New York State Public Transportation Safety Board Rail Safety Section Abbreviated Report Case Number: 9260

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD RAIL SAFETY SECTION ABBREVIATED REPORT CASE NUMBER: 9260 DATE OF ACCIDENT: February 2, 2007 CARRIER: MTA Long Island Rail Road TYPE OF INCIDENT: Evacuation SYNOPSIS: On Friday, February 2, 2007, at approximately 6:37 p.m., the LIRR movement bureau placed a block on the four main line tracks in the Valley interlocking after the Valley Tower Operator reported that an electrical power wire was hanging low across the tracks. Valley Tower is located in the town of Valley Stream and the power wire from a Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) sub-station on the north side of the right-of-way extends overhead across to the south side of tracks. The wire had sagged to approximately five feet above the Long Beach #2 track; 10 feet above the Montauk #2 track; and four feet above the top of the head car on train #4153 on Montauk #1 track were it had stopped adjacent to the Valley Tower. The wire did not come into contact with the train. The movement bureau established a block on the #1 and #2 tracks of both the Montauk and the Atlantic lines, effectively shutting down traffic through the interlocking. This affected train movement on the Montauk, Far Rockaway, West Hempstead and Long Beach Branches. A total of 14 trains (eight eastbound and six westbound) were delayed between the Hall Interlocking (west of Jamaica Station) and the Merrick Station on the Montauk Branch when third rail power was shut off. Of the above trains, 8 of them stopped within the limits of the Valley Interlocking. There were approximately 4,640 customers on board these 8 trains. Incident Description At approximately 6:34 p.m., the Operator at Valley Interlocking reported to the Movement Bureau that the tower radios were not functioning due to some type of power flip, however, he was able to display signals after a temporary loss of power which reset automatically. At 6:36 p.m., the Valley tower operator reported the sagging wire to the Movement Bureau and that the tower radios were not operating. The tower operator was unable to contact westbound train #4155 by radio to stop it before it entered the interlocking. However, the tower operator was able to stop the train using the interlocking whistle (the interlocking whistle is a whistle station used at many interlockings that allows a block operator in an emergency to contact a train by a whistle signal to tell the train to stop and contact the tower). 1 The downed wire was the property of LIPA and was neither in service nor carrying current before falling. However, after falling, the wire came in contact with a live LIPA 32,000 volt high tension wire strung below it and became energized. Until the power was removed from the high tension wire, which was not grounded, the removal of the wire from the right-of-way was deemed unsafe. A LIPA supervisor on scene informed the LIRR that: . the wires could be carrying a static current charge; . were unsafe to remove until the power was confirmed off ; and . the grounding operation to remove the current could not commence for two to three hours One of the delayed trains, westbound #957 on the West Hempstead Branch was stopped outside the Valley interlocking limit at the home signal and was not affected by the third rail power removal. At 7:07 p.m., the engineer was given permission to make a reverse move east, return to the Westwood Station and discharge the passengers. By 7:20 p.m., the LIRR Lead Transportation Manager on site decided that the delayed trains could safely be moved under and around the downed LIPA wire. A recovery plan was proposed to restore third rail power on the Atlantic, Far Rockaway, and Long Beach Branches to facilitate train movement. All personnel were cleared from the right-of way and the Movement Bureau was contacted to request third rail power to be restored, at which time they were informed that several passengers on two of the other delayed trains in the interlocking had begun to self- evacuate to the roadbed. LIRR rules prevent the third rails to be energized when passengers are on the right-of-way. Passenger Self Evacuations At 7:46 p.m., it was reported to the Movement Bureau that passengers were self evacuating from two trains in the western limits of the Valley interlocking. The train crews reported that approximately 300 to 400 passengers self-evacuated from train #1064 onto Montauk #2 track. The passengers exited the cars by opening doors or by squeezing out between the rubber baffles between cars and climbing down an embankment off the right-of-way. Also, approximately 8 passengers self-evacuated from train #2872 on the Long Beach #2 track to