78 Ct) Approved for 201 AC8SII Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea (U) Joe Wood Editor's Nou: Since 1987, the Central editors in January 1975. and he had lnu/Jigtna Agtncy has fontkJ a pro­ kept repeacing it. gram with the john F. Kennedy School ofGowmmmt. Harvard Univmity, Though Bruzinski Iacer described on /nuOigmce anti Policy. Under this the origins of Career's promise as a program, which is managed by GA i "mystery nor yet unravded," 2 South Cmur for the Study offnteOigmce, the Korea was nor popular in America in Kennedy School conducts semi1111.n anti 1976. It had been ruled for 15 years tkwlops ca.u studin that help i/Jumi- by an autocrat, Park Chung Hee, 7fii.U isiU41 reiA.teti to the use of who deale ruthlessly and, ar rimes, Carter was determined to inuOigmce by policymaltm. This case bloodily, with popular dissent. Park put greater emphasis on was writun in 1996for had been ruling by martial law since '' Profosson Ernest May anti Philip 1972, and his inreUigence agency America's commitment to Zelikow. had kidnapped opposition leader the protection of human Kim Dae Jung. At least Kim was On 23 June 1976, Jimmy Carter, only in prison: ocher opposition fig­ rights, and he sharply candidate for President of the U nitcd ures had been lcllled- un~ aiticized the apparent past States, stepped before a gathering in mysterious circumstances. Carter was New York sponsored by the Foreign determined ro put greater emphasis policy of backing any Policy Association. He was ready ro on America's commitment ro the dictator that promised to deliver his campaign's major state­ protection of human rights, and he fight Communism. ment on the policies he would sharply criticized the apparent past pursue around the world if be was policy of backing any dictaror that elected in November. The carefuHy promised to fight Communism. So prepared speech was veered by rhe next sentence in Carter's June Career's campaign advisers on for­ 1976 speech, after his promise ro eign policy, led by a Columbia withdraw American ground forces University profe$50r and former from South Korea, condemned the '' Scare Depacrmenc official, Zbigniew South Korean Government's "repug­ Bruzinski. The address "foreshad­ nant" oppression of inte.rnal dissent. owed many of [Carrer's\ actions and To make matters worse, in rhe fall of concerns as President." It included 1976, the South Korean Govern­ a promise ro reverse 26 years of US ment was direccly implicated in a policy and "withdraw our ground Washington scandal, dubbed forces from South Korea on a phased "Koreagate" by the press, involving basis over a time span to be deter­ the bribery of members of Congress mined after consultation with both in order to win favorable rrearment South Korea and Japan." The for South Korean inrerc:srs. In rhe mutual defense treaty and commit­ wake ofKoreagare, few politicians ment of American airpower might rose ro defend the Seoul regime. Joe Wood wrote case studies at stay, but US troops should go home. the Kennedy School of Governmenr. Carter had firsr made chis promise At the end ofJune 1950, North right afrer declaring his candidacy, in Korean ranks and troops, guided by an interview wirh Copyright 1996 by rhe President and Washington Po1t Soviet operational plans and acting Fellows of Harvard College. with rhe endorsement of both Stalin co 978 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 'carter Few analysts worked on Korea, and'' those who did had little intelligence data and China's new Communist leader, on to base. good position co defend irsdfwith­ Mao Zcdong. streamed southward which any out American hdp. 5 across the 38th par.illd that had judgments. divided the cwo Korean nates. The That is what rhe analySts rhoughc, ro Truman adminisrrarion had rhe extent they considered che situa­ responded in three ways. Washing­ tion in Korea. But they had nor ton commitred American ground thought about Korea very much. forces ro repel the North Korean According to Evelyn Colbert, the arrack. backed by a UN resolution. Ir decision on withdrawing troops, and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) nor to entertain ''the ~ibility of 6 also ordered irs ships to sail becween for East Asia from 1974 until 3 Taiwan and mainland China in reversing the decision. Of course, March 1977, US intelligence order to thwart a feared invasion by the White House was not heedless of resources in the early 1970s were China across the Taiwan suairs, a the continuing danger of an attack focused on Vietnam ro the exdusion commitment later codined into a from North Korea, still ruled by the of other Asian nations such as Korea. Mutual Defense Treaty signed with same man--Kim 11-sung--who had Few ~alysrs worked on Korea, and Taiwan. And Washington ordered ordered the 1950 invasion. Bur the those who did had little intelligence more miliraty assistance to the White House judgment turned on a data on which ro base any French forces in Indochina fighting crucial presumption: South Korea . judgments. 