version of the story, Putin was just throwing a bone to his (soon-to-be) man in Washington.

It’s a good story — and many elements of it are true. There is much for the Kremlin to enjoy in sitting back and watching Trump’s continued, seemingly unstoppable rise to power.

But it’s also a little too tidy. Plenty of Russian foreign-policy insiders also appreciate that Trump’s volatility — currently wreaking havoc in U.S. presidential politics — could mean he’d make for an unpredictable and potentially problematic interlocutor for Moscow, too. As one told me, “Trump is good for Russia so long as he’s in America. God knows what would happen if he were in the U.N. or the Situation Room.”

In addition, when subjected to scrutiny, the Kremlin’s track record when it comes to staging interventions in foreign democracies doesn’t exactly scream “mastermind” so much as “bumbling meddler.” Russia is notoriously inept when it comes to predicting how the aftereffects of its interventions will play out; the chance that the DNC hack will backfire, as other attempts to interfere have in the past, is very real.

It’s worth keeping in mind that what the Kremlin really wants is not so much a Trump victory as a United States that is less united and less able to play a powerful global role. Thus, although the DNC hack may wind up helping out the Republican nominee, that may not have been its primary aim. Rather, the simple goal was likely generalized chaos.

A leitmotif of Russian political and information operations in Europe, including so-called “active measures” — that is, those, like the hack, carried out by the intelligence services — has been to spread division and disarray. Having realized it is unlikely to make any real or lasting friends, Moscow has instead turned its efforts into paralyzing and demoralizing its enemies. From secessionist movements to anti-globalization radicals, from ecological activists to social conservatives, every potentially divisive force is worth an approving interview on the government-funded television network RT or an invitation to a glitzy conference in Moscow. In more extreme cases, the Kremlin’s support may extend to open or covert funding.

There have been some such efforts in the United States, from support for the “Occupy” movement (ironic, for a government run by kleptocrats and embezzling .01 percenters) to more surreal efforts to back Texas secessionists.

However, with the DNC breach, Russia has distinctly upped its disarray game. The hack looks likely to make the U.S. presidential election even more of a mudslinging contest. Clinton has already begun charging that Trump is “Putin’s man”; this seems likely to push Republicans toward questioning Clinton’s honesty and patriotism all the more shrilly. The Trump camp, meanwhile, now revels in the confirmation that the Democratic primary actually appears to have been “rigged” in favor of Clinton — as they’ve been claiming all along. Even if Clinton becomes president, she’ll start with a reputation that is that much more problematic as a result of the leaks and a base that is that much more divided. Would such a White House be able to take bold steps to deter or resist Russian adventurism?

Finally, there is also the wider propaganda dimension to leaks that show a DNC leadership actively maneuvering to support “their” chosen candidate. One of the key aims of the Kremlin’s propaganda in general is not so much to convince people that the Russian government is in the right, but to persuade them that everyone else’s government is just as bad. Moscow must hope it can use this scandal and the ensuing fallout to convey the message that the Washington political elite are hypocrites and that U.S. democracy is every bit as “managed” as Russia’s.

So far, so good. But the Kremlin’s professional meddlers shouldn’t pat themselves on the back just yet.

Historically, Russia has proved much better at making mischief than at channeling it toward its own ends.

Time and again, Putin has failed to appreciate the innate strengths and checks and balances of democratic societies and even the basic notions of how these countries work. Putin tends to assume, for example, that the people in democratic societies are easy to scare and easier to fool. In January, for example, pro-Moscow media outlets and social media tried their best to whip up ethnic tensions in Germany over the alleged rape by “Arab-looking” men of 13-year-old “Lisa F.,” a Russian-German girl from Berlin — at a time when anxieties over the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq into Germany were running high. Russia’s main TV channel showed Lisa saying that she had been raped by “southern-looking” men; another report claimed that in Germany “residents are regularly raped by refugees.” It soon became clear that this was a false story: Lisa F. was simply seeking to hide activities from her parents. But Russian media and officials did not back down, accusing German authorities of trying to conceal what happened to her out of political correctness. Not only did this personally anger Chancellor Angela Merkel, but it also embarrassed the so-called “,” or “Putin Understanders,” in Berlin, who seek to advocate for better relations with Moscow.

