Fonterra Applauds Xi's CIIE Speech
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Congressional-Executive Commission on China
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2008 ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION OCTOBER 31, 2008 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov VerDate Aug 31 2005 23:54 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6011 Sfmt 5011 U:\DOCS\45233.TXT DEIDRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT VerDate Aug 31 2005 23:54 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6019 Sfmt 6019 U:\DOCS\45233.TXT DEIDRE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2008 ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION OCTOBER 31, 2008 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ★ 44–748 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 23:54 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 U:\DOCS\45233.TXT DEIDRE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS House Senate SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio MAX BAUCUS, Montana TOM UDALL, New Mexico CARL LEVIN, Michigan MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska EDWARD R. ROYCE, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas DONALD A. -
China's Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors
China’s unpredictable maritime Linda Jakobson security actors December 2014 CHINA’S UNPREDICTABLE MARITIME SECURITY ACTORS The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: • produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. • promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences. The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. CHINA’S UNPREDICTABLE MARITIME SECURITY ACTORS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In recent years China’s good-neighbourly pledges of increased trade and investment have stood in stark contrast with its provocative actions in its near seas. In part this reflects contradictions in China’s core interests. On the one hand, economic growth — vital for China’s political stability — requires cooperative relations with neighbours. On the other hand, defending sovereignty causes friction with neighbours who are rival claimants to contested islands and seas on China’s periphery. China’s claims in the East and South China Seas have not changed in decades. What has changed is China’s capacity and desire to defend its maritime claims. Moreover, since becoming leader, Xi Jinping has placed greater emphasis on defending China’s sovereignty. -
Patronage Politics and Authoritarian Resilience in China
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO FRAGMENTED UNITY: PATRONAGE POLITICS AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN CHINA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY JUNYAN JIANG CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AUGUST 2016 c Copyright by Junyan Jiang 2016 All Rights Reserved Contents Abstract v Acknowledgements viii List of Tables xi List of Figures xii 1 Introduction1 1.1 The Puzzle of CCP’s Resilience...........................1 1.2 Argument.......................................4 1.3 Literature.......................................6 1.4 Road map.......................................9 2 Patronage and Politics in Chinese Officialdom: Past and Present 13 2.1 The Historical Roots of Patronage Politics: The Retainer/Mufu System....... 13 2.2 Patronage Politics under the CCP........................... 17 2.3 The Micro-Level Dynamics of Patron-Client Relations............... 20 2.4 Patron-Client Relations and Behavioral Patterns: A Survey Experiment on Regime Insiders........................................ 30 2.5 Conclusion...................................... 35 3 Patronage Networks, Informal Power, and the Contingent Institutionalization of Leadership Succession in the Post-Tiananmen Era 36 3.1 Institutionalizing Leadership Succession in Autocratic Regimes: Challenges and Solutions....................................... 41 3.2 Patronage Networks and the Development of Successions Institutions in Post- Tiananmen China.................................. -
Sansha City in China's South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control
U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute 1-2021 China Maritime Report No. 12: Sansha City in China's South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control Zachary Haver Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports Recommended Citation Haver, Zachary, "China Maritime Report No. 12: Sansha City in China's South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control" (2021). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 12. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/12 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI China Maritime Reports by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. iftChina00 Maritimeffij$i)f Studies �fflInstitute Summary China established Sansha City in 2012 to administer the bulk of its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Sansha is headquartered on Woody Island. The city’s jurisdiction includes the Paracel Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Spratly Islands and most of the waters within China’s “nine- dash line.” Sansha is responsible for exercising administrative control, implementing military-civil fusion, and carrying out the day-to-day work of rights defense, stability maintenance, environmental protection, and resource development. Since 2012, each level of the Chinese party-state system has worked to develop Sansha, improving the city’s physical infrastructure and transportation, communications, corporate ecosystem, party-state institutions, and rights defense system. -
Initial Assessment of Xi Jinping's Work Report at 19Th Party Congress
