A NEW L¨OWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREM 1. Introduction The
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Model Theory, Arithmetic & Algebraic Geometry
MODEL THEORY, ARITHMETIC & ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY JOEL TORRES DEL VALLE 1. LANGUAGES AND STRUCTURES. 1.1. What is Model Theory? Model Theory is the study of the relationship between theories and mathematical struc- tures which satisfies them [11]. Model Theory introduces Mathematical Logic in the prac- tice of Universal Algebra, so we can think it like Model Theory = Universal Algebra + Mathematical Logic. I started this pages with the same question Chang-Keisler started their celebrated book [3]: ‘What is Model Theory?’ They also summarize the answer to the equation above. In this pages I summarize the relationship between Model Theory, Arithmetic and Algebraic Geometry. The topics will be the basic ones in the area, so this is just an invitation, in the presentation of topics I mainly follow the philosophy of the references, my basic reference is [9]. The early pioneers in Model Theory were Leopold L¨owenheim in 1915, in his work ‘Uber¨ M¨oglichkeiten im Relativkalk¨ul’1 there he proved that if a first order theory T that has an infinite model then has a countable model. Thoralf Skolem in 1920 proved a second version of L¨owenheim result, in his work ‘Logisch-kombinatorische Untersuchungen ¨uber die Erf¨ullbarkeit oder Beweisbarkeit mathematischer S¨atze nebst einem Theoreme ¨uber dichte Mengen’2. Kurt G¨odel in 1930 proved his Completeness and Compactness Theorems for countable languages in his Doctoral dissertation at the University of Viena titled ‘Die Vollst¨andigkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalk¨uls’3. Alfred Tarski in 1931 -
Arxiv:1901.02074V1 [Math.LO] 4 Jan 2019 a Xoskona Lrecrias Ih Eal Ogv Entv a Definitive a Give T to of Able Basis Be the Might Cardinals” [17]
GENERIC LARGE CARDINALS AS AXIOMS MONROE ESKEW Abstract. We argue against Foreman’s proposal to settle the continuum hy- pothesis and other classical independent questions via the adoption of generic large cardinal axioms. Shortly after proving that the set of all real numbers has a strictly larger car- dinality than the set of integers, Cantor conjectured his Continuum Hypothesis (CH): that there is no set of a size strictly in between that of the integers and the real numbers [1]. A resolution of CH was the first problem on Hilbert’s famous list presented in 1900 [19]. G¨odel made a major advance by constructing a model of the Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) axioms for set theory in which the Axiom of Choice and CH both hold, starting from a model of ZF. This showed that the axiom system ZF, if consistent on its own, could not disprove Choice, and that ZF with Choice (ZFC), a system which suffices to formalize the methods of ordinary mathematics, could not disprove CH [16]. It remained unknown at the time whether models of ZFC could be found in which CH was false, but G¨odel began to suspect that this was possible, and hence that CH could not be settled on the basis of the normal methods of mathematics. G¨odel remained hopeful, however, that new mathemati- cal axioms known as “large cardinals” might be able to give a definitive answer on CH [17]. The independence of CH from ZFC was finally solved by Cohen’s invention of the method of forcing [2]. Cohen’s method showed that ZFC could not prove CH either, and in fact could not put any kind of bound on the possible number of cardinals between the sizes of the integers and the reals. -
Martin's Maximum and Weak Square
