Sharing Responsibilities in Fisheries Management Part 2 - Annex: Case Studies
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Sharing responsibilities in fisheries management Part 2 - Annex: case studies Luc van Hoof (co-ordinator) Ellen Hoefnagel Jan Willem van der Schans Jesper Raakjær Nielsen (IFM, Denmark) Anne-Sofie Christensen (IFM, Denmark) Sten Sverdrup-Jensen (IFM, Denmark) Alyne Delaney (IFM, Denmark) Svein Jentoft (University of Tromsø, Norway) Knut Mikalsen (University of Tromsø, Norway) Geir R. Karlsen (University of Tromsø, Norway) Clotilde Bodiguel (IDDRA, France) Joseph Catanzano (IDDRA, France) Juan Luis Suarez de Vivero (University of Seville, Spain) Inmaculada Martínez Alba (University of Seville, Spain) Sonia Feria Domínguez (University of Seville, Spain) Dominique Rommel (PHAROS Atlantic, UK) Project code 63651 September 2005 Report 7.05.05 LEI, The Hague I II III 4 Contents Page 1. Common fisheries policy 9 1.1 CFP decision making framework analysis: an entrance key 9 1.1.1 Introduction 12 1.1.2 The European level and the common fisheries policy 13 1.1.3 Atlantic institutions 17 1.2 Assessment of the inefficiencies of the present CFP 17 1.2.1 Ineffectiveness of CFP: stock decline 19 1.2.2 Inefficiencies within the CFP 22 1.2.3 Principles of CFP have systematic flaws 25 1.2.4 New objectives for CFP 25 1.3 Analysis of the common fisheries policy 2. Norway 27 2.1 From closed shop to transparent decision-making? On the history, structure and process of Norwegian fisheries management 27 2.1.1 Introduction 27 2.1.2 Managing Norwegian fisheries: a historical sketch 28 2.1.3 Political context and administrative structure 30 2.1.4 Formal procedures and politics of consultation 31 2.1.5 Reforming fisheries management: from user-groups to stakeholders 37 2.1.6 Conclusion 39 2.2 Local participation in the management of marine resources in Norway 41 2.2.1 Introduction 42 2.2.2 Blame it on the little guy: User-involvement in the management of marine resources 42 2.2.3 Local participation in fisheries management in Norway 43 2.2.4 The case of the Lofoten Control Committee 44 2.2.5 Much Ado about nothing: is fisheries management? 45 2.2.6 Conclusion 47 3. Spain 49 3.1 Introduction 49 3.2 Concepts and terminology related to decentralisation and participation 50 3.2.1 Political and administrative framework 50 5 Page 3.2.2 Concepts within the Spanish legislative framework relevant to decentralisation 52 3.2.3 Discussion 58 3.2.4 Examples of decentralisation 61 3.3 General political and administrative structure of fisheries management 62 3.3.1 Areas of state authority 62 3.3.2 Areas of autonomous community authority 63 3.3.3 State administration 66 3.3.4 The autonomous communities' administration 68 3.3.5 Co-ordination and co-operation between the state and the autonomous communities 69 3.3.6 Co-ordination between autonomous communities 71 3.3.7 Phases in decision-taking and participation actors 71 3.4 Conclusion 74 3.5 The consortium for fisheries management and the marketing of the striped-venus clam in the Gulf of Cadiz 76 3.5.1 Justification 76 3.5.2 Definition 76 3.5.3 Background 76 3.5.4 Legal framework 78 3.5.5 Consortium objectives and duties 79 3.5.6 Internal structure 80 3.5.7 The consortium-authorities relationship 83 3.5.8 Appraisal 84 3.5.9 Swot Analysis 85 3.5.10 Geographical and statistical data 85 3.6 Barbate, participation processes in a fishing locality in crisis 86 3.6.1 Introduction 86 3.6.2 Delegation-decentralisation up to the break-down of fisheries agreement with Morocco (1980-1999) 87 3.6.3 Delegation-decentralisation after the fisheries agreement with Morocco had come to an end (2001-2002) 89 3.6.4 Mobilisation by the authorities and organisations in the sector 91 3.6.5 Administrative processes associated with conversation 96 3.6.6 General appraisal. The decentralisation process: limits and opportunities 99 4. United Kingdom 100 4.1 Participation in the pelagic fishery 100 4.1.1 Justification 100 4.1.2 Brief description of pelagic sector in UK 100 4.1.3 Management of pelagic fisheries 102 4.1.4 Conclusion: Assessment of management of the UK pelagic fisheries 107 6 Page 4.2 Devolution to the Shetland selfish management organisation 108 4.2.1 Justification 108 4.2.2 Brief discription of the Shetland context 108 4.2.3 Legal Context 109 4.2.4 The Shetland shellfish management organisation 111 4.2.5 The government view 115 4.2.6 Decisions taken by the SSMO 115 4.2.7 Evaluation of the SSMO 118 4.2.8 Discussion 120 5. Denmark 122 5.1 Devolution of responsibilities in Danish fisheries management 122 5.2 Introduction 122 5.3 Fisheries management in Denmark 123 5.3.1 The European context 123 5.3.2 The national management system 124 5.4 Management