Feature Article Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China: Examining Large-Scale Unrest in Dongyang, Zhejiang

feature article Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China: Examining Large-Scale Unrest in Dongyang, Zhejiang

By Ma Tianjie

China is witnessing an alarmingly rapid increase in social unrest linked to pollution, especially in rural areas. Although pollution-catalyzed group petitions, protests and even violent riots are so widespread and severe, officials have dubbed them the euphemistic term “environmental mass incidents.” Examination of a specific environmental mass incident that occurred in Zhejiang Province in 2005, along with reports and studies of other pollution- related mass incidents in China, highlight some of the drivers behind this rising unrest. Notably, not all serious pollution problems lead to violent protests, but the recipe for unrest is often cases in which an “entrepreneurial” local government allows heavy pollution to occur and shuts down any effective grievance relief channels. China’s central government is increasingly viewing environmental mass incidents as a security threat, which is a mindset that closes off opportunities for dialogue, transparency, and institutional reforms, which could lessen tensions and potentially prevent major conflicts over pollution from erupting.

the emergence of environmental Digging Behind Unclear Numbers mass incidents in rural china Determining the actual figure of environmental mass incidents through publicly available sources is chal- An alarming sign of China’s quickly deteriorating lenging. In his discussion of the 29 percent increase environmental situation is the rapidly increasing in 2005, Pan Yue did not reveal the actual number number of disputes, unrest and even riots linked of protests that year. Nevertheless, several indicators to—often long unresolved—pollution problems. used by different Chinese government agencies may Chinese government documents, news media re- reflect the scale of the problem. One indicator is the ports, and academic studies often refer to severe number of mass incidents in general. According to environmental conflicts involving large groups of Zhou Yongkang, minister of the Ministry of Public people as “environmental mass incidents” (huanjing Security, between 1994 and 2004 the number of mass qunti xing shijian). (See Box 1 on official defini- incidents (protests involving 100 persons or more) tions of this term). High-level environmental of- in China increased from about 10,000 a year to 74, ficials, such as deputy minister of the Ministry of 000 (French, 2005). Chinese public security sources Environmental Protection (MEP) Pan Yue, have on in the mid-2000s estimated that among these mass different occasions highlighted the emerging crisis incidents about 30 percent are related to unemploy- of pollution protests. According to Pan, in 2005 ment, by far the largest source of social unrest in alone there was a 29 percent increase in environ- China. Another 27 percent of these incidents stems mental mass incidents from the year before (Wang, from issues related to land grabs, a particularly seri- 2006). The Chinese government and Communist ous source of social disturbance in rural China. The Party are concerned about these protests, and estimate for environmental mass incidents could then China’s leadership considers environmental protest be approximately 5,000 a year (based on the 74,000 one of the four major sources of social unrest in the figure in 2004), given that such incidents are one of country (Economy, 2004). the remaining major sources of social unrest.1

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 33 Box 1. “Environmental Mass Incidents” in Public Discourse

Mounting concerns over social unrest induced by environmental degradation are reflected in the emergence of the term “environmental mass incident” in the public discourse, including news reports, policy documents, and scholarly writings.1 Although the exact origin of this term is not clear, it is quite obvious that it derives from the more general term “mass incident” (quntixing shijian), which is a reflection of increasing social unrest in Chinese society in general. The vice president of the Central Party School (zhongyang dangxiao) wrote an important article in 2006, in which he defined a mass incident “the manifestation of the people’s increasingly confrontational and sharpened internal conflicts, [which are] serious social conflicts that affect, disturb and harm normal social order” (Wang, 2006). The phrase is given a more detailed definition in legal documents such as The Implementation Rules for the Anticipation and Handling of Mass Incidents in Shenzhen (shenzhenshi yufang he chuzhi quntixing shijian shishi banfa),2 which delineated eight forms of mass incidents:

1. Large-scale collective petition (shangfang);

2. llegal gatherings, protests and demonstrations involving large number of participants;

3. Illegal strikes;

4. Groups of people surrounding and sabotaging party, government and jurisdictional buildings and other important facilities;

5. Blockade of major transportation lines or illegal occupation of public places involving large numbers of people;

6. Collective obstruction of key national, provincial and municipal construction projects;

7. Group attack and/or abduction of civil servants; and,

8. Other activities that are induced by people’s internal conflicts that harm public orders.

In the same regulation, mass incidents are divided into four different levels according to the number of participants: Level I (5-30 people); Level II (30-300 people); Level III (300-1,000 people); and Level IV (more than 1,000 people).

34 China Environment Series 2008/2009 Another important indicator of conflicts caused Protection Administration (which was upgraded by environmental issues would be the statistics on to the Ministry of Environmental Protection in environmental complaints (huanjing xinfang), which March 2008) outlines the major environmental refer to complaints (by letter or in person) filed with health challenges faced by today’s rural communi- environmental bureaus all over the country. According ties in China.3 to the 2006 China Environmental Statistics Yearbook, the number of environmental letters and complaints 1. Poor Sanitation: Human and animal wastes are increased almost 70 percent from 369,712 cases in often released into the rural environment with- 2001 to 616,122 cases in 2006 (SEPA, 2006). The out any treatment. The 8 billion tons of sewage relationship between environmental complaints water and 120 million tons of daily wastes pro- and environmental mass incidents, however, is not duced annually in China’s rural areas that are not straightforward. Increasing complaints about air, properly treated are major sources of water con- water, and noise pollution could be indicators of tamination. The Ministry of Health reports that the growing number of mass incidents. Alternately, nearly 200 million rural Chinese drink water that the increase may also suggest that the complaint is making them sick (OECD, 2007). Moreover, system is working well and that people have confi- 60,000 Chinese citizens—nearly half of which dence knowing their voices are being heard. Thus, are rural children—die each year from diarrhea the complaint system could diffuse tensions and lead caused by contaminated water (OECD, 2007). to fewer cases of mass incidents. As Anna Brettell observed, Chinese authorities actually encourage en- 2. Accelerated Relocation of Pollution to Rural Areas: vironmental complaints and have standardized the With the nationwide restructuring of indus- complaint system as a way to prevent disputes and tries and stricter pollution enforcement in urban channel grievances, which contributes to the rise in areas, heavily polluting industries are moving complaints (Brettell, 2007). to the large number of “industrial zones” estab- Statistics on environmental disputes (huan- lished in rural areas. Weak enforcement of pol- ing jiufen) represent yet another source to tap into lution regulations in these zones has made these the environmental mass incident trend. According township and village enterprises major sources of to a MEP director, there was a significant rise in unchecked pollution. the number of environmental disputes from 51,000 in 2004 to 128,000 in 2005 (Lu, 2005 & 2006). 3. Soil Contamination from Agricultural Production: Although MEP statistics do not clearly define the The overuse of chemical fertilizers and pesticides term environmental dispute,2 it still serves as an has led to serious environmental consequences indirect indicator of increasing trends in conflicts including contaminated food, loss of biodiversity, caused by pollution in China. and decreased land productivity. Twelve million Although environmental unrest in urban centers tons of food crops are contaminated with heavy such as Xiamen often get wide attention in the do- metals from agricultural runoff every year. mestic and international press (see Box 2), China’s rural areas actually have seen more outbreaks of en- 4. Water shortages and water contamination: Less vironmental mass incidents (Dai, 2006). The gen- than 40 percent of China’s rural areas have ac- eral background of this discrepancy, according to cess to tap water. One hundred ninety million one government official, is the unbalanced develop- rural citizens drink water containing pollutants ment between urban and rural areas, the relocation well beyond government standards. News reports of urban pollution to the countryside, and the lack and anecdotal evidence collected by researchers of environmental infrastructure in rural areas—all and nongovernmental organizations indicate trends that make rural citizens particularly vulner- that cancer villages are a growing phenomenon able to pollution (Dai, 2006). in rural China, particularly in areas near polluted rivers (Gill & Lu, 2007). Environmental Health Challenges in Rural China Severe rural environmental degradation directly The 2006 National Rural Environmental Protection affects the livelihoods of farmers. The negative im- Action Plan (guojia nongcun xiaokang huanbao xing- pact is manifested in two ways: (1) the deteriorating dong jihua) released by the State Environmental quality of soil and water that affects basic agricul-

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 35 Box 2: An Urban Mass Protest Migrates to Rural Areas: Opposition to the Chemical (PX) Plant in Xiamen and Zhangzhou