7 Increasing the collec­ rhe nationalist and Communist could now defend itself without tion effon would nor make a huge rebds led by Ho Chi Minh. American ground forces. This panic· difference because North Korea was ular presumption was also an issue perhaps the toughest of all targets for As President Carter rook office, all rhat engaged the attention of the American militaty intelligence: it was three commitments were being intelligence agencies of the US~ arr entirelydosed society. defectors­ undone. America's military commit­ Government. and travelers were few and far ment in Indochina had been becween, and irs Army was known to extinguished in 1975, along with the deploy forces in ways that revealed South Vietnamese state. Carter and Intelligence Estimates on Korea: little to ourside observers. 8 Added to Bnczinski planned to terminate the 1970..77 all this was a transfer of responsibil­ Mutual Defense Treaty and break ity for determination of rhe Korean formal diplomatic rdations with T ai­ In 1979, the US Intelligence Com­ order of barde 9 from the disbanded wan in order to normalize: relations munity (I C) generally agreed that Army Paci6c Command co the with mainland China. Finally, Career Nonh and South Korean forces Defense lnrelligence Agency (DIA) entered office determined co keep his appeared ro stand in rough balance, in the mid-1970s, during which promise to withdraw the 42,000 wirh neirher side able ro attack the some organizational confusion was American uoops then deployed in ocher successfully. 4 This estimate inevitable. 10 South Korea guarding a cease-fire helped rhe Nixon administration line that marked the gains of three decide to withdraw one-third of the The result, according to one former years of barde against North Korean, 60,000 US rroops rhen in piace in senior defense inreJiigence officer, Chinese, and some Soviet forces, South Korea, as part of rhe Nixon was that the IC generally took the fighting that had cost more than Doctrine to encourage self-suffi­ 1970 estimates and drew a line for­ 33,000 American lives. Though ciency in defense in developing ward in time at a constant rare of Carter's Secretaty of State, Cyrus nations. Most government intelli­ growth in order to arrive at the Vance, worried about the campaign gence analysts agreed that, based on present year's estimate: for North promise, Carter had repeated it in a wharcver information they could Korean forces. The experts were press conference after the election gather, US croops were not essential pretty serried in rhcir conviction that and remained firm. When Vice Presi­ to the !Wiitary balance in Korea. North Korea was not a serious denr Mondale made the firsr Moreover, the South's higher popula­ threat. 11 Those who remembered administration visit to East Asia in tion was thought to pur it in good the Korean war would nor necessar­ February 1977, Carter instructed stead for long-run economic competi­ ily contradict this view, because they him to only inform the alarmed tion with the North, and thus in a would recall rhat the war had Japanese of the new Presidem's desrroyed most of the Norrh Korean CQ 78 Approved for Release: 2012/07/25 carter Acmy and in its last ye2ts had been Armstrong was not especially enthusi­ whom he briefed on his findings, but fought mainly against the Chinese. astic, however, about his initial SRD Army officers in Korea were very Now that Carter and Brzezinski were wk. The Acmy leadership realized interested. placing an extraordinarily high prior­ that Korea was not receiving much ity on normalizing rdations with the attention from the IC and turned to Armstrong then went to the CIA and Chinese, was there any real threat SRD to determine if problems might OIA offices responsible for Korea to from the anachronistic North exist in current estimates, especially propose a joint venture for a one­ Korean regime? in the military orders of batde. Acm­ year project to try ro bound the srrong knew, like mosr analysts, that North Korean Army's siu:, setting In the intelligence agencies, compla­ Korea was a backwater for the lC, plausible maximum and minimum cency began to erode in 1974. and he resisted the assignment. But totals. The CIA analysts seemed Economic analysts noticed that sub­ the Army prevailed, and Armstrong interested but too pressed by other stantial amounts of North Korean embarked on what would eventually matters co focus such effort for a sus­ economic production, such as con­ become more than three years of tained period; only a few were crete and steel, could nor be "basic, dirty-hands intelligence looking at Korea.