The Kremlin has also made efforts to cow the Baltic states with an array of tools. Some have been heavy- handed: Moscow threatened military repercussions, for instance — up to and including the use of nuclear force — if any of the Baltics invited NATO troops onto their soil. And two days after U.S. President Barack Obama visited Tallinn to show solidarity, an Estonian security officer was kidnapped across the border by Russian commandos. That’s not exactly subtle. At the same time, Moscow has also backed Russian-speaking political parties in the region and engaged in other, more understated forms of manipulation. None of it has worked. It has only made the Baltics more alarmed about their eastern neighbor and more insistent about the need for allied protection. NATO battalions are now being deployed in every country in the region.

But perhaps most striking of all were Moscow’s efforts to create a pro-Russian insurrection in the Donbass in 2014 with money, men, and military support, based on the assumption that the Ukrainian government would quickly buckle and accept Russian suzerainty. Not only did Putin not anticipate the popular enthusiasm that saw volunteers rushing to do what the Ukrainian army could not; he also didn’t realize the dynamics were such that even if Kiev wanted to make a deal, it wouldn’t be able to. It could never survive the public backlash. Moscow’s efforts to keep Ukraine in its own backyard have since led to it being stuck in a war and slapped with economic sanctions.

The Kremlin’s efforts to influence the U.S. election and sow divisions may, in the short term, make a bad- tempered election year even more divisive. But moves like the DNC hack could well wind up hurting Trump if the label of “Putin’s man” can be made to stick. And, if so, that may cause the next White House to regard Putin’s government as even more of a danger than the present one already does and ensure that the sanctions regime will not only stay in place, but even be expanded.

Or Moscow might succeed in what many seem to believe is its aim: helping Trump all the way to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. In that case, Putin, the geopolitical gambler who has relied on being able to break the rules with impunity and on the restraint of the West, might suddenly find himself dealing with an American president every bit as willing to bluff and operate beyond the traditional limits — and with the economic, political, and military muscle of the world’s leading power behind him. Maybe the Kremlin ought to be careful what it wishes for.

Putin Reshuffles Regional Leaders Ahead Of Vote; Russian Customs Chief Out By Tom Balmforth RFE/RL, July 28, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-putin-reshuffle-balyaninov-zurabov/27886343.html

Russian President Vladimir Putin has abruptly reshuffled several regional leaders and dismissed the ambassador to Ukraine in a substantial shake-up that also included the removal of the country's longtime customs chief.

Putin replaced four governors and appointed new presidential envoys to three of Russia's sprawling "federal districts," drawing heavily on former top security-services personnel in what analysts saw as a continuation of a push to tighten his grip on power since he returned to the Kremlin in 2012.

Prime Minister accepted the resignation of Federal Customs Service chief Andrei Belyaninov, a former KGB officer who served alongside Putin in 1980s East Germany and fell under the spotlight when his home was searched as part of a corruption probe on July 26.

Belyaninov was named as a witness in an investigation into the smuggling of high-end alcohol, but photographs of his opulent residence featuring bundles of cash laid out in piles had been leaked to local media, prompting speculation of his imminent dismissal or arrest.

The official is seen by analysts as a casualty of intensifying rivalry between government agencies -- particularly those that oversee lucrative business -- as they battle for control of shrinking resources amid Russia's longest recession in decades.

Putin replaced the governors of Kirov Oblast, Oblast, Oblast, and Sevastopol, a naval port city in Russian-annexed Crimea, and appointed new presidential envoys in the Northwestern, , and Siberian federal districts.

Putin formally dismissed , the jailed of Kirov Oblast, citing a "loss of trust." Belykh, once a liberal opposition leader of the Union of Rightist Forces party, was arrested in June for allegedly taking a bribe -- allegations he vehemently denies and has protested by going on a hunger strike.

Putin also abolished the Crimean federal district and folded the peninsula, which Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014, into the Southern Federal District under the helm of powerful presidential envoy and former Justice Minister Vladimir Ustinov.

And he fired Mikhail Zurabov, Russia's ambassador to Kyiv since January 2010 -- a ruinous period for mutual relations in which a Moscow-backed Ukrainian president was pushed out by pro-Western protesters. Russia responded by taking over Crimea and backing separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Several Russian media outlets called the shake-up the "largest in years," while Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, described it as a "normal rotation."