Protest against the proposed construction of a press conferences and newspaper articles. But, chemical plant in Xiamen, a large coastal city in these efforts failed to alleviate the public’s suspi- southern China’s Fujian Province, was an environ- cions. Xiamen residents, especially property own- mental mass incident that caught wide interna- ers living near the proposed site, expressed seri- tional attention in 2007. The case is unusual in ous concern through numerous Internet forums. that it was a large-scale peaceful demonstration On June1, 2007, tens of thousands of people went in a big urban center that attracted high-level onto the streets in Xiamen to peacefully protest involvement of mainstream news media report- against the project. The demonstration was reporting. Moreover, the relatively “benign” interac- edly triggered by a widely sent text message that tions between the public and the government led asking people to “take a walk.”5 And private citi- to a tentative resolution applauded by many. The zens posted live videos of the peaceful protesters Xiamen case demonstrates how improved public on the Internet. participation serves as a pressure valve and pre- The official position on the project changed vents the upgrading of environmental conflicts. significantly after this large-scale environmen- However, the relocation of the chemical plant to tal mass incident. The Ministry of Environmental Zhangzhou resulted in violent conflict between Protection demanded a “planning environmen- local residents and the government, illustrat- tal impact assessment” (guihua huanping) for the ing the unresolved problem of environmentally whole city of Xiamen, which was later carried out vulnerable rural communities and the relative by a group of experts from the Chinese Academy institutional marginalization of rural residents in of Science who were convened by the municipal comparison with their urban counterparts. government. The assessment report was released The buildup to the environmental mass pro- to the public in December 2007. Two weeks later, test was unique in that it was catalyzed from the municipal government held a high-profile above. Specifically, during the March 2007 Chinese public hearing on the proposed construction, People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) for which the participants were randomly drawn meeting in Beijing, a chemistry professor at Xiamen from a pool of Xiamen residents who volunteered University led 105 CPPCC members in putting forth through a live TV show. At the hearing, 80 percent a proposal to discuss the then imminent construc- of participants opposed the project.6 Days after tion of a large chemical plant near a densely the public hearing, Chinese news media outlets populated area in Xiamen.3 The proposal, which reported that the Fujian provincial government made information public for the first time, listed decided to relocate the chemical project to Gulei the serious health concerns associated with the Peninsula in Zhangzhou, a less developed rural particular chemical product (paraxylene or “PX”) town to the west of Xiamen. But, provincial offi- and asked for the relocation of the project. After cials immediately refuted the claim.7 learning about the CPPCC proposal, high officials The rumor of a possible relocation to in the Xiamen municipal government reportedly Zhangzhou triggered unexpected turmoil in the held a meeting to “unify thinking” (tongyi sixiang) town. On February 29, 2008, thousands of people and recommended that subordinates ignore the living on Dongshan Island in Zhangzhou started CPPCC proposal.4 The municipal government also protests against plans to relocate the plant in their initiated a public relations campaign to communi- community, which turned into a violent clash with cate the economic benefits of the project through police.8 Unlike the Xiamen protest that received

36 China Environment Series 2008/2009 extensive media coverage, the Zhangzhou case …the relocation of was largely unreported within China. Although further details about this environmental mass the chemical plant to incident are largely missing, the undertone of Zhangzhou resulted in injustice is still discernible from the rare reports that did emerge.9 The sharp contrast between the violent conflict between two incidents triggered by the same project is illu- local residents and the minating. While the Xiamen environmental mass government, illustrating protest is being celebrated for the peacefulness, the “benign government/public interactions,” and the unresolved problem the relative media openness, the Zhangzhou case of environmentally that happened in a rural setting was haunted by violence, rumors, and media censorship. The inci- vulnerable rural dent brought into serious question the strategy communities and the of relocation as a solution to environmental mass incidents. While the relocation eased tension in relative institutional Xiamen, social tension was merely transferred to marginalization of a rural area. Rural communities that already face many other livelihood challenges are increas- rural residents in ingly feeling a sense of injustice in that they are comparison with their increasingly being viewed as pollution havens for urban counterparts.” companies unable to meet stricter urban environmental regulations.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 37 The Dongyang case tion of the Dongyang case helps highlight some of the institutional and social factors triggering major demonstrates that the social unrest around pollution in China’s rural areas. main drivers of unrest The Dongyang case demonstrates that the main drivers of unrest are “entrepreneurial” local govern- are ‘entrepreneurial’ ments that permit pollution to occur and the lack local governments that of effective grievance relief channels for citizens— permit pollution to such as the environmental complaint system, the courts, and the news media. Such channels could occur and the lack of go far to diffuse tensions and create necessary pres- effective grievance relief sure on local governments to enforce existing pollution control regulations. channels…” catalyzing conflict in dongyang

tural production, and (2) the health impacts that di- In April 2005, a large-scale environmental mass in- rectly threaten the lives of rural residents (Zhang & cident sparked by industrial pollution in a small vil- Gu, 2003). The growing cancer rate in rural areas of lage in Dongyang, Zhejiang Province, shocked the China (in the so-called cancer villages) is probably Chinese authorities, news media, and the general one of the most tragic consequences of pollution. public. The scale—involving thirty to forty thousand Official data suggests that between 1988 and 2000, villagers and thousands of armed police—was previ- cancer rates in rural populations increased 33.4 per- ously unseen in a pollution incident in China. It was cent. (Zhang & Gu, 2003). Even China’s Ministry referred to by some people as a “peasant uprising” of Health has begun to report on the growing pol- and by some media analysts as a “huge riot” (Phoenix lution and cancer links in urban and rural areas. Weekly, 2005). In her 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, When rural citizens try to speak out on the grow- Elizabeth Economy summarized the protest: ing environmental and health threats posed by pollution, they face many institutional obstacles that After trying for two years to get redress by weaken their ability to combat serious pollution. petitioning local, provincial, and even central Key institutional drivers of high pollution in China’s government officials for spoiled crops and rural areas include the mismanagement of public re- poisoned air, in the spring of 2005, 30,000- sources at a local government level, the tight alliance 40,000 villagers from Zhejiang Province between officials and local industries, and inadequate swarmed 13 chemical plants, broke win- investments in environmental protection infrastruc- dows and overturned buses, attacked gov- ture (Wang, 2006; Zhang & Gu, 2003). Despite the ernment officials, and torched police cars. promulgation of measures requiring government The government sent in 10,000 members of transparency vis-à-vis environmental information the People’s Armed Police in response. The and regulations mandating citizen involvement in plants were ordered to close down, and sev- environmental impact assessment (EIA) hearings, eral environmental activists who attempted rural citizens continue to face difficulties in access- to monitor the plants’ compliance with these ing information about government investments orders were later arrested. and industrial production. Moreover, EIA hearings are rarely done well, if at all, in rural areas. [Editor’s The Dongyang case is probably the most well Note: See special issue on public participation and EIAs documented environmental mass incident in that in CES 8]. These institutional challenges that leave it received extensive news coverage, governmental citizens disempowered create the context in which attention (as reflected in numerous reflective arti- environmental mass incidents in China’s rural areas cles written by government officials), and academic should be understood. scrutiny. This coverage is indeed unusual, as similar Environmental degradation is increasingly be- cases often get little official or academic attention. coming one of the key catalysts feeding the growing While these official and academic accounts help re- tension between the Chinese government and citi- veal how the conflict unfolded, this paper was not zenry, especially in the countryside. An examina- able to access first-hand information from those

38 China Environment Series 2008/2009 who were directly involved, which means some rest, for anger continued to grow over the massive important pieces of the story are inevitably miss- amount of untreated wastewater flowing into rivers ing. Moreover, the conclusions in this paper are also and poisoning the villagers’ crops. In July 2003, all drawn from only one case and thus merit testing by the rice grown in Xishan village was completed de- empirical evidence, if possible, in future studies. stroyed because of the herbicide produced in the industrial zone (“Pollution starts,” 2005). The damages Long-Term Opposition to local agriculture were so serious that farmers had Although two years of unsettled petitions seems to to buy more expensive vegetables from urban areas be sufficient time for citizen discontent to build and to feed their families. The villagers also suffered catalyze a violent protest, the events in Dongyang health problems from gases leaking from the facto- actually developed over an even longer period. The ries, which sometimes were so offensive that people real start of the conflict should actually be traced could not open their eyes (Phoenix Weekly, 2005). back to the establishment of a chemical industrial Under such conditions, the villagers continu- zone in 1999 near two villages of Huashui Town in ally used the official complaintxinfang ( ) channels Dongyang. As a key part of its developmental strat- to petition environmental protection bureaus in egy, the local government gave strong priority to the Dongyang, Jinhua (the municipality one level higher introduction of chemical companies into Dongyang, in the administrative hierarchy), Hangzhou (the promising attractive land use and energy use terms provincial capital), and Beijing. Once the villagers to investors. The chemical companies directly in- received a reply from the Zhejiang Environmental volved in the 2005 protest incident were located in Protection Bureau stating that some of the chemical an industrial zone called Zhuxi, which shares a river companies in the industrial zone “were violating the with two densely populated villages of more than rules,” however, the government did not shut down 12,000 people, one of them located a mere 1,000 these factories (Phoenix Weekly, 2005). The villagers meters from the industrial zone (“Pollution starts,” also sought help from the news media. In early 2005, 2005). By 2004, 13 chemical companies had moved Wang Zhongfa, a local villager, went to Beijing to into the area, producing products from herbicides find journalists who could write about the situation. to plastic products and generating a combined an- Phoenix Weekly (2005) reported that Wang also ac- nual revenue of approximately 200 million Yuan companied a journalist to interview one of the com- (~$25 million) (Hu, 2005). panies several days before the large-scale conflict. From the very beginning, the industrial zone met with resistance from the villagers. For example, in Expired Patience 2001, when the Dongnong Pesticide Company, the In March 2005, the conflict started to intensify major chemical company in the zone, first signed when villagers were turned away after trying to meet a land use contract with the Huaxi (which later the mayor on “Dongyang Mayor Reception Day.” changed its name to Huashui) government and Wu Frustrated, the villagers started to build bamboo village, Wang Wei, the party secretary of the village tents to blockade the road into the industrial zone. refused to sign his name. Instead, he investigated Elderly people from the village stayed to guard these the company and wrote a provocative article called, tents. On March 28, hundreds of local government “A Portrait of Dongnong,” in which he revealed that officials and police raided and burnt some of the the company was notorious for its pollution and tents, but villagers kept up the blockade. Three days had been driven out by several villages where it had later, the Dongyang government released a notifi- formerly been located. Wang printed 1,000 copies cation announcing all 13 factories in the industrial of this article and distributed them to citizens in zone would suspend production and make adjust- and around Wu village. The pamphlet led to vio- ments (tingchan zhengdun). Meanwhile, official lent incidents, in which one official was wounded warnings were also issued to deter “a small bunch and villagers destroyed some of the equipment in of ill-willed criminals” who “instigate the rabble one of the factories. Wang Wei, together with an- to harm the social order.” On April 6, an ultima- other 11 villagers, was later arrested and in 2002 tum was announced to those villagers who refused he was sentenced to three years in prison (Phoenix to leave the bamboo tents and Wang Zhongfa, a Weekly, 2005). leader who had gone to Beijing to petition and had The conflict between villagers and the industrial accompanied a journalist to the industrial zone, was zone, however, was not at all subdued by the ar- arrested (Phoenix Weekly, 2005).

