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AC8SII Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea (U) Joe Wood
Editor's Nou: Since 1987, the Central editors in January 1975. and he had lnu/Jigtna Agtncy has fontkJ a pro kept repeacing it. gram with the john F. Kennedy School ofGowmmmt. Harvard Univmity, Though Bruzinski Iacer described on /nuOigmce anti Policy. Under this the origins of Career's promise as a program, which is managed by GA i "mystery nor yet unravded," 2 South Cmur for the Study offnteOigmce, the Korea was nor popular in America in Kennedy School conducts semi1111.n anti 1976. It had been ruled for 15 years tkwlops ca.u studin that help i/Jumi- by an autocrat, Park Chung Hee, 7fii.U isiU41 reiA.teti to the use of who deale ruthlessly and, ar rimes, Carter was determined to inuOigmce by policymaltm. This case bloodily, with popular dissent. Park put greater emphasis on was writun in 1996for had been ruling by martial law since '' Profosson Ernest May anti Philip 1972, and his inreUigence agency America's commitment to Zelikow. had kidnapped opposition leader the protection of human Kim Dae Jung. At least Kim was On 23 June 1976, Jimmy Carter, only in prison: ocher opposition fig rights, and he sharply candidate for President of the U nitcd ures had been lcllled- un~ aiticized the apparent past States, stepped before a gathering in mysterious circumstances. Carter was New York sponsored by the Foreign determined ro put greater emphasis policy of backing any Policy Association. He was ready ro on America's commitment ro the dictator that promised to deliver his campaign's major state protection of human rights, and he fight Communism. ment on the policies he would sharply criticized the apparent past pursue around the world if be was policy of backing any dictaror that elected in November. The carefuHy promised to fight Communism. So prepared speech was veered by rhe next sentence in Carter's June Career's campaign advisers on for 1976 speech, after his promise ro eign policy, led by a Columbia withdraw American ground forces University profe$50r and former from South Korea, condemned the '' Scare Depacrmenc official, Zbigniew South Korean Government's "repug Bruzinski. The address "foreshad nant" oppression of inte.rnal dissent. owed many of [Carrer's\ actions and To make matters worse, in rhe fall of concerns as President." It included 1976, the South Korean Govern a promise ro reverse 26 years of US ment was direccly implicated in a policy and "withdraw our ground Washington scandal, dubbed forces from South Korea on a phased "Koreagate" by the press, involving basis over a time span to be deter the bribery of members of Congress mined after consultation with both in order to win favorable rrearment South Korea and Japan." The for South Korean inrerc:srs. In rhe mutual defense treaty and commit wake ofKoreagare, few politicians ment of American airpower might rose ro defend the Seoul regime. Joe Wood wrote case studies at stay, but US troops should go home. the Kennedy School of Governmenr. Carter had firsr made chis promise At the end ofJune 1950, North right afrer declaring his candidacy, in Korean ranks and troops, guided by an interview wirh Copyright 1996 by rhe President and Washington Po1t Soviet operational plans and acting Fellows of Harvard College. with rhe endorsement of both Stalin co 978 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25
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Few analysts worked on Korea, and'' those who did had little intelligence data and China's new Communist leader, on to base. good position co defend irsdfwith Mao Zcdong. streamed southward which any out American hdp. 5 across the 38th par.illd that had judgments. divided the cwo Korean nates. The That is what rhe analySts rhoughc, ro Truman adminisrrarion had rhe extent they considered che situa responded in three ways. Washing tion in Korea. But they had nor ton commitred American ground thought about Korea very much. forces ro repel the North Korean According to Evelyn Colbert, the arrack. backed by a UN resolution. Ir decision on withdrawing troops, and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) nor to entertain ''the ~ibility of 6 also ordered irs ships to sail becween for East Asia from 1974 until 3 Taiwan and mainland China in reversing the decision. Of course, March 1977, US intelligence order to thwart a feared invasion by the White House was not heedless of resources in the early 1970s were China across the Taiwan suairs, a the continuing danger of an attack focused on Vietnam ro the exdusion commitment later codined into a from North Korea, still ruled by the of other Asian nations such as Korea. Mutual Defense Treaty signed with same man--Kim 11-sung--who had Few ~alysrs worked on Korea, and Taiwan. And Washington ordered ordered the 1950 invasion. Bur the those who did had little intelligence more miliraty assistance to the White House judgment turned on a data on which ro base any French forces in Indochina fighting crucial presumption: South Korea . judgments. 7 Increasing the collec rhe nationalist and Communist could now defend itself without tion effon would nor make a huge rebds led by Ho Chi Minh. American ground forces. This panic· difference because North Korea was ular presumption was also an issue perhaps the toughest of all targets for As President Carter rook office, all rhat engaged the attention of the American militaty intelligence: it was three commitments were being intelligence agencies of the US~ arr entirelydosed society. defectors undone. America's military commit Government. and travelers were few and far ment in Indochina had been becween, and irs Army was known to extinguished in 1975, along with the deploy forces in ways that revealed South Vietnamese state. Carter and Intelligence Estimates on Korea: little to ourside observers. 8 Added to Bnczinski planned to terminate the 1970..77 all this was a transfer of responsibil Mutual Defense Treaty and break ity for determination of rhe Korean formal diplomatic rdations with T ai In 1979, the US Intelligence Com order of barde 9 from the disbanded wan in order to normalize: relations munity (I C) generally agreed that Army Paci6c Command co the with mainland China. Finally, Career Nonh and South Korean forces Defense lnrelligence Agency (DIA) entered office determined co keep his appeared ro stand in rough balance, in the mid-1970s, during which promise to withdraw the 42,000 wirh neirher side able ro attack the some organizational confusion was American uoops then deployed in ocher successfully. 4 This estimate inevitable. 10 South Korea guarding a cease-fire helped rhe Nixon administration line that marked the gains of three decide to withdraw one-third of the The result, according to one former years of barde against North Korean, 60,000 US rroops rhen in piace in senior defense inreJiigence officer, Chinese, and some Soviet forces, South Korea, as part of rhe Nixon was that the IC generally took the fighting that had cost more than Doctrine to encourage self-suffi 1970 estimates and drew a line for 33,000 American lives. Though ciency in defense in developing ward in time at a constant rare of Carter's Secretaty of State, Cyrus nations. Most government intelli growth in order to arrive at the Vance, worried about the campaign gence analysts agreed that, based on present year's estimate: for North promise, Carter had repeated it in a wharcver information they could Korean forces. The experts were press conference after the election gather, US croops were not essential pretty serried in rhcir conviction that and remained firm. When Vice Presi to the !Wiitary balance in Korea. North Korea was not a serious denr Mondale made the firsr Moreover, the South's higher popula threat. 11 Those who remembered administration visit to East Asia in tion was thought to pur it in good the Korean war would nor necessar February 1977, Carter instructed stead for long-run economic competi ily contradict this view, because they him to only inform the alarmed tion with the North, and thus in a would recall rhat the war had Japanese of the new Presidem's desrroyed most of the Norrh Korean CQ 78 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 carter
