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Andrew Nam Phd.Pdf (1000.Kb) ABSTRACT Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the One and the Many: A Platonic Quest for Existential Unity Andrew S. Nam, Ph.D. Mentor: C. Stephen Evans, Ph.D. The dissertation argues that Kierkegaard’s major philosophical works overall offer faith in Christ as the only genuine solution to ‘the problem of the one and the many.’ The problem lies with the apparently contradictory properties of ‘being’ (e.g., universal/particular, infinite/finite, etc.), that—speaking most generally—everything has the same being insofar as it exists and yet each thing has a different being, its own being, from every other. The solution then must be one of ‘dialectical unity,’ the kind of unity that validates both contradictories equally. Kierkegaard argues that the one/many problem is really the problem of freedom, for the very consciousness of the contradiction arises from sinning against God, our self-conscious misrelation of ‘being’ by loving the finite infinitely. Therefore, unity cannot be obtained at the theoretical—metaphysical- epistemological—level, but rather, must be practically realized by becoming a dialectically unified self, achieving ‘existential unity.’ To explain the thesis, I conceptually reconstruct Kierkegaard’s stages of existence theory in terms of this dialectical problem: the contradiction between the aesthetic (capable of affirming particularity only) and the ethical (universality) gets resolved in a higher dialectical unity, the religious. Kierkegaard describes faith in Christ as the self’s final telos, the highest form of existential unity, explaining the final religious stage by comparing and contrasting Christian categories of existence with the corresponding philosophical categories in Plato’s works, specifically meant to address the one/many problem. Three Christian/Platonic counterparts are explained here: (1) the general characteristic of faith as ‘repetition’ vs. the philosophical existence characterized by recollection; (2) the ontological ‘moment’ of the God/man and the epistemological ‘moment’ of faith in Christ vs. Plato’s idea of ‘the instant’ in the Parmenides in addressing the problem of universals; (3) love of the neighbor vs. Platonic Eros. I shall analyze the one/many dialectic in these Platonic and Christian categories so as to clarify Kierkegaard’s claim that only the fully lived life of faith, characterized by a dynamic love relation between God and the self and the resulting progressive revelation of divine love in and from the self, can reconcile the one and the many. Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the One and the Many: A Platonic Quest for Existential Unity by Andrew S. Nam, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation Approved by the Department of Philosophy ___________________________________ Michael D. Beaty, Ph.D., Chairperson Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved by the Dissertation Committee ___________________________________ C. Stephen Evans, Ph.D., Chairperson ___________________________________ Robert M. Baird, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Anne-Marie Bowery, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Robert C. Roberts, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Mary P. Nichols, Ph.D. Accepted by the Graduate School August 2009 ___________________________________ J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean Page bearing signatures is kept on file in the Graduate School. Copyright © 2009 by Andrew S. Nam All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments. v List of Abbreviations. ix Dedication. x Epigraph. xi-xii Chapters I. Introduction: Kierkegaard and the Problem of the One and the Many. 1 1. The Dialectical Problem of Unity in the Self 2. The One/Many Dialectic in the Spheres of Existence 3. Kierkegaard’s Indirect Communication II. Unity of Existence and the One/Many Dialectic in Either/Or I. 25 1. Defining Existential Unity 2. An Aesthetic Attempt at Unity: the Essay on Don Giovanni 3. Assessment of the Aesthetic Attempt at Unity III. Judge William’s Dialectic of Unity in Either/Or II. 55 1. Marital Love and Duty as the Ethical Principle of Unity 2. Assessment of the Ethical Attempt at Unity 3. The Choice of Either/Or as a Perennial Moral Problem IV. Recollection, Repetition, and the Quest for Truth. 99 1. Repetition and Plato’s Theory of Recollection 2. Existential Recollection and the Nature of Truth 3. The Concept of Repetition in Abraham’s Faith iii V. The Moment of Time and the Phenomenology of Sin. 153 1. The Critique of Hegel in The Concept of Anxiety 2. Plato and the Moment 3. Time, Freedom, and Sin VI. The Moment of the God/man and Faith. 187 1. The Metaphysical Moment: Coming-into-existence 2. The Epistemological Moment: Faith 3. The Pride of Man, the Humility of God, and the Moment of Faith VII. The Dialectic of Neighbor Love and Platonic Love. 215 1. Neighbor-love’s Negation of Preference 2. Platonic Love 3. Dialectical Unity in Christ’s Revelation of Love VIII. Conclusion and Further Questions. 251 Works Cited. 