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 39 Undeterred by the police raid and arrests, the exploring how pollution villagers continued with their blockade. Then in develops into unrest the early morning on April 10, the local government convened about 3,500 local police and gov- The Dongyang incident raises many questions, such as ernment employees who tried to remove the tents whether it represents an inevitable clash between in- by force—an act that unexpectedly provoked even dustrialization and environment in China or whether stronger resistance by the villagers. Twenty to thirty the uprising is more a result of mismanagement by thousand villagers were reported to have gathered political institutions. The intermediate factors leading and the situation finally turned violent, as described to the escalation of the conflict into major social un- by Economy. Although no one died, dozens were rest are central to understanding the protest. injured, several quite seriously. Strikingly, the local authorities failed to clear the blockade on April 10. Pondering the Drivers Many policemen and government employees were In order to better understand the rising number of reported to have fled the scene in the face of over- environmental mass incidents in rural China, it is whelming opposition from the villagers. necessary to put them into a larger analytical framework that reveals the political, social, and economic Initial Fallout processes behind them. In her book, The River Not surprisingly, this large-scale environmental mass Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s incident attracted high-level attention. Both the Future, Elizabeth Economy emphasized “the role of governor and party secretary of Zhejiang Province political institutions and politics in shaping a coun- issued orders for local officials to properly deal with try’s environmental and developmental pathway,” the issue.4 A team led by Ministry of Environmental (Economy 2004, 14) asserting that environmen- Protection officials and provincial environmental au- tal degradation is not simply a result of economic thorities investigated the industrial zone, which led development, globalization, or population growth. to the order for the major polluting companies, in- The emphasis on “political institutions and politics” cluding Dongnong Pesticide, to shut down or move is particularly important to the analysis of environ- out of the zone (“Pollution starts,” 2005). Only on mental mass incidents in China. To be sure, the in- May 20, after seeing the machinery from the facto- creasing environmental unrest in rural China does ries removed the week before, did the villagers finally represent the bitter truth that rapid industrializa- take down the tents.5 Later that year in December, tion comes at a high price. However, it is also true eight government officials, including the party sec- that not all environmental problems lead to violent retary and mayor of Dongyang, were punished as conflict in China. The growing unrest over pollu- being responsible for the April environmental mass tion indicates disturbing political problems under- incident (“Seriously punishing,” 2005). Most of them lying the “black rivers,” which are more a result of were removed from their original positions, but some local political reality than a “natural” consequence only received a “warning.” In contrast, eight villag- of industrialization. ers charged with harming social order were arrested Studies directly looking at environmental pro- (“Eight villagers,” 2006). tests or environmental mass incidents in China The incident also triggered another unexpected have revealed several different drivers of the in- development that offers insights into the level of creasing turmoil. A widely cited study on this issue, official sensitivity vis-à-vis this incident. A group Jing Jun’s “Environmental Protest in Rural China” of Zhejiang activists, after witnessing the unrest in analyzes in detail two environmental protest cases Dongyang, decided to establish an environmental in China—one water pollution protest spanned two nongovernmental organization (NGO) called Green decades in Dachuan Village, Gansu Province and Watch in Hangzhou to monitor pollution from in- another surrounding people in Gaoyang Township, dustrial enterprises in the province. The NGO or- Chongqing being relocated by the Three Gorges ganizers were not allowed to register under the pro- Dam ( Jing, 2003). Jing Jun’s conclusion empha- vincial bureau of civil affairs, the government agency sizes the changing state-society relationship and overseeing NGOs. Moreover, Zhejiang security of- the growing consciousness of community and indi- ficials arrested Tan Kai, the founder of Green Watch, vidual rights among ordinary citizens as the driving on dubious charges officially unrelated to the NGO forces of emerging environmental protests. More (Buckley & Turner, 2005). recent studies, such as Zhang (2007), attribute the

40 China Environment Series 2008/2009 rise in environmental mass incidents to specific po- tion) in a way that can reframe the issue to bring litical economic situations such as the state-corpo- broad support for policy change, which could pos- rate alliance at the local level. Zhang’s study is par- sibly prevent environmental conflicts from devel- ticularly critical of the role played by the local gov- oping into a political showdown (Mertha, 2008). ernment. He maintains that local officials—who are Notably, some Chinese NGOs have been using empowered by higher-level political patrons—form the news media to increase public awareness of close alliances with businesses on the local level. some unsavory local governments that permit pol- Protecting local industry is crucial for local officials luting industries or approve dams without required who are largely evaluated for promotions by their EIAs. One of the more striking examples of savvy ability to push economic growth. These alliances, NGO use of news media was when Chinese green further strengthened by the necessity to find al- groups joined with environmental journalists to ternative sources for tax revenues due to declining carry out a national campaign against planned revenues from the agricultural sector, has serious dams on the Nujiang—one of China’s last wild environmental consequences such as widespread rivers. Subsequent reporting created considerable negligence in EIAs and lax enforcement of pollu- public discussion on the Internet leading Premier tion control laws at the local level (Zhang, 2007). Wen Jiabao to halt the planning of the dams. The The structural changes induced by the post-1978 Chinese NGO Center for Legal Assistance for reforms have resulted in the “redrawing of the lead- Pollution Victims has notably been adept at noti- ership role in the local landscape” and local govern- fying the news media about class action pollution ments have changed from regulators to the advo- cases, which promotes transparency—a powerful cates (e.g., entrepreneurs) of their local enterprises tool that sometimes helps “encourage” local gov- ( Jahiel, 1997, 84-85). ernments and industries to cooperate in such cases Besides a growth-oriented local state that is (Ellis, 2007). Pollution victims who can fairly access ill-prepared to address environmental problems, courts are clearly less likely to protest in the streets. scholars also direct our attention to other social and political elements such as insufficient dispute set- The Alliance of Local Governments tlement mechanisms or grievance relief channels. and Dirty Industry The governance structure at the local level leads The Dongyang case provides us with an oppor- to environmental degradation in the first place and tunity to examine the arguments on drivers more “eventually fails to check the violence by not pro- closely. Ultimately, the Dongyang case illustrates viding civil means of dispute resolution” (Najam, how an “entrepreneurial” local government makes 2003, 66). Minxin Pei argues that the rising envi- the rural community especially vulnerable to en- ronmental protests in China are just one symptom vironmental damages, while insufficient grievance of a “failing state,” which is neither able to provide relief channels further exacerbate local government public goods such as environmental protection nor and citizen tensions that can then catalyze a major equipped or willing to settle disputes and relieve environmental mass incident. tensions within the society due to the lack of “pres- One key aspect of this case is the initial estab- sure valves” (Pei, 2002, 101). Among the so-called lishment of the Zhuxi Industrial Zone and the na- “pressure valves,” researchers have paid close atten- ture of some of companies inside the zone. Most of tion to the environmental complaint system, the the companies introduced to the Industrial Zone court, and the news media. were chemical companies producing products such Anna Brettell, in her study of China’s environ- as pesticides or fluorides. Dongnong Pesticide mental complaint system, pointed out that de- Company, which was the center of the controversy spite significant standardization and improvement surrounding the pamphlet circulated by Wang since the 1990s, the system still suffers from insuf- Wei in 2001, is not the only company with a no- ficient accountability from officials charged with torious pollution record. According to a reflective the responsibility to respond to the complaints at article written by a government official involved in the local level and the lack of high-level oversight the handling of the Dongyang case, among the 13 (Brettell, 2007). In his case studies of anti-dam companies, 11 had received some form of punish- protests, Andrew Mertha has noted the limited ment by the Dongyang Environmental Protection ability of the Chinese news media to cover conten- Bureau in 2004, and seven were companies re- tious environmental issues (such as dam construc- located from the urban part of Dongyang (Hu,

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 41 Box 3. Other Cases of Rural Environmental Mass Incidents in Zhejiang

Besides the Dongyang case, three other envi- After the incident, the ronmental mass incidents occurred in Zhejiang Province in 2004 and 2005.10 These cases are local environmental unique in that they were widely covered in gov- protection bureau ernment, news media and academic reports, but thousands more such incidents occurring in rural initiated daily pollution China take place without outside scrutiny. inspection, sampling and