Acmy and in its last ye2ts had been Armstrong was not especially enthusi whom he briefed on his findings, but fought mainly against the Chinese. astic, however, about his initial SRD Army officers in Korea were very Now that Carter and Brzezinski were wk. The Acmy leadership realized interested. placing an extraordinarily high prior that Korea was not receiving much ity on normalizing rdations with the attention from the IC and turned to Armstrong then went to the CIA and Chinese, was there any real threat SRD to determine if problems might OIA offices responsible for Korea to from the anachronistic North exist in current estimates, especially propose a joint venture for a one Korean regime? in the military orders of batde. Acm year project to try ro bound the srrong knew, like mosr analysts, that North Korean Army's siu:, setting In the intelligence agencies, compla Korea was a backwater for the lC, plausible maximum and minimum cency began to erode in 1974. and he resisted the assignment. But totals. The CIA analysts seemed Economic analysts noticed that sub the Army prevailed, and Armstrong interested but too pressed by other stantial amounts of North Korean embarked on what would eventually matters co focus such effort for a sus economic production, such as con become more than three years of tained period; only a few were crete and steel, could nor be "basic, dirty-hands intelligence looking at Korea. Armstrong went accounted for unless they were being work." back to the Army and persuaded used for undetected defense pur them to give him the dedicated ser poses. After the fall of Saigon in The nature of SRD allowed Arm vices of six analysts. Thk ream 1975, rhe IC shifted some assets Strong to focus on one subject turned to che area of artillery and, from Indochina to assess the situa intensivdy for as long as necessary to for 14 months, "nailed down every tion in North Korea. and the linear complete comprehensive analyses. gun in the country." Using Arm projections from a presumed base of He dug out several years' worth of strong's method of reviewing all past suength which had prevailed for originatsource materiatuSedln c::Sti::. sourCe:: information for several years half a decade began to seem low. 12 mating the Korean order of battle. back and examining all sources simul As Armstrong discussed his work taneously, they worked out an Ar about the same time, John Arm with othet analysts, he found a gen estimate, formerly documented at strong, an Army officer with eral bdief that the Korean estimates the rcgimenrallevd, down to the experience in Southeast Asia and cre were poor, but there was little levd of individual gun batteries. dentials as a China specialise, was in bureaucratic interest in correcting Again, the team conduded that the midst of an extensive review of them. Others in the Community North Korea had much greater the intdligence information that had were surprised that Armstrong wouJd strength in artillery than previously formed the basis for US estimates of have the time for so much pure thought. 14 rhe North Korean order ofbude. research on a topic of such low Armstrong was assigned in 1974 to priority. In late 1976, Gen. John Vessey the Army's Special Research Detach assumed command of US and UN ment (SRD) ac the National Security In late 1975, after about one year of forces in Korea. Vessey heard Arm Agency. SRD was an unusual office concentrated effort, Armstrong, who strong's armor estimate presentation · with direct access to the head of had by then left the military ~nd in September 1976 before leaving Acmy intelligence: part of SRD's become a relativdy junior (GS-12) the United States, and he Iacer testi function was to serve as a chink tank civil servant in the Pentagon, circu fied that "this study impressed me of sorts and a place the Acmy could lated the first installment of his with che innovative inrdJ.igence tech go for judgments involving intelli study. He conduded that North niques which were applied. " 15 In gence matters. The environment was Korean tank forces were about 80 January 1977, Vessey, after an<;>ther unstructured; the management percent larger than previously esti Armstrong briefing, sent a message encouraged freewheeling explora mated. He also found an entire tank to various leaders in the defense intel tions and creativity. Direct access to division (about 270 tanks and I 00 ligence community calling for rop levels of Acmy intdfigence meant armored personnd carriers) within heightened efforts in order-of-battle that feedback was quick and mean I 00 kilometers of the demilitarized estimates and, more critically ac that ingful, contributing co high morale, zone (DMZ) separating the two juncture, on the problem. of judging even enthusiasm, among SRD' s Koreas. Acmsrrong got little initial how much warning the United analysts. !3 reaction from those in Washington St~tes might have before a possible 0 97 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 . Csrtet
Carter's promise to withdraw US'' troops &om Korea had been repeated North Korean :mack. 16 Washington Korea, the United States has trans· was becoming more receptive. time and again. Carter formed its presence in Asia from a Throughout 1975 and 1976, the gen~ knew what he had said, and land-based posture to an offihore eral thrust of Armstrong's he meant it. posture. This ... provides the United. assessments was confirmed by other States flexibility to determine at the intelligence agencies, while more dan~ rime whether it should or should not 2 ger signals appeared. North Korean get involved in a focal war." ' runnels under the DMZ had been discovered in 1974 and 1975. 17 A The American move also was a reac CIA study argued that the firepower tion co South Korea's domestic in North Korean divisions had option of cancding'' the withdrawal politics. It signaled the erosion of US 22 grown. 18 Assessments of North was nor on the table. Career him~ backing for Park Chung Hee and his Korean military strength were self announced. in March 1977 that , repressive policies, thereby conceiv revised upward. all ground forces were to be with ably inviting worried South Korean drawn in four or five years. American officers to stage a coup. 26 According to Colbert, by the end of tactical nuclear weapons in South the Ford administration the IC con· Korea would also be withdrawn. It The IC was certainly aware of the sensus was that the North Koreans was left ro a White House spokes juxtaposition berween Carter's were militarily superior ro the man co add that the withdrawal pledge and its revised and more wor South. !9 The generally accepted would be carried out carefully so as risome estimates about North numbers put North Korea ahead of not to upset the mili~ balance on Korean miJirary strength. Afrer South Korea in almost all types of the Korean Peninsula. Carter won the Democratic nomina equipment: North Korea was tion in 1976, he asked Director of thought to lead in tanks by a ratio of In June, the administration reiter Central Intdligence (DCI) George 1.5:1, and in artillery and armored ated the four~to-6v~year timetable Bush for CIA briefings on topics of personnd carriers by 1.9: l. Only in lOr the pullout of American ground priority. Colbert and her fellow personnd was South Korea assessed combat troops, emphasizing that NIOs proposed through Bush that as superior, with 560,000 rroops as American airpowcr and America's Carter lisren to the latest assessments compared to North Korea's security commitments to South on Korea, bur Carter never chose 450,000. 20 More impomnt, the Korea would continue. It was also rhar topic for a briefing. Afrcr Carter character of North Korean forces announced thatSouth Korea would won the general election, Colbert appeared more offensively oriented be compensated with a package of sent a memo to Ford'se outgoing 24 than before, and all these rrends had increased military aid and credits. National Security Adviser Brent been moving in this direction since Defenders of Carter's plan argued Scowcroli: noting the substantial 1970. that they were just extending the increases in recent estimates of logic and the s~lled Nixon Doc North Korean strength and the rrine of letting Asians defend upward trends in the North's mili Carter Tries To Implement His rhemsdves. Also, American troops tary capability since 1970; the memo Promise would no longer be hostages to possi~ drew no rcs~nse from transition ble provocative acts by South Korea's personnel. 2 Reportedly, on Bush's Carter's promise to withdraw US Park Chung Hee. An official last day as DCI (weeks into the rroops from Korea had been repeated explained that, "the President cannot Carter adminisrrarion), he sent time and again. 21 Carter knew what evade the choice of going to war or Carter another memo saying rhe Prer he had said, and he meant it. The nor because our Air Force will still be idenr was wrong in his judgt!!ents on campaign promise began to become chere. But he will not be forced into [he basis for the withdrawal. 28 policy when it was reiterated during committing ground troops without the Carter transition. Vance rold his the support of the Congress and che Still, some experts both inside and Assistant Secretary of State for East public." Privately, however, a Presi ouuide the US Government thought Asia, Richard Holbrooke, that rhe denriaJ Review Memorandum on chat, with irs robust economy, South formal policy review could consider defense planning was arguing that, Korea would be able to make up for different rates of withdrawal, but the "Once rhe US land fOrces are our of US withdrawal by increasing iu mili~ CQ58 978 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25