of Danish protein fishery 127 5.4.1 Historical Background 127 5.4.2 Target species in the protein fishery 127 5.4.3 The Danish protein fishing fleet 128 5.4.4 Socio-economic impact 128 5.4.5 Management of the protein fishery (decision making arrangements) 128 5.4.6 Incentives to coordinate and cooperate 129 5.4.7 Challenges ahead for management of protein fishery 130 5.5 Management of the Danish herring fisheries 132 5.5.1 Historical background 132 5.5.2 Target species 133 5.5.3 Fishing fleet 133 5.5.4 Socio-economic importance 133 5.5.5 Management of the herring fishery 133 5.5.6 Incentive to coordinate and cooperate 134 5.6 Summary 134 6. France 136 6.1 Introduction: fisheries management between cat and dog? 136 6.2 French fisheries management: weight of the past and current trends 136 6.2.1 Conflictive or complementary trends in fisheries management? 136 6.2.2 Actors of fisheries management 138 6.2.3 What geographical scale for fisheries management? 139 6.2.4 Fisheries management: the role of committees of marine fisheries 143 6.2.5 Conclusion 146 7 Page 6.3 Mediterranenean Sea versus Celtic Sea, coastal small scale fisheries versus EEZ trawling fleet: two cases of decision-making process 147 6.4 Process of quotas setting: the groundfish Norwegian lobster otter trawler fleet in the Celtic Sea 147 6.5 Small-scale fleet (Les Petits Métiers) in Languedoc-Roussillon, Mediterranean Sea 152 6.5.1 The small-scale fisheries 152 6.5.2 Management of artificial reefs in the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes 155 6.5.3 Clam licensing system in pond Thau 157 6.6 Conclusion 159 7. The Netherlands 161 7.1 General description of the Dutch fisheries 161 7.1.1 Introduction 161 7.1.2 The process of institutionalisation 162 7.2 The Oakerson framework and co-management experiences in the Netherlands 165 7.2.1 Introduction 165 7.2.2 Physical and technical attributes 167 7.2.3 Decision-making arrangements 169 7.2.4 Patterns of interaction 179 7.2.5 Outcomes 186 7.2.6 Conclusion and the conditions for an effective and successful co-management system 197 7.2.7 Epilogue 202 7.3 The Dutch shrimp case and the Oakerson model 203 7.3.1 Introduction 203 7.3.2 Physical and technical attributes 204 7.3.3 Decision-making Arrangements 205 7.3.4 External arrangements 206 7.3.5 Patterns of interaction 208 References 213 8 1. Common Fisheries Policy 1. CFP decision making framework analysis: an entrance key 1.1.1 Introduction The CFP policy is an instrument used by the European Union (EU) to manage common pool fish resources in compliance with the original European Community's treaties. Introduced in 1983, the CFP was preceded by a boom in stock of several important fish species that occurred in the 1970s (Symes, 1997). The CFP operates in four areas (Hatcher, 2000): - a common structural policy; - a common market organisation; - a resource conservation and management system; and - an external policy (concerned with fisheries agreements with third countries). The Common structural policy section of the CFP dates back to the 1970s when the six original members of the EU adopted regulation to establish common rules and actions to promote harmonisation and balanced development of the fishing industry. Additionally, the regulation also lays down the equal-access of Members States fishing fleets into each other's waters (Hatcher, 2000). The Common market organisation provides a system of marketing standards, including minimum prices (linked in to a set of trade provisions designed to protect EU fishers from imports priced below going market rates) and compensation payments for products withdrawn from the market at minimum price levels. In 1977 all EC member states extended their fishery limit from 12 miles to 200 miles (except the Mediterranean), creating a Community fishing zone. Soon after, negotiations on limiting catches in the zone began, with much difficulty; finally in 1983 an agreement was reached. Although referred to often as the Common Fisheries Policy, the resource management system provides for the setting of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for a number of key stocks and allocation of these national quotas at the same levels is based on the principle of 'relative stability'. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) gives biological advice on the state of the stocks and fishing mortality. TACs adopted must be agreed upon by the Council if Ministers agree (Hatcher, 2000). Although there are many technical and conservation measures that effect decisions concerning the TACs and fishing effort levels, the final use of national quotas are left to the Member States themselves, provided that the basic principles of the EU membership are adhered to.