The Ningbo Huaguang monitoring…conducted Stainless Steel Case an environmental assessment…and issued Because of serious dust emissions and noise problems, on November 21, 2004, a violent con- reports on how the flict broke out between villagers and the staff company needed to of Ningbo Huaguang Stainless Steel Company. More than 500 villagers were involved in a group address pollution….” fight with company staff, which led to the total suspension of the company’s production. The Ningbo government arrested 19 people (including some villagers) after the November conflict. destroyed. After the incident, the government It also initiated a cleanup campaign, inviting arrested and sentenced several villagers to jail. experts and villagers to make suggestions on possible improvements and having government The Xinchang Jingxin inspectors stationed in the company to super- Pharmaceutical Company Case vise the progress. On April 6, 2005, not con- vinced by the company’s improvements, more On July 4, 2005, a conflict broke out when villag- than 200 villagers staged a sit-in blockading the ers living near Xinchang Jingxin Pharmaceutical company from resuming production. Company asked the company for compensation because of serious odor problems and damages The Changxing Tianneng to rice crops. The initial conflict resulted in the Battery Case temporary suspension of production. But on July 15, believing the facility was resuming production On June 27, 2005, after high levels of lead were (the official explanation was that officials and com- detected in the blood of more than 200 chil- pany staff were checking some of the hazardous dren, hundreds of Changxing villagers broke substances stored in the facility), a few hundred into Tianneng Battery Company and demanded villagers tried to blockade the facility, which led the suspension of production. The conflict lasted into a violent confrontation with the police. More for five days and was only temporarily quieted than 10,000 villagers from nearby villages were by the local government, with several people drawn into the confrontation. The unrest only injured in the process. Two months later, the dissolved after a heavy rain storm. A few villagers conflict reemerged, with thousands of villagers were arrested later by the police. After the inci- involved in a violent riot against the police. A few dent, the local environmental protection bureau people were injured and many police cars were initiated daily pollution inspection, sampling, and

42 China Environment Series 2008/2009 monitoring on Jingxin Pharmaceutical Company. It Xinhua. [Online]. Available: http://news.xinhuanet. also conducted an environmental assessment for com/local/2007-12/19/content_7277860.htm. the whole Xinchang River Basin and issued reports 8. Associated Press. (2008, March 5). “Thousands on how the company needed to address pollution demonstrate against plan to build chemical factory in problems based on the assessment. southern China.” [Online]. Available: http://www.iht. com/articles/ap/2008/03/05/asia/AS-GEN-China- Factory-Protests.php. Notes 9. Li Xin, “From Xiamen to Zhangzhou: the Fate of Three People Who Care about the PX Project (cong 1. There are different English translations for this Xiamen dao zhangzhou: sange PX xiangmu guanhuzhe de term, including environmental group events or environ- mingyun),” New Century Weekly, March 10, 2008 mental mass affairs. 10. Sources include: Dai, Beijun. “Handling envi- 2. A Chinese text of this law is available at: ronmental mass incidents in Zhejiang Province: Practice http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/2005/10/ and thinking.” Government Research Report, 2006, ma5071633131015002304.html. [Online]. Available: http://hbj.zj.gov.cn/corpus/2005/3. 3. Yuan, Yue. (2007, October 15). “The Xiamen PX htm; Zhang, Yulin. (2007). “State-Corporation alliance incident,” Life Weekly. [Online]. Available: http://review. and environmental conflicts in rural China—Using three jcrb.com/200803/ca684330.htm ‘environmental mass incidents’ in Zhejiang Province as 4. “A hundred CPPCC members cannot stop analytical focus.” The Universities Service Centre for Xiamen PX project. (2007). (baiming weiyuan nanzu China Studies Paper Collection (Chinese University xiamen PX xiangmu),” Liaowang Dongfang Weekly, May. of Hong Kong). [Online]. Available: http://www.usc. 5. Yuan, Yue. (2007, October 15). cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=5920; Shaoxing 6. Zhu, Jingruo and Shengyang Jiang. (2007, Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (2005). Dec 19). “Continue, suspend or relocate: The PX “Summary of work 2005.” [Online]. Available: http:// incident teaches everyone a lesson,” People’s Daily. www.chinacitywater.org/hyfx/hyzs/25585-1.shtml; [Online]. Available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/for- Gui, Aizong & Daohe Zhuang. (2005, July 27) “A tune/2007-12/19/content_7277221.htm. toxic surrounded village fights for life.”Democratic 7. Zhou, Xifeng. (2007, Dec. 19). “Rumor says Newsletter. [Online]. Available: http://asiademo.org/gb/ PX plant will relocate to Zhangzhou, Official denies,” news/2005/07/20050727.htm#art06.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 43 2005). More importantly, two of the companies of pollution relocation within China (Wang, 2008): were industrial fluoride makers. In a MEP notification issued as early as 1997, (1) from upstream to downstream (especially the fluoride industry was identified as “heavily across political jurisdictions); polluting,” and new development of it banned due to the fact that fluoride supply already exceeded (2) from urban centers to their periphery areas market demands. This notification was passed to (mainly for the dumping of urban wastes); provincial level environmental bureaus, and, in the and, case of Zhejiang Province, had been distributed with a detailed implementation guideline attached (3) from the developed east to the less-devel- (Hu, 2005). These requirements were all ignored oped west (especially common for heavy- by the Dongyang local government, which, in- polluting industries such as pulp and paper stead, proactively welcomed the companies into plants). the industrial zone through attractive terms of land and energy use. Even within the same province, highly polluting By welcoming heavily polluting industry into industries often migrate from more developed urban a densely populated agricultural region, the local areas to less-developed rural communities. One ex- government was behaving like a classic “entrepre- treme example is Jiangsu Province, where 6,770 in- neurial government” prioritizing revenue genera- dustrial enterprises with an annual revenue over 5 tion (the role of an enterprise) over environmen- million Yuan (~$700,000) have relocated from the tal protection (the role of a regulator/public good highly industrialized southern part of the province provider). There are two major incentives for the to its less-developed northern part since 1994, with a local government to behave in this manner. First, large portion of the enterprises being highly pollut- the pressure from the central government to “de- ing chemical plants or galvanizing facilities (Wang, velop the economy” is still strong, given the cur- 2008). Economy also notes that big cities in China rent incentive system—local governments use often “pursue environmental cleanup by exporting the achievements of economic goals (e.g., GDP their polluting industries to points just outside the growth) as an exchange for political power and city limits” (Economy, 2004, 120). resources—as opposed to the previous system, Although the Chinese authorities tend to see which mainly used the leader’s charisma and “rev- the pollution-relocation problem as the result of olutionary visions” as the criteria for career mo- multiple factors including “a lack of attention to the bilization. Second, the taxation reforms that on rural environment, the absence of a coordinated en- one hand gave local governments the claim over vironmental strategy for the whole country and an the increased local tax revenue while on the other imbalanced development between urban and rural hand have substantially reduced their revenues areas” (Dai, 2005), the role of a revenue-driven local from agriculture surpluses. Less revenue for ag- state is unquestionably a key element. The relation- riculture has led local governments to turn their ship between the local state and pollution reloca- attention to the manufacturing sector for new tion is best demonstrated by the fact that a few less- sources of revenue ( Jahiel 1997; Zhang, 2007). developed provinces (including Jiangxi, Anhui, and This transformation from regulator to “semi- Henan) have “Investment Soliciting Delegations” enterprise” is then translated into a series of ad- specifically targeting high-polluting companies ministrative behaviors deteriorating the rural en- being driven out of the developed provinces such as vironment, including negligence in making EIAs, Zhejiang. Some of the delegations even include the inactions when corporations break environmental directors of local environmental protection bureaus regulations, and insufficiently addressing farmers’ (Wu, 2008). This kind of “pollution-soliciting” complaints (Zhang, 2007). literally creates a “race to bottom” within China, where local governments downplay environmental Soliciting Pollution regulations to attract polluting businesses. To some extent, the behavior of the Dongyang local government reflects a disturbing trend in China that Vulnerable Communities is driving dirty industries to rural areas or less-devel- The Dongyang case also illustrates how growth is pur- oped peri-urban areas. There are three major routes sued by an entrepreneurial local state at the expense

