Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m o C “Smartness” Without Vision WP The Moroccan Regime in the Face of Acquiescent Elites and Weak Social Mobilization Saloua Zerhouni S In contrast to other North African and Middle Eastern rulers, the Moroccan monar- chy has been able to maintain and stabilize its reign in the face of popular protest. In response to demonstrations by the 20 February Movement (M20) in early 2011, King Mohammed VI announced the reform of the constitution and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy. In addition, the regime has successfully bought off opposi- tion by appropriating the main reform demands and by bringing in figures from the former opposition Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développe- ment, PJD) to lead the government. But although the regime was able to absorb social unrest and to pull the rug from underneath the M20, protests and discontent have continued in Morocco, as major issues such as fighting corruption, establishing social justice and dealing with youth unemployment have not been addressed. Thus, although the moves of the monarchy have earned it the label of being “politically smart” and Morocco being “exceptional,” the country is far from immune to the unrest that has rocked neighboring countries. Europeans should therefore support a peaceful path of more substantial reforms to avoid regression and potentially violent escalations. Recent developments in Morocco show “inciting terrorism” after posting on his that reforms remain more at the level of website an indirect link to a video titled discourse than reality. There are major dis- “Morocco: Kingdom of Corruption and parities and contradictions between what Despotism,” which was released by al-Qaeda the regime claims with regards to democra- in the Islamic Maghreb and posted first on tization and respect of human rights and the website of Spain’s leading daily news- the actual practices of political control and paper El Pais. The detention of Anouzla was silencing dissident voices. Two cases con- clearly meant to silence him following a firm this trend: The first one was the arrest series of articles he had written that were in September 2013 of Ali Anouzla – who critical of the monarchy, and more specifi- has since been released on bail – one of the cally the King. The second example con- most popular independent journalists and stitutes a breach of the spirit – rather than editor of the Arabic version of the online the letter – of the 2011 constitution: The newspaper Lakome. Anouzla was charged for October 2013 cabinet reshuffle witnessed a From June to August 2013, Dr. Saloua Zerhouni was a fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 11 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in framework of February 2014 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 major increase in the number of “techno- (AMDH). Unlike protest movements in other crats” loyal to the Palace who were appoint- Arab states, M20 has maintained its call for ed to strategic portfolios such as the Minis- “reform” rather than for the “overthrow” try of Interior, national education and of the regime and has not questioned the business. monarchy as such. The movement has asked for a democratic constitution, the indepen- dence of the judiciary and the media, as Gradual reforms, well as the separation of wealth and politi- uncertain outcomes cal power to leave the politics of a rentier The idea of gradualism has been part of economy and the monopolization of re- the Moroccan political discourse for many sources behind. decades. But the reform process has been In reaction to the M20’s demands, the open-ended, broad and has not had well- monarchy adopted a series of reforms in defined objectives. Thus, there have often the political, social and economic fields – been contradictions between the proclaimed prominently announced in the King’s speech vision and the actual implementation of on March 9, 2011, in which he promised reforms. Regardless of the shortcomings of constitutional reform and professed his the reforms, they do serve a political goal, willingness to relinquish parts of his pow- namely to keep both the political elites and ers. Accordingly, the King appointed a royal the social forces busy with these reforms committee to be in charge of drafting a new rather than guaranteeing their implemen- constitution. It was adopted by referendum tation into practice. In addition, the reform in July 2011 and promoted by the official process is meant to reinforce the image of a media as providing for a democratic sys- modernizing monarchy at the international tem. It was also supported by major polit- and regional levels. At the national level, it ical parties, which have developed an helps the monarchy to portray itself as the alliance with the Palace based on common sole credible and efficient institution that interests over the years. is able to trigger and implement reform in In the new constitution, human rights the country. and political freedoms have been expanded. Amazigh, the language of the country’s Berber-speaking population, has been recog- The M20 and the monarchy’s reactions nized as an official language. The legislative In spite of Morocco’s alleged exceptional- and oversight powers of Parliament have ism with regards to the wave of protests been broadened and the competencies of in the region, in 2011 a group of online the government enhanced. The judiciary activists led the calls for nationwide pro- has been granted more independence. A tests in favor of major political changes Higher Judicial Council has been estab- and to organize the 20 February Movement. lished and its prerogatives have been ex- The first demonstrations were massive and tended to include missions of investigation. mobilized some 200,000 citizens in 53 cities Another novelty of the text is the constitu- across the country in early 2011. The move- tionalization of existing regulatory bodies ment was originally composed of a mixed that aim at implementing principles of group of opposition forces with different good governance, transparency and equali- ideological backgrounds, ranging from left ty, such as the Competition Council, cre- and radical left-wing political parties to ated in 2009, or the establishment of new Islamist movements. The most active and ones, such as the Authority in Charge of involved among them were the Islamist Parity and Fighting All Forms of Discrimi- movement al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and nation. (For more details on the constitu- Charity), the United Socialist Union and the tional reform, see SWP Comments 30/2012 Moroccan Association of Human Rights by Amin Alsaden, http://bit.ly/SWP12C30.) SWP Comments 11 February 2014 2 The reforms certainly brought improve- Government’s reform initiatives ments in certain areas, in particular with The PJD-led government has launched im- regards to enshrining human rights. Yet, portant reform initiatives, such as a dia- the constitutional reform did not establish logue on the reform of the judiciary system. the proclaimed parliamentary monarchy It has also introduced measures aimed at but rather maintained the “executive mon- fighting corruption and establishing pro- archy,” in which the King retains signifi- fessional conduct in the public service, and cant powers over strategic issues, such as it has made the reform of a costly system of matters related to religion and security. The subsidies one of its priorities. However, the King can still dissolve Parliament and dis- government – and more specifically the PJD miss ministers, and he chairs the Council – does not have the clout to put pressure on of Ministers when strategic issues are dis- the monarchical institution to implement cussed. He is the head of the Supreme Judi- these reforms. cial Council and the newly created National In fact, over the past two years, the PJD Security Council, and he remains the su- has supported most of the King’s moves preme arbiter among political actors. for the purpose of normalizing its presence In parallel to the constitutional reform, within the formal political sphere and other measures were adopted. Early legis- building trust with the monarchy. This in lative elections were held in November itself constrains the performance of the 2011. A few weeks later, a coalition govern- new government and its capacity to tackle ment led by the Islamist PJD, which had reform issues directly. In this regard, the received a plurality of votes, was formed. PJD’s attempts at fighting corruption are However, with a decrease in societal pres- a significant example. Corruption is wide- sures following the adoption of the new spread in the country, where wealth and constitution, the regime put the reform political power are highly concentrated and process on hold. The elections for the Upper the political system functions based on House of Parliament, which were to take what analysts have described as “endemic place in the fall of October 2012 at the corruption,” that is, different forms of latest, have not been organized as of yet. material benefits that are granted to both Whether the reason behind this delay is the the political and the military elites. In this regime’s fear of another success of the PJD system, the monarchy’s business interests at the local and regional levels, concerns are widespread in different sectors that over a potentially low voter turnout or the range from food distribution and cement official argument given that the Moroccan production to phosphate mining and the “model of regionalization” has not been services sector.