21 October 2017 ‘INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF XI JINPING’S WORK REPORT AT 19TH PARTY CONGRESS’ By JAYADEVA RANADE The crucial 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opened in Beijing on October 18, 2017, amidst stringent security restrictions in Beijing and other major cities in China. Nearly a thousand foreign reporters from 130 countries are reported to be covering the Congress. The Congress was preceded by other important meetings, namely the 7th and last Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee (CC), and of the Party’s powerful anti-corruption body the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) chaired by Xi Jinping’s close associate and Politburo Standing Committee member, Wang Qishan. CCP CC General Secretary Xi Jinping, who holds fourteen formal positions -- more than any other CCP leader so far -- is poised to emerge stronger from this Congress. His sustained anti-corruption campaign has eliminated opposition in the Party and military and drastically reduced the influence wielded by his predecessor once removed, Jiang Zemin. In September 2017, China’s official media publicised that more than 176 CCP cadres equivalent to the rank of central Vice Minister and above had been dismissed and arrested for corruption and that more than 14,000 officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been similarly dismissed, including more than 86 officers of and above the rank of Major General. Just weeks before the Congress, Xi Jinping publicly demonstrated his authority by arresting two top Generals, appointing 20 Generals to command thirteen new Group Armies and promoting close associates to head the PLA Army (ground forces) and PLA Air Force. -
Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: a Chinese Dream
Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (retired) June 2016 Distribution unlimited This report was made possible thanks to a generous grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. SRF Grant: 2014-0047. Distribution Distribution unlimited. Photography Credit: Chinese carrier Liaoning launching a J-15. PLAN photo. https://news.usni.org/2014/06/09/chinese-weapons-worry-pentagon. Approved by: June 2016 Dr. Eric Thompson, Vice President CNA Strategic Studies Copyright © 2016 CNA Abstract In November 2012, then president Hu Jintao declared that China’s objective was to become a strong or great maritime power. This report, based on papers written by China experts for this CNA project, explores that decision and the implications it has for the United States. It analyzes Chinese thinking on what a maritime power is, why Beijing wants to become a maritime power, what shortfalls it believes it must address in order to become a maritime power, and when it believes it will become a maritime power (as it defines the term). The report then explores the component pieces of China’s maritime power—its navy, coast guard, maritime militia, merchant marine, and shipbuilding and fishing industries. It also addresses some policy options available to the U.S. government to prepare for—and, if deemed necessary, mitigate— the impact that China’s becoming a maritime power would have for U.S. interests. i This page intentionally left blank. ii Executive Summary In late 2012 the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party announced that becoming a “maritime power” was essential to achieving national goals. -
Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy
U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI Red Books China Maritime Studies Institute 2021 Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy Andrew Chubb Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books Recommended Citation Chubb, Andrew, "Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy" (2021). CMSI Red Books, Study No. 16. This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI Red Books by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CHINA MARITIME STUDIES Number 16 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE COLLEGE WAR NAVAL U.S. Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone” Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy CHINA MARITIME STUDIES CHINA ISBN 978-1-935352-71-6 F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn .U s S , G . evo r emn tn P ublishing Office I tn er en t: skoob t ro e . P opg . vog enoh : lot l f ree ( 668 ) 215 - 0081 ; D C a re ( a 202 ) 215 - 0081 90000 Fa :x ( 202 ) 215 - 4012 aM il: S t I po DCC W , ihsa gn t no D , C 20402 - 1000 ISBN 978-1-935352-71-6 No. -
Shanghai-Expo-2010.Pdf
F i n a l COMM i SS i O n ER GE n ER a l ’S REPORT USA PAVILION EXPO 2010 SHANGHAI 美国国家馆 上海2010年世界博览会 美国展区总代表最终报告 This report is dedicated to our Student Ambassadors who made U.S. participation at Expo 2010 Shanghai an overwhelming success. 谨以此献给美国馆的学生大使们。 是他们使美国馆参与2010年世界博 览会的努力取得了巨大成功。 “A great presence for America . .” Philip BrEdesen FOr mE r Gove rnor of the StAtE of tE N N ESSE E “感谢美国馆如此出色地呈现美国!” 菲利普·布雷德森,田纳西州州长 “May China-U.S. friendship last forever.” Liu Xiaoming AmbassadOr of the People’S r E PU BLIc of c HINA tO the UnitE d King dOm of G r eat BrItain an d NOrthe r N Ir elan d “愿中美两国友谊长存。” 刘晓明,中国驻英国大使 T a b l E of CO n te n T s 目录 I N t r O d U c t ion 5 前言 H ighligh t S F r O m t he 8 美国国家馆亮点 U S A Pavilion r I S I N G t O t he 16 拥抱挑战,迎接世博 E xpo c H A L L E N G E W E B uilt I t an d 28 精心打造,游客如云 t H E y c A m E U S A N At ional d Ay 42 国家馆日,众星熠熠 c O m m E r c ial d I P L O m A c y 46 拓展商机,宣传品牌 m O r E t H A N 54 传播文化,扩大交流 “We are very proud of this U.S. exhibit J us t A Pavilion and the friendship it engenders between P r O m O t ing 64 促进外交,加深联系 China and America.” U.S.- c H I N A r E L At ions JImmy CartEr and Rosalynn CartEr S ha r ing O U r S t O ry 72 广用媒体,讲述美国 FOr mE r Pr esident an d FIrSt L Ady wi t H t he c H I N E S E of the UnitE d StAtes of AmE rIcA “我们为美国馆及其为美中两国带来的友谊感到非常自豪。” 吉米·卡特和罗萨琳·卡特,美国前总统及前第一夫人 “Great job in picturing America in a way that makes us proud.” JOhn t. -
Policy Recommendations by the Quadripartite Commission on the Indian Ocean Regional Security Towards a More Stable Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region