44 China Environment Series 2008/2009 of the livelihood of local people. As the industrial to their work. Within the environmental complaint zone shared the main river with villagers, the polluted system, there are institutional arrangements for bu- wastewater poisoned rice, wheat and rapeseed grown reau staff to receive complaints and visits, often in an by the villagers. Besides agricultural production, the around-the-clock manner. There are also procedural direct health impact was also serious. Among the requirements stipulating initial investigations should health problems, the pollution-induced miscarriages be completed within two days, and that complain- were especially disturbing to the villagers (Phoenix ants should be notified of the result (Brettell, 2007). Weekly, 2005). The trend of relocating pollution to However, the current complaint system gives very rural areas is even more alarming as these citizens are wide discretion to the officials involved in handling often more vulnerable to environmental degradation of such complaints without very strong accountabil- than urban communities, for rural areas often do not ity for these decisions. There is no clear definition have adequate environmental protection infrastruc- as to what counts as a “resolution” to a complaint. ture (Dai, 2005). Pollution also undermines the food In some cases, an environmental bureau official can supply and livelihoods of rural farmers. Moreover, simply pass on some factual information to those high costs limit the ability of rural citizens to access to who submitted the complaint without fixing the healthcare, which means they are less able to deal with problem, and the official can still report the com- pollution-induced illnesses. plaint as being resolved.6 When dissatisfied citizens The situation is further exacerbated by the fact turn to an upper level complaint office shangfang( ), that the villagers often have few institutional chan- the officials there are vested with even wider dis- nels to have problems redressed. The final outbreak cretion, since no rule exists as to how they should of large and violent pollution protests shows deep respond to such complaints. Often they choose to frustrations that are often more about their political turn the cases back to the subsidiary office or dismiss situation than the environment. In studies of envi- them completely.7 ronmental disputes throughout Asia Najam (2003) The Dongyang case is a textbook example has observed that weak institutional governance is of this kind of wide discretion. The provincial often the intermediate element between environ- Environmental Protection Bureau in Zhejiang mental degradation and conflicts. In the Dongyang chose not to intervene even after acknowledg- case, villagers rejected the establishment of the in- ing that some companies in the industrial zone in dustrial zone at the very beginning. Yet their wari- Dongyang were breaking the rules. Officials at the ness and strong expressions of resistance were never “Dongyang Mayor Reception Day” could simply represented or even considered in any of the official turn the villagers away without even listening to decision-making processes. Wang Wei, the village their complaint. leader, tried to boycott the industrial zone by refus- ing to sign on the land use contract but failed. Those Not In The News leading the opposition then resorted to an unortho- The Chinese news media also played a limited, dox method of resistance by disseminating infor- yet noteworthy, role in this case. From the very mation about the pollution history of the chemical beginning, the villagers tried to bring their situa- company, trying to mobilize resistance from the tion to the attention of the news media. Before the villagers. These efforts did not lead to any positive violent conflict broke out, at least two news media feedback from local authorities but instead were met organizations—the provincial television station of with repression. Those sending out alarms were ar- Zhejiang and the local newspaper of Jinhua—had rested and silenced. reported the issue (in June 2004 and January 2005, The deadlock situation in the villager’s efforts respectively).8 The absence of issue framing by the to petition different levels of government showed media or the domination of an official frame such as some of the key shortcomings of the complaint “social stability,” can close down the political space system—the lack of accountability and high-level for dialogue and compromise (Mertha, 2008). In an oversight (Brettell, 2007). China’s complaint system interview about the Dongyang case, Mertha placed has undergone some systematic improvement since specific emphasis on the importance of early pub- the 1990s. Since then, all government departments licity and the use of a frame that can attract a larger at the provincial, municipal, autonomous region, city, audience, which can help diffuse the tension.9 and prefecture levels are required to set up offices re- In the case of Dongyang, the media reports sponsible for complaints that are specifically related before the major conflicts were largely limited to

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 45 Zhejiang Province, for efforts to attract the atten- resistance than an offensive action. A very specific tion of national media were thwarted by the local pollution issue rather than a broader political agenda officials who had Wang Zhongfa arrested after drove this protest. When the issue is sufficiently he took a Beijing journalist to the industrial zone. addressed by the local authorities, the tension may Thus, no story was told to attract a broader audi- quickly disappear. In the case of Dongyang, after ence to the plight of the Dongyang villagers. the equipment was removed from the factories in May 2005, the villagers even helped the govern- Quiet Courts ment to remove the blockade they had built. As re- One other important element missing from all these searchers have pointed out, this kind of isolated and efforts is the legal channel. Based on numerous re- unorganized environmental unrest lacks the poten- ports on this unusual case, there is no indication that tial of becoming a “rural environmental movement” the local court ever got involved in the process. The (Zhang, 2007). Moreover, while these and other absence of a lawsuit in such an intense dispute is similar rural protests generally do not extend be- remarkable. However, just as Jing has noted in his yond a single locality, expand to cover other issues, research, lawsuits are often useless in these cases. or turn into an “ideological or organizational chal- Sometimes local courts do not have jurisdiction over lenge” to the state (Perry & Selden, 2003, 17), the high-level state-owned factories. In more cases the central government has begun to view environmen- polluting projects are seen as of “political impor- tal mass incidents as sources of political instability. tance,” therefore “not subject to the possible scrutiny of the country’s environmental laws” ( Jing 2003, implications of the government’s 219). Other restrictions on the full involvement of stability mindset courts include the often vaguely drafted environmental laws that make it difficult to allocate liabil- Environmental protests like the Dongyang case are ity, the interventions by local officials and the lack of largely an expression of citizen opposition to cor- legal training of many local judges (OECD, 2005). rupt local officials protecting polluting corporations The lack of an independent legal system is another and frustration over an inability to hold officials ac- key reason for China’s poor environmental record countable. Despite the overwhelming focus of these (Economy, 2007). It is therefore understandable that protests on local wrongdoings, Chinese central of- in Dongyang, either the villagers did not turn to the ficials view these environmental mass protests as a often costly and prolonged legal process, or that the potential threat to political stability, although they local court chose not to be involved in the case. describe these threats with considerable restraint— Furthermore, civil society groups are often to- for example, they are still defined as “people’s inter- tally absent as a mediating factor in such disputes. nal conflicts” renmin( neibu maodun). As the Green Watch episode after the Dongyang MEP Minister Zhou Shengxian candidly noted incident has shown, civil society involvement in that, “with the increase of environmental mass in- such confrontational cases is still subject to strict cidents, pollution has become the ‘primer’ for social government control.10 Under such circumstances, instability” (Zhang, 2007). The chief director of the villagers are often left to struggle for themselves provincial EPA of Zhejiang Province, when writing with very little outside support in terms of technical about his findings about four big environmental mass and legal expertise. incidents in his province during 2005, also started by It was a mixture of threatened livelihood and warning that “environmental disputes have become a deep frustration over injustice and lack of voice the new cause of social instability” and that “if being that finally pushed the villagers to the streets. Their used by a small bunch of ill-willed individuals, [such shouted slogans and posters not only demanded disputes] could seriously damage the Party-Mass re- protection of their family’s health and livelihoods, lationship and the Party’s image” (Dai, 2005). they also expressed anger over the injustice imposed Linking environmental degradation to political on them: “Corrupt officials have their pockets full stability, which is arguably the core concern of the of money, people have their lives full of pain,” “Rich Chinese authorities, would definitely elicit more people can buy houses outside the villages, poor support for the environmental cause inside the gov- people can only wait here for death!”11 ernment. Actually, Zhejiang Province, which suf- In this sense, the environmental mass incident fered four consecutive large-scale environmental is more of a response than an initiative, more of a mass incidents in 2005 (including the Dongyang

46 China Environment Series 2008/2009 case), was among the first provinces to initiate a Moreover, by including environmental degradation high-profile greening campaign. Zhejiang officials into the stability mindset, the government poten- initiated an “ecological province” project, which tially turns pollution incidents into highly sensitive includes a “recycling economy 911 project” and a situations that could limit the role of local commu- “pollution reduction 811 project.” Xi Jinping, the nity activists, courts, news media and/or NGOs to governor of Zhejiang in 2005, emphasized openly step in and play a mediating role. that environmental mass incidents could “destroy Although the government is still very restrained the fruits of reform and opening.”12 in its reaction to environmental protests, it still At the local level, all those counties in Zhejiang sees them largely as being “manipulated by a small that suffered from severe environmental protests group of ill-willed individuals” who want to harm established a series of new environmental policies. social order and produce chaos (Dai, 2005; Hu In Dongyang, besides shutting down nearly half of 2005). The deep-rooted suspicion that environ- the Zhuxi Industrial Zone (five companies were mental protests are somewhat an organized chal- completely closed, three were ordered to suspend lenge to the rule of the Party is identifiable in many production);13 banks were instructed not to give of the official writings. For instance, in a reflective loans to polluting companies; management of pol- article written by an official from the Provincial luting companies would be making public apolo- Party Academy of Zhejiang, environmental mass gies; and factories were ordered to commit openly incidents such as the Dongyang case are seen as to good environmental practices. In Changxing, particularly “well-organized.” The village-level el- another county where large environmental protests der’s association is even described as a “special in- broke out, 75 percent of the lead-acid battery in- terest group” behind the event (Tao, 2006). This dustry was shut down, and systems were established mentality creates a political environment hostile to to hold local officials personally responsible for pol- leading individuals such as Wang Wei and Wang lution accidents (“Economic protection,” 2007). Zhongfa, who could have played the role of what These initiatives do demonstrate the provincial Mertha terms as “policy entrepreneurs” that engage government’s response, albeit belated, to rural envi- other stakeholders (e.g., the news media, NGOs, ronmental concerns. But researchers such as Yulin and sympathetic officials). In engaging other stake- Zhang (2007) also warn about the limited effect of holders these “policy entrepreneurs” can potentially bringing environmental issues into discussions of ease the confrontational situation by facilitating instability: compromises. In other words, putting pollution issues into the stability mindset could further limit Although [linking environment with sta- the political space for such individuals to monitor bility] could attract some high-level atten- and expose pollution activities. tion, signed orders from high-level officials Another important detrimental element when do not seem very effective in breaking the environmental protests are viewed as security threats state-corporate alliance at the local level, nor is the subsequent strict control of information. In is [this linkage] useful in redirecting local Dongyang, for example, news media reports of the policy more towards addressing the needs of incident were heavily censored (Phoenix Weekly, the people. 2005). Moreover in government policy papers, the control of information to “stop rumors” is often Many of the new policies adopted by Zhejiang placed on high priority (Dai, 2005). This censor- Province following the Dongyang incident do have a ship can restrict important media reporting of local heavy public-relations flavor and on the surface very environmental problems that could help reframe strong self-policing elements. With the exception of the issue, open up space for policy changes, and the “green loans” policy, few of the new policies tar- avoid a political deadlock or even mass protests. get breaking the strong state-corporate ties that fuel The Dongyang case has demonstrated that en- such pollution problems. Actually, two of the most vironmental mass incidents are an extreme response polluting companies in the Dongyang case sim- to the quickly deteriorating natural and political ply opted to move to another area,14 which further environment for rural communities. These mass shows that the ad hoc “campaign style” environmen- incidents are citizens’ response to severely threat- tal policies restricted to specific regions could sim- ened livelihoods and a fundamental deprivation of ply displace the problems instead of solving them. power. To address these issues of environmental