257 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The idea for my dissertation was first conceived in a very inchoate form in Professor Stephen Evans’ Kierkegaard seminar in the spring semester of 2005. It was and remains the most electrifying seminar in all of my philosophical training; Evans’ reading of Kierkegaard’s works brought daylight to what had remained for me a mere enigma, the kind of enigma that nonetheless drew me with an irresistible force. He said more than once in the seminar that someone needed to do a dissertation on Kierkegaard and Plato, as we noticed time and time again Kierkegaard’s reference to the Greek philosopher in his pseudonymous works. Since I was becoming more and more Platonic in my philosophical orientation at that time, my ears perked up, and in some sense, I knew this was my task. So it is Dr. Evans who first gave the initial incentive for this project and then saw it through with me to the end, and therefore, I owe him the most in terms of its philosophical content. In particular, his sharp analytical eyes provided much needed criticisms for the work of a rather speculative mind that likes to revel in big metaphysical pictures, but often loses sight of necessary details. There really could not have been a better supervisor for this project. I am truly grateful to Dr. Evans for tirelessly lending not only his Kierkegaard expertise but time and philosophical energy. My project first took a more definite shape when I brought the prospectus research to the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College in the summer of 2006. Gordon Marino, the director of the library then, and Cynthia Lund kindly accepted me as a summer Kierkegaard fellow, providing me with a pleasant living space and a fantastic library. There I met and had numerous constructive conversations v with several fine Kierkegaard scholars. Especially two come to mind. First, I had the privilege of meeting M. Jamie Ferreira, a seasoned Kierkegaard scholar, who has since then become a good scholarly friend and a source of upbuilding at a few important stages of this project. Second, a brief—almost an accidental—encounter with Noel Adams, wherein he shared his dream about my project, has become an occasion for encouragement to me in persisting through it at times when I could not see the end; knowing that writing on the problem of the one and the many was my calling, however often the subject matter eluded my grasp, really made the difference. These individuals I met at St. Olaf thus deserve my acknowledgment of debt. The next phase of my project was carried out at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. The dissertation would have suffered a serious loss in its quality (as well as quantity), had I not had the opportunity to take off the whole academic year 2008-2009 to work on it. Such was made possible by a generous gift from the American Scandinavian Foundation. I am deeply thankful for this fine organization and its support of even such narrowly philosophical projects as mine. Moreover, various people I met at the Center made contributions to my work. I thank the director, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, for inviting me to the Center and providing me with a perfect spot in the library. My supervisor there, Jon Stewart, graciously read and commented on most of the early drafts. Lastly, it was the most fortunate coincidence for me that Bruce Kirmmse, one of today’s most able English translators of Kierkegaard’s Danish, was at the Center at the same time, for he selflessly gave himself to proofreading much of my own translation. vi Next I wish to thank the other members of the dissertation committee at Baylor University, Drs. Baird, Bowery, Roberts, and Nichols. I am grateful for their willingness to help with this project; their insightful comments and questions have improved the quality of the final product. While most of the above individuals contributed to my project’s content in one way or another, my family members—my parents, John and Hannah, my brother Joe, and my sisters, Sarah and Anna—have taken considerable part in offering the spiritual substance to my work by their examples of faith, constant prayers, and periodic prophetic encouragements. (They also willingly subjected themselves to my Kierkegaard rambling.) In particular, my little sister Anna has been an astute conversation partner with her brother, showing her own insightful reading of the author she herself loves so deeply. She also traveled to Copenhagen to encourage me when the whole of Scandinavia plunged itself into bitter coldness and oppressive darkness. Above all, however, I cannot thank my parents enough for their persistent and powerful prayers— and indeed do I sense their efficacy—for they have first won the battle in the heavenly on my behalf. Unlike the poor Silentio, I have had the distinct blessedness to witness the actual living knight of faith, precisely as described in Fear and Trembling, in reference to the man who “looks just like a tax collector”; my father is the most delightfully paradoxical man I know.
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