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The Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 Aviation, Mass Transit, Maritime, Infrastructure, Cyber, CBRN, Border, CTI & Public Safety

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The Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 Aviation, Mass Transit, Maritime, Infrastructure, Cyber, CBRN, Border, CTI & Public Safety The Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 Aviation, Mass Transit, Maritime, Infrastructure, Cyber, CBRN, Border, CTI & Public Safety ©notice This material is copyright by visiongain. It is against the law to reproduce any of this material without the prior written agreement of vision- gain. You cannot photocopy, fax, download to database or duplicate in any other way any of the material contained in this report. Each pur- chase and single copy is for personal use only. Contents 1. Executive Summary 1.1 Global Homeland Security Market Overview 1.2 Benefits of This Report 1.3 Who is This Report For? 1.4 Methodology 1.5 Global Homeland Security Market Forecast 2013-2023 1.6 Homeland Security Submarket Forecasts 2013-2023 1.7 Leading Homeland Security National Market Forecasts 2013-2023 2. Introduction to the Global Homeland Security Market 2.1 Homeland Security - The Nature and History of the Threat 2.2 Homeland Security: The Historical and Current Response to the Threat 2.3 Defining The Homeland Security Market 2.4 Other Issues With Definition in the Global Homeland Security Market 2.5 Threats Driving the Homeland Security Market 2.5.1 Terrorism and Sabotage 2.5.2 Domestic Insurgency 2.5.3 Domestic Unrest 2.5.4 Theft and Piracy 2.5.5 Infiltration 2.5.6 Environmental Threats 3. Global Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 3.1 The Global Homeland Security Market Forecast 2013-2023 3.2 The Global Homeland Security Market Analysis 2013-2023 3.3 Global Homeland Security Drivers & Restraints 3.4 The Global Homeland Security Market Forecast 2013-2023 3.5 The Global Homeland Security Market Growth Rates 3.6 Fastest Growing Leading National Homeland Security Markets 3.6.1 Fastest Growing Leading National Homeland Security Markets 2013-2023 3.6.2 Fastest Growing Leading National Homeland Security Markets 2013-2018 3.6.3 Fastest Growing Leading National Homeland Security Markets 2018-2023 3.7 Fastest Growing Homeland Security Submarkets 3.7.1 Fastest Growing Homeland Security Submarkets 2013-2023 www.visiongain.com Contents 3.7.2 Fastest Growing Homeland Security Submarkets 2013-2018 3.7.3 Fastest Growing Homeland Security Submarkets 2018-2023 3.8 Leading National Homeland Security Markets Share Forecast 2013-2023 3.9 Homeland Security Submarket Share Forecasts 2013-2023 3.10 Cumulative Value of the Homeland Security Leading National Markets 2013-2023 3.11 Cumulative Value of the Homeland Security Submarkets 2013-2023 3.12 Cumulative Value of the Leading National Homeland Security Markets 2013-2023 3.13 Cumulative Value of the Homeland Security Submarkets 2013-2023 4. Global Homeland Security Submarkets 2013-2023 4.1 Global Homeland Security Submarket Forecasts 2013-2023 4.2 The Homeland Security Aviation Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.2.1 The Homeland Security Aviation Security Submarket Forecast 4.2.2 Homeland Security Aviation Security Submarket Analysis 4.2.3 Passenger Screening 4.2.4 Biometric Systems 4.2.5 Baggage and Cargo Screening 4.2.6 RFID Systems 4.2.7 New Technological Developments 4.3 The Homeland Security Mass Transit Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.3.1 The Homeland Security Mass Transit Submarket Forecast 4.3.2 Homeland Security Mass Transit Submarket Analysis 4.3.3 Train Stations 4.3.4 Underground Systems 4.4 The Homeland Security Maritime Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.4.1 The Homeland Security Maritime Security Submarket Forecast 4.4.2 Homeland Security Maritime Security Submarket Analysis 4.4.3 Anti-Piracy 4.4.4 Port Security 4.4.5 Coastguards 4.4.6 Maritime Oil & Gas Infrastructure 4.5 The Homeland Security Infrastructure Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.5.1 The Homeland Security Infrastructure Security Submarket Forecast 4.5.2 Homeland Security Infrastructure Security Submarket Analysis 4.5.3 Electricity Infrastructure 4.5.4 Oil and Gas Infrastructure www.visiongain.com Contents 4.5.5 Water and Sanitation Infrastructure 4.6 The Homeland Security Cyber Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.6.1 The Homeland Security Cyber Security Submarket Forecast 4.6.2 Homeland Security Cyber Security Submarket Analysis 4.6.3 Notable Recent Cyber Security Incidents 4.6.3.1 Estonia 4.6.3.2 Operation Orchard 4.6.3.3 Georgia 4.6.3.4 Conficker 4.6.3.5 Pentagon 4.6.3.6 Aurora 4.6.3.7 Chinese Diversion of Internet Traffic 4.6.3.8 Stuxnet 4.6.3.9 Duqu 4.6.3.10 RSA 4.6.3.11 Sony 4.6.3.12 Operation Shady RAT 4.6.3.13 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 4.6.3.14 Flame / Operation: Olympic Games 4.6.4 Cyber Security Attacks, Weapons & Defences 4.6.5 Methods of Cyber Defence 4.7 The Homeland Security Border Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.7.1 The Homeland Security Border Security Submarket