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 47 justice requires solutions that are founded on a con- companies.” (2007, November 9). Economic Reference cern for the security of people and serious govern- News. [Online]. Available: http://jjckb.xinhuanet. ment restructuring that would prevent local officials com/yw/2007-11/09/content_73229.htm. from abusing the environment in the first place. French, Howard. (2005, Aug 24). “Land of 74,000 pro- Ultimately, it should be a solution about empower- tests (but little is ever fixed),”The New York Times. Gill, Bates & Lu Xiaoqing. (2008). “Assessing China’s ment rather than control, about participation rather response to the challenge of environmental health.” than exclusion, about democratic decision-making China Environment Series, Issue 9, 3-15. rather than ad hoc cleanup campaigns. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. Environment, Scarcity and Violence, Princeton University Press, 1999. Acknowledgments Hu, Xinmin. (2005). “Uphold the scientific development principle, strengthen the protection of the environ- The author would like to thank Scot Tanner, Anna ment.” [jianchi kexue fazhanguan, qieshi jiaqiang Brettell, and the two anonymous reviewers for their huanjing baohu]. Government Document. [Online]. comments on this paper. Available: http://hbj.zj.gov.cn/corpus/2005/21.htm. Jahiel, Abigail R. (1997). “The contradictory impact of Ma Tianjie was a summer 2008 research intern at the reform on environmental protection in China,” The , No. 149, March, 81-103. China Environment Forum. Currently he is in his sec- China Quarterly Jing, Jun. (2003). “Environmental protest in rural ond year at American University pursuing a Masters at China.” In Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden Eds., the School of International Service. He can be reached Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, at [email protected] Routledge, 204-222. Lang, Youxing. (2005). “Consultative democracy and References public participation in environmental governance: A case study of rural environmental protests in Zhejiang.”[shangyixing minzhu yu gongzhong canyu Brettell, Anna. (2007). “Channeling dissent: The institu- huanjing zhili: yi zhejiang nongmin kangyi huan- tionalization of environmental compliant resolution jing wuran shijian wei li] (paper presented at the in China,” in Peter Ho and Richard Louis Edmonds Symposium on Public Policy and Governance eds., China’s Embedded Activism. Routledge. in Transitional Societies, Guangzhou. [Online]. Buckley, Lila & Jennifer Turner. (2005). “Environmental Available: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. activist arrested in Hangzhou: Movement still asp?NewsID=42918. hampered by legal and financial restrictions.” China Lu, Xinyuan. (2005). “The progress, challenges and so- Watch Website, World Watch Institute. lutions of environmental law enforcement in China.” Dai, Beijun. (2006). “Handling environmental mass [woguo huanjing zhifa gongzuo jinzhan, tiaozhan yu incidents in Zhejiang Province: Practice and duice]. SEPA. [Online]. Available: http://www.sepa. thinking.”[zhejiangsheng huanjing quntixing shijian gov.cn/info/jzxx/200509/t20050919_70118.htm. de chuzhi yu sikao]. Government Research Report. Lu, Xinyuan. (2006, July 10). “Reform, creativity and [Online]. Available: http://hbj.zj.gov.cn/cor- problem solving: Environmental law enforcement pus/2005/3.htm. must adapt to the historical transition.” [gaige Economy, Elizabeth. “The great leap backward?” (2007). chuangxin, pojie nanti, huanjing zhifa bixu shiying Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct. lishixing zhuanbian], China Environmental News. Economy, Elizabeth. The River Runs Black: The [Online]. Available: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/hjjc/ Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Cornell hjzf/djt/200607/t20060707_78247.htm. University Press, 2004. Mertha, Andrew. (2008). China’s Water Warriors: Citizen “Eight villagers sentenced for the Dongyang inci- Action and Policy Change. Cornell University Press. dent.” (2006, January 9). Radio Free Asia. [Online]. Najam, Adil. (2003). “The human dimensions of Available: http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shen- environmental insecurity: Some insights from South rubaodao/2006/01/09/dongyang/. Asia,” Environmental Change and Security Project Ellis, Linden. (2007). “Greening the courts: China’s Report (Woodrow Wilson Center), No. 9, 59-74. legal advocates giving voice to pollution victims OECD. (2003). Governance in China, Chapter 17, and the environment.” China Environment Forum OECD. meeting summary, April 11. [Online]. Available: Pei, Minxin. (2002). “China’s governance crisis,” Foreign http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_ Affairs, Sept/Oct. id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_ Perry, Elizabeth & Mark Selden. (2003). Introduction to id=228068. Chinese Society, Change. Conflict and Resistance. (Eds.). “Environmental protection is a life and death issue for

48 China Environment Series 2008/2009 Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, Routledge. Zhang, Yulin & Jinlin Gu. (2003). “Who is the biggest Phoenix Weekly. (2005, May 18). “Large scale victim to pollution: Discussing rural issues in the police-people conflict in Dongyang.” [Online] background of environmental degradation.” [sheishi Available: http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/ huanjing wuran de zuida shouhaizhe: taolun huanjing china/2005/05/200505182308.shtml. wuran beijing xia de sannong wenti]. The Universities Pollution starts with planning: Probe into the Dongyang Service Centre for China Studies Paper Collection incident.” (2005, May 10). China Business News. (Chinese University of Hong Kong). [Online]. [Online] Available: http://finance.sina.com.cn/ Available: http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzde- chanjing/b/20050510/03131572813.shtml. tails.asp?id=2178. “Seriously punishing those responsible for the Dongyang incident.”(2005, December 30). Zhejiang Daily. NOTES State Environmental Protection Administration. (2006). China Environmental Statistics Yearbook (zhongguo 1. Interview with Anonymous U.S. China Analyst, huanjing tongji nianjian), 241-243. August 21, 2008 Tao, Junyi. (2006, December 12). “The handling of mass 2. Several respondents interviewed for this paper incidents and the capability of officals.” Website of noted that the term “environmental dispute” has never the Provincial Party Academy of Zhejiang. [Online]. been clearly defined. Available: http://www.zjdx.gov.cn/1304/15145.htm. 3. [Online] Available: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/natu/ Wang Aijun. (2006, July 16). “Pan Yue: Tinkering will stbh/js/200610/P020061026334063325958.doc (Text in not solve environmental problems,” Beijing News. Chinese) [Online]. Available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli- 4. Ibid. tics/2006-07/16/content_4840328.htm. 5. Dongyang government announcement, [Online]. Wang, Peng. (2008). “Environmental problems in de- Available: www.dongyang.gov.cn/dongyang/zhenwu- veloping of new socialist countryside.” In Dongping dongtai/zhengwuneirong.jsp?InfoId=7867. Yang eds., The China Environment Yearbook Vol.2: 6. Interview with Anna Brettell, September 25, 2008 Challenges and Struggles, Brill, 99-119. 7. Ibid. Wang, Weiguang. (2006, August 31). “The proper 8. Samples of earlier reports can be found handling of people’s internal conflicts is key to the at: http://www.clapv.org/bbs/viewthread. establishment of a harmonious society.” [zhengque php?action=printable&tid=99. (In Chinese). chuli renmin neibu maodun shi goujian hexie she- 9. Interview with Andrew Mertha, August 7, 2008. hui de guanjian], Xinhua News Agency Report. 10. Notably, very few Chinese NGO activists have [Online]. Available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli- been imprisoned, but the few who have been arrested or tics/2006-08/31/content_5029835.htm. harassed by security officials do tend to be involved in Wu Ruidong. (2008, July 8). “Cutting off the anti-pollution activities. route of pollution relocation.” Xinhua Daily. 11. Slogans and posters used by the villagers were [Online]. Available: http://news.xhby.net/sys- quoted in Zhang (2007) and the Phoenix Weekly (2005, tem/2008/07/08/010291695.shtml. May 18). Zhang, Yulin. (2007). “State-Corporation alliance and 12. Speech by Governor Xi Jinping, avail- environmental conflicts in rural China—Using three able at http://www.ywepb.gov.cn/Article_Show. ‘environmental mass incidents’ in Zhejiang Province asp?ArticleID=72. as analytical focus.” [zhengjing yitihua kaifa jizhi yu 13. Dongyang government announcement, May 23, zhongguo nongcun de huanjing chongtu: yi zhejiangsh- 2005. [Online]. Available: www.dongyang.gov.cn/dong- eng de san qi quntixing shijian wei zhongxin]. The yang/zhenwudongtai/zhengwuneirong.jsp?InfoId=7867 Universities Service Centre for China Studies Paper 14. According to the Economic Reference News report Collection (Chinese University of Hong Kong). and Hu (2005), two of the most polluting companies, [Online]. Available: http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/ including Dongnong, voluntarily moved to other prov- wk_wzdetails.asp?id=5920. inces to continue production