Election Planning

As the stream of appointments and dismissals emerged one-by-one in terse statements on the Kremlin website, photographs began to circulate of a casual, outdoor breakfast meeting Putin held with workers in a field in Oblast on July 28 -- images that appeared aimed to show that Putin was in control, conducting business as usual and taking care of ordinary Russians.

The reshuffle came ahead of September parliamentary elections that will set the stage for a 2018 presidential vote in which Putin -- in power as president or prime minister since 2000 -- could seek a new six-year term.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Russian Service, Vladimir Milov, an opposition politician and former deputy energy minister, linked the reshuffle directly to the upcoming vote, saying Putin replaced governors in regions where the ruling United Russia party is polling particularly badly.

Sergei Toropov was appointed interim ambassador in Ukraine. Peskov told journalists that Zurabov's successor would be chosen soon and said the reason for his dismissal was that Zurabov had served an unusually long term as ambassador -- seven years.

Moscow-based analyst Nikolai Petrov, however, said the move could indicate an intention to change policy toward Ukraine. "If there is to be a shift in relations with Ukraine, it is pretty logical to start by replacing the guy who was responsible for [implementing] the politics of the previous stage," he said.

Writing on Twitter, Kremlin opponent Aleksei Navalny criticized the series of appointments, noting the prevalence of high-ranking former members of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior Ministry.

Medvedev appointed Vladimir Bulavin, who holds a colonel general's rank in the FSB and until now was Putin's representative in the Northwestern Federal District, to head the Federal Customs Service. Putin appointed Yevgeny Zinichev, the head of the FSB branch in the western exclave of Kaliningrad, to be its governor. And Dmitry Mironov, a lieutenant general in the Interior Ministry, was named governor of Yaroslavl Oblast.

Peskov defended this trend, saying: "This was specifically a personal decision of the head of state. In this way, he has shown his faith, and, in the opinion of the head of state, it is precisely these people who have the required potential to continue to develop these regions."

Petrov had a different explanation, suggesting that Putin must pick from a shrinking circle of candidates for top posts because his top-down rule has not produced a vibrant field of talented politicians and administrators.

"When you don't have public politics, you are very limited looking for possible candidates to appoint," he said.

Plan to Settle Two Million Central Asians in Russian Far East Triggers Anger There By Paul Goble Window on Eurasia, July 27, 2016 http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/07/plan-to-settle-two-million-central.html

The Russian Ministry for the Development of the Far East says that it is preparing to announce before the end of 2016 a new demographic policy for that region over the next 15 years, one designed to boost the current population of that Chinese border area from six million to eight million.

Igor Romanov, the editor of the Beregrus portal, says that “it is obvious” on the basis of the documents that have been released so far that the ministry intends to meet this target primarily by bringing in immigrants from Central Asia, a development that he and others in the region very much oppose (beregrus.ru/?p=7470).

He says that experts have subjected such ideas to “the harshest criticism” but that the government continues to believe that moving cheap labor resources to the region, which will supposedly “solve” the needs of the raw materials extraction industry there is the best way to proceed.

What Moscow should be worried about but isn’t, Romanov says, is the quality of life of the people who live in the Russian Far East rather than their number. Life in the region has been rapidly “degrading in all relations but above all moral, educational and cultural,” and the introduction of Central Asian gastarbeiters will only make the situation worse.

By inviting them to come to the Russian Far East, he continues, “we will not in any way compensate for our democratic losses but simply ensure the replacement of the current population with another. Instead of the Russians who remain here will come other people, bearers of an alien culture, the so-called ‘new Russians’ [‘rossiyane’].

“The Far East is a strategic region. Here are resources; here is the outlet to the Pacific. And here are needed not alien migrants but powerful, state-thinking leaders, people capable of reviving a deteriorating society and reviving truly Russian statehood.” That doesn’t take a lot of people but rather the right kind, Romanov says.

“The life of Russia itself depends on the fate of the Far East,” he continues, and “here normal [ethnic] Russian people must life, to strengthen Russia and its access to the Pacific by their presence.” And the Beregrus editor then concludes with words that may worry some in the Russian capital.

“Two years ago,” he writes, “many volunteers went to the Donbass. Today, it is necessary for them to move to the Far East.” What is at stake, Romanov argues, is nothing less than “the preservation of Russia and its territorial integrity.”