TheJCS favoted a much longer phasing'' out of troops if a withdrawal had cary budget. The drawdown during American commitment in che the Nixon administration had been to occur. region, when in fact America's inter accompanied by a US pledge co aid ests and opportunities there were in a five-year $1.5 billion moderniza potencial" greater than ever tion of the South Korean armed before. 34 forces. It was also undernood that, coupled with Carter's plan Brzezinski recalls lirtle support for announced in June, there would be a Within the State'' Department, the withdrawal among the defense generous military aid package, which Vance's deputies were split. Philip and foreign policy community, even was initially set at over $800 million Habib, the Under Secretary of State in early l9n. Brzezinski himself says of miliwy equipment and nearly for Political Affairs, fdt South Korea he was not consulted before Carter's $300 million in arms credits, as well was "in a position to piclt up more of pledge, and he was initially indiffer as a promise to increase the US Air the action" of its own defense, and ent to the idea. Once in office, the Force presence by at least a squadron the US forces remaining after the question in his mind quicltly became of 12 F-4 fighters. 29 withdrawal (aircraft and some Army how to appear to withdraw just support troops) would provide a suf enough to meet Carter's commit Furthermore, of the 42,000 Army ficient deterrent. For Habib, though,. ment without damaging security on personnel in Korea, only about the withdrawal was "not a fundamen the Peninsula. 35 Michael Armacost, tal issue, .. and it attracted litde of his 1),000 were combat soldiers in the 33 who handled Japanese and Korean US 2d Infantry Division. As com cime and energy. But at the next issues on the NSC staff and later as a pared with South Korea's Army of level down, Richard Holbrooke, deputy assistant .secretary of defense more than 500,000, the American Assistant Secretary of State for East in the Carter administration, agrees numbers seemed tiny. With Carter Asian and Pacific Affairs, worried less that most decisionmakers had reser facing budget shortfalls and runaway about calculations of the military bal vations about the withdrawal at the inflation, removing an Army division ance than about the overall political outset, but none fdt Strongly enough from Korea would save money, espe context in which the withdrawal about the issue to take on the new cially if it was diminated rather than would oceur. After the collapse of President's program. 36 Some in the relocated. Certainly the fear of hav South Vietnam, American confi policy community blamed Brzezinski ing the division disbanded may have dence was low and irs stature as a for not actively opposing the with galvanized Army resistance to the Pacific power was threatened. Hoi drawal in interagency meetings; withdrawal plan. 30 The general cli brooke (whom some remember as an others, including Brzezinski, claim mate of opinion was more advocate of withdr.twal early in the that his rupport was intended only to influenced, though, by a widdy circu process who later distanced himsdf protect the President and to find a lated Congressional Budget Office from the decision) saw the major way to fU1611 Carter's pledge in form report confirming an even military flaw of the withdrawal policy imple without damaging the rubstance of balance in Korea, apparently relying mentation as the failure to anticipate £he American presence. 37 on older data. 31 A relevant official at its impact as a symbol to other coun the White House's Office of Manage tries in the region. US policy for the The Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly ment and Budget recalls thar in early Far East in the Carter years would opposed the withdrawal at 6rst, fear I9n, even though some estimates face numerous challenges, including ing both its effect on the military discussed a North Korean buildup, movement toward normalization of balance and the laclt of political intelligence and defense representa relations with the People's Republic resolve it might signal to North tives at interagency meetings would of China, reassurance for Taiwan Korea. The net effect, they reasoned, not say conclusively that South after that normalization, base negoti could be dangerous for deterrence. Korea was unable to srop a North ations with the Philippines, and The JCS favored a much longer phas Korean attaclt north of Seoul with shoring up the security relationship ing out of troops if a withdr.twal had out American assistance on the with Japan. Holbrooke saw the with to occur. They ulrimatdy supported ground. Absent such an assertion, dr.twal as objectionable co aU these the four- to 6ve-year withdrawal the revised estimates drew only a "1o countries because it would be per plan as imposing a "higher but whar?~ from the budget watchdogs. 32 ceived as a measure of declining acceptable" risk if accompanied by
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T urne1' sensed in the CIA an attitude'' that the withdrawal policy substantial US militan' aid and presented dangerous changes to make the annex less ori equipment transfers. 3 But, when risks. ented coward equipment numbers or asked by Congressmen what military "bean counts" and more revealing of rationale the JCS had been given for true war-fighting capability. For the withdrawal by the administra example. Turner recall~ that the table tion, rh:i consistently answered, on naval equipment included some 9 "None." draw." Mondale seemed amused, North Korean ships that were of lit and he reminded'' Abramowitz rhat de combat utility and did nor One early, adamant, and consistenc highlight South Korea's real naval he and Carter had recently won an 45 opponent of che croop pullout was election, and they indeed could with strength. General Vessey. Vessey was "unalter draw American troops if chey ably opposed" to Carter's decision; wished. 41 Some annex: authors who worked he asked ro see Secretary of Defense under Turner felt that, when the Harold Brown in JanLWY 1977, just The IC did make the military trends annex: turned into a National Intelli after Carter's inauguration, to in Korea evidenr in the intelligence gence Estimate (NIE), Turner · explain the risks he saw inherent in a annex to the policy review document "slashed away at the draft ... with US withdrawal. Vessey rold Brown for Asia, Presidential Review Memo offensive, not rdevanr remarks." thar the US ground forces were essen Some felt che new DCI was ~oliticiz randum (PRM) 13. Colbert and 6 tial ro the military balance on the other analysts who worked on the ing the intelligence process. Peninsula and thar removing them annex recall that ir concluded North Turner attributes these reactions to would be especially damaging to Korea was superior or well ahead in his own inexperience in supervising Korean morale as weJI as to broader many areas of armament. 42 A later the NlEs that would go our with his American foreign policy objectives in Congressional report noted that the signature. Moreover, Turner sensed the region. Brown was sufficiently annex "indicated the static balance in the CIA an attitude that the with persuaded by Vessey's views, and he had shifted in favor of the North. •43 drawal policy presented dangerous arranged for the general to sec the The annex went further than most risks. Bur he felt that, while South President immediately. Caner lis intelligence esrimares in char it Korea "did nor have a piece of cake tened carefully to Vessey and explored some areas of what is usu on its hands," rhe risk of withdrawal indicated thar, contrary to press spcc ally considered "net assessment," was nor alarming. To Turner, the ulacion, no final decision on a pointing to growing doubts about policy represented a political det.:i withdrawal had been taken. Career South Korea's ability to repel an sion. Administration decision added that no such final decision attack from rhe North without US makers underscood the risks involved would be made before he talked with troops; the PRM as a whole, how and had jud¥ed rhem ro be 4 Vessey again. A little over a monrh ever, coed the administration line accepcable. later, Caner's announcement rhat and concluded that the South could rhe rroop withdrawal was now Ameri mount an effective defense just with Neverrheless, several IC officials can policy "came [to Vessey) as a believed thar intelligence that ran 40 American air, naval, and logistic shock." support. 44 contrary ro rhe withdrawal policy was "not well received" by Career's Vessey recalls hearing from a senior Adm. Sransfield Turner, a classmate early appointees ar Defense and Pentagon civilian official, Morton of Carter's at rhe US Naval Academy State. In one early NSC meeting, rhe Abramowitz, that the policy was an in Annapolis, took over as DCI in PRM-13 annex:, in particular, drew announced Presidential decision to March 1977. PRM-123 was one of fire from budget officials, who be carried our faithfully by the his firsr problems. Turner knew of argued char it was "our of order" Defense Department. Abramowitz, rhe President's commitment to with because it had not been coordinated however, was typical of those who drawal, and he initially supported rhroughout the IC (the annex: was publicly supporred the President but rhe policy. He gave the annex consid rhus upgraded ro anNIE). Turner privately opposed the wirhdrawal. erable attention and senr it back to ulrimately accepted the basic conclu He told Mondale, while the Vice rhe analysts for several revisions. sions of the annex in NIE form, President was rraveling co Japan in Turner, new co his role, sought although some elemenrs of milirary February 1977, rhat "we can't with- 8 78 co Approved for Release: 2012/07/25
intelligence added footnotes that and a turn toward democracy less nese privately continued to sound challenged Turner's revisions. 48 likely. St this theme after Carter entered office.
