THE UNITY of GOD Introduction Monotheism, As a Word, Was Coined

CHAPTER SIX

THE UNITY OF GOD

René Munnik (Tilburg University)

Introduction

Monotheism, as a word, was coined in early modernity.1 It was meant to indicate religions, theologies or religious philosophies that apprehend God as “the one and only One for all.” The “oneness,” indicated by the prefix monos, had, and has, a triple meaning: it stands for God’s unique- ness—the “one and only, and no other”—, it stands for God’s unity— “One, no dividedness, fickleness or struggles within godself”—, and it stands for God’s universality—“for all, not for some.” Strictly speaking, these meanings do not necessarily imply each other, but orthodox “monotheism” generally holds that God is unique and universal because of God’s unity; whereas the gods being “many,” “particular” and “capricious” within and among themselves. Besides, “monotheism” is a word of controversies, in the sense that it is meant to exclude other ideas about God or the divine. Its natural place is within an arena of contested views, like polytheism, pantheism, deism, henotheism and even poly- demonism; all these words, again, being modern words. Hence, the use and meaning of this word “monotheism” presupposes a modern systematisation or taxonomy of different religious phenomena or theological convictions and their mutual antagonisms. It is hard to imagine why a non-Western, non-modern “polytheist” should consider himself as such, although he may in fact venerate “many gods.” It is against the background of the conceptual framework of modern

1 Henry More (1614-1687), a prominent member of the Cambridge Platonist School was among the first who used it. Perhaps he invented the word. Hume knew it and Kant used it in opposition with polytheism (“Thus, among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common understanding.” I. Kant, “Kritik der reinen Ver- nunft, 2. Auflage, 1787,” in Kants Werke: Akademie-Textausgabe IV (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968), 396), whereas Hegel used it mainly in opposition with pantheism. Ironically, such different oppositions certainly did not contribute to the distinctness or unequivocality of this notion of “monotheism.” THE UNITY OF GOD 107 thought that he appears to be one, because the significance of his “polytheism” becomes apparent only within a theoretical one-versus-many conception. Moreover, it is hard to imagine why a non-modern theolo- gian like Aquinas should have considered himself to be a “monotheist,” although unity is in the centre of his metaphysical reflections and theological convictions. It is only in retrospect, from a modern point of view, that we consider him an exponent of “monotheism.” So “monotheism,” not as a religious phenomenon but as a concept, i.e. a way of labelling and valuating religious phenomena, is utterly Western and modern. And this is increasingly true when we arrive at the limits of Western monotheism, which is the subject matter of this volume. Reflection on these limits presupposes a modern understanding of monotheism as a significant religious genre. What does this all mean? It means that an examination of “the limits of Western monotheism” is inextricably intertwined with an understanding of the adventures of the idea of “oneness,” or unity, in modernity. In this contribution I will consider some of these conceptions, starting with Aquinas’s pre-modern metaphysical reflections on unity as a transcendental idea. Next, I will indicate some aspects of the modern concept of unity (Descartes, Kant), and its consequence: the impossibility to affirm a primeval metaphysical unity within the context of contemporary culture, permeated as it is by technoscience (Hara- way). In that sense the post-modern “end of all unity-stories” seems to be the necessary outcome of the modern unity-story itself. In the last section I will propose an alternative, in the sense of an “open unity- story” and a “reformed, inclusive monotheism,” as developed by Alfred North Whitehead.

Unity as Transcendental: Thomas Aquinas

What would “monotheism” mean to Aquinas, if he had known the word? I suppose he would have considered it to be either a tautology or a contradiction. If “-theism” would indicate the faith and belief in the true God of the Christian symbolum, the prefix “mono-” would be entirely superfluous; it would contribute nothing to the conceptual con- tent of “God,” as Aquinas understood it. Hence, a tautology. If, on the other hand, the prefix “mono-” was supposed to add an important qua- lification not inherent in the notion of God, then this presupposed con-