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 49 Feature Box

Green Dragon Media Project

By Max Perelman

Dear Mr. Mou Zhang, In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s GDP has well surpassed the United States and Gongxi! Gongxi! China is on the minds of many even has a smaller portion of people below the around the world—not only because of the 2008 poverty line.9 I know that the Chinese people are Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in enjoying new luxuries and building new careers: Shanghai, but businessmen also are excited to hear You have a right to and you deserve it. But perhaps your country is now one of the world’s largest eco- there is a way for you to fulfill Deng Xiaoping’s nomic markets.1 Developers know that between challenge of becoming “gloriously rich” while si- now and 2015 roughly half of the world’s new multaneously addressing the urban and rural envi- building construction will take place in China.2 But ronmental challenges we all face. The International environmentalists are worried to learn China has Monetary Fund estimates the total cost of China’s become the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter.3 air and water pollution is 5.8 percent of your coun- My experience represents all three of these groups. try’s GDP, almost $200 billion.10 What if I told I have worked as an e-commerce consultant based you there was a way to minimize these costs while in Asia but am now devoted to promoting sustain- actually reducing many of the other infrastructural able construction in China and the United States. “growing pains” of development? I focus on buildings and cities because these will be humanity’s environmental experiment determin- The EcoBlock—Mass- ing the type of planet on which our children and Replicable Sustainability grandchildren will live. The majority of the world is now living in cities4 and within the next decade the Half of the world’s construction is occurring in majority of Chinese will too.5 People are becoming China and every year the country adds 12 million an urban species; our cities are consuming 2 per- new urban housing units (as well as all the associ- cent of the world’s landmass but 74 percent of its ated expensive infrastructure and services). The pre- resources.6 More than 50 percent of China’s green- dominant model of development is the “gated” 10- house gas emissions are due to the construction and to 30,000-unit SuperBlock. While these one-square operation of buildings.7 If cities are our environmen- kilometer blocks are highly efficient at providing a tal battleground, then Chinese cities are the front- large number of housing units, SuperBlocks have line since China will be urbanizing 400 million rural extraordinarily negative consequences—including people over the next 12 to 20 years.8 congested arterial roads, limited access to public I believe climate change is our global genera- transit, and a high dependency on a costly central- tion’s challenge and it is my responsibility to collab- ized infrastructure of power plants, sewage treat- orate with you so that our generation does not fol- ment facilities and water supply. To keep pace with low the path of my American parents’ generation. urban and industrial growth, China is currently That “American” path, perpetrated by consumerist building the equivalent of two coal-fired power propaganda, will lead to four-hour daily commutes plants every week.11 Gloom and doom reports in to work, worse than anything now experienced in the international news media on China’s air pollu- Beijing, promoting even further dependence on tion and other environmental problems have nota- foreign energy, food, and water. bly overlooked what I believe is an exciting plan to

50 China Environment Series 2008/2009 EcoBlock and a developer and site have been se- lected. Detailed design began in September 2008 and the developer hopes to break ground within 18 months. Construction is anticipated to complete within three to five years. Led by Jean Rogers in the San Francisco office, Arup’s primary role has been to provide a portion of the project’s seed funding and develop the detailed analysis demonstrating the viability of the project to the Chinese government. The results of the feasibility study are very positive and establish the proof of concept for the EcoBlock, confirming the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency in energy and water systems, and demonstrate the technical, social and cultural feasibility of a sustainable neighborhood model.

Eighty percent of the construction workers in Beijing, such as the man pictured above, are rural migrants. The Beauty of Straw—What the Photo Credit: Green Dragon Media Project Other Two Pigs Didn’t Know build a new model for sustainable urban neighbor- Last summer, I set out to learn more about proj- hoods that transforms China’s current residential ects like the Qingdao EcoBlock as well as the bar- SuperBlock paradigm. riers and opportunities to expanding China’s green On my way to China in 2007 as part of the Green building industry. One of the outcomes was a Green Dragon Media Project team, I met with Harrison Dragon Media Project documentary film and mul- Fraker at the University of California, Berkeley, timedia information source focused on green build- College of Environmental Design. Professor Fraker ings in China’s urban centers. However, urban wanted to tackle this development challenge while buildings are only part of the story, though perhaps working within the Chinese cultural framework and the largest part since the majority of Chinese will one-square kilometer SuperBlock development scale. live in cities within the next decade. Nevertheless, He has partnered with the international engineer- the plight of ordinary rural Chinese is a bit closer to ing firm, Arup, transforming the business-as-usual my heart, and I have found that oftentimes a dollar SuperBlock into a sustainable neighborhood model spent in the countryside not only has a greater im- for China—the EcoBlock. The EcoBlock is a mass- pact, but also is more emotionally satisfying. replicable and economically viable alternative that As my green building pilgrimage took me outside provides 100 percent on-site renewable energy gen- the cities, I learned that a third of all homes in rural eration; recycles 100 percent wastewater on site; re- northeast China are drafty and cold, made from duces 90-plus percent potable water demand; encour- mud and straw. Including the more modern build- ages journeys by foot, bicycle and public transit; and ings, only slightly more than 1 percent of homes provides 40 to 60 percent of the site area as productive in this region are equipped with energy efficiency green space—urban agriculture and urban orchards. measures. Understandably, families are often locked According to Professor Fraker, each EcoBlock in a vicious cycle of poverty and sickness as they development represents 415 tons less solid waste, struggle to heat their small 700-square-foot homes 23.8 million gallons less untreated sewage, and with four tons of ever-pricier coal each winter.12 1,404 tons less carbon dioxide emissions annu- Despite the fact that roughly 30 percent of average ally. Arup designers estimate that if the EcoBlock rural income goes to coal purchases, families will replaces just 25 percent of the SuperBlocks being often manage to find the $4,000 needed to build built, China could save $9 billion in infrastructure a “modern” red-fired brick home. This new home costs by avoiding the construction of 13 drinking will have solid brick walls almost three feet thick water plants, 11 wastewater treatment plants, 9 that will not only represent an enormous amount of coal-fired power stations, and 8 landfills. embodied energy, but surprisingly, will require the In the summer of 2008, the mayor of Qingdao same four tons of coal to heat annually and be just gave official approval to move forward with the first as dangerous in an earthquake.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 51 Box 1. STOP PRESS: The Green Dragon Sequel is Coming!

Red Hot Green China

WARNING: Content Could be Local and Spicy Red Hot Green China is a new TV series for international broadcast that follows a young, savvy production team as they explore one of the most critical societal transformations in human history. Because of its sheer scale, China’s environmental impacts are already affecting everyone on Earth. As they continue to build, their choices could either make or break humanity’s pathway to sustainability. That is why the Red Hot Green Team are going to be our there, on the ground, finding the real stories and the real character that reveal China’s potential for a bright green revolution. This is a travel show on a mission.

The TV series will be backed up by RedHotGreen China.com, an online visual media platform that will share feature stories of people and projects geographically-placed around China, a blog, an e-learning cinema and a video-based business who’s who directory for China’s emerging green leaders.

The production team is split across China and the United States and is currently producing the promotional video. Want to be a part of this? Early-bird corporate sponsorship benefits and investment opportunities are available. Please email [email protected] for details and access to the full online concept description.

In the above photos are a few of the many faces of people in the Green Dragon Media Project’s upcoming documentary. The film trailer can be viewed at: www.redhotgreenchina.com.