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY Volume 00, Number 0, Pages 000{000 S 0002-9939(XX)0000-0 MARTIN'S MAXIMUM AND WEAK SQUARE JAMES CUMMINGS AND MENACHEM MAGIDOR (Communicated by Julia Knight) Abstract. We analyse the influence of the forcing axiom Martin's Maximum on the existence of square sequences, with a focus on the weak square principle λ,µ. 1. Introduction It is well known that strong forcing axioms (for example PFA, MM) and strong large cardinal axioms (strongly compact, supercompact) exert rather similar kinds of influence on the combinatorics of infinite cardinals. This is perhaps not so sur- prising when we consider the widely held belief that essentially the only way to obtain a model of PFA or MM is to collapse a supercompact cardinal to become !2. We quote a few results which bring out the similarities: 1a) (Solovay [14]) If κ is supercompact then λ fails for all λ ≥ κ. 1b) (Todorˇcevi´c[15]) If PFA holds then λ fails for all λ ≥ !2. ∗ 2a) (Shelah [11]) If κ is supercompact then λ fails for all λ such that cf(λ) < κ < λ. ∗ 2b) (Magidor, see Theorem 1.2) If MM holds then λ fails for all λ such that cf(λ) = !. 3a) (Solovay [13]) If κ is supercompact then SCH holds at all singular cardinals greater than κ. 3b) (Foreman, Magidor and Shelah [7]) If MM holds then SCH holds. 3c) (Viale [16]) If PFA holds then SCH holds. In fact both the p-ideal di- chotomy and the mapping reflection principle (which are well known con- sequences of PFA) suffice to prove SCH. -
Henkin's Method and the Completeness Theorem
Henkin's Method and the Completeness Theorem Guram Bezhanishvili∗ 1 Introduction Let L be a first-order logic. For a sentence ' of L, we will use the standard notation \` '" for ' is provable in L (that is, ' is derivable from the axioms of L by the use of the inference rules of L); and \j= '" for ' is valid (that is, ' is satisfied in every interpretation of L). The soundness theorem for L states that if ` ', then j= '; and the completeness theorem for L states that if j= ', then ` '. Put together, the soundness and completeness theorems yield the correctness theorem for L: a sentence is derivable in L iff it is valid. Thus, they establish a crucial feature of L; namely, that syntax and semantics of L go hand-in-hand: every theorem of L is a logical law (can not be refuted in any interpretation of L), and every logical law can actually be derived in L. In fact, a stronger version of this result is also true. For each first-order theory T and a sentence ' (in the language of T ), we have that T ` ' iff T j= '. Thus, each first-order theory T (pick your favorite one!) is sound and complete in the sense that everything that we can derive from T is true in all models of T , and everything that is true in all models of T is in fact derivable from T . This is a very strong result indeed. One possible reading of it is that the first-order formalization of a given mathematical theory is adequate in the sense that every true statement about T that can be formalized in the first-order language of T is derivable from the axioms of T . -
The Z of ZF and ZFC and ZF¬C
From SIAM News , Volume 41, Number 1, January/February 2008 The Z of ZF and ZFC and ZF ¬C Ernst Zermelo: An Approach to His Life and Work. By Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus, Springer, New York, 2007, 356 pages, $64.95. The Z, of course, is Ernst Zermelo (1871–1953). The F, in case you had forgotten, is Abraham Fraenkel (1891–1965), and the C is the notorious Axiom of Choice. The book under review, by a prominent logician at the University of Freiburg, is a splendid in-depth biography of a complex man, a treatment that shies away neither from personal details nor from the mathematical details of Zermelo’s creations. BOOK R EV IEW Zermelo was a Berliner whose early scientific work was in applied By Philip J. Davis mathematics: His PhD thesis (1894) was in the calculus of variations. He had thought about this topic for at least ten additional years when, in 1904, in collaboration with Hans Hahn, he wrote an article on the subject for the famous Enzyclopedia der Mathematische Wissenschaften . In point of fact, though he is remembered today primarily for his axiomatization of set theory, he never really gave up applications. In his Habilitation thesis (1899), Zermelo was arguing with Ludwig Boltzmann about the foun - dations of the kinetic theory of heat. Around 1929, he was working on the problem of the path of an airplane going in minimal time from A to B at constant speed but against a distribution of winds. This was a problem that engaged Levi-Civita, von Mises, Carathéodory, Philipp Frank, and even more recent investigators. -
A Cardinal Preserving Extension Making the Set of Points of Countable V Cofinality Nonstationary