Japan had publidy expressed skepti In Congress, the reactions ro the Rcacdon to the Withdrawal cism toward the withdrawal before withdrawal policy were mixed. On Polic:yt 1977-78 Carter took office and responded by the one hand, influential members of promising consultations before rhe the Senate and House opposed the Almost as soon as it was announced, policy was finalized. Carter continu withdrawal. On the other, many in Carter's withdrawal policy ran into ally stressed that American security Congress were disinclined to support public difficulty ar home and abroad. commitments would be unchanged South Korea in any manner because 52 South Korea opposed the withdrawal by rhe withdrawal. But the Japa of the Koreagate influence-peddling in every available forum. Korea had nese were offended when Mondale scandal. In lace 1977, anger at South been badly shaken by the American arrived in February t9n with news Korea peaked. Some even speculated loss in Vietnam, where Korean of the forthcoming decision. They thar not only would Congress sup troops had also fought. One reporter correctly felt chis approach consti port withdrawal but also thar wrote that, "the spectacle of Ameri tuted notification rather than the Carter's proposal to compensate 53 cans scrambling off the roof of their promised consultation. The Japa South Korea with American weapons Embassy in Saigon (leaving rhe nese had long supported an and other military aid would not entire South Korean Embassy staff American troop presence in both pass. 56 Certain blocs in Congress behind) induced a mood of pessi their own country and Korea, and were more adamant rhan Career on mism unparalleled since the Korean they feared chat American with human rights, and these favored aid war. " 49 Korean officials stressed the drawal from Korea might be the next cutoffs and uoop reductions in order trends which American intelligence srage in a general American draw to punish the Park rcgim.e. Opposi had noticed indicating the North's down in the region that would open tion to the compensatory aid buildup, adding that their own intel the way for greater Soviet or Chinese package: linked those who were ligence estimates were even more influence. Carter and Japanese Prime against any withdrawal (and there disturbing. They emphasized the Minister Fukuda met in Washington fore the compensation for it) and deterrent role ofche American pres in March and issued a joint commu rhose who were against any aid at all ence, pointing our the dire nique agreeing chat the withdrawal to Park's government in Seoul. Influ consequences of the last American would "not endanger peace" in ential members of the Senate Foreign • pullout in the late 1940s. They Korea and reiterating American Relations Committee an9 Armed argued chat Kim IJ Sung dearly determination ro maintain security Forces Cominitree opposed the with 54 inrended to reunify the Peninsula on in the region. But, in private, the drawal, including Democratic his own rerms, using military force if Japanese continued to express doubts Scn.uors Nunn and Glenn, and possible (an evaluation shared by about the withdrawal, while being Republican Senators Percy, Baker, some in the American I C), and chat careful not to arrack Carter in public. and Javirs. These men took forceful the United Scares would be abandon positions in meetings with adminis..; ing a loyal ally with unfavorable, The Japanese had an unexpected ally trarion officials. 57 Senator Percy possibly disascrous, strategic results in the People's Republic of China. warned Holbrooke chat he would in the region. Some officials hinted Kim 11-sung had long cried to play "forge: a united Republican opposi- darkly rhar South Korea might have China and the Soviet Union against tion to the withdrawals." 58 The to develop nuclear weapons to com one another ro maximize eeonomic Senate as a whole refused to endorse pensate for the lack of American and military assistance. As early as the policy in June J977 and asked troops. 50 Even dissidents such as 1975, the Chinese had quietly let rhe President ro seek Congressional Kim Dae Jung rallied to the govern American diplomats and visimrs approval for the withdrawal. 59 ment's side in encouraging the know that, propaganda decrying Senator Glenn in particular traveled United States to leave ground troops American "imperialism" notwith and researched rhe issue extensively in place. Dissident groups held pro standing, rhey were nor unhappy in I9n and prepared a report in tests co argue that wilhdrawal would with the American presence in cooperation with former Democratic invite war and increase fears that Korea, given its connraining effect presidential candidate Senator would make an end to martial law on Soviet activity there. 55 The Chi- Hubcn Humphrey. The report was published in January 1978, shortly cos 597 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25
In rrud.tummer 1977, Carter reacted'' to the growing criticism by 68 after Humphrey's death, and it sending Secretary of replaced rhe 1953 armistice. Secre emphasized that the shifting mi!iwy tary Brown assured Congress that the balance in Korea demanded a contin Defense Brown to Seoul to withdrawal would be carried out ued American presence. The revise the withdrawal only if the military situation in Humphrey-Glenn assessment of rhe Korea warranted ir.69 This was no military balan~ was pessimistic: schedule. change in his position; he had said that the military situation allowed When m61111mJ by ft"fJtiWn for a withdrawal. But it left a conve only, the balant~ hill shifoJ nient door open for a reversal of the ftom rough parity in 1970 UJ a policy if the critics of it inside the Jefiniu aJvantage for the North administration had become uneasy in 1977. .. ./Givm the projmeJ stronger North Korea;'' he was con about the decision m withdraw. 1977-82 Force fmprovrrnmt cerned that administration officials According co Evelyn Colbert, who were basinff; the withdrawal on out had returned to the Srate Depart Pacltag6, inclutiing US Army 3 equipment transfm Juring wirh dared data. Singlaub was ment from her NIO position in immediately recalled by President drawallevm North I DIA had taken a large cut in analysts due'' to Vietnam, and Korea had been Abramowitz, rhe political coso of the neglected. suggesred that national leaders were policy in Asia seemed to mount. "being misinformed by ... overly con These rhrcc:.: met regularly as mem~ servative assessments of [North bets of rhe "East Asia Informal, .. Korean Army} srrengrh," and request together with Donald G regs of rhe ing a major elfon to correct the CIA and ochers. To this group, the problems. One recipient described policy was developing in an "ad hoc" '' the message as a "barn burner. "79 fashion, "sprung on our allies" with the Korean troop withdrawal."76 By The same monrh, DIA held a rou our consideration of irs impact on 1978, Caner had bcc:.:n forced to tine conference in preparation for a other foreign policy objectives. They retreat from several foreign policy ini joint Korea-US intelligence meeting. thought the withdrawal was "bereft ti.uives, induding demilitarization of The conference heard reports of of strategic purpose." While the men the Indian Ocean and dcc:.:p curs in changes in North Korean military were aware of rhe milirary trends on strategic nudear arms. Carter and dispositions and of increased activity the Peninsula, rhey were less alarmed Brzezinski had a "frank conversa near the: DMZ. These patterns, com over the military threat than the bined with Vessey's message. staned tion" over the problems of the 80 political costs abroad. One member withdrawal at least once in 1978. a DIA investigation. The Army of the "Informal" recalled that v~ Carter was still determined to salvage gave Armstrong more resources to sey's posicion was "not talcen roo continue his infantry work. 81 73 the withdrawal over the resistance of seriously." the bureaucracy, and Brzezinski con tinued to scc:.:k a formula that would According to General Tighe, DIA's . Yet by early 1978, there was "liule fulfill Caner's campaign pledge. 