Russia, Syria Forces Accused Of Extensive Use Of Cluster Bombs RFE/RL, July 28, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-syria-hrw-cluster-bombs/27886171.html

Russian and Syrian forces have renewed their use of widely banned cluster bombs against civilians and rebels in northern Syria, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on July 28.

The rights watchdog said in a report that it documented 47 instances in which cluster munitions were extensively used in attacks by pro-government forces across northern Syria in the past two months.

The attacks have killed and wounded dozens of civilians, the report said.

"Since Russia and Syria have renewed their joint air operations, we have seen a relentless use of cluster munitions," Ole Solvang, HRW's deputy emergencies director, said.

Cluster bombs, which explode in the air, release hundreds of tiny bomblets, posing a long-lasting danger to civilians. Cluster munitions are fired in rockets or dropped from the air.

Some 100 countries have signed a 2008 UN treaty prohibiting the use of cluster munitions.

The report said that, although Russia and Syria are not signatories to the treaty, "they are still bound by international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks."

Russia has in the past denied using cluster munitions in Syria.

'Humanitarian Corridors' In Aleppo

Meanwhile, Moscow says the Russian and Syrian governments are opening humanitarian corridors for civilians to leave the battered city of Aleppo in northern Syria. It also offered a passage for fighters, who wanted to lay down their arms.

The announcement by Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu came as Syrian government forces tightened their control around the rebel-held areas of Aleppo, where some 250,000 civilians are believed to be trapped.

Shoigu said on July 28 that President Vladimir Putin has a "large-scale humanitarian operation" that will be launched outside Aleppo to "help civilians who were taken hostage by terrorists as well as fighters who wanted to lay down arms."

Shoigu mentioned three humanitarian corridors as well as food and first aid points outside the city.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that helicopters have dropped leaflets with maps showing the routes.

In Damascus, President Bashar Assad offered an amnesty to rebels who lay down their weapons and surrender to authorities over the next three months, Syrian state media reported.

The amnesty offer, issued on July 28, also urged rebel groups to free their detainees.

Between Victory and Betrayal: How to Move Ukraine’s Anticorruption Reforms Forward Carnegie Endowment, July 26, 2016 http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/26/between-victory-and-betrayal-how-to-move-ukraine-s- anticorruption-reforms-forward-pub-64180

As part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s ongoingUkraine Reform Monitor project, a team of experts from VoxUkraine, the Reanimation Package of Reforms, Pact, and other civil society organizations convened a workshop in Kyiv to discuss anticorruption reforms. A follow-up workshop was organized in Washington, DC. Both discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule. The following reflects the conclusions drawn by the team. SUMMARY  Average Ukrainians are, if anything, more frustrated with state corruption than they were before the Maidan. Corruption is on more citizens’ radars, and the lack of tangible progress on major corruption cases is a source of popular disenchantment with the post-Maidan leadership. While more Ukrainian officials are now willing to talk frankly about corruption, average citizens readily perceive the disconnect between this high-minded talk and inaction by law enforcement agencies.1  The high degree of polarization in Ukrainian politics reinforces foreign and domestic perceptions that the state is hopelessly corrupt. A key potential remedy supported by Ukrainians, according to polls, is for reformers to ensure the continued infusion of new blood into state institutions. Such moves may help reduce the level of polarization and improve the country’s political culture—or better yet, create a new culture altogether.  While existing anticorruption legislation and institutions benefit from an impressive conceptual framework, state authorities simply lack the political will to confer upon these institutions the authority and budgetary capacity that would make them effective. Government institutions tasked with implementing anticorruption policies are either too weak or too incompetent to succeed. As a result, the reform process has been overshadowed by a lack of accountability, over-regulation, ineffective laws, and poor implementation.  To date, Ukraine’s reformers have failed to communicate their goals and methods effectively to the public, and populist politicians have taken advantage of the resulting information vacuum. As a consequence, public trust in the government remains low. In a recent survey, 70 percent of respondents said that they did not trust the new government.  The lack of trust in the Rada and other government institutions further weakens the reform effort. While civil society has played a key role in pushing for change, some of its representatives have also contributed to increased polarization by using inflammatory rhetoric and unsupported accusations of corruption.  Many forms of corruption and rent-seeking could, in theory, be mitigated through privatization. However, in the absence of meaningful judiciary reform, a new round of privatization is likely to play directly into the hands of existing patronage networks and reinforce the sense of impunity among the beneficiaries of corrupt schemes and shadowy practices.