A CARDINAL PRESERVING EXTENSION MAKING THE SET OF POINTS OF COUNTABLE V COFINALITY NONSTATIONARY MOTI GITIK, ITAY NEEMAN, AND DIMA SINAPOVA Abstract. Assuming large cardinals we produce a forcing extension of V which preserves cardinals, does not add reals, and makes the set of points of countable V cofinality in κ+ nonstationary. Continuing to force further, we obtain an extension in which the set of points of countable V cofinality in ν is nonstationary for every regular ν ≥ κ+. Finally we show that our large cardinal assumption is optimal. The results in this paper were inspired by the following question, posed in a preprint (http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0509633v1, 27 September 2005) to the paper Viale [9]: Suppose V ⊂ W and V and W have the same cardinals and the same reals. Can it be shown, in ZFC alone, that for every cardinal κ, there is in V a <ω + partition {As | s ∈ κ } of the points of κ of countable V cofinality, into disjoint sets which are stationary in W ? In this paper we show that under some assumptions on κ there is a reals and cardinal preserving generic extension W which satisfies that the set of points of κ+ of countable V cofinality is nonstationary. In particular, a partition as above cannot be found for each κ. Continuing to force further, we produce a reals and cardinal preserving extension in which the set of points of λ of countable V cofinality is nonstationary for every regular λ ≥ κ+. All this is done under the large cardinal assumption that for each α<κ there exists θ<κ with Mitchell order at least α. -
Shorter Curriculum Vitae Akihiro Kanamori
SHORTER CURRICULUM VITAE AKIHIRO KANAMORI DESCRIPTION: Born 23 October 1948 in Tokyo, Japan; now a United States citizen. DEGREES: 1966-1970 California Institute of Technology, Bachelor of Science. 1970-1975 University of Cambridge (King's College), Doctor of Philosophy. Subject: Set Theory, Mathematics. Thesis: Ultrafilters over Uncountable Cardinals. Advisor: A.R.D. Mathias. This involved one year of research at: 1972-1973 University of Wisconsin, Madison. Advisor: K. Kunen. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 1975-1977 Lectureship at the University of California, Berkeley. 1977-1981 Benjamin Pierce Assistant Professorship at Harvard University. 1981-1982 Assistant Professorship at Baruch College of the City University of New York. 1982-1983 Visiting Associate Professorship at Boston University. 1983-1992 Associate Professorship at Boston University. 1988-1989 Berman Visiting Professorship, Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 1992- Professorship at Boston University. 1995 Visiting Professorship, Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew Universiy of Jerusalem. 2002-2003 Senior Fellow of the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology. Visiting Scholar at the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University. 1 2009-2010 Senior Fellow of the Lichtenberg-Kolleg, Institute for Advanced Study, G¨ottingen,Germany. Lecture Course on Set Theory, Mathematische Institut, G¨ottingen,Germany, June-July 2010. FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS: Marshall Scholarship (British Government), 1970-1972. Danforth Foundation Fellowship, 1970-1975. Woodrow Wilson Foundation Fellowship, 1970. 1984 New England Open Co-Champion of Chess. Equal First 1986 Greater Boston Chess Open. Equal Second, 1987 Massachusetts Chess Open Championship. Equal Sixth, 1989 Israel Open. Class Prize, 1992 New England Open Championship. 2002-2003 Senior Fellowship, Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology. -
A Framework for Forcing Constructions at Successors of Singular Cardinals