77 product on Nonh Korea before 1978 difference of views among agencies• was "skimpy and mtally inadequate." in the negative evaluation ofrhe pot. Tlghe,wllom some thought to be a ·icy on political or military grounds, The Army's 1978 Study strong candidate eventually to or both. Brzezinski continued to sup become DCI, had firsthand experi port the withdrawal at some After Armstrong had completed his ence as a user of DIA's estimates interagency mcc:.:tings, often the only tank and artillery studies, the next when he served as J-2 (chief intelli person to do so. He explains that he logical srep was to work on infantry. gence officer) to Pacific Command was just trying ro kcc:.:p the President For North Korea, this would be an from 1972 to 1974. DIA: had taken a from having ro override the unani large cut in analysts due to Yiemam, 4 extremely difficult problem. Infantry mous view of his advisers.7 units had lime equipment associated and Korea had bcc:.:n neglected. Korea Nathanid Thayer, who rook over as with themA and troops were difficult was getting analysis as good as that NIO for East Asia after Colben, to coum. 7 But the results of the ear for any other small region, but the recalls thinkit~g that, "Brzezinski did lier studies suggested chat the effort work was "very sloppy" and dearly not quite know what to do with the required could be worthwhile. Gen lacked sufficient resources. There issue. Everyone below was tellin~ eral Vessey certainly agreed. After were organizational problems him the withdrawal was cr:u.y." working rhrough the implications of throughout the agency aS weH: Tighe Armstrong's anillery study,· Yessey recaUs there was "'a general resistance BI"ZCZinski recalls recognizing that pressed the deficiencies directly with ro youth and new ways, (with] lots of there was "very lircle disagreement Air Force Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, tired people who were ill-equipped within the system that the with to spread out from rhe Soviet the new DIA director, when Tighe 82 drawal was an unwise idea." Like visited Korea on an orientation tour. Union. " DIA's reputation among others, he was reading intelligence After hearing Armstrong's condu irs consumers within rhe Defense reports on the North's military sions on the magnitude of the Depanmenr was no betrer. A former buildup and hearing of the political information void, Yessey followed member of the Office of Net Assess costs of the policy. Brzezinski, how up in January 1978 with a message ment (ONA) described DIA during ever, sent Caner a memo in to Tighe and others in defense inrdli this period as a "stodgy bureaucracy. December 1977 warning chat rhe US gence detailing the problems in If you wanted innovative work. DIA position in Asia scc:.:med to be unrav putting together a good estimate of was the last place you'd go.''83 eling and urging Carter to press for rhe Non:h Korean order ofbatde and "the preservation of the integrity of 78 Approved for 2012/07/25 carter DIA, chen, recognized the order-of About four days after Armstrong sene Armstrong's Army superiors sensed a battle problems pointed our by Ves our his results, he was leaving for the truly major imelligence event in the sey, bur it was not in a posicion to golf course to enjoy his first day off making. and rhey trusted Armstrong respond quickly co correct them. in months when his telephone rang. as an extremely hard worker and a Armstrong and the SRD, however, Admiral Turner, the DCI, wanted to creative analyse. Armstrong asked for were already well into a pilot study hear Armnrong's briefing rhe next a team of 30 ro 40 analysts to be of North Korean infantry by January day. Armstrong immediately jumped assembled in Washington; Arm 1978, and they pushed ahead with well up his chain of command and strong would select the ream rhe strong support ofVessey and the obtained the approval of the Army's members from the Army's mosr expe Army's own senior intelligence offic top intelligence officers. After all, the rienced Korea analysts all ove·r the ers in Washington. 84 Moreover, results had been our for nearly a world. Such a program would because chis was a ground force ques week, so briefing the DCI should require by-name requests for person tion in a theater dominated by the not surprise anyone. Besides, me nel (a prohibited practice in the Army, there was a certain logic in the senior national intelligence official Army u rhe time) and would rake Army's taking the lead even though wanted the story, and they had to analysts away from cheir permanent DIA had formal responsibiliry for respond. 87Armstrong briefed Turner jobs for nearly five months. The estimating rhe North Korean order the next day, and what followed is a major general in charge of Army of battle. Armstrong continued co legend in some analytic circles. intelligence, John Rolya, took Arm develop hi& methodology of purring Turner reportedly saw Defense Secre strong ro explain the plan ro the all-source analysts together with tary Brown char night at a parry and Army Vice Chief of Staff. When the ocher specialists co find signatures for asked Brown about the situation in Vice Chief seemed doubtful, the gen infantry units. Given the pauciry of Korea. Brown was surprised, as he eral cQmmenred on the seriousness · clear-cut evidence of numbers and had nor heard the briefing;~The nexr of the situation and on his faith in organizational structure in the day at work, Brown supposedly Armstrong; ro make his poinr dear, North's Army, this approach was called Tighe co ask why the DIA he threatened to resign. Although thought to be highly innovative and director had nor told Brown of Arm rhe Vice Chief hinted that the resig uniquely able to solve the difficult strong's findings and why rhe Army nation might be accepted, the next problems of assessing North Korea. 85 study was necessary ar all if DIA was day Armstrong was told co start get doing its job on the order of barrie. 88 ting his team together. 91 Armstrong's ream began by focusing on one key region of North Korea to Armstrong briefed Tighe and his dep Armstrong's team worked from June search for infantry, and in May 1978 ury a few days Iacer. Tighe does not through October, putting in 80-hour they published their flrsc dramatic recall being angry or surprised by weeks in a review of all available findings. Armstrong claimed co find Brown's original questions on the material on rhe North Korean armed three divisions and one brigade in ·report, bur several attendees at the forces for several years back, and, in . this single region that were not part briefing from borh the Army and some cases, as far back as the Korean of the US order-of-battle estimate. D lA disagree. 89 Tighe asked several war. Absent an immediate crisis, put When Armscrong wrore up these questions of Armstrong, seclcing ring together a 35-person ream with results, he nored his new methodol proof char the units Armstrong had such "high-densiry expertise" on ogy and suggested that rhis finding fOund were nor parr of an el:olborate Korea and rhe willingness ro work so was rhe "tip of the iceberg." Arm shell game of deception (the degree intensively for several months was strong briefed his study "aJJ over ofTighe's displayed skepticism varies possible only in a military service. rown" in Washington and created a depending on who is retelling the DIA and CIA were charged with vali stir ar the middle-management levd story). In the end, Tighe compli dating the Army's work, buc, even of the I C. 86 The results, if they were mented Armstrong and assured with additional resources from their borne out and extended ro other him of complete DIA cooperacion.90 own agencies, these shops were hard regions in the North, could clearly Soon after, Tighe himsdfbriefed the pressed to keep up. 92 have an impact on Gitter's with JCS, chaired by Air Force Gen. drawal efforrs and would thus be David Jones, who was quietly fight The Army leadership followed Arm controversial among policymakers. ing the troop withdrawal within the strong's progress closely, and General bureaucracy. Tighe rreared it as usubject number C0 58 97 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Carter one" for DIA, though this was a rime Former members of ONA, part of Like General Tighe; Armstrong of growing concern about Soviet the civilian-run Office of the Secre anticipated his study would receive worldwide political and military tary of Defense, saw that, while severe scrutiny because of Carter's behavior as well as an acrive period Armstrong's workers were reporring withdrawal commitment, and he in US-Soviet nuclear arms comrol major troop-level increases, DIA was planned ways to ensure rhe accuracy negotiations.93 1ighe also estab assuring Pentagon officials the num and viability of his findings. He also lished a Korea Consultative Group bers would not change by more than realized rhe Army would 'be viewed ro improve Communiry coordina I 0 percenr. 98 ONA decided to per highly skeptically as a source of new tion, which he put under his Army form its own srudy on Korea, and numbers on Korea, given the institu dcpury to assuage Army fears of the Army numbers seemed to be tional inrerests'ar stake. Armstrong interservice rivalry. 94 Bur coordina credible and dangerous (an opinion set out ro make his methodology and tion quickly became a problem and they passed direcdy to Secretary rc:sulrs "visually impressive to an analytic arguments were laced with Brown). One ONA sraffer could not observer of any experience levd." 103 birrer personal rivalry. understand how DIA could remain Those who warched Armstrong's so "skeptical and criricaJ" of Arm ream were "amazed" at rhe exrraordi~ Armstrong believed that OIA, embar strong's srudy when char study was nary depth of the study and the rassed by his earlier findings, had a "more comprehensive than any simi- lengths ro which the!< went to docu stake in discrediting his team. He felt lar effort [he had} seen."99 ~ ment their findings. 