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America's Stake in Taiwan No. 1996 January 11, 2007 America’s Stake in Taiwan John J. Tkacik, Jr. Taiwan is one of democratic Asia’s most impor- since the end of World War II has been that “as Tai- tant nations: It has a bigger population than Austra- wan…[is] not covered by any existing international lia, a larger GDP than Indonesia, and an advanced disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unset- technology base second only to Japan’s. Taiwan is tled question.” In 1982, President Reagan reaf- America’s eighth largest trading partner and sixth firmed this position, and all subsequent U.S. largest agricultural customer. For over a half cen- Administrations have affirmed this stance. Yet in tury, Taiwan has been one of America’s important recent years, official Washington has averted its defense and intelligence partners, first as a bulwark gaze whenever Beijing declared its right to retake against the Sino–Soviet alliance and now as a part- Taiwan by force. ner monitoring China’s expanding strategic pres- Taiwan’s Strategic Value. Taiwan is a key (albeit ence in the Pacific. unofficial) American defense and intelligence part- But this partnership is in peril as Taiwanese pol- ner in the Pacific astride vital sea lanes. Taiwan’s iticians and voters sense—rightly or wrongly—that military has been America’s second best cash cus- America’s commitment to their democracy is tomer (after Saudi Arabia) for defense equipment wavering. In a vicious circle, an uncertain U.S. and services nearly every year for the past 15 years. commitment undermines Taiwan’s consensus on its However, the Pentagon must also face the reality own defense, which in turn annoys U.S. leaders that limiting Taiwan to a purely defensive posture and policymakers. vis-à-vis China is horrifically—and needlessly— Washington must now contemplate how its expensive. An effective strategy requires that Tai- position in Asia would change if Taiwan were to wan have the deterrent offensive capacity to inflict slip into China’s sphere. If Washington intends to serious pain on Chinese military targets. maintain America’s historic strategy of keeping Would it matter if, through benign neglect or “Island Asia” out of the hands of “Mainland Asia,” it otherwise, Washington acquiesced to Taiwan’s must reassess its policies toward Taiwan and adopt absorption by China? China threatens war if Tai- a set of policies that enhances U.S. interests. Taiwan: Part of China? The central policy ques- tion for Washington is whether to accept that Tai- This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: wan is “part of China” as Beijing insists or to www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1996.cfm maintain—as President Ronald Reagan did in Produced by the Asian Studies Center Published by The Heritage Foundation 1982—that the people of Taiwan will decide their 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE future relationship with China. The U.S. position Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 1996 January 11, 2007 wan does not submit, but would Beijing settle for and still faces the prospect of major program cuts. Taiwan? If Beijing’s threats of war were successful in Nonetheless, Taiwan politicians who advocate a breaking Washington’s commitments in the Taiwan defense accommodation with China certainly must Strait, what would prevent China from declaring at see that it would supplant any security relationship some point that Japan’s continued occupation of with the United States or other Asian democracies. the Senkaku Islands means war? What the United States Should Do. If the “glo- Until Asia’s democracies can rest assured that bal expansion of democracy” is indeed a pillar of Beijing does not seek military preeminence in the American foreign policy in Asia, the U.S. should: region, U.S. strategists should resume their historic • Counter Beijing’s relentless campaign to iso- objective of keeping “Island Asia” out of the hands late Taiwan by strengthening U.S.–Taiwan of “Mainland Asia.” trade ties with a U.S.–Taiwan free trade agree- Is Taiwan a threat to peace? Given China’s myriad ment and by encouraging other democracies to territorial claims on India, Japan, South Korea, and include Taiwan in international health, trans- its other neighbors, one must ask whether China’s port, nonproliferation, counterterrorist, and war threats would end with Taiwan. Moreover, humanitarian relief efforts. given China’s reliance on international manufactur- • Lend moral support to Taiwan’s democracy. ing supply chains, war is clearly no more in China’s Admit publicly that America has a stake in the interests than it is in America’s interests. Colin Pow- survival of Taiwan as a democracy regardless of ell observed that “whether China chooses peace or China’s territorial