Towards a more stable security environment in the Indian Ocean region Policy Recommendations by the Quadripartite Commission on Indian Ocean Regional Security Policy Recommendations by the Quadripartite Commission on the Indian Ocean Regional Security Towards a more stable security environment in the Indian Ocean region Appendix Appendix Policy Recommendations by the Quadripartite Commission on the Indian Ocean Regional Security Towards a more stable security environment in the Indian Ocean region Appendix The Sasakawa Peace Foundation in cooperation with Australian National University Vivekananda International Foundation Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Copyright©2017 by The Sasakawa Peace Foundation All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission of the publisher, except for the purpose of review written for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper, broadcast, or online service. International Peace and Security Department The Sasakawa Peace Foundation The Sasakawa Peace Foundation Bldg. 7F 1-15-16 Toranomon Minato-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN Phone: +81-3-5157-5209 URL: https://www.spf.org/ Printed at Urban Connections Co., Ltd. Contents FY2016 Chapter 1 India’s Role in South Asian Economic Dynamism ......................................................................... 7 Makoto Kojima Chapter 2 Energy Security in the Indian Ocean ............................................................................................. 39 Jun Arima Chapter 3 Commercial Shipping in -
China's Maritime Strategy and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies: Quest for a Maritime Power CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 4 China’s Maritime Strategy and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies: Quest for a Maritime Power Masayuki Masuda The maritime domain has been increasingly important for China’s national strategy. At the end of July 2013, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Politburo held a study session on how to turn China into a major maritime power. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that as a land power, and also a maritime power, China possesses extensive strategic interests in the oceans.1 Maritime issues are, first and foremost, sovereignty issues. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has territorial disputes with several Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, Beijing claims territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, insisting that a territorial dispute exists between China and Japan. Second, maritime issues for China are closely related to the country’s sustainable economic development. As its economic development progresses, the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent on maritime transport. With 90% of China’s exports and imports of cargo and oil imports said to be transversing through key sea lanes of communication (SLOCs),2 ensuring the safety of sea lanes is of decisive importance for sustainable economic growth in China. Furthermore, China, which has become further reliant on other countries for vital resources, including oil and natural gas, has been attaching greater importance to the development and exploitation of the seas as new resource base. In this regard, operating within and controlling its maritime contiguities holds significant importance for China realizing lasting 1 “Jin yibu guanxin haiyang renshi jinglue haiyang, tuidong haiyang qiangguo jianshe buduan qude xin chengjiu [To further care for, know about and manage the seas, pushing forward building China into a maritime power],” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], August 1, 2013. -
Echelon Defense: the Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy Ryan D
U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI Red Books Reports & Studies 2-2018 Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy Ryan D. Martinson Follow this and additional works at: http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books Recommended Citation Martinson, Ryan D., "Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy" (2018). CMSI Red Books. 15. http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/15 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports & Studies at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI Red Books by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Echelon Defense The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy Ryan D. Martinson CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island usnwc.edu/Research-and-Wargaming/Research-Centers/China-Maritime -Studies-Institute Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Martinson, Ryan D., author. | Naval War College (U.S.). China Maritime Studies Institute, issuing body. Title: Echelon defense : the role of sea power in Chinese maritime dispute strategy / Ryan D. Martinson. Other titles: China maritime studies ; no. 15. Description: Newport, Rhode Island : Naval War College Press, 2018. | Series: China Maritime Study ; No. 15 | “China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College.” | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2018004420| ISBN 9781935352648 | ISBN 1935352644 Subjects: LCSH: Sea-power—China. | China—Military policy. | Sea control. -
Xi Jinping's Inner Circle (Part 5: the Mishu Cluster II) Cheng Li
Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 5: The Mishu Cluster II) Cheng Li Mentor-protégé ties play an important role in elite formation in virtually all kinds of political systems. But arguably no country gives more prominent advantage in terms of later political career promotions to those who have previously served as personal assistants to senior leaders than China. This phenomenon of having a large number of leaders with such experience in Chinese officialdom has led to the romanization of the Chinese term mishu (秘书) to refer to this group. At present, more than three-quarters of cabinet ministers and provincial governors have served as mishu.1 Of the current 25 members of the Politburo, 16 (64 percent) have served in such roles, and on the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, five (71 percent) members have mishu backgrounds. Xi Jinping himself served as a mishu for the minister of defense for three years in his late 20s, and this experience helped him tremendously later as he advanced his career, especially by enhancing his credentials in military affairs. Xi’s personal assistants, both previous and current, have constituted a major cluster of his inner circle. Because of their very close working relationships with Xi, they are often among his most trusted confidants. This final installment in the series first shows the continuing large representation of mishu in the current national and provincial leadership and then reveals the strong bonds between Xi and his mishu as well as their diversity. It concludes with a brief assessment of Xi’s consolidation of power in the middle of his first term and his new strategy for elite recruitment for the 19th Party Congress.