04 A DIA rhar he had to answer numerous irrel officer called Armstrong's effort the evant questions propagated by DIA DIA's perspective was very different. "mosr vigorous scutwork" based on for the purpose of slowing, or even Tighe knew this issue was extremely "incredible derail." damaging, the Army effort and that sensitive politically, and he DIA was misleading rhe Community demanded hign standardS ofevi Nevertheless, working with consider in rhe process. His team was also rela dence in all analysis. According to ably fewer people, DIA analysts tively junior, which raised eyebrows Alan MacDougall, a senior analyst in thought that Armstrong was slow ro regarding irs credibility and forced DIA's Korea branch, Tighe's policy provide the marerial they needed for Armstrong to respond {Armstrong was to say nothing "unless we could their validation. MacDougall felt himself had been promoted but was defend it to the death. " 100 Lt. Col. . that Armstrong's work was "sloppy" only a GS-13).95 Others in the Com Harry Tear, the Army officer who at times and chat Armstrong munity, watching from outside rhe headed the Korea branch and led the demanded high srandards of others Army or DIA, agree that DIA's ques DIA validation effort, knew "Tighe while he allowed himself short· 10 tions often seemed "idiotic" and did not wam this overblown." Tighe cuts. ' Tear was skeptical of perhaps designed to hold up insisted on conclusive proof for the Armstrong's much-touted methodol progress, although these could be new findings and felt that one refuta ogy of identifying units; Tear attributed co a lack of familiarity tion of any part of the study by a rhoughr it "was good for marketing with rhe material or to miscommuni Congressional or White House bur overly simplistic.'' 106 Arm cation.% Thayer, the NIO, also staffer would endanger the entire strong's method also required its sensed some "footdragging" at DIA. effort. Tighe was closely involved in customers to "take a lot on faith," He was initially told the validation "quality control" ofTear's work and because he was putting together would rake a year and a half. Again, insisted on "the fastest pace possible strands of information to connect dis this slowness could be rraa:d either consisrent with accuracy and the persed units into larger to ill will or ro bureaucratic need for conclusive proof." 101 organizational elements. These con sluggishness. 97 According to Alan MacDougall, nections were "not easy to feel or Tighe determined "to put his impri rouch."107 With such doubts in Although Tighe recaJis accepting matur on any Dep~menc of mind and Tighe's instructions to pur early on that the order of battle Defense Korea estimate" and fdr he sue conclusive evidence, the DIA would require substantial upward "had to assert DIA's primacy" as the analysts proceeded cautiously on the revisions, ochers who read DIA prod legitimate: lead organization for validation. Armstrong, in turn, rook ucts over the summer of 1978 defense intdligence. 102 the slow pace as proof rhar DIA was noticed that the agency was slow to :mempring to undermine his effort. incorporate Armnrong's findings. 97 co Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Carter DIA analyses also felt the Army lead The coordination procedure became forces appeared ro be: deployed ership's inrerest in rhe study had as very personal and bitter. Participants nearer the DMZ than previously much to do with the potential loss of at the working level uniformly recall thought and in such a-configuration a four-scar command in Korea as the: episode as the "nastiest" in their to suggest offensive intent. Addi with a search for an accurate order of careers. DIA analysts came to resent tional tanks and artillery had been battle. This insrirutional interest was, deeply what they saw as Armstrong's found, and the late-1978 estimate on they theorized, what really drove the arrogance:, and Armstrong resented ranks was 35 percent higher rhan rhc: Army's seemingly frenetic pace. · rhdr questioning his every conclu~ I 9n estimate while artillery and Tear, himself an Army officer, found sion. Accusations of lying and other armored personnel carriers were up himself caught between his DIA unethical behavior were traded. 110 by 20 percent (the 19n figures had posicion and the Army; former MacDougall saw his subordinates partially accommodated Armstrong's "green-suit" colleagues refused to begin ro seek ro disprove Arm earlier findings). 112 Armstrong and acknowledge his presence at strong's work just to cut him down others were careful to point our that meetings. to size. But both sides insist rhar the these increases were the result of upper levels of their own agencies steady growth throughout the decade Everyone interviewed, from the remained aloof from rhe personality that was only now being detected, Army, DIA, or elsewhere, agreed that conflicts, yc:t immersed in the results not from a sudden surge in North Armstrong was an exceptionally capa of the studies. Indeed, Tighe remem Korean acquisition. ble analyst with enormous energy bers trying co convince some of his and, unusual for an analyst, a flair analysts that Armstrong's work was for showmanship in briefing. He was in fact a new and better depatture The New Estimates Find an tremendously self-confident and from traditional techniques. Audience driven by his work, and he enjoyed srrong personal relationships with a It fell ro rhe CIA's Korea office, in its After his May briefing from Arm~ number of the Army's top brass and Directorate of Intelligence, to arbi strong and as the studies proceeded with Vessey in patticul.ar. He was trate disputes, a function that it over the summer of 1978, DCI also a talented manager of large genetally performed effectively. DIA Turner remained skeptical of the projects. These qualities were the analysts felt the Army had co-opted Army's work. Turner felt "skewered" 111 stuff of his inirial successes and his the CIA ream. CIA analyses recall by .the new estimate. Only partly high standing in the Army, and tho/ a dose but questioning relationship aware of the battles taking place at allowed him to garner such superior with the Army group. The CIA team the analytic level between DIA and resources for his summer 1978 afro felt that DIA seemed to want rhe Army, he was bothered that no study. But these characteristics were the two agencies to join forces one: seemed ro be looking critically at accompanied, in the opinion of some against the Army, a situation CIA Armstrong's method. The whole esti observers, by a low tolerance for carefuJly avoided. mate was based on a series of views different from his own; one sequential seeps of deduction, and no observer described his "fatal flaw" as By October, the Army results were one was pointing to uncerainties in 108 a "king-sized ego." Armstrong in, and they were impressive. Accord assumptions about numbers of could be "confrontational: leading ing ro press and Congressional troops or arms per division. Turner some senior officials at DIA to avoid accounts, Armstrong's ream con would like to have seen "diffc:renr 10 dealing with him direcdy. 9 His cluded rhat rhe real size of the North estimates of chose variables to show willingness to "advertise widely" his Korean Army was at least 550,000 to chis [assessment} was not a point products further annoyed some ana 600,000, perhaps a one-third solution and to give some range of lyses. Stansfield Turner, although he increase from the previous estimate possible outcomes. No one under does nor remember Armstrong by of 450,000. Armstrong repotted stood the [concept of] probabilities name, noted in his diary, "My skepti these were only rhe troops they defi or uncertainties." Turner had cism on this estimate {is] probably nitely could idenrify; more were insisted on rhe CIA and DIA val ida from [theJ briefer's [having] too likely present in rhe North's forces. cion efforrs, and he discussed several much self-assurance and More important, rhe number of rimes with Secretary Brown his con salesmanship. a ground maneuver divisions jumped cerns that the "double checks ... were from 28 to 41. Most crucially, the: not very thorough." Turner was also co 978 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Cartllf Only Brz~inski, among the President's'' senior advisers, continued to bothered chat he lacked the time he favor the withdrawals. Another imagined how rhe study felt he needed to rrlunge into the would affect the pullout but saw lit macerial himself. 13 tle change to the "dynamics of the siruarion." Nevertheless, these men CIA analysts credit Turner with were happy to have the new estimate pushing for a fair, unbiased esrimare as another cool with which to fight with all the details accurate; all were rhe withdrawal·. Some immediately aware of the imporcance of the issue. '' saw the news as the possible justifica IfTurner fdr insufficiently versed in tion for a Caner reversal; the the details of the validation, his ana Iran hostage crisis and after the estimate would provide a face-saving lysts recall that he was closely Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). means for Carter to account for relax involved and asked specific questions ing his campaign commitmenr. 