claims. coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will tell us a great deal about the kind of relationship • Bolster Taiwan’s offensive military capacities. China seeks not only with its neighbors, but with The Pentagon should admit that Taiwan’s strat- us.” In this sense, Taiwan is a touchstone of Amer- egy, based purely on defensive systems, is ica’s commitment to democracy in Asia. expensive and lacks the deterrence of a second- strike, counterforce capability. Taiwan Defense Cooperation with China? In 2005, a top Taiwan politician and Chinese leader Conclusion. America’s strategic position in Asia Hu Jintao issued a joint communiqué declaring is approaching a tipping point vis-à-vis China. that “military conflicts shall be effectively avoided Some believe that America’s only interest in Taiwan so long as there is no possibility that Taiwan moves is to ensure peaceful resolution of the Taiwan toward ‘Taiwan independence.’” Today, some Tai- issue—a policy in which process trumps outcome. wan politicians call for a peace agreement with In 1945, President Harry Truman declared a China whereby Taiwan would agree that it is part of “strong, united and democratic China” to be one of an undefined “one China,” and they suggest that “the most vital interests of the United States.” Two the U.S. wants this as well. Still others hold that out of three is not good enough. Until China is Taiwan does not need to defend itself from China. democratic, the most vital U.S. interest must be to maintain America’s strategic posture in the Western With Taiwan’s defenses becoming obsolete while Pacific, and Taiwan is essential to that strategy. China’s military modernization accelerates, Tai- wan’s military can no longer rely on its technologi- —John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in cal edge to defeat a Chinese attack. Taiwan’s 2007 China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian defense budget faces a mid-January deadline for Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. passage in the opposition-dominated legislature No. 1996 January 11, 2007 America’s Stake in Taiwan John J. Tkacik, Jr. The United States and Taiwan have maintained a remarkable security partnership in the Western Pacific for over a half century, but today this partner- Talking Points ship is in peril. • Taiwan is one of democratic Asia’s key nations: In Washington, there is considerable concern and It has a bigger population than Australia, a confusion about Taiwan’s commitment to its own larger GDP than Indonesia, and an advanced defense. In Taiwan, a much deeper uncertainty among technology base second only to Japan’s. the citizenry about the Washington–Taipei relation- • Taiwan is one of America’s most important ship threatens to undermine their determination to defense and intelligence partners in Asia, keep democratic Taiwan separate from Communist but this partnership is in peril as Taiwanese China. This uncertainty is compounded by the cur- politicians and voters sense—rightly or wrongly—that America’s commitment to rent political turmoil in Taipei surrounding allega- their democracy is less than firm. tions of corruption by members of the president’s family. Beijing’s relentless campaign to isolate Taiwan • In a vicious circle, an uncertain U.S. commit- internationally and Washington’s constant pressure to ment undermines Taiwanese consensus on its own defense, which in turn annoys U.S. abjure “independence” have persuaded influential leaders and policymakers. political leaders in Taiwan to seek an accommodation with Beijing that easily could have the effect of plac- • Washington needs to reaffirm its stake in a ing the island’s security in China’s hands. democratic Taiwan, separate from Commu- nist China. America has an overall strategic Taiwan’s political leaders across the partisan spec- interest in keeping “Island Asia” out of the trum now must make a decision. One choice will lead hands of “Mainland Asia.” to effective disarmament and ultimate union with • If the U.S. continues to let Taiwan policy drift, China. The other will lead to effective deterrence and it should not be surprised as some Taiwan a potential future beyond Beijing’s rule. As Taiwan politicians hint that a security relationship makes its choice, Washington must contemplate how with China may be democratic Taiwan’s its position in Asia would look should Taiwan fall only future. firmly into China’s hands. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: Taiwan: Part of China? www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1996.cfm Among Taiwan’s moderate politicians, there is Produced by the Asian Studies Center Published by The Heritage Foundation hope that Beijing might accept a “one China, differ- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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