Forecast 4.7.2 Homeland Security Border Security Submarket Analysis 4.7.3 EU Border Security 4.7.4 Border Security Technology 4.8 The Homeland Security CBRN Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.8.1 The Homeland Security CBRN Security Submarket Forecast 4.8.2 Homeland Security CBRN Security Submarket Analysis 4.9 The Homeland Security Counter-Threat Intelligence Security Submarket 2013-2023 4.9.1 The Homeland Security CT Intelligence Submarket Forecast 4.9.2 Homeland Security CT Intelligence Submarket Analysis 4.9.3 Surveillance 4.9.4 Databases 4.9.5 Language Translation Systems 4.10 The Homeland Security Public Safety Submarket 2013-2023 www.visiongain.com Contents 4.10.1 The Homeland Security Public Safety Submarket Forecast 4.10.2 Homeland Security Public Safety Submarket Analysis 5. Leading National Homeland Security Markets Forecast 2013-2023 5.1 Leading National Homeland Security Market Share Forecast 2013-2023 5.2 US Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 5.2.1 US Homeland Security Market Forecast 5.2.2 US Homeland Security Market Analysis 5.2.2.1 US Budgetary Issues 5.2.2.2 US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Budget and Priorities 5.2.2.3 What Threats Exist for the US in HLS and How Will They Respond? 5.2.2.4 US Homeland Security Contracts 5.2.2.5 US Homeland Security Submarkets 5.2.3 US Aviation Security Submarket 5.2.3.1 US Aviation Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.3.2 US Aviation Security Submarket Analysis 5.2.3.3 US Transport Security Administration (TSA) 5.2.3.4 What New Developments Are Expected for the TSA & Aviation Security? 5.2.3.5 How Will Aviation Security Respond to the Sequester? 5.2.3.6 US Aviation Security Contracts 5.2.4 US Mass Transit Security Submarket 5.2.4.1 US Mass Transit Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.4.2 US Mass Transit Security Submarket Analysis 5.2.4.2 Who Has Responsibility For US Mass Transit Security? 5.2.4.3 US Mass Transit Security Contracts 5.2.5 US Maritime Security Submarket 5.2.5.1 US Maritime Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.5.2 US Maritime Security Submarket Analysis 5.2.5.3 US Coast Guard (USCG) 5.2.5.4 USCG Deepwater Programme 5.2.5.5 Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWICs) 5.2.5.6 Maritime Awareness Global Network (MAGNET) 5.2.5.7 US Maritime Security Contracts 5.2.6 US Infrastructure Security Submarket 5.2.6.1 US Infrastructure Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.6.2 US Infrastructure Security Market Analysis www.visiongain.com Contents 5.2.6.3 US Infrastructure Security Contracts 5.2.7 US Cyber Security Submarket 5.2.7.1 US Cyber Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.7.2 US Cyber Security Submarket Analysis 5.2.7.3 What HLS Threats Currently Exist for the US in Cyber Space? 5.2.7.4 What Domestic Factors Will Condition the US Cyber Response? 5.2.7.5 US DHS Budget Request 5.2.7.6 Operation: Olympic Games 5.2.7.7 US International Strategy for Cyberspace 2011 5.2.8 US Border Security Submarket 5.2.8.1 US Border Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.8.2 US Border Security Submarket Analysis 5.2.8.3 Barrier Method or Active Denial? How Does the US Guard the Southern Border? 5.2.8.4 What Results is the Cancellation of SBINet to Have on US Border Security Spending? 5.2.8.5 What New Technologies Are Expected to Be Introduced By The US in the Field of Border Security? 5.2.8.6 US Border Security Contracts 5.2.9 US CBRN Security Submarket 5.2.9.1 US CBRN Security Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.9.2 US CBRN Security Analysis 5.2.9.3 Who is the Largest Source of US CBRN Spending? 5.2.9.4 Which Other US Government Agencies Are Involved in CBRN? 5.2.9.5 How Has Spending Developed for the US Project BioShield Since 2004? 5.2.9.6 What Other Measures Current Exist for the US CBRN Response? 5.2.9.7 US CBRN Security Contracts 5.2.10 US Counter-Threat Intelligence Submarket 5.2.10.1 US Counter-Threat Intelligence Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.10.2 US Counter-Threat Intelligence Submarket Analysis 5.2.10.3 US Intelligence Spending & The 2013 PRISM Scandal 5.2.10.4 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Other Domestic Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Agencies 5.2.10.5 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State-Level Counter-Threat Intelligence Funding 5.2.10.6 US Private Sector CTI Involvement 5.2.10.7 US Counter Threat Intelligence Contracts 5.2.11 US Public Safety and Emergency Response Submarket www.visiongain.com Contents 5.2.11.1 US Public Safety and Emergency Response Submarket Forecast 2013-2023 5.2.11.2 US Public Safety and Emergency Response Submarket Analysis 5.2.11.3 US Public Safety and the Growth of the US HLS Concept 5.2.11.4 How Are First Responder Grants Being Apportioned in the Future? 5.2.11.5 The COTS Revolution Comes to US HLS: Who Is Involved? 5.2.11.6 US Public Safety Contracts 5.3 PRC Homeland Security Market 2013-2023 5.3.1 PRC Homeland Security Market Forecast 5.3.2 PRC Homeland Security Submarket Forecasts 2013-2023 5.3.3 PRC Homeland Security Market Analysis
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