120 In about the evidence for each North Carter had long been hearing from public. however, they continued co Korean unit discovered in the study. both the military and the civilian speak as if rhe withdrawal were a fore During 1978, Turner's skepticism bureaucracy that the troop with gone conclusion. In a December receded as a CIA study confirmed drawal from Korea was a bad idea, 1978 speech in New York, Hoi the Army results within 8 to 10 per and the pullout had gone through brooke described the phased puHout cent, and Turner himsdf began to many setbacks and delays. Only plan and spoke glowingly of future brief the new resultS co national lead 3,500 to 4,000 .soldiers had been US-South Korean rdatioru. 121 ers. Br1.e'tinski recalls chat Turner withdrawn by the end of 1978, and Whatever he may have said in the came in "with a serious int:eUigence much of chat number represented privacy of the East Asia Informal, report with serious implications" for only attrition achieved by nor replac Holbrooke gave no hint of it in the withdrawal, but Career showed ing personnel as normal rotations public. 116 Jitde reacrion. 114 ended. Secreraty of Stare Vance recaJled that "Each time Harold In January 1979, the essential thrust According to Brzezinski, by late 1978 Brown and I tried to raise the subject of the Army study was leaked to The and early J 979, Carter was less con with the President, we found him Army Times and quickly picked up cerned with che details of the Korean adamant. Only Brzezinski, among by other major newspapers. The military balance chan with other trou the President's senior advisers, con report renewed the public contro bled foreign policy commitmentS. He tinued to favor the withdrawals. versy over the withdrawal. They also rook the intelligence seriously, bur Luckily, the depth of the disagree brought into the open some skepti only up to a point: the new studies ment within the executive branch cism that che Army estimate was did not reveal an imminent attack. never became public, although there biased to hdp preserve rhe four-star 117 Brzezinski was convinced that a bud were a fi:w flurries. " command in Korea, an attitude ding strategic relationship with strengthened by rhe fact that the rele China was the key to creating what If the White House was preoccupied. vation came in a newspaper with he called a Carter Doctrine in or unmoved, military leaders took dose but unofficial cies to the Army Asia. 115 Early 1979 promised a rhe new study as further evidence and with no track record of investiga major battle with Congress over the chat US troops were needed for deter tive journalism involving dassified Carter administration's plan ro with rence. Vessey and JCS Chairman data. But insiders noticed the dual draw from the Mutual Defense Gen. David Jones both added the signal being emitted when The New Treaty with Taiwan and ro break off dramatic new numbers ro their York Times correspondent could 118 relations with Taipei, a plan that arguments. write that, "White House officials Brzezinski persuaded Carter to place said that the study was unJikdy to ahead of any other major action on Members of the East Asia Informal, affect the pace of the American with foreign policy in Congress during concerned with the political implica drawal, but some said privately they 1979-even the SALT II US-Soviet tions of the withdrawal, recall their were disturbed rhar Mr. Carter's deci arms control treaty (a fateful choice, skepticism on hearing of the Army sion had apparently been made on because SALT II ultimately could study. One felt the new numbers the basis of inadequate not be rarified in 1980, during the might be "hoked up" to help the intdligence.» 122 Army forestall the withdrawal. 119 8 5 7 co Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Carter Cuter immediately ordered CIA and rhus faced opposition from the mili first topic, arguing against it for 45 DIA to examine the study, a project tary and the bureaucracy and what minutes. Vance recalls feeling "the they had already undertaken. The amounted. to a revolt within his own temperature in the room drop as combined results would come party in Congress. Park continued .... Sitting berween together in a Special National Intelli the President and Harold Brown, I gence Estimate (SNIE) in the spring The results of the SNIE were largely could feel the con rained anger of rhe of 1979. a foregone conclusion. 125 Arm President, but there was nothing to strong's findings were essentially be done but let the drama play itsdf Shortly after the The Army Times confirmed. Most policymakers agree out." 128 Carter then talked privately story, Senators Nunn, Glenn, Byrd, that the outcome for the policy was with Park on human rights issues and Hart completed a 13-month also a foregone conclusion, even and then, back in his limousine, study of the US defense posture in before' the end of 1978. The cumula turned on his advisers. rhe Pacific and submined their dve reaction of key advisers, report to Senator Stennis, the Chair Congress, the military, and the Carter was furious. The motorcade man of the Armed Services bureaucracy left Carter isolated, and stood stalled for blocks extending Committee. This "Pacific Study the political costs of that isolation from the Ambassador's residence as Group" included the most respected made the policy untenable. Accord Carter "unburdened himself" Senate expens on defense from the ing to Hoi brooke, "'If the bean (Vance's phrase:). Carter fdt isolated, President's own party and covered a counting had gone the other way, we opposed by all his advisers except wide spectrum of political leanings. stiU would have found a reason to BI'U2.inski. He threatened to The report included the new num . suspend the withdrawal." announce a decision then and there bers on the North Korean Army and to press ahead with the withdrawal. flatly recommended halting the But the new assessment was clearly a His advisers tried to calm him. troop withdrawal. The report factor. It made enough of an impres Brown and Vance joined the Ameri concluded: sion on Secretary of State Vance thar can Ambassador to Seoul, William he devoted a paragraph to the esti Gleysteen, "in pointing out rhe vast The rtiiJStnmmt casts grave mate in his memoirs, concluding difficulties that we faced in carrying doubts upon the vaJitlity ofta,... that, as a result of the estimate leak our rhe policy as originally lin judgTfUnts about tht nature ing to the press, "the President was announced and the benefits that ana stability of the Korean mili not happy, feeling that his hand was would accrue from irs swpension, tary balance'that fo~ui the being forced," which Vance thought especially in li~ht of the new intelli 126 29 basis ofthe administration i deci was rrue. In Aprill979, the JCS gence figures." Jion in 1977 to withdraw US formally reco~mended the pullout ground troops ftom Korell. More be "swpended" pending another As Career rested, Vance and his aides review of rhe Korean military bal let rheir Korean hosts know of ovtr, the prnmt plans for 127 withdrawal wiJJ cost the United ance in 1981. Carter delayed Carter's anger. That evening, the Statn httwem $1.5 ana 2.5 hiJ making any final decision. Carters were entertained by a dc:Jight Iion without reducing tht ful Korean chorus that included in Carter still did not like hearing of prohability ofimmediate US its repertoire "Sweet Georgia the necessity for suspension as he Brown," and Carter was visibly more comhat involvtmmt in a foture 130 123 traveled to Korea in July 1979 after a rdaxed. A few weeks later, back in Korean conflict. G-7 economic summit in Tokyo. Washington, Carter decided to sus His advisers recognized the Presi pend the troop withdrawals. The The results of the report were dent's sensitivity and senr word to written White House statement reviewed at a White House lunch in President Park not to raise rhe issue accepred the JCS recommendation the cabinet room with Carter, Secre with Carter in their first meeting. that the withdrawal \lias suspended taries Brown and Vance, and the: Park ignored the warnings, perhaps unciJ 1981, "when the riming and Senators. Each Senator, including feeling chat the security of his coun pace of further troop cuts in Korea Hart who had earlier been open to try took precc:dence over Carter's [would] be reexamined." In rhe Presi rhe policy, indicated he could not 124 reluctance to discws his Korean pol dent's statement, rhe first of the support the withdrawal. Carter icy. Park made the withdrawal his three reasons offered for the new 201 co 8 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Carter decision was "recent studies by rhe NOTES intelligence officer in the structure Intelligence Community. •l3l :u that rime. 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Three months later, in October Principle: Memoin oftht National 14. Armstrong. 