52 China Environment Series 2008/2009 Just as with urban SuperBlocks, however, I Bound at the Hip learned of a group tackling this rural challenge from within the cultural and socioeconomic constraints Mr. Zhang, you are in Beijing and I am in of the region. The Adventist Development Relief California—although I share your excitement for Agency (ADRA) is leading a grassroots initiative China’s growth, I also share your pollution. As your to build environmentally friendly, energy efficient SuperBlock’s central furnace burns coal to heat an housing in Heilongjiang Province in China’s rural apartment or a villager up north adds a coal briquette northeast. This is the largest straw bale building to her stove, portions of that coal smoke’s fine partic- initiative in the world. Since introducing straw bale ulates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and airborne construction to northern China in 1998, the pro- mercury travel the long journey along air currents gram has worked with local communities, giving over the Pacific Ocean to end up in California and training to local construction teams and building other parts of the United States. China is responsible over 600 (registered) energy efficient, earthquake- for a quarter of U.S. airborne mercury, a quarter of resistant, and culturally appropriate homes and the particulate matter above Los Angeles,14 up to a schools using straw and other local building ma- quarter of California’s nitrogen oxide,15 and nearly terials. In this extremely cold environment, villag- a third of the state’s smog-forming air pollution.16 ers can take advantage of straw’s amazing insulative Even more troubling, China’s coal combustion is qualities. Homeowners of straw houses will burn an predicted to quadruple California’s current levels of average of three tons (75 percent) less coal per year nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds in to heat versus the mainstream red brick alternative. the next fifteen years.17 Rice turns out to be an incredibly elegant and Geography and winds funnel pollution from the useful natural material. First, the rice grain can be California coast into inland air basins. Comprising eaten. Second, the rice husk can be burned as bio- two-thirds of the Central Valley landmass, the bowl- fuel to produce heat and/or electricity. Next, the shape topography of the San Joaquin Valley Air Basin husk ash can be used to offset cement and reduce provides a particularly ideal conduit for trans-Pacific the total embodied energy of concrete, of which air pollution. This does not bode well for my coun- China is the world’s largest producer.13 After re- try’s food supply, for California’s agriculture industry placing a large portion of cement with the ash from is the world’s fifth largest source of food and agricul- its burnt husk—reducing the need for the energy- tural produce and California’s Central Valley supplies intensive product—the remaining shafts of straw, a quarter of food to the United States. While China’s typically an agricultural waste product, can be baled atmospheric pollution has doubled in the past ten into blocks of dense insulation for ADRA’s homes! years, Chinese desertification and coal combustion is ADRA has been careful to design homes that forecast to quadruple atmospheric pollution by 2020 look like modern red brick structures. Villagers in China as well as in the Central Valley.18 were hesitant at first but word has spread and Your environmental fate is tied to mine, Mr. people now prefer buildings made from straw over Zhang. Coal is the source of 70 percent of China’s brick! This turns out to make good environmen- energy19 and will be so for the foreseeable future. tal sense as over its lifetime, the straw bale ver- You use it to produce steel and cement, to generate sion of a typical rural Chinese home will produce electricity and to heat buildings—all of these are over 300 tons less greenhouse gas. Unfortunately, aspects of the urban environment. The World Bank with the high price of steel, straw-baling equip- estimates that between now and 2015, roughly half ment is in short supply. ADRA and the provincial of the world’s new building construction will take government have partnered to launch a new pro- place in China—so let’s work together promoting gram providing training and straw balers to local green buildings in China. construction companies. The project investment yields an impressive one ton of greenhouse gas Sincerely, mitigation per $1 spent. Ensuring 25 percent of Max Perelman the annual 150,000 homes that need to be replaced each year in Heilongjiang Province are made with Max Perelman is the research director and co-producer straw bale could reduce greenhouse gas emissions of the Green Dragon Media Project, a documentary by 11,250,000 tons, roughly the same amount at- film and website identifying barriers and opportunities tributed annually to 511,000 Americans. to expanding the Chinese green building movement.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 53 He can be reached at [email protected]. For lications/the-world-factbook/. China’s GDP (purchas- more information, see the following links: ing power parity) is $10.21 trillion while United States • The Film: http://www.greendragonfilm.com/more_ GDP (purchasing power parity) is $13.08 trillion. about.html Regarding the percentage below the poverty line, it is • The Qingdao EcoBlock: http://www.greendragon- 10% in China versus 12% in the United States. 10. The World Bank. (2007, March). film.com/qingdao_ecoblock_project.html Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages. • Rural Chinese Straw Building: http://www.green- Report presented at the International Conference on dragonfilm.com/strawbale/index.php Sustainable Development, Beijing, China. [Online]. Available: http://go.worldbank.org/FFCJVBTP40. Notes 11. Kim, Juli S. (2007, February 2). A China Environmental Health Project Factsheet: Transboundary 1. MacLeod, Calum. (2008, April 21). “China Air Pollution – Will China Choke on Its Success? vaults past USA in number of Internet users.” USA Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson International Today, p. 1A. Center for Scholars. [Online]. Available: http://www. 2. Langer, Kenneth & Watson, Robert. (2006, wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/transboundary_feb2.pdf. January 9). “Bringing LEED to China.” Sustainable The government plans “building nearly 100 new coal- Business. [Online]. Available: http://www.sustainable- fired power stations each year until 2012.” business.com/index.cfm/go/news.feature/id/1289. 12. Perelman, Max. (2007, July). Interviews with Wu 3. “China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emis- Yongxue, Government of Harbin, Heilongjiang. sions.” (2007, June 20). International Herald Tribune. 13. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, China [Online]. Available: http://www.iht.com/arti- Energy Group. (2008). [Online]. Available: http://china. cles/2007/06/20/business/emit.php. lbl.gov/cement. 4. NC State University. (2007, May 22). “Mayday 14. Hopkins, Brent. (2006, August 1). “L.A.’s big 23: World population becomes more urban than rural.” import: overseas pollution,” L.A. Daily News. [Online]. Available: http://news.ncsu.edu/releases/2007/ 15. Wells, Janet. (2006, February 2). “Live locally, act may/104.html. globally: The EPA’s China Director, Lida Tan, found a 5. United Nations Development Fund. (2007). State way to help clean up her homeland from San Francisco,” of World Population 2007: Unleashing the Potential of The San Francisco Chronicle. Urban Growth. Page 13. [Online]. Available: http:// 16. Barboza, David & Bradsher, Keith. (2006, www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/introduction.html. June 11). “Pollution from Chinese cities casts a global 6. Global Foresight Network. (2006, October). shadow,” The New York Times. Article alludes to 2006 Future Cities, page 9. [Online]. Available: www.global- study by Natural Resources Defense Council. foresight.net. 17. Watts, Jonathan. (2005, October 31). “Satellite 7. Skinner, Nathaniel. (2007, December 12). data reveals Beijing as air pollution capital of the world,” Interview with David Fridley, Staff Scientist at the The Guardian. Environmental Energy Technologies Division of 18. Pollock, Caitlin. (2007). “From China with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Conducted Love: Transboundary Dust and the Fate of the after presentation at the Monterey Institute of California Central Valley.” Monterey Institute of International Studies. International Studies. Unpublished. 8. Perelman, Max. (2007, July). Interviews with David 19. Kim, Juli S. (2007, February 2). “Transboundary Nieh of Shui On Land. [Online]. Available: http://www. air pollution—Will China choke on its success?” greendragonfilm.com/how_industry_works.html. Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson International 9. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Factbook. Center for Scholars. [Online]. Available: http://www. [Online]. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/pub- wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/transboundary_feb2.pdf.

54 China Environment Series 2008/2009 Spotlight on Ngo activism in China Ensuring Clean Water for Communities in the Earthquake’s Epicenter: A Child’s Right Post-Disaster Relief Work in Sichuan

By Eric Stowe

hina’s devastating earthquake on 12 May Everpure were but a few of the companies that 2008 claimed more than 80,000 lives and donated clean water systems to the local govern- Cleft more than 5 million people homeless ment in Sichuan. and more than 4,000 children orphaned. Within Our organization—A Child’s Right (ACR)—has days of the earthquake, the potential for outbreaks been working in China for several years with the of widespread communicable diseases were of goal of providing every orphanage in the country major concern to the Chinese Ministry of Health, with purified water, through means of purification the World Health Organization, and to countless equipment, which we install, monitor, and maintain. NGOs en route to assist. Fortunately, the possi- After the earthquake, a sub-branch of the Ministry bilities for outbreaks were mitigated, in large part of Civil Affairs asked if we could help regarding by the efforts of multiple NGOs undertaking the water systems in the displacement villages. With task of focusing on provisions of food, clean water, tremendous speed we saw significant donations of and sanitation. However, the Chinese government equipment, money to fund the project, U.S. State was a focal contributor and primary catalyst in Department assistance to get our equipment into the this push as well. country, as well as Chinese governmental approvals In the wake of the disaster, and remaining for us to work directly in the epicenter. largely underreported, the Chinese government ACR worked with the Chinese government both performed an outstanding job of transplanting nationally and provincially in the most damaged areas the displaced communities from the countless to provide clean and safe drinking water to families tent cities which sprung up after the earthquake and children impacted by the earthquake. Through to safer and more manageable displacement our project, ACR installed 30 clean water systems in “villages”—each one housing between 500 to as 10 schools for children displaced by the earthquake, many as 10,000 people, and each with multiple 9 displacement camps, and 1 hospital. All sites were kitchens, toilets, electricity, and running water. equipped with replacement parts and supplies to The larger sites house security staff, as well as keep the systems fully operational for several years; maintenance crews to keep the “villages” function- this is important given rebuilding efforts will take ing and cleaning crews to keep the sites relatively quite some time, leaving many in the displacement hygienic. The swift action by the Chinese gov- camps for years before being relocated. ernment in reconnecting nearly 5,000,000 people The majority of our work focused within miles with basic services in less than three months time of the earthquake’s epicenter, and each installation was impressive by every measure; it is somewhat provided water to more than 1,500 people on aver- disheartening that our own natural disaster in age. With this undertaking, we were able to pro- Louisiana has still not seen the level of attentive- vide clean and safe drinking water to more than ness comparable to the Chinese government’s in 50,000 people who severely impacted by the earth- the three years post-Hurricane Katrina. quake—30,000 of which were children. We were Several corporations and organizations saw informed this was the single largest water purifi- provisions of clean water for the displaced com- cation donation of its kind from any organization munities as imperative for the long-term health after the earthquake! of those populations. Although most displace- With direction from local government, hiring ment camps had running water, the biological of local engineers and plumbers, assistance from contaminants from breaches in the municipal grid our own China staff, and additional help from A.J. were quite high. General Electric, Siemens, and Antunes Filtration Technologies staff, ACR was

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 55 Children tasting the water after treatment for a site with more than 3,000 people. Photo Credit: Eric Stowe

able to install systems in sites with the greatest need nities and schools, and continue working with us for high-impact and sustainable water purification in monitoring the efficacy of the purification units methods. As each site will be in operation for at post-installation. least three to five years, our national staff and re- It has been six months since our work was com- gional contracted employees will provide consistent pleted. In that time, the filled-to-capacity displace- maintenance and support for each system to ensure ment camps and schools are being rebuilt, though success and sustainability at every site. lives are still far from normal in the region. Local In our years working in China we have experi- water officials tested several of our systems and found enced delays, as is common dealing with any gov- each still provides high-quality water. It is a small of- ernment in navigating the bureaucratic chains. On fering at best for the communities affected by the this project, however, the national government, by earthquake. However, the charitable, philanthropic, way of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the China and cross-agency partnerships that arose from this Association of Social Work, the local government event will hopefully be fostered within China and in Sichuan, as well as Civil Affairs Bureau, Water continue to offer substantive and sustainable con- Resources Department, Construction Bureau, duits for change and assistance in the future. Office of Disaster Relief Management, and several local magistrates, assisted extensively and quickly Eric Stowe is director of A Child’s Right. He can be with site designation and proper approvals to in- reached at: [email protected]. For more infor- stall our systems. These agencies also quickly coor- mation on A Child’s Right’s work in China and other dinated our work amongst the displaced commu- countries, please visit www.a-childs-right.org.

56 China Environment Series 2008/2009