A FRAMEWORK FOR FORCING CONSTRUCTIONS AT SUCCESSORS OF SINGULAR CARDINALS JAMES CUMMINGS, MIRNA DAMONJA, MENACHEM MAGIDOR, CHARLES MORGAN, AND SAHARON SHELAH Abstract. We describe a framework for proving consistency re- sults about singular cardinals of arbitrary conality and their suc- cessors. This framework allows the construction of models in which the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis fails at a singular cardinal κ of uncountable conality, while κ+ enjoys various combinatorial prop- erties. As a sample application, we prove the consistency (relative to that of ZFC plus a supercompact cardinal) of there being a strong limit singular cardinal κ of uncountable conality where SCH fails + and such that there is a collection of size less than 2κ of graphs on κ+ such that any graph on κ+ embeds into one of the graphs in the collection. Introduction The class of uncountable regular cardinals is naturally divided into three disjoint classes: the successors of regular cardinals, the successors of singular cardinals and the weakly inaccessible cardinals. When we 2010 Mathematics Subject Classication. Primary: 03E35, 03E55, 03E75. Key words and phrases. successor of singular, Radin forcing, forcing axiom, uni- versal graph. Cummings thanks the National Science Foundation for their support through grant DMS-1101156. Cummings, Dºamonja and Morgan thank the Institut Henri Poincaré for their support through the Research in Paris program during the period 24-29 June 2013. Dºamonja, Magidor and Shelah thank the Mittag-Leer Institute for their sup- port during the month of September 2009. Mirna Dºamonja thanks EPSRC for their support through their grants EP/G068720 and EP/I00498. Morgan thanks EPSRC for their support through grant EP/I00498. -
Classical Metalogic an Introduction to Classical Model Theory & Computability
Classical Metalogic An Introduction to Classical Model Theory & Computability Notes by R.J. Buehler January 5, 2015 2 Preface What follows are my personal notes created in preparation for the UC-Berkeley Group in Logic preliminary exam. I am not a computability theorist, nor a model theorist; I am a graduate student with some knowledge who is–alas–quite fallible. Accordingly, this text is made available as a convenient reference, set of notes, and summary, but without even the slight hint of a guarantee that everything contained within is factual and correct (indeed, some areas are entirely unchanged from the moment I copied them off the blackboard). This said, if you find a serious error, I would greatly appreciate it if you would let me know so that it can be corrected. The material for these notes derives from a wide variety of sources: Lectures by Wes Holliday Lectures by Antonio Montalban Lectures by John Steel Kevin Kelly’s computability theory notes David Marker’s “Model Theory: An Introduction” Wilfrid Hodge’s “A Shorter Model Theory” Robert Soare’s “Recursively Enumerable Sets and Degrees" Richard Kaye’s “Models of Peano Arithmetic” Chang and Keisler’s “Model Theory" While I certainly hope my notes are beneficial, if you’re attempting to learn the contained material for the first time, I would highly suggest picking up (at least) a copy of Marker and Soare’s texts in addition. To those Group in Logic students who may be using these notes to help themselves prepare for their preliminary exam, chapters 1-5, 7, and 9-18 contain relevant material, as well as chapter 8, section 3. -
Mathematics of the Gateway Arch Page 220
ISSN 0002-9920 Notices of the American Mathematical Society ABCD springer.com Highlights in Springer’s eBook of the American Mathematical Society Collection February 2010 Volume 57, Number 2 An Invitation to Cauchy-Riemann NEW 4TH NEW NEW EDITION and Sub-Riemannian Geometries 2010. XIX, 294 p. 25 illus. 4th ed. 2010. VIII, 274 p. 250 2010. XII, 475 p. 79 illus., 76 in 2010. XII, 376 p. 8 illus. (Copernicus) Dustjacket illus., 6 in color. Hardcover color. (Undergraduate Texts in (Problem Books in Mathematics) page 208 ISBN 978-1-84882-538-3 ISBN 978-3-642-00855-9 Mathematics) Hardcover Hardcover $27.50 $49.95 ISBN 978-1-4419-1620-4 ISBN 978-0-387-87861-4 $69.95 $69.95 Mathematics of the Gateway Arch page 220 Model Theory and Complex Geometry 2ND page 230 JOURNAL JOURNAL EDITION NEW 2nd ed. 1993. Corr. 3rd printing 2010. XVIII, 326 p. 49 illus. ISSN 1139-1138 (print version) ISSN 0019-5588 (print version) St. Paul Meeting 2010. XVI, 528 p. (Springer Series (Universitext) Softcover ISSN 1988-2807 (electronic Journal No. 13226 in Computational Mathematics, ISBN 978-0-387-09638-4 version) page 315 Volume 8) Softcover $59.95 Journal No. 13163 ISBN 978-3-642-05163-0 Volume 57, Number 2, Pages 201–328, February 2010 $79.95 Albuquerque Meeting page 318 For access check with your librarian Easy Ways to Order for the Americas Write: Springer Order Department, PO Box 2485, Secaucus, NJ 07096-2485, USA Call: (toll free) 1-800-SPRINGER Fax: 1-201-348-4505 Email: [email protected] or for outside the Americas Write: Springer Customer Service Center GmbH, Haberstrasse 7, 69126 Heidelberg, Germany Call: +49 (0) 6221-345-4301 Fax : +49 (0) 6221-345-4229 Email: [email protected] Prices are subject to change without notice. -