1979, Park Chung Hee was assassi S«UrityAdviser 1977-1981 (New nated at a private dinner by his own York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, rev. 15. TestimonyofGen.John Vessey, ed., 1985), p. 7. lmpaa oflnte/Jigm« Reassasrnmt on chief of intelligence. America moved WithtlrawJ ofUS Troops from an aircraft carrier closer to Korea. sig 2. Interview with Brzezinski, Washing· Kortll, Hearings, Investigations Sub naling the North not ro cake ron, DC. 24 February 1989. committee, House Armed Services advantage of the change of power in Committee, 21 June and 17 July 132 rhe South. Thirteen months later, 3. Cyrus Vance, Harrl Choices: Critical 1979, p. 64. Ronald Reagan was elecred Presi Ytan in America i Fortign Policy dent. The 198 I review of the (New York: Simon & Schuster, 16. Vessey testimony and interview, withdrawal suspension passed virtu 1983), p. 128. Gen. John Vessey, Washington, aHy unnoticed. Reagan subsequendy DC, 21 March !989. appointed General Vessey to be JCS 4. Interview with Evelyn Coberr. Wash ington, DC, 23 February 1989. 17. Russell Spurr, "Fingers on the Trig Chairman. ger,~ Far Eastern Economic &view, 5. !hid. 4 July 1975, p. 28. Ten years after The Army Times leaked the results of Armstrong's 6. NICs are the senior intelligence 18. Interview with CIA analyst, Wash 1978 study, The Washington Post experts in their regional or functional ington, DC, 9 February 1989. reported in January 1989 that, after special des. They arbitnue IC dis,. extensive review, American intelli putes on issues within their areas and 19. Colberr. gence had just raised its estimate of act a$ liaisons between policymakers Nonh Korean ground forces from and analyses. 20. AJI numbers here taken from testi 750,000 to 930,000. The results mony of Rep. Les Asp in, I mptUt of were attributed to "improved meth 7. Colbert. lnte/Jigmce Amssmmt, pp. 5-6. ods of estimation." I.B In 1995, the 8. Interview with John Armsrrong, 21. US Senace, Humphrey-Glenn 2d Infantry Division remained in a Washington, DC. 9 February 1989. Report, US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea under democratic rule, the Republic ofKorea, Report to part of a contingent of more than 9. An order of batde is a systemic tabu Senate Foreign Relations Commie 33,000 American troops. American lation of numbers and locations of tee, 9 January 1978. tactical nuclear weapons were with personnel and equipment fur a given drawn from South Korea in 1992 as nation or military unit. They are usu· 22. Vance, Hartl Cht:!kn, p. 128. part of a global, unilateral initiative ally divided functionally into from President Bush to retire these ground, naval. and air orders of 23. Richard Halloran, "Carter Sees Pull battle. anachronistic weapons. Yet the US out From Korea by 1982," The NtW York Timl!l, 10 March 1977. troop presence endures, even being 10. Interview wirh Dick Nelson, Wash P· 9. temporarily reinforced in 1994 dur ington, DC, 9 February 1989. ing an international crisis triggered 24. The NtW Yo'* Timn, 6 June 1977. by revelations that the North had II. Interview wirh furmcr senior DIA been conducting a clandestine and official, Washington, DC. 10 Febru 25. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, illegal program to build nuclear ary 1989. "PRM-10 and the Korean Pullout," weapons. And Jimmy Carter Tht Washington Post, 7 Seprember returned ro Korea. But chat is 12. Colbert interview. 1977. another story. 13. Armstrong. SRD had direct access 26. Richard Halloran, "A Parcial US both co the Commander of Pullout from South Korea Now INTSCOM, rhe Intelligence and Seems Inevitable," Tht New York Security Command, and to rhe Times, 27 February 1977; see also Assistant Chief of Sraff for l melli rhe analysis by Don Oberdorfer in gence, or ACSI, the Army's senior The Washington Po1t, 12 June 1977, p. Al5. 7 Approved for 2012/07/25 Cal1111 27. Colbert. 48. Colbert. 68. Th' Nnu Yorio Timn, 27 April 1978. p.6. 28. Senior DIA official. 49. Spurt, "Fingm: on tN TriKZ"." 69. TIM New Yor• Timn. 27 July 1978, 29. TIM New Yorl Timn, 23 February 50. TIM Washington Port. 27 May 1977. p.7. 1978; TIM Washinpm Post, p. I. 22 April 1978. 70. Colbert. 51. Th, Worhington Pott, 27 May 1977, 30. Interview with Henry Shaw (senior p.8. 71. TN New York Timn, 13 December official ar: the Office of Manage 1977. p. 4. ment and Budget under Carter), 52. TN Nnu Yorl Times, I 0 December 21 February 1989. 1976. 72. TN New York Timn, 19 February 1978, p. 3. 31. Th, Nnu York Timn, 19 May 53. Holbrook 1977. p.A4. 73. Abramowitz. Armacosr, Holbrooke. 54. TIM New Yorl Timn, 5 April1977. )2. Shaw. 74. Brzezinslci. 55. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten. 33. Interview with Philip Habib, Th' Washington Post, 24 February 75. Interview with Thayer, 14 April 23 April 1989. 1976. 1989. 34. Interview with Richard Holbroolce, 56. Th, Washington Post, 26 Ocrober 76. Brzezinslci co the President, Weeldy 13 April 1989. 1977. memo #39, US Position in Asia, 9 December 1977, abstracted in 35. Brzezinslci. 57. Holbrook Brzezinslci, Puwer and Principk, Annex II, p. .560. 36. Interview with Armacost, Washing· 58. Vance:. Hartl Choi~n. p. 129. ron, DC, 20 March 1989. 77. Brzezinslci. 59. Th, New YorA> Timn, 18 June 37. Brzezinslci. 1977, p. 4. 78. Armstrong. 38. TMNew York Timn, 14 July 1977, 60. Humphrey-Glenn report, p. 47. 79. Vessey testimony; Asrnsrrong. P· 7. 61. House Armed Services Commirtee, 80. Interview wirh Gen. Eugene Tighe, 39. Vessey testimony and inrerview. Invesrigarions Subcommittee San Diego, 31 Masch 1989. Report, Rwinu oftlw Polity Jheision 40. Vessey. to Withdraw UnitNI S~.tttn Growui 81. Artnsrrong. Form from Korta. 26 April 1978. 41. Holbrooke. Confirmed in inrerview pp. 3. 8-9. . 82. Tighe. with Morton Abramowitz. Wash ington, DC, 14 April1989. 62. TM Washington Post, 19 May 1977, 83. lnrerview with Barry Warrs, p.Al4. 10 February 1989. 42. Colbert. 63. /but 84. Artnsttong; Vessey testimony. 43. Humphrey-Glenn Report, p. 20. 64 .. TM Worhington S~.ttr, 25 May 1977, 8.5. Artnsuong and others. 44. Colbert. P· I. 86. Armstrong. 45. Interviews with Sran.slidd Turner, 65. TIM N4W Yorio Timn, 23 May 1977. 20 February and 3 March 1989. 87. Allll$ftong. 66. TN New Yorio Timn, 27 July 1977, P· l. 46. Former senior inrelligence official. 88. Several analyst~~ offi:red coruisrcnt versions of this nory. Turner does 47. Turner. 67. 711, Nm1 York 11ma, 22 April not recall che incident, but he 1978, p. L 7 co Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 Carter thinks it plawible. Tighe thinks the 107. Turner; senior DIA official. 122. Richard Burt, "New Srudy Raises party dcmencs are plausible, bur he Estimate of North Korean Army docs nor recall derails. 108. Senior DIA official. Srrengrh," TheN~ York Timts, 4 January 1979. 89. Eyewitness descriptions of Tighe at 109. Tear, MacDougall. the briefing, from Arm! and OIA 123. US Senate, Report oftiH Pariftr officials, include dlivid , and 110. MacDougall. Stutiy Group to the OJmmitt« on "dearly hot. w Tighe's reaction dur Armetl Snuirts, 23 January 1979. ing and after the briefing was I 11. MacDougall. described, again from both Army 124. Holbrooke. and DIA sources, as •a11 hell broke loose." I 12. The exact numbers vary among the open reports. These figures are 125. CIA analyst; Armstrong. DIA did not complete its review by the 90. Tighe, Armstrong. taken &om TM Ntw Yor! Timn, 21 January 1979, p. 15. See also rime the SNIE was published, but TM Army Timn, 8 January 1979, ics objections at chat paine were 91. Armstrong. p. I; The WaJhington Post, 4 Janu small. ary 1979, p. I; and, most 92. Interview wirh Alan MacDougall, comprehensively, Rep. Aspin's tes 126. Vance, Hartl Choktt, p. 129. Washington, DC, 9 February 1989. rimony before rhe HASC Investigations Subcommittee, 127. TheNtw York Timn, 18July 93. Tighe and interview wirh Gen. Ed which gives rhe final figure as 37 1979. p.A4. Thompson, Kennebunkport, divisions. 27 March 1989. 128. Vance, Hart/Choim. p. 129. 113. Turner. 94. Tighe plays down such rivalry in 129. lbitl, p. 130. retrospect. bur several arudyscs recall 114. Brzezinski. ir was a concern at the rime. 130. Holbrooke; Vance, HarJ Choices, 115. Brzezinski to rhe President, p. 130. 95. Armstrong. Weeldy memo 175, "Our Asian Policy-or the Making of a 131. DepanmnuofSuteBulktin, 96. CIA analyst; Colbert. Carter Doctrine," 13 October September 1979, p. 37; The Ntw 1978, abstracted in Brzezinski, York Timn, 21 July 1979, p. 3. 97. Thayer. Power arui Principk, Annex H, p. 563. This memo does not men 132. The Ntw York Times, 27 October tion Korea, or even Japan. 98. Armstrong; also Ndson; also inter 1979, p. 1. view with Andrew Marshall, Brzezinski's singlcminded focw on China prompted Carter, Washington, DC, 24 February 133. The Washinpn Post, 26 January 1989. though he was rhe policy's spon sor, to note on rhe memo: 1989, p. A20. "Zbig-you have a tendency to 99. Nelson. a air PRC issue." 100. MacDougall. 116. The Washington Post. 4 January 1979, p. 1. 101. Interview with Harry Tear, 23 Aprill989. 117. Vance, Hartl Choim, p. 129. 102. Senior DIA official. 118. Holbrooke. 103. Armstrong. 119. Abr:unowia, Armacost, Hoi brooke. 104. Nelson; CIA analyst. 120. Thayer. 105. MacDougall. 121. Depamnmt ofState Blllktin, 106. Tear. February 1979.