roadbed. Another train, #1158, was stopped on Montauk #2 track adjacent to Rosedale Station and the crew reported some customers from the middle of the train self-evacuated to the platform, but they were unsure exactly how many. The passengers on the longest delayed trains waited approximately 1 hour and 8 minutes before they also started to self evacuate.Railroad crews described conditions inside the cars as stuffy and that most of the passengers were calm, with the exception of a few who were reported to be extremely agitated. MTA Police, who had responded to the location of the downed power line, were redeployed to restore order on the trains. At 8:22 p.m., the MTA Police Department reported that 5 trains in the westerly limits of the Valley interlocking were secured and that no more passengers were self evacuating from the trains. The LIRR Supervisor on scene reported to the Movement Bureau that it was safe to lift the block and move the trains. The modified version of the earlier recovery plan was put into effect and the third rail was energized even though the power line had still not been moved by LIPA. 2 Recovery to Normal Service Third rail power was restored first to the Montauk #2 track, and then followed by the Montauk #1, and the Far Rockaway, West Hempstead and Long Beach Branch tracks. Four eastbound trains stopped on Montauk track #2 west of the down wire were rerouted west back to Jamaica Station. Trains #1152, 162, 1064, and 160, were permitted to move west (reverse) on Montauk track #2 at restricted speed to Jamaica Station. The last train, #160 was reported on the move at 9:06 p.m., and arrived at Jamaica Station at 9:43 p.m. The passengers could change trains at Hicksville for diesel train service to Babylon Station on the Montauk Branch. At approximately 9:31 p.m., train #876 on the Atlantic#2 track was allowed to proceed eastbound at restricted speed under the downed wire and switch on to the Long Beach Branch. Train #2872 followed train #876 on Atlantic #2 track at restricted speed but switched to the Far Rockaway Branch before encountering the downed wire. West bound train #4153 was granted permission to precede west under the wire on Montauk track #1. At 9:39 p.m. a LIPA crew with a bucket truck arrived at the incident location. At 9:45 p.m. all third rail power in the Valley interlocking was again de-energized so the LIPA crew could remove the downed wire. At 9:56 p.m., the LIRR Lead Transportation Manager on site reported that the LIPA wire was removed and requested third rail power be restored to the interlocking tracks. At 10:04 p.m., Valley Tower reported that the tracks are clear of personnel and the block was lifted giving trains authorization for maximum speed. This allowed the last four delayed westbound trains on Montauk #1 track to proceed. Post Incident Investigation: Seven eastbound evening rush hour trains were cancelled after they arrived at the Jamaica Station and their passengers were discharged to the station platforms. In total that evening there were 37 cancelled trains and 17 partially cancelled trains. The LIRR train crews followed procedures in the Employee Timetable and Special Instructions, Appendix B, which states that announcements should be made approximately every five minutes and conductors should walk their entire train to field questions and address any concerns of the passengers. The train crews made these announcements and notified the passengers with as much information that was available to them at the time. The LIRR said that they have no plans at this time to update the emergency evacuation procedures to include self evacuations. No customers or crewmembers on any of the stranded trains reported any injuries. There were no reports of any equipment damage. Since this incident, the LIRR and LIPA have begun an inspection program to identify and repair any wires or power lines that exist along the approximate 130 miles railroad property which may cause a problem in the future. The LIRR is also implementing a remote activated PA system that will allow the Movement Bureau to contact the new M-7 trains through the use of a computer program. This will allow contact with trains when radios are not working or there are other communication problems. Conclusion Since all train crews were giving the same basic statements to passengers, and constantly walking the trains answering questions to the best of there abilities, the PTSB feels that in this case, the location of each train was a factor in whether or not passengers decided to self-evacuate or stay on the train. Two of the three trains that experienced self-evacuations were stopped next to a busy roadway (Sunrise Highway) that passengers could see.

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