Foundations of Mathematics from the Perspective of Computer Verification
Foundations of Mathematics from the perspective of Computer Verification 8.12.2007:660 Henk Barendregt Nijmegen University The Netherlands To Bruno Buchberger independently of any birthday Abstract In the philosophy of mathematics one speaks about Formalism, Logicism, Platonism and Intuitionism. Actually one should add also Calculism. These foundational views can be given a clear technological meaning in the context of Computer Mathematics, that has as aim to represent and manipulate arbitrary mathematical notions on a computer. We argue that most philosophical views over-emphasize a particular aspect of the math- ematical endeavor. Acknowledgment. The author is indebted to Randy Pollack for his stylized rendering of Formalism, Logicism and Intuitionism as foundational views in con- nection with Computer Mathematics, that was the starting point of this paper. Moreover, useful information or feedback was gratefully received from Michael Beeson, Wieb Bosma, Bruno Buchberger, John Harrison, Jozef Hooman, Jesse Hughes, Bart Jacobs, Sam Owre, Randy Pollack, Bas Spitters, Wim Veldman and Freek Wiedijk. 1. Mathematics The ongoing creation of mathematics, that started 5 or 6 millennia ago and is still continuing at present, may be described as follows. By looking around and abstracting from the nature of objects and the size of shapes homo sapiens created the subjects of arithmetic and geometry. Higher mathematics later arose as a tower of theories above these two, in order to solve questions at the basis. It turned out that these more advanced theories often are able to model part of reality and have applications. By virtue of the quantitative, and even more qualitative, expressive force of mathematics, every science needs this discipline. -
Paradox and Intuition
PARADOX AND INTUITION ACASE STUDY JERZY POGONOWSKI Department of Applied Logic Adam Mickiewicz University www.logic.amu.edu.pl We share with the reader a few reflections concerning the role of mathematical in- tuition in possible resolutions of the Skolem’s Paradox. We assume that the reader is familiar with the rudiments of metalogic and the philosophy of mathematics. Paradoxes are not absolute — they are relativized to a chosen language. Paradoxes in mathematics are thus relativized to particular formal languages in which mathema- tical constructions are represented. Paradoxes are at the beginning of investigations — think for example about: the dis- covery of irrational numbers, the construction of complex numbers, prejudices concer- ning the „true” geometry and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, paradoxical uses of the infinitely small magnitudes in early Calculus and the rise of the non-standard analysis, etc. Mathematical intuition is not simply a part of common-sense intuition. The first has a dynamic nature, while the second is more static. Common-sense intuition is (may be) shaped by evolution. Mathematical intuition develops in the process of creating mathematics itself. The views concerning the nature of mathematical intuition are diversified according to the positions taken in the philosophy of mathematics (e.g. Platonistic, formalistic and intuitionistic standpoints). In the broadest sense, „intuition” means „immediate apprehension”. Here „appre- hension” may cover sensation, knowledge or even mystical rapport. In turn, „imme- diate” may mean the absence of e.g.: inference, causes, justification, symbols or even absence of thought. Looking from the functional perspective, we may say that: Paradoxes are modifiers of intuition.